Battle of Dogger Bank

Keep Nearer the Enemy

—signal hoisted in H.M.S. Lion

The Battle of Dogger Bank was a naval battle fought in the North Sea on 24 January, 1915.

Plans

On 23 January 1915 the British Grand Fleet under Admiral Sir John Jellicoe had 18 dreadnoughts ready at Scapa Flow and the eight pre-dreadnoughts of the Third Battle Squadron and five battlecruisers at Rosyth in the Firth of Forth. The battlecruisers had been moved there from Cromarty after the German raid on the north east coast on 16 December 1914 so that they could respond more quickly to future attacks.

Jellicoe thought that his margin over the German High Seas Fleet was too narrow. It had 17 dreadnoughts, 22 pre-dreadnoughts and four battlecruisers. There were other British pre-dreadnoughts in the Channel Fleet, but these were not under his command.

Jellicoe always counted the number of ships that he had actually available, excluding those under repair or refit or newly built ones that we not fully worked up. He assumed that the Germans would not come out unless they were at full strength, which proved not to be the case.

The British battlecruisers, commanded by Vice Admiral Sir David Beatty, had recently carried out a sweep into the Helgoland Bight, but had not encountered the enemy. They returned to base on 20 January 1915.

The Germans planned an operation of their own for 23 January. The battlecruisers of Konteradmiral Franz Hipper's 1st Scouting Group of three battlecruisers and the armoured cruiser S.M.S. Blücher, the four light cruisers of the 2nd Scouting Group and two flotillas totalling of 18 torpedo boats would carry out a reconnaissance towards Dogger Bank.

Admiral Friedrich von Ingenohl, commander of the High Seas Fleet, wrote in an after action report that:

'The intention was to make an extended destroyer advance with cruiser support, in order to clear the course to the Dogger Bank of trawlers employed in enemy service, and, if fortune were favourable, to surprise light forces on patrol.'

He was reluctant to carry out such an operation at a time when the rest of the High Seas Fleet was not in a state of preparedness to support it. However, he agreed because he assumed that the Grand Fleet would be in port coaling, as it had carried out a sweep of the North Sea on 19 January.

The Germans had begun to realise that the British had accurate intelligence on their movements, but did not suspect that it came from reading coded German signals. They believed instead that British trawlers were responsible.

A 1922 German analysis of the Battle of Dogger Bank states that it the war it had then 'only recently transpired' that the Russians had recovered the code books of the German light cruiser S.M.S. Magdeburg in August 1914 and shared them with their allies.

The British intelligence slightly over estimated the strength of Hipper's force at four battlecruisers, six light cruisers and 22 torpedo boats. Jellicoe's assumption that the Germans would come out only when all their ships were available was wrong, since the battlecruiser S.M.S. Von der Tann was in dry dock. This was for a routine overhaul, and the story that she was being repaired after colliding with another warship during the Cuxhaven Raid by British seaplanes is wrong: it came from prisoners taken at Dogger Bank who either lied to mislead the enemy or else repeated false gossip.

Action

Beatty had the five battlecruisers of the First and Second Battle Cruiser Squadron and the four ships of the Light Cruiser Squadron under his command: a sixth battlecruiser, H.M.S. Queen Mary, was undergoing maintenance. He was ordered to rendezvous with the three light cruisers and 35 destroyers of Commodore Reginald Tyrwhitt's Harwich Force at 7:00 am on 24 January near Dogger Bank.

The pre-dreadnoughts of the Third Battle Squadron and the armoured cruisers of the Third Cruiser Squadron were positioned about 45 miles northwest of the rendezvous point in case the Germans were driven north. Four submarines were sent to intercept the Germans on their way home, but received the signal too late to do so if the Germans returned to port before dusk on 24 January.

Jellicoe and the rest of the Grand Fleet were ordered to sea, but too late to make the action. He later complained that his ships could have been at Beatty and Tyrwhitt's rendezvous point by 9:30 am on 24 January had he been told to raise steam as soon as the Admiralty learnt that of the German operation. In the event, his ships were 140 miles away from the battle. The light cruiser H.M.S. Aurora of the Harwich Force came into contact with the Germans just before sunrise. She sighted and challenged a cruiser, which was S.M.S Kolberg. She replied with a single letter and then opened fire. Aurora returned fire, damaging Kolberg, which withdrew at 7:25 am.

Beatty headed South South East at full speed in the hope of getting to the south of the Germans and cutting them off from their bases. Even if a chase developed, the wind would be blowing the smoke of the coal fired ships towards the Germans, giving the British an advantage on visibility, The Germans were in sight at 8:00 am and the British fired their first ranging shots at 20,000 yards at 8:52 am.

The British ships were sailing in the order Lion (Beatty's flagship), Tiger, Princess Royal (these three all had eight 13.5 inch guns), New Zealand (flagship of Rear Admiral Sir Rear Admiral Archibald Moore, commanding 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron) and Indomitable (the last two both had eight 12 inch).

The German order was Seydlitz (Hipper's flagship with 10 11 inch), Derfflinger (eight 12 inch), Moltke (10 11 inch) and Blücher, which was the last armoured cruiser rather a battlecruiser (12 8.2 inch).

Beatty's despatch claimed that Lion achieved a speed of 28.5 knots, although the highest given in her log was 27 knots. Indomitable could make only 25 knots, so fell behind. New Zealand claimed to have managed 27 knots, a knot faster than in her trials two years before. At 9:52 am Beatty had to slow down to 24 knots so that his squadron could keep close enough together to support each another.

Only Tiger was able to keep up with Lion. Princes Royal was foul-bottomed as a result of not having being dry docked since returning from the West Indies, where she had been sent in the search for Vizeadmiral Graf vonSpee's squadron after his victory at Coronel. New Zealand and Indomitable were older and slower ships. This meant that the British ships became too separated to support each other. Beatty was also unsure about the intentions of the German torpedo boats, which were struggling to maintain their positions and attempting to trying spoiling the German battlecruisers fire. They were not moving in a co-ordinated way, so were unlikely to be planning a torpedo attack, but he feared that they might be intending to drop mines. He therefore moved south east in order to increase the lateral range between the two forces.

The German claimed maximum speeds of about 28 knots for their three battlecruisers, but they were held back by Blücher, which managed only just over 22 knots, below her designed speed. The German squadron stayed together until 9:30 am, when the battlecruisers increased speed to 23 knots, pulling away from Blücher.

By 09:05 am all three 13.5 inch gun ships were firing on Blücher. The two 12 inch armed ones were still out of range. At 09:24 am Lion switched her fire to Derfflinger. The three German battlecruisers were all firing on Lion. At 09:35 am Beatty ordered his ships to fire on their opposite number in the enemy line.

This should have meant Lion at Seydlitz, Tiger at Moltke, Princess Royal at Derfflinger and New Zealand at Blücher; Indomitable was out of range. However, Tiger, not realising that one British ship was not able to fire, targeted Seydlitz, meaning Moltke was not being fired at and creating spotting problems for Lion and Tiger. Captain Henry Pelly of Lion justified his decision on the grounds that the Grand Fleet Battle Orders stated that when the outnumbered the enemy, two British ships should fire on the first enemy one and so on down the line until every enemy ship was being fired upon by at least one British ship. However, Indomitable was not firing, so no German ships should have had two British ships firing on her. Lion was also a recently commissioned ship with an inexperienced crew, but she did hit Seydlitz once, causing minor damage.

The German principle was to concentrate on the enemy's van when being pursued, so their three leading ships all fired on Lion, which suffered heavy damage.

At 09:43 am Lion hit Seydlitz, penetrating the armour near her after turret. This caused a cordite fire that wrecked her two aft turrets and killed all their crews. Kapitan Magnus von Levetzow of S.M.S Moltke turned to his bridge crew and said. 'Have a good last look at the Seydlitz before she goes.' Had the flash penetrated to the magazines, they would have exploded, breaking her back. However, three men, led by her executive officer, Lieutenant-Commander Hagedom, got to the magazines' flooding station. Pumpmaster Wilhelm Heidkamp was later given particular credit for admitting the 600 tons of water that saved the ship by turning red hot valves to whilst breathing in toxic fumes.fn16 A destroyer completed in 1939 was named after him.

Around 10:45, the badly damaged Lion began to drop back and to be overtaken by the other British battlecruisers. About the same time, Blücher left the German line and headed north. By then, she was in range of Indomitable.

Tiger moved ahead of Lion, but came under heavy fire. Her Q turret was hit and one gun disabled. A shell ignited the tank that stored the petrol for her motor boats, creating a fire that enveloped all the ship aft of the bridge in fire and smoke, with flames reaching to the top of her funnels. Witnesses on board Moltke thought that she was doomed but the fires were brought under control within 15 minutes.

At 10:54 submarines were reported on Lion's starboard bow and Beatty thought that he had spotted a periscope, almost certainly wrongly as the German Official History later stated that there were no U-boats in the area.

Beatty therefore ordered a turn to port, taking the course to North North East. Hipper ordered a torpedo boat attack on the battlecruisers at 11:00 am, but it was cancelled at 11:07 am because of the British change of course.

This signal was hoisted without the submarine warning that should have accompanied it. Consequently, it appeared at first to his Flag Commander, Reginald Plunkett, that Beatty was breaking off the action.

Lion had been hit 15 times, her port engine was stopped, all her lights were out, her speed was down to 15 knots, she was listing 10 degrees to port, her searchlights and wireless were out of action and she had only two signal halliards left.

The rest of the squadron had to immediately resume the chase in order to take advantage of an opportunity to destroy the German squadron, but it was lost because of signalling errors. Plunkett, who was not a signals specialist, suggested that Beatty signal to 'Attack the rear of the enemy.'

Beatty ordered two signals to be raised: 'Course N.E' and 'Attack the rear of the enemy.' They were then followed by 'Keep nearer the enemy - repeat the signal Admiral is now making.' These signals were raised 'practically simultaneously.'

Beatty's intention was that the squadron should head north east, taking it clear of any mines that he wrongly feared the German torpedo boats might have dropped, and cutting Blücher off from the German battlecruisers. However, Blücher was north east of the British squadron and Moore, who was now in command since Lion could not keep up, did not know why Beatty had ordered the earlier turn.

Beatty's first two signals were interpreted as a single one: 'Attack the rear of the enemy bearing north east.' They had been raised almost together on adjacent halliards as only these two were left. The man at fault here was his Flag Lieutenant, Lieutenant Commander Ralph Seymour. He should not have allowed the two signals to be raised and hauled down together, making them appear to be a single order. It was also his job to advice Beatty that there were two other options in the Fleet Signals Book that would have conveyed his intentions better than Plunkett's suggestion: 'Attack the van of the enemy;' or even better, 'Pass the Sternmost Ships of the Enemy and endeavour to destroy, or disable, the Headmost ships.'

The British battlecruisers therefore pounded the stricken Blücher to destruction, whilst the rest of the German squadron escaped. Plunkett said to Beatty: 'What we now need is Nelson's signal, "Engage the enemy more closely."' Beatty agreed but it was no longer in the signal book. 'Keep nearer the enemy' was hoisted but had no effect.

Blücher was now under attack from four battlecruisers and several light cruisers and destroyers. She was still putting up a fight and badly damaged the destroyer H.M.S. Meteor, but stopped firing at 11:38 am after the light cruiser H.M.S. Arethusa put two torpedoes into her.

At 11:40 am the battlecruisers headed south east in pursuit of the Germans. Five minutes later Tyrwhitt reported that Blücher had struck her colours. The British then began to rescue survivors, observed by a Zeppelin that had been fired on by the light cruiser H.M.S. Template:UK-Southamption (1912) around 10:30 am. A German seaplane appeared at 12:30 pm and dropped bombs. The rescue effort was called off at 12:40 pm, by when most of the men in the sea had been either rescued or killed by the bombs. Presumably the seaplane crew assumed that the sinking ship was British. She was then the only large German ship with a tripod mast, but British dreadnoughts and battlecruisers had tripod masts.

Beatty had by then ordered Tyrwhitt to form an anti-submarine screen round Lion and Beatty ordered Tyrwhitt to form an anti-submarine screen round Lion and transferred his flag at 11:25 am to the destroyer H.M.S. Attack and then at 12:20 to Princess Royal. However, it was impossible to catch the German battle cruisers, the High Seas Fleet was coming out, U-boats were in the area and Lion could make only 10 knots and was nearly 300 miles from Rosyth. At 12:45, Beatty therefore ordered the British battlecruisers to abandon the chase and to close on Lion.

Both sides had submarines at sea, but none of them were able to inflict any damage on the enemy.

Aftermath

Dogger Bank was a clear British victory, with a German armoured cruiser sunk and no British ships lost. It could have been a greater victor had the British battlecruisers pursued the retreating Germans. It is possible, that a pursuit might have turned victory into defeat, given the way in which three British battlecruisers .would blow up at Jutland in 1916. This is unlikely, however, since four British battlecruisers would have been facing three German ones, with Seydlitz already badly damaged. Her near loss in this action shows that in 1915 the Germans were also making the mistakes in ammunition handling and flash protection that cost the British three battlecruisers a year later.

A German U-boat crewman who was captured in 1918 had been a gunlayer on Seydlitz at Dogger Bank. The British report on his interrogation said that:

Great damage was done by a shell which hit her aftermost turret and exploded the ready ammunition (6 rounds per gun) stowed there. A flame rose mast high and also went down the ammunition hold, causing the magazine to be flooded hurriedly to save the ship. The entire turret's crew, including the men in the magazine perished. Informant could not remember if a fire was actually started.

In consequence of this, precautionary measures were taken which had a very considerable influence on the Battle of Jutland. These were:- At the top and bottom of all cartridge hoists double flap doors were fitted through which every cartridge has to pass. Similar doors were fitted to the projectile hoists in the turrets and working chambers, but not in the shell rooms. The ready supply of six rounds in the turret was abandoned. The hatchways to magazines and shell rooms were ordered to be kept closed while at sea, and the only exits from these compartments is then by way of an escape through the central hoist into the turret.

The manhole in the well under the slide of each gun was ordered to be kept permanently closed.

fn29

The British had also had a chance to learn from their mistakes when H.M.S. Kent was saved from blowing up at the Falkland Islands by the courage and quick thinking of Royal Marine Sergeant Charles Mayes, but did nothing other than awarding Mayes the Conspicuous Gallantry Medal.fn30

Naval-History.net lists lost 14 British killed and 29 wounded: 17 wounded on Lion, 10 killed and 11 wounded on Tiger and 4 killed and one wounded on Meteor. Lion had to be towed back to port by Indomitable and took four months to be repaired.fn31

German casualties were 959 killed, 90 returned to port wounded and 234 captured, 45 of them wounded: 792 killed and all the captured were on Blücher, 159 killed and 88 wounded on Seydlitz and 8 killed and two wounded on Kolberg. Seydlitz was ready for sea on 1 April and Derfflinger on 17 February.fn32

Lion took several months to repair because Admiral Lord Fisher, the First Sea Lord, thought that not dry docking her, combined with her relatively low casualties, would conceal the extent of her damage. Tiger, however, was repaired in a fortnight.fn33

The battle resulted in von Ingenohl, who had held back the High Seas Fleet, being replaced as commander of the High Seas Fleet by Admiral Admiral Hugo von Pohl

On 2 February Moore, who was deemed to lack the initiative required to command a battlecruiser squadron, was transferred to command a cruiser squadron in the Canaries.fn34

Fisher wanted to dismiss Captain Henry Pelly of Tiger, who had fired on the wrong target and then should, according to Fisher, have disobeyed Moore's orders and continued the chase. Fisher, looking back at Lord Nelson, said that 'In war the first principle is to disobey orders. Any fool can obey orders!.'fn34 Tiger's gunnery was also poor, but Pelly kept his job.

Another who retained his position was Seymour, Beatty's Flag Lieutenant. He had made a crucial signalling error during the pursuit of Hipper's squadron after the Scarborough Raid and was clearly not good enough at signalling to do the job. He had other duties, such as being the admiral's social secretary when ashore, but signalling was by far the most important task. Beatty, who was loyal to his immediate subordinates, liked him. However, if he did not want to fire Seymour he could have had him appointed to command a destroyer command, but he kept him on to make more mistakes at Jutland.fn35

Dogger Bank was a British victory, but it was one that glossed over many problems, such as poor gunnery, dangerous ammunition handling procedures and signalling errors. Derfflinger was hit once, which set her on fire. Seydlitz was hit only twice, but the almost catastrophic nature of one of the hits caused the Germans to correct mistakes in their anti-flash procedures, which the British did not.fn36

Hipper's decision to take Blücher with him was reasonable. Her guns, although lighter than those of his battlecruisers, were longer ranged. She was also an excellent gunnery ship and had a better record of engine reliability than the German battlecruisers. Possibly, he was mistaken in having her at the rear rather than the van of his line, given that it was likely that he might have to withdraw from a more powerful force.fn38 On the other hand, she would have slowed down the withdrawal of the other German ships if she had been leading the line, possibly resulting in greater German losses.

Gunnery

In a 1919 Naval Staff précis of naval gunnery during the war, it was claimed that, "From a gunnery point of view the outstanding feature of this battle was that the British battle cruisers commenced to hit their opponents at 19,000 yds."

Lion and Princess Royal started their fire with individual shots while still out of range, in hopes of immediately discovering when the limits of firing range were met. Upon crossing the target, Lion fired salvoes from "A" and "B" . Princess Royal did as well, after ten minutes of single shot fire.

Tiger used her director for the first 90 minutes until the firing circuit was cut off by a breaker thrown by an enemy shell strike, which forced a resort to gunlayer firing after three director missfires. This experience prompted the decision to fit auxiliary firing circuits in all ships.

The ships reports the following expenditures of ammunition and materiel failures.

Lion fired 243 rounds. Her "A" turret was hit. The right gun was never put out of action, but the left gun was not ready for use until two hours later. "B" turret had only a very slight delay due to choked vents. In one case, a gun had to be depressed in order to get it to run out in reasonable time.

Princess Royal fired 271 rounds. Her "A" turret sheared a pin which caused a flash door to become inoperative. A run in and out cylinder's drain opened due to vibration. A training pinion jammed the turret, putting it out of action for 10 minutes. A similar failing in "Q" was put right immediately.

Tiger fired 355 rounds. "Q" turret was hit on the roof. Small problems only elsewhere. New Zealand fired 139 rounds and Indomitable 136 without serious breakdowns or delays.

British Torpedoes

The Royal Navy quantised its use of torpedoes during the action thusly, with target inclinations and speeds noted.

• 11:00am, Miranda fired a torpedo from 5,500 yards with 135R and 20 knot target, securing a hit under the bridge.
• 11:20am, Tiger fired a torpedo from 6,000 yards with 96L and 10 knot target speed, securing a hit under fore funnel.
• 11:20am, Tiger fired a torpedo from 6,000 yards with 96L and 0 knot target speed and 10 knots on director, missing ahead.
• 11:30am, Arethusa fired a high speed torpedo from 1,600 yards at 90L and 5 knots, hitting under fore turret.
• 11:30am, Arethusa fired a high speed torpedo from 1,600 yards at 90L and 5 knots, hitting the engine room.
• at 11:30am, Mentor fired three torpedoes, claiming one hit.

See Also

• Wikipedia

Bibliography

• Admiralty, Gunnery and Torpedo Division (July, 1919). Progress in Naval Gunnery, 1914-1918. C.B. 902. The National Archives. ADM 186/238.
• Bennett, Geoffrey (1974). Naval Battles of the First World War. London: Pan Books Ltd.
• Committee of Imperial Defence. German Navy and Sources of Material. Dogger Bank Action, 1915. Miscellaneous Reports from German Sources. The National Archives. [CAB 45/283][1].
• Committe of Imperial Defence. German Navy and Sources of Material. Dogger Bank Action, 1915. Translation of German Account, by Commander Groos. The National Archives. [CAB 45/284][2].
• Corbett, Sir Julian S. (1921). Naval Operations. Volume II. London: Longmans, Green and Co..
• Goldrick, James (2015). Before Jutland: The Naval War in Northern European Waters, August 1914-February 1915. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press.
• Goldrick, James (1984). The King's Ships Were At Sea: The War in the North Sea August 1914–February 1916. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-334-2.
• Gordon, Andrew (1996). The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command. London: John Murray.
• Layman, RD (1985). The Cuxhaven Raid: The World's First Carrier Air Strike. London: Conway Maritime Press.
• Marder, Arthur Jacob (1965). From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919: The War Years : To the Eve of Jutland.. Volume II. London: Oxford University Press.
• Naval Staff, Training and Staff Duties Division (1921). Naval Staff Monographs (Historical). Fleet Issue. Volume III. Monograph 6.—Passage of the British Expeditionary Force, August, 1914. Monograph 7.—The Patrol Flotillas at the Commencement of the War. Monograph 11.—The Battle of Heligoland Bight, August 28th, 1914. Monograph 8.—Naval Operations Connected with the Raid on the North-East Coast, December 16th, 1914. Monograph 12:—The Action of Dogger Bank, January 24th, 1915. O.U. 6181 (late C.B. 1585.). Copy No. 127 at The National Archives. ADM 186/610.