I wonder who created this device? The only Longmore of the period was Arthur M. Longmore, who as far as I can tell never specialised in Torpedoes and later went on to be an Air Chief Marshal in the Royal Air Force. —Simon Harley 09:54, 14 March 2011 (UTC)
I have no idea as yet. It is very hard to get all the data out of the ARTS volumes... a lot of jumping around is required. Some of my recent work is nearly retyping stuff from there, as I do not always have the fullest understanding of what is being described. Some abysmal imagery, too -- some figures are illegible, basically, and sometimes I stopped photographing in the middle of a good passage. Tone 15:07, 14 March 2011 (UTC)
It really is astounding how many different inventions (for want of a better word) the R.N. was trialling or putting into service. I'm assuming that you've only scraped the tip of the iceberg when it comes to cataloguing all these devices?
Out of interest, was there an equivalent Excellent series to the ARTS that you know of? —Simon Harley 15:13, 14 March 2011 (UTC)
Not that I know of. I find the torpedo stuff interesting because it demands a level of analysis and writing comparable to the gunnery issue. I get a very strong sense that the level of snafu on the torpedo side was greater than that on the gunnery side, with a shocking lack of contemporary analysis and realistic forecasting of how one should use the torpedo. Issues that are rough analogs to questions of armor penetration, shell fuzing, and fire control are not even mentioned before the war is well underway. I am trying to determine, for instance, when the term "torpedo control" is first used... I think it is in 1915 when the first (?) handbook on it was issued (I am not sure one has survived ... the 1916 edition has at Portsmouth). The ARTS of 1917 (actually not printed before mid-1918) and 1918 (mid 1919) contain profuse editorials on lessons taken from joint firings and salvo firings that are entirely missing in any prior publications. The plans for the Torpedo Control equipment for Hood's 3 tubes per broadside looks like Cheyenne Mountain meets the customer service center for Dell computer... a comedic over-kill approach that suggests widespread and acute dementia. No softer term seems sufficient; something is truly amok, institutionally. Tone 15:33, 14 March 2011 (UTC)
It does seem pretty mad. All that infrastructure and trained personnel (on board ship) for a grand total of 32 torpedoes (after Hood stopped carrying practice warheads). I really do need to try and get a handle on the tactical background to the reasons for continually trying to cram all this stuff into British dreadnoughts. At the moment, the only way I can see it being useful is if you have the much-maligned line of battle of extraordinary length firing a continual barrage of torpedoes at the enemy's line - as I mentioned before, I got off Steve McL. a copy of William May's tactical notes, where God knows how many different dreadnought battle situations are mapped out, with torpedo tracks displayed. Of course it's dangerous with that sort of thing to try and deduce to much from it in the absence of informed contemporary comment or analysis, but it certainly shows what some people in authority were actually doing. —Simon Harley 15:55, 14 March 2011 (UTC)