Second L.C.S. (Royal Navy) at the Battle of Jutland

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The Second Light Cruiser Squadron operated in a screening role for the Battle Cruiser Fleet at the Battle of Jutland.

Under the command of Commodore William Edmund Goodenough in Southampton, the squadron was notably more attentive to its role in keeping the fleet commander informed as to enemy movements and dispositions, often by wireless. Goodenough's report on the action was sent on 12 June, 1916, and included his own report for Southampton with enclosures from the captains of the other three light cruisers in his formation.[1]

The Squadron was represented by four light cruisers at the battle.[2]


Commodore Goodenough's initial report for his flagship was dated 2 June, 1916.[3]

I HAVE the honour to submit the following report of the
proceedings of the Second Light Cruiser Squadron, consisting of
HM. Ships " Southampton " (wearing my Broad Pendant),
" Nottingham " (Captain Charles B. Miller), " Birmingham "
(Captain Arthur A. M. Duff), and " Dublin " (Captain Albert
C. Scott) during the operations on 31st May and 1st June :—
31st May.
2. The enemy were reported by the Senior Officer, 1st Light
Cruiser Squadron, between 2.23 and 2.56 p.m.
3. A t 4.40 p.m. " Southampton " sighted and reported
enemy's battle fleet bearing S. by E., steering N. The Second
Light Cruiser Squadron closed to within 13,000 yards to observe
enemy's battle fleet, and came under very heavy fire.
At 5.00 p.m. the Second Light Cruiser Squadron turned
Northwards and followed our battle cruisers and 5th battle
squadron. The Second Light Cruiser Squadron were at this
time practically in line with the rear ship of the 5th battle
squadron, and came under a very heavy fire from time to time
until about 6.05 p.m. ; no damage, however, resulted.
4. At 6.15 p.m. our battle fleet was sighted right ahead.
5. At 6.35 p.m. " Warspite " suddenly turned South and
ran in towards the German line, coming under heavy concentrated
" Warspite " shortly afterwards rejoined the line at
the rear. During this time the Second Light Cruiser Squadron
occupied position " N " (in accordance with Grand Fleet Battle
Orders, page 41).
6. At about 6.40 p.m. the action appeared to become general.
7. At 6.47 p.m. the Second Light Cruiser Squadron turned
in towards the German line partly to finish off a disabled
battleship, but more to observe the enemy's rear more clearly,
their course being in doubt. Enemy's turn to E.S.E. was
reported by " Southampton " at 7.04 p.m.
The Squadron now came under heavy fire from the German
battle fleet, and it became necessary to return to the rear of
our battle line.
Between 6.55 and 7.05 p.m. water and spray was constantly
coming on board " Southampton " from enemy's salvoes,
which were dropping all round the ship.
8. At 7.30 p.m. the Germans altered course together to
S. by W., and their destroyers made an effective smoke screen,
as the German fleet was now in bad light.
9. At about 8.30 p.m. a German destroyer was sighted and
fired on by " Southampton " and " Dublin," who hit her heavily
amidships. She was afterwards sunk by a division of our
10. At 9.00 p.m. the enemy's destroyers attempted to attack
our 5th battle squadron from the North-West. They were
driven off by the Second Light Cruiser Squadron ; one destroyer
was observed to have been hit.
11. At 10.20 p.m. the Squadron was engaged with five enemy
ships, apparently a cruiser and four light cruisers, who concen-
trated on " Southampton " and " Dublin " at very short range.
The action was very sharp while it lasted (about 15 minutes), and
the casualties in " Southampton " were heavy. Detailed lists
of killed and wounded in " Southampton " and " Dublin " have
been forwarded separately.[4]
Three fires broke out on board " Southampton " during the
action; these were promptly extinguished, though the hoses
had been very much cut up by shell fire.
12. On the enemy retiring, " Southampton," " Nottingham,"
and " Birmingham " proceeded and remained astern and on
starboard quarter of the centre of the battle fleet during the
night, as it was not known what protection they had against
destroyer attack. Firing astern was heard at intervals between
10.30 p.m. and 2.00 a.m.
H.M.S. " Dublin " became detached from the Squadron
during the night, and did not rejoin till 10.00 a.m. the next day.
1st June.
13. Squadron, except " Dublin," regained touch with our
Battle Cruiser Fleet at 4.30 a.m., and proceeded as ordered.
" Southampton " passed a mine, with horns, at 4.25 a.m.
in Latitude 55° 25' N., Longitude 6° 11' E.
14. The behaviour of all ranks and ratings of " Southampton "
while the ship was in the trying position of receiving a heavy
fire from 11 and 12-in. guns without being able to return it,
and also during the night action with fires breaking out on board
was in every way in accordance with the best and highest
traditions of the Service.

Details on recommendation, personnel &c. omitted from the Report
as reproduced in the
Official Despatches.

15. A track chart[5]
enclosed (Enclosure 2).

I have the honour to be,
Your obedient Servant,

Second Light Cruiser Squadron

The Vice-Admiral Commanding,
Battle Cruiser Fleet,


Goodenough also provided a short note dated 5 June.[6]

IN continuation of my letter No. 037/5 of 2nd June, I have
the honour to report that from a piece of shell found on board
" Southampton " it appears that one of the cruisers engaged
with the Second Light Cruiser Squadron at 10.20 p.m. on
31st May was armed with 9.4-in. guns, probably the " Roon "
or " Fürst Bismarck."
The course of the enemy squadron was S.S.E., and position
at 10.20 p.m. Latitude 56° 10' N., Longitude 6° 11' E. When
beaten off, they appeared to retire to the westward.
One torpedo (high speed setting) was fired at close range by
" Southampton " at 10.21 p.m. It is worth observing that
when passing within about a mile of the spot, by reckoning,
at 11.30 a.m. the next day, the sea was covered by oil, for an
area of about a square mile.

Details on recommendation, personnel &c. omitted from the Report
as reproduced in the
Official Despatches.

I have the honour to be,
Your obedient Servant,

Second Light Cruiser Squadron

The Vice-Admiral Commanding,
Battle Cruiser Fleet,

Technical Report

On 8, June in H.M.S. Birmingham, Commodore Goodenough wrote a detailed technical account, No. 037/11, of the battle in reply to a request from Beatty from the previous day..[7]

I have the honour to forward the accompanying
Notes on Gunnery, Torpedo, Electrical and General matters
which have been compiled from experience gained in H.M.S.
"Southampton" during the action on 31st May.
2. With reference to your signal 1235, of 7th June,
a copy of these Notes is being sent to Commander Bailey,
H.M.S. "Lion", direct.

I have the honour to be,
Your obedient Servant,
W E GOODENOUGH (signed),

The Vice Amiral Commanding,

H.M.S. " L I O N ".

I. Gunnery.
Practically nothing occurred to alter preconceived


(2). Day Action, General.
The necessity for director fire under certain
conditions of light was very much brought home.
It is most important that the Control Position
should have DIRECT communication with one of the Gun
On one occasion much time was wasted through the
fore top not knowing that the enemy could not be seen from
the guns. Had one of the gun commanders been able to inform
the fore top of this, director fire could have been
resorted to immediately.
Actually, the Control Officer did not know until
the guns failed to fire. Director fire was then used.

(3). Bearing racers for rangefinders.
These would be of considerable assistance in
getting the rangefinders quickly onto the object to be
engaged. Once or twice it was found difficult to get the
rangefinder to range on the correct object.

(4). Effectiveness of 6" gun against Destroyers.
This was very marked. On the two occasions on
which enemy destroyers were engaged, the fire was most
On the first occasion the destroyer was hit by
the first salvo at 6,400 yards, and was shortly afterwards
dealt with by our destroyers.
The second occasion was a dusk attack by two or
more destroyers. Spotting was most difficult owing to bad
light, and to the destroyers turning away and using a smoke
screen, but it was observed that at least one of them was

(5). Allowance of electric tubes.
It was feared at one time that the allowance
(50%) would not be sufficient if the action continued for
a considerable time. It is considered that a complete out-
-fit of electric tubes should be supplied, for, though the
ship underwent a heavy fire, none of the electrical fittings
at the guns were damaged.


(6). Cordite on deck.
This subject has received much attention in
" Southampton". It has been ascertained that only 12 cordite
charges were destroyed by fire, but the three fires caused
by these charges were very considerable, and caused a number
of casualties among the engaged guns' crews.
The fire directed on the ship was, however, so
intense and at such short range as to indicate that no
further precautions could have reduced the fires or casualt-
-ies without impairing the supply of ammunition to the guns.

(7). Spare guns' crews.
The large number of upper deck casualties greatly
reduced the guns' crews. By utilising all the ratings who
had been trained at gun drill ( viz - one spare gun's crew
and 16 Stokers trained as loading numbers ) it was possible
after the action to make up five complete guns' crews, i.e.
sufficient to main one side at a time.

(8). Voice-pipes.
These were badly cut up, but after one hour's
work at repairs, effective communication to all guns was
again established.

(9). Protective mattresses.
Their value round exposed positions was very
evident, and the undoubtedly prevented many casualties.

(10). Switching on searchlights.
Our searchlights were not of assistance to the
gunlayers, and appeared to benefit the enemy more than our-
This is borne out by the fact that practically all
the damage occurred between the foremast and after search-
It is considered that the number of searchlights
manned should be reduced, the ratings thus released being
employed as submerged tubes' crews, so as to ensure a rapid
torpedo fire.

(11). Director training.
Some form of director training is urgently
required, since, when firing at short range with a fixed
sight, the only difficulties experienced is in getting the guns
on to the correct object, particularly at night.

II. Torpedo.

(12). Particulars of torpedo fired.
At 10.20 p.m. on 31st May, five enemy cruisers
and light cruisers were observed on and abaft starboard
beam of 2nd L.C.S., steaming in the same direction, distance
about 1,500 to 2,000 yards.
"SOUTHAMPTON" fired a torpedo from starboard tube
at high speed setting, the particulars of which are as
Type of torpedo - 21" Mark II**
Beam submerged tube 2° depression.
Speed of own ship 17 knots.
Impulse used on discharge, 60 lbs.
Gyro. angle, 15° left.
The Bearing of point of aim on firing, about 95° Green.

(13). Result of shot.
The torpedo was not seen, but observers from opposite
ends of the ship, particularly the Captain of the fore-
-castle gun and the gunlayer of the Quarterdeck gun, agree
that a big explosion occurred aft in the leading enemy
cruiser, and that her searchlights immediately went out.

(14). Re-loading arrangements etc.
The action was broken off shortly afterwards and, as
the majority of the submerged tubes' crews were manning the
searchlights, it was not possible to re-load in time for
a second shot.
The four hands stations in the Flat actually succeeded
in getting a second torpedo ready in the tube by the close
of the action.
It is considered essential that submerged tubes' crews
in light cruisers should not be depleted for the purpose
of manning the searchlights, even at the cost of the
ammunition supply.[9]

(15). Remote control of searchlights.
This was shot away immediately, and is not considered
to be of any value. The men stationed at the lights had
no difficulty in keeping the target, but were handicapped
by the remnants of wire about the projectors.
Had the attack been by Destroyers, the control wires
would probably not have been destroyed, but even so it is
doubtful if the system is of any value.

III. Electrical.

(16). Breakdowns and repairs.
The breakdowns were few, and were in all cases immed-
-iately dealt with by the electrical staff.
During the day Action no breakdown or fault of any kind
During the night Action the following breakdowns
occurred :-
"M" branch breaker was thrown off twice by two shells
entering the after part of the ship. The first time it was
put on again from the switchboard; the second time a large
leak caused by damaged wiring in the cabin flat had to be
removed, and local control was resorted to.
"B" Generator ( fed off this circuit ) stopped, and
the communications were immediately put on "A" Generator.
Whilst locating the fault in "M" circuit, all the
branch contactors on the starboard side of the ring main
came off, and continued making and breaking intermittently.
This stopped "C" Generator ( fed off "P" circuit ), and all
low power installation was put on "A" Generator.
The D.P. switch in ring main in switchboard room
was made, putting the dynamos in parallel. This rectified
the branch contactors on the starboard side, and enabled
all 20-volt generators to be brought into action again.
The fault was afterwards discovered to be in the
negative fuse at switchboard for starboard side of ring
main, which had blown - probably when the after searchlight
was shot away, but the ends of the fuse were making inter-
-mittent contact and caused the branch contactors to
chatter. The breakers, being already made, had a complete
circuit through the solenoid and so kept on, but "M"
breaker, having come off, could only be put on again by
local control.
This points to the necessity for feeding circuits
required in action from breakers and not contactors, as
the latter depend on the fuse at the switchboard to com-
-plete their solenoid circuit, and the fuse may blow from a
variety of causes.
A large leak of 15 amperes occurred on the gun
circuits, which blew the generator fuse. The fault was
overcome by inserting a piece of copper wire in place of
the fuse, and this maintained the gun circuits till the
end of the action, when the fault was found to be in P-2
auxiliary circuit, shot away and earthing.

(17). Repair party.
All the breakdowns occurred during the few minutes
the action lasted ; the promptitude with which the repairs
were effected speaks very highly for the efficiency of the
Gunner (T) and Repair Party.

III. General.

(18). Skin plating.
The skin plating fitted to prevent sweating in the
Officers' Quarters made it most difficult to repair holes
in the ship's side, since the skin playing had first to be
torn away. It is strongly recommended that all skin
plating should be removed and ships' sides corked.

(19). Small collision mats.
The small collision mats made in the ship (size 6ft
by 7ft ) when backed by mess table tops cut to size, were
found to be most effective in repair of shot holes.
It is strongly recommended that these mats should
be generally supplied.


Captain Arthur Allan Morison Duff's report to Goodenough was dated 2 June.[10]

I HAVE the honour to report that during the operations on
31st May 1916 and 1st June 1916 I was in the immediate presence
of your broad pendant except for a few hours during the night
31st May 1916-1st June 1916, and I therefore only mention a
few points that may be of interest together with an account of
my proceedings during the time I was separated from you.
2. About 4.35 p.m. G.M.T. on Wednesday, 31st May 1916,
H.M.S. " Birmingham " was under heavy fire from 11-in. or
12-in. guns of the enemy's battle fleet, and on one or two other
occasions later in the evening.
On all these occasions the shells were falling all round the
ship so close that a good many pieces of the shells as they burst
catne on board and also a good deal of water thrown up by them.
The fact that the ship was not actually hit appeared extra-
ordinary, and I attribute it in a great measure to the fact that
on each occasion when fire was opened the ship at once steered
away at full speed, and on each salvo falling near the ship, course
was at once altered 2 points one way or another. As a result
of this, although the next salvo appeared correct for range it
was generally well clear to the right or left,. But there was
also a large element of good fortune in it, as when there was
more than one ship firing at us it was impossible to avoid them
all and many fell all round the ship.
It was noticed that just before they ceased firing on account
of the ship getting out of range, the time of flight was 40 seconds,
which appeared also to be the time between the salvoes.
3. About 7.0 p.m. G.M.T. on 31st May 1916 fire was opened
on a disabled battleship or large cruiser with the remainder of
the squadron, and the shooting appeared to be good, the bursts
of the shell on her being quite obvious.
4. I was unable to fire on the destroyer that the rest of the
squadron fired at later in the evening owing to being blanketed
by some of our own destroyers.
5. During the attack on the enemy's cruisers about 10.15 p.m.
G.M.T. it was impossible, owing to the smoke made by the
three ships that were ahead of me in the line, to see anything
until the enemy's ships switched on their searchlights when fire
was opened on the rear ship. From the same cause it was then
so difficult to see that I could not distinguish what class of
ships they were. The enemy ship returned the fire and the
shot fell very close round the ship.
6. After the squadron turned to the Eastward together
I found myself approaching our 5th Battle Squadron, who were
steering to the Southward, and was obliged to turn to the north-
ward to avoid the two rear ships, thus losing touch with the
remainder of the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron. As I could not
see any destroyers or light cruisers guarding the 5th Battle
Squadron from enemy destroyer attack in that direction,
I remained during the dark hours on the starboard quarter of
the rear ship from where I could act in the event of an attack
on them. At daylight I sighted " Southampton " and " Notting-
ham " on my starboard bow and rejoined.
7. At about 11.30 p.m. G.M.T. on 31st May 1916 I observed
two or more large enemy ships switch on their searchlights and
open fire on some of our destroyers or light cruiser and destroyers,
astern. At the time I was convinced from their appearance
and the speed they were going that they were the enemy battle
cruisers, but I have since ascertained that they were probably
8. Soon after midnight 31st May-1st June 19161 observed
heavy firing some distance away to the North-eastward.
9. When under fire of the battle fleet the engines were put
to full speed and subsequently kept at it for two hours in order
to regain station. During this period the revolutions averaged
381, or 14 higher than the ship has done since she was in commis-
sion. The work of the engine-room department under Engineer
Commander John B. Hewitt was most satisfactory throughout
a very arduous day.

I have the honour to be,
Your obedient Servant,

The Commodore Commanding,

Second Light Cruiser Squadron,
H.M.S. " Southampton."


H.M.S. Nottingham's Track Chart (Plate 14)[11]

Captain Charles B. Miller submitted a report and track chart to Goodenough was dated 2 June.[12]

I HAVE the honour to report the proceedings of H.M. Ship
under my command, during the Action on 31st May 1916.
2. At 2.56 p.m. a signal was received from Senior Officer,
Battle Cruiser Fleet, to 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron : "Prepare
to attack the van of the enemy."
3. " Nottingham " was at that time on " Lion's " starboard
bow and took up a position a shade on her port bow as far ahead
as possible, in order to break up any attack from Enemy
Torpedo Craft, and to support our own Torpedo Boat Destroyers
of 13th Flotilla.
4. The enemy Torpedo Boat Destroyers started to attack
about 4.0 p.m., and " Nottingham " opened fire upon them,
which fire appeared to be effective, and the attack was not
pressed home.
5. As " Lion " was gradually opening the range, " Notting-
ham " altered to starboard to prevent getting in her way, and
when " Nottingham " could no longer support the T.B.D.'s,
she took station on Commodore 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron,
which station she maintained during rile remainder ot the action.
6. About 4.40 p.m., "Nottingham " tired an E.R. Torpedo
at Enemy Battle Fleet ; the range being about 16,500 yards,
the Battle Fleet being in line ahead. No other opportunity for
firing torpedoes presented itself.
7. The ship was steaming at high speed from 3.0 p.m. until
8.0 p.m., and from 4.0 p.m. to 6.0 p.m. the engines were running
at a mean speed of 377 revolutions, the greatest S.H.P. developed
being 28,156.
8. No defects were brought to fight except an increased
leakage of oil fuel from after tanks into reserve feed tanks in
After Engine Room, caused probably by the vibration.
9. I would submit that this performance is most creditable
to the whole of the Engine Room Stag especially in that
Engineer Commander Gerald Moore, R.N., was able to receive
no assistance from the Senior Engineer Lieutenant, he and
14 Engine Room Ratings (including seven chief or P.O.'s) being
out of the ship at the time.
10. I enclose a tracing showing the rough track of " Notting-
ham " between 3.0 p.m and 10.30 p.m.[13] This track was plotted
a trained rating track working in the Lower Conning Tower.
11. " Nottingham " sustained no damage and no direct hits
from heavy shell, although she was frequently straddled and
fragments of heavy shell bursting in the water close to the ship
struck the sides and fell about the upper deck.
12. The behaviour of both Officers and Ship's Company was
everything that could be desired.

I have the honour to be,
Your obedient Servant,

The Commodore Commanding,

Second Light Cruiser Squadron
H.M.S. " Southampton."


Captain Albert Charles Scott's report to Goodenough was dated 2 June.[14]

I HAVE the honour to report that the proceedings of
H.M. Ship under my command during 30th-31st May and
1st June were as follows :—
Tuesday Night, 30th May.
At 9.30 p.m. Proceeded to sea with 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron.
When clear of May Island, took up usual
screen ahead of Battle Cruisers, 2nd L.C.
Squadron on Starboard wing position.
31st May.
At 2.30 p.m. " Galatea " reported enemy's Cruisers in sight.
At 3.40 p.m. Sighted 5 enemy Battle Cruisers and several
destroyers with them.
At 3.50 p.m. " Lion " opened fire on enemy's Battle Cruisers.
At 4. 4 p.m. " Indefatigable " blew up.
At 4.12 p.m. Ordered by Commodore of 2nd L.C. Squadron
to support our Destroyers in a Torpedo attack.
" Dublin " at the time being about 5 cables
on disengaged bow of " Lion " and, proceeding
at "Full speed," it was found impossible to
cross the bows of the " Lion " to take up
position, also our smoke would have much
interfered with the " Lion " if I could have
crossed her bows.
4.30 p.m. " Queen Mary " blew up and sank.
4.35 p.m. 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron in "Single Line
4.40 p.m. Our Battle Cruisers altered course 16 points to
Starboard, 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron now
to rear.
4.43 p.m. Enemy's Battle Fleet sighted—steering to the
4.56 p.m. 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron under very heavy
shell fire from enemy's Battle Fleet, salvoes
falling very close, but the ship did not receive
a direct hit, although many pieces of 12-in.
shell came inboard, the Navigating Officer,
Lieutenant Percy Strickland, being hit by
a small piece which did no harm. He was
standing by my side at the time, on the
Upper Bridge.[15]
4.58 p.m. A 12-in, shell struck the water a few yards on
Starboard beam and 4 shells passed just over
the bridge.
5.15 p.m. Observed one of our " M " class Torpedo Boat
Destroyers sinking.
5.47 p.m. "Opened fire" on damaged enemy ship.
6.22 p.m. Ship bearing N.E. blew up.
6.23 p.m. " Warspite " hauled out of line and enemy's
Battle Fleet concentrated their fire on her, but
she had regained her position in line by
6.45 p.m.
7.20 p.m. Our Battle Fleet "opened fire" on enemy's
Battle Fleet.
7.45 p.m. Observed two enemy destroyers on Starboard
Beam, "opened fire" on same.
8. 6 p.m. Lost sight of enemy's Battle Fleet.
8.56 p.m. Observed two enemy torpedo boat destroyers on
Starboard bow and "opened fire" on same,
and they disappeared in a cloud of smoke.
9.10 p.m. Heard heavy firing S.W.
10.40 p.m. Sighted enemy's vessels on Starboard Beam, it
being quite dark and rather misty. Directly
enemy "switched on" searchlights " Dublin "
opened a very rapid fire on an enemy ship
on the Beam, but it was impossible to distin-
guish what ship it was.
10.45 p.m. Lieutenant Percy Strickland. Navigating Officer,
was killed as he was stepping on to the Upper
Bridge, ship was being hit many times, and
on a fire starting on the Seamen's Mess Deck
the ship was hauled out 3 points, which made
enemy's shells fall short.
10.55 p.m. Resumed course of 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron.
11 . 0 p.m. All firing ceased, and in total darkness hauled
About over 3 points to Port as " Southampton "
appeared to be doing so.
11. 20 p.m. Resumed Course and Speed of 2nd Light Cruiser
Squadron, but lost sight of them.
From 11.0 p.m. until 2.0 a.m. on 1st June,
observed continuous flashes of guns to the
At daylight, no vessel in sight but visibility low ;
I think the shell which passed through the
Chart House and then exploded must have
affected the Standard Compass, otherwise the
ship must have been in close touch with
2nd Light Cruiser Squadron.
4, 0 a.m. Course North. Nothing in sight. Weather very
misty. Impossible to work up a "dead
reckoning," as Navigating Officer is dead
and his records gone, and the charts in Chart
House badly damaged.
The wireless trunk having been shot away, it
was some considerable time before the main
aerials were connected up ; in the meanwhile
the Battle aerial was connected up and signals
were received.
4.10 a.m. Sighted about one mile off some enemy's vessels,
one of which resembled the " Roon," the
others were too indistinct to make out what
class of vessel they belonged to, they were
steering a southerly course at a high rate of
In a few seconds the enemy was lost in the fog,
the ship was turned with the object of chasing
and shadowing them, but the existing condi-
tions of weather made this impossible. Course
was therefore shaped for a position where it was
hoped to meet with and join up with the
2nd Light Cruiser Squadron. The Commander-
in-Chief was informed of sighting the enemy.
The Commodore, 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron,
was asked for course and speed of Squadron.
5.30 a.m. Passed a lot of oil fuel and rescued a man on
a piece of wood who turned out to be George
T. A. Parkyn, Stoker 1st class of H.M.S.
" Tipperary," who had been in the water for
about 5 hours, and stated his ship had been
sunk by shell fire at night. (His statement
is enclosed
The ship had previous to this passed through a
large number of dead bodies,
6. 0 a.m. Sighted Torpedo Boat Destroyer " Sparrow-
hawk " in a very damaged condition, bows
crumpled up to the Bridge and stern badly
damaged. Destroyer Leader " Marksman "
standing by to take men from her ; helped
" Marksman " by giving her a lee, and
when I parted company with " Marksman "
she was attempting to tow " Sparrowhawk,"
but I saw it was a hopeless case, and an
intercepted signal later stated that " Sparrow-
hawk " had been sunk.
At 8. 5 a.m. Joined the Flag of the Commander-in-Chief.
During the night action the ship was struck by 13 shells,
about half of which did not explode.
I would like to mention the cool behaviour of all Officers and
Men during the time when the 12-in. shell were falling thickly
around the ship by day, and also, when the ship was under
heavy fire at night.

Details on recommendation, personnel &c. omitted from the Report
as reproduced in the
Official Despatches.

I have the honour to be,
Your obedient Servant,

The Commodore Commanding,

2nd Light Cruiser Squadron.

See Also


  1. Battle of Jutland Official Despatches. pp.175-184.
  2. Battle of Jutland Official Despatches. pp. 33, 46.
  3. Battle of Jutland Official Despatches. pp.175-178.
  4. These lists were not printed in the Official Despatches.
  5. This chart was apparently lost at the Admiralty.
  6. Battle of Jutland Official Despatches. pp.175-178.
  7. Beatty Papers at the National Maritime Museum. (BTY 6/6), item 1.
  8. The editor loves this sentence. It is clearly a revealing summary, but reasonable people could argue what it really says, and whose mindsets are thus illuminated.
  9. This sentence was underlined by hand in green, though it is not clear by whom.
  10. Battle of Jutland Official Despatches. pp. 178-180.
  11. Battle of Jutland Official Despatches. Plate 14.
  12. Battle of Jutland Official Despatches. pp. 183-184, Plate 14.
  13. See Plate 14.
  14. Battle of Jutland Official Despatches. pp. 180-183.
  15. It appears that Lt. Strickland would actually be hit again, later, with mortal effect.