Fleet Torpedo Committee
In 1918, the Royal Navy's Fleet Torpedo Committee, consisting of representatives of the Commander-in-Chief, as well as the battle and battlecruiser squadrons, convened to determine new directions for torpedoes and torpedo control.
Captain Arthur Kipling Waistell of Benbow acted as President.[1]
Best Means of Setting Torpedo Directors
One of questions they were asked to settle was how to obtain data for setting the torpedo director, which by that time likely meant the Torpedo Deflection Sight. At the time, this was being done by estimating, or by a deflection plotter, inclinometer or from the gunnery plot. This was regarded as an unsound method, as it these measures were taken from a single ship in the enemy line, and the process ignored the likelihood that the target(s) would manoeuvre during the time of flight of the torpedoes fired. Moreover, if results were obtained by plot, the results were already somewhat stale.[2]
It was realized that the enemy's manoeuvres during a long range torpedo time-of-flight would be, in part, influenced by the manoeuvres of one's own fleet during that time, and that own planning should be incorporated in the calculations of a likely mean line of advance for the enemy fleet. However, it is curiously not mentioned that the enemy fleet might itself manoeuvre under its own initiative for the same reason.
It was deemed helpful that a number of selected ships in the battlecruiser force and battle fleet should transmit the range and bearing of their gunnery target at regular intervals via W/T. Flagships, with their greater accommodation, would become the primary processing points for torpedo data being reported from a number of ships within the fleet.
To this reader, the complexity of the process seems profound, especially considering the variations that would certainly arise through enemy manoeuvre and that the emphasis of the study is placed entirely on the best mode of employment of the torpedoes which can be relied on to always be furthest from their selected target: those mounted on the capital ships. A futile call for greater accuracy in a plot is persistent, and it ignores the historical nature of these graphical data which cannot in any way address future manoeuvres. Another wrinkle entirely absent is having anyone in the friendly force "put himself in the shoes" of the enemy to propose a torpedo barrage aimed at striking him should he undertake a given initiative, such as to turn away. The only take-away this reader finds realistic and helpful is the suggestion that torpedo tactics must become divisional, and that the entire formation should collectively undertake fire against the enemy formation. Belatedly, the Royal Navy has come to regard the torpedo as a barrage weapon.[3]
Positions for Torpedo Control Officers
It was decided that the Conning Tower was to be the primary position, and the Torpedo Control Tower the secondary position. The position above the charthouse used in Queen Elizabeth, or the searchlight control hut atop the charthouse in Benbow were regarded as ideal. Once more, the value of capital ship-borne torpedo armament is seemingly over-emphasised, with calls to prioritize emplacement of torpedo control positions in these ships. A secondary plotting position was even mentioned as being desireable were it not for practical limitations on equipment and personnel.
| Station | in Flagships | in private ships |
| Control and plotting position |
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| Conning tower |
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| Torpedo Control Tower |
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| Observation position aloft |
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See Also
Footnotes
Bibliography
- H.M.S. Vernon. Annual Report of the Torpedo School, 1917. Originally C.B. 1474. Copy 7 at The National Archives. ADM 189/37.
- H.M.S. Vernon. Annual Report of the Torpedo School, 1918. C.B. 1527. Copy 143 at The National Archives. ADM 189/38.
