Battle of Heligoland Bight
The Battle of Heligoland Bight was the first naval action of Great War, fought on 28 August 1914 near the island of Heligoland near the main German naval base at Wilhelmshaven.
Background
In the early weeks of the Great War it was known to the British that the German High Sea Fleet was based in its North Sea ports. On 16 August the British Grand Fleet, supported by Cruiser Force C and the Harwich flotillas, had performed a sweep to within 40 miles of Heligoland, but had not encountered any German shipping. Another sweep was proposed to the Admiralty by three different authorities: On 18 August the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, Admiral Sir John R. Jellicoe, proposed: "a sweep in force at dawn on August 24th, to within 30 miles of Heligoland, the flotillas leading, covered by cruisers with the battle fleet supporting, and submarines keeping east of longitude 7° 40' E and south of 54° N." Rear-Admiral Arthur H. Christian, commanding a "combined force" based at Harwich, proposed at the same time a sweep to the eastward commencing on a line from Terschelling. Commodore (S) Roger Keyes, commanding the submarines based at Harwich, also proposed a sweep. [1]
The original plan envisaged a sweep by two light cruisers and 36 destroyers, led by Commodore (T) Reginald Tyrwhitt commanding the Harwich destroyers, with Force K of the battlecruisers H.M.S. Invincible and New Zealand and four destroyers in support. The three cruisers of Force C would be in reserve. There would be two lines of submarines, an inner one of five boats and an outer one of three. The seaplane carrier H.M.S. Engadine, with two seaplanes armed with bombs and one with a torpedo, was originally intended to attack a cruiser lying off the entrance to the West Ems, but her orders were cancelled. [2]
At 1305 on 26 August, Jellicoe was informed by the Admiralty that Ostend was to be occupied in order to relieve the pressure on the left wing of the Allied army. The same message told him about the planned sweep of Heligoland Bight. His reaction was to propose that the First Battle Cruiser Squadron, the First Light Cruiser Squadron and 2nd and Fourth Destroyer Flotilla should support the operations, with the battleships nearby. The Admiralty replied the battleships were not required but that the other forces should rendezvous with the Humber Force. The Naval Staff Monograph states that this decision was entirely justified by the outcome of the battle. However, it required late changes to orders that were not received by Tyrwhitt and Keyes. [3]
The final plan involved the following forces:
Supporting Force Grand Fleet Detachment: First Battle Cruiser Squadron: Vice Admiral Sir David Beatty, (a) Lion, Queen Mary and Princess Royal. First Light Cruiser Squadron Commodore William Goodenough, Southampton, Birmingham, Nottingham, Lowestoft, Falmouth and Liverpool. Second Destroyer Flotilla and Fourth Destroyer Flotilla Cruiser Force K: Rear Admiral Archibald Moore, Invincible, New Zealand and four destroyers.
In Reserve (b) Cruiser Force C: Rear Admiral Arthur H. Christian, Euryalus, Aboukir, Bacchante, Cressy and Hogue.
Sweeping Force (c) Arethusa Commodore (T) Reginald Tyrwhitt Fearless, Third Destroyer Flotilla of 16 L class destroyers and First Destroyer Flotilla of 15 Acheron class destroyers. (d) Submarines: 3 E class at Heligoland, 3 E class in outer line and 2 D class class off the Ems. (e) Submarines tenders: Lurcher (Commodore (S) Roger Keyes) and Firedrake.
Action
The submarines began to move on 26 August, with all forces being underway by the next day. Tyrwhitt learnt of the involvement of Goodenough and David Beatty's ships when he encountered the former at 03:45 on 28 August. All forces were in position by 05:00 that day. [4]
During the day, the Germans defended the Bight by two lines of U boats: one of five boats and one of four. At night, it was covered by an outer line of destroyers 25 miles from the coast and an inner line of minesweepers 12 miles offshore, supported by three light cruisers. The flaws in the German defensive plan were that it did not consider the possibility of an attack by capital ships and that the tides meant that large German ships could not pass over the Jade Bar to sea in certain times of day. On the morning of 28 August, it was light by 04:00, with the sun rising about 05:00. The sea was smooth but visibility was poor and the sky overcast.[5]
That day, the German outer line consisted of nine destroyers and the inner one of nine old torpedo boats employed as minesweepers. The light cruisers in support were S.M.S. Stettin, S.M.S. Frauenlob and the elderly S.M.S. Hela.[6]
The III Flotilla first encountered a German destroyer at 06:53, opening fire five minutes later. at 07:18, Tyrwhitt signalled the destroyer H.M.S. Laurel to rejoin. She did not receive the signal and, fearing that she might become too closely engaged, at 07:26 he turned to cut the enemy off from Heligoland. [7]
At 07:57, two German light cruisers appeared. H.M.S. Fearless engaged Stettin at about 8,000 yards but broke off about 15 minutes after receiving a signal giving a new course. Firing had been ineffective due to the range and haze. [8]
Meanwhile, H.M.S. Arethusa had become engaged with Frauenlob, initially at 9,000 yards, closing to 6,000 by 08:10. British destroyers and German destroyers also became engaged. Both cruisers were damaged. Arethusa lost one officer and eight men killed and 10 wounded. Her wireless and searchlights were out of action and most of her halliards had been shot away, making it hard for her to signal. Frauenlob lost five men killed and 32 wounded at the time, with four of the wounded later dying. She also had her wireless destroyed. She got back to Heligoland at 10:30. The British destroyers suffered little damage, with only one man being wounded on any of them. but the old German torpedo boat D 8 was badly damaged. [9]
During this part of the action, the Norwegian steamer Kong Guttorm, bound from Christania to Bremen, appeared. She was mistaken for an enemy minelayer and fired on by first Stettin and then by the British destroyers. The latter attack forced her crew to take to their boats [10]. She survived this action but was sunk in 1918 by the U-boat Template:DE-UB103 (1917). See [U-boat.net][1].
At 07:50 Tyrwhitt signalled Goodenough, whose squadron was about eight miles behind H.M.S. Fearless, that his destroyers were in action. At 08:15, Goodenough increased full speed and ordered H.M.S. Nottingham and Lowestoft to support Tyrwhitt's destroyers. [11]
Just after 08:12, Fearless and the First Destroyer Flotilla engaged the destroyer Template:DE-V187. She headed for Heligoland under cover of her smoke and the mist as British destroyers fired on her. At 08:45 she encountered Nottingham and Lowestoft. The British cruisers fired on her and she turned away, passing through one British destroyer division but then finding herself in a trap. She ignored a signal to surrender and sank at 09:10. Efforts to pick up her survivors were hampered by the appearance of the light cruiser S.M.S. Stettin five minutes later. [12]
The fact that Keyes had not been informed of the presence of Goodenough's squadron caused confusion as it led him to assume that Goodenough's four funnel cruisers were German. At 0754 he reported seeing two German cruisers to the north west, heading south. This signal was relayed to Beatty and Goodenough, who assumed that there were two German cruisers to the west of Goodenough's squadron when Keyes had actually seen two of Goodenough's cruisers. However, neither Beatty nor Goodenough appears to have acted on this report. At 09:45, Keyes reported that he was being pursued by four enemy cruisers, which he was drawing onto Beatty's battlecruisers. Fifteen minutes later, Keyes got a better view of the four cruisers, challenged them by searchlight and discovered their identity. [13]
There was, however, concern, that British light cruisers and submarines might attack each other. HMS H.M.S. Southampton had attempted to ram the British submarine E 6 at 0930. Goodenough therefore decided that his cruisers should withdraw 15 miles to the west. [14]
At 10:46 the German light cruiser S.M.S. Strassburg appeared to the south east. H.M.S. Arethusa engaged her and Tyrwhitt ordered H.M.S. Fearless and part of the First Destroyer Flotilla to attack her with torpedoes. However, the German cruiser withdrew.
Another German light cruiser, S.M.S. Cöln, flagship of Konteradmiral Lebrecht Mass, commanding the German torpedo boats, appeared at 11:05. She also fired a few salvoes before disappearing into the mist. Tyrwhitt, mistaking her for a Roon class cruiser, twice asked Beatty for support. Captain Frederick Blunt of HMS Fearless also asked for urgent assistance when Strassburg reappeared at 11;16. She was forced by torpedo attacks to open the range at 11:35 and withdrew about 11:40-11:45. [15]
The light cruiser S.M.S. Mainz had become engaged with 11 British destroyers of the 1st Flotilla at 11:30. The British ships fired torpedoes without success and opened the range. Goodenough's four cruisers, which Beatty had ordered to support Tyrwhitt, appeared at 11:50. Mainz turned away immediately, reporting incorrectly that she was being chased by armoured cruisers, which led to the German battlecruisers ordered to move out in support. The British light cruisers gained on Mainz at first, but she then pulled away.[16]
The German cruiser had not, however, escaped. At 12:08 she came upon H.M.S. Arethusa and the Third Destroyer Flotilla. She was also engaged by H.M.S. Fearless but concentrated her fire on the destroyers, damaging H.M.S. Liberty, H.M.S. Laurel, whose captain was killed and H.M.S. Laertes, which was stopped in the water. She was, however, struck by at least one torpedo and at 12:15 turned away. Her speed was reduced, and she could not escape the British light cruiser, which pounded her into a wreck. The British ceased fire at 12:25 and rescued 344 of her crew. [17]
Beatty had received three requests for support, but taking the battlecruisers in ran the risk of encountering submarines, mines or German battleships or battlecruisers. He said to his Flag Captain Ernle Chatfield that 'I ought to go forward and support Tyrwhitt, but if I lose of these valuable ships the country will not forgive me.' Chatfield replied that 'surely we must go', which convinced Beatty to order all five battlecruisers to head for the action at full speed at 11:35 am. [18]
H.M.S. Lion opened fire on S.M.S. Cöln at 12:37. The German ship withdrew and the haze meant that she was never a clear target. The battlecruisers engaged the light cruiser S.M.S. Ariadne at 12:56 and at 13:25 Lion was again able to see Cöln. The German light cruiser was hit by two 13.5 inch salvoes from Lion and sank at 13:35 with her colours flying. She had hit the British battlecruiser five times, casing little damage. The British saw no survivors in the water but the Germans found one two days later. [19]
The British withdrew at 13:10. By then S.M.S. Ariadne was also sinking. H.M.S. Arethusa and three or four British destroyers needed to be escorted home and German reinforcements might arrive at any point. [20]
At 08:50, Konteradmiral Franz Hipper had requested permission to move the battlecruisers S.M.S. Moltke and Von der Tann. It was granted and they were ready to move by 11:00 but could not pass the Jade Bar until 12:00. They did not cross it until 14:00 as the Germans had expected the British to advance right up to the rivers and attack their heavy ships as they emerged. They had therefore positioned U-boats to ambush the British. The German battlecruisers were further delayed as Hipper ordered them to wait until he joined them with his flagship S.M.S. Seydlitz, which had been delayed by condenser problems.[21]
Aftermath
Heligoland Bight was a clear British victory: three German light cruisers and a destroyer were sunk and three light cruisers damaged, with 1,242 Germans killed, captured or wounded. Maas was amongst the dead. The British had one light cruiser and three destroyers damaged but lost no ships. 35 British sailors were killed and 40 wounded. [22]
Despite this, the British made a number of mistakes. There was little co-ordination between the different squadrons and flotillas and communications were poor. As well as the failure to tell Keyes and Tyrwhitt that they were being supported by Beatty and Goodenough, Keyes and Tyrwhitt did not give the speeds and courses of their ships when requesting support. The Germans mistakenly assumed that British light forces would not be supported by heavy ships. [23] They also committed their light cruisers piecemeal.
The Germans accepted Hipper's recommendation that the patrol that their system of patrol lines should be replaced them with minefields. In September, they laid minefields off Heligoland and closed the Bight.[24]
The German Kaiser became even more determined not to risk his battle fleet. It was not to fight an action outside the Bight or the Skaggerak and even inside the Bight it was to avoid action with superior forces. Occasional sorties by the battlecruisers were permitted and U-boats, destroyers and minelayers should continue to act energetically. [25]
The main impact of the battle was moral, both positive on the British and negative on the Germans. The New Statesman said that it was of 'immense moral, if slight material, importance in its effect upon the two fleets.' [26]
British Torpedo Analysis
The Royal Navy quantised its use of torpedoes during the action thusly.[27]
| Fired at Cöln, judged collectively to have 95.8% chance of a hit | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Time | Firing Ship | Range (yds) | Enemy Speed (knots) | Inclination | Result |
| 11:30am | Lennox | 3,000 | 20 | 150 | — |
| 11:45am | Legion | 5,000 | 20 | 90L | — |
| 9:11am | Liberty | 6,000 | 20 | 90L | — |
| 1:00pm | New Zealand | 4,000 | 0 | — | Hit amidships |
| 1:15pm | New Zealand | 5,000 | very slow | — | Ran under |
The claimed "miss under" to New Zealand might be due to the torpedoes being set for 18 feet depth and Koln having a draught of 17.75 feet.
| Fired at "4 funnel light cruiser" | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Time | Firing Ship | Range (yds) | Enemy Speed (knots) | Inclination | Result |
| 11:00am | Lance | 4-5,000 | 15 | 70L | Missed ahead? |
| 11:00am | Lysander | 6,000 | 17 | 110L | — |
| Forenoon | Lark | 6,000 | — | 90R | — |
| 11:30am | Acheron x two | 4,500 | — | 93L | Target avoided by turning |
| Archer | 4,500 | 20 | 113L | ||
| Attack x two | 5,000 | — | 113L | ||
| — | Hind x two | 4,500 | 22 | 110R | |
| Noon | Lookout x two | 5,000 | 20 | 90R | — |
| Fired at Mainz | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Time | Firing Ship | Range (yds) | Enemy Speed (knots) | Inclination | Notes/Result |
| — | Fearless | 5,000 | 21 | 90R | — |
| — | Fearless | 7,000 | 21 | 135R | — |
| — | Defender | 4,500 | 27 | 110R | Believed hit |
| 9:11am | Liberty | 5,000 | 20 | 90L | — |
| 9:11am | Liberty | 5,000 | 20 | 90L | — |
| 9:11am | Linnet | 3,500 | 0 | — | Hit abaft fore funnel |
| 10:30am | Ferret | 5,000 | 25 | source incomprehensible |
target turned |
| 10:30am | Laforey | 5,000 | 10 | 130R | — |
| — | Laforey | 5,000 | 10 | 130R | hit port quarter[28] |
| 10:43am | Laertes | 3,500 | 17 | 120L | H.S., Hit near fore funnel |
| 11:00am | Lydiard | 4,500 | 12 | 90R | H.S., hit tween funnels 2&3 |
| 11:20am | Lance | 3,500/ 4,000 |
18-20 | 45L | — |
| 11:45am | Lysander | 4,500 | 20 | 110L | — |
| 11:45am | Lysander | 4,500 | 20 | 110L | hit engine room |
| 11:45am | Southampton | 8,500 | 0 | — | — |
| 11:56am | Ariel | 6,000 | 18 | 140L | Target turned |
| Noon | Lark | 4,000 | Not stated | 90R | — |
| Noon | Lark | 3,000 | Not stated | 90R | hit Stb quarter |
| Noon | Landrail | 5,000 | 6 | 100L | Believed hit |
| Noon | Landrail | 5,000 | 6 | 100L | Believed hit |
| 12:15pm | Legion | 5,500 | 22 | 90L | Hit near fore funnel |
| 12:15pm | Falmouth | 4,000 | 20 | 110L | — |
| 12:20pm | Falmouth | 5,000 | 10 | 90L | Believed hit |
| 1:00pm | Laurel | 800 | 20 | 135R | Hit under main mast |
| Firings at other targets | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Time | Firing Ship | Range (yds) | Enemy Speed (knots) | Inclination | Target/Result | |
| 7:45am | Lance | 3,500/ 4,000 |
18 | 100R | Ariadne, unclear | |
| 7:45am | Lydiard | 6,000 | 15 | 110L | Frauenlob, unlikely | |
| 8:00am | Ferret | 5,000 | 20 | 90R | 2-funnel L.C. turned | |
| 8:30am | Arethusa | 2,500 | 12 | 93L | Frauenlob hit, H.S. setting | |
| 8:30am | Arethusa | 2,500 | 12 | 93L | missed 50 yards astern, H.S. setting | |
| 9:11am | Linnet | 14,000 | too far away to say | |||
| Forenoon | Lark | 5,000 | — | 90R | Ariadne, unsure | |
| 11:19am | Phoenix | 4,000 | 20 | 90R | Light cruiser, unsure | |
Honours
By Admiralty Order, each ship that was engaged in the action was to have the words "Heligoland, August 28th, 1914" painted on her in gold letters "in some convenient place." Additionally, H.M.S. Arethusa was to have a two stanza verse engraved on a brass plate.[29]
See Also
Footnotes
- ↑ Naval Staff Monographs. Volume III. pp.110-11.
- ↑ Naval Staff Monographs. Volume III. pp.111-12.
- ↑ Naval Staff Monographs. Volume III. pp.113.
- ↑ Naval Staff Monographs. Volume III. pp.115.
- ↑ Naval Staff Monographs. Volume III. pp.119.
- ↑ Naval Operations. Volume I. p. 101-2.
- ↑ Naval Staff Monographs. Volume III. pp.119-20.
- ↑ Naval Staff Monographs. Volume III. pp.120.
- ↑ Naval Staff Monographs. Volume III. pp.120-21.
- ↑ Naval Staff Monographs. Volume III. pp.120.
- ↑ Naval Staff Monographs. Volume III. pp.125.
- ↑ Naval Staff Monographs. Volume III. pp.125-27.
- ↑ Naval Staff Monographs. Volume III. pp.127-28.
- ↑ Naval Staff Monographs. Volume III. pp.128.
- ↑ Naval Staff Monographs. Volume III. pp.129.
- ↑ Naval Staff Monographs. Volume III. pp.133.
- ↑ Naval Staff Monographs. Volume III. pp.133-34.
- ↑ From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow. Volume II. p. 52.
- ↑ Naval Staff Monographs. Volume III. pp.136-37.
- ↑ Naval Staff Monographs. Volume III. pp.136-37.
- ↑ Naval Staff Monographs. Volume III. pp.142.
- ↑ Naval Operations. Volume I. p. 119.
- ↑ From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow. Volume II. p. 53.
- ↑ Naval Operations. Volume I. p. 120.
- ↑ From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow. Volume II. p. 53-54.
- ↑ From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow. Volume II. p. 54.
- ↑ Annual Report of the Torpedo School, 1915. pp. 22-23.
- ↑ how this hit the port quarter from the given inclination seems puzzling
- ↑ Admiralty Weekly Order No. 414 of 29 Sep, 1914. Arethusa's inscription is on her page..
Bibliography
- Corbett, Sir Julian S. (1921). Naval Operations. Volume II. London: Longmans, Green and Co..
- Goldrick, James (1984). The King's Ships Were At Sea: The War in the North Sea August 1914–February 1916. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-334-2.
- Marder, Arthur Jacob (1965). From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919: The War Years : To the Eve of Jutland.. Volume II. London: Oxford University Press.
- Naval Staff, Training and Staff Duties Division (1921). Naval Staff Monographs (Historical). Fleet Issue. Volume III. Monograph 6.—Passage of the British Expeditionary Force, August, 1914. Monograph 7.—The Patrol Flotillas at the Commencement of the War. Monograph 11.—The Battle of Heligoland Bight, August 28th, 1914. Monograph 8.—Naval Operations Connected with the Raid on the North-East Coast, December 16th, 1914. Monograph 12:—The Action of Dogger Bank, January 24th, 1915. O.U. 6181 (late C.B. 1585.). Copy No. 127 at The National Archives. ADM 186/610.
