Difference between revisions of "Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland"

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Soon after the Battle of Jutland on 31 May – 1 June 1916 the Naval Attaché of the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Navy to the German Empire visited the High Sea Fleet. He composed a report on the battle for his superiors using first-hand accounts and also his occasional comment thereon. The version reproduced here is an English translation apparently made by the Naval Intelligence Division in 1919, from a copy which was subsequently returned to "F.N.A.", presumably the French Naval Attaché. A copy of the translation then made its way into the papers of the British Cabinet, from where historian Arthur J. Marder obtained a copy which is in his papers.^[1] It is worth comparing this translation with the translation made by Mihály Krámli of the original (apparently less complete) report published on the NavWeaps online resource.^[2]

Report

From:- Austrian Naval Attache in Berlin.

To:- Commander-in-Chief, Pola.

The following is a report of the naval proceedings of 31 May - 1 June, 1916, and also of the damage sustained by the German Fleet.

During my 3-days' visit to Wilhelmshaven, followed by a cursory examination of the "MARKGRAF" and "KURFURST" at Hamburg, I endeavoured to gain merely a general idea of the results of gunfire and concentrated my attention on the course of the action itself. Admiral Scheer, whom I only saw for a short time as he left for Kiel to attend the funeral of his borther-in-law [sic], Lieut.-Commander Mohr, who was killed in the action, very kindly arranged that his Chief of Staff, Captain Trotha, should give me an account of the whole proceedings, illustrated by plans, and that I should be furnished with all information. I have tried to fill in the gaps by conversations with officers whom I know; this has resulted in some contradictory statements, and several points remain obscure, the accounts from the various ships not having all come in.

Many episodes will therefore be explained later and may appear in a different light, but, as regards the broad outlines which are of chief importance, the picture of this interesting engagement is fairly clear. The accompanying plan of the action was made in haste for the Kaiser and will therefore need much correction.

The spirit pervading the Fleet can only be described as one of enthusiasm; they are intoxicated with victory. The heavy load weighing on them all, the dear that this war might end without an encounter of the Fleets, have vanished. They have learnt what fighting really means, they know themselves to be superior to the enemy as regards tactics, and that they were following the right lines and have nothing to unlearn; they know that their gunfire was more effective than that of the enemy, and that they can rely implicitly on their flotillas which have always been looked upon in the German Navy as one of the chief factors in an action. Finally they know that their largest ships can stand heavy fire and serious damage, that they leave nothing to be desired as regards construction and cannot be sunk easily. In short, they feel that the British, in spite of all their boasting, cannot overcome the German Fleet and have a considerable respect for it.

This conviction imbues the whole Fleet, down to the last man, with confidence in their strength and a calm assurance regarding future encounters. At the same time they are free from over-confidence and from under-estimation of the enemy. On the contrary, the British fire-control and the enormous piercing power of their heavy shell at great distances have roused their admiration, so that a careless conception of the situation is not to be feared, the less so, as well-balanced minds such as those of Admiral Scheer and his Staff are unlikely to be led away by former successes to undertake rash enterprises in the future.

They do not deny that they were extraordinarily fortunate, and that if the action had been prosecuted with energy on the British side, and if the "Nelson touch" had been in evidence, things might have gone very badly for Germany, especially as the British still had an intact Battle Squadron of 12 units at their disposal which had not yet taken part in the action. But they console themselves with the knowledge that no naval action was ever won without some stroke of luck.

The Kaiser's visit, the day before my arrival, and his address to the Fleet gave great satisfaction, and subsequently many important personages arrive to inspect the ships, such as Prince Henry and the Grand Dukes of Mecklenburg and Oldenburg, and numbers of decorations were distributed. Vice-Admiral Scheer was promoted to Admiral, and he and Vice-Admiral Hipper received the Pour le Merite.

I also visited Rear-Admiral Behncke, who was wounded and in hospital; his wounds are slight, a few small splinters in his head, elbow and knee, and he will probably soon be well again.

The Commander-in-Chief intended to advance with the whole Fleet to the waters of the Skagerrak, in order to make his presence felt unpleasantly by disturbing the shipping, hoping thereby to lure on the British forces and in this manner to be in a position to attack a part of the British Fleet with superior or at least with equal forces. He reckoned that any movements of the British Fleet would be reported to him in good time by the submarines which had been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and he hoped that the airships would prove a better means of reconnoitring than any possessed by the enemy.

Unfavourable weather prevented him for a considerable period from undertaking any operations, and, as the submarines were to return home on 1 June and be relieved by a new group, the 31 May was the last date for carrying out the planned advance.

The cruisers left the Jade at 3 a.m., the Main Fleet at 4 a.m., steering an easterly course, and then, after passing Heligoland, a N.N.W'ly course. No reports were received from submarines. These were stationed chiefly off the Orkneys and the Firth of Forth, and the large group of Flanders boats were off the Thames and at the entrance to the Channel.

While proceeding northwards, a few W/T messages were received, but they were corrupt, appeared to refer only to small formations and gave no clue to the movements of the Grand Fleet. The airships were unable to start in the morning, on account of the wind, and, as it blew hard throughout the day in the Heligoland Bight, they could not start until the early hours of 1 June. In this respect things did not go well, but Admiral Scheer decided nevertheless to continue on his course to the Skagerrak.

This the account given by Captain von Trotha, who affirms that nothing was known of the presence of the British Fleet in the waters of the Skagerrak, and that there seemed no probability of encountering this Fleet before 1 June.

There are some points here which I am unable to understand. The submarines are said to have been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and were to return home on 1 June to be relieved probably by a weaker group. For, If the same number of boats were to to keep watch off the English coast, why should 31 May have been the last day for the German Fleet to sail. The day of departure was, therefore, too late in any case, for, if no encounter was to be expected before 1 June, the boats stationed off the coast could not possibly encounter the damaged British ships, as was intended, for probably no damaged ships would be there before 2 June.

The battleship "KONIG ALBERT" had to carry out repairs to her condensers and did not proceed with the Fleet. Von Trotha told me that there was no alternative and that a ship must carry out small overhauls regularly in a dockyard according to programme. But could it not be arranged, when one is taking the initiative, to choose one's moment for an advance and to have all the ships together for this short time? And why should just that moment be chosen when one of the most powerful ships of the "Kaiser" class is in the dockyard, instead, for instance, of one of the "Nassau" class with 11-in. guns.

In addition, the "BAYERN" was to have joined up a few days later. After having waited so long, why should not the plan have been postponed for 2 or 3 weeks, instead of dispensing with the only ship carrying 15-in. guns.

In the same manner they dispensed with air reconnaissance, from which they had expected so much.

These considerations make me doubt whether the account given me is quite correct, and whether, on the contrary, they knew of certain movements of the British Fleet and considered the moment extremely favourable for an attack. Perhaps they only knew of Beatty's battle squadron, and thinking the Main Fleet was far away, hoped to entrap this squadron. In Berlin, they have much to say, even in military circles, about the British Fleet's intention to push through into the Baltic, and of Kitchener's mission having some connection with this. I consider this senseless, for it cannot be presemed [sic] that the British Fleet would leave their shores unprotected and do the Germans the favour of operating in the Baltic, which would certainly be a most advantageous area for the German Fleet. In any case, there appear to be discrepancies which will probably be explained at some later date.

Scouting groups, battle cruisers and light cruisers, together with flotillas, preceded the Main Fleet by 50 - 60 miles. At 4 p.m. the light cruisers encountered some British battle cruisers. These at once opened fire on the light cruisers, at an estimated distance of 26,247 yds.; the range could be taken accurately. Though they did not obtain a hit, the salvoes fell so well that the German cruisers thought it advisable to turn away and fall back on their battle cruisers.

As the British approached, these battle cruisers turned on to a southerly course, in order to lure the enemy on to the German Main Fleet. A running action, on a southerly course, ensued. The British were to starboard and to the west of the Germans, who had therefore the following advantage: in the North Sea, in summer, the western horizon is quite light and visibility towards the west is good, while towards the east, and in a still greater degree off the Jutland Coast, it is misty and visibility is bad and no silhouettes stand out against the eastern horizon. This phenomenon also played great part in the subsequent course of the action. The sun was still high and was not troublesome, and the British ships offered admirable targets. The sea was calm, the wind N.W. 1-2, altering subsequently through W. to S.W.

The following British ships were recognised:- 3 "Lion" class, 1 "Tiger" and 2 "Indefatigable" class; they were soon reinforced by 5 "Queen Elizabeth" class following astern.

It is asserted that, judging from shell splinters, the ship of the "Tiger" class carried 15-in. guns, and that she was therefore the mysterious vessel which replaced the "TIGER" sunk on 24.1.15; as the last-named "TIGER" carried only 13.5-in.guns, this was taken as a further proof of her loss. The silhouette of the new "TIGER", however, is said to have resembled that of the old "TIGER" exactly. As the "Queen Elizabeths" soon opened fire also with 15-in. guns, I rather doubt this assertion regarding the "TIGER", and the various ships on this early part of the engagement are altogether somewhat at variance.

On the German side the ships proceeded in the following sequence:- "LÜTZOW", Flagship of Vice-Admiral Hipper, "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN".

As Hipper edged towards the enemy, the distance decreased to about 7655 yds. The German fire was unquestionably superior, but the speed of the British vessels was greater. After a short time the "INDEFATIGABLE" and "QUEEN MARY" blew up, and 2 battle-cruisers and two attacking destroyers were also accounted for. The "QUEEN MARY" must have been destroyed by the explosion of a magazine; she was torn in two halves, and a water-colour painted by an officer represents her enveloped in an enormous column of black smoke; she disappeared in a few seconds. Only one cadet was subsequently picked.

The second battle cruiser disappeared under similar circumstances. The "VON DER TANN" claims to have accounted for one of these battle-cruisers by a broadside. But the "MOLTKE" fired 4 torpedoes and also claims this achievement.

The Germans suffered very little during this phase of the action, the "MOLTKE" alone receiving hits on the starboard side. The fire of the British battle-cruisers is said not to have been nearly as good as that of the "QUEEN ELIZABETH" class later on.

When they had approached the German Main Fleet, the British turned on to a contrary course and the German cruisers did the same. The German Main Fleet proceeded in divisions in starboard quarter-line, the 3rd Battle Squadron: 4 "König" class and 3 "Kaiser" class, Fleet Flagship, 1st Battle Squadron: 4 "Ostfriesland" class and 4 "Westfalen" class, and the 2nd Battle Squadron: 5 "Deutschland" class and the "Hessen". They endeavoured to effect a junction with the cruisers, but were unable to take part very effectually.

The course of the action was now in a northerly direction, over the area which had just been traversed, and the British ships now drew ahead considerably and turned more and more towards the East; the Germans followed this movement, and in consequence the conditions of visibility became less and less favourable for them.

The "Queen Elizabeths" now made their presence more greatly felt; one of them had dropped out, but I was unable to ascertain when this occurred.

The course of the German Math Fleet at first led past the 2 disabled British destroyers, which were lying stopped. The crews had already taken to the boats and were picked up later on by German destroyers. As the Main Fleet was doubtful about the advisability of passing the destroyers while they were still afloat, they were sunk by a few broadsides. One of the officers who was picked up was in pyjamas and is said to have stayed in his cabin during the action. He declared "We did not expect so much resistance," while another said - "The battle is rather disappointing." It has been ascertained that these destroyers were greatly under-manned; their crews seemed very exhausted, which points to their having been in the water for a long time.

While on this easterly course, the light cruisers of the fast 2nd Scouting Group: "FRANKFURT", "PILLAU", "ELBING" and "WIESBADEN", were heavily fired on from the N.E. and E. without their being able to see more than the gun flashes. In addition, they were under continual fire from the N., and while turning away to S.E. and S., they ascertained that they were opposed by an interminable line of British ships, which appeared at first to be on a N.W.'ly course, and had then evidently turned together on to a S.'ly course.

It may be noted here that the battleships, and, generally speaking, the battle-cruisers also, never sighted the British Main Fleet, and saw nothing but the flashes of the guns and the effects of the fire. These British ships, about 25 in number, were only sighted by a few light cruisers and by the flotillas, and were counted by them as accurately as possible.

Surrounded thus from the N. and the E. and under fire, the "WIESBADEN" was disabled, apparently by a hit in the engine-room. The Admiral noticed, it is true, that his leading ships must have encountered new and powerful forces and that they were turning away; but he thought it his duty to go to the assistance of the "WIESBADEN" and therefore continued on an easterly course.

The van of the Main Fleet, led by the "KÖNIG" (Rear-Admiral Behncke) now came under heavy fire from right ahead; the "KÖNIG" turned away under this fire towards the S.E., whereupon the Commander-in-Chief ordered the whole line to "turn together" to starboard and gave up the idea of helping the "WIESBADEN". About this time Vice-Admiral Hipper transferred his flag from the "LÜTZOW" to the "MOLTKE" with the help of a destroyer, his W/T station being damaged.

Hardly had the Main Fleet drawn away on a westerly course, before it was ascertained that the pressure was relaxing and the fire decreasing, and that the British were no longer pursuing so hotly. Scheer therefore ordered the ships to "turn together" back on to their former course, and made the signal 'R' = 'Engage the enemy'. This second advance may be termed the zenith of the action. Admiral Scheer gave his views on it approximately as follows:- "Those who make a study of this engagement will be very puzzled as to my object in advancing thus against the wall of British ships. The fact is that I had no particular object. I made the first advance because I had a feeling that I ought to endeavour to assist the "WIESBADEN" and because the situation ahead was quite obscure to me, for I saw nothing of the "LÜTZOW" and received no W/T reports. I soon saw, however, that the leading ships were coming under an overwhelming fire, and that I could not risk the Fleet on the "WIESBADEN'S" account. When I noticed that the British pressure had quite ceased and that the Fleet remained intact in my hands, I turned back, under the impression that the action could not end in this way and that I ought to seek contact with the enemy again."

The situation during the first and second advances may serve as an example of what should not take place according to all the laws of tactics, for it could not have been worse; von Trotha said jokingly that, if an Admiral brought about such a situation at a war game or in manoeuvres, he would never be entrusted without another command. In the North, the "Queen Elizabeths", then the battle-cruisers, and from N.E. through E. to S.E., an endless line of battleships formed an arc round the German van and kept it under fire. Evidently it had fallen into the most perfect trap. In addition to this unfavourable tactical position, there was a further difficulty, namely that the German ships could be clearly distinguished while they themselves only saw the gun flashes, 4 or 5 to each salvo, but could find no target.

The Gunnery Officer of the "MARKGRAF" told me that he could not fire at all during half-an-hour, and that they were at the mercy of the British broadsides. Critical though the position was, in theory, they think that experience justifies the conclusion that this 'crossing the T' is in reality not so disastrous at longer ranges; for, in spite of the enormous superiority of their fire, the British made comparatively few hits, the simple reason being that, when fire is thus concentrated on a few leading ships, there can be no question of improving the shooting by spotting.

Given good tactical training and squadrons which work well together, it is always easy to retire rapidly from an unfavourable position and even possibly to reach an advantageous one.

The small amount of damage sustained by the Main Fleet may be owing partly to the fact that the leading battle-cruisers drew the enemy's fire, thus relieving the battleships. Only the three leading ships, "KÖNIG", "GROSSER KURFÜRST" and "MARKGRAF" received several hits; while among all the other ships, the "KAISER", "HELGOLAND" and the "SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN" received one hit each, and the rest were not hit at all.

Simultaneously with the battle-cruisers, which were ahead and pressing forward in quarter-line formation, the 6th and 9th Flotillas, left by the "REGENSBURG", also proceeded to a torpedo attack. Regarding this cruiser advance, the Commanding Officer of the "SEYDLITZ" told me that he was in such a position that he was able to avoid the British salvoes, for he altered course towards the point where each salvo fell and thus evaded the spotting correction.

This torpedo attack was carried out with great determination and seems to have been completely successful, although nobody is able to state how many hits were obtained. The British ships overlapped somewhat and their line was almost unbroken, and, as about 100 torpedoes were fired, it is estimates that there must have been a considerable number of hits, some people affirm that there were 20, but I do not place much confidence in these figures and it is useless to trouble about them as nobody is certain.

The boats were fired on by guns of all calibres, even the heaviest, but with little effect, only one boat being destroyed; two other boats had been sunk in an earlier attack during the cruiser action.

The battle-cruisers were also attacked by British torpedoes, the "SEYDLITZ" being hit once. The "MOLTKE" was lucky, for, when close to the ship, one torpedo apparently had a gyro failure and ran parallel with her. The "LÜTZOW" was probably hit also.

After the attack, the destroyers laid fog and a heavy smoke screen, which interposed between the Fleet; this benefitted not only the heavily-damaged "LÜTZOW" and "DERFFLINGER", whose nets had been shot away and were hanging down, but also the whole Fleet. It may also have made an impression on the British.

The German Main Fleet and cruisers turned on a westerly course, fire having again entirely ceased; and the ships of the Main Fleet then turned gradually in succession and in inverse sequence from W. to S.W., subsequently steering towards Horns Reef.

It is not known what the British did; all that is certain, is that they did not follow in pursuit and that nothing further was seen of their Main Fleet. It remained light until 11 p.m. (summer time), and it would not have been impossible, considering their superior speed, for them to have come within firing range. The Germans expected it too, and now have to content themselves with surmises about the British Commander-in-Chief's reasons for not doing so. It is probably that the unfavourable issue of the fleet part of the battle and the demoralising losses in ships took away any desire on Jellicoe's part for further fighting. His Fleet may have lost heavily and been severely shaken by the torpedo attack; and, as the Germans still had some intact flotillas at their disposal, he may have feared further strong torpedo attacks in the critical hours of twilight, for in the German Navy they say that Jellicoe fears their destroyers in particular.

Nevertheless, the Germans were not under the impression of having shaken the British Fleet to the extent of obliging them to give up the struggle, and when the evening passed without further incident, they reckoned with certainty on encountering Jellicoe off Horns Reef at daybreak. They were the more astonished at his non-appearance when their air reconnaissance reported that on the morning of 1 June a squadron of 12 battle-ships was proceeding North from the southern part of North Sea and that it suddenly turned on to an opposite course and proceeded South.

As it could not possibly have been the intention of the British Commander-in-Chief to let the German Fleet escape after having encountered it at last far from its base, and as he still had an intact battle-squadron at his disposal, one is compelled to take the view that he no longer felt strong enough for a second encounter; the achievement of the German Fleet must therefore be very highly thought of.

During the night cruising following the action, numerous small episodes and minor engagements took place, of which no clear idea can be formed.

In view of a possible fresh attack or of a possible pursuit on the part of the enemy, it was thought undesirable to leave the 2nd Battle Squadron either in the van or in the rear, it therefore took station to starboard and at first proceeded on an opening course from the other squadrons, and continued fairly independently during the night.

The 1st Battle Squadron therefore led, with the "WESTFALEN" as guide, and it was followed by the 3rd Battle Squadron.

After the action had been broken off, the 4 remaining battle cruisers were ahead to port, where they were suddenly again brought under heavy fire from the port side and from ahead, apparently by 3 or 4 battle cruisers. It is presumed that these were the remaining 3 or 4 older cruisers of the "Invincible" class, which Jellicoe probably always stationed ahead of the Main Fleet, for it would hardly have been possible for the "Lions", which were following in the rear in the British line, to have taken station ahead so quickly. The German battle cruisers, all severely damaged, did not feel able to withstand this fire and turned away to starboard, passing ahead of the Main Fleet and between it and the 2nd Battle Squadron, which proceeded quietly on their course and before which the mysterious ships retired, not to be sighted again.

The battle-cruisers then gradually fell astern, and as they were making much water, and also owing to their differing speeds, they lost contact with the Main Fleet and with each other.

The "LÜTZOW" had dropped out during the engagement and proceeded independently, accompanied by 4 destroyers. At first she was able to steam 14 knots, but her speed decreased rapidly and dropped finally to 4 knots. Her bows sank slowly, and when the whole forecastle was under water the Commanding Officer decided to leave the ship. The badly wounded were transferred carefully to the boats and the disembarkation was conducted in good order. A torpedo was then fired at the ship and this coup de grace sank her in deep water at about 1 o'clock, I believe.

The "SEYDLITZ" was hardly in a better condition than the "LÜTZOW"; she also sank gradually by the bows till the water was almost level with the deck, and she had a heavy list to port, but she continued on her course. In the darkest hours of the night she suddenly sighted 3 large ships to port, quite close to. She turned away, made a British recognition signal and was not pursued. As bad luck would have it, the steaming light had short-circuited, could not be switched off and showed intermittently.

The "DERFFLINGER", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN" followed the Main Fleet more or less and met with no particular experiences.

The Main Fleet had to repulse a series of destroyer attacks and was also engaged by cruisers. The movements of these British cruisers, which came up singly, are incomprehensible and give the impression of having lost their heads. They appear to have received the order, judging by an intercepted W/T message, to proceed on a northerly and north-westerly course, and thereby they ran into the extended German line which they probably imagined they had passed to the South.

One large cruiser (?"WARRIOR") proceeded unsuspectingly within 875 yds. of the line of battleships and came under concentrated fire from several ships before she could reply, so that she blew up enveloped in flames and disappeared in 47 seconds. The "BIRMINGHAM" seems to have been accounted for in a similar manner. The destroyers all approached in a really insane manner; frequently not from ahead but from a direction astern, scattered, singly or in pairs, or at most 3 together, never in large numbers. Most of them were disabled forthwith by a few salvoes and set on fire. The "WESTFALEN" distinguished herself particularly at this time.

These burning destroyers strewn along the course, lit it up as if for a festival. Evidently the fires were largely due to the light American and Mexican oils; at any rate German firing trials on oil bunkers never caused any such conflagrations.

The attacking boats directed shrapnel fire on the searchlights with fairly good results, the searchlights of two battleships and one light cruiser being hit.

One large destroyer, which only recognised the danger at the last moment and endeavoured to avoid it by altering course was rammed by the "NASSAU", which put her helm over for this purpose. The boat exploded internally and sank.

The only ships hit were the "POMMERN" in the 2ns Battle Squadron, and the "ROSTOCK". The "POMMERN" blew up at once and nobody was saved. The "ROSTOCK" was just passing between ships of the Main Fleet when she was hit; the loss of life on board was small.

The Germans believe they destroyed 11 British destroyers in all. The manner in which these destroyers were handled has not left a good impression on the whole, and one has certainly lost respect for this weapon. The view is also taken that the boats are too large and offer too wide a target.

The light cruiser "ELBING", like the "ROSTOCK", apparently wanted to break through the line from port to starboard under pressure from the British cruisers; she was, however, rammed by the "POSEN" and had to be abandoned in a sinking condition. The Germans also fired a torpedo into her.

The "FRAUENLOB" and 2 destroyers were lost during the night; no details of their loss are known.

Not far from Heligoland, the "OSTFRIESLAND", 7th of the line, struck a mine. This brings the account of the chief events of this exciting cruiser to an end.

The German flotillas were detached from the Fleet to clear the area off the Jutland Coast, which was divided up into sectors. The flotillas stationed furthest to the North proceeded to the Skagerrak and through these straits into the Baltic and to Kiel.

None of the flotillas sighted the British Main Fleet again, which proves that it must have turned away to the N. or N.W. immediately after the action. According to confidential reports the Fleet entered British ports as early as 1 June.

Two British battleships, in a severely damaged condition and accompanied by destroyers, were sighted proceeding back to England. One was attacked by a submarine, but without success.

On the morning of 1 June, in fairly misty weather, a Zeppelin sighted groups of British ships leaving the Channel on a N.E.'ly course. The reports were rather vague, as sometimes 6 and sometimes 12 ships were mentioned; but it seems most likely that 12 battleships and 3 cruisers were in question, and that they soon retired. The airship, which flew low at one time to get a clearer view, was also fired on.

Some of the ships are said to have had tripod masts.

The German Fleet, with the exception of "SEYDLITZ", reached the Jade in the afternoon. The "SEYDLITZ" could not cross the bar on account of being so much down by the bows, and it was not till the next day at high water that she was towed in, stern first.

The Germans ascribe their success to various causes, and in the first place to their own superiority as regards tactics. This is a point which every officer discusses, and it is constantly repeated that it all happened just as in tactical manoeuvres and in "battle exercises", and that things could not have gone better.

Movements of squadrons, divisions and individual ships, "turns together" and alterations of course and speed, all went like clockwork and demonstrated the very great mobility of all formations.

The W/T signalling system of the Main Fleet never failed, and its failure would have been immaterial, as the primary and secondary flag action signals, showing from several positions in the ship, were made simultaneously.

All this was due to the peace training and the practical experience of the Flag Officers and Captains. Though in peace time the Commander-in-Chief had never commanded a Fleet, nor the Admirals a squadron, still the training carried out on the same lines for a number of years resulted in everything proceeding with the expected precision.

The British, on the contrary, are said to have displayed a certain clumsiness as regards tactics and to have preferred turning together when "turning on to an opposite course" (Wendungen im Gegenmarsch), though this conclusion does not seem altogether justified from the description of the action.

The ships kept station 547 yds. apart, and Vice-Admiral Schmidt told me that, in his opinion, this distance is too small for large ships and that he prefers 656 yds., as the shorter distances result in the ships getting bunched and overlapping during alterations of course. In order to relieve this during the first turn to starboard, the Fleet Flagship herself turned to port and then closed gradually into line. At night the distance was 656 yds.

No interruption of W/T communication was occasioned by the enemy.

It is admitted that the British are superior as regards their gunnery technique. Their salvoes fall most astoundingly close together and aroused admiration on all sides. Some people affirm that they fell too close together, and that it was consequently difficult to cover a sufficiently large danger space.

This is particularly the case with the heaviest calibres: 13.5-in. and 15-in. and the battle-cruisers' fire was noticeably inferior to that of the "Queen Elizabeth" class, for example.* [* Literal translation; the meaning is not clear. - Tr.] The spread of the salvoes frequently only covered a few square yards. In the "KÖNIG" 3 rounds, out of a salvo of 4 rounds, hit between the capstan and the bridge.

This is attributed to careful calibration, which the British have studied for a long time and which, as is well known, was abandoned by the German Navy after a few trials. The gunnery officers declare unanimously that it must unquestionably be re-introduced.

The British range-finders are superior to the German, and the construction of their turrets enables them to shoot at ranges impossible for German guns. The question of range appears to be immaterial to the British, who fire at any range so long as visibility permits.

The Germans are fully convinced of the great superiority of 15-in. guns over all others, and deplore the fact that, owing to the predominant conservative tendencies in the German Navy, this calibre was not introduced until so lately. Vice-Admiral Gerdes, the Head of the Armament Department, is responsible for this, for he always opposed it on the ground that the poor visibility in German waters and the consequent short ranges rendered an increase of calibre useless; he considered the German 12-in. gun to be an altogether superior weapon, capable of competing with every other.

In one respect the British seem behindhand as compared with the Germans: namely that they cannot alter range quickly enough and they are too dependent on the range clock. The British rely on steady fire at long range, and they adapt their tactics to this and avoid alterations of course and range most assiduously.

The Germans, on the contrary, in their firing practices always work with big and rapid alterations of range and exercise firing while turning, so that the gunnery officers consider they have an advantage in this respect.

The Turn on to an opposite course was certainly not advantageous for the German Fleet, but in this particular instance it made little difference, as the German ships were already unable to find a target; besides which, it must have disconcerted the British and it prevented them from obtaining good results with their fire. The salvoes fell very close together round the ships, but few hits were obtained. The rate of fire in the British ships is said to have been fair, but not excessive. Some people affirm that it was very modest.

The British shell had great penetrating power, and from all reasonable distances the main armour was generally pierced clean through. The shell splinters picked up prove conclusively that at least 2 kinds of shell were used, differing considerably in material and quality. One kind of shell had a very thick wall and an extremely small explosive charge, it might almost be called a solid shot. It seems to have broken up frequently without exploding and the fuse did not function. Its explosive power, if it possessed any at all, was quite inconsiderable, and it is presumed that the explosives used was not high explosive.

It appears from the splinters of these 15-in. shell that the wall was 6.3 - 6.7 ins. (16 - 17 cm.), so that the hollow space cannot measure more than 2.4 ins. - 1.8 ins. (4 - 6 cm.). It is true that the large pieces into which these shell broke pierced everything in their course and often went right through the whole ship, unless they struck an armoured part. Several intact heads were found, with and without caps, and also entire bases.

The second kind of shell had considerably thinner walls, only about half as thick, but it also often broke up into quite large pieces and displayed no great explosive power, and little or no incendiary power.

It appears therefore that the British aimed only at attaining penetrating power, and the Germans are of opinion that they do not possess (rohrsicheren)* [* I.D.Note.- This appears to be a special fuse which is very delicate, but safe until it has left the gun.] fuses for high explosive shell; this was their opinion before the war also.

They believe that the high explosive power of the German ammunition gives them a great advantage which may partly counterbalance the smaller calibre of their guns and perhaps also their inferior gunnery. In any case, the effect of the German shell at the point of impact was very considerable.

The fact that the ships blew up must be attributed to explosions in their magazines. (In this connection one may recall a turret of the "SEYDLITZ" being hit in the action of 24 January, 1915; see my report No.47 ex 15). The turret armour must have been pierced and the shells in the turret must have been exploded. The British have no metal cartridge-cases and also no cartridge-holders such as the Germans have, but they keep their cartridges in locked boxes which are perhaps not flash-proof enough. It seems therefore, from the incident experienced by the "SEYDLITZ", that this must constitute a particular danger to British ships. In this last action also turrets in German ships were frequently hit; further details are given in the account of damage sustained.

After having compared the hits received in the German ships with the observations of results on enemy targets, it may be safely affirmed that the explosive power of the German shells exceeds that of the British; this was already known after the action of 24 January 1915. The Germans are therefore very much annoyed that they had no 15-in. guns to fire, as they are persuaded that ships so knocked about (eingedeckte) as, for example, the "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" would have been completely destroyed by German shell.* [* I.D. Note.- The writer appears to mean that if German 15-in. shell had been used against "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" these ships would have been sunk.]

It may be noted here that the "BAYERN", the first of their ships to carry 15-in. guns, will not join the Fleet for another few days, and the "BADEN" not until the autumn.

Medium armament played no part, only a few hits were obtained and they did little damage.

The British fired part-salvoes, like the Germans; full salvoes may have been fired now and again.

The method of repulsing destroyer attacks, which has previously been reported, namely the 'turning away' and firing on one, or at most two boats, proved to be sound, and the repulsing of attacks both by day and night offered no difficulties.

As regards gunnery, it may also be mentioned that the fire-control apparatus worked without a hitch and withstood the heaviest shocks. The elevation pointers worked admirably. A few ships were not yet fitted with them.

As regards torpedo work the Germans consider themselves very much superior. There were prolonged discussions about depriving Flotilla Leaders of their independence and putting them under the orders of a Leader Ship, but they are now convinced that this is necessary to ensure the flotillas attacking at the right moment and all together.

The flotillas were led by the 2 leader Ships "ROSTOCK" and "REGENSBURG", the first having 2 flotillas and the second 3 flotillas allocated to them. The remaining 2 flotillas accompanied the Main Fleet or the battle-cruisers. The leaders carried out their duties with great daring and circumspection. The attacks of the British were weak and scattered, and could therefore have little or only occasional success.

The German 2nd Flotilla, composed of the larger 1500 ton boats were held back instead of being sent to attack. Although these boats are spoken of very highly and are indispensable for certain enterprises, the view is now taken that they are too large and too valuable to be used for attacking during an action. This Flotilla proceeded to Zeebrugge immediately after the action and arrived there safely. It is to be employed in preventing the British from blockading the harbour with nets, and thus make it impossible for the German submarines to proceed out.

As far as I have heard, the "MOLTKE" alone of the larger ships fired 4 torpedoes.

Submarines were not in evidence. No German submarines were present; on the other hand a German destroyer claims to have rammed a British submarine. This claim appears to be erroneous, at least it was declared to be nonsense by the Chief of Staff. The submarines failed as regards scouting and also doing the pursuit.

Some people state that a British aeroplane was sighted to the northward, and that it had apparently risen from a cruiser. It played no part in the action.

The use of "Höschter"* [* I.D. note:- Probably the name of the inventor.] fog seems to have been of good service, it and the smoke made by the destroyers having completely masked the Main Fleet and its movements at critical moments.

The advantage of speed lay entirely with the British, not only as regards the Main Fleet on account of the "Deutschland" class, but also as regards the battle-cruisers. The latter are said to have proved considerably faster than the German battle cruisers, an unpleasant experience which had already been made on 25 January 1915. This alone proves that the British are talking nonsense when they assert that the German Fleet sought safety in flight; on the contrary, it was far from its bases and entirely in the power of the British, who either did not wish to take advantage of their superior speed, or were unable to do so on account of the damage sustained. The visibility was no worse than it had been during the day and Jellicoe may have even welcomed the "Höschter" fog which would enable him to plead bad visibility as a reason for abandoning the pursuit. On the German side in the light of experience the factor of speed in the battleships is considered very important. But the moderate depths of the German harbours limits the draught of the ships, and make it particularly difficult for German builders to do much in this respect. In spite of greater length and higher horse power the most modern cruisers "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ" and "LÜTZOW" attained only a quite inconsiderable increase of speed in comparison with the older "GOEBEN" class, and proved a disappointment in this particular.

The question whether the older battleships should take part in an important engagement was not easy to decide. The 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons composed of the "WITTLESBACH" and "BARBAROSSA" class, re-commissioned at the beginning of the war, were intended to be used in such actions, but have long since been paid off; some have been disarmed and employed as guardships and instructional ships, etc. It was considered however, that the 2nd Battle Squadron, composed of the most modern of the older ships, would be of some service in the action; but this squadron was in a privileged position, inasmuch as it was merely attached to the 1st and 3rd Battle Squadrons and its Admiral was allowed to operate independently and select the position he thought best. On this occasion it kept station quite well and did not prove a hindrance, but, on the other hand, it did not come under any heavy fire. This must be considered very fortunate, for, in view of the damage sustained by other ships and in view of the fact that the British shell pierced all armour above or below water even at the longest range, it is certain that every ship of this class would have been sunk by a few hits, as their internal sub-division is not proof against large inrushes of water.

The loss of the "Pommern", which gives the British an opportunity for a hollow triumph, also teaches a clear lesson. The Chief of Staff told me that they will probably consider carefully before again exposing this Squadron to danger; therefore this action will have further confirmed the complete worthlessness of all Dreadnought types [sic] and will condemn them as old iron.

The torpedo nets of the battle cruisers are all badly damaged and the gear so knocked about by gunfire that they were almost useless. This was particularly the case with the "Derfflinger", where the after port nets were hanging in the water, and would have fallen across the propeller had they not chanced to remain held up by a temporary lashing. The ship was obliged to stop during the action to secure the nets, and they might easily have occasioned the loss of the ship.

For this reason all the nets, together with the booms, were unshipped immediately after the ships' return, to everybody's satisfaction. They will not be carried any more, except perhaps for operations in the Baltic, where the ships may be obliged to anchor at sea.

The leak-stopping service which had been systematically developed, worked admirably and the Germans are convinced that they owe much to it. They believed that the "Seydlitz" could not have been brought in if the strengthening of the bulkheads, etc., had not been so thoroughly exercised and if the personnel had not been so well trained.

It is also said, that in the "Lutzow", which had only been in commission for 2 months, was naturally not up to the mark in this respect, and that it is not impossible that small shortcomings, for which of course nobody can be blamed, were responsible for the ship sinking. The "Lutzow" was an unfortunate ship altogether. First her turbines collapsed, thus delaying her commissioning for 6 months, then she immediately struck a mine, and she was hardly out of dockyard hands before she was sunk.

Only 2 days before sailing, a large number of the ships, and fortunately exactly those that came most under fire, namely battle-cruisers and the 3rd Squadron, were supplied with gas masks fitted with alkali cartridges for the whole crew and a plentiful reserve (in the "Seydlitz" 1500 masks for about 1200 men). The masks are similar to those used in the army for poisonous gases. Each man carries a mask slung round him, if he is not actually wearing it.

I was told emphatically by all the officers, that, in their experience, these masks are absolutely necessary and not only saved many lives but enabled the men to carry on in parts of the ship which they would otherwise have been compelled to leave.

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