Difference between revisions of "Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland"

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Soon after the Battle of Jutland on 31 May – 1 June 1916 the Naval Attaché of the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Navy to the German Empire compiled a report on the battle after visiting the High Sea Fleet. The version reproduced here is an English translation apparently made by the Naval Intelligence Division in 1919 from a copy which was returned to the French Naval Attaché. This translation then made its way into the papers of the British Cabinet, from where historian Arthur J. Marder obtained a copy which is in his papers.^[1] It is worth comparing the translation made by Mihály Krámli and published on the NavWeaps online resource.^[2]

Report

From:- Austrian Naval Attache in Berlin.

To:- Commander-in-Chief, Pola.

The following is a report of the naval proceedings of 31 May - 1 June, 1916, and also of the damage sustained by the German Fleet.

During my 3-days' visit to Wilhelmshaven, followed by a cursory examination of the "MARKGRAF" and "KURFURST" at Hamburg, I endeavoured to gain merely a general idea of the results of gunfire and concentrated my attention on the course of the action itself. Admiral Scheer, whom I only saw for a short time as he left for Kiel to attend the funeral of his borther-in-law [sic], Lieut.-Commander Mohr, who was killed in the action, very kindly arranged that his Chief of Staff, Captain Trotha, should give me an account of the whole proceedings, illustrated by plans, and that I should be furnished with all information. I have tried to fill in the gaps by conversations with officers whom I know; this has resulted in some contradictory statements, and several points remain obscure, the accounts from the various ships not having all come in.

Many episodes will therefore be explained later and may appear in a different light, but, as regards the broad outlines which are of chief importance, the picture of this interesting engagement is fairly clear. The accompanying plan of the action was made in haste for the Kaiser and will therefore need much correction.

The spirit pervading the Fleet can only be described as one of enthusiasm; they are intoxicated with victory. The heavy load weighing on them all, the dear that this war might end without an encounter of the Fleets, have vanished. They have learnt what fighting really means, they know themselves to be superior to the enemy as regards tactics, and that they were following the right lines and have nothing to unlearn; they know that their gunfire was more effective than that of the enemy, and that they can rely implicitly on their flotillas which have always been looked upon in the German Navy as one of the chief factors in an action. Finally they know that their largest ships can stand heavy fire and serious damage, that they leave nothing to be desired as regards construction and cannot be sunk easily. In short, they feel that the British, in spite of all their boasting, cannot overcome the German Fleet and have a considerable respect for it.

This conviction imbues the whole Fleet, down to the last man, with confidence in their strength and a calm assurance regarding future encounters. At the same time they are free from over-confidence and from under-estimation of the enemy. On the contrary, the British fire-control and the enormous piercing power of their heavy shell at great distances have roused their admiration, so that a careless conception of the situation is not to be feared, the less so, as well-balanced minds such as those of Admiral Scheer and his Staff are unlikely to be led away by former successes to undertake rash enterprises in the future.

They do not deny that they were extraordinarily fortunate, and that if the action had been prosecuted with energy on the British side, and if the "Nelson touch" had been in evidence, things might have gone very badly for Germany, especially as the British still had an intact Battle Squadron of 12 units at their disposal which had not yet taken part in the action. But they console themselves with the knowledge that no naval action was ever won without some stroke of luck.

The Kaiser's visit, the day before my arrival, and his address to the Fleet gave great satisfaction, and subsequently many important personages arrive to inspect the ships, such as Prince Henry and the Grand Dukes of Mecklenburg and Oldenburg, and numbers of decorations were distributed. Vice-Admiral Scheer was promoted to Admiral, and he and Vice-Admiral Hipper received the Pour le Merite.

I also visited Rear-Admiral Behncke, who was wounded and in hospital; his wounds are slight, a few small splinters in his head, elbow and knee, and he will probably soon be well again.

The Commander-in-Chief intended to advance with the whole Fleet to the waters of the Skagerrak, in order to make his presence felt unpleasantly by disturbing the shipping, hoping thereby to lure on the British forces and in this manner to be in a position to attack a part of the British Fleet with superior or at least with equal forces. He reckoned that any movements of the British Fleet would be reported to him in good time by the submarines which had been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and he hoped that the airships would prove a better means of reconnoitring than any possessed by the enemy.

Unfavourable weather prevented him for a considerable period from undertaking any operations, and, as the submarines were to return home on 1 June and be relieved by a new group, the 31 May was the last date for carrying out the planned advance.

The cruisers left the Jade at 3 a.m., the Main Fleet at 4 a.m., steering an easterly course, and then, after passing Heligoland, a N.N.W'ly course. No reports were received from submarines. These were stationed chiefly off the Orkneys and the Firth of Forth, and the large group of Flanders boats were off the Thames and at the entrance to the Channel.

While proceeding northwards, a few W/T messages were received, but they were corrupt, appeared to refer only to small formations and gave no clue to the movements of the Grand Fleet. The airships were unable to start in the morning, on account of the wind, and, as it blew hard throughout the day in the Heligoland Bight, they could not start until the early hours of 1 June. In this respect things did not go well, but Admiral Scheer decided nevertheless to continue on his course to the Skagerrak.

This the account given by Captain von Trotha, who affirms that nothing was known of the presence of the British Fleet in the waters of the Skagerrak, and that there seemed no probability of encountering this Fleet before 1 June.

There are some points here which I am unable to understand. The submarines are said to have been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and were to return home on 1 June to be relieved probably by a weaker group. For, If the same number of boats were to to keep watch off the English coast, why should 31 May have been the last day for the German Fleet to sail. The day of departure was, therefore, too late in any case, for, if no encounter was to be expected before 1 June, the boats stationed off the coast could not possibly encounter the damaged British ships, as was intended, for probably no damaged ships would be there before 2 June.

The battleship "KONIG ALBERT" had to carry out repairs to her condensers and did not proceed with the Fleet. Von Trotha told me that there was no alternative and that a ship must carry out small overhauls regularly in a dockyard according to programme. But could it not be arranged, when one is taking the initiative, to choose one's moment for an advance and to have all the ships together for this short time? And why should just that moment be chosen when one of the most powerful ships of the "Kaiser" class is in the dockyard, instead, for instance, of one of the "Nassau" class with 11-in. guns.

In addition, the "BAYERN" was to have joined up a few days later. After having waited so long, why should not the plan have been postponed for 2 or 3 weeks, instead of dispensing with the only ship carrying 15-in. guns.

In the same manner they dispensed with air reconnaissance, from which they had expected so much.

These considerations make me doubt whether the account given me is quite correct, and whether, on the contrary, they knew of certain movements of the British Fleet and considered the moment extremely favourable for an attack. Perhaps they only knew of Beatty's battle squadron, and thinking the Main Fleet was far away, hoped to entrap this squadron. In Berlin, they have much to say, even in military circles, about the British Fleet's intention to push through into the Baltic, and of Kitchener's mission having some connection with this. I consider this senseless, for it cannot be presemed [sic] that the British Fleet would leave their shores unprotected and do the Germans the favour of operating in the Baltic, which would certainly be a most advantageous area for the German Fleet. In any case, there appear to be discrepancies which will probably be explained at some later date.

Scouting groups, battle cruisers and light cruisers, together with flotillas, preceded the Main Fleet by 50 - 60 miles. At 4 p.m. the light cruisers encountered some British battle cruisers. These at once opened fire on the light cruisers, at an estimated distance of 26,247 yds.; the range could be taken accurately. Though they did not obtain a hit, the salvoes fell so well that the German cruisers thought it advisable to turn away and fall back on their battle cruisers.

As the British approached, these battle cruisers turned on to a southerly course, in order to lure the enemy on to the German Main Fleet. A running action, on a southerly course, ensued. The British were to starboard and to the west of the Germans, who had therefore the following advantage: in the North Sea, in summer, the western horizon is quite light and visibility towards the west is good, while towards the east, and in a still greater degree off the Jutland Coast, it is misty and visibility is bad and no silhouettes stand out against the eastern horizon. This phenomenon also played great part in the subsequent course of the action. The sun was still high and was not troublesome, and the British ships offered admirable targets. The sea was calm, the wind N.W. 1-2, altering subsequently through W. to S.W.

The following British ships were recognised:- 3 "Lion" class, 1 "Tiger" and 2 "Indefatigable" class; they were soon reinforced by 5 "Queen Elizabeth" class following astern.

It is asserted that, judging from shell splinters, the ship of the "Tiger" class carried 15-in. guns, and that she was therefore the mysterious vessel which replaced the "TIGER" sunk on 24.1.15; as the last-named "TIGER" carried only 13.5-in.guns, this was taken as a further proof of her loss. The silhouette of the new "TIGER", however, is said to have resembled that of the old "TIGER" exactly. As the "Queen Elizabeths" soon opened fire also with 15-in. guns, I rather doubt this assertion regarding the "TIGER", and the various ships on this early part of the engagement are altogether somewhat at variance.

On the German side the ships proceeded in the following sequence:- "LÜTZOW", Flagship of Vice-Admiral Hipper, "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN".

As Hipper edged towards the enemy, the distance decreased to about 7655 yds. The German fire was unquestionably superior, but the speed of the British vessels was greater. After a short time the "INDEFATIGABLE" and "QUEEN MARY" blew up, and 2 battle-cruisers and two attacking destroyers were also accounted for. The "QUEEN MARY" must have been destroyed by the explosion of a magazine; she was torn in two halves, and a water-colour painted by an officer represents her enveloped in an enormous column of black smoke; she disappeared in a few seconds. Only one cadet was subsequently picked.

The second battle cruiser disappeared under similar circumstances. The "VON DER TANN" claims to have accounted for one of these battle-cruisers by a broadside. But the "MOLTKE" fired 4 torpedoes and also claims this achievement.

The Germans suffered very little during this phase of the action, the "MOLTKE" alone receiving hits on the starboard side. The fire of the British battle-cruisers is said not to have been nearly as good as that of the "QUEEN ELIZABETH" class later on.

When they had approached the German Main Fleet, the British turned on to a contrary course and the German cruisers did the same. The German Main Fleet proceeded in divisions in starboard quarter-line, the 3rd Battle Squadron: 4 "König" class and 3 "Kaiser" class, Fleet Flagship, 1st Battle Squadron: 4 "Ostfriesland" class and 4 "Westfalen" class, and the 2nd Battle Squadron: 5 "Deutschland" class and the "Hessen". They endeavoured to effect a junction with the cruisers, but were unable to take part very effectually.

The course of the action was now in a northerly direction, over the area which had just been traversed, and the British ships now drew ahead considerably and turned more and more towards the East; the Germans followed this movement, and in consequence the conditions of visibility became less and less favourable for them.

The "Queen Elizabeths" now made their presence more greatly felt; one of them had dropped out, but I was unable to ascertain when this occurred.

The course of the German Math Fleet at first led past the 2 disabled British destroyers, which were lying stopped. The crews had already taken to the boats and were picked up later on by German destroyers. As the Main Fleet was doubtful about the advisability of passing the destroyers while they were still afloat, they were sunk by a few broadsides. One of the officers who was picked up was in pyjamas and is said to have stayed in his cabin during the action. He declared "We did not expect so much resistance," while another said - "The battle is rather disappointing." It has been ascertained that these destroyers were greatly under-manned; their crews seemed very exhausted, which points to their having been in the water for a long time.

While on this easterly course, the light cruisers of the fast 2nd Scouting Group: "FRANKFURT", "PILLAU", "ELBING" and "WIESBADEN", were heavily fired on from the N.E. and E. without their being able to see more than the gun flashes. In addition, they were under continual fire from the N., and while turning away to S.E. and S., they ascertained that they were opposed by an interminable line of British ships, which appeared at first to be on a N.W.'ly course, and had then evidently turned together on to a S.'ly course.

It may be noted here that the battleships, and, generally speaking, the battle-cruisers also, never sighted the British Main Fleet, and saw nothing but the flashes of the guns and the effects of the fire. These British ships, about 25 in number, were only sighted by a few light cruisers and by the flotillas, and were counted by them as accurately as possible.

Surrounded thus from the N. and the E. and under fire, the "WIESBADEN" was disabled, apparently by a hit in the engine-room. The Admiral noticed, it is true, that his leading ships must have encountered new and powerful forces and that they were turning away; but he thought it his duty to go to the assistance of the "WIESBADEN" and therefore continued on an easterly course.

The van of the Main Fleet, led by the "KÖNIG" (Rear-Admiral Behncke) now came under heavy fire from right ahead; the "KÖNIG" turned away under this fire towards the S.E., whereupon the Commander-in-Chief ordered the whole line to "turn together" to starboard and gave up the idea of helping the "WIESBADEN". About this time Vice-Admiral Hipper transferred his flag from the "LÜTZOW" to the "MOLTKE" with the help of a destroyer, his W/T station being damaged.

Hardly had the Main Fleet drawn away on a westerly course, before it was ascertained that the pressure was relaxing and the fire decreasing, and that the British were no longer pursuing so hotly. Scheer therefore ordered the ships to "turn together" back on to their former course, and made the signal 'R' = 'Engage the enemy'. This second advance may be termed the zenith of the action. Admiral Scheer gave his views on it approximately as follows:- "Those who make a study of this engagement will be very puzzled as to my object in advancing thus against the wall of British ships. The fact is that I had no particular object. I made the first advance because I had a feeling that I ought to endeavour to assist the "WIESBADEN" and because the situation ahead was quite obscure to me, for I saw nothing of the "LÜTZOW" and received no W/T reports. I soon saw, however, that the leading ships were coming under an overwhelming fire, and that I could not risk the Fleet on the "WIESBADEN'S" account. When I noticed that the British pressure had quite ceased and that the Fleet remained intact in my hands, I turned back, under the impression that the action could not end in this way and that I ought to seek contact with the enemy again."

The situation during the first and second advances may serve as an example of what should not take place according to all the laws of tactics, for it could not have been worse; von Trotha said jokingly that, if an Admiral brought about such a situation at a war game or in manoeuvres, he would never be entrusted without another command. In the North, the "Queen Elizabeths", then the battle-cruisers, and from N.E. through E. to S.E., an endless line of battleships formed an arc round the German van and kept it under fire. Evidently it had fallen into the most perfect trap. In addition to this unfavourable tactical position, there was a further difficulty, namely that the German ships could be clearly distinguished while they themselves only saw the gun flashes, 4 or 5 to each salvo, but could find no target.

The Gunnery Officer of the "MARKGRAF" told me that he could not fire at all during half-an-hour, and that they were at the mercy of the British broadsides. Critical though the position was, in theory, they think that experience justifies the conclusion that this 'crossing the T' is in reality not so disastrous at longer ranges; for, in spite of the enormous superiority of their fire, the British made comparatively few hits, the simple reason being that, when fire is thus concentrated on a few leading ships, there can be no question of improving the shooting by spotting.

Given good tactical training and squadrons which work well together, it is always easy to retire rapidly from an unfavourable position and even possibly to reach an advantageous one.

The small amount of damage sustained by the Main Fleet may be owing partly to the fact that the leading battle-cruisers drew the enemy's fire, thus relieving the battleships. Only the three leading ships, "KÖNIG", "GROSSER KURFÜRST" and "MARKGRAF" received several hits; while among all the other ships, the "KAISER", "HELGOLAND" and the "SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN" received one hit each, and the rest were not hit at all.

Simultaneously with the battle-cruisers, which were ahead and pressing forward in quarter-line formation, the 6th and 9th Flotillas, left by the "REGENSBURG", also proceeded to a torpedo attack. Regarding this cruiser advance, the Commanding Officer of the "SEYDLITZ" told me that he was in such a position that he was able to avoid the British salvoes, for he altered course towards the point where each salvo fell and thus evaded the spotting correction.

This torpedo attack was carried out with great determination and seems to have been completely successful, although nobody is able to state how many hits were obtained. The British ships overlapped somewhat and their line was almost unbroken, and, as about 100 torpedoes were fired, it is estimates that there must have been a considerable number of hits, some people affirm that there were 20, but I do not place much confidence in these figures and it is useless to trouble about them as nobody is certain.

The boats were fired on by guns of all calibres, even the heaviest, but with little effect, only one boat being destroyed; two other boats had been sunk in an earlier attack during the cruiser action.

The battle-cruisers were also attacked by British torpedoes, the "SEYDLITZ" being hit once. The "MOLTKE" was lucky, for, when close to the ship, one torpedo apparently had a gyro failure and ran parallel with her. The "LÜTZOW" was probably hit also.

After the attack, the destroyers laid fog and a heavy smoke screen, which interposed between the Fleet; this benefitted not only the heavily-damaged "LÜTZOW" and "DERFFLINGER", whose nets had been shot away and were hanging down, but also the whole Fleet. It may also have made an impression on the British.

The German Main Fleet and cruisers turned on a westerly course, fire having again entirely ceased; and the ships of the Main Fleet then turned gradually in succession and in inverse sequence from W. to S.W., subsequently steering towards Horns Reef.

It is not known what the British did; all that is certain, is that they did not follow in pursuit and that nothing further was seen of their Main Fleet. It remained light until 11 p.m. (summer time), and it would not have been impossible, considering their superior speed, for them to have come within firing range. The Germans expected it too, and now have to content themselves with surmises about the British Commander-in-Chief's reasons for not doing so. It is probably that the unfavourable issue of the fleet part of the battle and the demoralising losses in ships took away any desire on Jellicoe's part for further fighting. His Fleet may have lost heavily and been severely shaken by the torpedo attack; and, as the Germans still had some intact flotillas at their disposal, he may have feared further strong torpedo attacks in the critical hours of twilight, for in the German Navy they say that Jellicoe fears their destroyers in particular.

Nevertheless, the Germans were not under the impression of having shaken the British Fleet to the extent of obliging them to give up the struggle, and when the evening passed without further incident, they reckoned with certainty on encountering Jellicoe off Horns Reef at daybreak. They were the more astonished at his non-appearance when their air reconnaissance reported that on the morning of 1 June a squadron of 12 battle-ships was proceeding North from the southern part of North Sea and that it suddenly turned on to an opposite course and proceeded South.

As it could not possibly have been the intention of the British Commander-in-Chief to let the German Fleet escape after having encountered it at last far from its base, and as he still had an intact battle-squadron at his disposal, one is compelled to take the view that he no longer felt strong enough for a second encounter; the achievement of the German Fleet must therefore be very highly thought of.

During the night cruising following the action, numerous small episodes and minor engagements took place, of which no clear idea can be formed.

In view of a possible fresh attack or of a possible pursuit on the part of the enemy, it was thought undesirable to leave the 2nd Battle Squadron either in the van or in the rear, it therefore took station to starboard and at first proceeded on an opening course from the other squadrons, and continued fairly independently during the night.

The 1st Battle Squadron therefore led, with the "WESTFALEN" as guide, and it was followed by the 3rd Battle Squadron.

After the action had been broken off, the 4 remaining battle cruisers were ahead to port, where they were suddenly again brought under heavy fire from the port side and from ahead, apparently by 3 or 4 battle cruisers. It is presumed that these were the remaining 3 or 4 older cruisers of the "Invincible" class, which Jellicoe probably always stationed ahead of the Main Fleet, for it would hardly have been possible for the "Lions", which were following in the rear in the British line, to have taken station ahead so quickly. The German battle cruisers, all severely damaged, did not feel able to withstand this fire and turned away to starboard, passing ahead of the Main Fleet and between it and the 2nd Battle Squadron, which proceeded quietly on their course and before which the mysterious ships retired, not to be sighted again.

The battle-cruisers then gradually fell astern, and as they were making much water, and also owing to their differing speeds, they lost contact with the Main Fleet and with each other.

The "LÜTZOW" had dropped out during the engagement and proceeded independently, accompanied by 4 destroyers. At first she was able to steam 14 knots, but her speed decreased rapidly and dropped finally to 4 knots. Her bows sank slowly, and when the whole forecastle was under water the Commanding Officer decided to leave the ship. The badly wounded were transferred carefully to the boats and the disembarkation was conducted in good order. A torpedo was then fired at the ship and this coup de grace sank her in deep water at about 1 o'clock, I believe.

The "SEYDLITZ" was hardly in a better condition than the "LÜTZOW"; she also sank gradually by the bows till the water was almost level with the deck, and she had a heavy list to port, but she continued on her course. In the darkest hours of the night she suddenly sighted 3 large ships to port, quite close to. She turned away, made a British recognition signal

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