Difference between revisions of "Jutland:Aftermath"
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==Evaluation in Print== | ==Evaluation in Print== | ||
| − | [[Arthur Marder (Naval Historian)|Arthur Marder]] wrote in 1978 that tactically, "since neither fleet was able to inflict a crippling blow on the other, the battle belongs to the series of inconclusive battles or partial victories which are the rule in naval warfare."<ref>Marder. ''From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow''. '''III'''. p. 252.</ref> | + | [[Arthur Marder (Naval Historian)|Arthur Marder]] wrote in 1978 that tactically, "since neither fleet was able to inflict a crippling blow on the other, the battle belongs to the series of inconclusive battles or partial victories which are the rule in naval warfare."<ref>Marder. ''From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow''. '''III'''. p. 252.</ref> The tactical expert Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., holds that, "Tactically he [Jellicoe] executed what he conceived to be his mission: to bottle up the High Seas Fleet, make his numbers count, win as he could, and avoid loss due to carelessness, enemy wit, or bad luck."<ref>Hughes. ''Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat''. p. 86.</ref> |
==Footnotes== | ==Footnotes== | ||
Revision as of 06:07, 23 July 2010
Allegedly, while discussing the battle in the admiral's mess along with other admirals from Berlin (among them Holtzendorff), the conversation turned to what motives would be attributed to Scheer's tactics, to which he replied, "My idea? I had no idea. I wanted to help the poor Wiesbaden. And then I thought I had better throw in the cruisers in full strength. The thing just happened—as the virgin said when she got a baby."[1] According to the post-battle report of the Austro-Hungarian naval attaché, Captain von Trotha joked that, "if an Admiral brought about such a situation at a war game in manoeuvres, he would never be entrusted with another command."[2]
Evaluation in Print
Arthur Marder wrote in 1978 that tactically, "since neither fleet was able to inflict a crippling blow on the other, the battle belongs to the series of inconclusive battles or partial victories which are the rule in naval warfare."[3] The tactical expert Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., holds that, "Tactically he [Jellicoe] executed what he conceived to be his mission: to bottle up the High Seas Fleet, make his numbers count, win as he could, and avoid loss due to carelessness, enemy wit, or bad luck."[4]
Footnotes
- ↑ von Weizsäcker. Memoirs of Ernest von Weizsäcker. p. 33.
- ↑ Marder Papers. University of California Irvine. Box 27, Folder 3. p. 10. My thanks to Stephen McLaughlin for this document.
- ↑ Marder. From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow. III. p. 252.
- ↑ Hughes. Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat. p. 86.
Bibliography
