Difference between revisions of "H.M.S. Chester at the Battle of Jutland"

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Material concerning H.M.S. Chester at the Battle of Jutland.

Report of Proceedings

Enclosure No. 15 to Battle Cruiser Fleet Letter No. B.C.F. 01 of 12/6/16.^[1]

IN confirmation of my telegram 1700 and 0830 of June 1st, I have the honour to make the following preliminary report on the circumstances in which H.M.S. "Chester" went into action on May 31st.

2. From daylight on May 31st "Chester" was attached to 3rd B.C.S. and stationed as a linking ship between the armoured cruiser screen of the Battlefleet and the three ships of the 3rd B.C.S., to pass signals visually, W/T not being in use except in cases of emergency.

3. The distance between the Battle cruisers and the cruiser screen varied during the day from about 18 to 12 miles, "Chester" keeping a midway position. The mean course was about S. 50 E. after 5.20 a.m. and the Battle cruisers were from a point to two points on the Port bow of the battle fleet. At noon they were about 30 miles apart. Check bearings and distances were passed through "Chester" twice during the day. "Chester's" noon position was Lat. 58·8 N., Long. 3·36 E.

4. At 3.26 p.m. the battle cruisers increased speed and steered E.S.E. and "Chester" had to turn towards the "Minotaur" (S.O. of Armoured cruisers) to pass to her the signal reporting Battle Cruisers alteration of course and speed, the visibility having slightly decreased, perhaps to 8 miles. Having passed the signal, "Chester" followed Battle cruisers (which were then just visible) at full speed.

5. A W/T from C.-in-C. to 3rd B.C.S. was intercepted at 4.15 p.m. ordering the squadron to re-inforce B.C.F. At about this time a large number of reports, some apparently contradictory, were being intercepted, relative to position, course, and speed of enemy sighted and engaged by various units of the Fleet.

6. Third B.C.S. steered to the Southward at about 4.15 p.m. (their mean course was apparently S. by E.) to carry out C.-in-C. 's signal, proceeding at a high speed. "Chester" turned with them. The bearing and distance of 3rd B.C.S. from "Chester" was then about S. 70 E. 8 miles. On a S. by E. course "Chester" at full speed was very slowly overhauling 3rd B.C.S. The distance was gradually decreased to about 6 miles, and the bearing kept about the same. The visibility was rapidly decreasing.

7. At 2.23 p.m., intercepted reports indicated that enemy ships were in the close vicinity. Visibility to the Westward was rather less, I think, than to the Eastward.

8. At 5.30 p.m. the sound of gunfire to the S.W. was heard and flashes of guns were seen in this direction. This was reported to "Invincible" by searchlight, and "Chester" turned to S.W. to investigate.

9. At 5.36 one 3-funnelled light Cruiser with one (or perhaps two—opinions differ) destroyers was sighted dimly a little on Starboard bow. She was challenged and made no reply. "Chester" altered course to about West. The appearance of the destroyer made it most probable that the ship was an enemy. (The light cruiser had, I think, been firing at some ships to the westward of her, but her target was not in sight from "Chester"). As the "Chester's" course laid her open to torpedo attack by the destroyer at once, course was altered to starboard from about West to about North (the approximate course of enemy) bringing enemy Mell abaft the port beam. The approximate position at this time was Lat. 57·10 E., Long. 5·42 E.

10. While turning two more light cruisers were sighted astern of the other. The leading light cruiser opened fire on "Chester" at about the time of the completion of the turn to Northward, and "Chester's" first salvo was fired at her at about the same time as her (the leading light cruiser's) second salvo. The range was about 6,000 yards. After "Chester's" third salvo, the fourth salvo (about) of the enemy disabled No. 1 gun portside, and killed or wounded a large proportion of the guns' crews of Numbers 1, 2, and 3 Port. The appearance of two more light cruisers made it desirable to increase the range rapidly. "Chester" turned to N. Eastward, her speed and rapid alteration of course making any effective firing from "Chester" impracticable. The after gun continued firing steadily in local control. By the time "Chester" had steadied on a North Easterly course all enemy ships had apparently opened fire and obtained an accurate range. In about the first five minutes of the action most of "Chester's" casualties occurred and the three guns, No. 1 Port, and Nos. 1 and 2 starboard were, I believe, disabled during the same period. There were several small cordite fires in the first few minutes; they were not serious, except for damage to personnel. The personnel of all guns' crews was also seriously reduced.

12. Enemy ships turned together to North Eastward soon after "Chester's" turn, bringing the enemy leading ship astern of "Chester" and the two other slightly on starboard quarter. The 3rd B.C.S. had approached from the Eastward, and when first noticed by me were on a North Westerly course to Eastward of " Chester."

13. From the time of altering course to the N.E. my attention was given to dodging enemy's salvoes by steering towards the last fall of shot; thus maintaining the mean course to the N. Eastward, and keeping enemy's salvoes falling alternately on either side, on account of the constantly changing deflections. This was apparently successful, as regards saving the ship from a large amount of further serious damage. In the last few minutes I believe she was seldom hit, but the changes of ship's course rendered it impossible for the after guns to make effective shooting, even if the guns' crews had been in a fit state and sufficient numbers to do so. But it was obvious to me that "Chester" was smothered with enemy's fire, and I considered only the best way of getting out of action, without further heavy loss, by zigzagging and taking shelter to the North Eastward of the Battle Cruisers.

14. After 10 minutes under fire, as observed in the transmitting station, "Chester" crossed the bows of "Invincible" and took station on her starboard bow. The last enemy salvo was fired about the time "Chester" passed "Invincible," and took station on her starboard bow. The Battle cruisers opened fire on enemy light cruisers shortly before this.

15. "Chester" remained to North Eastward of 3rd B.C.S. for a short time, and when they went into heavy action shortly afterwards, took station astern of "Minotaur's" squadron further to the Eastward, remaining with them. I reported condition of ship and casualties to R.A. "Minotaur" during the night, and was ordered to Humber by signal from him at daylight, June 1st.

16. My opinion is that all enemy salvoes were fired by director. Considering that there were three enemy ships, the rate of fire was perhaps not great. Spread for both elevation and direction was small. Range was thoroughly well maintained, but correction for deflection was evidently difficult. I do not estimate the rate of fire of any one ship higher than one salvo every 45 secs., and if three ships were not firing all the time, it was slower than this. There were usually four or five shots per salvo.

17. The behaviour of officers and ship's company was admirable. I propose to forward a fuller report on this and other matters when I have had further opportunity of consulting with officers of the ship.

18. The principal items of serious damage to material are:—

1. Three guns disabled.

2. After control destroyed.

3. Whaler and one cutter smashed, and some other boats damaged.

4. Forecastle deck holed and splintered in many places.

5. Large amount of electrical circuits and voice pipes (including fire control) damaged.

6. All funnels holed, foremost funnel very badly.

7. Forebridge considerably damaged.

8. All rigging in a bad state.

9. Three holes in armour, and damage to frames behind these.

10. Two holes in side above armour.

11. E.R. ventilation trunks wrecked, and forecastle deck fittings generally much damaged.

12. Two boilers, slight damage to tubes from splinters.

13. Number of small steam and water pipes holed and shot away.

19. Since drafting the above, I am informed that Commander Forbes (seriously wounded and in hospital) stated that he is sure that there was a fourth enemy light cruiser engaged, besides one destroyer. I am not yet able to confirm this.

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