Difference between revisions of "Battle of the Falkland Islands"
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The '''Battle of the Falkland Islands''' was a naval engagement fought between elements of the [[Royal Navy]] and the [[Imperial German Navy|Kaiserliche Marine]] on 8 December, 1914 near the Falkland Islands. It came a little over a month after the defeat of the [[British South Atlantic Squadron|South Atlantic Squadron]] at the [[Battle of Coronel]] and saw [[Maximilian Johannes Maria Hubert Reichsgraf von Spee|Graf von Spee's]] squadron effectively annihilated by a powerful British force under the command of [[Frederick Charles Doveton Sturdee]] especially assembled to avenge Coronel. | The '''Battle of the Falkland Islands''' was a naval engagement fought between elements of the [[Royal Navy]] and the [[Imperial German Navy|Kaiserliche Marine]] on 8 December, 1914 near the Falkland Islands. It came a little over a month after the defeat of the [[British South Atlantic Squadron|South Atlantic Squadron]] at the [[Battle of Coronel]] and saw [[Maximilian Johannes Maria Hubert Reichsgraf von Spee|Graf von Spee's]] squadron effectively annihilated by a powerful British force under the command of [[Frederick Charles Doveton Sturdee]] especially assembled to avenge Coronel. | ||
| − | == | + | ==Cruiser Action== |
| + | At 13:20 von Spee ordered ''Dresden'', ''Leipzig'' and ''Nürnberg'' "to leave the line and try to escape". They then steered to the South while von Spee led ''Scharnhorst'' and ''Gneisenau'' off E.N.E.. In his Fighting Instructions issued before leaving the Abrolhos Rocks, Sturdee had written that his light and armoured cruisers should, "… in the event of the enemy's light cruisers separating or attempting to escape, make it their business to deal with them: …" Consequently, ''Glasgow'', ''Cornwall'' and ''Kent'' swung to starboard and steered South after the fleeing German ships. Rear-Admiral Stoddart in the ''Carnarvon'' realised that his armoured cruiser wasn't fast enough to pursue the three German ships as directed, and continued in the chase of the German armoured cruisers.<ref>Bennett. ''Coronel and the Falklands''. pp. 140-141.</ref> | ||
| − | + | The ''Dresden'' began to pull ahead, while the ''Nürnberg'' began to lag behind. The British ships were disposed with ''Kent'' to Port, ''Cornwall'' in the centre and ''Glasgow'' to Starboard. Captain Ellerton of ''Cornwall'' signalled, "I will take centre target [''Leipzig''] if ''Kent'' take left [''Nürnberg''] and ''Glasgow'' take right [''Dresden'']." Captain Luce in ''Glasgow'', the senior officer of the force, replied, "I fear I am only gaining slowly on [on the ''Dresden'']. Having already engaged ''Leipzig'' I feel I must stand by you." Luce doubted his ability to bring ''Dresden'' to battle before nightfall and then defeat her. He chose instead to fight ''Leipzig'' and keep her engaged until ''Cornwall'' could bring her guns to bear. He slowed down to keep touch with ''Cornwall'', and at 14:50 opened fire on ''Leipzig''. Captain Haun replied by altering course so as to bring his 4.1-inch guns into action. Luce turned ''Glasgow'' to allow her after 6-inch gun to fire.<ref>Bennett. ''Coronel and the Falklands''. p. 154.</ref> | |
| − | Many record the low hit percentages of the British ships as being indicative of the weaknesses of the [[Dreyer Fire Control Table]]. It' | + | The navigating officer of ''Leipzig'' later wrote: |
| + | |||
| + | :Twenty minutes after fire had been opened the ''Leipzig'' received her first hit. A 6-inch shell struck the superstructure before the third funnel … passed through the upper deck into a bunker which happened to be the one in use. This caused a temporary diminution of the forced draught in Nos. 3 and 4 boiler-rooms. We succeeded in stopping up the hole sufficiently well with blankets and a heavy tub filled with water. Our fire was very severely hampered by the fact that only three guns on the starboard side, and occasionally the aftermost gun on the port side, were in action, [and] at such long range the salvoes followed each other very slowly and observation was very difficult.<ref>Quoted in Bennett. ''Coronel and the Falklands''. pp. 154-155.</ref> | ||
| + | ==Myths== | ||
| + | ===Dreyer Tables=== | ||
| + | Many record the low hit percentages of the British ships as being indicative of the weaknesses of the [[Dreyer Fire Control Table]]. It is, to quote [[John Brooks (Naval Historian)|one historian]], "almost certain"<ref>Brooks. ''Fire Control for British Dreadnoughts''. p. 204.</ref> that neither battle cruiser was equipped with a functioning table at the time of the battle.<ref>Friedman. ''Naval Firepower''. p. 106.</ref> | ||
The most likely reasons for bad hit percentages were both attributable to the fact that the fight was a long range one on bearings well ahead: | The most likely reasons for bad hit percentages were both attributable to the fact that the fight was a long range one on bearings well ahead: | ||
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* A spry enemy more interested in escape than combat can, under these circumstances, zig-zag and offset his position far enough in deflection during the long [[Time-of-Flight|time-of-flight]] of the shells that you must guess where he might be when they get there. Even the World War II American battleships ''New Jersey'' and ''Iowa'', with their extremely sophisticated fire control systems failed to bring the fleeing destroyer ''Nowaki'' to bay in 1944 under roughly similar circumstances. | * A spry enemy more interested in escape than combat can, under these circumstances, zig-zag and offset his position far enough in deflection during the long [[Time-of-Flight|time-of-flight]] of the shells that you must guess where he might be when they get there. Even the World War II American battleships ''New Jersey'' and ''Iowa'', with their extremely sophisticated fire control systems failed to bring the fleeing destroyer ''Nowaki'' to bay in 1944 under roughly similar circumstances. | ||
| − | In his report of the battle, ''Invincible's'' Commander [[Hubert Edward Dannreuther|Dannreuther]] wrote: | + | In his report of the battle, ''Invincible's'' Gunnery Officer, Commander [[Hubert Edward Dannreuther|Dannreuther]] wrote: |
| − | :Primary Control from Fore Top was used throughout. At times the control was very difficult as we were firing down wind the whole time and the view from aloft was much interfered with by gun smoke and funnel smoke | + | :Primary Control from Fore Top was used throughout. At times the control was very difficult as we were firing down wind the whole time and the view from aloft was much interfered with by gun smoke and funnel smoke … |
| − | :Range Finders were of little use and any form of range finder plotting was impossible owing to the difficulty of observation and high range. In fact as far as this particular action was concerned it would have made no difference if the ship had not had a single Range Finder or Dumaresq or any plotting outfit on board | + | :Range Finders were of little use and any form of range finder plotting was impossible owing to the difficulty of observation and high range. In fact as far as this particular action was concerned it would have made no difference if the ship had not had a single Range Finder or Dumaresq or any plotting outfit on board … |
| − | :During the latter part of the action with the Gneisenau (she) continually zig-zagged to try to avoid being hit, altering course every few minutes about two points either side of her normal course. This alteration of course could not be detected by Range Finder or by eye and continual spotting corrections were necessary. The rate being fairly high and changing every few minutes from opening to closing I found the only effective means was to keep the rate at zero and continually spot on the target. By this means we managed to hit her now and again. | + | :During the latter part of the action with the Gneisenau (she) continually zig-zagged to try to avoid being hit, altering course every few minutes about two points either side of her normal course. This alteration of course could not be detected by Range Finder or by eye and continual spotting corrections were necessary. The rate being fairly high and changing every few minutes from opening to closing I found the only effective means was to keep the rate at zero and continually spot on the target. By this means we managed to hit her now and again.<ref>"Gunnery Remarks" and "Damage caused to H.M.S. "Invincible" by Gunfire...", with ''Invincible'' to C.-in-C. S. Atlantic & S. Pacific. 18 December 1914. The National Archives. ADM 137/304. Quoted in Brooks. ''Fire Control for British Dreadnoughts''. p. 232.</ref> |
===Coriolis Effect=== | ===Coriolis Effect=== | ||
| − | |||
An annoying urban legend persists that the Royal Navy's shooting at the Battle of the Falklands was poor due to their equipment applying corrections for [[Coriolis Effect|Coriolis effect]] in the wrong direction, as the action was in the southern hemisphere rather than the northern. To the best of my knowledge, no aspect of Royal Navy equipment or process took Coriolis effect into consideration at this juncture, and this is not a terrible deficiency. For, even if the old story were true, if the action took place on a nearly constant bearing, and at a range that changed only slowly, even a blatant mistreatment of Coriolis effect would therefore have been a constant error, and one unlikely to be large compared to other factors affecting the proper deflection to use (such as the zig-zagging of a fleeing enemy). This fact implies that the remedy for such a miscue would have been a spotting correction for deflection which, once made, would counteract the error for the remainder of the action. | An annoying urban legend persists that the Royal Navy's shooting at the Battle of the Falklands was poor due to their equipment applying corrections for [[Coriolis Effect|Coriolis effect]] in the wrong direction, as the action was in the southern hemisphere rather than the northern. To the best of my knowledge, no aspect of Royal Navy equipment or process took Coriolis effect into consideration at this juncture, and this is not a terrible deficiency. For, even if the old story were true, if the action took place on a nearly constant bearing, and at a range that changed only slowly, even a blatant mistreatment of Coriolis effect would therefore have been a constant error, and one unlikely to be large compared to other factors affecting the proper deflection to use (such as the zig-zagging of a fleeing enemy). This fact implies that the remedy for such a miscue would have been a spotting correction for deflection which, once made, would counteract the error for the remainder of the action. | ||
Revision as of 09:53, 22 February 2010
The Battle of the Falkland Islands was a naval engagement fought between elements of the Royal Navy and the Kaiserliche Marine on 8 December, 1914 near the Falkland Islands. It came a little over a month after the defeat of the South Atlantic Squadron at the Battle of Coronel and saw Graf von Spee's squadron effectively annihilated by a powerful British force under the command of Frederick Charles Doveton Sturdee especially assembled to avenge Coronel.
Contents
Cruiser Action
At 13:20 von Spee ordered Dresden, Leipzig and Nürnberg "to leave the line and try to escape". They then steered to the South while von Spee led Scharnhorst and Gneisenau off E.N.E.. In his Fighting Instructions issued before leaving the Abrolhos Rocks, Sturdee had written that his light and armoured cruisers should, "… in the event of the enemy's light cruisers separating or attempting to escape, make it their business to deal with them: …" Consequently, Glasgow, Cornwall and Kent swung to starboard and steered South after the fleeing German ships. Rear-Admiral Stoddart in the Carnarvon realised that his armoured cruiser wasn't fast enough to pursue the three German ships as directed, and continued in the chase of the German armoured cruisers.[1]
The Dresden began to pull ahead, while the Nürnberg began to lag behind. The British ships were disposed with Kent to Port, Cornwall in the centre and Glasgow to Starboard. Captain Ellerton of Cornwall signalled, "I will take centre target [Leipzig] if Kent take left [Nürnberg] and Glasgow take right [Dresden]." Captain Luce in Glasgow, the senior officer of the force, replied, "I fear I am only gaining slowly on [on the Dresden]. Having already engaged Leipzig I feel I must stand by you." Luce doubted his ability to bring Dresden to battle before nightfall and then defeat her. He chose instead to fight Leipzig and keep her engaged until Cornwall could bring her guns to bear. He slowed down to keep touch with Cornwall, and at 14:50 opened fire on Leipzig. Captain Haun replied by altering course so as to bring his 4.1-inch guns into action. Luce turned Glasgow to allow her after 6-inch gun to fire.[2]
The navigating officer of Leipzig later wrote:
- Twenty minutes after fire had been opened the Leipzig received her first hit. A 6-inch shell struck the superstructure before the third funnel … passed through the upper deck into a bunker which happened to be the one in use. This caused a temporary diminution of the forced draught in Nos. 3 and 4 boiler-rooms. We succeeded in stopping up the hole sufficiently well with blankets and a heavy tub filled with water. Our fire was very severely hampered by the fact that only three guns on the starboard side, and occasionally the aftermost gun on the port side, were in action, [and] at such long range the salvoes followed each other very slowly and observation was very difficult.[3]
Myths
Dreyer Tables
Many record the low hit percentages of the British ships as being indicative of the weaknesses of the Dreyer Fire Control Table. It is, to quote one historian, "almost certain"[4] that neither battle cruiser was equipped with a functioning table at the time of the battle.[5]
The most likely reasons for bad hit percentages were both attributable to the fact that the fight was a long range one on bearings well ahead:
- The Royal Navy (probably all navies in 1914) lacked a means of correcting for cross-tilt, which as their ships rolled would subject the salvoes to large and chaotic errors in deflection.
- A spry enemy more interested in escape than combat can, under these circumstances, zig-zag and offset his position far enough in deflection during the long time-of-flight of the shells that you must guess where he might be when they get there. Even the World War II American battleships New Jersey and Iowa, with their extremely sophisticated fire control systems failed to bring the fleeing destroyer Nowaki to bay in 1944 under roughly similar circumstances.
In his report of the battle, Invincible's Gunnery Officer, Commander Dannreuther wrote:
- Primary Control from Fore Top was used throughout. At times the control was very difficult as we were firing down wind the whole time and the view from aloft was much interfered with by gun smoke and funnel smoke …
- Range Finders were of little use and any form of range finder plotting was impossible owing to the difficulty of observation and high range. In fact as far as this particular action was concerned it would have made no difference if the ship had not had a single Range Finder or Dumaresq or any plotting outfit on board …
- During the latter part of the action with the Gneisenau (she) continually zig-zagged to try to avoid being hit, altering course every few minutes about two points either side of her normal course. This alteration of course could not be detected by Range Finder or by eye and continual spotting corrections were necessary. The rate being fairly high and changing every few minutes from opening to closing I found the only effective means was to keep the rate at zero and continually spot on the target. By this means we managed to hit her now and again.[6]
Coriolis Effect
An annoying urban legend persists that the Royal Navy's shooting at the Battle of the Falklands was poor due to their equipment applying corrections for Coriolis effect in the wrong direction, as the action was in the southern hemisphere rather than the northern. To the best of my knowledge, no aspect of Royal Navy equipment or process took Coriolis effect into consideration at this juncture, and this is not a terrible deficiency. For, even if the old story were true, if the action took place on a nearly constant bearing, and at a range that changed only slowly, even a blatant mistreatment of Coriolis effect would therefore have been a constant error, and one unlikely to be large compared to other factors affecting the proper deflection to use (such as the zig-zagging of a fleeing enemy). This fact implies that the remedy for such a miscue would have been a spotting correction for deflection which, once made, would counteract the error for the remainder of the action.
While I think it likely that later systems of firing incorporated Coriolis corrections nicely, a system lacking such treatment which is designed primarily to bring fire upon a maneuvering enemy is not a sad system by any means. Taken in context, Coriolis errors are a constant source of deflection error and quite modest in scale. The need to fire repeated salvoes which for many reasons will require spotting to put them onto the target implies that a failure to handle Coriolis effect, or even a failure to handle it correctly, does not imply an inability to hit the target.
See Also
Footnotes
- ↑ Bennett. Coronel and the Falklands. pp. 140-141.
- ↑ Bennett. Coronel and the Falklands. p. 154.
- ↑ Quoted in Bennett. Coronel and the Falklands. pp. 154-155.
- ↑ Brooks. Fire Control for British Dreadnoughts. p. 204.
- ↑ Friedman. Naval Firepower. p. 106.
- ↑ "Gunnery Remarks" and "Damage caused to H.M.S. "Invincible" by Gunfire...", with Invincible to C.-in-C. S. Atlantic & S. Pacific. 18 December 1914. The National Archives. ADM 137/304. Quoted in Brooks. Fire Control for British Dreadnoughts. p. 232.
Bibliography
