Difference between revisions of "Battle of Coronel"

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The World War I naval Battle of Coronel took place on 1 November, 1914 off the coast of central Chile near the city of Coronel. German Kaiserliche Marine forces led by Vizeadmiral Graf Maximilian von Spee met and defeated a Royal Navy squadron commanded by Rear-Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock. This was Britain's first naval defeat since the Battle of Lake Champlain in the War of 1812 and the first of a British naval squadron since the Battle of Grand Port in 1810.

Background

The Royal Navy, with assistance from other Allied navies, had spent the early months of the war searching for Spee's German East Asia Squadron, fearing its potential for commerce-raiding in the Pacific. Spee left the German colony at Tsingtao in China, once Japan entered the war on Britain's side.

Japan issued an ultimatum to Germany on 15 August demanding that Germany withdraw its ships from Chinese and Japanese waters and hand it Tsingtao. It declared war eight days later. A naval blockade of Tsingtao by a largely Japanese force that included a small British contingent began on 27 August. A land siege began on 31 October and the heavily outnumbered defenders surrendered on 7 November.

Von Spee's squadron was by then no longer at Tsingtao. His two armoured cruisers, S.M.S. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, were cruising through the German Pacific islands at the outbreak of war. The light cruiser S.M.S. Emden had sailed from Tsingtao on 31 July. Another light cruiser, S.M.S. Leipzig, was on the west coast of Mexico, protecting German interests there during the Mexican Revolution. The third, S.M.S. Nürnberg, was on her way to relieve Leipzig.

At its Chinese bases, the Royal Navy had two armoured cruisers, two light cruisers, eight destroyers and three submarines. The pre-dreadnought battleship Triumph had been in reserve at the start of the war, but was quickly recommissioned. There were insufficient sailors available to fully crew her, but two officers, six signallers and 100 other men of the Duke of Cornwall Light Infantry volunteered for sea service.

Further south, the battlecruiser H.M.A.S. Australia gave the British Empire naval forces a big superiority in Australasian waters. The Royal Australian Navy also had two modern and two old light cruisers and three destroyers and there were three old light cruisers on the New Zealand Station. There were also two French armoured cruisers and two smaller ships, all of them old, in the Pacific. Many of these ships were engaged in supporting operations against German possessions in the South Pacific, the loss of which denied Spee potential coaling bases.^[1]

By 12 August Spee had gathered Emden, Nürnberg, the two armoured cruisers and a number of supply ships at Pagan in the Marianas. The strength of the enemy and his lack of bases and coal supplies meant that his squadron could not operate in Indian, East Asian or Australasian waters. The high coal consumption of his armoured cruisers was a particular problem.

Spee did detach S.M.S. Emden and the supply ship Markomannia, to operate in the Indian Ocean. One fast ship could raid commerce and obtain its coal supplies from prizes. Emden carried out an extremely successful commerce raiding campaign until she was sunk by H.MA.S. Sydney in the Cocos Islands on 9 November 1914.

He also sent two armed merchantmen, Prinz Eitel Friedrich and Cormoran, south to raid commerce. The former captured and sank 11 merchantmen with a total displacement of 33,423 tons before coal supply problems forced her to accept internment at Newport News on 11 March 1915. High coal consumption was a problem for both these ships.^[2]

Cormoran entered the US territory of Guam on 14 December 1914 with her coal bunkers almost empty. She was not allowed to re-coal, so could not leave, and was scuttled on 7 April 1917 after the USA declared war on Germany.

The German squadron moved slowly in order to conserve coal, avoiding contact with Allied forces. Spee sent Nürnberg to Honolulu on 22 August in order coal, send and pick up mail and send orders to German agents in South America to obtain coal and other supplies for his squadron.^[3]

The two German armoured cruisers appeared off Apia on 14 September. They then headed off to the southeast, reversing their course once out of sight. A week later, Spee was able to buy some supplies, but not enough, from the French island of Bora Bora by sending only English and French speaking officers ashore. The next day, he appeared at the French island of Papeete, where there were supplies, including 5,000 tons of coal, but there was also a garrison and a gunboat that had landed part of her armament. The Germans sank the gunboat and bombarded the town but did not enter the harbour in case it was mined, so gained no supplies for this expenditure of ammunition that could not be replaced.^[4]

On 12 October Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Nürnberg were at Easter Island, a remote Chilean possession where they could coal in security. The light cruiser S.M.S. Dresden, which had been stationed in the Caribbean before the war, was already there. Two days later they were joined by Leipzig; her appearance off San Francisco on 11 August and erroneous rumours that she was accompanied by Nürnberg 'paralysed the movements of [British] shipping from Vancouver to Panama.' However, the German ship was unable to stay for long, as an engagement with even an inferior British cruiser might leave her needing to put into a neutral port for repairs and thus be interned.^[5]

The British learned from an intercepted radio communication in early October of Spee's plan to prey upon shipping in the crucial trading routes along the west coast of South America. Patrolling in the area at that time was Admiral Cradock's West Indies Squadron, consisting of two armoured cruisers, H.M.S. Good Hope (Cradock's flagship) and H.M.S. Monmouth, the modern light cruiser Glasgow, and the armed merchant cruiser H.M.S. Otranto.

Cradock's fleet was by no means modern or particularly strong, and most of the crew were inexperienced. Spee had a formidable force of five vessels, led by the armoured cruisers S.M.S. Scharnhorst and S.M.S. Gneisenau plus a further three light cruisers, all modern ships with officers handpicked by Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz. Nevertheless Cradock was ordered to confront Spee.

On 18 October, 1914 von Spee, having learned of the presence of the Glasgow, set off with all five warships from Valparaíso with the intention of destroying it.

Cradock, aware that his ships were outgunned by Spee's, had been waiting in the hope of reinforcements. The Admiralty dispatched the armoured cruiser H.M.S. Defence and the elderly battleship Canopus, the latter sent from London. Neither reached Cradock before battle commenced on 1 November, 1914.

H.M.S. Defence, then in the Mediterranean, had been ordered to head to Gibraltar on 10 September and then to South America after engine room defects had been corrected. A telegram of 14 September told Cradock that "Defence" was joining him, although she had not set off, and that the pre-dreadnought battleship H.M.S. "Canopus" was on her way. Spee's two armoured cruisers were likely to appear at the Magellan Straits. He was told that:

'Until Defence joins keep at least Canopus and one County class with your flagship. As soon as you have superior force search the Magellan Straits with squadron, being ready to return and cover the River Plate, or, according to information, search north as far as Valparaiso, break up the German trade and destroy the German cruisers.'^[6]

Deciding that he could wait no longer, Cradock sailed from the Falkland Islands to a predetermined rendezvous point with the Glasgow at Coronel, the latter having been sent there to gather intelligence.

At this point, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, issued orders to Cradock on 28 October instructing him to halt, pending possible reinforcement from the Japanese navy. It is a moot point as to whether Cradock actually received Churchill's instructions; in any event, he shortly afterwards ordered his squadron to adopt an attacking formation.

However, two days later he was told the German armoured cruisers had been seen at Samoa on 14 September and had left heading north west. He was now told that '[c]ruisers need not now be concentrated' and 'the German trade on the west coast of America was to be attacked at once.'^[7]

On 14 October the Admiralty informed Cradock that it had accepted his proposal that he should concentrate Good Hope, Monmouth, Canopus, Glasgow and Otranto and that a second cruiser squadron should be formed on the east coast of South America. It would be commanded by Rear Admiral Archibald Stoddart and would consist of his flagship the County class armoured cruiser H.M.S. Carnarvon, her sister H.M.S. Cornwall, the light cruiser H.M.S. Bristol and the armed merchant cruisers H.M.S. Macedonia and Orama. H.M.S. Defence would join Stoddart's squadron when she arrived.

According to the Naval Staff Monograph on Coronel, a detailed report prepared by RN staff officers after the war for internal use only:

'It was apparently intended that [Cradock's] squadron, with the exception of the Glasgow, should concentrate and presumably remain at the Falkland Islands, but the actual instructions sent on October 14th did not emphasise this and certainly did not debar him from going to the west.' ^[8]

Naval Operations, the British official history, argues that the formation of a new squadron on the east coast and a mention of combined operations made Cradock assume that his orders of 5 October were still in effect, so he should 'concentrate all his squadron on the west coast "to search and protect trade" in co-operation with his colleague.'^[9] H.M.S. Kent, another County class cruiser, was sent to join Cradock, but he does not seem to have been informed of this, and she was diverted elsewhere, so never joined his command.

The Admiralty had made a 'fairly accurate' estimate of Spee's movements.^[10] Cradock left the Falkland Islands in Good Hope on 22 October to rendezvous with Monmouth, Glasgow and Otranto at a secret coaling base in south west America. He left Canopus to convoy colliers because he believed that her speed was only 12 knots. However, she was actually capable of 16.5 knots, but her 'Engineer Commander...was ill mentally...and made false reports on the state of the machinery.'^[11]

On 26 October Cradock ordered Defence to join him, but the Admiralty countermanded this the next day, ordering her to join Stoddart. Churchill claimed that this telegram did not reach Stoddart and a note for the Cabinet said that it is 'not certain that this message reached Good Hope.' However, Paymaster Lloyd Hirst of Glasgow, whose ship did receive it, later wrote that it is 'practically certain' that it reached Cradock just before the battle.^[12]

Glasgow went to the port of Coronel in south west Chile to send and receive messages on 31 October. By the time that they reached the Admiralty Lord Fisher had been re-appointed First Sea Lord following the resignation of Prince Louis Battenberg on 29 October because of 'rising agitation in the Press against every one German or of German descent.'^[13] Fisher ordered Defence to join Cradock and sent a signal making it 'clear that he was not to act without the Canopus.'^[14] It never reached Cradock.

Cradock received word, again via an intercepted radio signal on 31 October, that S.M.S. Leipzig, the slowest light cruiser in Spee's fleet, was in the area. He promptly took his squadron north to cut it off but instead found himself confronting Spee's entire force the following day at around 4.30pm.

At this stage, it is probable that the British could have escaped by sailing towards Canopus, then some 300 miles to the south; with the failing light Spee would most likely have lost contact with the British squadron. Instead, Cradock chose to stay and fight; however he did direct Otranto to escape.

Battle

Shortly after 1630, Leipzig sighted smoke and hauled out to Starboard to investigate. At 1640, Glasgow, having sighted and investigated smoke on the horizon, identified the enemy. Otranto, with Monmouth to the West, moved to support Glasgow, which increased to full speed and shaped course for the flagship, over fifty miles away, while sending a wireless message to Cradock informing him that Leipzig, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had been sighted.^[15] With plenty of sea room, Cradock could have turned South and fallen back on Canopus, steaming North with two colliers. He could not know that the Germans had steam only for 14 knots and were unaware of the presence of Good Hope and Monmouth.^[16]

Footnotes

Bibliography