Conduct of a Fleet

From The Dreadnought Project
Revision as of 13:14, 13 April 2014 by Simon Harley (talk | contribs) (Created Page.)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Jump to navigationJump to search

This memorandum concerning ship handling was issued on 13 November, 1915, by the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, Admiral Sir John R. Jellicoe. A copy exists in his papers.[1]

Memorandum

SECRET.

"Iron Duke,"

13 November 1915

H.F. 0034/19.

MEMORANDUM.

Conduct of a Fleet.

Attention is drawn to the points enumerated below, some of which, as shown by experience in recent exercises, are in danger of being neglected.

2. Too much stress cannot be laid upon the instructions in Article 79 of the "Instructions for the Conduct of a Fleet," page 299 of the 1915 General Signal Book.

This instruction is being constantly disobeyed. Not only does the neglect of the instruction cause grave inconvenience, if not worse, to the next astern, but it has a most disturbing influence in action on the gunfire of the ship committing the error. The instruction applies not only to cases of ships turning out of the line, but to any ship, which, from any cause, finds herself out of the line.

3. The aim of every ship should be to turn in the wake of her guide, whether her next ahead has turned correctly or not; if this rule is strictly followed, a bad turn by any one ship will not throw all ships in rear of her into confusion and disorganise their gunfire. Any error in turning had obviously better be in the direction of turning inside rather than outside the wake of the guide. A ship cannot, however, safely turn much inside her next ahead unless she can depend on that vessel obeying the instruction referred to in the preceding paragraph.

4. It is impressed upon the commanding officers of leading ships of divisions that, when deploying, it is unwise, and very disturbing to the ships astern, if the leading ship of a division turns too far, and has to turn back again. This is especially the case when the deployment turn is a large one. If the leading ship of a division turns nearly to the point on which the rear ship of the division next ahead of her will come into the line, she is apt to be forced back again off her course, if the rear ship ship of the division ahead turns outside the proper turning point. It is therefore obvious that it is much better for leading ships of divisions to turn a little short of the necessary amount than to turn too far, as a further slight turn inwards is not at all disturbing to the ship astern, whereas a turn outwards has a very decided contrary effect. During deployment divisional leaders should watch the ships of their divisions astern of them; a wavy line with inefficient gunfire often implies faulty leading.

5. Similarly, when divisions are being turned by the Signals "02" or "21", it is desirable that the leading ships of divisions should turn slightly less than the sixteen points until they are certain that they will clear the rear ship of the division now ahead of them, otherwise, if the divisions turn in very rapid succession, the leading ships of divisions may be forced out of the line by the rear ship of the division now ahead of them, if the ships of that division are outside their distance, or (and) the rear ship turns outside the wake of her guide.

6. Some ships have the bad habit of following exactly the movements of their next ahead when that ship yaws out of line. This is most disturbing, both to gunfire and to the next astern. A steady course is of far greater importance than any mechanical following of the next ahead. It is a common fault, both as regards course and distance, to pay too much attention to the next ahead and too little to the guide.

7. On the other hand, it must be remembered that it is most undesirable that ships should remain considerably out of the line longer than can be avoided; they should resume their station in the line by gradually edging back again; the reason being that should a turn by divisions or sub-divisions be signalled, a ship much out of the line may find herself in a position of danger, or may place her neighbour in the line in such a position, or may even render it undesirable to make the signal.

8. The commanding officers of cruisers spreading should always remember that it is most unwise to get astern of bearing; there is no difficulty in correcting the bearing if the ship is ahead, but the matter is very different if the ship is once allowed to get astern of bearing; particular care is necessary if the guide from which the cruisers are spreading is moving at high speed.

9. Flag Officers and Officers Commanding ships must always bear in mind that they can greatly increase the facility with which signals are passed if discretion is used in placing or manœuvring ships so as to facilitate signalling. For instance, a cruiser column stationed ahead of the fleet, if in line ahead, should always avoid being exactly ahead of the Admiral, because, if so placed, the ships comprising the cruiser column entirely block the view of the commanding or senior officer of the column from the Admiral, and signals cannot be made direct. Again, if the wind is right aft, and flags have a tendency to hang up and down the mast; ships repeating signals, or ships signalling, should remember that a slight yaw will blow the flags clear at once, and enable the signal to be read. Further, if a ship in the line has an important signal to pass to another vessel some distance ahead or astern, the passing of the signal is immensely facilitated if the ship hauls slightly out of line for the purpose.

10. Practically the whole of these remarks are included in the term "Neighbourly conduct."


J. R. Jellicoe.


Admiral.


The Flag Officers, Commodores, and

Officers in command of H.M. ships of

the Grand Fleet.

Footnotes

  1. Jellicoe Papers. British Library. Add MS 49011. f. 168.

Bibliography

Commander-in-Chief.