A Direct Train of Cordite

Tudor minuted on 26 October:

This is a somewhat severe criticism of our ship construction, and I do not feel that it is justified – especially after reading DNC's report.

Immediate and far-reaching steps were taken directly after the action of 31st May, which have put the whole of our armoured ships on a much better footing; and practically all of the points mentioned by Admiral Beatty have received attention.

I propose to investigate further para (a), (b), (d), (e), (f), (h), & L of DNC, and steps should be taken forthwith.

There is very little doubt in my mind that in the great anxiety to attain a rapid rate of fire, the ordinary precautions for safety of cordite cartridges have been gradually relaxed, until at last the test of the enemy's shells has proved the danger of what was being done. -Stringent orders and precautionary and protective measures have now been taken to safeguard charges; and I feel confident that they will have the desired effect.

I do not agree that we should gain anything by the proposed committee (para. 9 of Vice-Admiral's letter). I feel greater confidence in the opinions of Naval Officers who know all the interests involved and are not slow to recommend any definite improvement, which it is their continual endeavour to suggest; and that these proposals should receive the careful consideration of the Admiralty, as is now the procedure.

It seems desirable that a reply should be carefully drafted embodying the gist of DNO's and DNC's remarks, and laying great stress on the undoubted improper exposure of cordite during this action.

FCTT
26/10/16

Jackson noted beneath:

Concur generally with 3.S.L. A reply should be sent, stating also in what direction investigations will be made.

Experiments with cordite in the magazines of some old ship are most desirable to ascertain the effect of burning charges & a programme should be prepared.

HBJ
27/10/16

The sections italicised in Tudor's minute were highlighted in red pencil, and the bottom of the minute sheet has been signed in red by the First Lord, Arthur Balfour.

On 16 November Tudor minuted:

Noted.

Action on all material points has been taken on other papers.

I am in full agreement with D.N.C. as to the cause of the explosions in our Battle and Armoured Cruisers. There is no evidence to show that any enemy shell penetrated to the magazines of our ships, on the contrary the immunity of engine and boiler rooms generally, points to exactly the opposite conclusion.

On the other hand there can be no doubt that the amount of exposed cordite about the ships was enormous and that as regards turrets, if bare charges were permitted to remain in the handing rooms, as there is every reason to believe was the case, these must have furnished trains of explosives to the magazines.

The very narrow escape of “LION” from blowing up affords an immediate explanation of the disasters which occurred to the other ships.

Even with the precautions which have been taken since the action, I do not feel that we are safe without more efficient control of the ammunition parties, who are, in most ships, I have little doubt, in isolated positions without Officers. This is due not only to the unavoidable stringency in Officers, but also because such an abnormal number are required for control of fire.

The question of Officering the ammunition supply parties is one which has caused me grave concern for over 25 years, but the difficulty seems to be almost insuperable.

One of the most unfortunate results of this Battle has possible [sic] been to give a false idea as to the necessity and value of armour protection; we should all like to have as much armour as possible, but for every ton we add some other feature of the design has to be sacrificed.

The "RENOWN" and "REPULSE" for example, for which such exertions and sacrifices have been made, will now be demobilised for many weeks and then speed and draught will never be what they were designed for.

FCTT 16/11/11

Sir Henry Jackson wrote on 17 November:

The summary of information elicited from the perusal of these papers should be edited to remove any question of personal criticism, & prepared for issue to the Fleet as in the case of the T.B.Ds.

I feel sure the drawing prepared by DNC of the tracks of projectiles & the deductions drawn would be received with great interest.

17/11/16

HBJ

In a minute of 19 December, D'Eyncourt claimed:

The point of particular interest noted from a perusal of the reports from the Commanding Officers of the Battle Cruisers, Cruisers, and Light Cruisers, engaged in the action of the 31st May 1916, is that the Battle Cruisers were in action against enemy Battle Cruisers and Battle-ships, and that the three ships, “Indefatigable”, “Queen Mary” and “Invincible” that were lost, were blown up during the early part of the action when engaged with enemy Battle Cruisers. These three ships were sunk before they had received heavy punishment and the deduction is that the flame reached the turret magazines, causing them to explode.

It is now the generally accepted opinion that the fault to which these explosions may be attributed lay in the method adopted in the transportation of charges to the guns, whereby these charges which were not in non-inflammable cases had an open course from the magazine to the gun. This, in association with the number of charges that were usually in the Handing-Room, Revolving Trunk, Working Chamber, and Gun House provided a direct train of cordite from the turret to the magazine.

There would seem to be an impression in the Fleet that these three ships were lost because enemy shells penetrated the lower protective deck and exploded either in the magazine or so close to it as to ignite the contents. This is not substantiated by a detailed examination of all the reports that have been received, and in the ships that returned from the engagement there is no known case of an enemy shell travelling so far down before bursting and only one known case (that of “Barham”) where a shell, which burst a short distance beyond the point of penetration, sent a fragment so far into the ship. Further, there were very few cases where fragments of projectiles penetrated the protective deck over the machinery spaces, which occupy a much larger portion of the ship than the magazines, are in the midship part of the ship, and are not better protected.

As this matter is of extreme importance the accompanying diagrams have been prepared which show, by means of vertical sections through the path of the shell, all the principal hits and bursts that have been traced in the Battle Cruisers, and Battle-ships engaged. It will be seen that these do not bear out the contention that enemy shells can penetrate the lower protective decks of modern Battle Cruisers, and Battle-ships, before they burst, not that they burst so far beyond the point of entry as to explode in the immediate vicinity of the magazines. If the impression that enemy shells can do this amount of damage be allowed to remain it will lead to demands for a further considerable increase in protection in future warship construction, and the result will be that ships will become very much greater in displacement and cost, without proportionate increase in armament, as a greater proportion of the total weight will be given up to protection than hitherto.

The fundamental maxim of British Warship design has been that the best defence is superior power of offence and it is considered that this action shows this maxim to be essentially sound, as although British Battle Cruisers were in action with enemy Battle-ships they were not then put out of action, whereas the more heavily protected and less heavily armed German ships received very severe punishment.

E. H. T. D'E. 19.12.16

On 22 December Tudor wrote to Jellicoe:

1st Sea Lord

D.N.C. has drawn up the enclosed memorandum marked 'A' on the damage inflicted on our Battle Cruisers & Battle Ships in the Jutland Battle.

The drawings he has had got out should be of great value & interest to the Fleet[.] I do not know if you would wish the memorandum issued.

Referred.

FCTT 22.12.16

The same day Jellicoe minuted:

The memorandum should certainly not be issued. It does not at all represent the the views of officers at sea & I do not agree with it. No objection of the drawings.

JRJ 22/12

Tudor initialled his acknowledgement the following day.

Footnotes