David Richard Beatty, First Earl Beatty

Admiral of the Fleet David, Earl Beatty.
Portrait: Sir William Orpen.

Admiral of the Fleet THE RIGHT HONOURABLE David Richard Beatty, First Earl Beatty, G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O., P.C., Royal Navy (17 January, 1871 – 11 March, 1936) was an officer of the Royal Navy.

Early Life & Career

Beatty was born David Richard Beatty on 17 January, 1871 at Howbeck Lodge, Stapeley, in the Registration District of Nantwich, in the County of Chester. His birth was registered on 17 February. He was the second of four sons of Captain David Longfield Beatty (1841–1904), of the Fourth Hussars, and his first wife, Catherine Edith (d. 1896), daughter of Nicholas Sadlier of Dunboyne Castle, County Meath, Ireland. David Richard and his elder brother Charles were both born out of wedlock, as David Longfield Beatty and Catherine Sadlier were not married until nearly six months after David Richard was born.

A fellow officer in Trafalgar, Lieutenant Sydney Fremantle, later recalled of Beatty:

We had some enjoyable shooting trips together. He was a conscientious officer who never failed in his duties and obligations, but showed little interest in the Service outside his immediate functions, and when our ship was at Malta distinguished himself as a member of the naval polo team.

For his service in China he was promoted to the rank of Captain on 9 November, 1900, aged just twenty-nine.

Captain

Beatty was succeeded in command of Suffolk by Captain Rosslyn E. Wemyss. According to Lady Wester Wemyss, Sir John Fisher had laughingly described Suffolk as "the worst ship in the navy," and upon taking command Wemyss had supposedly "found the ship plunged in the deepest gloom, the officers discontented, the men unwilling."

At a gathering of the Home Fleet at Cromarty in 1909, Beatty complained to his wife, "Many admirals, and not one that inspires a great deal of confidence, this is private, unless it be Prince Louis, and his national or birth qualifications are against him."

Beatty had reached the top of the Captains' list without the necessary six years' of peacetime service, and an Order-in-Council was promulgated on 2 December, 1909 sanctioning Beatty's promotion to Flag rank, the regulations notwithstanding. No-one has yet offered a satisfactory reason as to why this privilege was granted Beatty. That which Professor Lambert proffers, "Beatty was a very good seaman, had commanded four ships and had nothing left to prove," is utterly unconvincing. Hundreds of Beatty's contemporaries on the Captains' list were in command of ships. Many would be retired for age or for lack of sea time, of whom there must have been some who must have shown promise. Why was Beatty extended such extraordinary treatment? This mystery notwithstanding, he was promoted to the rank of Rear-Admiral on 1 January, 1910, vice Cross, promoted to the rank of Vice-Admiral.

Flag Rank

He attended the June, 1911 War Course, where he placed fifth out of seven Rear-Admirals. He was judged to be "Well set, an excellent example to the juniors. Smart and able, apt to be rash in conclusion". On 19 June, 1911 he was appointed a Companion of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath (C.B.) on the occasion of the coronation of King George V.

Beatty was rescued from this impasse by Winston Churchill's becoming First Lord of the Admiralty in 1911. Advised by Fisher to exercise particular care in his choice of naval secretary, Churchill selected Beatty after an interview in which he demonstrated "the profound sagacity of his comments expressed in language free from technical jargon" (R. Churchill, 550). According to Admiral Sir Dudley de Chair, when Beatty met Churchill the latter said, "You seem very young to be an admiral." To which Beatty replied, "And you seem very young to be First Lord of the Admiralty."

In the absence of an organized naval staff, an able and determined naval secretary could exercise considerable influence over his political master. Beatty used the opportunity to the full, and despite his earlier suspicion began to appreciate Churchill's genuine enthusiasm for the navy and his ability in cabinet to further its interests. A paper that he addressed to Churchill in April 1912 on naval dispositions in a German war shows the maturity and perceptiveness of Beatty's contributions to their discussions (Beatty Papers, 1.36–45).

The practical result of Churchill's approbation led to Beatty's taking temporary command of the Sixth Cruiser Squadron, with his flag in Aboukir for the fleet manoeuvres of July 1912. His success in bringing his command to fighting efficiency must have reminded his critics of his high leadership qualities.

Great War

On 9 August, 1915, Beatty was confirmed in the rank of Vice-Admiral.

Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, 1916–1919

Asquith wrote to Balfour on 20 November of a successor to Jellicoe, "I quite realise the difficulty of taking him at this moment from the Grand Fleet, especially as his only possible successor in the command (I am sure you would agree) from the combatant point of view is Beatty, who, with all his fine fighting qualities, is yet comparatively untried in the domain of fleet administration on a large scale."

He hoisted his flag on board Iron Duke on 28 November, having been promoted acting admiral on the previous day. Some doubted his ability to handle and administer so huge a force; it had twenty-four battleships, three battlecruisers, nineteen cruisers, and fifty destroyers under direct command at Scapa Flow, in addition to the battlecruiser force at Rosyth now under his friend William Pakenham. The Grand Fleet itself comprised some 35,000 officers and men afloat, including three vice-admirals and six rear-admirals.

Beatty had prepared himself for this gigantic responsibility under the shadow of Jutland, determined that the failures of that day should not be repeated. The technical problems he left to his senior subordinates and his personal staff, but for tactical and strategic doctrine and above all for leadership he drew on his own resources. First was his confidence that victory could be gained, and second was his ability to convey this confidence to his subordinates, from flag officers to stokers. He cultivated decisiveness of speech, eccentricities of uniform, and as much personal contact as possible. ‘The first thing that strikes you about him are his penetrating eyes. He has a phenomenally quick brain and he can take in all he wants to know in one glance … and decisions are given without a moment's hesitation’ (Roskill, 148).

Beatty's experience since 1914 had increased his awareness of the uncertainties of sea warfare and hardened his insistence that decisive victory could come only from commitment to the offensive and to personal initiative at all levels of command. His display of self-confidence won over the most critical of his senior subordinates, sustained the loyalty of his personal staff, and maintained the fighting spirit of his men throughout the years of frustration that lay ahead. Hence his Nelsonic reputation. His grasp of strategic realities and the need to avoid unnecessary risks has been less clearly appreciated. Despite his hopes for a second Jutland, he accepted that a superior Grand Fleet, vigilant and informed by an efficient Admiralty intelligence system, would provide the essential basis of both a devastating economic blockade and the eventual defeat of the enemy's submarine campaign. He would not agree to any weakening of the fleet to deal with the unlikely danger of invasion. Sufficient deterrence could be provided by the light and submarine forces at Harwich, supported by a squadron of older battleships in the Thames estuary. Connected with this was his conviction, shared with the Admiralty and Jellicoe, of the dangers of any section of the fleet being deployed for battle in the southern North Sea; there German strength in submarines and mines and her Zeppelin reconnaissance might enable her to weaken his force so that it could no longer discharge its fundamental strategic roles.

Although his analysis of grand strategy was realistic, Beatty's hopes always focused on the achievements of the decisive battle which would compensate for the shortcoming of Jutland. His ‘Grand fleet battle instructions’, promulgated in 1916–18 (Beatty Papers, 1.456–506), replaced Jellicoe's ‘Battle orders’ and embodied his basic demands on his subordinates. They should always concentrate on annihilating the enemy without waiting for detailed orders. To achieve this they should attack with every available means: guns, underwater weapons, and aircraft. The last were to be used both in reconnaissance and in attack with bombs, torpedoes, and machine-guns. A retreating enemy must be hotly pursued by day and night. To avoid torpedo attack, ships should turn towards the enemy rather than away (as had happened at Jutland). The spirit of these instructions was instilled in all ranks by training and exercises. Beatty produced a visible demonstration of this commitment when in February 1917 he transferred his flag from Iron duke to Queen Elizabeth, which had a design speed of 25 instead of 21 knots. Even more significant were the removal of the Grand Fleet's base from Scapa Flow to the Firth of Forth in July 1917 and Beatty's pressure on the Admiralty to authorize aircraft-carrier strikes on the enemy fleet in harbour.

Events showed that even an imaginative combat doctrine and greater fighting resources could not overcome the uncertainties of sea warfare or individual failures of judgement. In October and December 1917 two lightly defended Scandinavian merchant convoys sustained heavy losses, and on 17 November an unsuccessful sweep by Pakenham's battlecruisers had missed an opportunity to inflict heavy losses.

The likelihood of Beatty's second Jutland receded, and 23 April 1918 was the last time on which he took his entire fleet to sea. In the following months the morale of the high seas fleet, already shaken by protests against poor conditions and harsh repression in August 1917, was hastened by signs of the breakdown of the imperial government and general social discontent caused by the economic blockade. Although Hipper, now commander-in-chief, repeated his readiness to seek action, his ability to do so declined, and with it Beatty's opportunity for battle.

This drawn-out disappointment at failure to secure his objective added to Beatty's exasperation with what he saw as the Admiralty's failure to counter the dangers to the alliance's war effort from the submarine campaign against merchant shipping. Although long aware of the threat of submerged weapons, he had never expected the type of unrestricted operations implemented by Germany in 1917. He never fully appreciated the technical and scientific difficulties of submarine detection and destruction, and denounced the Admiralty for not organizing offensive hunting operations. He was prevented from extreme denunciation of the lack of success only by the apprehension that he might be ordered to the Admiralty to give this leadership himself. He afterwards claimed to be an early advocate of the convoy system, which proved to be a solution to the problems, but he supported it only after deciding that all else had failed. And later he actually released some of his Grand Fleet destroyers for merchant convoy duties.

Perhaps Beatty's most important contribution was to use a meeting with Lloyd George to tackle the Admiralty on its opposition to convoy. In addition, however, he used his position as the allies' leading naval commander to intervene in political and diplomatic issues. He approached these with supreme self-confidence in correspondence and personal interviews with ministers, other influential politicians, and the king.

After the United States entered the war in April 1917 she put six battleships under Rear-Admiral Hugh Rodman at Beatty's disposal. A close professional accord developed between the two, and Beatty was soon reporting that the new ally was enthusiastically accepting his tactical doctrine and command style. But he never allowed himself to be overawed by America's wealth and power. He remained sceptical of her great technical contribution, the North Sea mine barrage. He also persuaded the minister for blockade, Robert Cecil, to modify his strong pressures on Norway, which he thought incompatible with the allies' claim to fight for the freedom of small nations.

Beatty's most significant political impact was made on the armistice of 1918. He insisted that the German fleet should surrender unconditionally to the Royal Navy, while the entire U-boat force should also be handed over. He personally staged the arrival in the Firth of Forth of the German fleet on 21 November so that they moved as prisoners between the lines of the Grand Fleet to receive his unauthorized signal: ‘The German flag will be hauled down at sunset today, Thursday, and will not be hoisted again without permission’ (Roskill, 279). The symbolism of the surrender was completed on 24 November when the enemy ships moved out of the Firth of Forth to be interned at Scapa Flow, escorted by the 1st battlecruiser squadron, his former command.

Two of Beatty's political objectives were not achieved. First, despite his arguments before the war cabinet, his case for depriving Germany of Heligoland was not pursued. Second, his claim that in the final peace terms the bulk of Germany's most modern capital ships should be allotted to Britain, rather than to her allies, foundered on 21 June 1919 when the ships were scuttled by their crews at Scapa Flow. By then Beatty, having been promoted admiral of the fleet (the youngest ever) on 3 April, had hauled down his flag on 7 April, avoiding responsibility for this ironic achievement of his victory over the high seas fleet.

The period from the immediate aftermath of Jutland to the end of the war was the most testing time of Beatty's career. It also coincided with occasional meetings with his wife that were full of mutual misunderstanding. However, he wrote to her almost daily: sometimes apologizing for his fits of bad temper; more often taking her into his confidence over his professional difficulties and his uninhibited criticisms of his naval and political colleagues. He was to find consolation in his increasingly close relationship with Eugénie Godfrey-Faussett, the wife of Captain Bryan Godfrey-Faussett, an equerry and friend of George V. She was a beautiful woman well known in London society for her wit and gaiety. Beatty at first reacted cautiously to her letters of admiration for the hero of Jutland, but soon responded with increasing warmth. Public scandal had to be avoided, but they probably became lovers during his visit to London in April 1917 and met again during her visits to Scotland. When he became first sea lord more opportunities arose, but the need to maintain secrecy and Beatty's continuing loyalty to Ethel, as her mental instability became more apparent, meant that the relationship with Eugénie was never free from strain.

First Sea Lord, 1919–1927

On 18 October, 1919, Beatty was granted an Earldom of the United Kingdom, with the courtesy titles Baron Beatty of the North Sea, and of Brooksby in the County of Leicester, and Viscount Borodale of Wexford in the County of Wexford.

Beatty's Service

Chronological Record of Services of Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty
Ship	Rank	Period of Service		Remarks
		From	To
Britannia	Naval Cadet	15 January, 1884	14 January, 1886
Alexandra	Naval Cadet	15 January, 1886	14 May, 1886
Alexandra	Midshipman	15 May, 1886	20 July, 1888
Cruiser	Midshipman	21 July, 1888	20 October, 1888
Alexandra	Midshipman	21 October, 1888	19 March, 1889
Duke of Wellington	Midshipman	20 March, 1889	14 September, 1889
Ruby	Midshipman	15 September, 1889	13 May, 1890
Ruby	Sub-Lieutenant	14 May, 1890	15 May, 1890
Duke of Wellington	Sub-Lieutenant	16 May, 1890	10 June, 1890
Ruby	Sub-Lieutenant	11 June, 1890	31 August, 1890
Duke of Wellington	Sub-Lieutenant	1 September, 1890	1 September, 1890
Excellent	Sub-Lieutenant	2 September, 1890	13 January, 1892
Victory II	Sub-Lieutenant	14 January, 1892	4 February, 1892
Nile	Sub-Lieutenant	5 February, 1892	6 July, 1892
Victoria and Albert	Sub-Lieutenant	7 July, 1892	30 August, 1892
Ruby	Lieutenant (Seniority of 25 August, 1892)	31 August, 1892	30 September, 1893
Camperdown	Lieutenant	1 October, 1893	2 October, 1895
Trafalgar	Lieutenant	3 October, 1895	18 May, 1896
Victory I	Lieutenant	19 May, 1896	2 June, 1896
Egyptian Government	Lieutenant	3 June, 1896	19 November, 1896	Half Pay
Victory III for Ranger in command	Lieutenant	9 January, 1897	30 June, 1897
Egyptian Government	Lieutenant	1 July, 1897	24 October, 1898	Half Pay
—	Commander	15 November, 1898
Barfleur	Commander	20 April, 1899	12 September, 1900	Wounded
Duke of Wellington	Commander	13 September, 1900	30 September, 1900
—	Captain	9 November, 1900		Half Pay
Juno	Captain	2 June, 1902	17 December, 1902	Half Pay
Arrogant	Captain	3 November, 1903	29 September, 1904
Diana	Captain	30 September, 1904	11 October, 1904
Mars	Captain	12 October, 1904	24 October, 1904
Suffolk	Captain	25 October, 1904	19 September, 1905
Victory I	Captain	20 September, 1905	14 October, 1905	Half Pay
Naval Adviser to the Army Council	Captain	21 December, 1906	14 December, 1908
Queen	Captain	15 December, 1908	3 January, 1910	Half Pay
Naval Secretary to the First Lord	Rear-Admiral (Seniority of 1 January, 1910)	8 January, 1912	1 July, 1912
Aboukir (Sixth Cruiser Squadron)	Rear-Admiral	2 July, 1912	27 July, 1912
Naval Secretary to the First Lord	Rear-Admiral	28 July, 1912	8 January, 1913	Half Pay
Lion	Rear-Admiral	1 March, 1913	2 August, 1914
Lion	Acting Vice-Admiral	3 August, 1914	28 January, 1915
Princess Royal	Acting Vice-Admiral	29 January, 1915	8 April, 1915
Lion	Acting Vice-Admiral	9 April, 1915	8 August, 1915
Lion	Vice-Admiral	9 August, 1915	27 November, 1916
Iron Duke	Acting Admiral (Seniority of 27 November, 1916)	28 November, 1916	15 February, 1917
Queen Elizabeth	Acting Admiral	16 February, 1917	31 December, 1918
Queen Elizabeth	Admiral	1 January, 1919	2 April, 1919
Queen Elizabeth	Admiral of the Fleet	3 April, 1919	7 April, 1919
President	Admiral of the Fleet	8 April, 1919	31 October, 1919
First Sea Lord	Admiral of the Fleet	1 November, 1919	29 July, 1927	Half Pay

Bibliography

• "Lord Beatty, O.M." (Obituaries). The Times. Wednesday, 11 March, 1936. Issue 47320, pg. 17.
• "Funeral of Lord Beatty" (Obituaries). The Times. Wednesday, 17 March, 1936. Issue 47325, pg. 21.
• Beatty, Charles (1980). Our Admiral. London: W. H. Allen / Virgin Books. ISBN 049102388X.
• Beatty, Admiral of the Fleet David, First Earl Beatty (1989). Ranft, Bryan McL.. ed. The Beatty Papers. Volume I. London: Navy Records Society. ISBN 0859678070.
• Beatty, Admiral of the Fleet David, First Earl Beatty (1993). Ranft, Bryan McL.. ed. The Beatty Papers. Volume II. London: Navy Records Society. ISBN 0859679640.
• Template:BibChalmersBeatty
• Churchill, Randolph Spencer (1967). Winston S. Churchill: Young Statesman 1910–1914. II. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company. ISBN 0395075262.
• Template:BibdeChairTheSeaisStrong
• Lambert, Andrew (2009). Admirals: The Naval Commanders who made Britain Great. London: Faber and Faber Limited. ISBN 978-0-571-23157-7.
• Template:BibRoskillBeatty

Papers

• Papers in the possession of the National Maritime Museum.

Service Record

• The National Archives. ADM 196/43.

Naval Offices
Preceded by Sir John R. Jellicoe	Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet 1916 – 1919	Succeeded by Command Dispersed
Preceded by Sir Rosslyn E. Wemyss	First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff 1919 – 1927	Succeeded by Sir Charles E. Madden, Bart.