Battle Cruiser Fleet Orders

This is a reproduction of the Battle Cruiser Fleet Orders issued by Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty on 18 February, 1915. Apparently the wording of Sections I & II, General Principles & Battle Cruisers was all the work of Beatty, with some passages initiated by his War Staff officer, Commander Reginald A. R. Plunkett.

Battle Cruiser Fleet Orders

Part S, OPERATIONS, STRATEGY, TACTICS, &c.

1. General Principles (Revision of B.C.S. 015 of 15-4-13.)

1. From a study of the Great Naval Wars it is impressed upon one that Cruiser captains and battle-cruiser Captains, to be successful, must possess, in a marked degree, initiative, resource determination, and fearlessness of responsibility.

To make the best use of these qualities they must be given a clear outline of the functions and duties of the force to which they belong, and of the principles by which the Admiral is guided in handling them.

War is a perpetual conflict with the unexpected, so that n r. impossible to prescribe beforehand for all the circumstances that may arise.

The Admiral will therefore rely on Captains to use all 11 it-information at their disposal so as to grasp the situation quickly and anticipate his wishes, using their own discretion as to how to act in unforeseen circumstances and carrying through every operation with resolution and energy.

2. Cruiser Captains cannot be too often reminded that, in war, there is an immense increase in those things which occur to distract a man's judgment and overwhelm him with uncertainty. As Clausewitz has said, in war much information is contradictory, more is false, the greatest part is doubtful.

In all doubtful cases a carefully considered first opinion should not be abandoned until a clear conviction forces us to do so. That line of action which promises the greatest possible damage to the enemy is very seldom wrong.

3. As a rule, instructions will be of a very general character so as to avoid interfering with the judgement and initiative of Captains.

Orders should be complied with in spirit but it is not desirable to be tied by the letter of a standing order in circumstances where perhaps it was never intended to apply.

Orders issued by signal frequently indicate the Admiral's intentions or requirements; they may perhaps have to be obeyed literally by some ships and not by others. For example, a course signal when ships are widely spread would probably indicate that the Admiral and ships near him will steer the course indicated. More distant ships may find that a slightly different course will better suit their requirements.

4. Functions and duties of the battle-cruisers. These are concisely summarised in a later memo. See 2.

5. The attainment of good results in fast vessels is enormously impendent on rapid and efficient signalling. All forms of signalling require careful attention, particularly wireless.

To meet this the following points require attention:—

All ships should be carefully tuned with loose couplings, and receiving ships should have opportunity to get accurate adjustments for all ships that may send to them.

Signals must be brief. To contain the necessary information in its most concise form it is essential that the Officer drafting a signal should have a good knowledge of the Wireless Code Book.

Cruiser in sight of the enemy must continue sending off information even though interference may prevent them hearing any replies to their signals.

If interference is on a low note it may be possible to get through by changing quickly to a high note.

It is useful to fit a wavemeter in the receiving circuit as an additional rejector.

A thoroughly efficient code staff is essential; without it cruiser operations become almost impossible.

Wireless Officers should realise that the efficiency of material is only a small portion of the preparation necessary to success. The training of personnel and a careful study of the organisation of communications in all its details are factors requiring constant attention.

It is important for cruisers while engaged to be able to send wireless from behind armour, and to shift to or from that position without delaying operations.

2. Battle-cruisers (Revision of B.C.S. 015 of 3-3-14.)

1. Having completed one year in command of the First Battle-Cruiser Squadron, and being now at the commencement of another year of work, the moment is opportune to summarise and review the results of the work of the past year. From this we can revise, if necessary, the General Principles upon which we have-based our exercises hitherto, and at the same time determine the points requiring further attention.

2. I stated in my memorandum 015 of 15 April 1913, issued on taking command, that the functions of the Squadron included:—

Strategical. To provide a fast and powerful force for supporting the operations of advanced cruisers, or armoured cruisers, whether employed for patrolling, watching, searching, making a reconnaisance, or for other duties.

Tactical. To form the fast division of the line of battle for a general action.

These two functions, as shown by the lessons of last year, covei practically all the most important duties of the B.C.F. The following remarks are compiled as an aid to further investigation in the coming year:-

3. Strategical Principles. From the experience gained from excicises carried out in April, June, July and October, also from the naval manoeuvres, I think it has been clearly demonstrated

(a) That there are many limitations and difficulties in carrying out efficiently the work of support.

(b) That supports should never be divided so that any portion of them could be overwhelmed in detail by a superior force of the enemy. Even when spread, the battle-cruisers should always In-in sight of one another.

There can be no certainty of effecting a rapid junction with ships out of sight and dependent on wireless.

The support should be of such strength as to be at least equal to the greatest force of enemy battle-cruisers that can be brought against them.

(c) One unit of supports can only provide support to a veil limited front of cruisers, the actual length of line from wing to wing being dependent upon the visibility, but not more than 50 miles, with supports 30 miles from the line, under the most favourable circumstances. In low visibility they should be very much closer, ten or fifteen miles in rear.

(d) The Batttle-Cruiser Squadron in performance of support duty must be prepared to man and fight every gun of its Anti-Torpedo Armament at the same time as its main armament, by day as well as by night.

(e) Strategically, and in many cases tactically, full use can be made of the Battle-Cruiser Squadron only when it is working in co-operation with other vessels. By itself it can accomplish something, but with small fast cruisers it could be made of infinitely greater value to the Commander-in-Chief, and would not be exposed to the same risks as at present.

(f) The destroyer menace compels retirement by night; the dangers of submarine attack by day, though undoubtedly large, have not yet been fully investigated.

(g) The safety and utility of all advanced or detached vessels will depend very considerably on the efficiency of the coding and wireless staffs. Thorough training in peace is essential and should be directed towards studying the principles of wireless communication, and means of saving time in signalling, decoding and delivering messages, rather than in studying the technical peculiarities of the instruments.

(h) It is essential that vessels which would co-operate with the I tattle-Cruiser Squadron in war should be frequently exercised with it in peace.

4. Tactical Principles. The following lessons learnt during the p.ist year deal with all phases of tactics including the earlier movements prior to engaging.

(a) My Battle Orders contain sufficient general instructions for the internal conduct of the Battle-Cruiser Fleet in action. See 3.

(b) Further questions relating to the co-operation of all forces in a general action have been, after practical trial, discussed fully in correspondence between the Commander-in-Chief and myself from October to December last, the principal points are as (61 lows:-

(c) It is most important that the B.C.F should join the C.-in-< in time to take part in the Fleet action.

(d) From experience gained during the principal exercises last year, the battle-cruisers on approaching the Battle Fleet will probably be employed in advance of it to gain information of the enemy's movements, strength, formation, etc., until shortly before the line of battle is formed.

(e) Their future movements would depend upon one of two factors, viz., the presence of a squadron of battle-cruisers with enemy's fleet or not.

If hostile battle-cruisers are present they must form the objective of our battle-cruisers, so that they may be held by ships of equal power and speed to prevent them choosing their position. We should engage with sufficient strength to annihilate them, while our surplus battle-cruisers, if any, would be sent to attack enemy's flank battleships. The choice of flank would depend on circumstances. If possible, it is useful to have battle-cruisers at each end of the line.

(f) If there are no battle-cruisers with the enemy fleet, our B.C.F. will act as a fast division of the Grand Fleet. Our B.( Squadrons may be concentrated in an endeavour to crush the enemy's van, or may be separated so as to act on both flanks simultaneously.

In carrying out the objects mentioned in (e) and (/) it is essential that our movements should be governed by the following factors

(1.) The B.C.F. should run no risk of fouling or masking the front of the Battle Fleet when deployed.

(2.) It should not come into range of enemy Dreadnought Battle Fleet until our own Battle Fleet is engaged.

(3.) It must be in a position to open fire immediately after our Battle Fleet is engaged, and if possible should have reached a good tactical position beforehand.

(4.) The smoke of the B.C.F. must never be liable to interfere with the view of the Battle Fleet at a critical moment.

These four factors all make for the desirability of forming in good time on the selected flank.

Good work can be accomplished by the B.C.F. working on conjunction with light cruisers and flotillas.

5. In the light of past experience, and the principles learnt, it is now necessary to consider the training and exercises that we need during the current year. For training, we must of course practice all the strategical and tactical operations that we may have to perform in war. This can only be done efficiently when working in concert with the other forces which in war would actually cooperate with us.

Further, we must endeavour by practical trial to clear up nil outstanding problems which are at present unsettled or in iIn-controversial stage.

6. The following list gives a few of the exercises desirable for battle-cruisers and cruisers.

Strategical.

(1.) Exercise bringing in cruisers and destroyers from a distance to surround a fleet that has been located at sea.

(2.) Follow this with shadowing duty by day, making long range torpedo attacks if visibility is less than 11,000 yards.

(3.) Then shadowing exercise by night, making torpedo attacks with destroyers and long range attacks from cruisers.

(4.) Finally, by day, own Battle Fleet approaches and all vessels take stations for a general action.

Tactical. In tactics, even more than in strategy, what we specially need to practice is the concerted action of all arms in a simultaneous offensive. The following should be exercised:-

(a) Closing the Battle-Cruiser Fleet when spread, and forming order of battle for a cruiser action.

(b) Joining the Commander-in-Chief for a general action; first, when detached out of sight; second, when keeping touch with the enemy's fleet.

(c) Taking up preliminary station ahead of Commander-in-Chief and thence operating to drive back enemy cruisers and gain information of enemy's fleet.

(d) Proceeding to engage battle-cruisers when present with enemy's fleet.

(e) Falling back to form a fast division of the battle line. This entails first manoeuvring for a good tactical position, then closing to engage simultaneously with our main fleet but never before it.

(f) Practice concerted attacks on van or rear, battle-cruisers co-operating with light cruisers and flotillas. Also practice co-operation of the same forces for repelling attacks by the enemy's flotillas.

(g) Exercise as in (f) but firing salvoes of torpedoes sometimes from a Battle-Cruiser Squadron and sometimes from the light * misers or flotillas.

(h) Exercises as above, but with submarines also taking part.

7. The exercises quoted above are retained in the present reprint because, although they cannot be practised as exercises, they describe operations which we may very possibly have to carry out.

3. Battle orders for Battle-Cruiser Fleet (Reprint of B.C.S. 015 of 17-7-13.)

The following orders are generally applicable for an action with battle or armoured cruisers, but they apply mainly to the requirements of a Fleet action.

1. It may be expected that the Commander-in-Chief would use the fast division for attacking the enemy's flank, and the battle-cruisers must therefore be prepared to attack either van or rear. To attain quickly a good tactical position full speed will be needed, not only during the approach but perhaps also while engaged.

2. Much will depend on whether the enemy's van or rear is attacked. If the van, one of our chief objects will be to pour in a steady fire with long range torpedoes.

3. Very probably we shall have to meet a determined attack by the enemy's torpedo craft, directed either at the battle-cruisers or our own battle line; in either case the anti-torpedo guns must he ready to open fire instantly for repelling this attack. Similarly the squadron must be prepared to deal effectively with the enemy's armoured cruiser force, whether acting as supports or attempting to attack the flank of our battle line with gun and torpedo. In so doing we should also afford necessary protection to our own flotillas near by, and thus assist and support them in advancing to make their attack.

4. If the enemy's rear is to be attacked, it will be necessary to open out to 4 or 5 cables apart when within range of enemy torpedoes; or to steer a course which reduces their chance ol hitting. A sharp look-out should also be kept for submarines or small craft laying mines, which may be found near the rear of the enemy's line.

5. Whether at the van or rear, our final aim must be to concentrate on the flank battleships of the enemy and to press in. provided they are engaged by our own Battle Fleet, to such range' that our fire may have decisive results.

6. Much must be left to the initiative and judgment of Captains They are relied upon to act promptly in battle on their own initiative for dealing with all cases such as the following:—

(a) Two or more ships requiring to concentrate fire on one of the enemy.

(b) Altering course to avoid torpedoes, or extending gaps in the line as a precautionary measure.

(c) Making small alterations of course to fire torpedoes. N.B. - Care should be taken to right the helm and resume station as soon after as possible.

(d) Hauling out of the wake of the next ahead to avoid smoke or backwash. N.B. — It is desirable that ships should not haul out more than one point, lest they hamper the squadron when turning in succession. If one point is insufficient, ships should avoid smoke interference by opening out.

(e) Altering line of bearing from Flag in order to get a clearer arc of fire, or to close nearer the enemy.

(f) Or in any other case in which Captains consider that prompt action is needed, and their movements are such as the Vice-Admiral would certainly approve if they could be made known to him beforehand. The chief limitation in these cases is that no movement must mask the fire of other ships or in any way inconvenience them from a manoeuvring point of view.

7. After opening fire every effort must be made to keep the 'A' arc bearing steadily. Alterations of course should be small — not exceeding two points if possible and made with small helm, usually 10 to 15 degrees.

8. Should any ship or squadron find itself being heavily hit, it is permissible to alter course 1 or ll/2 points to upset the enemy's i ontrol. In doing this, however, it is most important not to drop -istern nor to make the line so ragged as to interfere with manoeuvring.

9. If ordered to form on a line of bearing or reform while rimaged, the smallest possible amount of helm should be used < onsistent with rapid execution.

10. If, as may happen, the Admiral is not leading the line, the leader is to hoist 4 Pendant without signal.

11. Re signals in action; guiding principle in single line, 'Each ship is responsible for her next astern.' If, as is quite likely, the Admiral does not wait for all ships to repeat close up, the last ship that has repeated the signal is to keep it flying after Flagship hauls down, until next astern has seen it; ships in rear to act similarly until the last ship has got it.

4. Instructions for concentrating battle-cruisers when spread and forming order of battle (Reprint of B.C.S. 015 of 17-7-13.)

1. When spread, ships must remember the importance of quick action and quick communication of intelligence on sighting the enemy. For this, and equally for concentrating, it is essential that ships should be within visibility distance. A sudden alteration of course by the ship sighting the enemy is seen by those on either side of her far more rapidly than any signal could be sent, and being an almost certain indication of an enemy having been sighted it should be acted on immediately.

2. All ships that may be required to support must proceed to do so until they know definitely that they will not be required.

3. The immediate sequel to concentrating is forming order ol battle and engaging the enemy. In future this will be done so t;u as possible without signal, and each Captain is to use his discretion in handling his ship as he considers that the Admiral would wish. The following principles are to be accepted as a guide foi concentrating and forming line of battle:-

4. Concentrating must be understood to mean placing each ship as rapidly as possible in a position to support her consorts In engaging the enemy with effective gunfire. This naturally does not require that all ships shall be in close order, but those near oiu another must form line of battle at the first opportunity aftei concentrating; leading ship automatically taking guide.

5. Ships that are able to close must form line ahead roughly ;it right angles to bearing of enemy, in the order in which they then are, leading ship taking guide, all without signal. Those ships furthest ahead of the enemy should not sacrifice their position in order to take station on others abeam of him, nor is it desirablr to form in close order if heavy smoke on the engaged side is liable to mask the guns of ships astern. These exceptions must of comsr depend on existing circumstances.

6. When ships are widely separated and perhaps on opposite sides of the enemy, they are to hoist action signal 98 to indicate 'I am now nearly in range of the enemy and will close to engage as soon as sufficient support has come up.'

Each detached ship should, at her discretion, close and engage the enemy at the earliest moment she thinks justified, without waiting for further orders. The signal should be repeated by searchlight, and if necessary by wireless. Ships of Battle-Cruiser Fleet are to note the above signification in pencil against action signal 98 in the signal book.

7. If possible no signal other than this will be used. Ships must never suppose that the absence of a signal implies that any given action is not sanctioned by Flagship; on the contrary it usually denotes that the Admiral relies on each ship to take whatever action may be necessary without waiting to be told.

8. The above principles apply equally for separated divisions of 2 or 3 ships when concentrating to attack a superior enemy squadron. The sole object of these instructions is to enable ships to understand beforehand the principles of rapid co-operation, so that the enemy may be brought to action at the earliest possible moment without any ship needing or wishing to wait for detailed orders from the Admiral.

5. Training (Revision of B.C.S. 015 of 17-7-13.)

It is desired that all exercises and training for battle shall be, so far as possible, carried out with a view to practising the conditions and operations described in my 'Orders for Battle.'

2. A few of the principal requirements are as follows:-

(a) That guns shall be able to shoot effectively when ships are steaming at full speed and perhaps making frequent alterations of course.

(b) That ships shall be able to carry out concentration of fire, either with ships of their own squadron, or with others firing from a different direction.

(c) That turrets in local control shall be able to make good shooting at both long and short ranges.

(d) That ships shall be able to steam full speed, and keep loughly in station, while closely engaged.

(e) That ships while engaged shall be able to fire torpedoes steadily and accurately until every torpedo is expended.

(f) That ships can man their light guns and repel torpedo attacks while simultaneously engaged with armoured vessels.

(g) That arrangements be made to keep a good lookout, throughout an action, for the enemy's submarines or torpedoes (the latter are not likely to be visible unless running shallow), also loi minelayers or destroyers laying mines ahead.

3. The above requirements must be kept constantly in view, iind every effort made to comply with the principle that 'Any exercise or training which does not reproduce as closely as possible Hi* actual conditions of war is almost inevitably bad.'

4. It is desired to impress on all officers that the object of training is not merely to attain success in target practices and competitions, but to ensure that the fighting value of the squadron us a whole shall be as high as possible. To this end it should be remembered that good comradeship and cordial co-operation are among the first essentials for success in war.

(4 and 5 were previously issued as Appendices to Battle Orders.)