Report on the Loss of H.M.S. Victoria
A Report by the Assistant Controller and Director of Naval Construction, Based Upon Minutes of Proceedings of the Court Martial Appointed to Inquire into the Loss of Her Majesty's Ship "Victoria" by William Henry White.
Report (Sans Diagrams)
IT has been thought desirable by their Lordships that the Minutes of Evidence given before the Court Martial on the logs of the Victoria should be carefully gone through, in order that all important statements made by witnesses on matters relating to the collision between the Camperdown and Victoria, and the circumstances attending the subsequent sinking of the Victoria, should be summarised and classified. Having been directed to undertake this work, I now submit the following remark*.
The Minutes of Evidence being voluminous, and the evidence bearing on the matters above mentioned being scattered over the whole of the Minutes, it appeared necessary to bring together in a tabular form and under various heads a summary of the statements made by various witnesses, giving the substance of each statement, as well as references to the original Minutes of Evidence. This has been done in the "Tabular Summary" annexed hereto, which is a digest of the evidence under the various headings therein contained. The references to the original Minutes will facilitate further investigation by any one desiring to form an independent opinion respecting the relative authority of different witnesses where their opinions differ.
As might be expected under the circumstances, witnesses are not in absolute agreement on every point. In many cases the impressions and estimates of individuals differ.
Such differences do not, however, affect the principal circumstances or the order of events from the time that the manœvre began until the moment when the Victoria sank. On all essential matters there is practical agreement.
The investigations of the Court Martial were most searching, and have put on record in a definite form the causes contributing to the loss of the Victoria. Their Lordships have desired also that I should prepare a Report based upon the enclosed Summary of Evidence, in which the main facts established by the Court Martial should be set out briefly and in order. This has been done in the following pages. For the most part the statements made are supported by unquestioned evidence. Where differences of opinion occur in the evidence, they are indicated: there are in most instances good grounds for reaching a decision, and an attempt is made to decide where the balance of evidence lies. In a few instances the evidence given before the Court Martial has been made the bans of certain calculations, the results of which are stated. Care has been taken to indicate clearly where the evidence is either criticised or supplemented.
From the evidence it is established that before the manœuvre began the ships were proceeding at a speed of 8.8 knots, the two lines being 1,200 yards apart.
When the signal to turn inwards 16 points was hauled down, the helm of the Victoria was put hard to starboard (35 degrees), which corresponded to a tactical diameter of abont 600 yards. At the same moment the helm of the Camperdown was put at 23 degrees to port, which corresponded to a tactical diameter estimated at about 800 yards. Had the helm of the Camperdown been put hard to port, the tactical diameter would have been reduced abont 20 per cent.
The two ships continued to turn under these conditions, until they had each turned through about 8 points, and were very nearly end-on to one another. Their distance apart at that instant was estimated at 2 or 2½ cables (400 to 600 yards). Both ships must then have acquired practically their full "swing" (or angular velocity) corresponding to the conditions of speed and helm-angle above stated. Apart from change of helm or alteration in speed and direction of the engines, the ships would have continued to turn in practically circular arcs from 8 points onward.
At or near the 8 points position it was recognised in both ships that a collision was imminent, and steps were taken to avoid it if possible. The port engines of the Victoria and starboard engines of the Camperdown were ordered to be reversed practically at the same moment for the purpose of making the ships turn more quickly. These orders were given only about a minute before the collision took place. Assuming that the orders were executed with all possible despatch, these engines could have been working astern only a very short time before the collision, so that tha movements of the ships could have been but little affected thereby. The evidence bears out this conclusion.
In the Victoria the order to reverse the port engines was quickly followed by the order to reverse the starboard engines. The tendency, therefore, during the minute preceding the collision, was to somewhat check her headway. Captain Bourke considers she was moving at about 6 knots at the instant of collision. Staff-Commander Hawkins Smith estimates the speed at not more than 5 knots.
In the Camperdown, according to Admiral Markham's and Captain Johnstone's evidence, it was intended to go full speed astern with the starboard screw; but, probably through some misunderstanding or error in working the telegraphs (not fault in the instruments), only three-quarters' speed astern was shown on the dial in the engine-room: and the starboard engines were so worked up to the instant of collision. Almost simultaneously the order was received in the engine-room to stop the pure engines. The evidence of the engineer officer of the watch, and the chief engine-room artificer proves that the port engines were stopped for about one minute—that is, practically up to the instant of collision. They were then ordered to go three-quarters' speed astern. Admiral Markham stated that he ordered full speed; but the seaman working the telegraph asserted that he received the order three-quarters' speed and acted on it. The engine-room staff, of course, only knew what the dial showed, and obeyed that order. While the misunderstanding is to be regretted, it cannot have sensibly influenced the result, since the interval of time was so short.
Witnesses differ in their estimates of the speed of Camperdown when she struck the Victoria. Lieutenant Barr puts it at 4 to 5 knots; Captain Johnstone at 6 knots; Staff-Commander Hawkins Smith at 5 knots; Admiral Markham considered that the way of the ship had not been much checked.
This point admits of independent verification. The engine-room register of Camperdown shows that up to 8 points (90 degrees) in turning, the engines were running at 54 revolutions, corresponding to a speed on a straight course of 8¾ to 9 knots. In turning, this speed would, of course, be reduced. According to records of turning trials of similar ships at about the speed in question, the speed from 8 to 12 points on an approximately circular path would be about 75 per cent, of the speed on a straight course before the helm was put over. The Camperdown's speed therefore at the moment when the starboard engine was reversed and the port engine stopped, must have been about 6¾ knots. In the brief interval—less than a minute—before the collision, this speed could have been but little lessened. Hence it appears that Captain Johnstone's estimate of 6 knots is fairly accurate, and not in excess.
This is confirmed by the fact that, as the Victoria was using abont 25 per cent, greater helm than the Camperdown, her speed on the circular path from 8 to 12 points must have been checked more from that on a straight course than was the case in the Camperdown. Moreover, both the Victoria's engines were reversed before the collision and only one engine in Camperdown. Consequently the Victoria must have been moving more slowly than the Camperdown, and yet her speed as above stated was estimated at 5 to 6 knots.
There is practical agreement that both ships occupied about one minute in turning from 8 to 12 points, in which latter position they were when the collision took place. This estimate of time is confirmed by recorded observations on similar ships made during turning trials; and the fact that they were turning rapidly at the instant of collision had an important influence on the injuries received by both ships. All the witnesses agree that the Camperdown struck the Victoria nearly at right angles. The weight ot evidence is in favour of the view that the keel-line of Camperdown was abont l0 degrees abaft the beam of the Victoria, the keel-lines then being at an angle of about 80 degrees. This is confirmed by an examination of the paths actually traversed under similar circumstances by similar ships when turning from 8 to 12 points.
The blow was delivered on the starboard side of the Victoria, about 65ft. abaft the stem-head, and just before important transverse bulkheads which extended from the keel to the upper deck. These bulkheads are lettered E. and F. where shown on Plates III. to X. [not reproduced.]
With the estimated apeed of 6 knots the "energy" of the blow delivered by the Camperdown must have been about 17,000 to 18,000 foot-tons. This is about the muzzle energy of a 12 in. 45 ton B.L.R. gun, the estimated perforation of its projectile being about 22½ ins. of wrought-iron armour.
Observers agree that this terrific blow delivered on the bow of the Victoria, at a time when she was rapidly turning, caused the fore-end of that vessel to move about 60 or 70 ft. to port. This bodily movement of the Victoria absorbed some of the energy of impact, and tended to lessen the shook and injury done to the structure, even with this reduction the shock must have been very great. It caused a tremor throughout the whole length of the vessel, and the noise of the collision waa heard on board other vessels at some distance from the Victoria.
The upper decks of the two ships were nearly at the same height above water. Before the Camperdown was "brought up"— which must have been done chiefly by the strong under-water protective deck of the Victoria—her stem and ram-bow penetrated some distance into the side of the Victoria.
Observers, for the most part, saw only the damage done to the upper deck of the Victoria. Several of the witnesses spoke of that deck having been broken and injured for a distance of 8 to 11 ft. from the side. Accepting this estimate of the extent to which injury or disturbance was carried, it obviously does not follow that the upper portion of the stem of the Camperdown actually penetrated so far. The best evidence on this point is to be found in the damage done to the bows of the Camperdown. Drawings and photographs have been received showing the nature and extent of that damage. Using this data in association with the evidence given respecting the movements of the ships while they were locked together, it is possible to decide with some certainty how far the Camperdown's stem entered the Victoria. On this basis the actual penetration (normal to the side) of the upper portion of the stem is shown to have been 5½ to 6 ft. (See Plate IX.) [not reproduced.] When the ships collided, as explained above, they were both turning rapidly. Consequently after the bow of the Camperdown was engaged in the side of the Victoria, the sterns swung together to some extent. This fact waa noted by several witnesses. Those most competent to form an opinion (particularly Lieutenant Barr of the Camperdown) state that the movement involved a swinging of the Camperdown relatively to the Victoria through an arc of about 20 degrees. It is stated further that the two ships were locked together for about a minute, before the Camperdown backed astern and cleared—which she did at an angle of about 30 degrees abaft the beam of the Victoria. This swinging together of the two ships exaggerated
