Henry Bradwardine Jackson

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Henry B. Jackson.

Admiral of the Fleet SIR Henry Bradwardine Jackson, G.C.B., K.C.V.O., F.R.S., Royal Navy (21 January, 1855 – 14 December, 1929) was an officer of the Royal Navy and a pioneer in Wireless Telegraphy.

Onset of war

Apparently Jackson was opposed to the continuing escalation of the size of capital ships, telling Admiral Sir George F. King-Hall at the beginning of 1914 that, "He agreed with me that Battleships were getting too big and he had set his face against the 15" guns most determinedly." He was promoted to the rank of Admiral on 10 February, 1914, vice King-Hall. In July, 1914 it was announced that Jackson would succeed Admiral Sir Berkeley Milne as Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet on 10 December. However, when war broke out he was retained for special service at the Admiralty. He was president of the subcommittee of the Committee of Imperial Defence dealing with overseas attack and largely concerned with planning attacks on the German colonies. In October, 1914, after the First Sea Lord Prince Louis of Battenberg had been forced to resign following the agitation over his German birth, the King suggested Jackson as a possible replacement. Churchill did not accept; Jackson no doubt appeared too bland and mild. Churchill chose to recall Fisher.

The Dardanelles Expedition

At the beginning of 1915 Jackson was involved with planning for the Dardanelles expedition where he believed a methodical, although possibly protracted, naval bombardment would permit ships alone to force the straits. By mid-February he had revised his opinion and argued that ships alone would not suffice and a strong military force was necessary to assist in the operations. When the purely naval attack failed on 18 March he was one of those opposing a second naval attack without military support. The stalemate at the Dardanelles after the April landing and the clash between Churchill and Fisher over sending additional naval reinforcements to the Dardanelles led to Fisher's resignation and Churchill's dismissal. In May Balfour became the new First Lord and Jackson First Sea Lord. Jackson appeared to be everyone's second choice and received the job only after Admiral A. K. Wilson declined. He was in some ways an odd selection for he had never commanded a fleet nor seen action at sea; and had been primarily involved in the scientific, technical, and administrative side of the navy. The Balfour–Jackson administration was in sharp contrast to the dynamic though volatile Churchill–Fisher combination. Jackson wrote to his predecessor Fisher, commenting that there was ‘no senior officer who desired the appointment less than I’ (Marder, Fear God, 3.253), and acknowledging he had a very difficult job before him for which he was not fully qualified. On the other hand Jackson was generally acknowledged as highly intelligent, sound, and level-headed. Unfortunately he was also regarded as being in somewhat questionable health and had acquired a reputation for irritability. Barely a month after his appointment Jellicoe wrote to Beatty: ‘I fear Jackson will only get irritated at all this bombardment of letters. I know him so well and told Balfour of this trait in his character’ (Patterson, 1.170). Jackson complained that the mass of paperwork was "overwhelming" and gave him no time for thought. To a certain extent he had himself to blame, for contemporaries alleged that he habitually concerned himself with trivial matters.

The Dardanelles expedition was a particularly pressing problem after Bulgaria entered the war and Serbia was overrun by an overwhelming German, Austrian, and Bulgarian force. An Anglo-French expedition to Salonika proved too little and too late. The loss of Serbia meant that direct rail communications between Germany and Constantinople would soon be supplying ammunition to the Turks. The allied expedition would also face the problem of supply of the army over open beaches at a time of winter gales. It became a problem of ‘Get on or get out’. Jackson was at first inclined to favour another naval attempt and wrote to the naval commander, Admiral de Robeck, on 9 October, 1915, ‘Personally, I say go for Constantinople tooth and nail, without further procrastination or delay’ (Halpern, 5.476). But de Robeck was opposed and Jackson's doubts grew. Subsequently Jackson would consent to a renewed naval attack only if it was made in conjunction with an offensive by the army. This possibility was doomed when Kitchener returned from a tour of inspection at the Dardanelles and recommended evacuation.

Reputation for Indecision

Unfortunately Jackson appeared indecisive, particularly to those who favoured a renewed naval attack. Jackson, for his part, resented the naval commitments necessitated by the new Salonika expedition and found fault with his French and Italian allies in the Mediterranean. By 1916 the shortage of destroyers was evident; there were demands for them everywhere in the face of the submarine danger. Jackson, while admitting the shortage, claimed they were building all they could as rapidly as possible, and grew testy with Jellicoe when the latter complained of the Grand Fleet's shortages. The Balfour–Jackson administration in 1916 gave the impression of apathy and lassitude. It was a combination Admiral Bacon later termed "the philosopher wedded to the scientist" (R. H. Bacon, The Life of Lord Fisher of Kilverstone, 1, 1929, xiii). The vigour associated with Churchill and Fisher was gone. There were no real disasters attributable to Jackson but the indecisive Battle of Jutland meant the Admiralty could not bask in the glory of a great victory. There were more missed opportunities when the High Sea Fleet sortied on 19 August, and in the autumn the Admiralty had the appearance of failing to counter two raids by German destroyers into the channel. Critics of the Admiralty claimed that the Balfour–Jackson regime seemed more to be reacting to events and absorbing blows than initiating them. There was a widespread feeling that an offensive spirit was lacking at the Admiralty and some critics pointed out that the board in general lacked experience of command in battle. Jackson was vulnerable to these charges and despite his merits was not an inspiring wartime leader. The feeling of drift gave way to one of impending crisis as losses to submarines mounted and Jackson was openly pessimistic about defeating them. Asquith grew anxious to replace Jackson, although he was inclined to retain Balfour. By December 1916 Jackson himself was ready to go and indicated to Beatty that it was time a more energetic and experienced Admiral replaced him as he had been away from the sea too long for someone who was responsible for naval operations. He was therefore ready to depart when Jellicoe replaced him as First Sea Lord on 4 December. A few days later the cabinet crisis resulted in a new coalition government with Lloyd George as prime minister, and on 11 December Sir Edward Carson replaced Balfour as First Lord.

Later Years & Reputation

Jackson left the Admiralty to become President of the Royal Naval College, Greenwich where he remained until July, 1919. On 2 April, 1917 he succeeded Sir George Callaghan as First and Principal Naval Aide-de-Camp to the King. In 1919 he was created a G.C.B. On 31 July, 1919, he was promoted Admiral of the Fleet in place of Sir William May, placed on the Retired List. In 1920 he was appointed chairman of the Radio Research Board. On 31 July, 1924 Jackson was placed on the Retired List. He remained active with scientific societies such as the Institution of Electrical Engineers. He was also a vice-president of the Institution of Naval Architects and vice-president of the Seamen's Hospital Society. He was awarded honorary degrees: D.S.C.s from Oxford and Leeds and an L.L.D. from Cambridge. He was also awarded Spanish, Russian, Japanese, and French decorations. Jackson died on 14 December, 1929 at his home, Salterns, on Hayling Island, Hampshire, his wife surviving him. He was buried on 17 December in Hayling Island parish churchyard.

Bibliography

• "Admiral of the Fleet Sir H. B. Jackson" (Obituaries). The Times. Monday, 16 December, 1929. Issue 45387, col A, pg. 19.
• Murfett, Malcolm H. (1995). Murfett, Malcolm H.. ed. The First Sea Lords: From Fisher to Mountbatten. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. ISBN 0-275-94231-7.

Papers

• Papers in the possession of the National Maritime Museum.

Service Records

• The National Archives. ADM 196/38.
• The National Archives. ADM 196/19.

Naval Offices
Preceded by George Le C. Egerton	Assistant Director of Torpedoes 1902 – 1903	Succeeded by The Hon. Alexander E. Bethell
Preceded by Sir William H. May	Third Sea Lord and Controller 1905 – 1908	Succeeded by Sir John R. Jellicoe
Preceded by Lewis Bayly	President of the Royal Naval War College 1911 – 1913	Succeeded by The Hon. Sir Alexander E. Bethell
Preceded by Ernest C. T. Troubridge	Chief of the Admiralty War Staff 1913 – 1914	Succeeded by Sir F. C. Doveton Sturdee
Preceded by The Lord Fisher	First Sea Lord 1915 – 1916	Succeeded by Sir John R. Jellicoe
Preceded by Position Vacant	President of the Royal Naval College, Greenwich 1916 – 1919	Succeeded by Sir William C. Pakenham
Preceded by Sir George A. Callaghan	First and Principal Naval Aide-de-Camp 1917 – 1919	Succeeded by The Hon. Sir Stanley C. J. Colville