The Battle Cruiser in the Royal Navy

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History in the Royal Navy

In an interesting lecture to the Institution of Naval Architects of March, 1893, entitled "On the Present Position of Cruisers in Naval Warfare", Rear-Admiral Samuel Long stated that the size of cruisers had grown to such an extent that it would "justify attaching the name of battle-cruisers to many of them." Later in his talk, he made these remarks:

In considering the duties of cruisers attending on fleets, I shall confine myself to those intended to act as look-out ships, observing that it is possible first-class or battle-cruisers may be attached to fleets to play the part assigned by Lord Howe to his fast-sailing battle-ships on May 28, 1794, so well described by Captain Mahan [a fast squadron harrying the rear of the French battle line]. In fact, it seems not impossible that offensive power and speed may be developed in future battleships at the expense of armoured protection. The duties of scouting for intelligence, while avoiding action, would doubtless be best fulfilled by mercantile auxiliaries and ships like Iris and Mercury.

It is noteworthy that Long publicly thanked Rear-Admiral (later Admiral of the Fleet Lord) John A. Fisher, the Controller of the Navy, and A. John Durston, the Engineer-in-Chief, for their assistance with information on cruisers, it being not implausible that the two of them were aware of what was contained in the paper. A month later, however, Long died following a riding accident.

While Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, Fisher stated:

In regard to Cruisers, the fact has been overlooked that no number of unprotected or unarmoured or smaller type of Cruisers can cope successfully with even one thoroughly powerful first-class armoured Cruiser. An infinite number of ants would not be equal to one armadillo! The armadillo would eat them up one after the other wholesale!"

In a lecture of 1902, Fisher stated that, "It is a cardinal mistake to assume that Battleships and Armoured Cruisers have not each of them a distinct mission." Ruddock Mackay's take on Fisher's lecture was that the armoured cruiser's mission was "to outpace and eliminate enemy cruisers."

In July, 1904, he wrote that, "All are agreed that battleships must for the present be continued, and that their characteristic features, distinguishing them from armoured cruisers, are more powerful guns and more armour." In papers presented to the Earl of Selborne in October, he wrote, "At the present moment naval experience is not sufficiently ripe to abolish totally the building of battleships so long as other countries do not do so." Selborne commented, "Indeed not! The battleship is essential, just as much as 100 years ago. Ask the Japs."

The First Battle Cruisers

A Committee on Designs was instituted by Fisher in December, 1904 and first met on 3 January, 1905, to consider designs for a battleship, an armoured cruiser, and three types of torpedo craft. The terms of reference for the armoured cruiser design were set as follows:

Speed, 25 knots.
Armament, 12-inch guns and anti-torpedo-craft guns. Nothing between. 12-inch guns to be as numerous only as is consistent with the above speed and reasonable proportions.
Armour to be on similar scale to "Minotaur" class.
Docking facilities to be carefully observed.

Admiral Sir Reginald H. S. Bacon, who served as Fisher's Naval Assistant and later as Director of Naval Ordnance (D.N.O.), later gave his opinion on the philosophy behind the battle cruiser:

The speed of the Invincible was definitely fixed at 25 knots. This gave her some margin over the German Transatlantic liners. Hitherto we had subsidized, for a huge annual sum, some of our own liners to fight those of Germany, in spite of the fact that they had never been designed to fight and were totally unfitted to do so. For weeks, however, discussion continued about the armament of the Invincible 9.2-inch versus 12-inch; but in the end the 12-inch gun won on the unanswerable plea that ships, of the size and tonnage necessary in order to build an Invincible, should have an additional use in being able to form a fast light squadron to supplement the battleships in action, and worry the ships in the van or rear of the enemy's line. They were never intended to engage battleships singlehanded; but they were designed to assist in a general action by engaging some of the enemy's ships which were already fighting our battleships.

Indefatigable

One "Large Armoured Cruiser" was included in the 1908-1909 building programme. When discussing the estimates in June, 1907, it had apparently been suggested that two armoured cruisers be constructed, armed with 9,2-inch guns, which were intended for "pressing home a reconnaissance" in addition to commerce protection. Under pressure from the Liberal Cabinet to economise, the number of armoured cruisers was reduced to one. This ship's design, essentially an enlarged Invincible (or Design E.), was approved by the Board of Admiralty in November, 1908. The armoured cruiser was named Indefatigable on 9 December and was laid down at Devonport on 23 February, 1909.

Lion Class

In the 1909-1910 estimates, it was announced that the programme would consist of "4 Battleships (Dreadnought type)", with provision "for the rapid construction of four more large armoured ships, beginning on 1st April of the following financial year [1910]." One of the "4 Battleships" was actually the Lion, laid down on 29 November, 1909. Princess Royal was laid one of the four additional large armoured ships, and was laid down on 2 May, 1910. On the Board of Admiralty, apparently the new Second Sea Lord, Vice-Admiral Sir Francis C. B. Bridgeman, had insisted that the eight capital ships in the 1909-1910 programme be battleships.

The 1910-1911 programme included "5 large armoured ships," of which one was the Queen Mary, laid down on 6 March, 1911.

Tiger

Again in 1911-1912, the programme consisted of five large armoured ships. The Tiger formed part of this programme, and was laid down on 20 June, 1912. As detailed by John Roberts, "The debate on the design of the 1911-1912 battlecruiser continued somewhat longer than in the case of earlier ships." The chief delay was the replacement of McKenna as First Lord by Winston S. Churchill in October, 1911. On 20 November Churchill requested that the tender of the armoured cruiser design be delayed while the design was reviewed, and tender wasn't provisionally accepted until 2 March, 1912. Apparently on 10 November, 1911, Churchill had written to Battenberg, soon to become Second Sea Lord, that he intended to press for the construction of four battle cruisers, but was persuaded to continue building battleships by Briggs, the Controller, and Moore, the D.N.O.

Tactics

Admiralty Weekly Order 351.
Image: Simon Harley.

On 24 November, 1911, Admiralty Weekly Order 351 was promulgated, declaring that, "All cruisers of the "Invincible" and later types are for the future to be described and classified as "battle cruisers," in order to distinguish them from the armoured cruisers of earlier date."

On 31 January, 1913, the Admiralty announced that all cruisers were to be divided into three class, "Battle Cruisers," "Cruisers," and "Light Cruisers." For the first time classes were to be formally "grouped tactically and administratively," and battle cruisers were grouped into battle cruiser squadrons.

In his report on the 1913 naval manœuvres, Vice-Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, Commander-in-Chief of the Red Fleet (representing the German High Sea Fleet), noted first among several points:

(a.) The immense value of battle cruisers of the highest speed.
They dominate the situation absolutely. This has been shown time after time in both the recent and in previous manœuvres. They can drive off any other cruiser with great ease, they can shadow a battle fleet with equal ease, and it is almost impossible to shake them off in the daytime ; the only method by which they can be disposed of is by waiting till dark and then attacking them with destroyers.
A Commander-in-Chief will certainly sacrifice a good deal to compass the destruction of hostile battle cruisers, as he cannot feel safe until they are disposed of.
Battle cruisers, or at any rate some of them, must have a speed at least equal to that attained by the battle cruisers of possible enemies. The value of powerful armament and good protection in a ship of great speed is enormous, but if an opposing vessel has considerably greater speed even with less offensive qualities it will be difficult to shake off.

In his "Remarks on the Conduct of a Fleet in Action", dated 5 December, 1913, the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleets, gave the "principal functions" of the battle cruiser in action:

Battle-Cruisers. — The primary function must be that of engaging the battle-cruisers of the enemy. There are many reasons for this, the most important being that, owing to their great power and speed, battle-cruisers, if not in the line of battle, can force all inferior vessels to give way, and, consequently, if the enemy’s battle-cruisers are not “held,” their power to inflict damage on ships of weaker types is unchecked, and they are able to assume positions from which they can concentrate on, or enfilade, the line of battle, cover the attack of light-cruisers and torpedo-craft, etc.
If the enemy has no battle-cruisers with his fleet, the function of our battle-cruisers may be an equally definite one; they may be employed as a fast division of the battle-fleet, or comparative freedom of action may be given to the Admiral commanding to attack the enemy in the manner (indicated above) he may judge best.

Upon receiving some papers from Rear-Admiral Beatty, Churchill wrote back on 15 April, 1914, with his thoughts on the usage of the battle cruiser:

In your enumeration of battle cruiser functions ought you not to include what is to my mind the most formidable and disconcerting of all, viz — rupturing an enemy's cruiser line and attacking his cruisers of all kinds wherever found.
This is what bothers us: and surely we should also make it bother them.

Redistribution of the Battle Cruisers

In July, 1914, the Board approved a future reorganisation of cruisers in full commission. Upon Tiger being ready for service, Invincible would join the battle cruisers in the Mediterranean, and that New Zealand would join them "as soon as convenient." In March, 1915, also the date of Rear-Admiral Beatty's time being up, the First Battle Cruiser Squadron would be split up, and with eight light cruisers formed into two separate mixed cruiser squadrons. The Rear-Admiral Commanding the Third Cruiser Squadron would transfer his flag from Antrim to Tiger. In December, 1915, the four battle cruisers in the Mediterranean would return to Home Waters, and with eight Calliope class light cruisers would be split into the Third and Fourth Mixed Cruiser Squadrons. These new squadrons are referred to as either Cruiser Squadrons or Battle Cruiser Squadrons.

Under this arrangement, it was envisaged that in December, 1915 the battle and light cruisers of the First Fleet would be composed thus:

First Cruiser Squadron	Second Cruiser Squadron	Third Cruiser Squadron	Fourth Cruiser Squadron
Lion	Princess Royal	Indefatigable	Inflexible
Tiger	Queen Mary	Indomitable	Invincible
Royalist	Penelope	Cordelia	Conquest
Undaunted	Galatea	Caroline	Cleopatra
Aurora	Inconstant	Comus	Calliope
Arethusa	Phaeton	Champion	Carysfort

While Moltke was in the Mediterranean, New Zealand was to remain there. If not, she was to join the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron in the First Fleet. The withdrawal of the battle cruisers from the Mediterranean was to be compensated for by the transfer of the five oldest dreadnought battleships to that theatre, and the pre-dreadnoughts Queen, London and Bulwark. In April, 1917 these three ships would be replaced by St. Vincent and Vanguard.

Great War

Post-Jutland

On 3 September, 1916, Jellicoe replied to a missive from Beatty:

With regards to your letter of 25 August, B.C.F.01, renewing your request that the Fifth Battle Squadron may be attached to the Battle Cruiser Fleet, I do not concur in this proposal, as I consider such a division of the Battle Fleet to be strategically unsound.
2. The supposed new enemy disposition, to which you refer, does not lead me to modify this view; indeed, I consider it to be a false move on his part and advantageous to us, since it reduces the speed of his battle-cruisers to that of the attached battleships.
3. The function of our battle-cruisers is that of a powerful scouting force; the addition of battleships of lower speed is a handicap to the scouting force.
4. I do not consider that the events of 31 May show that the presence of the Fifth Battle Squadron was preferable to that of the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron. I should have preferred the whole of the battle-cruisers in company, as the superiority over the German First Scouting Group would have been more marked, since all the battle-cruisers would have been in action from the commencement and their speed would have admitted of their keeping out of range of the enemy battle fleet.

Bibliography

• Template:BibBrownWarriorToDreadnought
• Template:BibBrownTheGrandFleet
• Doig, Captain (S) D. H. An Analysis of the Battlecruiser 1906-1948. 1985.477/13. Royal Naval Museum, Portsmouth.
• Template:BibLambertNavalRevolution
• Template:BibMackayFisherOfKilverstone
• Template:BibRobertsBattlecruisers
• Template:BibSeligmannNewWeapons
• Template:BibSumidaIDNS