A Direct Train of Cordite

On 14 July, 1916, the Vice-Admiral Commanding the Battle Cruiser Fleet, Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, sent a letter to the Admiralty:

Sir,

Be pleased to lay the following remarks before Their Lordships:-

2. Since the recent Battle of Jutland it has been very strongly brought home to me that I can recall no single instance of a German warship blowing up, as unhappily occurred in the case of "QUEEN MARY", "INVINCIBLE", "INDEFATIGABLE", and "DEFENCE".

3. This fact is the more remarkable since on several occasions German battle-cruisers and light cruisers have been subjected to far heavier punishment by gunfire than was experienced by these three battle-cruisers. As instance, the "BLUCHER", on 24th January, 1915, when lying over practically on her beam ends was repeatedly hit by heavy shell, some of which, entering through the unprotected bottom, must have penetrated to and burst in or near her magazines. Again, a light cruiser on 31st May, 1916, having been reduced to a sinking condition by the fire of the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron and 1st Cruiser Squadron, passed the whole length of the Battle Line under heavy fire, and burning ferociously, but yet did not blow up. On 28th August, 1914, the "KOLN" was under the concentrated fire of five battle-cruisers at about 6000 yards for some minutes. She sank, but there was no trace of an explosion. Other instances could be cited, but these are sufficient for the purpose.

4. I have personally, both on 24th August and on May 31st seen high columns of flame rising from German ships, which could only have been caused by magazine fires, yet in no case did I witness any semblance to an explosion to this cause.

5. The immunity of German cruisers of all types to these disastrous explosions may be attributable to the following differences, which I understand exist between British and German methods:-

(a) For 12" guns and below, the propellant is not exposed and fitted with a highly sensitive igniter, is contained either in a light metallic envelope or a brass cylinder. In either case, in all probability, the charge is impervious to flash.

(b) In heavy ships- Adequate protection which ensures the burst of an A.P. shell before it reaches the immediate vicinity of a magazine. There is also the belief, held by many officers, that the turret magazines are placed under the shell rooms and next to the inner bottom.

6. Should these two reasons be held as sufficient to account for the absence of disruptive explosions when German ships are literally riddled by shell fire at close range, there is still required an explanation of how it is possible in German ships for very large cordite fires to arise, and apparently burn out, without any visible explosion. In this connection, on 24th January a turret in the "SEYDLITZ" was seen to be surrounded by sheets of flame, rising as high as her masthead, and obviously due to fire in the magazine. Had such a situation arisen in a British ship, in the light of recent events it seems certain that she would have been totally destroyed in the space of a few moments.

7. From the various reports of eye-witnesses and survivors, the destruction of the "QUEEN MARY" and "INDEFATIGABLE" appears in each case have instantaneously followed their being struck by an accurate salvo. Both ships up to this moment shewed no signs of distress and had received but slight punishment. The extracts from Despatches, given in the Appendix, are of importance since in the case of "QUEEN MARY" and "INVINCIBLE" a hit on, or abreast, "Q" turret was observed immediately before the explosion. A similar explosion under "Q" turret of "LION" was avoided by the presence of mind of the Officer of the Turret, but in this case an interval of 20 to 30 minutes elapsed between the burst of the shell and the resulting explosion of ammunition below the turret. Perhaps the cause of the final explosion in the "AUDACIOUS" has been explained, and might bear some connection to these cases.

8. Consideration of the points I have mentioned leads to the conclusion that either our methods of ship construction are seriously at fault or that the nature of the ammunition we use is not sufficiently stable to ensure safety. The catastrophes which occurred on May 31st must be due to one or both of these causes. From the behaviour of German ships, these are proved not to be insuperable. It is noted that no case has been reported of a British Destroyer blowing up, although several have now been sunk by gunfire.

9. I therefore most strongly urge that it should be accepted that a radical fault does exist, and that the best brains in the country are necessary to assist in its speedy removal in existing ships and its prevention in new construction. To this end I suggest that Committees of the greatest experts should be formed, and no expense or trouble spared to thoroughly investigate the following amongst other points. I assume that the measures taken by the Admiralty since the action are not in any way final or other than temporary expedients; to my mind the cure is farther to seek.

10. Points particularly recommended for investigation:

The Director of Naval Ordnance and Torpedoes, Rear-Admiral Morgan Singer, wrote on 3 August:

Submitted:-

While not wishing to minimise in any way the seriousness of the events of 31st May, I am convinced that the blowing up of our ships in that action was caused not so much by the greater inflammability of our propellant as by the system of supply which we unfortunately practised i.e. magazine doors open, lids off powder cases, all cages and waiting positions loaded; thus should a shell burst in working chamber or trunk, as I have no doubt occurred at least in on case "Invincible", there was every possibility of the flash being carried direct to the magazine.

As regards the case of the "Seydlitz", mentioned in paragraph 6 of Vice-Admirals's letter, it was the custom in German turrets (to go by report on "Goeben") to keep charges in ready racks in the turrets, these probably caught fire during the action of 24th January, 1915 and the turret ports &c., forming a good vent the flame would be very visible; the cartridges being protected would not pass the flash to the magazine, I also suggest that the Germans on 24th January, 1915, had good experience of what heavy shell fire meant which we certainly had not, the former have therefore most probably profited by their experience in increasing their deck protection and preventing any accumulation of powder charges.

The Germans use, according to our latest information, a nitro-glycerine powder in their Naval Service somewhat similar to our M.D. powder and we know that in their guns up to 11-inch brass cartridges are used for the rear charge and some sort of metallic envelope which is consumed in the gun and above but I understand that considerable difficulty was experienced with such heavy brass cases in extracting and getting rid of them after firing.

The Vice Admiral appears to think that cordite if ignited in the open or only lightly confined will explode, this is not so, it burns rapidly giving off a large quantity of gas; in the "Lion" the charges did not explode but the evolution of gas was sufficient to carry the flash down the trunk, as the nearest vent, into the shell room igniting some charges in the handing room en route, [underlined in red pencil] had the magazine been open and lids off the powder cases undoubtedly the magazine would have blown up.
Taking the points mentioned in paragraph 3 of Vice-Admiral[']s letter seriatim:

(a) As far as the gun mounting is concerned it would be arranged in new designs for the magazine to be under the shell room.

(b) A constructive question.

(c) The question of roof plates has been dealt with for existing for existing and future turrets.

(d) This is being considered in new designs & in accordance with instructions of 3rd Sea Lord.

(e) The necessity for this is very doubtful but requires consideration.

(f) This no doubt requires consideration[,] it is difficult to arrange a flash door which would always be shut except when the cage is actually passing it; at present flash doors open in one direction and are kept open during the time the G.L. cage is up. In the case of the "Lion" the burst of the shell did not directly ignite the cordite charges, it is impossible to say what did cause them to ignite 20 minutes later, nor is it known why the charges were not sent down as all gear in the working chamber was intact i.e. no vital damage was done in working chamber or to charges by the actual blast of the shell, one flash door was on this occasion open as the cage was up.

(g) Trials have shewn that igniters are very little more inflammable than the cordite itself, and in any case the protecting discs now fitted to igniters afford more protection to the charge en route to the gun than if there were no igniter and no disc.

(h) Requires consideration and research.

(i) As before remarked the apparent immunity mentioned is considered to be due to the protection of charges and care taken to prevent any accumulation, not to the nature of the propellant.

(j) This is not understood

(k) There is a possibility, in shell fuzed with No. 13 fuze, if the fuze were hit fair by a fragment, of the shell detonating; all trotyl shell have No. 45 which has a sealing device, orders have been given to withdraw heavy lyddite common shell as soon as possible.

(l) Orders have been given prohibiting stowage of H.E. Shell in gun houses and working chambers of turrets.

(m) I think that if the point under (h) can be solved it would be the sounder plan than attempting to introduce the Q.F. principle for heavy guns. As regards light guns the objections to the Q.F. Principle are well known and we have experience from 6-inch calibre downwards; I think that adequate protection of the charge from magazine to gun overcomes the danger and risk of bare charges and this can be arranged with some possible loss in rapidity of fire.

Taking Vice Admiral[']s suggestions as a whole there appears to be scope for investigation of several important points, though with the exception of the provision of metal envelopes for charges the points to be dealt with are connected with ship and gun mounting designs.

 M. Singer

 D.N.O.

 -3 Aug. 1916

Tudor minuted on 26 October:

This is a somewhat severe criticism of our ship construction, and I do not feel that it is justified – especially after reading DNC's report.

Immediate and far-reaching steps were taken directly after the action of 31st May, which have put the whole of our armoured ships on a much better footing; and practically all of the points mentioned by Admiral Beatty have received attention.

I propose to investigate further para (a), (b), (d), (e), (f), (h), & L of DNC, and steps should be taken forthwith.

There is very little doubt in my mind that in the great anxiety to attain a rapid rate of fire, the ordinary precautions for safety of cordite cartridges have been gradually relaxed, until at last the test of the enemy's shells has proved the danger of what was being done. -Stringent orders and precautionary and protective measures have now been taken to safeguard charges; and I feel confident that they will have the desired effect.

I do not agree that we should gain anything by the proposed committee (para. 9 of Vice-Admiral's letter). I feel greater confidence in the opinions of Naval Officers who know all the interests involved and are not slow to recommend any definite improvement, which it is their continual endeavour to suggest; and that these proposals should receive the careful consideration of the Admiralty, as is now the procedure.

It seems desirable that a reply should be carefully drafted embodying the gist of DNO's and DNC's remarks, and laying great stress on the undoubted improper exposure of cordite during this action.

FCTT
26/10/16

Jackson noted beneath:

Concur generally with 3.S.L. A reply should be sent, stating also in what direction investigations will be made.

Experiments with cordite in the magazines of some old ship are most desirable to ascertain the effect of burning charges & a programme should be prepared.

HBJ
27/10/16

The sections italicised in Tudor's minute were highlighted in red pencil, and the bottom of the minute sheet has been signed in red by the First Lord, Arthur Balfour.

On 16 November Tudor minuted:

Noted.

Action on all material points has been taken on other papers.

I am in full agreement with D.N.C. as to the cause of the explosions in our Battle and Armoured Cruisers. There is no evidence to show that any enemy shell penetrated to the magazines of our ships, on the contrary the immunity of engine and boiler rooms generally, points to exactly the opposite conclusion.

On the other hand there can be no doubt that the amount of exposed cordite about the ships was enormous and that as regards turrets, if bare charges were permitted to remain in the handing rooms, as there is every reason to believe was the case, these must have furnished trains of explosives to the magazines.

The very narrow escape of "LION" from blowing up affords an immediate explanation of the disasters which occurred to the other ships.

Even with the precautions which have been taken since the action, I do not feel that we are safe without more efficient control of the ammunition parties, who are, in most ships, I have little doubt, in isolated positions without Officers. This is due not only to the unavoidable stringency in Officers, but also because such an abnormal number are required for control of fire.

The question of Officering the ammunition supply parties is one which has caused me grave concern for over 25 years, but the difficulty seems to be almost insuperable.

One of the most unfortunate results of this Battle has possible [sic] been to give a false idea as to the necessity and value of armour protection; we should all like to have as much armour as possible, but for every ton we add some other feature of the design has to be sacrificed.

The "RENOWN" and "REPULSE" for example, for which such exertions and sacrifices have been made, will now be demobilised for many weeks and then speed and draught will never be what they were designed for.

FCTT 16/11/11

Sir Henry Jackson wrote on 17 November:

The summary of information elicited from the perusal of these papers should be edited to remove any question of personal criticism, & prepared for issue to the Fleet as in the case of the T.B.Ds.

I feel sure the drawing prepared by DNC of the tracks of projectiles & the deductions drawn would be received with great interest.

17/11/16

HBJ

In a minute of 19 December, D'Eyncourt claimed:

The point of particular interest noted from a perusal of the reports from the Commanding Officers of the Battle Cruisers, Cruisers, and Light Cruisers, engaged in the action of the 31st May 1916, is that the Battle Cruisers were in action against enemy Battle Cruisers and Battle-ships, and that the three ships, "Indefatigable", "Queen Mary" and "Invincible" that were lost, were blown up during the early part of the action when engaged with enemy Battle Cruisers. These three ships were sunk before they had received heavy punishment and the deduction is that the flame reached the turret magazines, causing them to explode.

It is now the generally accepted opinion that the fault to which these explosions may be attributed lay in the method adopted in the transportation of charges to the guns, whereby these charges which were not in non-inflammable cases had an open course from the magazine to the gun. This, in association with the number of charges that were usually in the Handing-Room, Revolving Trunk, Working Chamber, and Gun House provided a direct train of cordite from the turret to the magazine.

There would seem to be an impression in the Fleet that these three ships were lost because enemy shells penetrated the lower protective deck and exploded either in the magazine or so close to it as to ignite the contents. This is not substantiated by a detailed examination of all the reports that have been received, and in the ships that returned from the engagement there is no known case of an enemy shell travelling so far down before bursting and only one known case (that of "Barham") where a shell, which burst a short distance beyond the point of penetration, sent a fragment so far into the ship. Further, there were very few cases where fragments of projectiles penetrated the protective deck over the machinery spaces, which occupy a much larger portion of the ship than the magazines, are in the midship part of the ship, and are not better protected.

As this matter is of extreme importance the accompanying diagrams have been prepared which show, by means of vertical sections through the path of the shell, all the principal hits and bursts that have been traced in the Battle Cruisers, and Battle-ships engaged. It will be seen that these do not bear out the contention that enemy shells can penetrate the lower protective decks of modern Battle Cruisers, and Battle-ships, before they burst, not that they burst so far beyond the point of entry as to explode in the immediate vicinity of the magazines. If the impression that enemy shells can do this amount of damage be allowed to remain it will lead to demands for a further considerable increase in protection in future warship construction, and the result will be that ships will become very much greater in displacement and cost, without proportionate increase in armament, as a greater proportion of the total weight will be given up to protection than hitherto.

The fundamental maxim of British Warship design has been that the best defence is superior power of offence and it is considered that this action shows this maxim to be essentially sound, as although British Battle Cruisers were in action with enemy Battle-ships they were not then put out of action, whereas the more heavily protected and less heavily armed German ships received very severe punishment.

E. H. T. D'E.
19.12.16

On 22 December Tudor wrote to Jellicoe:

1st Sea Lord

D.N.C. has drawn up the enclosed memorandum marked 'A' on the damage inflicted on our Battle Cruisers & Battle Ships in the Jutland Battle.

The drawings he has had got out should be of great value & interest to the Fleet[.] I do not know if you would wish the memorandum issued.

Referred.

FCTT
22.12.16

The same day Jellicoe minuted:

The memorandum should certainly not be issued. It does not at all represent the the views of officers at sea & I do not agree with it. No objection of the drawings.

JRJ

22/12

Tudor initialled his acknowledgement the following day.