The Battle Cruiser in the Royal Navy: Difference between revisions

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<blockquote>''Battle-Cruisers''. &mdash; The primary function must be that of engaging the battle-cruisers of the enemy. There are many reasons for this, the most important being that, owing to their great power and speed, battle-cruisers, if not in the line of battle, can force all inferior vessels to give way, and, consequently, if the enemy’s battle-cruisers are not “held,” their power to inflict damage on ships of weaker types is unchecked, and they are able to assume positions from which they can concentrate on, or enfilade, the line of battle, cover the attack of light-cruisers and torpedo-craft, etc.<br>If the enemy has no battle-cruisers with his fleet, the function of our battle-cruisers may be an equally definite one; they may be employed as a fast division of the battle-fleet, or comparative freedom of action may be given to the Admiral commanding to attack the enemy in the manner (indicated above) he may judge best.<ref>''Naval Tactical Notes.  Volume I''.  O.U. 6183.  p. 35.  My thanks to Stephen McLaughlin for this document.</ref></blockquote>
<blockquote>''Battle-Cruisers''. &mdash; The primary function must be that of engaging the battle-cruisers of the enemy. There are many reasons for this, the most important being that, owing to their great power and speed, battle-cruisers, if not in the line of battle, can force all inferior vessels to give way, and, consequently, if the enemy’s battle-cruisers are not “held,” their power to inflict damage on ships of weaker types is unchecked, and they are able to assume positions from which they can concentrate on, or enfilade, the line of battle, cover the attack of light-cruisers and torpedo-craft, etc.<br>If the enemy has no battle-cruisers with his fleet, the function of our battle-cruisers may be an equally definite one; they may be employed as a fast division of the battle-fleet, or comparative freedom of action may be given to the Admiral commanding to attack the enemy in the manner (indicated above) he may judge best.<ref>''Naval Tactical Notes.  Volume I''.  O.U. 6183.  p. 35.  My thanks to Stephen McLaughlin for this document.</ref></blockquote>
Upon receiving some papers from Rear-Admiral Beatty, Churchill wrote back on 15 April, 1914, with his thoughts on the usage of the battle cruiser:
<blockquote>In your enumeration of battle cruiser functions ought you not to include what is to my mind the most formidable and disconcerting of all, ''viz'' &mdash; rupturing an enemy's cruiser line and attacking his cruisers of all kinds wherever found.<br>This is what bothers us: and surely we should also make it bother them.<ref>''Winston S. Churchill.  Companion Volume II.  Part 3.''  pp. 1974-1975.</ref></blockquote>


===Redistribution of the Battle Cruisers===
===Redistribution of the Battle Cruisers===

Revision as of 08:49, 9 December 2010

This page is a draft.

History in the Royal Navy

While Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, Fisher stated:

In regard to Cruisers, the fact has been overlooked that no number of unprotected or unarmoured or smaller type of Cruisers can cope successfully with even one thoroughly powerful first-class armoured Cruiser. An infinite number of ants would not be equal to one armadillo! The armadillo would eat them up one after the other wholesale!"[1]

In a lecture of 1902, Fisher stated that, "It is a cardinal mistake to assume that Battleships and Armoured Cruisers have not each of them a distinct mission." Ruddock Mackay's take on Fisher's lecture was that the armoured cruiser's mission was "to outpace and eliminate enemy cruisers."[2]

In July, 1904, he wrote that, "All are agreed that battleships must for the present be continued, and that their characteristic features, distinguishing them from armoured cruisers, are more powerful guns and more armour."[3] In papers presented to the Earl of Selborne in October, he wrote, "At the present moment naval experience is not sufficiently ripe to abolish totally the building of battleships so long as other countries do not do so." Selborne commented, "Indeed not! The battleship is essential, just as much as 100 years ago. Ask the Japs."[4]

A Committee on Designs was instituted by Fisher in December, 1904 and first met on 3 January, 1905, to consider designs for a battleship, an armoured cruiser, and three types of torpedo craft.[5] The terms of reference for the armoured cruiser design were set as follows:

Speed, 25 knots.
Armament, 12-inch guns and anti-torpedo-craft guns. Nothing between. 12-inch guns to be as numerous only as is consistent with the above speed and reasonable proportions.
Armour to be on similar scale to "Minotaur" class.
Docking facilities to be carefully observed.[6]

Admiral Sir Reginald H. S. Bacon, who served as Fisher's Naval Assistant and later as Director of Naval Ordnance (D.N.O.), later gave his opinion on the philosophy behind the battle cruiser:

The speed of the Invincible was definitely fixed at 25 knots. This gave her some margin over the German Transatlantic liners. Hitherto we had subsidized, for a huge annual sum, some of our own liners to fight those of Germany, in spite of the fact that they had never been designed to fight and were totally unfitted to do so. For weeks, however, discussion continued about the armament of the Invincible 9.2-inch versus 12-inch; but in the end the 12-inch gun won on the unanswerable plea that ships, of the size and tonnage necessary in order to build an Invincible, should have an additional use in being able to form a fast light squadron to supplement the battleships in action, and worry the ships in the van or rear of the enemy's line. They were never intended to engage battleships singlehanded; but they were designed to assist in a general action by engaging some of the enemy's ships which were already fighting our battleships.[7]

One "Large Armoured Cruiser" was included in the 1908-1909 building programme.[8] When discussing the estimates in June, 1907, it had apparently been suggested that two armoured cruisers be constructed, armed with 9,2-inch guns, which were intended for "pressing home a reconnaissance" in addition to commerce protection. Under pressure from the Liberal Cabinet to economise, the number of armoured cruisers was reduced to one.[9] This ship's design, essentially an enlarged Invincible (or Design E.), was approved by the Board of Admiralty in November, 1908. The armoured cruiser was named Indefatigable on 9 December and was laid down at Devonport on 23 February, 1909.[10]

In the 1909-1910 estimates, it was announced that the programme would consist of "4 Battleships (Dreadnought type)", with provision "for the rapid construction of four more large armoured ships, beginning on 1st April of the following financial year [1910]."[11] One of the "4 Battleships" was actually the Lion, laid down on 29 November, 1909. Princess Royal was laid one of the four additional large armoured ships, and was laid down on 2 May, 1910. On the Board of Admiralty, apparently the new Second Sea Lord, Vice-Admiral Sir Francis C. B. Bridgeman, had insisted that the eight capital ships in the 1909-1910 programme be battleships.[12]

The 1910-1911 programme included "5 large armoured ships,"[13] of which one was the Queen Mary, laid down on 6 March, 1911.

Again in 1911-1912, the programme consisted of five large armoured ships.[14] The Tiger formed part of this programme, and was laid down on 20 June, 1912. As detailed by John Roberts, "The debate on the design of the 1911-1912 battlecruiser continued somewhat longer than in the case of earlier ships." The chief delay was the replacement of McKenna as First Lord by Winston S. Churchill in October, 1911. On 20 November Churchill requested that the tender of the armoured cruiser design be delayed while the design was reviewed, and tender wasn't provisionally accepted until 2 March, 1912.[15] Apparently on 10 November, 1911, Churchill had written to Battenberg, soon to become Second Sea Lord, that he intended to press for the construction of four battle cruisers, but was persuaded to continue building battleships by Briggs, the Controller, and Moore, the D.N.O.[16]

Tactical Use

In his "Remarks on the Conduct of a Fleet in Action", dated 5 December, 1913, the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleets gave the "principal functions" of the battle cruiser in action:

Battle-Cruisers. — The primary function must be that of engaging the battle-cruisers of the enemy. There are many reasons for this, the most important being that, owing to their great power and speed, battle-cruisers, if not in the line of battle, can force all inferior vessels to give way, and, consequently, if the enemy’s battle-cruisers are not “held,” their power to inflict damage on ships of weaker types is unchecked, and they are able to assume positions from which they can concentrate on, or enfilade, the line of battle, cover the attack of light-cruisers and torpedo-craft, etc.
If the enemy has no battle-cruisers with his fleet, the function of our battle-cruisers may be an equally definite one; they may be employed as a fast division of the battle-fleet, or comparative freedom of action may be given to the Admiral commanding to attack the enemy in the manner (indicated above) he may judge best.[17]

Upon receiving some papers from Rear-Admiral Beatty, Churchill wrote back on 15 April, 1914, with his thoughts on the usage of the battle cruiser:

In your enumeration of battle cruiser functions ought you not to include what is to my mind the most formidable and disconcerting of all, viz — rupturing an enemy's cruiser line and attacking his cruisers of all kinds wherever found.
This is what bothers us: and surely we should also make it bother them.[18]

Redistribution of the Battle Cruisers

In July, 1914, the Board approved a future reorganisation of cruisers in full commission. Upon Tiger being ready for service, Invincible would join the battle cruisers in the Mediterranean, and that New Zealand would join them "as soon as convenient." In March, 1915, also the date of Rear-Admiral Beatty's time being up, the First Battle Cruiser Squadron would be split up, and with eight light cruisers formed into two separate mixed cruiser squadrons. The Rear-Admiral Commanding the Third Cruiser Squadron would transfer his flag from Antrim to Tiger. In December, 1915, the four battle cruisers in the Mediterranean would return to Home Waters, and with eight Calliope class light cruisers would be split into the Third and Fourth Mixed Cruiser Squadrons. These new squadrons are referred to as either Cruiser Squadrons or Battle Cruiser Squadrons.

Under this arrangement, it was envisaged that in December, 1915 the batttle and light cruisers of the First Fleet would be composed thus:

First Cruiser Squadron Second Cruiser Squadron Third Cruiser Squadron Fourth Cruiser Squadron
Lion RAdm.png Princess Royal RAdm.png Indefatigable RAdm.png Inflexible RAdm.png
Tiger Queen Mary Indomitable Invincible
Royalist Penelope Cordelia Conquest
Undaunted Galatea Caroline Cleopatra
Aurora Inconstant Comus Calliope
Arethusa Phaeton Champion Carysfort

While Moltke was in the Mediterranean, New Zealand was to remain there. If not, she was to join the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron in the First Fleet. The withdrawal of the battle cruisers from the Mediterranean was to be compensated for by the transfer of the five oldest dreadnought battleships to that theatre, and the pre-dreadnoughts Queen, London and Bulwark. In April, 1917 these three ships would be replaced by St. Vincent and Vanguard.[19]

Footnotes

  1. ↑ Quoted in Mackay. In light of this statement, it would be interesting to learn Fisher's opinion on the question of Goeben as a "Superior Force" in comparison to the First Cruiser Squadron in 1914.
  2. ↑ Mackay. pp. 269-270.
  3. ↑ Quoted in Fisher Papers. II. p. 28.
  4. ↑ Quoted in Fisher Papers. II. p. 41.
  5. ↑ Fisher Papers. I. pp. 198-201.
  6. ↑ Quoted in Bacon. p. 259.
  7. ↑ Quoted in Bacon. p. 256.
  8. ↑ Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty Explanatory of the Navy Estimates, 1908-1909. Cd. 3913. p. 4.
  9. ↑ Mackay. pp. 386-389.
  10. ↑ Roberts. p. 28.
  11. ↑ Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty Explanatory of the Navy Estimates, 1909-1910. Cd. 4553. pp. 3-4.
  12. ↑ Lambert. "Sir John Fisher and the Concept of Flotilla Defence, 1905-1909." p. 644.
  13. ↑ Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty Explanatory of the Navy Estimates, 1910-1911. Cd. 5063. p. 3.
  14. ↑ Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty Explanatory of the Navy Estimates, 1911-1912. Cd. 5547. p. 3.
  15. ↑ Roberts. pp. 36-38.
  16. ↑ Sumida. pp.258-259.
  17. ↑ Naval Tactical Notes. Volume I. O.U. 6183. p. 35. My thanks to Stephen McLaughlin for this document.
  18. ↑ Winston S. Churchill. Companion Volume II. Part 3. pp. 1974-1975.
  19. ↑ This section on future dispositions is based on "Battle and Cruiser Squadrons-Programme." The National Archives. ADM 1/8383/179. My thanks to Stephen McLaughlin for supplying me with a copy of this docket.

Bibliography

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