The Battle Cruiser in the Royal Navy: Difference between revisions
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The terms of reference for the armoured cruiser design were set as follows: | The terms of reference for the armoured cruiser design were set as follows: | ||
<blockquote>Speed, 25 knots. | <blockquote>Speed, 25 knots.<br>Armament, 12-inch guns and anti-torpedo-craft guns. Nothing between. 12-inch guns to be as numerous only as is consistent with the above speed and reasonable proportions.<br>Armour to be on similar scale to "Minotaur" class.<br>Docking facilities to be carefully observed.<ref>Quoted in Bacon. p. 259.</ref></blockquote> | ||
Armament, 12-inch guns and anti-torpedo-craft guns. Nothing between. 12-inch guns to be as numerous only as is consistent with the above speed and reasonable proportions. | |||
Armour to be on similar scale to "Minotaur" class. | |||
Docking facilities to be carefully observed.<ref>Quoted in Bacon. p. 259.</ref></blockquote> | |||
Admiral [[Reginald Hugh Spencer Bacon|Sir Reginald H. S. Bacon]], who served as Fisher's Naval Assistant and later [[Director of Naval Ordnance and Torpedoes (Royal Navy)|Director of Naval Ordnance]] (D.N.O.), later gave his opinion on the philosophy behind the battle cruiser: | Admiral [[Reginald Hugh Spencer Bacon|Sir Reginald H. S. Bacon]], who served as Fisher's Naval Assistant and later [[Director of Naval Ordnance and Torpedoes (Royal Navy)|Director of Naval Ordnance]] (D.N.O.), later gave his opinion on the philosophy behind the battle cruiser: |
Revision as of 18:51, 28 November 2010
This page is a draft.
While Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, Fisher stated:
In regard to Cruisers, the fact has been overlooked that no number of unprotected or unarmoured or smaller type of Cruisers can cope successfully with even one thoroughly powerful first-class armoured Cruiser. An infinite number of ants would not be equal to one armadillo! The armadillo would eat them up one after the other wholesale!"[1]
In July, 1904, he wrote that, "All are agreed that battleships must for the present be continued, and that their characteristic features, distinguishing them from armoured cruisers, are more powerful guns and more armour."[2] In papers presented to the Earl of Selborne in October, he wrote, "At the present moment naval experience is not sufficiently ripe to abolish totally the building of battleships so long as other countries do not do so." Selborne commented, "Indeed not! The battleship is essential, just as much as 100 years ago. Ask the Japs."[3]
The terms of reference for the armoured cruiser design were set as follows:
Speed, 25 knots.
Armament, 12-inch guns and anti-torpedo-craft guns. Nothing between. 12-inch guns to be as numerous only as is consistent with the above speed and reasonable proportions.
Armour to be on similar scale to "Minotaur" class.
Docking facilities to be carefully observed.[4]
Admiral Sir Reginald H. S. Bacon, who served as Fisher's Naval Assistant and later Director of Naval Ordnance (D.N.O.), later gave his opinion on the philosophy behind the battle cruiser:
The speed of the Invincible was definitely fixed at 25 knots. This gave her some margin over the German Transatlantic liners. Hitherto we had subsidized, for a huge annual sum, some of our own liners to fight those of Germany, in spite of the fact that they had never been designed to fight and were totally unfitted to do so. For weeks, however, discussion continued about the armament of the Invincible 9.2-inch versus 12-inch; but in the end the 12-inch gun won on the unanswerable plea that ships, of the size and tonnage necessary in order to build an Invincible, should have an additional use in being able to form a fast light squadron to supplement the battleships in action, and worry the ships in the van or rear of the enemy's line. They were never intended to engage battleships singlehanded; but they were designed to assist in a general action by engaging some of the enemy's ships which were already fighting our battleships.[5]
One "Large Armoured Cruiser" was included in the 1908-1909 building programme.[6] This was the Indefatigable.
In the 1909-1910 estimates, it was announced that the programme would consist of "4 Battleships (Dreadnought type)", with provision "for the rapid construction of four more large armoured ships, beginning on 1st April of the following financial year [1910]."[7] One of the "4 Battleships" was actually the Lion, laid down on 29 November, 1909. Princess Royal was laid one of the four additional large armoured ships, and was laid down on 2 May, 1910. On the Board of Admiralty, apparently the new Second Sea Lord, Vice-Admiral Sir Francis C. B. Bridgeman, had insisted that the eight capital ships in the 1909-1910 programme be battleships.[8]
The 1910-1911 programme included "5 large armoured ships,"[9] of which one was the Queen Mary, laid down on 6 March, 1911.
Again in 1911-1912, the programme consisted of five large armoured ships.[10] The Tiger formed part of this programme, and was laid down on 20 June, 1912. As detailed by John Roberts, "The debate on the design of the 1911-1912 battlecruiser continued somewhat longer than in the case of earlier ships." The chief delay was the replacement of McKenna as First Lord by Winston S. Churchill in October, 1911. On 20 November Churchill requested that the tender of the armoured cruiser design be delayed while the design was reviewed, and tender wasn't provisionally accepted until 2 March, 1912.[11] Apparently on 10 November, 1911, Churchill had written to Battenberg, soon to become Second Sea Lord, that he intended to press for the construction of four battle cruisers, but was persuaded to continue building battleships by Briggs, the Controller, and Moore, the D.N.O.[12]
In July, 1914, the Board approved a future reorganisation of cruisers in full commission. Upon Tiger being ready for service, Invincible would join the battle cruisers in the Mediterranean, and that New Zealand would join them "as soon as convenient." In March, 1915, also the date of Rear-Admiral Beatty's time being up, the First Battle Cruiser Squadron would be split up, and with eight light cruisers formed into two separate mixed cruiser squadrons. The Rear-Admiral Commanding the Third Cruiser Squadron would transfer his flag from Antrim to Tiger. In December, 1915, the four battle cruisers in the Mediterranean would return to Home Waters, and with eight Calliope class light cruisers would be split into the Third and Fourth Mixed Cruiser Squadrons. These new squadrons are referred to as either Cruiser Squadrons or Battle Cruiser Squadrons.
Under this arrangement, it was envisaged that in December, 1915 the batttle and light cruisers of the First Fleet would be composed thus:
While Moltke was in the Mediterranean, New Zealand was to remain there. If not, she was to join the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron in the First Fleet. The withdrawal of the battle cruisers from the Mediterranean was to be compensated for by the transfer of the five oldest dreadnought battleships to that theatre, and the pre-dreadnoughts Queen, London and Bulwark. In April, 1917 these three ships would be replaced by St. Vincent and Vanguard.[13]
Footnotes
- ↑ Quoted in Mackay. In light of this statement, it would be interesting to learn Fisher's opinion on the question of Goeben as a "Superior Force" in comparison to the First Cruiser Squadron in 1914.
- ↑ Quoted in Fisher Papers. II. p. 28.
- ↑ Quoted in Fisher Papers. II. p. 41.
- ↑ Quoted in Bacon. p. 259.
- ↑ Quoted in Bacon. p. 256.
- ↑ Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty Explanatory of the Navy Estimates, 1908-1909. Cd. 3913. p. 4.
- ↑ Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty Explanatory of the Navy Estimates, 1909-1910. Cd. 4553. pp. 3-4.
- ↑ Lambert. "Sir John Fisher and the Concept of Flotilla Defence, 1905-1909." p. 644.
- ↑ Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty Explanatory of the Navy Estimates, 1910-1911. Cd. 5063. p. 3.
- ↑ Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty Explanatory of the Navy Estimates, 1911-1912. Cd. 5547. p. 3.
- ↑ Roberts. pp. 36-38.
- ↑ Sumida. pp.258-259.
- ↑ This section on future dispositions is based on "Battle and Cruiser Squadrons-Programme." The National Archives. ADM 1/8383/179.
Bibliography