User:Simon Harley/Battle of Jutland Chapter One

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Preparations

After the news of the condenser problems came through, Kapitän zur See Hermann Bauer, commanding the High Sea Fleet submarines, proposed that all available U-boats be sent to sea by 23 May. Scheer agreed and ten were despatched to search for and attack Allied warships from 17 to 22 May. After 23 May the ten submarines would then take up station off British bases, and be joined by other U-boats and remain there until 1 June.[1] The despatch of so many U-boats to the coast of Britain gave Room 40 the first inkling that an operation by the High Sea Fleet was underway.[2] Hope first assumed that the U-boats were heading out to attack trade in the North Atlantic, but when the submarines didn't report themselves stationed on the trade routes Hope suspected that the submarines had been deployed for another offensive reason.[2][3] Jellicoe was "evidently"[4] informed, as he wrote to the First Sea Lord on 22 May, "The enemy submarines appear to be across the fleet routes south at present, particularly the route towards Horn's Reef."[5]

Shortly after midnight on 29 May Scheer ordered a state of readiness for the High Sea Fleet beginning at 07:00 that day, a message picked up by the British.[6] At 09:44 on 30 May the High Sea Fleet was instructed to be assembled in the outer roads by 19:00 that day at the latest.[7] At 10:04 the German transmitter at Bruges sent a signal out to "All ships" which was translated by Room 40 as, "Reckon on our own forces being at sea on 31st May and 1st June."[8] The signal had been written in a new code which had not yet been fully broken by Room 40. "Own forces" was initially translated as "enemy forces", but in the report to the Operations Division was changed to "own forces". When a copy of the German codebook was later acquired, "enemy forces" was found to have been the correct translation.[9]

Having received the decrypt of the 10:04 signal the Admiralty informed Jellicoe that the High Sea Fleet might be at sea early on the next day, 31 May.[10] At 14:00 Korvettenkapitän Peter Strasser informed Scheer that there could be no airship reconnaissance for the next two days, at which point the bombardment of Sunderland was abandoned in favour of the advance on Horns Reef. At 15:36 Scheer sent to the fleet the signal "31 May G.G.2490",[11] which was intercepted by the British. It was translated at 17:08 as "On May 31, most secret (?) 2490."[12] and from it Captain Hope assumed that it referred to a major operation involving the High Sea Fleet on 31 May.[13] At 17:16 Jellicoe and Beatty were ordered to raise steam and at 17:40 the Admiralty informed Jellicoe via land line that, "Germans intend some operations commencing to-morrow and leaving viâ eastern route and Horns Reef. Operation appears to extend over May 31 and June 1. You should concentrate to eastward of Long Forties ready for eventualities."[14] By 10:30 the whole of the Grand Fleet had sailed.[15]

At 01:00 on 31 May Hipper's force of I and II Scouting Groups, and II, VI and IX Flotillas, left the outer Jade Roads. Scheer put to sea with the rest of the force at 02:30 as dawn was breaking. Only two of the U-boats, U66 and U32, had received the "All ships" signal informing them that the British might be at sea. U66, 60 miles east of Peterhead prepared to attack the armoured cruiser Duke of Edinburgh (part of the First Cruiser Squadron) but the latter quickly steamed out of range. At 06:35 on 31 May the submarine reported by wireless that she had sighted "Eight enemy battleships, light cruisers, destroyers on northerly course" and gave her position. The British ships she had sighted were actually travelling east-north-east.[16] U32, stationed off the Firth of Forth, sighted the light cruisers Galatea and Phaeton at 04:40 and fired one torpedo at the leading ship. Before a second could be fired the periscope jammed while extended and the submarine was forced to crash-dive. After lying submerged for 30 minutes she surfaced and sighted the Second Battle Cruiser Squadron, and reported it as "Two battleships, two cruisers and several destroyers on southerly course." Scheer received U32's report at 05:37 and U66's about an hour later, and didn't suspect that the two British forces might be working in concert.[17]

On the morning of 31 May, as the two fleets steamed towards each other, an episode occurred at the Admiralty in London which later affected Admiral Jellicoe's prosecution of the battle. The Director of the Operations Division, Captain Thomas Jackson, visited Room 40 and inquired where British directional finders put "DK", the callsign used by Scheer's flagship Friedrich der Grosse. He was told that DK was still in the Jade Estuary.[18] When Scheer went to sea, the callsign was exchanged with that of Wilhelmshaven Dockyard III Entrance, "RA".[17] It has been often been stated or suggested[19][20][21][22][23][24][25][26][27][28] that had Jackson "condescended"[29] to ask the Room 40 staff, he would have been informed of the switch, which had indeed been announced in a German signal of 17:41 on 30 May.[30]

However, the signal announcing the callsign switch had been sent in a new cipher which at the time was unreadable and a translated version wasn't sent to the Operations Division until 18:40 on 31 May. Room 40 thought the High Sea Fleet was at sea, but could not be certain[31] and this was reflected in the signal sent at 12:30 to Jellicoe, "No definite news of enemy. They made all preparations for sailing this morning. It was thought fleet had sailed but directional wireless places flagship in Jade at 11.10 G.M.T. Apparently they have been unable to carry out air reconnaissance which has delayed them."[32]

Footnotes

  1. ↑ Tarrant. Jutland:The German Perspective. pp. 56-60.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 Hope. War Diary (1 June 1916).
  3. ↑ Clarke; Birch. A Contribution to the History of German Naval Warfare 1914-1918. I. pp. 338-339.
  4. ↑ Hines. Sins of Omission and Commission. p. 1125.
  5. ↑ Jellicoe Papers. I. p. 242.
  6. ↑ Hope. Notes on Action of May 31-June 1. 1916.
  7. ↑ Clarke; Birch. A Contribution to the History of German Naval Warfare 1914-1918. I (Appendix). p. 1.
  8. ↑ Clarke; Birch. A Contribution to the History of German Naval Warfare 1914-1918. I. p. 339.
  9. ↑ Hines. Sins of Omission and Commission. p. 1126.
  10. ↑ Hope. Notes on Action of May 31-June 1. 1916. p. 2.
  11. ↑ Tarrant. Jutland: The German Perspective. p. 62.
  12. ↑ Naval Staff Appreciation. p. 166.
  13. ↑ Beesly. Room 40. p. 152.
  14. ↑ Naval Staff Appreciation. p. 30.
  15. ↑ Naval Staff Appreciation. p. 43.
  16. ↑ Tarrant. Jutland: The German Perspective. pp. 65-67.
  17. ↑ 17.0 17.1 Tarrant. Jutland: The German Perspective. p. 67.
  18. ↑ Hines. Sins of Omission and Commission. pp. 1127-1128.
  19. ↑ Gordon. The Rules of the Game. pp. 72-73.
  20. ↑ Marder. From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow. III. p. 46.
  21. ↑ Palmer. Command at Sea. p. 243.
  22. ↑ Budiansky. Battle of Wits. p. 50.
  23. ↑ Andidora. Iron Admirals. p. 71.
  24. ↑ Halpern. A Naval History of World War I. p. 316.
  25. ↑ Butler. Distant Victory. p. 139.
  26. ↑ London; Gerrard. Jutland 1916. p. 37.
  27. ↑ Keegan. Intelligence in War. p. 137.
  28. ↑ Steel; Hart. Jutland 1916. pp. 57-58.
  29. ↑ Irving. The Smoke Screen of Jutland. p. 36.
  30. ↑ Hines. Sins of Omission and Commission. p. 1128.
  31. ↑ Hines. Sins of Omission and Commission. p. 1129.
  32. ↑ Hines. Sins of Omission and Commission. p. 1127.

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