http://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/api.php?action=feedcontributions&user=Simon+Harley&feedformat=atomThe Dreadnought Project - User contributions [en]2024-03-29T05:24:33ZUser contributionsMediaWiki 1.24.2http://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Report_on_German_Warships_after_Jutland&diff=334786Austro-Hungarian Naval Report on German Warships after Jutland2024-03-28T00:01:42Z<p>Simon Harley: Oops.</p>
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<div>In the papers of Vice-Admiral [[John Ernest Troyte Harper|John E. T. Harper]] (author of the ''Record of the Battle of Jutland'') is a copy of an English translation of an Austro-Hungarian Navy report on German Imperial Navy warships after the [[Battle of Jutland]].<ref>Harper papers. Churchill Archives Centre. JEHR 1/4. This research was made possible by the [https://www.chu.cam.ac.uk/news/news-and-events/the-first-colin-bell-award-winners-announced/ Colin Bell Award, a grant from the Colin Bell Fund at Churchill College, Cambridge]. John Brooks has informed me that there is also a copy in {{TNA|ADM 137/1644.}} ff. 39-87.</ref> It was prepared by ''Marineartillerie-Oberingenieure 2. Klasse'' Georg Schindler.<ref>Rank from ''Almanach für die k. und k. Kriegsmarine 1917''. p. 698.</ref> This report is in many ways more detailed than that of ''Fregattenkapitäne'' Hieronymus Graf von Colloredo-Mannsfeld [[Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland|prepared immediately after Jutland]], which is also in Harper's papers. The references to "I.D." notes suggest that, like Colloredo-Mannsfeld's report, this was a translation prepared in the [[Naval Intelligence Division (Royal Navy)|Naval Intelligence Division]]. Transcriber [[User:Simon Harley|Simon Harley]] has faithfully reproduced the many typing errors in the translation.<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
REPORT by a Mission undertaken in accordance with Order. Section 4 M.S. No.1746 of 1916.<br />
----<br />
<br />
On the inspection of German Warships which took part in the Battle of the Skaggerak (Jutland), 31st.May - 1st.June 1916; on Wilhelmshaven, Hamburg and Kiel, and on other inspections of ships and bases.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}By Georg Schindler,<br />
<br />
{{pad|580px}}Gunnery Engineer, 2nd Class.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}AUSTRIAN NAVY.<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
The only details which have been dealt with are those which were of Gunnery interest.<br />
<br />
{|<br />
| A.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "SEYDLITZ"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| B.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "OSTFRIESLAND"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| C.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "VON DER TANN"<br />
| were<br />
|-<br />
| D.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "GROSSER KÜRFURST"<br />
| in<br />
|-<br />
| E.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"&nbsp;<br />
| "MARKGRAF"<br />
| engagement.<br />
|-<br />
| F.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "MOLTKE"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| G.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"<br />
| "DERFFLINGER"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| H.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "KÖNIG"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| J.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "HINDENBURG" (building)<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| K.<br />
| Large Battleship<br />
| "BAYERN"<br />
| rowspan=2 | } Newly commissioned<br />
|-<br />
| L.<br />
| T.B.D.<br />
| "G.90"<br />
|-<br />
| M.<br />
| colspan=3 | Fishing vessels Anti-Submarine armament, etc.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| N.<br />
| colspan=3 | Short inspection of the Ordnance Workshops in the Arsenal in Wilhelmshaven. <br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| O.<br />
| Ditto in Kiel.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|}<br />
<br />
Ships under A.B.C.J. and M. were in Wilhelmshaven. D.E.F. in Hamburg and G.H.K.L. in Kiel.<br />
<br />
In the following reports on each ship, Section 1 deals with the effect of enemy hits on ships A. to H. above, in conjunction with the two attached ship sketches (Enclosures 1 and 2). [Not attached.]<br />
<br />
Of the hits marked in the sketches those of a gunnery interest are distinguished by red ink. Section II gives general remarks concerning the ships in question.<br />
<br />
Further a report is submitted on installations in newly commissioned ships (K. and L.) also on a ship still under construction (J.), as well as means of combating submarines installed in Fishing vessels (M.) and finally, briefly on the Ordnance workshops in the Naval Arsenals (N. and O.).<br />
<br />
A. "SEYDLITZ" (Enclosure 1).<br />
<br />
This Cruiser received 24 shell hits (38 cm. 34.3 cm. and 30.5 cm.)(15", 13.5" and 12") and one Torpedo hit.<br />
<br />
Except for 1 shell hit (apparently 34.3 cm.) (13.5") on the starboard side forward (Hits nos.2-4) and one hit no.16 (38 cm.?) in the starboard after 15 cm. (6") casemate all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all Gun tubes, Guns and many fittings had been dismantled and landed.<br />
<br />
<center>I. Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
<br />
1. A large calibre shell (hit no.8) struck the 2nd. 15 cm. port casemate (from forward), put the gun out of action and killed or seriously wounded the majority of the gun's crew.<br />
<br />
2. A 38 cm. shell exploded in the 4th 15 cm. casemate (hit No.13) the gun was similarly damaged, and 2 men (wounded) remained alive of the crew.<br />
<br />
3. In the port after 15 cm. casemate, No.6 gun, (hit No.15) had the same effect as the two described above.<br />
<br />
4. A 38 cm. shell (hit No.16) penetrated the armoured bulkhead on starboard side aft, near the last 15 cm. casemate, close to the curve of the armour (Fig.1, Enc.3) destroyed the 15 cm. gun and killed most of the gun crew.<br />
<br />
Of the twelve 15 cm. guns it appears that 2 port and 4 starboard fired unceasingly until the end.<br />
<br />
5. No.2 Turret (starboard) received a hit from port on the vertical turret armour (hit No.21) to the right of the right gun. Part of the nose of the shell pierced the armour anddestroyed [sic] the cradle and training gear of the right gun. The left was undamaged. The turret remained in action with this gun.<br />
<br />
6. An interesting hit is to be seen on the right 28 cm. gun of No.3 Turret port. The gun was on one of the jetties of the arsenal and could be examined. A large calibre shell hit the aforesaid gun a glancing blow just outside the turret, producing at the point of impact, a considerable elliptical scoop on the outside, causing a fracture of the inner tube and in addition bent the gun so that the axis of the tube at the muzzle was (as far as could be estimated) 200 mm. (about 8 in.) out of line.<br />
<br />
The cradle of this gun was split, the trunnions somewhat bent and the caps thereof partially opened out.<br />
<br />
The left gun of this turret, however, remained serviceable and the Turret could continue firing without interruption.<br />
<br />
7. A 34.3 cm. (13.5") shell (hit No.18) pierced the vertical armour of the revolving structure of No.4 Turret superimposed to the left of the left gun exploded inside the turret, ignited the cartridges which were ready for loading, put the turret out of action and killed all the crew (about 70 men) except 6.<br />
<br />
T [sic] This turret, already out of action, received another hit later from a 38 cm. (15") shell (hit No.17) this projectile struck the revolving Turret armour close to the lower edge at the right rear of the turret, and partially penetrated the turret.<br />
<br />
8. A Large calibre shell tore off the roof of the after (No.5) turret. (Geschossgeller ? ricochet). The turret suffered no appreciable damage inside.<br />
<br />
The remaining hits are being dealt with in the report on ship construction.≠ [I.D. Note: The original of this report can, unfortunately, not be obtained.]<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
<center>II Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
1. Extensive "flash" protection was already installed in "SEYDLITZ".<br />
<br />
(a) The openings for bringing 28 cm. cartridges into the lower loading chamber of the Ammunition Hoist can be shut off with sliding doors (schubtüren ?). The supply scuttles from the magazines are fitted with hinged flaps which open upwards on each side (Fig.3, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
(b) The 15 cm. (5.9") Ammunition hoists at the supply position in the casemates are fitted with a "closing flap" which shuts automatically, but its own weight assisted by a spring, immediately after the ammunition has rolled out on to the Ammunition Tray (which is placed in a horizontal position by a Paternoster apparatus (endless chain) (Fig.4, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
2. Apparently Gas Masks are employed in all ships. The method of use is the same as in the German Army. <u>Every</u> man was supplied with a mask (as it happened 2 days before action). These masks were to be brought into use immediately there was any evidence of suffocating gases, and they were so far successful that, according to the opinions of officers, at least one ship, if not two, was saved by their use.<br />
<br />
3. Enemy "shorts" usually exploded on hitting the water, with the result that, (as in the cases of shells exploding on board), splinters of various sizes struck guns among other things, and caused damage, but in practically every case no stoppage of firing from the gun resulted. Shell splinters also entered Conning Towers and Turrets through the sighting slits. But they caused no internal damage as their force was broken by their passage through the deeps [sic] slits. (Fig.5, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
4. In Turret firing. Salvoes were gradually used, and always with <u>only one</u> gun of each turret.<br />
<br />
5. For transmission of orders to the guns (also to 15 cm. (5.9" guns) from the Gunnery Officers position (in the Conning Tower) Elevation pointers are used which are mounted (<u>separately</u>) on brackets away from the Turret armour.<br />
<br />
6. Ranges of the individual rangefinders are shown on a circular scale (range receiver) by means of electrically worked pointers. All these dials are mounter [sic] in a circular box (Fig.6, Enc.3) so that the ranges of the same object shown by several rangefinders (Pointers in similar direction)[.] Further, it is possible to cut out one or other of the dials if the Rangetaker concerned is ranging badly.<br />
<br />
7. Repulse of Destroyers is carried out invariably by means of broadside salvoes of 15 cm. (5.9) guns etc. and one target only is always used. But the Gunlayer is only to fire when sights are exactly on the target.<br />
<br />
8. The 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) guns were not used in the battle. It is understood that in the future guns of this calibre, will only be retained on board as anti-aircraft guns, as was laid down for all ships.<br />
<br />
9. (a) The empty 26 cm. (11") cartridge cases are thrown out of the turrets on to the deck through openings in rear of the Gun platforms (2 per turret). A covering flap, opening downwards when the cases are thrown out, automatically closes the hole by means of a spring (Fig.7, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
(b) The fired 15 cm. (5.9") cartridge are placed in a large hanging net in the casemate, and are only removed from the casemate during a lull in the firing. It was stated that a very large number of fired cases (including Large Calibre ones) were collected and brought back.<br />
<br />
10. The voice pipes are made of 60,100 and 150 mm. diameter (2.4 in., 3.8 in.,and 6 in.). (The last named are called Schallrohre and are intended for short distances). Voice pipes are not lagged.<br />
<br />
11. The ventilation of the Turrets is similar to the method employed in our newer ships. A Fan placed between the two guns, sucks, on the one hand the powder gases from the breeches by means of a ventilation pipe from each gun when the breech is opened and on the other hand draws them away from the roof of the turret on the gun platform another fan, portable, and continually running, was installed when sucked in fresh air through a hose and passed it into the interior of the turret bymeans [sic] of a second hose. If any man had any difficulty in breathing he inhaled fresh air through the second hose. But even this method only afforded partial relief.<br />
<br />
12. All Gunnery machinery (hydraulic and electric) appears to have function correctly.<br />
<br />
13. From the Gunnery point of view there were no serious fires (magazines of any description), for which the "Flash door" protection described in Section II Miscellaneous, Pars. I (a) and (b) is principally responsible. All cartridges actually in a turret or casemate,when [sic] an enemy shell burst in the turret or casemate, were exploded in every case. Therefore the rule was most strictly enforced that only the absolute minimum of ammunition was kept ready at the guns.<br />
<br />
14. "SEYDLITZ" had 1150 28 cm. (11" shell) on board, of which 450 were expended. (No ship expended all her ammunition).<br />
<br />
15. The torpedo nets were not actually a hindrance in the action but they sustained heavy damage fromenemy [sic] hits and splinters so that parts of them hung down over the ships side.<br />
<br />
In future these nets being useless ballast will no longer be carried. This is already the case in the new battleship "BAYERN".<br />
<br />
<center>B. "OSTRFRIESLAND".</center><br />
<br />
<center>I. Hits. (Enclosure 1).</center><br />
<br />
This Battleship received no shell hits, but was struck by a mine onthe [sic] starboard side forward. The detailed description is contained in the report on Ship Construction.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
At the time of the inspection of this ship the 30.5 cm. (12") Ammunition was being embarked. The shells were being slung from the Quay on to the Deck by means of a powerful floating crane in bundles (of about 5 projectiles). All cartridges are enclosed in long water-tight zinc containers, fitted with stiffening bands. They were being rolled on board carefully across broad planks and stowed in the Magazines. If several rounds of ready ammunition have to be stowed in the Turret, the charges are always kept in the zinc cylinders.<br />
<br />
The 30.5 cm. (12") and also 28 cm. (11") projectiles are (according to the statement of the Gunnery Officer of this ship, Lt.Comdr.Lauenstein) of one description throughout, capped and fitted with base fuse. Total weight 405 kg. (about 890 lbs.) Bursting charge 12 to 13 kg. (26½ to 29 lbs.) of Trotyl. In the latest ships, however, "Armour piercing" and "high explosive" shell (but with a new explosive for bursting charge) are again to be used, as is already the case with the 28 cm. (15") shell in the Battleship "BAYERN".<br />
<br />
For the 15 cm.(5.9") guns it is reported that there are two types of shell in use.<br />
<br />
:(a) Fused shell with base fuses.<br />
<br />
:(b) High explosive shell,with a very sensitive nose fuse and a base fuse.<br />
<br />
<center>C. "VON DER TANN". (Enclosure 1.)</center><br />
<br />
This Battle Cruiser received 4 hits from large calibre shells (all on the starboard side).<br />
<br />
<center>I.Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
<br />
(1). The foremost 28 cm. (11") Turret was hit in the Barbette on the starboard side. The shell exploded and the armour was just penetrated (Hit No.1). Three men in the turret sustained burns (not very severe) from the "Flash". But the Turret was placed out of action as the armour at the point of impact was bulged inwards and jammed the Turret.<br />
<br />
(2). The after Conning Tower was similarly hit (Hit No.2)[.] But the shell only caused a shaking of the Tower and all apparatus inside remained intact.<br />
<br />
(3.) A shell exploded in the neighbourhood of the after Turret No.4 (Hit No.3). The effect on the Turret was only evident in a shaking, and the armour in the vicinity of the explosion was very slightly indented but without doing any damage so that the Turret continued in action.<br />
<br />
(4). No.4 hit is only of slight constructional interest.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
(1). In this ship, as in "OSTFRIESLAND", the question as to whether the collection of scraps of metal (coming from driving bands or Cartridge cases) in the Breech made any difference to the condition of the breech was answered in the negative.<br />
<br />
(2). The maximum rate of fire of the 28 cm. (11") guns of this Cruiser, as well as of the 30.5 cm. (12") guns of the "OSTFRIESLAND" is stated to have reached 3 - 4 rounds per minute in peace time.<br />
<br />
(3). The arrangement in the 28 cm. (11") turrets is in principle the same as in "SEYDLITZ" or as in the 30.5 cm. (12") guns of the large Battle Cruiser "HINDENBURG" (now building), with the exception of a few improvements in the last named ship. But while in the later ships (30.5 cm. 12") hydraulic rammers with reserve Hand ramming are installed "VON DER TANN" has only double Hand rammers, which are hung under the Turret roof.<br />
<br />
<center>D. "GROSSER KURFÜRST."</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Effects of shell hits (Enclosure 1).</center><br />
<br />
The ship was hit 8 times (large calibre) all from the port side.<br />
<br />
:(1) Hit No.4 (presumably 34 cm. 13.5") exploded before the Barbette armour of the foremost Turret.<br>Apart from breaking off small pieces of the hard armour (? Panzerschichte) and a slight shaking of the turret no damage was done to the Turret fittings. A fragment struck the upper surface of a sight slot and remained in the slot, while a good deal of gas entered the Turret and necessitated the use of gas masks by the crew for some time.<br />
<br />
:(2). A further heavy shell (Hit No.6) struck the port 15 cm.(5.9") Casemate (3rd. from forward) killed 10 of the crew of 14, but damaged the gun so little that after about 12 minutes the gun's crew having been made up, it was brought into action again. Two cartridges which were in the casemate were ignited.<br />
<br />
:(3). The other hits are only of constructional interest.<br />
<br />
:Some 30.5 cm. (12") and 15 cm. (5.9") guns were damaged on the outside by splinters from "shorts", but sustained no other damage.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
The Magazine arrangements in this ship were somewhat more minutely examined as well as reports made concerning them. (The arrangements described below are also used in the other ships).<br />
<br />
The shell bins and shell transport to the shell hoist are shown in Fig. 8, Enc.3) diagrammatically.<br />
<br />
A shell grab (Z) worked by 2 electric motors automatically controlled is used to transport the shell from the bins to the waiting tray fixed round the trunk (Turmraum) (A 1.-4). This grab is suspended from a broad length of wire sword matting, the latter can be wound up or down round a drum (Wa), if the transporting shaft (T) which is provided with two diametrical opposite longitudinal feathers is turned in the corresponding direction. Shaft (T) is fitted into drum (Wa). By this the grab is wound up or down. The grab is moved horizontally by the carrier (R), which holds the above-mentioned revolving drum, being drawn to one side or the other by an endless rope, worked electrically along the shaft (T). To assist the long shaft a deck rail is fitted above it which carries the weights, (Projectile grab and drum with carrier), the carrier being suspended from the rail. The electrical starting levers for both motors are fitted in the shell handing room.<br />
<br />
If it is required to get a shell out of the bin, the motor operating the horizontal movement of the grab is started. Then the long transporting drum is turned correspondingly by the 2nd.motor, thereby lowering the grab, which grips the shell by automatic pressure. Thereupon, by turning the shaft in the opposite direction the shell is raised, transported to the waiting tray (A) of which 4 are provided and placed on it. This waiting tray is so arranged that a shell can be landed only in the one position in order to prevent an inverted landing on the shell bogie relative to the entry in the hoist. The shell bogie is fitted with the same stops as the waiting tray.<br />
<br />
From the waiting tray the shell can be placed on either of the two shell bogies (which are rigidly joined to each other). The latter run easily with rollers on a circular rail, and can not only be adjusted exactly at the waiting tray by means of spring stops, but can also be coupled to the shell hoist in the loading position.<br />
<br />
In the shell rooms (lower deck) the shells are stowed in bins four to five deep (Fig.9, Enc.3)[.] The copper driving bands are protected by a broad covering band of strong canvas the ends of which are sewn together with (twine ?). Only rope is placed between the individual shells as a preventative against damage. Two vertical wooden batten are secured to the side walls of the shell bins - right and left.<br />
<br />
In order to ensure the grab gripping the shell as near as possible round the centre of gravity, each shell has a white ring painted round it.<br />
<br />
It is to be noted that the shell room cannot be shut off (water tightly) from the shell handing room as the large openings in the dividing Bulkhead, through which the transport carrier passes, are always open.<br />
<br />
In addition projectiles are stowed in many ships in the corners of the shell handing room itself in fixed bins.<br />
<br />
The 30.5 (12") cartridges are stowed in their water tight zinc cylinders in special stowage fittings in the magazines. These stowages are made of angle Iron and sheet plates. (There is no wood in the fittings).<br />
<br />
The Magazines, (2 decks from the bottom) in contrast to the shell room, are separated from the Magazine handing room, by a means of thin sheet bulkheads, in which the passage ways are fitted with double doors and the circular openings for handing cartridges are fitted with double covering flaps (the latter have already been remarked on in "SEYDLITZ" Section 11, Fig.3, Enc.3.[)]<br />
<br />
For transport of cartridges in the Magazines the transporting gear shewn in Fig.10, Enc.3 is available. This consists of a double rail (R) in which a horizontal (sheet iron) tray, semicircular in section can be moved up and down in guides by means of a hand differential purchase (F). The Tray can then be brought to the exact level of the cartridge. The Transporting gear is suspended from an overhead rail,(S) and also runs in a guide rail on the deck (SS). The cartridge is pushed on to the tray and the transporter then brought to the cartridge handing hole, and after opening the double flaps, transferred to the Turret.<br />
<br />
The Turret appliances correspond in general to those in "HINDENBURG", about which data are described later. But an exception must be made in the case of the size and installation of the Rangefinders (Fig.11, Enc.3).In "KURFÜRST" the Rangefinders about 3 meters (10 ft.) long are fitted in hoods in the front of the Turret, while "HINDENBURG" the 8 metre (26 ft.) range finders are already being fitted in the same way as will be the case in our 35 cm. (about 14") turrets, now building.<br />
<br />
<center>E. "MARKGRAF".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This Battleship was hit 5 times by big guns and all from the port side.<br />
<br />
Only hit No.2 is of gunnery interest. This entered the next to the last 15 cm. (5.(') [5.9"] casemate on the port side and exploded, killing the crew and putting gun out of action for the remainder of the battle, though it did not damage it very seriously.<br />
<br />
Several splinters from this shell pierced the bulkhead and entered the next casemate (forward) and killed or wounded several men. But this gun was brought into action again after an interval of about 10 minutes to make up the crew.<br />
<br />
<center>11. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
In the case of this ship also, splinters from enemy shorts entered the Conning Tower, but without causing any damage to either personnel or Materiel.<br />
<br />
During the whole engagement about 250 rounds of 30 cm. (12") ammunition was fired, i.e. about one fifth of the total supply on board.<br />
<br />
<center>F. "MOLTKE".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This ship was hit 4 times by heavy shell (all from the starboard side).<br />
<br />
One shell (Hit No.3) pierced the upper side armour and burst behind the latter inside the ship. It also caused some damage outside to No.4.15 cm. (5.9") casemate starboard (from forward) killing or wounding several men, but causing little damage to the gun. This gun was again brought into action after about 15 minutes.<br />
<br />
<center>11. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
"MOLTKE" was the only ship from which 4 Torpedoes were fired (not in salvo, but one after the other). On board, it was stated by officers that "QUEEN MARY" was fired at and hit at about 10 kilometres (10,935 yds.), and that this was the cause of the rapid sinking of this Battle Cruiser. Officers of other ships, however, were not of this opinion, as when "MOLTKE" fired the distance from "QUEEN MARY" was about 13 kilometres (14,217 yds.) and that the torpedoes have not this range; so that only Gunnery can be taken into consideration.<br />
<br />
In the "MOLTKE", splinters from short bursting shells also entered the Conning Tower, without, however, causing any noteworthy damage.<br />
<br />
<center>G. "DERFFLINGER".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This Battle Cruiser was hit the largest number of times, viz:- 30, of these 20 were of heavy calibre and all came from the port side.<br />
<br />
:(1) A 15" shell pierced the roof of N.4 30.5 cm. (12") Turret (hit No.5) exploded inside the Turret, thereby igniting all the charges which were there (apparently only two) and killed all the Turret's crew, (74 men including reserve crew), except 2 men who were able to get away (wounded).<br />
<br />
:The Turret itself was put out of action because (as was the case in all these hits on Turrets) much damage was done to the various instruments and appliances by the splinters and flash.<br />
<br />
:It is worthy of note that the electric cables in the Turret were comparatively uninjured.<br />
<br />
:(2). Turret No.3 was also hit by a 38 cm. (15") shell (hit No.6). The projectile penetrated the Barbette armour and took with it a large piece of plating into the interior of the Turret. The 74 men of the Turret's crew (as in the hit described above[)] for the most part were killed, only 6 men getting away wounded. It is observed that an 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) gun which was 3½ metres (about 11½ ft.) away from the point of impact, was completely undamaged, although the deck below the spot, and in the immediate vicinity of this gun, was badly damaged.<br />
<br />
:Nos.3 and 4 Turrets were only put out of action towards the end of the engagement.<br />
<br />
:The two foremost Turrets remained completely intact, although the Barbette armour of the second Turret showed a fairly large scrape from a (very glancing) shell hit. But this caused no further damage to the Turret (hit No.13).<br />
<br />
:(4). The Conning Tower was hit on the starboard side on the edge. But only small pieces of the brittle face of the armoured plates splintered off, and in the Tower itself only one elevation-pointer ceased to function.<br />
<br />
:(5). Very severe damage was done by a large calibre shell (hit No.20) which exploded close to the casemate of the No.2 15 cm. (5.9) gun port, which not only damaged this gun, but also put the two neighbouring 15 cm. (5.9") guns out of action. The first named gun was principally severely damaged on the chase, and the chase of the foremost 15 cm. (5.9") gun was indented to such an extent by splinters, that it could not be fired again. The other gun in the vicinity was so shaken up by the powerful explosion, that it could not be moved again. The casualties sustained by the gun's crews were in contrast comparatively small. (1 man killed and several severely or slightly wounded at the first named gun[)].<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
A large fragment of a 38 cm. (15") shell (which failed to explode), was exhibited on board (as is shown in Fig.12, Enc.3)[.] The much distorted fuze was also found.<br />
<br />
<center>H. "KÖNIG".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits.</center><br />
<br />
There were 13 hits (large calibre) identified all from the port side and above the waterline.<br />
<br />
:(1). A 34.3 cm. (13.5) shell hit the port foremost 15 cm. (5.9") casemate. (Hit No.9). A large piece of armour plating was carried into the casemate, where the shell exploded, killed the gun's crew (11 men) and put the gun out of action. The armour plate went further, penetrated the bulkhead, entered the galley, destroyed it and killed more men.<br />
<br />
:(2). Another 34.3 cm. (13.5") shell penetrated the second 15 cm. (5.9") casemate (hit No.8) and exploded, making the gun useless and, by penetrating the deck also caused much damage in the compartment below. The crew of this gun was by chance not at the moment in the casemate, as they had gone out for a short time on account of gas from the explosion in the first 15 cm. (5.9) casemate (which had occurred just previously.) The result was that there were no killed or wounded among the gun's crew.<br />
<br />
:(3). The traces of a shell were visible on the roof of the foremost 30.5 (12") Turret. (Hit No.11.) The projectile damaged the Rangefinder cover, and tore off a piece of it, rendering the Rangefinder useless. No other damage was caused by this hit.<br />
<br />
:(4). The roof of the Conning Tower was similarly gazed [sic] by a shell, which left a scratch but caused no other damage to the Tower or its instruments, etc.<br />
<br />
<center>J. "HINDENBURG."</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Apparently about 30,000 tons displacement)</center><br />
<br />
This Cruiser, now building will be given an armament of 8 30.5 cm. (12") guns 50 cal. (in four double turrets, 2 forward and 2 aft as in "DERFFLINGER") and 14 15 cm. (5.9") and 8.8 cm[.] (22 pr.) Anti-aircraft guns.<br />
<br />
The foremost superimposed Turret (No.2) was mostly built in, and a short inspection of it was made.<br />
<br />
The Gun-platform is especially roomy. The distance apart of the centres of the two gun barrels being estimated at about 3 metres (10 feet approx.)[.] The complete arrangement of the gun-platform can be seen in the diagrammatic Sketch (Fig.13, Enc.3). The 2 shell hoists (G) are side by side between the gun and to the left of the left gun, (and right of the right gun) are the two ammunition hoists (P).<br />
<br />
The up-coming ammunition is placed in its slide (TT) in the rear by means of unloading rammers (so-called "Umlauder"), whence it rolls on to the loading Tray, and finally on to the shell swings or cartridge swings, which by swinging across, brings the shell or cartridges one after the other to the rear of the gun for loading.<br />
<br />
The two rammers are hydraulic chain Rammers (with reserve hand drive). In the space at the rear of the platform there are :- an entrance opening (E) and two openings (A) for passing out firedcartridge [sic] cases. These openings (A) are constructed similarly to those more exactly described under "SEYDLITZ" (Sec.II. Par.9).<br />
<br />
The Breeches are worked hydraulically (the reserve method being by hand.)<br />
<br />
The principle can be gathered from Fig.14, Enc.3 . A bar with a tooth edged point (Z), (which can be worked up or down hydraulically) turns the Traversing shaft by means of cog wheels (R1, R2, R3) and opens or shuts the breech. The Water-pressure is led to the mechanism through two flexible hoses. If the cog wheel R3 is placed out of gear with R2, the hydraulic system is shut off.<br />
<br />
For elevating,Trunnion [sic] sights are provided and for training a sighting telescope is fitted in front between the guns.<br />
<br />
The Rangefinder (about 8 metres long) which was not yet on board, is to be fitted in the front of the Turret above the guns (under the roof as already referred to under "KURFÜRST")[.] Only the two side openings in the armour could be seen.<br />
<br />
Elevating is worked hydraulically (Reserve system by hand). (The ammunition hoists are also worked hydraulically, but here the alternative system is electric).<br />
<br />
A gun coupling is fitted in this ship as in all later ships. But these couplings are apparently only for use when it is desired to elevate a gun whose elevating gear has been damaged.<br />
<br />
The normal Turret Training gear and also the reserve system is only worked by electric motors.<br />
<br />
The same system of ventilation is used as has already been described in "SEYDLITZ" (Section II, Par.II).<br />
<br />
All working machinery (Electrically driven pumps, and electric motors for elevating, training, hoists, rammers, etc.) are apparently installed in the spacious working chamber below the gun platform.<br />
<br />
The arrangements in the Magazines as well as the transporting gear for passing shell and cartridges from them to the hoists are the same as those already more minutely described under battleship "GROSSER KÜRFURST."<br />
<br />
<center>K. "BAYERN".</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Class Ersatz "WÖRTH" about 30,000 tons disp.)</center><br />
<br />
This battleship, only recently completed, had to carry out exercises whilst at Kiel, and the Commission was invited to join for a cruise, which gave opportunity for a certain amount of inspection.<br />
<br />
The armament consists of eight 38 cm. (15") G.L. 45 guns in four double turrets apparently arranged as shown in the Almanac; sixteen 15 cm. (5.9") G.L. 45 guns in casemates and eight 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) anti-aircraft guns.<br />
<br />
38 cm. Gun Turret. (Fig. 15, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
The distance apart of the bore axes is 3700 mm. (12.1 ft.) for these guns[.] 8.8 cm. sub-calibre guns are provided, which are put in from outboard (i.e. muzzle end.)<br />
<br />
The Gunhouse, as in the turrets of the "HINDENBURG" is very roomy.<br />
<br />
In this turret there has been introduced no important alteration with respect to the munition hoists. Whereas in all previous ships the shot hoist was separate from the cartridge hoist, in this ship, as with us (the Austrian Navy), both hoists for one gun are combined in one trunk; and also instead of the shell and cartridge swings in the "HINDENBURG" (see above) munition wagons (W1, W2), which run on cross rails are introduced. The two main hoists (A1, A2) come up between the two guns. Besides these there are in addition two electrically driven auxiliary hoists (H1, H2).<br />
<br />
The round which arrives at the top of the hoist is taken out and landed, by means of the unloading rammer (U) in the munition wagon, which brings it to the rear of the particular gun in the loading position, whence it is loaded by means of the rammer.<br />
<br />
The munition wagons, rammers and unloading rammers are normally worked by hydraulic power (with auxiliary handworking gear); at the back of the turret are two principal operating positions, (ST1, ST2) which are raised to give a good all-round view, and where all the necessary manipulation for the foregoing hydraulic machinery is carried out.<br />
<br />
The munition hoists are also hydraulically worked, and electric drive is provided as an alternative. The elevating and breech mechanism gear are hydraulic (with alternative hand gear).<br />
<br />
The following sighting arrangements are provided :-<br />
<br />
:(a) For elevation - two side trunnion sights as well as two reserve sights in front.<br />
<br />
:(b) For training - a principal trainer's telescope in front between the two guns, as well as a side telescope as reserve.<br />
<br />
Asked whether any automatic firing apparatus was in contemplation, it was replied that a place for such apparatus was provided but the installation could not be expected till later, and depended on the solution of several problems which had yet to be experimented on.<br />
<br />
The large 8.2 m. (26.9 ft.) rangefinder is placed the same as in the "HINDENBURG".<br />
<br />
The ventilation of the turret is on the same principle as in the "HINDENBURG" and "SEYDLITZ", except that in addition there are two powerful electric fan motors between the guns.<br />
<br />
The Training is done electrically, as is also the alternative arrangement. Fig 15, Enc.3 gives a diagrammatic sketch of the arrangements. The controller gives 72 degrees of speed.<br />
<br />
For absorbing the shock in the training gear of single gun shooting there are provided, in the friction coupling box of the worm gearing, besides the friction plates (as in our own installations) two rings of strong springs above them - each ring containing six springs as shewn in Fig.17, Enc.3. Apparently any turret thrown off a small angle by a single round will be trained back to its original position by means of these springs.<br />
<br />
As in "HINDENBURG", so also in "BAYERN", the various machines for training[,] elevating, munition supply, rammers and unloading rammers are placed on the deck underneath the Gun platform (working chamber), and also the machines for the magazine and transport arrangements of munitions are similarly installed.<br />
<br />
In Fig. 18, Enc.3 is a diagrammatic sketch of the munition hoists and magazines from which it can be seen that the shell room is on the lowest level and has the magazine above it. The cartridge loading door (F1 for cartridges, G1 for shell) are fitted for flash protection with sliding shutters which are self-operating when the lift arrives at one or the other, i.e. when the lift arrives at the bottom, the shutter there will open and leave the loading hole (P) free, while the upper openings F1 and G1 will be shut and locked.<br />
<br />
An inspection of the shell room 38 cm. (15") showed that on these shells there is attached to the rearmost of the three upper driving bands a zinc band about 20 mm. (.78 in.) broad (similar to the driving bands). Experience has shown that this zinc ring is a very good anti-coppering device for the bore. It was apparently on the French front, at Verdun and in Flanders, that experiments with this arrangement were made; the results were very good and its introduction followed. The Army has also adopted it.<br />
<br />
The following is the situation with regard to 38 cm. (15 in.) shell. As opposed to the single type of shell (long calibre) in newly completing ships, here there are two :-<br />
<br />
:(a) A.P. shell, with cap, total length of shell 3.5 calibres.<br />
<br />
:(b) H.E. shell, uncapped, total length of shell 4.1 calibres. The total weight is 750 kg. (1653.5 lbs). The burster (not Trotyl, probably Heranit? 23.5 kg. (57.8 lbs.) for the A.P. shell and 67 kg. (147.7 lbs) for the H.E. The establishment allowed per [gun] is 90 A.P. and 30 H.E. The maximum range is 24 kilometres (26,247 yds.) with an angle of descent of 32 degrees, elevation of gun 247 degrees, time of flight 48 secs.<br />
<br />
:The charge is 87 kg. (191.8 lbs) in the main cartridge and 96 kg. (211.6 lbs.) in the foremost cartridge.<br />
<br />
:The rate of fire is one round per 40 seconds.<br />
<br />
15 cm. casemates. In these ships the flash protection for the 15 cm. (5.9") munition hoists in the casemates has been improved (Fig.20, Enc.3). In that a sheet iron chamber (K) has been built around the delivery opening which, by means of sliding plates (S1 and S2) can be shut off either from the trunk or from the munition tray. (G2.) For example, a shell arrives at the top of the hoist (G) - the shutter (S1) is raised in its guides by means of the lift mechanism, so that the shell can roll into the chamber (G1) while the shutter (S3) remains closed. Immediately afterwards the shutter (S1) closes the opening and the shutter (S2) raises in its guides and the shell rolls on the munition tray (G2). By this means the trunk is rendered flash proof at all stages of the operation.<br />
<br />
Submerged Flats. On board this ship there was also the opportunity to visit a submerged flat with two broadside tubes.<br />
<br />
In all there are five tubes (2 in each flat) and a bow tube. The calibre of the torpedoes is 60 cm. (23.6 in.) and the weight of a fully charged torpedo 2200 kg. (4850 lbs.). The explosive (? Heranit) weighing 250 kg. (531.1 lbs). The establishment per tube is four torpedoes - making in all 20 on board. The greatest torpedo range is 13 kilometres, 14,217 yds) with a medium speed setting of 28 knots.<br />
<br />
The flat that was visited (Fig.21, Enc.3) is very large and about 5 metres high, (16 ft.) so that it is perfectly feasible to turn any torpedo hanging on the purchase at the turntable (W1) on the overhead rails, so that is [sic] can be loaded into the port or starboard tube.<br />
<br />
The tubes (L1, L2) are side loading with very strong longitudinal holts [sic] on top (V1, V2) and fitted with a strong shield bar. For loading the torpedoes in the tubes, there are fitted near the tubes, on the same side on the side door, mechanical loading apparatus (quickloaders A1, A2), and on the opposite side are provided the rails (R1, R2) which serve for the adjustment (lever system) of the gyroscope of a torpedo lying in the tube.<br />
<br />
A torpedo is struck down from the upper deck through the trunk (E) and swung through the opening (O) into the flat, whence by means of a purchase (mechanically driven) it is run on to the tramways (S) and thence either to the bulkhead stowage or to a stowage over the tube.<br />
<br />
One must take this opportunity of noting that the overhead rails are not bolted to the actual deck, but are a separate structure, so as to avoid putting any vibration or other strain on to the armoured deck.<br />
<br />
If a torpedo is to be loaded it will be brought by means of the purchase to the exact ready stowage over the tube; then the hydraulic loader is operated by a lever; a grad [sic] with two arms seizes the torpedo in two specially cut away parts and draws it horizontally on to the guide rail of the loader, which then is lowered together with the torpedo. In the meantime the side door is mechanically unbolted and opened, so that the torpedo can be placed right in the tube (impulse frame). After this the guide rail and grab of the loader are withdrawn and raised, while the side door is shut and bolted. Loading by this means proceeds comparatively noiselessly, rapidly and precisely.<br />
<br />
The sluice is hydraulically worked, and after firing is operated by the return movement of the shield bar. When draining the tube the water can be pumped either overboard or into a well.<br />
<br />
The discharge is operated electrically from the Conning Tower or by hand.<br />
<br />
The sluice is hydraulically worked, and after firing is operated by the return movement of the shield bar. When draining the tube the water can be pumped either overboard or into a well.<br />
<br />
The discharge is operated electrically from the Conning Tower or by hand.<br />
<br />
<center>L. TORPEDO BOAT "G. 90".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1200 tons displacement.)</center><br />
<br />
From the Battleship "BAYERN" the Commission was brought back to Kiel in one of the newest torpedo boats (G.90), which offered an opportunity of seeing certain details.<br />
<br />
The gun armament consists of three 10.5 cm. (4.1") Guns on transferable mountings; the torpedo armament, of two single tubes forward and two double tubes for<nowiki>*</nowiki> [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. Note: Apparently a clerical error for 50 cm.(19.7")] 45 cm. (17.7") torpedoes in the after part. (See Fig. 22, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
The following details respecting the torpedo equipment were noted :<br />
<br />
Six torpedoes were carried, which remain stowed in the tubes; spare torpedoes are not carried on board, and no torpedo stowage is provided. The tubes of the twin mountings are not parallel but inclined outwards from each other, making an angle of 20° between the tubes.<br />
<br />
The reason for this lies in the method of torpedo boat attack. Torpedo craft always fire on the swing (in order to offer the full broadside target to the enemy fire for the shortest possible time), and the torpedoes from a twin mounting are are [sic] fired one after the other (the mounting remaining on a fixed bearing). The first torpedo having been fired, the boat continues to swing under helm and after 20° the second torpedo is fired.<br />
<br />
The training is done by means of a training gear at each tube, which can be understood from the detailed sketch (Fig. 23, Enc.3). By means of the hand crank (K) a worm and worm wheel (Zr) can be turned, this engages inthe [sic] training rack (Zs) and so the tube can be trained. The training pinion can, by means of a coupling clutch worked by the lever (H) be disconnected from the rack, should be required to train the mounting quickly, or for loading and unloading the torpedo by means of the training gear. This latter is accomplished by means of the windlass (W) mounted on the training shaft round which can be taken a line secured either to the nose or the tail of the torpedo. At the back part of the mounting is fitted a training brake which grips the rack.<br />
<br />
A director is fitted at each tube, and torpedoes are fired electrically from the bridge. At the rear of each tube are fitted two firing pushes (Abfeurungspöller), which can be operated either singly or together. In order to prevent firing from a tube which is not yet at the ready, the particular firing gear is held fast by a special locking gear fitted to the tube; its method of working can be seen from (Fig.24, Enc.3). The locking levers (St1 and St2) are only clear of the firing gear, when the rollers (R1 and R2), connected to the locking gear, are clear of the guide strip (G). This guide strip covers the arc in which firing is to be prevented. The springs.(F1 and F2) release the gear, as shewn in the sketch under (T).<br />
<br />
For torpedo transport on deck a special rail is fitted on the starboard side, on which was seen a fairly long transport wagon.<br />
<br />
<center>M. TRAWLER.</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Fitted out for Anti Submarine work)</center><br />
<br />
For fighting submarine boats trawlers are employed with the following :-<br />
<br />
:(a). A.S.rope nets fitted with two or four A.S.mines.<br />
<br />
:(b). Large Depth charges.<br />
<br />
:(c). Anti Submarine explosive Kite.<br />
<br />
::These appliances are described below.<br />
<br />
(a). Nets with A.S. Mines (Fig.25, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
These nets are made up from hemp rope (diameter of rope about 10 mm.); they are 250 m.long and of varying breadth (up to 20 m.) To a normal net two mines (M.M.) are attached (see Fig.25, Enc.3); for broader nets the mines are secured in pairs vertically - thus making four mines to a broad net. The mines are supported by their own large iron flat (S) while for the support of the nets smaller floats (S1) are placed on top.<br />
<br />
Each pair of nets also has an anchor and cable attached.<br />
<br />
The nets which are joined together are stowed with their mines in large shaped iron floats. The latter are stowed ready for shooting in two rows, (1 and 2, Fig.26, Enc3) on the top of the trawler. Shortly before action the primers are inserted through circular holes in the floats (1 hole per float).<br />
<br />
The shooting of nets one and two is carried out at a speed of 10 knots by one man. First , the first anchor of the first net is let go and the net with its mines dragged into the water, afterwards being anchored by the second anchor. Before, however, this latter is slipped the first anchor of the second net must be let go to ensure over-lapping.<br />
<br />
There are tiny holes in the floats by means of which just sufficient water can enter the floats so as to sink the net with its mines and floats at the end of an hour, and leave the area free again for traffic.<br />
<br />
These net mines (Fig.27, Enc.3) are contact mines with an explosive charge (1) from 12-13 kg. of Trotyl and consist of the mine case (M), firing mechanism (S), impact plate (P), distance pin (St), the safety lever (S1) and the primer (J) with the detonator (K).<br />
<br />
When the mine enters the water and reaches a depth of 5 metres the safety catch is released by a hydrostatic valve, which thus frees the detonator for the striker.<br />
<br />
Firing is effected in that by the impact of a submarine the impact plate (and with it the distance pin) are displaced, and by means of the latter the striker is freed and fires the mine by means of the firing spring (which is already cocked).<br />
<br />
(b). Depth charge (Fig., Enc.3).<br />
<br />
These depth charges are cylindrical in form and contain a large explosive charge of 60 kg. of Trotyl. They consist of the mine (M) and the float (S). The latter is connected to the mine by a strong steel wire (3 mm.), which is wound on a reel in the float. It fires (exactly like the depth charge of Korvetten Kapitän Schönthaler) because on reaching the set depth the tension on the wire operates the firing mechanism (Striker spring (F) is compressed as the striker (B) is raised by the grab (Z)) and thus frees the striker.<br />
<br />
The set depth can be adjusted from 5 to 5 (5 to 50?) metres (practically in the same way as in the Schönthaler Depth Charge) and it is to be noted that the time of explosion (1 to 5 secs) is adjustable by means of turning the pointer of the seconds scale (E) on the outside. The delay action itself operates by means of a disc similar to shrapnel.<br />
<br />
(c). Explosive Kite (Fig.30, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
The Kite (D) is made of wood and shaped as shown in Fig.31, inside is an explosive charge (the same size as the net mine, 12 - 13 kg., described in par. (a) above.<br />
<br />
The Kite is towed by a 15 mm. strong steel wire (T) whose core is an electric cableby [sic] means of which the kite is electrically exploded.<br />
<br />
The cable wire is wound on the winch (K), the ends being connected to the electric firing battery in the hollow drum.<br />
<br />
The towing wire is led from the winch over an adjustable brake (B) and from there over a roller (R) secured to a derrick (L) where the other end is connected to the charge.<br />
<br />
When the kite hits against a hard object (submarine) it is electrically fired.<br />
<br />
As a safety precaution the electric switch at the battery is only made when the kite is towing at the requisite speed.<br />
<br />
Trawlers tow at 10 knots, which causes a pull of 350 kg. on the wire.<br />
<br />
<center>N. ARSENAL WILHELMSHAVEN.</center><br />
<br />
Only a short visit to the gun shops was made. There about 1,000 civil workman [sic] were employed.<br />
<br />
In general the work carried out was similar to that in our own gun factories (repair of gun material, production of necessary equipment, magazine and shellroom machinery, examination and cleaning of bores of guns, the storage and preservation of magazine and shellroom fittings, small calibre guns, searchlights, range finders, etc.), only here the buildings, in particular the shops and storehouses, are modern throughout and planned on a spacious lay out.<br />
<br />
The drawing office is worthy of note, in it at that time the stowage plan of munitions for the Battle Cruiser "HINDENBURG" was in preparation. For the protection of such drawings there is provided a large fireproof room.<br />
<br />
To the gun shops belong :- the large mechanical shops, a smithy, a large carpenter's shop, a large shop for work on canvas, leather, and similar equipment, a plumber's shop, two very roomy storehouses for magazine material and a depot for various constructional materials; in the last named is a special,cellar for rubber and leather articles in which at the time there were gathered about 700,000 marks worth.<br />
<br />
A new large gun hall was under construction which is about 60 m. long and 25 m. broad. The building itself was nearly finished, only the installation and also the large travelling crane were not in place.<br />
<br />
Both high sliding doors (T1 T2) were operated by an electrically driven (alternative hand working) which at the side. The travelling crane (N) brings the material to the door, where a floating crane (S) with large overhang takes it over and provides for its further transport.<br />
<br />
While passing through the shop the decoppering of a 15 cm. (5.9) gun was seen. The decoppering machine was a brush withbvery [sic] fine steel bristles, as shewn in Fig.33. The head of the brush (K) is a cylindrical drum of strong plate, which before use is filled with petroleum and turpentine. On the head are fixed three bristle holding rings (H), which carry on their periphery the small steel bristles (B). These three bristle rings are separated by two intermediate rings (R).<br />
<br />
The fine steel wire used in the bristles is 0.2 mm. thick and must be softer than the material of the inner tube so as not to scratch the latter. The cleaning is accomplished by powerful brushing th [sic] through the bore, this action forcing out the petroleum mixture from the drum at the head of the brush into the bore.<br />
<br />
The decoppering device was very successful with the 15 cm. (5.9") gun; a small quantity of the copper scraping and two bristles were given to the Mission. (A bristle and a portion of copper scrapings accompany the reports (1 each) to the K.U.K.K.M. Marine Section (Austrian Admiralty) and to the (Austrian) Naval Technical Committee.)<br />
<br />
<center>O. ARSENAL KIEL.</center><br />
<br />
The "Artilleriewerkstätten" (Gun shops) at Kiel are in general the same as those at Wilhelmshaven described above, so that this amounted to an opportunity for closer description.<br />
<br />
The only noteworthy sight among the gunshops visited was one very large gunhall in which numerous guns are stowed, (among them some from ships that had been in the battle (Jutland); for the transport of the heaviest weights are two travelling cranes (each of 45 tons both cranes are employed together). For the further transport normal gauge rail tracks are provided.<br />
<br />
For the mechanical decoppering of guns a special scraper is used, whose action can be seen from Fig. 34. In the dial shaped head (K) are two difference scrapers (S1 S2), which by means of an inserting gear (E) can be placed exactly in the groove it is required to clean. The scraper (S1), cleans the base of the grooves, the scraper (S2) cleans the sides. The red (st) is guided so as to avoid any corners of the scraper<nowiki>*</nowiki> [I.D.Note: Apparently this guide rod arrangement keeps the scraper true in the groove.] This apparatus has proved its worth.<br />
<br />
Later on information from the Ordnance Department of the Admiralty showed that 30.5 and 28 cm. gun tubes, from which 60 - 100 rounds had been fired in the action, from later experimental firings at Krupps were found to have suffered from wear (actually about 20 mm.) which permitted overramming. After the conclusion of the experimental firings, only gun tubes of equ [sic] equal wear are sent to one and the same ship.<br />
<br />
Of very great interest is the information that many of the 25 cm. (13.7") guns, which were on the French front (6 on the Verdun front) had fired 600 - 800 rounds with full charge (range 36 kilometers, 39,376 yds.) with a diminished range of only 2 km., 2,187 yds. and no necessity for a new inner tube. The shell used in these guns were those provided with the anti-coppering zinc ring.<br />
<br />
The following summarize the points of the greatest importance.<br />
<br />
:1. Introduction of gas masks for each man, as of utmost importance.<br />
<br />
:2. Specially important is flash protection (including) cover plates for munition hoist trunks in turrets and casemates, shut off hatches and doors as well as partition of the magazines.).<br />
<br />
:3. As few cartridges as possible by the gun (in the gun house of a turret or in a casemate), because of the great danger of its ignition by a hit.<br />
<br />
:4. Abolition of the ready use position in the turrets (on account of point 3, above).<br />
<br />
:5. Many gun tubes 30.5 and 28 cm. (12" and 4" [sic]) have fired 60 - 100 rounds with only 20 mm. overramming.<br />
<br />
:6. Many gun tubes undergo experimental firing and are reissued only in similar tubes to one ship.<br />
<br />
:7. Automatic firing apparatus is not yet in use.<br />
<br />
:8. Gun coupling gear provided, but is only used in the event of danger to elevating gear.<br />
<br />
:9. Introduction of small calibre guns 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) only for anti-aircraft work.<br />
<br />
:10. Normally the turrets only fire salvoes, and only from one gun per turret.<br />
<br />
:11. Repulse of Torpedo boat attacks is achieved by broadside salvoes from the 15 cm. (5.9") guns - all in one target.<br />
<br />
:12. Normal turret machinery :-<br />
<br />
::Training{{pad|50px}}Electric (as is also reserve)<br />
<br />
::Elevating<br />
<br />
::Rammers<br />
<br />
::Unloading rammers{{pad|50px}}All hydraulic and<br />
<br />
::Breech mechanism and in some{{pad|30px}}hand control.<br />
<br />
::cases Munition wagons<br />
<br />
::Munition hoists - hydraulic - with electric reserve<br />
<br />
::Shell transport in shell rooms - electric<br />
<br />
:13. Observation of fall of shot :- in each top, 1 or two men in telephonic communication with the gunnery officer. (On 31st.May neither Aeroplanes or Zeppelins were present[)].<br />
<br />
:14. Fire control from gunnery officer's position by elevation pointer only.<br />
<br />
:15. All rangefinders stereoscopic normally 3 m. long instruments in armour domes in Turrets, in the latest ships 8 m. instruments projecting from sides below Turret roofs.<br />
<br />
:16. Large calibre projectiles are standard type armour shells with caps and sharply pointed explosive shells without cap are being reintroduced. For 15 cm. Guns (5.9") fused shell with base fuse and H.F. shell with a very sensitive nose fuse and a base fuse.<br />
<br />
:17. No ship expended all her heavy ammunition, at the most a little over 1/3 of the establishment.<br />
<br />
:18. Establishment for heavy guns 115 - 120 rounds per gun.<br />
<br />
:19. As an anti-coppering precaution for guns, projectiles are fitted with a zinc ring behind the rear driving band and in direct contact therewith.<br />
<br />
:20. English 38 cm. (15") and 34.3 cm (13.5") projectiles have apparently black powder as a bursting charge: bursting bad and effect not commensurate with the calibre.<br />
<br />
:21. The explosion of a large calibre projectile in a Turret always puts the same out of action.<br />
<br />
:22. Ventilation of Turrets insufficient.<br />
<br />
:23. Voice pipes 60 - 100 and 150 mm. calibre have no lagging and are provided with wooden stoppers or sponges wherewith to close the tube to gases.<br />
<br />
:24. Emergency lighting by means of Pocket lamps.<br />
<br />
:25. Torpedo nets are no longer carried.<br />
<br />
:26. All ranges below 15 km. heavy armour is generally pierced by 38 cm. (15")projectiles. [sic]<br />
<br />
:27. Submarine Defence. Mine nets, (? Depth charges) and Explosive Kites.<br />
<br />
Appendices 2 Sketches, Hits Appendix 1 and 2. One sheet of sketches to report. Appen. 3.<br />
<br />
In conclusion, one matter may be mentioned, which, on the occasion of the visit to the Arsenal at Wilhelmshaven and to the ships, attracted attention through its differing so greatly from our own arrangements. Viz, the handling procedure of consumable stores.<br />
<br />
The characteristic points of the Organisation of this Branch in the German Navy are, as follows :-<br />
<br />
:1. In the ships, the demanding, keeping and issuing of consumable stores is done by one officer under the special supervision of the Commander, who is responsible for the stores being on board, for maintaining them in proper condition, for stowing them efficiently and according to regulations and for the accuracy and completeness of the necessary accounts.<br>These officers are occupied by "Materialenverwalter" W.O.'s [Warrant Officers] who are well trained in the work of their branch and are selected from P.Os. [Petty Officers]<br />
<br />
:2. Money necessary for the Administrative work of the ship is remitted to the Captain in the form of a fixed sum and the expenditure of this is checked by the "Materialenverwalter".<br />
<br />
:3. The limit to the yearly expenditure of stores is fixed by a "Stores Credit" (estimate). Permission to exceed this limit must be obtained from the Admiralty and only in specially exceptional cases is permission for such excess to be requested afterwards.<br />
<br />
:4. The paymaster controls stores and the "Materialenverwalter" accounts and reports tomthe [sic] Captain whenever expenditure in excess of the quantity allowed is to be feared. The paymaster is not responsible for the accuracy of the entries made by the "Materialenverwalter" in books, etc.,kept [sic] by him.<br />
<br />
:5. The Office staff is at the disposal of the Captain to assist in accounting for consumable and non-consumable stores. This staff consists of one officer and the clerk, they are jointly responsible for reporting losses, deficiencies as compared with quantities shown by the books, necessary repairs and replacements. They also keep such records as are necessary to afford at any time a clear statement of the consumable and non-consumable stores and munition on board.<br />
<br />
:6. Stores are completed by demands on the Imperial Dockyards or depots by means of special forms. The consignment note serving as voucher.<br />
<br />
:Ship's demands are not checked by the Dockyards, the ships alone being responsible for the demand being in order.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}Pola, 4th. August, 1916.<br />
<br />
==See Also==<br />
*[[Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland]]<br />
<br />
==Footnotes==<br />
{{reflist}}<br />
<br />
==Bibliography==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
*''Almanach für die k. und k. Kriegsmarine 1917. Kriegsausgabe''. '''XXXVII'''. Pola: 1917.<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
[[Category:Battle of Jutland]]</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Report_on_German_Warships_after_Jutland&diff=334785Austro-Hungarian Naval Report on German Warships after Jutland2024-03-28T00:01:11Z<p>Simon Harley: Made Changes.</p>
<hr />
<div>In the papers of Vice-Admiral [[John Ernest Troyte Harper|John E. T. Harper]] (author of the ''Record of the Battle of Jutland'') is a copy of an English translation of an Austro-Hungarian Navy report on German Imperial Navy warships after the [[Battle of Jutland]].<ref>Harper papers. Churchill Archives Centre. JEHR 1/4. This research was made possible by the [https://www.chu.cam.ac.uk/news/news-and-events/the-first-colin-bell-award-winners-announced/ Colin Bell Award, a grant from the Colin Bell Fund at Churchill College, Cambridge]. John Brooks has informed me that there is a copy in {{TNA|ADM 137/1644.}} ff. 39-87.</ref> It was prepared by ''Marineartillerie-Oberingenieure 2. Klasse'' Georg Schindler.<ref>Rank from ''Almanach für die k. und k. Kriegsmarine 1917''. p. 698.</ref> This report is in many ways more detailed than that of ''Fregattenkapitäne'' Hieronymus Graf von Colloredo-Mannsfeld [[Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland|prepared immediately after Jutland]], which is also in Harper's papers. The references to "I.D." notes suggest that, like Colloredo-Mannsfeld's report, this was a translation prepared in the [[Naval Intelligence Division (Royal Navy)|Naval Intelligence Division]]. Transcriber [[User:Simon Harley|Simon Harley]] has faithfully reproduced the many typing errors in the translation.<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
REPORT by a Mission undertaken in accordance with Order. Section 4 M.S. No.1746 of 1916.<br />
----<br />
<br />
On the inspection of German Warships which took part in the Battle of the Skaggerak (Jutland), 31st.May - 1st.June 1916; on Wilhelmshaven, Hamburg and Kiel, and on other inspections of ships and bases.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}By Georg Schindler,<br />
<br />
{{pad|580px}}Gunnery Engineer, 2nd Class.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}AUSTRIAN NAVY.<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
The only details which have been dealt with are those which were of Gunnery interest.<br />
<br />
{|<br />
| A.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "SEYDLITZ"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| B.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "OSTFRIESLAND"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| C.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "VON DER TANN"<br />
| were<br />
|-<br />
| D.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "GROSSER KÜRFURST"<br />
| in<br />
|-<br />
| E.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"&nbsp;<br />
| "MARKGRAF"<br />
| engagement.<br />
|-<br />
| F.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "MOLTKE"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| G.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"<br />
| "DERFFLINGER"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| H.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "KÖNIG"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| J.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "HINDENBURG" (building)<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| K.<br />
| Large Battleship<br />
| "BAYERN"<br />
| rowspan=2 | } Newly commissioned<br />
|-<br />
| L.<br />
| T.B.D.<br />
| "G.90"<br />
|-<br />
| M.<br />
| colspan=3 | Fishing vessels Anti-Submarine armament, etc.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| N.<br />
| colspan=3 | Short inspection of the Ordnance Workshops in the Arsenal in Wilhelmshaven. <br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| O.<br />
| Ditto in Kiel.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|}<br />
<br />
Ships under A.B.C.J. and M. were in Wilhelmshaven. D.E.F. in Hamburg and G.H.K.L. in Kiel.<br />
<br />
In the following reports on each ship, Section 1 deals with the effect of enemy hits on ships A. to H. above, in conjunction with the two attached ship sketches (Enclosures 1 and 2). [Not attached.]<br />
<br />
Of the hits marked in the sketches those of a gunnery interest are distinguished by red ink. Section II gives general remarks concerning the ships in question.<br />
<br />
Further a report is submitted on installations in newly commissioned ships (K. and L.) also on a ship still under construction (J.), as well as means of combating submarines installed in Fishing vessels (M.) and finally, briefly on the Ordnance workshops in the Naval Arsenals (N. and O.).<br />
<br />
A. "SEYDLITZ" (Enclosure 1).<br />
<br />
This Cruiser received 24 shell hits (38 cm. 34.3 cm. and 30.5 cm.)(15", 13.5" and 12") and one Torpedo hit.<br />
<br />
Except for 1 shell hit (apparently 34.3 cm.) (13.5") on the starboard side forward (Hits nos.2-4) and one hit no.16 (38 cm.?) in the starboard after 15 cm. (6") casemate all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all Gun tubes, Guns and many fittings had been dismantled and landed.<br />
<br />
<center>I. Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
<br />
1. A large calibre shell (hit no.8) struck the 2nd. 15 cm. port casemate (from forward), put the gun out of action and killed or seriously wounded the majority of the gun's crew.<br />
<br />
2. A 38 cm. shell exploded in the 4th 15 cm. casemate (hit No.13) the gun was similarly damaged, and 2 men (wounded) remained alive of the crew.<br />
<br />
3. In the port after 15 cm. casemate, No.6 gun, (hit No.15) had the same effect as the two described above.<br />
<br />
4. A 38 cm. shell (hit No.16) penetrated the armoured bulkhead on starboard side aft, near the last 15 cm. casemate, close to the curve of the armour (Fig.1, Enc.3) destroyed the 15 cm. gun and killed most of the gun crew.<br />
<br />
Of the twelve 15 cm. guns it appears that 2 port and 4 starboard fired unceasingly until the end.<br />
<br />
5. No.2 Turret (starboard) received a hit from port on the vertical turret armour (hit No.21) to the right of the right gun. Part of the nose of the shell pierced the armour anddestroyed [sic] the cradle and training gear of the right gun. The left was undamaged. The turret remained in action with this gun.<br />
<br />
6. An interesting hit is to be seen on the right 28 cm. gun of No.3 Turret port. The gun was on one of the jetties of the arsenal and could be examined. A large calibre shell hit the aforesaid gun a glancing blow just outside the turret, producing at the point of impact, a considerable elliptical scoop on the outside, causing a fracture of the inner tube and in addition bent the gun so that the axis of the tube at the muzzle was (as far as could be estimated) 200 mm. (about 8 in.) out of line.<br />
<br />
The cradle of this gun was split, the trunnions somewhat bent and the caps thereof partially opened out.<br />
<br />
The left gun of this turret, however, remained serviceable and the Turret could continue firing without interruption.<br />
<br />
7. A 34.3 cm. (13.5") shell (hit No.18) pierced the vertical armour of the revolving structure of No.4 Turret superimposed to the left of the left gun exploded inside the turret, ignited the cartridges which were ready for loading, put the turret out of action and killed all the crew (about 70 men) except 6.<br />
<br />
T [sic] This turret, already out of action, received another hit later from a 38 cm. (15") shell (hit No.17) this projectile struck the revolving Turret armour close to the lower edge at the right rear of the turret, and partially penetrated the turret.<br />
<br />
8. A Large calibre shell tore off the roof of the after (No.5) turret. (Geschossgeller ? ricochet). The turret suffered no appreciable damage inside.<br />
<br />
The remaining hits are being dealt with in the report on ship construction.≠ [I.D. Note: The original of this report can, unfortunately, not be obtained.]<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
<center>II Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
1. Extensive "flash" protection was already installed in "SEYDLITZ".<br />
<br />
(a) The openings for bringing 28 cm. cartridges into the lower loading chamber of the Ammunition Hoist can be shut off with sliding doors (schubtüren ?). The supply scuttles from the magazines are fitted with hinged flaps which open upwards on each side (Fig.3, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
(b) The 15 cm. (5.9") Ammunition hoists at the supply position in the casemates are fitted with a "closing flap" which shuts automatically, but its own weight assisted by a spring, immediately after the ammunition has rolled out on to the Ammunition Tray (which is placed in a horizontal position by a Paternoster apparatus (endless chain) (Fig.4, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
2. Apparently Gas Masks are employed in all ships. The method of use is the same as in the German Army. <u>Every</u> man was supplied with a mask (as it happened 2 days before action). These masks were to be brought into use immediately there was any evidence of suffocating gases, and they were so far successful that, according to the opinions of officers, at least one ship, if not two, was saved by their use.<br />
<br />
3. Enemy "shorts" usually exploded on hitting the water, with the result that, (as in the cases of shells exploding on board), splinters of various sizes struck guns among other things, and caused damage, but in practically every case no stoppage of firing from the gun resulted. Shell splinters also entered Conning Towers and Turrets through the sighting slits. But they caused no internal damage as their force was broken by their passage through the deeps [sic] slits. (Fig.5, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
4. In Turret firing. Salvoes were gradually used, and always with <u>only one</u> gun of each turret.<br />
<br />
5. For transmission of orders to the guns (also to 15 cm. (5.9" guns) from the Gunnery Officers position (in the Conning Tower) Elevation pointers are used which are mounted (<u>separately</u>) on brackets away from the Turret armour.<br />
<br />
6. Ranges of the individual rangefinders are shown on a circular scale (range receiver) by means of electrically worked pointers. All these dials are mounter [sic] in a circular box (Fig.6, Enc.3) so that the ranges of the same object shown by several rangefinders (Pointers in similar direction)[.] Further, it is possible to cut out one or other of the dials if the Rangetaker concerned is ranging badly.<br />
<br />
7. Repulse of Destroyers is carried out invariably by means of broadside salvoes of 15 cm. (5.9) guns etc. and one target only is always used. But the Gunlayer is only to fire when sights are exactly on the target.<br />
<br />
8. The 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) guns were not used in the battle. It is understood that in the future guns of this calibre, will only be retained on board as anti-aircraft guns, as was laid down for all ships.<br />
<br />
9. (a) The empty 26 cm. (11") cartridge cases are thrown out of the turrets on to the deck through openings in rear of the Gun platforms (2 per turret). A covering flap, opening downwards when the cases are thrown out, automatically closes the hole by means of a spring (Fig.7, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
(b) The fired 15 cm. (5.9") cartridge are placed in a large hanging net in the casemate, and are only removed from the casemate during a lull in the firing. It was stated that a very large number of fired cases (including Large Calibre ones) were collected and brought back.<br />
<br />
10. The voice pipes are made of 60,100 and 150 mm. diameter (2.4 in., 3.8 in.,and 6 in.). (The last named are called Schallrohre and are intended for short distances). Voice pipes are not lagged.<br />
<br />
11. The ventilation of the Turrets is similar to the method employed in our newer ships. A Fan placed between the two guns, sucks, on the one hand the powder gases from the breeches by means of a ventilation pipe from each gun when the breech is opened and on the other hand draws them away from the roof of the turret on the gun platform another fan, portable, and continually running, was installed when sucked in fresh air through a hose and passed it into the interior of the turret bymeans [sic] of a second hose. If any man had any difficulty in breathing he inhaled fresh air through the second hose. But even this method only afforded partial relief.<br />
<br />
12. All Gunnery machinery (hydraulic and electric) appears to have function correctly.<br />
<br />
13. From the Gunnery point of view there were no serious fires (magazines of any description), for which the "Flash door" protection described in Section II Miscellaneous, Pars. I (a) and (b) is principally responsible. All cartridges actually in a turret or casemate,when [sic] an enemy shell burst in the turret or casemate, were exploded in every case. Therefore the rule was most strictly enforced that only the absolute minimum of ammunition was kept ready at the guns.<br />
<br />
14. "SEYDLITZ" had 1150 28 cm. (11" shell) on board, of which 450 were expended. (No ship expended all her ammunition).<br />
<br />
15. The torpedo nets were not actually a hindrance in the action but they sustained heavy damage fromenemy [sic] hits and splinters so that parts of them hung down over the ships side.<br />
<br />
In future these nets being useless ballast will no longer be carried. This is already the case in the new battleship "BAYERN".<br />
<br />
<center>B. "OSTRFRIESLAND".</center><br />
<br />
<center>I. Hits. (Enclosure 1).</center><br />
<br />
This Battleship received no shell hits, but was struck by a mine onthe [sic] starboard side forward. The detailed description is contained in the report on Ship Construction.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
At the time of the inspection of this ship the 30.5 cm. (12") Ammunition was being embarked. The shells were being slung from the Quay on to the Deck by means of a powerful floating crane in bundles (of about 5 projectiles). All cartridges are enclosed in long water-tight zinc containers, fitted with stiffening bands. They were being rolled on board carefully across broad planks and stowed in the Magazines. If several rounds of ready ammunition have to be stowed in the Turret, the charges are always kept in the zinc cylinders.<br />
<br />
The 30.5 cm. (12") and also 28 cm. (11") projectiles are (according to the statement of the Gunnery Officer of this ship, Lt.Comdr.Lauenstein) of one description throughout, capped and fitted with base fuse. Total weight 405 kg. (about 890 lbs.) Bursting charge 12 to 13 kg. (26½ to 29 lbs.) of Trotyl. In the latest ships, however, "Armour piercing" and "high explosive" shell (but with a new explosive for bursting charge) are again to be used, as is already the case with the 28 cm. (15") shell in the Battleship "BAYERN".<br />
<br />
For the 15 cm.(5.9") guns it is reported that there are two types of shell in use.<br />
<br />
:(a) Fused shell with base fuses.<br />
<br />
:(b) High explosive shell,with a very sensitive nose fuse and a base fuse.<br />
<br />
<center>C. "VON DER TANN". (Enclosure 1.)</center><br />
<br />
This Battle Cruiser received 4 hits from large calibre shells (all on the starboard side).<br />
<br />
<center>I.Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
<br />
(1). The foremost 28 cm. (11") Turret was hit in the Barbette on the starboard side. The shell exploded and the armour was just penetrated (Hit No.1). Three men in the turret sustained burns (not very severe) from the "Flash". But the Turret was placed out of action as the armour at the point of impact was bulged inwards and jammed the Turret.<br />
<br />
(2). The after Conning Tower was similarly hit (Hit No.2)[.] But the shell only caused a shaking of the Tower and all apparatus inside remained intact.<br />
<br />
(3.) A shell exploded in the neighbourhood of the after Turret No.4 (Hit No.3). The effect on the Turret was only evident in a shaking, and the armour in the vicinity of the explosion was very slightly indented but without doing any damage so that the Turret continued in action.<br />
<br />
(4). No.4 hit is only of slight constructional interest.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
(1). In this ship, as in "OSTFRIESLAND", the question as to whether the collection of scraps of metal (coming from driving bands or Cartridge cases) in the Breech made any difference to the condition of the breech was answered in the negative.<br />
<br />
(2). The maximum rate of fire of the 28 cm. (11") guns of this Cruiser, as well as of the 30.5 cm. (12") guns of the "OSTFRIESLAND" is stated to have reached 3 - 4 rounds per minute in peace time.<br />
<br />
(3). The arrangement in the 28 cm. (11") turrets is in principle the same as in "SEYDLITZ" or as in the 30.5 cm. (12") guns of the large Battle Cruiser "HINDENBURG" (now building), with the exception of a few improvements in the last named ship. But while in the later ships (30.5 cm. 12") hydraulic rammers with reserve Hand ramming are installed "VON DER TANN" has only double Hand rammers, which are hung under the Turret roof.<br />
<br />
<center>D. "GROSSER KURFÜRST."</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Effects of shell hits (Enclosure 1).</center><br />
<br />
The ship was hit 8 times (large calibre) all from the port side.<br />
<br />
:(1) Hit No.4 (presumably 34 cm. 13.5") exploded before the Barbette armour of the foremost Turret.<br>Apart from breaking off small pieces of the hard armour (? Panzerschichte) and a slight shaking of the turret no damage was done to the Turret fittings. A fragment struck the upper surface of a sight slot and remained in the slot, while a good deal of gas entered the Turret and necessitated the use of gas masks by the crew for some time.<br />
<br />
:(2). A further heavy shell (Hit No.6) struck the port 15 cm.(5.9") Casemate (3rd. from forward) killed 10 of the crew of 14, but damaged the gun so little that after about 12 minutes the gun's crew having been made up, it was brought into action again. Two cartridges which were in the casemate were ignited.<br />
<br />
:(3). The other hits are only of constructional interest.<br />
<br />
:Some 30.5 cm. (12") and 15 cm. (5.9") guns were damaged on the outside by splinters from "shorts", but sustained no other damage.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
The Magazine arrangements in this ship were somewhat more minutely examined as well as reports made concerning them. (The arrangements described below are also used in the other ships).<br />
<br />
The shell bins and shell transport to the shell hoist are shown in Fig. 8, Enc.3) diagrammatically.<br />
<br />
A shell grab (Z) worked by 2 electric motors automatically controlled is used to transport the shell from the bins to the waiting tray fixed round the trunk (Turmraum) (A 1.-4). This grab is suspended from a broad length of wire sword matting, the latter can be wound up or down round a drum (Wa), if the transporting shaft (T) which is provided with two diametrical opposite longitudinal feathers is turned in the corresponding direction. Shaft (T) is fitted into drum (Wa). By this the grab is wound up or down. The grab is moved horizontally by the carrier (R), which holds the above-mentioned revolving drum, being drawn to one side or the other by an endless rope, worked electrically along the shaft (T). To assist the long shaft a deck rail is fitted above it which carries the weights, (Projectile grab and drum with carrier), the carrier being suspended from the rail. The electrical starting levers for both motors are fitted in the shell handing room.<br />
<br />
If it is required to get a shell out of the bin, the motor operating the horizontal movement of the grab is started. Then the long transporting drum is turned correspondingly by the 2nd.motor, thereby lowering the grab, which grips the shell by automatic pressure. Thereupon, by turning the shaft in the opposite direction the shell is raised, transported to the waiting tray (A) of which 4 are provided and placed on it. This waiting tray is so arranged that a shell can be landed only in the one position in order to prevent an inverted landing on the shell bogie relative to the entry in the hoist. The shell bogie is fitted with the same stops as the waiting tray.<br />
<br />
From the waiting tray the shell can be placed on either of the two shell bogies (which are rigidly joined to each other). The latter run easily with rollers on a circular rail, and can not only be adjusted exactly at the waiting tray by means of spring stops, but can also be coupled to the shell hoist in the loading position.<br />
<br />
In the shell rooms (lower deck) the shells are stowed in bins four to five deep (Fig.9, Enc.3)[.] The copper driving bands are protected by a broad covering band of strong canvas the ends of which are sewn together with (twine ?). Only rope is placed between the individual shells as a preventative against damage. Two vertical wooden batten are secured to the side walls of the shell bins - right and left.<br />
<br />
In order to ensure the grab gripping the shell as near as possible round the centre of gravity, each shell has a white ring painted round it.<br />
<br />
It is to be noted that the shell room cannot be shut off (water tightly) from the shell handing room as the large openings in the dividing Bulkhead, through which the transport carrier passes, are always open.<br />
<br />
In addition projectiles are stowed in many ships in the corners of the shell handing room itself in fixed bins.<br />
<br />
The 30.5 (12") cartridges are stowed in their water tight zinc cylinders in special stowage fittings in the magazines. These stowages are made of angle Iron and sheet plates. (There is no wood in the fittings).<br />
<br />
The Magazines, (2 decks from the bottom) in contrast to the shell room, are separated from the Magazine handing room, by a means of thin sheet bulkheads, in which the passage ways are fitted with double doors and the circular openings for handing cartridges are fitted with double covering flaps (the latter have already been remarked on in "SEYDLITZ" Section 11, Fig.3, Enc.3.[)]<br />
<br />
For transport of cartridges in the Magazines the transporting gear shewn in Fig.10, Enc.3 is available. This consists of a double rail (R) in which a horizontal (sheet iron) tray, semicircular in section can be moved up and down in guides by means of a hand differential purchase (F). The Tray can then be brought to the exact level of the cartridge. The Transporting gear is suspended from an overhead rail,(S) and also runs in a guide rail on the deck (SS). The cartridge is pushed on to the tray and the transporter then brought to the cartridge handing hole, and after opening the double flaps, transferred to the Turret.<br />
<br />
The Turret appliances correspond in general to those in "HINDENBURG", about which data are described later. But an exception must be made in the case of the size and installation of the Rangefinders (Fig.11, Enc.3).In "KURFÜRST" the Rangefinders about 3 meters (10 ft.) long are fitted in hoods in the front of the Turret, while "HINDENBURG" the 8 metre (26 ft.) range finders are already being fitted in the same way as will be the case in our 35 cm. (about 14") turrets, now building.<br />
<br />
<center>E. "MARKGRAF".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This Battleship was hit 5 times by big guns and all from the port side.<br />
<br />
Only hit No.2 is of gunnery interest. This entered the next to the last 15 cm. (5.(') [5.9"] casemate on the port side and exploded, killing the crew and putting gun out of action for the remainder of the battle, though it did not damage it very seriously.<br />
<br />
Several splinters from this shell pierced the bulkhead and entered the next casemate (forward) and killed or wounded several men. But this gun was brought into action again after an interval of about 10 minutes to make up the crew.<br />
<br />
<center>11. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
In the case of this ship also, splinters from enemy shorts entered the Conning Tower, but without causing any damage to either personnel or Materiel.<br />
<br />
During the whole engagement about 250 rounds of 30 cm. (12") ammunition was fired, i.e. about one fifth of the total supply on board.<br />
<br />
<center>F. "MOLTKE".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This ship was hit 4 times by heavy shell (all from the starboard side).<br />
<br />
One shell (Hit No.3) pierced the upper side armour and burst behind the latter inside the ship. It also caused some damage outside to No.4.15 cm. (5.9") casemate starboard (from forward) killing or wounding several men, but causing little damage to the gun. This gun was again brought into action after about 15 minutes.<br />
<br />
<center>11. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
"MOLTKE" was the only ship from which 4 Torpedoes were fired (not in salvo, but one after the other). On board, it was stated by officers that "QUEEN MARY" was fired at and hit at about 10 kilometres (10,935 yds.), and that this was the cause of the rapid sinking of this Battle Cruiser. Officers of other ships, however, were not of this opinion, as when "MOLTKE" fired the distance from "QUEEN MARY" was about 13 kilometres (14,217 yds.) and that the torpedoes have not this range; so that only Gunnery can be taken into consideration.<br />
<br />
In the "MOLTKE", splinters from short bursting shells also entered the Conning Tower, without, however, causing any noteworthy damage.<br />
<br />
<center>G. "DERFFLINGER".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This Battle Cruiser was hit the largest number of times, viz:- 30, of these 20 were of heavy calibre and all came from the port side.<br />
<br />
:(1) A 15" shell pierced the roof of N.4 30.5 cm. (12") Turret (hit No.5) exploded inside the Turret, thereby igniting all the charges which were there (apparently only two) and killed all the Turret's crew, (74 men including reserve crew), except 2 men who were able to get away (wounded).<br />
<br />
:The Turret itself was put out of action because (as was the case in all these hits on Turrets) much damage was done to the various instruments and appliances by the splinters and flash.<br />
<br />
:It is worthy of note that the electric cables in the Turret were comparatively uninjured.<br />
<br />
:(2). Turret No.3 was also hit by a 38 cm. (15") shell (hit No.6). The projectile penetrated the Barbette armour and took with it a large piece of plating into the interior of the Turret. The 74 men of the Turret's crew (as in the hit described above[)] for the most part were killed, only 6 men getting away wounded. It is observed that an 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) gun which was 3½ metres (about 11½ ft.) away from the point of impact, was completely undamaged, although the deck below the spot, and in the immediate vicinity of this gun, was badly damaged.<br />
<br />
:Nos.3 and 4 Turrets were only put out of action towards the end of the engagement.<br />
<br />
:The two foremost Turrets remained completely intact, although the Barbette armour of the second Turret showed a fairly large scrape from a (very glancing) shell hit. But this caused no further damage to the Turret (hit No.13).<br />
<br />
:(4). The Conning Tower was hit on the starboard side on the edge. But only small pieces of the brittle face of the armoured plates splintered off, and in the Tower itself only one elevation-pointer ceased to function.<br />
<br />
:(5). Very severe damage was done by a large calibre shell (hit No.20) which exploded close to the casemate of the No.2 15 cm. (5.9) gun port, which not only damaged this gun, but also put the two neighbouring 15 cm. (5.9") guns out of action. The first named gun was principally severely damaged on the chase, and the chase of the foremost 15 cm. (5.9") gun was indented to such an extent by splinters, that it could not be fired again. The other gun in the vicinity was so shaken up by the powerful explosion, that it could not be moved again. The casualties sustained by the gun's crews were in contrast comparatively small. (1 man killed and several severely or slightly wounded at the first named gun[)].<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
A large fragment of a 38 cm. (15") shell (which failed to explode), was exhibited on board (as is shown in Fig.12, Enc.3)[.] The much distorted fuze was also found.<br />
<br />
<center>H. "KÖNIG".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits.</center><br />
<br />
There were 13 hits (large calibre) identified all from the port side and above the waterline.<br />
<br />
:(1). A 34.3 cm. (13.5) shell hit the port foremost 15 cm. (5.9") casemate. (Hit No.9). A large piece of armour plating was carried into the casemate, where the shell exploded, killed the gun's crew (11 men) and put the gun out of action. The armour plate went further, penetrated the bulkhead, entered the galley, destroyed it and killed more men.<br />
<br />
:(2). Another 34.3 cm. (13.5") shell penetrated the second 15 cm. (5.9") casemate (hit No.8) and exploded, making the gun useless and, by penetrating the deck also caused much damage in the compartment below. The crew of this gun was by chance not at the moment in the casemate, as they had gone out for a short time on account of gas from the explosion in the first 15 cm. (5.9) casemate (which had occurred just previously.) The result was that there were no killed or wounded among the gun's crew.<br />
<br />
:(3). The traces of a shell were visible on the roof of the foremost 30.5 (12") Turret. (Hit No.11.) The projectile damaged the Rangefinder cover, and tore off a piece of it, rendering the Rangefinder useless. No other damage was caused by this hit.<br />
<br />
:(4). The roof of the Conning Tower was similarly gazed [sic] by a shell, which left a scratch but caused no other damage to the Tower or its instruments, etc.<br />
<br />
<center>J. "HINDENBURG."</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Apparently about 30,000 tons displacement)</center><br />
<br />
This Cruiser, now building will be given an armament of 8 30.5 cm. (12") guns 50 cal. (in four double turrets, 2 forward and 2 aft as in "DERFFLINGER") and 14 15 cm. (5.9") and 8.8 cm[.] (22 pr.) Anti-aircraft guns.<br />
<br />
The foremost superimposed Turret (No.2) was mostly built in, and a short inspection of it was made.<br />
<br />
The Gun-platform is especially roomy. The distance apart of the centres of the two gun barrels being estimated at about 3 metres (10 feet approx.)[.] The complete arrangement of the gun-platform can be seen in the diagrammatic Sketch (Fig.13, Enc.3). The 2 shell hoists (G) are side by side between the gun and to the left of the left gun, (and right of the right gun) are the two ammunition hoists (P).<br />
<br />
The up-coming ammunition is placed in its slide (TT) in the rear by means of unloading rammers (so-called "Umlauder"), whence it rolls on to the loading Tray, and finally on to the shell swings or cartridge swings, which by swinging across, brings the shell or cartridges one after the other to the rear of the gun for loading.<br />
<br />
The two rammers are hydraulic chain Rammers (with reserve hand drive). In the space at the rear of the platform there are :- an entrance opening (E) and two openings (A) for passing out firedcartridge [sic] cases. These openings (A) are constructed similarly to those more exactly described under "SEYDLITZ" (Sec.II. Par.9).<br />
<br />
The Breeches are worked hydraulically (the reserve method being by hand.)<br />
<br />
The principle can be gathered from Fig.14, Enc.3 . A bar with a tooth edged point (Z), (which can be worked up or down hydraulically) turns the Traversing shaft by means of cog wheels (R1, R2, R3) and opens or shuts the breech. The Water-pressure is led to the mechanism through two flexible hoses. If the cog wheel R3 is placed out of gear with R2, the hydraulic system is shut off.<br />
<br />
For elevating,Trunnion [sic] sights are provided and for training a sighting telescope is fitted in front between the guns.<br />
<br />
The Rangefinder (about 8 metres long) which was not yet on board, is to be fitted in the front of the Turret above the guns (under the roof as already referred to under "KURFÜRST")[.] Only the two side openings in the armour could be seen.<br />
<br />
Elevating is worked hydraulically (Reserve system by hand). (The ammunition hoists are also worked hydraulically, but here the alternative system is electric).<br />
<br />
A gun coupling is fitted in this ship as in all later ships. But these couplings are apparently only for use when it is desired to elevate a gun whose elevating gear has been damaged.<br />
<br />
The normal Turret Training gear and also the reserve system is only worked by electric motors.<br />
<br />
The same system of ventilation is used as has already been described in "SEYDLITZ" (Section II, Par.II).<br />
<br />
All working machinery (Electrically driven pumps, and electric motors for elevating, training, hoists, rammers, etc.) are apparently installed in the spacious working chamber below the gun platform.<br />
<br />
The arrangements in the Magazines as well as the transporting gear for passing shell and cartridges from them to the hoists are the same as those already more minutely described under battleship "GROSSER KÜRFURST."<br />
<br />
<center>K. "BAYERN".</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Class Ersatz "WÖRTH" about 30,000 tons disp.)</center><br />
<br />
This battleship, only recently completed, had to carry out exercises whilst at Kiel, and the Commission was invited to join for a cruise, which gave opportunity for a certain amount of inspection.<br />
<br />
The armament consists of eight 38 cm. (15") G.L. 45 guns in four double turrets apparently arranged as shown in the Almanac; sixteen 15 cm. (5.9") G.L. 45 guns in casemates and eight 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) anti-aircraft guns.<br />
<br />
38 cm. Gun Turret. (Fig. 15, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
The distance apart of the bore axes is 3700 mm. (12.1 ft.) for these guns[.] 8.8 cm. sub-calibre guns are provided, which are put in from outboard (i.e. muzzle end.)<br />
<br />
The Gunhouse, as in the turrets of the "HINDENBURG" is very roomy.<br />
<br />
In this turret there has been introduced no important alteration with respect to the munition hoists. Whereas in all previous ships the shot hoist was separate from the cartridge hoist, in this ship, as with us (the Austrian Navy), both hoists for one gun are combined in one trunk; and also instead of the shell and cartridge swings in the "HINDENBURG" (see above) munition wagons (W1, W2), which run on cross rails are introduced. The two main hoists (A1, A2) come up between the two guns. Besides these there are in addition two electrically driven auxiliary hoists (H1, H2).<br />
<br />
The round which arrives at the top of the hoist is taken out and landed, by means of the unloading rammer (U) in the munition wagon, which brings it to the rear of the particular gun in the loading position, whence it is loaded by means of the rammer.<br />
<br />
The munition wagons, rammers and unloading rammers are normally worked by hydraulic power (with auxiliary handworking gear); at the back of the turret are two principal operating positions, (ST1, ST2) which are raised to give a good all-round view, and where all the necessary manipulation for the foregoing hydraulic machinery is carried out.<br />
<br />
The munition hoists are also hydraulically worked, and electric drive is provided as an alternative. The elevating and breech mechanism gear are hydraulic (with alternative hand gear).<br />
<br />
The following sighting arrangements are provided :-<br />
<br />
:(a) For elevation - two side trunnion sights as well as two reserve sights in front.<br />
<br />
:(b) For training - a principal trainer's telescope in front between the two guns, as well as a side telescope as reserve.<br />
<br />
Asked whether any automatic firing apparatus was in contemplation, it was replied that a place for such apparatus was provided but the installation could not be expected till later, and depended on the solution of several problems which had yet to be experimented on.<br />
<br />
The large 8.2 m. (26.9 ft.) rangefinder is placed the same as in the "HINDENBURG".<br />
<br />
The ventilation of the turret is on the same principle as in the "HINDENBURG" and "SEYDLITZ", except that in addition there are two powerful electric fan motors between the guns.<br />
<br />
The Training is done electrically, as is also the alternative arrangement. Fig 15, Enc.3 gives a diagrammatic sketch of the arrangements. The controller gives 72 degrees of speed.<br />
<br />
For absorbing the shock in the training gear of single gun shooting there are provided, in the friction coupling box of the worm gearing, besides the friction plates (as in our own installations) two rings of strong springs above them - each ring containing six springs as shewn in Fig.17, Enc.3. Apparently any turret thrown off a small angle by a single round will be trained back to its original position by means of these springs.<br />
<br />
As in "HINDENBURG", so also in "BAYERN", the various machines for training[,] elevating, munition supply, rammers and unloading rammers are placed on the deck underneath the Gun platform (working chamber), and also the machines for the magazine and transport arrangements of munitions are similarly installed.<br />
<br />
In Fig. 18, Enc.3 is a diagrammatic sketch of the munition hoists and magazines from which it can be seen that the shell room is on the lowest level and has the magazine above it. The cartridge loading door (F1 for cartridges, G1 for shell) are fitted for flash protection with sliding shutters which are self-operating when the lift arrives at one or the other, i.e. when the lift arrives at the bottom, the shutter there will open and leave the loading hole (P) free, while the upper openings F1 and G1 will be shut and locked.<br />
<br />
An inspection of the shell room 38 cm. (15") showed that on these shells there is attached to the rearmost of the three upper driving bands a zinc band about 20 mm. (.78 in.) broad (similar to the driving bands). Experience has shown that this zinc ring is a very good anti-coppering device for the bore. It was apparently on the French front, at Verdun and in Flanders, that experiments with this arrangement were made; the results were very good and its introduction followed. The Army has also adopted it.<br />
<br />
The following is the situation with regard to 38 cm. (15 in.) shell. As opposed to the single type of shell (long calibre) in newly completing ships, here there are two :-<br />
<br />
:(a) A.P. shell, with cap, total length of shell 3.5 calibres.<br />
<br />
:(b) H.E. shell, uncapped, total length of shell 4.1 calibres. The total weight is 750 kg. (1653.5 lbs). The burster (not Trotyl, probably Heranit? 23.5 kg. (57.8 lbs.) for the A.P. shell and 67 kg. (147.7 lbs) for the H.E. The establishment allowed per [gun] is 90 A.P. and 30 H.E. The maximum range is 24 kilometres (26,247 yds.) with an angle of descent of 32 degrees, elevation of gun 247 degrees, time of flight 48 secs.<br />
<br />
:The charge is 87 kg. (191.8 lbs) in the main cartridge and 96 kg. (211.6 lbs.) in the foremost cartridge.<br />
<br />
:The rate of fire is one round per 40 seconds.<br />
<br />
15 cm. casemates. In these ships the flash protection for the 15 cm. (5.9") munition hoists in the casemates has been improved (Fig.20, Enc.3). In that a sheet iron chamber (K) has been built around the delivery opening which, by means of sliding plates (S1 and S2) can be shut off either from the trunk or from the munition tray. (G2.) For example, a shell arrives at the top of the hoist (G) - the shutter (S1) is raised in its guides by means of the lift mechanism, so that the shell can roll into the chamber (G1) while the shutter (S3) remains closed. Immediately afterwards the shutter (S1) closes the opening and the shutter (S2) raises in its guides and the shell rolls on the munition tray (G2). By this means the trunk is rendered flash proof at all stages of the operation.<br />
<br />
Submerged Flats. On board this ship there was also the opportunity to visit a submerged flat with two broadside tubes.<br />
<br />
In all there are five tubes (2 in each flat) and a bow tube. The calibre of the torpedoes is 60 cm. (23.6 in.) and the weight of a fully charged torpedo 2200 kg. (4850 lbs.). The explosive (? Heranit) weighing 250 kg. (531.1 lbs). The establishment per tube is four torpedoes - making in all 20 on board. The greatest torpedo range is 13 kilometres, 14,217 yds) with a medium speed setting of 28 knots.<br />
<br />
The flat that was visited (Fig.21, Enc.3) is very large and about 5 metres high, (16 ft.) so that it is perfectly feasible to turn any torpedo hanging on the purchase at the turntable (W1) on the overhead rails, so that is [sic] can be loaded into the port or starboard tube.<br />
<br />
The tubes (L1, L2) are side loading with very strong longitudinal holts [sic] on top (V1, V2) and fitted with a strong shield bar. For loading the torpedoes in the tubes, there are fitted near the tubes, on the same side on the side door, mechanical loading apparatus (quickloaders A1, A2), and on the opposite side are provided the rails (R1, R2) which serve for the adjustment (lever system) of the gyroscope of a torpedo lying in the tube.<br />
<br />
A torpedo is struck down from the upper deck through the trunk (E) and swung through the opening (O) into the flat, whence by means of a purchase (mechanically driven) it is run on to the tramways (S) and thence either to the bulkhead stowage or to a stowage over the tube.<br />
<br />
One must take this opportunity of noting that the overhead rails are not bolted to the actual deck, but are a separate structure, so as to avoid putting any vibration or other strain on to the armoured deck.<br />
<br />
If a torpedo is to be loaded it will be brought by means of the purchase to the exact ready stowage over the tube; then the hydraulic loader is operated by a lever; a grad [sic] with two arms seizes the torpedo in two specially cut away parts and draws it horizontally on to the guide rail of the loader, which then is lowered together with the torpedo. In the meantime the side door is mechanically unbolted and opened, so that the torpedo can be placed right in the tube (impulse frame). After this the guide rail and grab of the loader are withdrawn and raised, while the side door is shut and bolted. Loading by this means proceeds comparatively noiselessly, rapidly and precisely.<br />
<br />
The sluice is hydraulically worked, and after firing is operated by the return movement of the shield bar. When draining the tube the water can be pumped either overboard or into a well.<br />
<br />
The discharge is operated electrically from the Conning Tower or by hand.<br />
<br />
The sluice is hydraulically worked, and after firing is operated by the return movement of the shield bar. When draining the tube the water can be pumped either overboard or into a well.<br />
<br />
The discharge is operated electrically from the Conning Tower or by hand.<br />
<br />
<center>L. TORPEDO BOAT "G. 90".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1200 tons displacement.)</center><br />
<br />
From the Battleship "BAYERN" the Commission was brought back to Kiel in one of the newest torpedo boats (G.90), which offered an opportunity of seeing certain details.<br />
<br />
The gun armament consists of three 10.5 cm. (4.1") Guns on transferable mountings; the torpedo armament, of two single tubes forward and two double tubes for<nowiki>*</nowiki> [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. Note: Apparently a clerical error for 50 cm.(19.7")] 45 cm. (17.7") torpedoes in the after part. (See Fig. 22, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
The following details respecting the torpedo equipment were noted :<br />
<br />
Six torpedoes were carried, which remain stowed in the tubes; spare torpedoes are not carried on board, and no torpedo stowage is provided. The tubes of the twin mountings are not parallel but inclined outwards from each other, making an angle of 20° between the tubes.<br />
<br />
The reason for this lies in the method of torpedo boat attack. Torpedo craft always fire on the swing (in order to offer the full broadside target to the enemy fire for the shortest possible time), and the torpedoes from a twin mounting are are [sic] fired one after the other (the mounting remaining on a fixed bearing). The first torpedo having been fired, the boat continues to swing under helm and after 20° the second torpedo is fired.<br />
<br />
The training is done by means of a training gear at each tube, which can be understood from the detailed sketch (Fig. 23, Enc.3). By means of the hand crank (K) a worm and worm wheel (Zr) can be turned, this engages inthe [sic] training rack (Zs) and so the tube can be trained. The training pinion can, by means of a coupling clutch worked by the lever (H) be disconnected from the rack, should be required to train the mounting quickly, or for loading and unloading the torpedo by means of the training gear. This latter is accomplished by means of the windlass (W) mounted on the training shaft round which can be taken a line secured either to the nose or the tail of the torpedo. At the back part of the mounting is fitted a training brake which grips the rack.<br />
<br />
A director is fitted at each tube, and torpedoes are fired electrically from the bridge. At the rear of each tube are fitted two firing pushes (Abfeurungspöller), which can be operated either singly or together. In order to prevent firing from a tube which is not yet at the ready, the particular firing gear is held fast by a special locking gear fitted to the tube; its method of working can be seen from (Fig.24, Enc.3). The locking levers (St1 and St2) are only clear of the firing gear, when the rollers (R1 and R2), connected to the locking gear, are clear of the guide strip (G). This guide strip covers the arc in which firing is to be prevented. The springs.(F1 and F2) release the gear, as shewn in the sketch under (T).<br />
<br />
For torpedo transport on deck a special rail is fitted on the starboard side, on which was seen a fairly long transport wagon.<br />
<br />
<center>M. TRAWLER.</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Fitted out for Anti Submarine work)</center><br />
<br />
For fighting submarine boats trawlers are employed with the following :-<br />
<br />
:(a). A.S.rope nets fitted with two or four A.S.mines.<br />
<br />
:(b). Large Depth charges.<br />
<br />
:(c). Anti Submarine explosive Kite.<br />
<br />
::These appliances are described below.<br />
<br />
(a). Nets with A.S. Mines (Fig.25, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
These nets are made up from hemp rope (diameter of rope about 10 mm.); they are 250 m.long and of varying breadth (up to 20 m.) To a normal net two mines (M.M.) are attached (see Fig.25, Enc.3); for broader nets the mines are secured in pairs vertically - thus making four mines to a broad net. The mines are supported by their own large iron flat (S) while for the support of the nets smaller floats (S1) are placed on top.<br />
<br />
Each pair of nets also has an anchor and cable attached.<br />
<br />
The nets which are joined together are stowed with their mines in large shaped iron floats. The latter are stowed ready for shooting in two rows, (1 and 2, Fig.26, Enc3) on the top of the trawler. Shortly before action the primers are inserted through circular holes in the floats (1 hole per float).<br />
<br />
The shooting of nets one and two is carried out at a speed of 10 knots by one man. First , the first anchor of the first net is let go and the net with its mines dragged into the water, afterwards being anchored by the second anchor. Before, however, this latter is slipped the first anchor of the second net must be let go to ensure over-lapping.<br />
<br />
There are tiny holes in the floats by means of which just sufficient water can enter the floats so as to sink the net with its mines and floats at the end of an hour, and leave the area free again for traffic.<br />
<br />
These net mines (Fig.27, Enc.3) are contact mines with an explosive charge (1) from 12-13 kg. of Trotyl and consist of the mine case (M), firing mechanism (S), impact plate (P), distance pin (St), the safety lever (S1) and the primer (J) with the detonator (K).<br />
<br />
When the mine enters the water and reaches a depth of 5 metres the safety catch is released by a hydrostatic valve, which thus frees the detonator for the striker.<br />
<br />
Firing is effected in that by the impact of a submarine the impact plate (and with it the distance pin) are displaced, and by means of the latter the striker is freed and fires the mine by means of the firing spring (which is already cocked).<br />
<br />
(b). Depth charge (Fig., Enc.3).<br />
<br />
These depth charges are cylindrical in form and contain a large explosive charge of 60 kg. of Trotyl. They consist of the mine (M) and the float (S). The latter is connected to the mine by a strong steel wire (3 mm.), which is wound on a reel in the float. It fires (exactly like the depth charge of Korvetten Kapitän Schönthaler) because on reaching the set depth the tension on the wire operates the firing mechanism (Striker spring (F) is compressed as the striker (B) is raised by the grab (Z)) and thus frees the striker.<br />
<br />
The set depth can be adjusted from 5 to 5 (5 to 50?) metres (practically in the same way as in the Schönthaler Depth Charge) and it is to be noted that the time of explosion (1 to 5 secs) is adjustable by means of turning the pointer of the seconds scale (E) on the outside. The delay action itself operates by means of a disc similar to shrapnel.<br />
<br />
(c). Explosive Kite (Fig.30, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
The Kite (D) is made of wood and shaped as shown in Fig.31, inside is an explosive charge (the same size as the net mine, 12 - 13 kg., described in par. (a) above.<br />
<br />
The Kite is towed by a 15 mm. strong steel wire (T) whose core is an electric cableby [sic] means of which the kite is electrically exploded.<br />
<br />
The cable wire is wound on the winch (K), the ends being connected to the electric firing battery in the hollow drum.<br />
<br />
The towing wire is led from the winch over an adjustable brake (B) and from there over a roller (R) secured to a derrick (L) where the other end is connected to the charge.<br />
<br />
When the kite hits against a hard object (submarine) it is electrically fired.<br />
<br />
As a safety precaution the electric switch at the battery is only made when the kite is towing at the requisite speed.<br />
<br />
Trawlers tow at 10 knots, which causes a pull of 350 kg. on the wire.<br />
<br />
<center>N. ARSENAL WILHELMSHAVEN.</center><br />
<br />
Only a short visit to the gun shops was made. There about 1,000 civil workman [sic] were employed.<br />
<br />
In general the work carried out was similar to that in our own gun factories (repair of gun material, production of necessary equipment, magazine and shellroom machinery, examination and cleaning of bores of guns, the storage and preservation of magazine and shellroom fittings, small calibre guns, searchlights, range finders, etc.), only here the buildings, in particular the shops and storehouses, are modern throughout and planned on a spacious lay out.<br />
<br />
The drawing office is worthy of note, in it at that time the stowage plan of munitions for the Battle Cruiser "HINDENBURG" was in preparation. For the protection of such drawings there is provided a large fireproof room.<br />
<br />
To the gun shops belong :- the large mechanical shops, a smithy, a large carpenter's shop, a large shop for work on canvas, leather, and similar equipment, a plumber's shop, two very roomy storehouses for magazine material and a depot for various constructional materials; in the last named is a special,cellar for rubber and leather articles in which at the time there were gathered about 700,000 marks worth.<br />
<br />
A new large gun hall was under construction which is about 60 m. long and 25 m. broad. The building itself was nearly finished, only the installation and also the large travelling crane were not in place.<br />
<br />
Both high sliding doors (T1 T2) were operated by an electrically driven (alternative hand working) which at the side. The travelling crane (N) brings the material to the door, where a floating crane (S) with large overhang takes it over and provides for its further transport.<br />
<br />
While passing through the shop the decoppering of a 15 cm. (5.9) gun was seen. The decoppering machine was a brush withbvery [sic] fine steel bristles, as shewn in Fig.33. The head of the brush (K) is a cylindrical drum of strong plate, which before use is filled with petroleum and turpentine. On the head are fixed three bristle holding rings (H), which carry on their periphery the small steel bristles (B). These three bristle rings are separated by two intermediate rings (R).<br />
<br />
The fine steel wire used in the bristles is 0.2 mm. thick and must be softer than the material of the inner tube so as not to scratch the latter. The cleaning is accomplished by powerful brushing th [sic] through the bore, this action forcing out the petroleum mixture from the drum at the head of the brush into the bore.<br />
<br />
The decoppering device was very successful with the 15 cm. (5.9") gun; a small quantity of the copper scraping and two bristles were given to the Mission. (A bristle and a portion of copper scrapings accompany the reports (1 each) to the K.U.K.K.M. Marine Section (Austrian Admiralty) and to the (Austrian) Naval Technical Committee.)<br />
<br />
<center>O. ARSENAL KIEL.</center><br />
<br />
The "Artilleriewerkstätten" (Gun shops) at Kiel are in general the same as those at Wilhelmshaven described above, so that this amounted to an opportunity for closer description.<br />
<br />
The only noteworthy sight among the gunshops visited was one very large gunhall in which numerous guns are stowed, (among them some from ships that had been in the battle (Jutland); for the transport of the heaviest weights are two travelling cranes (each of 45 tons both cranes are employed together). For the further transport normal gauge rail tracks are provided.<br />
<br />
For the mechanical decoppering of guns a special scraper is used, whose action can be seen from Fig. 34. In the dial shaped head (K) are two difference scrapers (S1 S2), which by means of an inserting gear (E) can be placed exactly in the groove it is required to clean. The scraper (S1), cleans the base of the grooves, the scraper (S2) cleans the sides. The red (st) is guided so as to avoid any corners of the scraper<nowiki>*</nowiki> [I.D.Note: Apparently this guide rod arrangement keeps the scraper true in the groove.] This apparatus has proved its worth.<br />
<br />
Later on information from the Ordnance Department of the Admiralty showed that 30.5 and 28 cm. gun tubes, from which 60 - 100 rounds had been fired in the action, from later experimental firings at Krupps were found to have suffered from wear (actually about 20 mm.) which permitted overramming. After the conclusion of the experimental firings, only gun tubes of equ [sic] equal wear are sent to one and the same ship.<br />
<br />
Of very great interest is the information that many of the 25 cm. (13.7") guns, which were on the French front (6 on the Verdun front) had fired 600 - 800 rounds with full charge (range 36 kilometers, 39,376 yds.) with a diminished range of only 2 km., 2,187 yds. and no necessity for a new inner tube. The shell used in these guns were those provided with the anti-coppering zinc ring.<br />
<br />
The following summarize the points of the greatest importance.<br />
<br />
:1. Introduction of gas masks for each man, as of utmost importance.<br />
<br />
:2. Specially important is flash protection (including) cover plates for munition hoist trunks in turrets and casemates, shut off hatches and doors as well as partition of the magazines.).<br />
<br />
:3. As few cartridges as possible by the gun (in the gun house of a turret or in a casemate), because of the great danger of its ignition by a hit.<br />
<br />
:4. Abolition of the ready use position in the turrets (on account of point 3, above).<br />
<br />
:5. Many gun tubes 30.5 and 28 cm. (12" and 4" [sic]) have fired 60 - 100 rounds with only 20 mm. overramming.<br />
<br />
:6. Many gun tubes undergo experimental firing and are reissued only in similar tubes to one ship.<br />
<br />
:7. Automatic firing apparatus is not yet in use.<br />
<br />
:8. Gun coupling gear provided, but is only used in the event of danger to elevating gear.<br />
<br />
:9. Introduction of small calibre guns 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) only for anti-aircraft work.<br />
<br />
:10. Normally the turrets only fire salvoes, and only from one gun per turret.<br />
<br />
:11. Repulse of Torpedo boat attacks is achieved by broadside salvoes from the 15 cm. (5.9") guns - all in one target.<br />
<br />
:12. Normal turret machinery :-<br />
<br />
::Training{{pad|50px}}Electric (as is also reserve)<br />
<br />
::Elevating<br />
<br />
::Rammers<br />
<br />
::Unloading rammers{{pad|50px}}All hydraulic and<br />
<br />
::Breech mechanism and in some{{pad|30px}}hand control.<br />
<br />
::cases Munition wagons<br />
<br />
::Munition hoists - hydraulic - with electric reserve<br />
<br />
::Shell transport in shell rooms - electric<br />
<br />
:13. Observation of fall of shot :- in each top, 1 or two men in telephonic communication with the gunnery officer. (On 31st.May neither Aeroplanes or Zeppelins were present[)].<br />
<br />
:14. Fire control from gunnery officer's position by elevation pointer only.<br />
<br />
:15. All rangefinders stereoscopic normally 3 m. long instruments in armour domes in Turrets, in the latest ships 8 m. instruments projecting from sides below Turret roofs.<br />
<br />
:16. Large calibre projectiles are standard type armour shells with caps and sharply pointed explosive shells without cap are being reintroduced. For 15 cm. Guns (5.9") fused shell with base fuse and H.F. shell with a very sensitive nose fuse and a base fuse.<br />
<br />
:17. No ship expended all her heavy ammunition, at the most a little over 1/3 of the establishment.<br />
<br />
:18. Establishment for heavy guns 115 - 120 rounds per gun.<br />
<br />
:19. As an anti-coppering precaution for guns, projectiles are fitted with a zinc ring behind the rear driving band and in direct contact therewith.<br />
<br />
:20. English 38 cm. (15") and 34.3 cm (13.5") projectiles have apparently black powder as a bursting charge: bursting bad and effect not commensurate with the calibre.<br />
<br />
:21. The explosion of a large calibre projectile in a Turret always puts the same out of action.<br />
<br />
:22. Ventilation of Turrets insufficient.<br />
<br />
:23. Voice pipes 60 - 100 and 150 mm. calibre have no lagging and are provided with wooden stoppers or sponges wherewith to close the tube to gases.<br />
<br />
:24. Emergency lighting by means of Pocket lamps.<br />
<br />
:25. Torpedo nets are no longer carried.<br />
<br />
:26. All ranges below 15 km. heavy armour is generally pierced by 38 cm. (15")projectiles. [sic]<br />
<br />
:27. Submarine Defence. Mine nets, (? Depth charges) and Explosive Kites.<br />
<br />
Appendices 2 Sketches, Hits Appendix 1 and 2. One sheet of sketches to report. Appen. 3.<br />
<br />
In conclusion, one matter may be mentioned, which, on the occasion of the visit to the Arsenal at Wilhelmshaven and to the ships, attracted attention through its differing so greatly from our own arrangements. Viz, the handling procedure of consumable stores.<br />
<br />
The characteristic points of the Organisation of this Branch in the German Navy are, as follows :-<br />
<br />
:1. In the ships, the demanding, keeping and issuing of consumable stores is done by one officer under the special supervision of the Commander, who is responsible for the stores being on board, for maintaining them in proper condition, for stowing them efficiently and according to regulations and for the accuracy and completeness of the necessary accounts.<br>These officers are occupied by "Materialenverwalter" W.O.'s [Warrant Officers] who are well trained in the work of their branch and are selected from P.Os. [Petty Officers]<br />
<br />
:2. Money necessary for the Administrative work of the ship is remitted to the Captain in the form of a fixed sum and the expenditure of this is checked by the "Materialenverwalter".<br />
<br />
:3. The limit to the yearly expenditure of stores is fixed by a "Stores Credit" (estimate). Permission to exceed this limit must be obtained from the Admiralty and only in specially exceptional cases is permission for such excess to be requested afterwards.<br />
<br />
:4. The paymaster controls stores and the "Materialenverwalter" accounts and reports tomthe [sic] Captain whenever expenditure in excess of the quantity allowed is to be feared. The paymaster is not responsible for the accuracy of the entries made by the "Materialenverwalter" in books, etc.,kept [sic] by him.<br />
<br />
:5. The Office staff is at the disposal of the Captain to assist in accounting for consumable and non-consumable stores. This staff consists of one officer and the clerk, they are jointly responsible for reporting losses, deficiencies as compared with quantities shown by the books, necessary repairs and replacements. They also keep such records as are necessary to afford at any time a clear statement of the consumable and non-consumable stores and munition on board.<br />
<br />
:6. Stores are completed by demands on the Imperial Dockyards or depots by means of special forms. The consignment note serving as voucher.<br />
<br />
:Ship's demands are not checked by the Dockyards, the ships alone being responsible for the demand being in order.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}Pola, 4th. August, 1916.<br />
<br />
==See Also==<br />
*[[Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland]]<br />
<br />
==Footnotes==<br />
{{reflist}}<br />
<br />
==Bibliography==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
*''Almanach für die k. und k. Kriegsmarine 1917. Kriegsausgabe''. '''XXXVII'''. Pola: 1917.<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
[[Category:Battle of Jutland]]</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Category:Source&diff=334784Category:Source2024-03-26T10:58:33Z<p>Simon Harley: Made Changes.</p>
<hr />
<div>''The Dreadnought Project'' relies to a great extent on primary sources, scattered across repositories across the world. We also rely on material printed in specialist secondary sources.<br />
<br />
==Archives==<br />
===[http://www.chu.cam.ac.uk/archives/ Churchill Archives Centre]===<br />
Churchill Archives Centre, located at Churchill College, Cambridge, has a large collection of personal papers relating to persons featured on this website. A full list can be viewed [https://archives.chu.cam.ac.uk/collections/guide-holdings/ here.] The college also holds the papers of [[Winston Leonard Spencer-Churchill|Sir Winston S. Churchill]], which have been [https://www.churchillarchive.com/ digitised.]<br />
<br />
Visits have to be booked in advance (link [https://calendars.libraries.cam.ac.uk/calendar/Churchill-Archives-RR-Calendar?cid=8436&t=m&d=0000-00-00&cal=8436&inc=0 here]), and new readers have to [https://forms.office.com/Pages/ResponsePage.aspx?id=HeJzuz14RkaXoeLCiZxAr5XElc1TN_5HnTImBJd1-fhURFpSRVc2N0k1UlpDVUxUMUE5UTY2STIzRCQlQCN0PWcu register]. Material can be retrieved throughout the day.<br />
<br />
;Contact Details<br />
<br />
Churchill Archives Centre,<br>Churchill College,<br>Cambridge, CB3 0DS,<br>United Kingdom.<br />
<br />
Telephone: +44 1223 336087<br><br />
Fax: +44 1223 336135<br><br />
Email: archives@chu.cam.ac.uk<br />
Website: https://archives.chu.cam.ac.uk/<br />
<br />
===[http://www.kcl.ac.uk/library/archivespec/collections/LHCMA.aspx The Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives]===<br />
Located at King's College, London, the Liddell Hart Centre is home to the personal papers of a number of British naval officers of the Dreadnought Era, along with those of other members of the Armed Forces. The full list can be found [http://www.kcl.ac.uk/lhcma/info/index.shtml here]. It is recommended that one makes an appointment before visiting.<br />
<br />
;Contact Details<br />
<br />
Michael Howard Archives Reading Room,<br><br />
Room 302, Strand Building,<br><br />
Strand,<br><br />
London, WC2R 2LS,<br><br />
United Kingdom.<br />
<br />
Telephone: 020 7848 2015.<br><br />
Fax: 020 7848 2760.<br><br />
Email: archives@kcl.ac.uk<br><br />
Website: http://www.kcl.ac.uk/iss/archivespec/<br />
<br />
===[https://library.leeds.ac.uk/special-collections/collection/723 Liddle Collection]===<br />
The Liddle Collection, an archive of various first-hand accounts of both World Wars assembled by Peter Liddle, is located in the Special Collections of the Brotherton Library at the University of Leeds. It contains many accounts by officers and men of the Royal Navy during the First World War. The collection is searchable [https://explore.library.leeds.ac.uk/special-collections-explore/Liddle%20Collection here].<br />
<br />
Visits have to be booked at least three days in advance.<br />
<br />
;Contact Details<br />
<br />
Special Collections,<br>Leeds University Library,<br>Woodhouse Lane,<br>Leeds,<br>West Yorkshire,<br>LS2 9JT,<br>United Kingdom.<br />
<br />
Telephone: 0113 34 35518 or 0113 343 5518.<br><br />
Email: specialcollections@library.leeds.ac.uk<br><br />
Website: http://library.leeds.ac.uk/liddle-collection<br><br />
<br />
===[http://www.nmm.ac.uk/index.php National Maritime Museum (UK)]===<br />
The National Maritime Museum is probably the United Kingdom's pre-eminent museum of the sea. It is located in the former buildings of the Royal Hospital School at Greenwich in London, and lies across the road from the former [[Royal Naval College, Greenwich]]. The museum's Caird Library is home to a large collection of books and personal papers. There is also an out-station at the Brass Foundry, Woolwich, which stores [https://prints.rmg.co.uk/collections/ship-plans ships' plans] and [[Ship's Cover|ships' covers]].<br />
<br />
The Caird Library's website can be found [http://www.rmg.co.uk/researchers/library here]. The library catalogue (for books) can be searched [http://librarycatalogue.rmg.co.uk/ here], and the archive catalogue (for papers) can be searched [http://collections.rmg.co.uk/archive.html#!asearch here]. A largely complete list of holdings is also available [[:Category:Papers in the Possession of the National Maritime Museum|here]]).<br />
<br />
;Contact Details.<br />
<br />
The Caird Library,<br><br />
National Maritime Museum,<br><br />
Greenwich,<br><br />
London SE10 9NF,<br><br />
United Kingdom.<br />
<br />
Telephone: +44 (0)20 8312 6516.<br><br />
Email: library@rmg.co.uk and manuscripts@rmg.co.uk<br><br />
Website: http://www.rmg.co.uk/researchers/library/<br />
<br />
===[http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/default.htm The National Archives (UK)]===<br />
Formerly known as the Public Record Office (P.R.O.), The National Archives (T.N.A.) at Kew in west London is the main repository of official British naval documents, located in the ADM series. The online catalogue is accessible [http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/SearchUI here]. The library catalogue is available [http://tna.koha-ptfs.co.uk/ here]. A "Reader's Ticket" is required to order and view original material, and is obtainable on-site at Kew: Details [http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/visit/readers-ticket.htm here]. The National Archives is a five-ten minute walk from Kew Gardens railway station and is served by London Underground (District Line) and London Overground services. Service records for a great many officers and seamen of the Royal Navy have been digitised and are available for a fee to download remotely or for free at Kew.<br />
<br />
;Contact Details.<br />
<br />
The National Archives,<br>Kew,<br>Richmond,<br>Surrey,<br>TW9 4DU,<br>United Kingdom.<br />
<br />
Telephone: +44 (0)20 8392 9198.<br>Website: http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/default.htm<br />
<br />
===National Museum of the Royal Navy===<br />
The National Museum of the Royal Navy (N.M.R.N.) encompasses several museums across the United Kingdom, including the warships ''Victory'', ''Warrior'' and ''Caroline''. It has a library which holds a number of personal papers, many of which are listed [http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/a/A13532604 here]. After a hiatus of many years the institution has an [http://collections.nmrn.org/search/simple online catalogue] of its own once more. However, at the time of writing (1 February, 2019) it is not working, nor is the library taking any requests for research appointments.<br />
<br />
===Primary Documents===<br />
We maintain a comprehensive [[The Dreadnought Project:Primary Documents|list of documents]] found within the various libraries and archives detailing those we have in-hand in some form, and which we have not. This serves as a good bibliographic accounting as well as a wish-list to help us plan visits to those repositories. Tony Lovell had [http://dreadnoughtproject.org/docs/ an old section to this site] that catalogued some he has found useful.<br />
<br />
==Print Publications==<br />
===[http://www.snr.org.uk/pages/top-mast/article-abstracts ''The Mariner's Mirror'']===<br />
A quarterly publication published by the Society of Nautical Research since 1911, ''The Mariner's Mirror'' features articles, notes and book reviews covering all aspects of maritime history.<br />
<br />
===[[Navy and Army Illustrated (Periodical)|''Navy & Army Illustrated'']]===<br />
An illustrated periodical published fortnightly between 1895 and 1903, in 1906, and between 1914 and 1915. Some historical articles in the Dreadnought Project are illustrated with images from ''Navy and Army Illustrated''. <br />
<br />
===[[Warship (Journal)|''Warship'']]===<br />
An annual hardcover (formerly a quarterly) worth buying just about any year at all. While it covers all of naval history, it seems to have a focus on the extended period 1850-1950, which offers our own period substantial coverage.<br />
<br />
===[http://warship.org ''Warship International'']===<br />
A quarterly publication of great merit. It focuses on ships more so than on battle accounts and certainly not on biographical matter.<br />
<br />
==Websites==<br />
''Please Note: The Editors and the Owner of '''The Dreadnought Project''' are not responsible for the content of the following sites. They are included here as a further source of information.''<br />
<br />
===[http://www.naval-history.net/ Naval-History.net]===<br />
An amazing website by the late Gordon Smith. Of particular value are crowd-sourced transcription of original Royal Navy and U.S. Navy ship logs.<br />
<br />
===[https://discoveringanzacs.naa.gov.au/ Discovering ANZACs]===<br />
A government website which includes Service Records of men serving in the [[Royal Australian Navy]] and [[Royal New Zealand Navy]]. The search field will pull up men by name.<br />
<br />
===[http://www.gwpda.org/naval/n0000000.htm GWPDA: The War at Sea]===<br />
A rich, but moribund website hosting various documents and articles related to the war at sea in the First World War.<br />
<br />
===[http://www.hazegray.org/danfs Haze Gray: Dictionary of American Fighting Ships]===<br />
Early version of this comprehensive official history of individual United States Navy warships.<br />
<br />
===[http://www.kinghallconnections.com/ The King-Hall Family and its Connections]===<br />
Website devoted to the King-Hall family and its connection to the Royal Navy. Of chief interest are the meticulously transcribed diaries of {{AdmRN}} [[George Fowler King-Hall|Sir George F. King-Hall]] (the originals of which are held at the N.M.R.N.). <br />
<br />
===[http://www.godfreydykes.info/NAVY%20THINGS.htm Navy Things]===<br />
Website written by a former Fleet Chief Petty Officer in the Royal Navy. Covers various aspects of the Royal Navy over the last three centuries.<br />
<br />
===[http://www.navweaps.com/ NavWeaps]===<br />
A website devoted to "Naval Weapons, Naval Technology and Naval Reunions". Features much detail on hundreds of naval weapons. The data should really be footnoted, but I doubt that the editor can afford to do that with a decade's worth of work. <br />
<br />
===[http://www.hnsa.org Historical Naval Ships Association (HNSA.org)]===<br />
An odd site well executed. Of particular value is their [http://www.hnsa.org/resources/manuals-documents online collection of primiary documents]<br />
<br />
===[http://www.oxforddnb.com/ Oxford Dictionary of National Biography]===<br />
The ''O.D.N.B.'' has a large number of potted biographies of British naval officers and politicians in its database. Many of these are hopelessly biased and based on incomplete research. The archive of original ''Dictionary of National Biography'' articles, which are far more neutral, is of much greater historical value.<br />
<br />
===[https://sites.rootsweb.com/~pbtyc/Nbd/exec/Index.html Paul Benyon's Naval History Website]===<br />
This may not be the original site I had linked, which has gone missing.<br />
<br />
===[http://www.personanavalpress.co.uk/index.htm Persona Naval Press]===<br />
The webmaster, Dr. Mary Jones, wrote her doctoral thesis on officer education in the [[Royal Navy]], and has published the edited diaries and letters of Admiral [[John Locke Marx|John L. Marx]]. Of particular interest is her [http://www.personanavalpress.co.uk/nomination_database.htm nominations database].<br />
<br />
===[http://www.naval-reference.net/uniforms/rn_ww1/rn_ww1.html Royal Navy Rank Insignia of the Great War]===<br />
A well-designed representation of Royal Naval rank insignia at the turn of the 20th Century. Currently offline.<br />
<br />
===[http://www.glennsmuseum.com/bombsights/bombsights.html Glenn's Computer Museum]===<br />
As astonishing personal collection of early computers, featuring many WW2 era bombsights and fire control components. A kindred site for our own [[Fire Control]] pages.<br />
<br />
===[http://humanities.exeter.ac.uk/history/research/centres/maritime/rasor/ Rasor Bibliography]===<br />
A bibliography of British naval and maritime history compiled by Dr. Eugene L. Rasor provided by the University of Exeter's Centre for Maritime and Historical Studies.<br />
<br />
==Internet Forums==<br />
Many of these appear to be shut down now in trepidation of the new EU data protection laws. Thanks, EU! (sarcasm)<br />
<br />
===[http://dreadnoughtproject.org/bbs Dreadnought Project BBS]===<br />
Our own site's BBS. Very low volume, but worthy. Please register and check in.<br />
<br />
===[http://p216.ezboard.com/bwarships1discussionboards Warships1 and NavWeaps Discussion Board]===<br />
Broad discussion of battleships, their history, and their armament. Users often descend into heated debate. A companion to the NavWeaps website.<br />
<br />
===[http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/index.php?showforum=24 Ships and navies - Great War Forum]===<br />
There are a number of knowledgeable users. A strength of this forum is biographical research and coverage of events and ships.<br />
<br />
===[http://www.worldnavalships.com/forums/ World Naval Ships Forums]===<br />
The Royal Navy section is the most active. Ship identification and minor nuances are a true strength.<br />
<br />
==Ship Plans==<br />
===Dreadnought Project===<br />
We have about [[Category:Ship Plans|150 original plans]] of German warships 1870-1945 digitised at 100 DPI.<br />
<br />
===The UK's National Maritime Museum===<br />
Most of the dockyard drawings for Britain's ships are held at the NMM. Copies may be obtained through [http://www.rmg.co.uk/contact/buy-ship-plans/ their website] or by inquiry [mailto:plansandphotos@rmg.co.uk via email]. <br />
<br />
===Service Historique de la Defense===<br />
Many French warship plans were digitised and placed online at [https://www.servicehistorique.sga.defense.gouv.fr/ their website], but they were hacked and lost.<br />
<br />
I happened to download a good many of them, and have mirrored them [http://dreadnoughtproject.org/French%20Warship%20Plans/ here].<br />
<br />
===Bundesarchiv===<br />
The German archives in Freiburg (often known by their acronym, "BAMA") have most of the German plan holdings. [http://www.bundesarchiv.de/ Their website] is available in German only, however.<br />
<br />
I am informed they may have moved to Potsdam, becoming part of the [http://www.zmsbw.de/ Zentrum fuer Militaergeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr].<br />
<br />
===National Archives and Records Administration===<br />
The American plans are held at the [http://www.archives.gov/dc-metro/college-park/ NARA archive in College Park, Maryland].<br />
<br />
===Christian Schmidt===<br />
This German firm has a [http://www.christian-schmidt-fachbuchhandlung.de/ small catalog] of commercially-available drawings that I found to be very high quality and well suited to modelers' needs.<br />
<br />
==Display Items==<br />
I am a snob for great display items. Two merchants stand out.<br />
===Fine Art Models===<br />
The display models shown on [http://fineartmodels.com their website] are expensive, but their quality explains this nicely.<br />
<br />
===Maritime Prints===<br />
Located in the UK, and thus focussing on Royal Navy. [http://www.maritimeprints.com/ Their website] shows the quality of the originals and prints they have to offer.</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=H.M.S._Tiger_(1913)&diff=334781H.M.S. Tiger (1913)2024-03-25T12:24:55Z<p>Simon Harley: Made Changes.</p>
<hr />
<div><div name=fredbot:career>{{ShipCareer|fullname=H.M.S. ''Tiger'' (1913)|fate2=to Ward, Inverkeithing{{DittColl|p. 35}}<br />
|comm=3 Oct, 1914<ref>''Tiger'' log entry for 3 October 1914. {{TNA|ADM 53/63078.}}</ref><br />
|cat=Battlecruiser<br />
|launch=15 Dec, 1913{{Conways1906|p. 32}}<br />
|builder=[[John Brown & Company]], Clydebank<br>(Ship no. 418){{JohnstonClydebankBattlecruisers|Footers}}<br />
|type=battlecruiser<br />
|fate=Sold<br />
|fatedate=Feb, 1932{{DittColl|p. 35}}<br />
|order=1911-1912 Programme{{Conways1906|p. 32}}<br />
|chain=Major Cruisers<br />
|name=Tiger<br />
|laid=20 Jun, 1912{{Conways1906|p. 32}}<br />
|nat=UK<br />
|pend=42 (1914)<br>A4 (Jan 1918)<br>91 (Apr 1918){{DittColl|p. 35}}<br />
|fg=white|bg=crimson}}</div name=fredbot:career><br />
'''H.M.S. ''Tiger''''', the only member of her class, was the last battle cruiser laid down for the [[Royal Navy]] before the [[Great War]].<br />
<br />
==Construction and Service==<br />
Letters inviting tenders were sent to ten firms on 21 December, 1911. That of John Brown and Company of Clydebank was accepted on 4 April, 1912, and she was laid down on 20 June of that year.<ref>''Records of Warship Construction during the War. 1914&mdash;1918''. '''Volume I.''' ADM 1/8547/430. p. 78.</ref> ''Tiger'' was launched on 15 December, 1913, by Lady Helen Vincent, wide of Sir Edgar Vincent. Captain [[Edward Stafford Fitzherbert, Thirteenth Baron Stafford|Edward S. Fitzherbert]], Captain Superintendent, Contract Built Ships, Clyde District, was present on behalf of the Admiralty.<ref>"The Launch of H.M.S. Tiger" (News). ''The Times''. Tuesday, 16 December, 1913. Issue '''40396''', col C, p. 12.</ref><br />
<br />
Of the ship's chief commissioning officers, the first to be appointed was the Gunnery Officer, Lieutenant-Commander [[Evan Bruce-Gardyne]], on 13 March, 1914. The Torpedo Officer, Lieutenant-Commander Walter N. Lapage, was appointed on 19 June. Captain [[Henry Bertram Pelly|Henry B. Pelly]] was appointed in command on 3 August, closely followed by Commander Henry G. Sherbrooke as Commander on the sixth and Commander Edward R. Jones as Navigating Officer on the eighth.{{NLNov14|p. 385''a''}} The First Lieutenant was apparently the retired Lieutenant James Bayley, appointed on the twenty-second.{{NLOct15|p. 398''q''}} The ship commissioned at Clydebank at 09:00 on 3 October.<ref>''Tiger'' log entry for 3 October 1914. {{TNA|ADM 53/63078.}}</ref> On 12 October she ran measured mile trials on the Polperro course, making ten runs in total.<ref>''Battle Cruiser "Tiger"''. {{TNA|ADM 1/8547/430.}}</ref> She joined the Grand Fleet at Scapa on 6 November.<ref>Parkes. p. 557.</ref> On the tenth the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, Admiral [[John Rushworth Jellicoe, First Earl Jellicoe|Sir John R. Jellicoe]], wrote to [[John Arbuthnot Fisher, First Baron Fisher|Lord Fisher]], the [[First Sea Lord]], objecting to the removal of a battle cruiser from his command:<br />
<br />
<blockquote>I explained that ''Tiger'' is absolutely unfit to fight yet. Even if trained (which she is not), her one dynamo that is effective cannot do the work of the fire control instruments, lighting, etc., and she would be a present to the Germans.<ref>''Fear God and Dread Nought''. '''III'''. p. 68.</ref></blockquote><br />
<br />
On the 13th Vice-Admiral [[David Richard Beatty, First Earl Beatty|Sir David R. Beatty]], Vice-Admiral Commanding the [[First Battle Cruiser Squadron (Royal Navy)|First Battle Cruiser Squadron]] referred in a letter to Jellicoe to "TIGER being as yet unfit" to take the place of ''Princess Royal'', detached.<ref>{{TNA|ADM 137/2134.}} f. 32.</ref> Jellicoe flatly replied on the 17th that "TIGER will be with you when next at sea."<ref>The National Archives. ADM 137/2134. f. 34.</ref> Beatty informed Fisher on the 15th:<br />
<br />
<blockquote>You are probably not aware that ''Tiger'' is not yet fit to fight. Three out of her four dynamos are out of action for an indefinite period, and her training is impeded by bad weather, which might continue for many weeks at this time of year, and at present she is quite unprepared and inefficient.<ref>''Fear God and Dread Nought''. '''III'''. p. 71.</ref></blockquote> <br />
<br />
On 14 December Commander [[Arthur John Davies|Arthur J. Davies]] replaced Commander Sherbroke.{{NLOct15|p. 398''q''}}<br />
<br />
===Dogger Bank===<br />
In the wake of Dogger Bank, Vice-Admiral Beatty mentioned to the [[Second Sea Lord]], [[Frederick Tower Hamilton|Sir Frederick T. Hamilton]], that he told Churchill <br />
<br />
<blockquote>I did say that 'Tiger' had a very mixed Ship's Company, with a large number of recovered deserters, and that it was an up hill task for the Captain to pull them together in War Time, and the same efficiency could not be expected from the 'Tiger' as from the other ships. No you have not had any complaint from me or from Pelly, it is not the time to complain but to do the best we can with the material available. I assumed her Ship's company would have been better if it had been possible make it so. If they had had time to work up together and and get to know each other as your System provides for now, there would have been a vast difference, the higher ratings are excellent and gradually making themselves felt, but it takes time.<ref>Beatty to Hamilton. Letter of 17 February, 1915. Hamilton Papers. National Maritime Museum. HTN/117/A.</ref></blockquote><br />
<br />
Lieutenant-Commander [[Patrick Macnamara]] succeeded Bruce-Gardyne as Gunnery Officer on 9 March, 1915.{{NLOct15|p. 398''q''}} Vice-Admiral [[Frederick Charles Doveton Sturdee, First Baronet|Sir F. D. Doveton Sturdee]], commanding the [[Fourth Battle Squadron (Royal Navy)|Fourth Battle Squadron]], told his Rear-Admiral, [[Alexander Ludovic Duff|Alexander L. Duff]] of the relief, who noted in his diary:<br />
<br />
<blockquote>He also told me what I am extremely sorry to hear, viz, that Bruce Gardyne is to be taken out of Tiger on account of bad shooting both in action & in at target practice. I was afraid it might happen. I am sorry for his mother who is so proud of him being Lieut (G) of so fine a ship. Shall we gain by swapping horses while crossing the stream? I doubt it.<ref>Diary entry of 7 March, 1915. Duff Papers. National Maritime Museum. DFF 15.</ref></blockquote><br />
<br />
===Battle of Jutland===<br />
:{{Main|H.M.S. Tiger at the Battle of Jutland}}<br />
<br />
===Gunnery Practice===<br />
''Tiger'' practiced at least twice in early 1918.<ref>Admiralty. ''Extract of Gunnery Practices in Grand Fleet, 1914-1918. Battleships and Battle Cruisers.'' {{TNA|ADM 137/4822}}</ref><br />
<br />
On 25 January, 1918, she performed 13.5-in full charge long range throw-off firing assisted by an airplane.<br />
<br />
On 22 March, she repeated the exercise with help from aircraft from {{UK-Pegasus}} while steaming with {{UK-Lion}} and {{UK-PrincessRoyal}} ahead against a 145 foot target while steaming at full speed and turning, firing 31 of 32 permitted rounds in six minutes of firing. Her consorts' funnel smoke caused intermittent interruption in target visibility, and 4-6 Force winds from 11 o'clock caused spray interference at all positions except the top. The sea caused 5 degrees of roll and 1 degree pitching. Spotting and control was from the top. An "up 100" correction was wrongly applied as an "up 200" at 2.30. The rate was well-kept by inclination reports from {{GCT}}, top, and "B" and "X" turrets being meaned in the {{TS}}. A lack of practice caused the control officer to wait excessively for the W/T and visual reports from his spotting aircraft, but a hit was recorded at 20,000 yards on the second salvo while deflection was still being sought. Overall, however, this waiting slowed the rate of fire markedly.<br />
<br />
Deflection was maintained throughout except when a "deflection correction calculator" had not yet applied the results of a turn at 4.40. The roll of the ship, and vibration from the 27 knot speed she was making caused all R.F.s difficulty, and spray hampered all but the R.F. in the top. Only that one, and the one in "Q" turret and the 15-foot Argo instrument got any cuts, but the top's ranges were accurate at beginning and end of the shoot. The top took 14 ranges, "Q" took 4, and I do not see the Argo's alleged contribution recorded.<br />
<br />
Funnel smoke caused issues with taking in visual signals from aircraft, but it seemed that often these could be taken in from an alternative position on own ship. Ranges had varied from 20,100 yards at open fire to 19,500 yards at cease fire.<br />
<br />
===Post-War===<br />
''Tiger'' commissioned on 3 October, 1919 under the command of William Boyle.{{NLJan21|p. 874}}<br />
<br />
She completed to Special Complement at Portsmouth on 15 February, 1924.{{NLApr25|p. 275}}<br />
<br />
''Tiger'' slightly damaged the moored {{UK-RoyalSovereign}} as she entered Portland Harbour on 24 November 1920. Boyle was subjected to a Court Martial and successfully defended himself against a charge of having hazarded the ship.{{ToL|Acquittal at Naval Court Martial|6 Dec. 1920, p. 9}}<br />
<br />
She re-commissioned at Portmouth on 17 October, 1926.{{NLFeb29|p. 274}}<br />
<br />
Under the terms of the London Naval Treaty of 1930, ''Tiger'' was one of five capital ships to be removed from the effective list.<ref>"Naval Estimates" (News). ''The Times''. Friday, 6 March, 1931. Issue '''45764''', col A, p. 9.</ref> Before paying off she participated in the Spring Cruise of the Atlantic Fleet. She fired her guns for the last time on the night 13-14 March, 1931, and with her last salvo straddled the target.<ref>"End of Famous Ship" (News). ''The Times''. Tuesday, 31 March, 1931. Issue '''45785''', col B, p. 11.</ref> On 30 March the Atlantic Fleet sailed out of Gibraltar for home. At a signal from Sir [[Michael Henry Hodges|Michael Hodges]], the Commander-in-Chief, ''Tiger'' proceeded at full speed from her position at the rear of the battle cruisers, up the line of ships of the Fleet, whose crews cleared lower deck and cheered her, whilst the bands of the Royal Marines played "Heart of Oak" and other tunes. At the head of the line she shaped course for Devonport, 200 miles distant, and sailed into the mist, with her band playing "Auld Lang Syne."<ref>"Passing of the Tiger" (News). ''The Times''. Thursday, 2 April, 1931. Issue '''45787''', col D, p. 8.</ref><br />
<br />
She re-commissioned at Devonport with special complement on 15 May, 1931.{{NLJul31|p. 275}}<br />
<br />
==Radio==<br />
According to the ambitions of 1909, ''Tiger'' had [[Service Gear Mark II]] wireless upon completion.{{ARTS1908|Wireless Appendix, p. 13}}<br />
<br />
Sometime before 1913, she may have also had a [[Type 3 Wireless Set|Type 3 Battleship Auxiliary set]], but it was to be replaced by a [[Type 10 Wireless Set|Type 10 Cruiser Auxiliary set]].{{ARTS1913|W/T Appendix, p. 13}}<br />
<br />
==Armament==<br />
<br />
===Main Battery===<br />
This section is sourced from ''The Sight Manual, 1916'' except where otherwise noted.{{TheSightM|pp. 4, 23-27, 106, 108-109}}<br />
<br />
The 13.5-in Mark V(H) guns were in Mark II mountings able to elevate 20 degrees and depress 5 degrees. In many respects, Tiger's main battery guns were similar to those of the ''King George V'' and ''Iron Duke'' class dreadnoughts, except her "A" turret was unique in the Royal Navy for having its layer's sighting scopes in the turret face as horizontal periscopes in an effort to avoid blast from super-firing B turret.<br />
<br />
The sights were limited to 15 degrees elevation, but the central sights had "20 degree super-elevation strips". Additionally, 6 degree super-elevation prisms would have been provided by 1916. The deflection gearing constant was 61.3, with 1 knot equalling 2.51 arc minutes, calculated as 2500 fps at 5000 yards. Range drums were provided for full charge at 2450 fps, three-quarter charge at 2000 fps, as well as 6-pdr sub-calibre gun and .303-in aiming rifle. Muzzle velocity was corrected by adjustable scale plate between 2560 and 2260 fps. The adjustable temperature scale plate could vary between 40 to 100 degrees Fahrenheit, and a "C" corrector could alter the ballistic coefficient by +/- 20%. <br />
<br />
The periscope holder was inclined 1 degree 37 minutes (which may have effectively been 2.5 degrees for mechanical reasons; it equalled .195 degrees at 10,000 yards).<br />
<br />
The side sighting lines were 2 inches below the bore and 83.95 inches abreast for "A" turret, and 43.25 inches above and 39 inches abreast the bore for the other turrets. The central scopes were 56.25 inches above and 42 inches abreast. <br />
<br />
O.O.Q. [[Open Director Sight]]s capable of 20 degrees elevation were fitted by 1916.<br />
<br />
The guns were capable of continual aim in all but heavy weather. Gunlayer and turret trainer each used a single hand wheel. Elevation was at 5 degrees per second was achieved by just a single revolution of the hand wheel &mdash; a final increase in sprightliness over ''King George V'' and ''Lion'' classes.{{BrooksDGBJ|pp. 45-46}}<br />
<br />
The mount required (or preferred) a low elevation for loading.<ref>Noel Papers at National Maritime Museum, Turret Captain Bourne's report. (NOE/5)</ref><br />
<br />
===Torpedoes===<br />
* Four submerged 21-in torpedo tubes on the broadside<br />
<br />
In mid-1920, she was equipped with {{Torp|21-in Mark IV|UK}}s.{{ARTS1919|p. 113}}<br />
<br />
==Fire Control==<br />
<br />
By mid-1918, it was approved to fit [[Pattern 333X Navyphones|Pattern 3331 Navyphones]] with loud-sounding bells in the auxiliary machinery compartments of [[Lion Class Battlecruiser (1910)|''Lion'']] and [[Orion Class Battleship (1910)|''Orion'']] classes and later where existing navyphones have proven ineffective.{{ARTS1917|p. 233}}<br />
<br />
===Range Dials===<br />
As of 1920, the ship had one [[Range Dial Type B]] and one [[Range Dial Type C|Type C]].{{UKManGun1920III|p. 44}}<br />
<br />
===Rangefinders===<br />
''Tiger'' was completed with seven 9-foot rangefinders: one atop each of its four turrets, one in the fore top, and a pair in armoured hoods atop the gun control tower and torpedo control tower.<ref>Roberts. ''Battlecruisers'', p. 92. Technical History Part 23 does not mention the fore top one on its p. 33.</ref> The T.C.T. rangefinder, a 9-foot [[Barr and Stroud Rangefinders|Barr and Stroud Rangefinder]] of unknown model, sat on an [[M.V. 3]] mounting.{{ARTS1918|p. 175}} This simple outfit was to be lost as the benefits of longer base rangefinders became clear.<br />
<br />
In her refit from 10 November 1916 to 29 January 1917 at Rosyth,{{RobertsBattlecruisers|pp. 112-3}} a small rangefinder was added over the C.T., and a medium one to the rear of "X" turret which is curiously unmentioned in the same source's description of 1918 equipment.{{Burt1986|p. 219}}<br />
<br />
Sometime in 1917 or 1918, the T.C.T. rangefinder was upgraded to a 15-foot instrument, with a new armoured hood and racers and training driving the hood directly rather than through the rangefinder mounting. This rangefinder lacked hand-following gear to facilitate in transmission of range cuts, and when it was considered as an addition around 1917, space concerns were causing problems.{{ARTS1917|p. 198. (C.I.O. 481/17)}}<br />
<br />
By 1918, the desire for torpedo control rangefinders was so keen that an additional 9-foot instrument was ordered.{{ARTS1918|p. 177}}<br />
<br />
Her rangefinder equipment during 1918 had come to be:{{Burt1986|p. 213}}<br />
* two 25-ft R.F.s in "A" and "Q" turret<br />
* three 15-ft in "X" turret, G.C.T., T.C.T.<br />
* one 12-ft in spotting top<br />
* three 9-ft in "B" turret, in G.C.T. and above compass platform (the last, likely the torpedo control one mentioned above)<br />
* one 2m [[F.T. 29]]<ref>length and type inferred from reported 6-ft 6-in base length and knowledge of B&S R.F.s.</ref> H.A. R.F. (in shield over control top, added July 1918)<br />
<br />
In 1919, a large rangefinder, seemingly a 25ft [[F.X. 2]] was added to "A" turret.{{Burt1986|p. 219}}<br />
<br />
By 1921, ''Tiger'' was equipped as follows:{{HRFs1921|p. 170}}<br />
* "B" and "X" turrets: 9ft [[F.T. 8]]s on [[M.G. 3]] mountings<br />
* "A" turret: 25ft [[F.X. 2]] on [[M.G. 15]]<br />
* "Q" turret: 25ft [[F.X. 2]] on [[M.G. 17]]<br />
* Fore top: 12ft [[F.Q. 2]] on [[Argo Mounting]]<br />
* Above compass platform: 9ft [[F.Q. 2]] on [[M.Q. 1]]<br />
* [[G.C.T.]]: 9ft [[F.Q. 2]] on [[M.P. 2]], 15ft [[F.T. 24]] on [[M.G. 5]]<br />
* [[T.C.T.]]: 15ft [[F.T. 24]] on [[M.N. 1]]<ref>Recorded as "M.N." in the source, but any of this type may have been too small for a 15ft instrument.</ref><br />
* High Angle: 2m [[F.T. 29]] on [[M.T. 6]]<br />
<br />
In 1922-24, "X" turret may have been upgraded to a 25ft [[F.X. 2]].{{Burt1986|p. 220}}<br />
<br />
===Evershed Bearing Indicators===<br />
The ship was not provided this equipment until 1916 later, as it is not recorded in the pertinent section of ''Handbook for Fire Control Instruments, 1914''.{{HFCI1914|p. 34}} In 1916, it was decided that she was to be so equipped. {{ARTS1916|p. 145}} If and when so fitted, her installation would likely have resembled that of the [[Lion Class Battlecruiser (1910)#Evershed Bearing Indicators|''Queen Mary'']], {{INF}} with transmitting positions at<br />
* [[Gun Control Tower]]<br />
* [[Conning Tower]] (transmitters to port and starboard with a local switch to select one in use)<br />
* "B" turret<br />
* "X" turret<br />
<br />
In 1917, it was approved that capital ships of {{UK-Dreadnought}} class and later should have Evershed equipment added to their {{CT}}, able to communicate with either the fore top or the {{GCT}}. If there were not enough room in the C.T., a bearing plate with open sights and 6-power binoculars would be added to the C.T..{{ARTS1917|p. 230}}<br />
<br />
Also in 1917, it was decided that all directors were to be fitted with receivers and, "as far as possible", ships were to have fore top, {{GCT}} and controlling turrets fitted to transmit as well as receive, though this was noted as being impossible in some earlier ships. While it would have been nice to have the {{CT}} able to transmit bearings to the 6-in guns, it was decided not to do this for reasons of space.{{ARTS1917|p. 230}}<br />
<br />
===Mechanical Aid-to-Spotter===<br />
At some point, ''Tiger'' was likely equipped with four [[Mechanical Aid-to-Spotter Mark II]]s:<br />
* one on each side of the foretop, driven by flexible shafting from the Evershed rack on the director<br />
* one on each side of the [[Gun Control Tower]] employing an electrical [[F.T.P.]] system.<br />
As the need for such gear was apparently first identified in early 1916, it seems likely that these installations were effected well after Jutland.{{FCHMShips|pp. 25-6}}{{INF}}<br />
<br />
In 1917, it was decided that these should have mechanical links from the director and pointers indicating the aloft Evershed's bearing.{{ARTS1917|p. 230}}<br />
<br />
===Gunnery Control===<br />
The control arrangements were similar to those in ''Iron Duke'', as follows.{{HFCI1914|pp. 7-8}}<br />
<br />
====Main Battery Control====<br />
=====Control Positions=====<br />
* G.C.T.<br />
* "B" turret<br />
* "X" turret<br />
<br />
=====Control Groups=====<br />
The four 13.5-in turrets were separate groups, each with a local {{COS}} so that it could be connected to <br />
* T.S.<br />
* Local control from officer's position within turret <br />
<br />
====Secondary Battery Control====<br />
=====Control Positions=====<br />
* Two primary towers on each side of C.T.<br />
* Two secondary towers each side further aft<br />
<br />
=====Control Groups=====<br />
The 6-in broadside guns were organized into two groups, port and starboard. "The guns are worked in pairs, three pairs each side."{{HFCI1914|p. 7}}<br />
<br />
===Directors===<br />
<br />
====Main Battery====<br />
''Tiger'' was fitted with a cam-type, tripod-mounted director in a light aloft tower along with a directing gun in "Q" turret.{{DirectorH|p. 142}} The battery was divisible into forward ("A" and "B") and aft ("Q" and "Y") groups, and a [[C.O.S.]] in the [[T.S.]] allowed the following modes of control:{{DirectorH|p. 88}}<br />
* All turrets on aloft director<br />
* All turrets on directing gun<br />
* Forward group on aloft, aft group on directing gun<br />
<br />
At the [[Battle of Jutland]], ''Tiger'' suffered some damage in her aft turrets early and appeared to grow mistrustful of her director system, repeatedly "lining up", often after reporting salvoes as "ragged" &mdash; taken as indication that receivers were out of step:<ref>Admiralty. ''Jutland Official Despatches'' pp. 389-393.</ref> <br />
* At 4.05.5, after a ragged salvo, the director took 5 minutes to be lined up correctly as the guns were put into "individual." "X" [sic] remained in individual thereafter, perhaps owing to damage.<br />
* 4.23.05 the same process (for the same reason) took 3.35 to complete.<br />
* 4.43 Completed a lining up, seemingly for luck as the enemy had passed out of sight some three and a half minutes prior<br />
* 5.09.45 Lined up after checking fire, again seemingly as a tic<br />
* 6.36 Lined up during lull<br />
* 7.20 Tested director on friendly light cruiser on port bow during lull<br />
<br />
In August, 1918, in recognition of shortcomings in the use of directing guns, it was ordered that ''Tiger'' should be fitted with a second tripod-type{{INF}} director aft, as ''Lion'' and ''Princess Royal'' had been configured. It seems likely that this work was not completed in the 1918-1919 timeframe, owing to a shortage of sighting equipment.{{FCHMShips|p. 18}}<br />
<br />
The turret [[Elevation Receiver]]s were pattern number H. 1, capable of matching the 20 degree elevation limit of the mountings. The [[Training Receiver]]s were the [[Single Dial Turret Training Receiver|single dial type]], pattern number 5.{{DirectorH|pp. 144, 145}}<br />
<br />
====Secondary Battery====<br />
The 6-in broadside guns were supported by a pair of pedestal-mounted directors situated forward, one to port and one to starboard. Guns could only be directed by the director on their broadside.{{DirectorH|pp. 91, 143}}<br />
<br />
The [[Elevation Receiver]]s on the guns were 6-in P. VIII Type with electrical tilt correctors, Pattern F.C. 1, capable of 14 degrees elevation. The [[Small Type Training Receivers]] were pattern number 19.{{DirectorH|p. 144, 146}}<br />
<br />
===Transmitting Stations===<br />
''Tiger'' had a single [[T.S.]] for her main battery, and a separate one for her secondary battery.{{HFCI1914|pp. 6-7}} It is not clear whether there was ever a Dreyer table of any kind for the secondary T.S.. If one was there, it might have been a [[Dreyer Turret Control Table]].<br />
<br />
===Dreyer Table===<br />
''Tiger'' most likely had a [[Mark IV Dreyer Table]] when she completed.<ref>an inference supported by John Brooks in an email dated March 28 2008.</ref> It is a certainty that she had this equipment by the Battle of Dogger Bank.<ref>''The Beatty Papers, Volume I'' Appendix V, Gunnery Notes, p. 241, reference thanks to John Brooks.</ref> It seems likely that this table was updated to Mark IV* standard late during or after 1918<ref>crossed out from one section and pencilled in in another in ''Handbook of Capt. F.C. Dreyer's Fire Control Tables'', p. 3.</ref>. At some point, she likely received [[Dreyer Turret Control Table]]s, but it is unknown whether each turret received one, or just the two controlling turrets.{{DreyerH|p. 3}}<br />
<br />
===Fire Control Instruments===<br />
[[Vickers]] [[F.T.P.]] Mark III instruments sent range and deflection data to gun sights, while [[Barr and Stroud]] (probably Mark II*{{INF}}) instruments were used elsewhere.{{HFCI1914|pp. 72}}<br />
<br />
''Gun Ready'' signals mounted in the T.S. and control positions indicated which which guns were ready.{{HFCI1914|p. 11}}<br />
<br />
No ''Target Visible'' indicators were installed.{{HFCI1914|p. 11}}<br />
<br />
In 1916, it was decided that instruments were to be provided so that the fore top could be equally able to control gunnery as the G.C.T..{{ARTS1916|p. 145}}<br />
<br />
==Torpedo Control==<br />
In 1916, a number of further changes were decided upon:{{ARTS1916|p. 145}}<br />
* Navyphone communication between C.T. and aft torpedo flat and T.C.T. and fore torpedo flat<br />
* removal of secondary director hoods<br />
* "transfer of instruments in the secondary positions" to the C.T. and T.C.T.. I presume that "secondary positions" means the secondary director hoods.<br />
* it was approved that the ships should have a transmitters in the T.S. and receivers in T.C.T. and C.T. so that gunnery data for range, course and speed could be shared with the torpedo control group. <br />
* arrangements were to be made that all capital ships with 21-in torpedoes to receive transmitters and receivers so that the T.C.T. could pass the plotted torpedo deflection to the C.T., which could then use a reciprocal set of equipment to send the T.C.T. a deflection to be placed on the sight and range to open fire.<br />
<br />
By 1917-1918, a number of common Torpedo Control equipment packages were to be provided to those ships not already sporting them. Those for the 21-in torpedo ships follow.<br />
<br />
[[File:ARTS1917Plate71.jpg|thumb|400px|'''Torpedo Control Data between C.T. and T.C.T..'''{{ARTS1917|Plate 71}} ]]<br />
The data instruments to be wired between C.T. and {{TCT}} to share range, order and deflection data provided a single deflection transmitter in the T.C.T. so that the results of the torpedo plot to be sent to the single deflection receiver in the {{CT}} for the information of the Torpedo Control Officer. Conversely, a combined range and deflection transmitter forward allowed the T.C.O. to send back the deflection and intended firing range to the secondary T.C.O. in the {{TCT}}.{{ARTS1917|p. 208. (T.O. 29/17.)}}<br />
<br />
[[File:ARTS1917Plate72.jpg|thumb|240px|'''Torpedo Control Evershed'''{{ARTS1917|Plate 72}} ]]<br />
The 21-in torpedo ships were also to be provided with Evershed transmitters in the {{CT}} and a receiver at the torpedo rangefinder in the {{TCT}} in order to ensure that it was obtaining data on the intended target. Limited "slit space" in the C.T. required that the customary binocular-based transmitters be foregone in favour of placing the transmitter on or below the floorboards and to drive it by a shaft from a [[Torpedo Deflection Sight Mark IV]]. A control key on the transmitter allowed it to indicate when it was controlling the remote rangefinder or not.{{ARTS1917|p. 208. (C.I.O. 4585/17.) }}<br />
<br />
Finally under the 1917-1918 mandate, sufficient instruments were to be provided to permit the Fore Bridge to communicate with the tubes.{{ARTS1917|p. 208. (C.I.O. 1644/17, 3706/17.)}}<br />
<br />
In mid-1920, it was decided that ''Tiger'' should receive a [[Renouf Torpedo Tactical Instrument Type B]],{{ARTS1919|p. 119}} and a single [[Torpedo Control Disc Mark III*]] with a pair of mounting brackets to be installed in her primary torpedo control position.{{ARTS1919|p. 113}}<br />
<br />
==Alterations==<br />
In 1913, ''Tiger'' was slated as part of the [[British Adoption of the Director#Early Orders|twelve ship order]] to receive a director system for her main battery. It was fitted sometime after the war started but prior to May, 1915.{{FCHMShips|pp. 9-10}}<br />
<br />
In October, 1914, it was decided that ''Tiger'' should receive a [[Open Director Sight]] for each of her turrets. They were fitted between April 1916 and June 1917.{{FCHMShips|p. 18}}<br />
<br />
In October 1914, the ship was to be given 13 Pattern 1582 Electric Radiators to warm cabins whose stoves could not be used for heating them.{{AWO1914|512 of 16 Oct, 1914}}<br />
<br />
By the end of 1915, she had been equipped with a [[Torpedo Control Plotting Instrument Mark I]] in her T.C.T..{{ARTS1915|p. 60}}<br />
<br />
In August, 1918, in recognition of shortcomings in the use of directing guns, it was ordered that ''Tiger'' should be fitted with a second tripod-type{{INF}} director aft, as {{UK-Lion}} and {{UK-PrincessRoyal}} had been configured. It seems that supplies of sights were insufficient to meet this goal, however. In November 1918, an alternative source for the equipment was considered, but the changing circumstances put an end to the plan.{{FCHMShips|p. 18}}<br />
<br />
On 20 July 1931, she left Devonport to have her turrets removed to prepare her for sale.{{ToL|H.M.S. Tiger|20 July 1931, p. 7}}<br />
<br />
==Captains==<br />
Dates of appointment are provided when known.<br />
<div name=fredbot:officeCapt otitle="Captain of H.M.S. ''Tiger''"><br />
{{Tenure|rank={{CaptRN}}|name=Henry Bertram Pelly|nick=Henry B. Pelly|appt=3 August, 1914{{NLOct15|p. 398''q''}}|precBy=New Command|note=in command at the [[Battle of Jutland]]|end=29 June, 1916<ref>Pelly Service Record. {{TNA|ADM 196/42.}} f. 483.</ref>}}<br />
{{Tenure|rank=Captain|name=Rudolf Walter Bentinck|nick=Rudolf W. Bentinck|appt=29 June, 1916{{NLDec16|p. 398''r''}}|end=14 August, 1917<ref>Bentinck Service Record. {{TNA|ADM 196/43.}} f. 47.</ref>}}<br />
{{Tenure|rank=Captain|name=Arthur Allan Morison Duff|nick=Arthur A. M. Duff|appt=14 August, 1917{{NLFeb19|p. 920}}|ass=18 August, 1917<ref>Duff Service Record. {{TNA|ADM 196/43.|D7602680}} f. 390.</ref>|end=1 April, 1919<ref>Duff Service Record. {{TNA|ADM 196/43.|D7602680}} f. 390.</ref>}}<br />
{{Tenure|rank=Captain|name=William Henry Dudley Boyle, Twelfth Earl of Cork and Orrery|nick=William H. D. Boyle|appt=29 March, 1919{{NLAug19|p. 920}}|ass=1 April, 1919<ref>Duff Service Record. {{TNA|ADM 196/43.|D7602680}} f. 390.</ref>}}<br />
{{Tenure|rank=Captain|name=John Ewen Cameron|nick=John E. Cameron|appt=29 March, 1921<ref>Cameron Service Record. {{TNA|ADM 196/43/409.|D7602727}} f. 453.</ref>|end=24 April, 1922<ref>Cameron Service Record. {{TNA|ADM 196/43/409.|D7602727}} f. 453.</ref>}}<br />
{{Tenure|rank={{CaptRN}}|name=Arthur Kemmis Betty|nick=Arthur K. Betty|appt=26 November, 1923{{NLApr25|p. 275}}<ref>Betty Service Record. {{TNA|ADM 196/44.|}} f. 397.</ref>|end=1 May, 1924<ref>Betty Service Record. {{TNA|ADM 196/44.|}} f. 397.</ref>}}<br />
{{Tenure|rank=Captain|name=Horace Walker Longden|nick=Horace W. Longden|appt=1 May, 1925|end=1 November, 1925}}<br />
{{Tenure|rank=Captain|name=Gordon Campbell|nick=Gordon Campbell|appt=1 November, 1925{{NLJul27|p. 274}}<ref>Campbell Service Record. {{TNA|ADM 196/50.|}} f. 210.</ref>|end=30 July, 1927<ref>Campbell Service Record. {{TNA|ADM 196/50.|}} f. 210.</ref>}}<br />
{{Tenure|rank=Captain|name=Walter John Challoner Lake|nick=Walter J. C. Lake|appt=30 July, 1927<ref>Lake Service Record. {{TNA|ADM 196/44/415.|}} f. 475.</ref>|end=5 November, 1928<ref>Lake Service Record. {{TNA|ADM 196/44/415.|}} f. 475.</ref>}}<br />
{{Tenure|rank=Captain|name=Kenneth Gilbert Balmain Dewar|nick=Kenneth G. B. Dewar|appt=5 November, 1928<ref>Dewar Service Record. {{TNA|ADM 196/45.}} f. 59.</ref>|end=10 May, 1929<ref>Dewar Service Record. {{TNA|ADM 196/45.}} f. 59.</ref>}}<br />
{{Tenure|rank=Captain|name=Dudley Burton Napier North|nick=Dudley B. N. North|appt=10 May, 1929<ref>North Service Record. {{TNA|ADM 196/46.}} f. 144.</ref>|end=1 January, 1930<ref>North Service Record. {{TNA|ADM 196/46.}} f. 144.</ref>}}<br />
{{Tenure|rank=Captain|name=Arthur Edward Frederick Bedford|nick=Arthur E. F. Bedford|appt=31 December, 1929<ref>"Naval, Military, and Air Force" (Official Appointments and Notices). ''The Times''. Monday, 30 December, 1929. Issue '''45397''', col D, p. 3.</ref>|ass=5 October, 1929<ref>Bedford Service Record. {{TNA|ADM 196/46/17.|}} f. 17.</ref>|end=21 September, 1931<ref>Bedford Service Record. {{TNA|ADM 196/46/17.|}} f. 17.</ref>|note=curiously, took command before being appointed}}<br />
{{Tenure|rank={{CaptRN}}|name=Arthur Francis Eric Palliser|nick=Arthur F. E. Palliser|appt=15 May, 1931<ref>Palliser Service Record. {{TNA|ADM 196/52/290.|}} f. 663.</ref>|end=6 August, 1931<ref>Palliser Service Record. {{TNA|ADM 196/52/290.|}} f. 663.</ref>}}<br />
</div name=fredbot:officeCapt><br />
<br />
==See Also==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
{{WP|https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Tiger_(1913)}}<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
==Footnotes==<br />
{{reflist}}<br />
<br />
==Bibliography==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
*{{FCHMShips}}<br />
*{{HFCI1914}}<br />
*{{DirectorH}}<br />
*{{DreyerH}}<br />
*{{Burt}}<br />
*Roberts, John. ''The Design and Construction of the Battlecruiser Tiger'', a two-part article in [[Warship (Journal)|Warship]], Issues 5 and 6.<br />
*{{RobertsBattlecruisers}}<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
{{Footer H.M.S. Tiger (1913)}}<br />
<br />
{{DEFAULTSORT:Tiger}}<br />
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{{CatClassBattlecruiser|UK}}<br />
{{CatShipBattlecruiser|UK}}<br />
<br />
<br />
<!-- data<br />
<br />
nat=UK<br />
cat=Battlecruiser<br />
type=battlecruiser<br />
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chain=Major Cruisers<br />
<br />
{ship<br />
name=Tiger<br />
pend=42 (1914)<br>A4 (Jan 1918)<br>91 (Apr 1918){{DittColl|p. 35}}<br />
builder=[[John Brown & Company]], Clydebank<br>(Ship no. 418){{JohnstonClydebankBattlecruisers|Footers}}<br />
order=1911-1912 Programme{{Conways1906|p. 32}}<br />
laid=20 Jun, 1912{{Conways1906|p. 32}}<br />
launch=15 Dec, 1913{{Conways1906|p. 32}}<br />
comm=Oct, 1914{{Conways1906|p. 32}}<br />
fate=Sold<br />
fate2=to Ward, Inverkeithing{{DittColl|p. 35}}<br />
fatedate=Feb, 1932{{DittColl|p. 35}}<br />
}<br />
<br />
<br />
data --><br />
<br />
[[Category:Featured Ship Classes]]</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Report_on_German_Warships_after_Jutland&diff=334780Austro-Hungarian Naval Report on German Warships after Jutland2024-03-25T08:35:03Z<p>Simon Harley: Made Changes.</p>
<hr />
<div>In the papers of Vice-Admiral [[John Ernest Troyte Harper|John E. T. Harper]] (author of the ''Record of the Battle of Jutland'') is a copy of an English translation of an Austro-Hungarian Navy report on German Imperial Navy warships after the [[Battle of Jutland]].<ref>Harper papers. Churchill Archives Centre. JEHR 1/4. This research was made possible by the [https://www.chu.cam.ac.uk/news/news-and-events/the-first-colin-bell-award-winners-announced/ Colin Bell Award, a grant from the Colin Bell Fund at Churchill College, Cambridge].</ref> It was prepared by ''Marineartillerie-Oberingenieure 2. Klasse'' Georg Schindler.<ref>Rank from ''Almanach für die k. und k. Kriegsmarine 1917''. p. 698.</ref> This report is in many ways more detailed than that of ''Fregattenkapitäne'' Hieronymus Graf von Colloredo-Mannsfeld [[Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland|prepared immediately after Jutland]], which is also in Harper's papers. The references to "I.D." notes suggest that, like Colloredo-Mannsfeld's report, this was a translation prepared in the [[Naval Intelligence Division (Royal Navy)|Naval Intelligence Division]]. Transcriber [[User:Simon Harley|Simon Harley]] has faithfully reproduced the many typing errors in the translation.<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
REPORT by a Mission undertaken in accordance with Order. Section 4 M.S. No.1746 of 1916.<br />
----<br />
<br />
On the inspection of German Warships which took part in the Battle of the Skaggerak (Jutland), 31st.May - 1st.June 1916; on Wilhelmshaven, Hamburg and Kiel, and on other inspections of ships and bases.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}By Georg Schindler,<br />
<br />
{{pad|580px}}Gunnery Engineer, 2nd Class.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}AUSTRIAN NAVY.<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
The only details which have been dealt with are those which were of Gunnery interest.<br />
<br />
{|<br />
| A.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "SEYDLITZ"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| B.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "OSTFRIESLAND"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| C.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "VON DER TANN"<br />
| were<br />
|-<br />
| D.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "GROSSER KÜRFURST"<br />
| in<br />
|-<br />
| E.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"&nbsp;<br />
| "MARKGRAF"<br />
| engagement.<br />
|-<br />
| F.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "MOLTKE"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| G.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"<br />
| "DERFFLINGER"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| H.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "KÖNIG"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| J.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "HINDENBURG" (building)<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| K.<br />
| Large Battleship<br />
| "BAYERN"<br />
| rowspan=2 | } Newly commissioned<br />
|-<br />
| L.<br />
| T.B.D.<br />
| "G.90"<br />
|-<br />
| M.<br />
| colspan=3 | Fishing vessels Anti-Submarine armament, etc.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| N.<br />
| colspan=3 | Short inspection of the Ordnance Workshops in the Arsenal in Wilhelmshaven. <br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| O.<br />
| Ditto in Kiel.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|}<br />
<br />
Ships under A.B.C.J. and M. were in Wilhelmshaven. D.E.F. in Hamburg and G.H.K.L. in Kiel.<br />
<br />
In the following reports on each ship, Section 1 deals with the effect of enemy hits on ships A. to H. above, in conjunction with the two attached ship sketches (Enclosures 1 and 2). [Not attached.]<br />
<br />
Of the hits marked in the sketches those of a gunnery interest are distinguished by red ink. Section II gives general remarks concerning the ships in question.<br />
<br />
Further a report is submitted on installations in newly commissioned ships (K. and L.) also on a ship still under construction (J.), as well as means of combating submarines installed in Fishing vessels (M.) and finally, briefly on the Ordnance workshops in the Naval Arsenals (N. and O.).<br />
<br />
A. "SEYDLITZ" (Enclosure 1).<br />
<br />
This Cruiser received 24 shell hits (38 cm. 34.3 cm. and 30.5 cm.)(15", 13.5" and 12") and one Torpedo hit.<br />
<br />
Except for 1 shell hit (apparently 34.3 cm.) (13.5") on the starboard side forward (Hits nos.2-4) and one hit no.16 (38 cm.?) in the starboard after 15 cm. (6") casemate all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all Gun tubes, Guns and many fittings had been dismantled and landed.<br />
<br />
<center>I. Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
<br />
1. A large calibre shell (hit no.8) struck the 2nd. 15 cm. port casemate (from forward), put the gun out of action and killed or seriously wounded the majority of the gun's crew.<br />
<br />
2. A 38 cm. shell exploded in the 4th 15 cm. casemate (hit No.13) the gun was similarly damaged, and 2 men (wounded) remained alive of the crew.<br />
<br />
3. In the port after 15 cm. casemate, No.6 gun, (hit No.15) had the same effect as the two described above.<br />
<br />
4. A 38 cm. shell (hit No.16) penetrated the armoured bulkhead on starboard side aft, near the last 15 cm. casemate, close to the curve of the armour (Fig.1, Enc.3) destroyed the 15 cm. gun and killed most of the gun crew.<br />
<br />
Of the twelve 15 cm. guns it appears that 2 port and 4 starboard fired unceasingly until the end.<br />
<br />
5. No.2 Turret (starboard) received a hit from port on the vertical turret armour (hit No.21) to the right of the right gun. Part of the nose of the shell pierced the armour anddestroyed [sic] the cradle and training gear of the right gun. The left was undamaged. The turret remained in action with this gun.<br />
<br />
6. An interesting hit is to be seen on the right 28 cm. gun of No.3 Turret port. The gun was on one of the jetties of the arsenal and could be examined. A large calibre shell hit the aforesaid gun a glancing blow just outside the turret, producing at the point of impact, a considerable elliptical scoop on the outside, causing a fracture of the inner tube and in addition bent the gun so that the axis of the tube at the muzzle was (as far as could be estimated) 200 mm. (about 8 in.) out of line.<br />
<br />
The cradle of this gun was split, the trunnions somewhat bent and the caps thereof partially opened out.<br />
<br />
The left gun of this turret, however, remained serviceable and the Turret could continue firing without interruption.<br />
<br />
7. A 34.3 cm. (13.5") shell (hit No.18) pierced the vertical armour of the revolving structure of No.4 Turret superimposed to the left of the left gun exploded inside the turret, ignited the cartridges which were ready for loading, put the turret out of action and killed all the crew (about 70 men) except 6.<br />
<br />
T [sic] This turret, already out of action, received another hit later from a 38 cm. (15") shell (hit No.17) this projectile struck the revolving Turret armour close to the lower edge at the right rear of the turret, and partially penetrated the turret.<br />
<br />
8. A Large calibre shell tore off the roof of the after (No.5) turret. (Geschossgeller ? ricochet). The turret suffered no appreciable damage inside.<br />
<br />
The remaining hits are being dealt with in the report on ship construction.≠ [I.D. Note: The original of this report can, unfortunately, not be obtained.]<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
<center>II Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
1. Extensive "flash" protection was already installed in "SEYDLITZ".<br />
<br />
(a) The openings for bringing 28 cm. cartridges into the lower loading chamber of the Ammunition Hoist can be shut off with sliding doors (schubtüren ?). The supply scuttles from the magazines are fitted with hinged flaps which open upwards on each side (Fig.3, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
(b) The 15 cm. (5.9") Ammunition hoists at the supply position in the casemates are fitted with a "closing flap" which shuts automatically, but its own weight assisted by a spring, immediately after the ammunition has rolled out on to the Ammunition Tray (which is placed in a horizontal position by a Paternoster apparatus (endless chain) (Fig.4, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
2. Apparently Gas Masks are employed in all ships. The method of use is the same as in the German Army. <u>Every</u> man was supplied with a mask (as it happened 2 days before action). These masks were to be brought into use immediately there was any evidence of suffocating gases, and they were so far successful that, according to the opinions of officers, at least one ship, if not two, was saved by their use.<br />
<br />
3. Enemy "shorts" usually exploded on hitting the water, with the result that, (as in the cases of shells exploding on board), splinters of various sizes struck guns among other things, and caused damage, but in practically every case no stoppage of firing from the gun resulted. Shell splinters also entered Conning Towers and Turrets through the sighting slits. But they caused no internal damage as their force was broken by their passage through the deeps [sic] slits. (Fig.5, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
4. In Turret firing. Salvoes were gradually used, and always with <u>only one</u> gun of each turret.<br />
<br />
5. For transmission of orders to the guns (also to 15 cm. (5.9" guns) from the Gunnery Officers position (in the Conning Tower) Elevation pointers are used which are mounted (<u>separately</u>) on brackets away from the Turret armour.<br />
<br />
6. Ranges of the individual rangefinders are shown on a circular scale (range receiver) by means of electrically worked pointers. All these dials are mounter [sic] in a circular box (Fig.6, Enc.3) so that the ranges of the same object shown by several rangefinders (Pointers in similar direction)[.] Further, it is possible to cut out one or other of the dials if the Rangetaker concerned is ranging badly.<br />
<br />
7. Repulse of Destroyers is carried out invariably by means of broadside salvoes of 15 cm. (5.9) guns etc. and one target only is always used. But the Gunlayer is only to fire when sights are exactly on the target.<br />
<br />
8. The 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) guns were not used in the battle. It is understood that in the future guns of this calibre, will only be retained on board as anti-aircraft guns, as was laid down for all ships.<br />
<br />
9. (a) The empty 26 cm. (11") cartridge cases are thrown out of the turrets on to the deck through openings in rear of the Gun platforms (2 per turret). A covering flap, opening downwards when the cases are thrown out, automatically closes the hole by means of a spring (Fig.7, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
(b) The fired 15 cm. (5.9") cartridge are placed in a large hanging net in the casemate, and are only removed from the casemate during a lull in the firing. It was stated that a very large number of fired cases (including Large Calibre ones) were collected and brought back.<br />
<br />
10. The voice pipes are made of 60,100 and 150 mm. diameter (2.4 in., 3.8 in.,and 6 in.). (The last named are called Schallrohre and are intended for short distances). Voice pipes are not lagged.<br />
<br />
11. The ventilation of the Turrets is similar to the method employed in our newer ships. A Fan placed between the two guns, sucks, on the one hand the powder gases from the breeches by means of a ventilation pipe from each gun when the breech is opened and on the other hand draws them away from the roof of the turret on the gun platform another fan, portable, and continually running, was installed when sucked in fresh air through a hose and passed it into the interior of the turret bymeans [sic] of a second hose. If any man had any difficulty in breathing he inhaled fresh air through the second hose. But even this method only afforded partial relief.<br />
<br />
12. All Gunnery machinery (hydraulic and electric) appears to have function correctly.<br />
<br />
13. From the Gunnery point of view there were no serious fires (magazines of any description), for which the "Flash door" protection described in Section II Miscellaneous, Pars. I (a) and (b) is principally responsible. All cartridges actually in a turret or casemate,when [sic] an enemy shell burst in the turret or casemate, were exploded in every case. Therefore the rule was most strictly enforced that only the absolute minimum of ammunition was kept ready at the guns.<br />
<br />
14. "SEYDLITZ" had 1150 28 cm. (11" shell) on board, of which 450 were expended. (No ship expended all her ammunition).<br />
<br />
15. The torpedo nets were not actually a hindrance in the action but they sustained heavy damage fromenemy [sic] hits and splinters so that parts of them hung down over the ships side.<br />
<br />
In future these nets being useless ballast will no longer be carried. This is already the case in the new battleship "BAYERN".<br />
<br />
<center>B. "OSTRFRIESLAND".</center><br />
<br />
<center>I. Hits. (Enclosure 1).</center><br />
<br />
This Battleship received no shell hits, but was struck by a mine onthe [sic] starboard side forward. The detailed description is contained in the report on Ship Construction.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
At the time of the inspection of this ship the 30.5 cm. (12") Ammunition was being embarked. The shells were being slung from the Quay on to the Deck by means of a powerful floating crane in bundles (of about 5 projectiles). All cartridges are enclosed in long water-tight zinc containers, fitted with stiffening bands. They were being rolled on board carefully across broad planks and stowed in the Magazines. If several rounds of ready ammunition have to be stowed in the Turret, the charges are always kept in the zinc cylinders.<br />
<br />
The 30.5 cm. (12") and also 28 cm. (11") projectiles are (according to the statement of the Gunnery Officer of this ship, Lt.Comdr.Lauenstein) of one description throughout, capped and fitted with base fuse. Total weight 405 kg. (about 890 lbs.) Bursting charge 12 to 13 kg. (26½ to 29 lbs.) of Trotyl. In the latest ships, however, "Armour piercing" and "high explosive" shell (but with a new explosive for bursting charge) are again to be used, as is already the case with the 28 cm. (15") shell in the Battleship "BAYERN".<br />
<br />
For the 15 cm.(5.9") guns it is reported that there are two types of shell in use.<br />
<br />
:(a) Fused shell with base fuses.<br />
<br />
:(b) High explosive shell,with a very sensitive nose fuse and a base fuse.<br />
<br />
<center>C. "VON DER TANN". (Enclosure 1.)</center><br />
<br />
This Battle Cruiser received 4 hits from large calibre shells (all on the starboard side).<br />
<br />
<center>I.Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
<br />
(1). The foremost 28 cm. (11") Turret was hit in the Barbette on the starboard side. The shell exploded and the armour was just penetrated (Hit No.1). Three men in the turret sustained burns (not very severe) from the "Flash". But the Turret was placed out of action as the armour at the point of impact was bulged inwards and jammed the Turret.<br />
<br />
(2). The after Conning Tower was similarly hit (Hit No.2)[.] But the shell only caused a shaking of the Tower and all apparatus inside remained intact.<br />
<br />
(3.) A shell exploded in the neighbourhood of the after Turret No.4 (Hit No.3). The effect on the Turret was only evident in a shaking, and the armour in the vicinity of the explosion was very slightly indented but without doing any damage so that the Turret continued in action.<br />
<br />
(4). No.4 hit is only of slight constructional interest.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
(1). In this ship, as in "OSTFRIESLAND", the question as to whether the collection of scraps of metal (coming from driving bands or Cartridge cases) in the Breech made any difference to the condition of the breech was answered in the negative.<br />
<br />
(2). The maximum rate of fire of the 28 cm. (11") guns of this Cruiser, as well as of the 30.5 cm. (12") guns of the "OSTFRIESLAND" is stated to have reached 3 - 4 rounds per minute in peace time.<br />
<br />
(3). The arrangement in the 28 cm. (11") turrets is in principle the same as in "SEYDLITZ" or as in the 30.5 cm. (12") guns of the large Battle Cruiser "HINDENBURG" (now building), with the exception of a few improvements in the last named ship. But while in the later ships (30.5 cm. 12") hydraulic rammers with reserve Hand ramming are installed "VON DER TANN" has only double Hand rammers, which are hung under the Turret roof.<br />
<br />
<center>D. "GROSSER KURFÜRST."</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Effects of shell hits (Enclosure 1).</center><br />
<br />
The ship was hit 8 times (large calibre) all from the port side.<br />
<br />
:(1) Hit No.4 (presumably 34 cm. 13.5") exploded before the Barbette armour of the foremost Turret.<br>Apart from breaking off small pieces of the hard armour (? Panzerschichte) and a slight shaking of the turret no damage was done to the Turret fittings. A fragment struck the upper surface of a sight slot and remained in the slot, while a good deal of gas entered the Turret and necessitated the use of gas masks by the crew for some time.<br />
<br />
:(2). A further heavy shell (Hit No.6) struck the port 15 cm.(5.9") Casemate (3rd. from forward) killed 10 of the crew of 14, but damaged the gun so little that after about 12 minutes the gun's crew having been made up, it was brought into action again. Two cartridges which were in the casemate were ignited.<br />
<br />
:(3). The other hits are only of constructional interest.<br />
<br />
:Some 30.5 cm. (12") and 15 cm. (5.9") guns were damaged on the outside by splinters from "shorts", but sustained no other damage.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
The Magazine arrangements in this ship were somewhat more minutely examined as well as reports made concerning them. (The arrangements described below are also used in the other ships).<br />
<br />
The shell bins and shell transport to the shell hoist are shown in Fig. 8, Enc.3) diagrammatically.<br />
<br />
A shell grab (Z) worked by 2 electric motors automatically controlled is used to transport the shell from the bins to the waiting tray fixed round the trunk (Turmraum) (A 1.-4). This grab is suspended from a broad length of wire sword matting, the latter can be wound up or down round a drum (Wa), if the transporting shaft (T) which is provided with two diametrical opposite longitudinal feathers is turned in the corresponding direction. Shaft (T) is fitted into drum (Wa). By this the grab is wound up or down. The grab is moved horizontally by the carrier (R), which holds the above-mentioned revolving drum, being drawn to one side or the other by an endless rope, worked electrically along the shaft (T). To assist the long shaft a deck rail is fitted above it which carries the weights, (Projectile grab and drum with carrier), the carrier being suspended from the rail. The electrical starting levers for both motors are fitted in the shell handing room.<br />
<br />
If it is required to get a shell out of the bin, the motor operating the horizontal movement of the grab is started. Then the long transporting drum is turned correspondingly by the 2nd.motor, thereby lowering the grab, which grips the shell by automatic pressure. Thereupon, by turning the shaft in the opposite direction the shell is raised, transported to the waiting tray (A) of which 4 are provided and placed on it. This waiting tray is so arranged that a shell can be landed only in the one position in order to prevent an inverted landing on the shell bogie relative to the entry in the hoist. The shell bogie is fitted with the same stops as the waiting tray.<br />
<br />
From the waiting tray the shell can be placed on either of the two shell bogies (which are rigidly joined to each other). The latter run easily with rollers on a circular rail, and can not only be adjusted exactly at the waiting tray by means of spring stops, but can also be coupled to the shell hoist in the loading position.<br />
<br />
In the shell rooms (lower deck) the shells are stowed in bins four to five deep (Fig.9, Enc.3)[.] The copper driving bands are protected by a broad covering band of strong canvas the ends of which are sewn together with (twine ?). Only rope is placed between the individual shells as a preventative against damage. Two vertical wooden batten are secured to the side walls of the shell bins - right and left.<br />
<br />
In order to ensure the grab gripping the shell as near as possible round the centre of gravity, each shell has a white ring painted round it.<br />
<br />
It is to be noted that the shell room cannot be shut off (water tightly) from the shell handing room as the large openings in the dividing Bulkhead, through which the transport carrier passes, are always open.<br />
<br />
In addition projectiles are stowed in many ships in the corners of the shell handing room itself in fixed bins.<br />
<br />
The 30.5 (12") cartridges are stowed in their water tight zinc cylinders in special stowage fittings in the magazines. These stowages are made of angle Iron and sheet plates. (There is no wood in the fittings).<br />
<br />
The Magazines, (2 decks from the bottom) in contrast to the shell room, are separated from the Magazine handing room, by a means of thin sheet bulkheads, in which the passage ways are fitted with double doors and the circular openings for handing cartridges are fitted with double covering flaps (the latter have already been remarked on in "SEYDLITZ" Section 11, Fig.3, Enc.3.[)]<br />
<br />
For transport of cartridges in the Magazines the transporting gear shewn in Fig.10, Enc.3 is available. This consists of a double rail (R) in which a horizontal (sheet iron) tray, semicircular in section can be moved up and down in guides by means of a hand differential purchase (F). The Tray can then be brought to the exact level of the cartridge. The Transporting gear is suspended from an overhead rail,(S) and also runs in a guide rail on the deck (SS). The cartridge is pushed on to the tray and the transporter then brought to the cartridge handing hole, and after opening the double flaps, transferred to the Turret.<br />
<br />
The Turret appliances correspond in general to those in "HINDENBURG", about which data are described later. But an exception must be made in the case of the size and installation of the Rangefinders (Fig.11, Enc.3).In "KURFÜRST" the Rangefinders about 3 meters (10 ft.) long are fitted in hoods in the front of the Turret, while "HINDENBURG" the 8 metre (26 ft.) range finders are already being fitted in the same way as will be the case in our 35 cm. (about 14") turrets, now building.<br />
<br />
<center>E. "MARKGRAF".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This Battleship was hit 5 times by big guns and all from the port side.<br />
<br />
Only hit No.2 is of gunnery interest. This entered the next to the last 15 cm. (5.(') [5.9"] casemate on the port side and exploded, killing the crew and putting gun out of action for the remainder of the battle, though it did not damage it very seriously.<br />
<br />
Several splinters from this shell pierced the bulkhead and entered the next casemate (forward) and killed or wounded several men. But this gun was brought into action again after an interval of about 10 minutes to make up the crew.<br />
<br />
<center>11. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
In the case of this ship also, splinters from enemy shorts entered the Conning Tower, but without causing any damage to either personnel or Materiel.<br />
<br />
During the whole engagement about 250 rounds of 30 cm. (12") ammunition was fired, i.e. about one fifth of the total supply on board.<br />
<br />
<center>F. "MOLTKE".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This ship was hit 4 times by heavy shell (all from the starboard side).<br />
<br />
One shell (Hit No.3) pierced the upper side armour and burst behind the latter inside the ship. It also caused some damage outside to No.4.15 cm. (5.9") casemate starboard (from forward) killing or wounding several men, but causing little damage to the gun. This gun was again brought into action after about 15 minutes.<br />
<br />
<center>11. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
"MOLTKE" was the only ship from which 4 Torpedoes were fired (not in salvo, but one after the other). On board, it was stated by officers that "QUEEN MARY" was fired at and hit at about 10 kilometres (10,935 yds.), and that this was the cause of the rapid sinking of this Battle Cruiser. Officers of other ships, however, were not of this opinion, as when "MOLTKE" fired the distance from "QUEEN MARY" was about 13 kilometres (14,217 yds.) and that the torpedoes have not this range; so that only Gunnery can be taken into consideration.<br />
<br />
In the "MOLTKE", splinters from short bursting shells also entered the Conning Tower, without, however, causing any noteworthy damage.<br />
<br />
<center>G. "DERFFLINGER".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This Battle Cruiser was hit the largest number of times, viz:- 30, of these 20 were of heavy calibre and all came from the port side.<br />
<br />
:(1) A 15" shell pierced the roof of N.4 30.5 cm. (12") Turret (hit No.5) exploded inside the Turret, thereby igniting all the charges which were there (apparently only two) and killed all the Turret's crew, (74 men including reserve crew), except 2 men who were able to get away (wounded).<br />
<br />
:The Turret itself was put out of action because (as was the case in all these hits on Turrets) much damage was done to the various instruments and appliances by the splinters and flash.<br />
<br />
:It is worthy of note that the electric cables in the Turret were comparatively uninjured.<br />
<br />
:(2). Turret No.3 was also hit by a 38 cm. (15") shell (hit No.6). The projectile penetrated the Barbette armour and took with it a large piece of plating into the interior of the Turret. The 74 men of the Turret's crew (as in the hit described above[)] for the most part were killed, only 6 men getting away wounded. It is observed that an 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) gun which was 3½ metres (about 11½ ft.) away from the point of impact, was completely undamaged, although the deck below the spot, and in the immediate vicinity of this gun, was badly damaged.<br />
<br />
:Nos.3 and 4 Turrets were only put out of action towards the end of the engagement.<br />
<br />
:The two foremost Turrets remained completely intact, although the Barbette armour of the second Turret showed a fairly large scrape from a (very glancing) shell hit. But this caused no further damage to the Turret (hit No.13).<br />
<br />
:(4). The Conning Tower was hit on the starboard side on the edge. But only small pieces of the brittle face of the armoured plates splintered off, and in the Tower itself only one elevation-pointer ceased to function.<br />
<br />
:(5). Very severe damage was done by a large calibre shell (hit No.20) which exploded close to the casemate of the No.2 15 cm. (5.9) gun port, which not only damaged this gun, but also put the two neighbouring 15 cm. (5.9") guns out of action. The first named gun was principally severely damaged on the chase, and the chase of the foremost 15 cm. (5.9") gun was indented to such an extent by splinters, that it could not be fired again. The other gun in the vicinity was so shaken up by the powerful explosion, that it could not be moved again. The casualties sustained by the gun's crews were in contrast comparatively small. (1 man killed and several severely or slightly wounded at the first named gun[)].<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
A large fragment of a 38 cm. (15") shell (which failed to explode), was exhibited on board (as is shown in Fig.12, Enc.3)[.] The much distorted fuze was also found.<br />
<br />
<center>H. "KÖNIG".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits.</center><br />
<br />
There were 13 hits (large calibre) identified all from the port side and above the waterline.<br />
<br />
:(1). A 34.3 cm. (13.5) shell hit the port foremost 15 cm. (5.9") casemate. (Hit No.9). A large piece of armour plating was carried into the casemate, where the shell exploded, killed the gun's crew (11 men) and put the gun out of action. The armour plate went further, penetrated the bulkhead, entered the galley, destroyed it and killed more men.<br />
<br />
:(2). Another 34.3 cm. (13.5") shell penetrated the second 15 cm. (5.9") casemate (hit No.8) and exploded, making the gun useless and, by penetrating the deck also caused much damage in the compartment below. The crew of this gun was by chance not at the moment in the casemate, as they had gone out for a short time on account of gas from the explosion in the first 15 cm. (5.9) casemate (which had occurred just previously.) The result was that there were no killed or wounded among the gun's crew.<br />
<br />
:(3). The traces of a shell were visible on the roof of the foremost 30.5 (12") Turret. (Hit No.11.) The projectile damaged the Rangefinder cover, and tore off a piece of it, rendering the Rangefinder useless. No other damage was caused by this hit.<br />
<br />
:(4). The roof of the Conning Tower was similarly gazed [sic] by a shell, which left a scratch but caused no other damage to the Tower or its instruments, etc.<br />
<br />
<center>J. "HINDENBURG."</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Apparently about 30,000 tons displacement)</center><br />
<br />
This Cruiser, now building will be given an armament of 8 30.5 cm. (12") guns 50 cal. (in four double turrets, 2 forward and 2 aft as in "DERFFLINGER") and 14 15 cm. (5.9") and 8.8 cm[.] (22 pr.) Anti-aircraft guns.<br />
<br />
The foremost superimposed Turret (No.2) was mostly built in, and a short inspection of it was made.<br />
<br />
The Gun-platform is especially roomy. The distance apart of the centres of the two gun barrels being estimated at about 3 metres (10 feet approx.)[.] The complete arrangement of the gun-platform can be seen in the diagrammatic Sketch (Fig.13, Enc.3). The 2 shell hoists (G) are side by side between the gun and to the left of the left gun, (and right of the right gun) are the two ammunition hoists (P).<br />
<br />
The up-coming ammunition is placed in its slide (TT) in the rear by means of unloading rammers (so-called "Umlauder"), whence it rolls on to the loading Tray, and finally on to the shell swings or cartridge swings, which by swinging across, brings the shell or cartridges one after the other to the rear of the gun for loading.<br />
<br />
The two rammers are hydraulic chain Rammers (with reserve hand drive). In the space at the rear of the platform there are :- an entrance opening (E) and two openings (A) for passing out firedcartridge [sic] cases. These openings (A) are constructed similarly to those more exactly described under "SEYDLITZ" (Sec.II. Par.9).<br />
<br />
The Breeches are worked hydraulically (the reserve method being by hand.)<br />
<br />
The principle can be gathered from Fig.14, Enc.3 . A bar with a tooth edged point (Z), (which can be worked up or down hydraulically) turns the Traversing shaft by means of cog wheels (R1, R2, R3) and opens or shuts the breech. The Water-pressure is led to the mechanism through two flexible hoses. If the cog wheel R3 is placed out of gear with R2, the hydraulic system is shut off.<br />
<br />
For elevating,Trunnion [sic] sights are provided and for training a sighting telescope is fitted in front between the guns.<br />
<br />
The Rangefinder (about 8 metres long) which was not yet on board, is to be fitted in the front of the Turret above the guns (under the roof as already referred to under "KURFÜRST")[.] Only the two side openings in the armour could be seen.<br />
<br />
Elevating is worked hydraulically (Reserve system by hand). (The ammunition hoists are also worked hydraulically, but here the alternative system is electric).<br />
<br />
A gun coupling is fitted in this ship as in all later ships. But these couplings are apparently only for use when it is desired to elevate a gun whose elevating gear has been damaged.<br />
<br />
The normal Turret Training gear and also the reserve system is only worked by electric motors.<br />
<br />
The same system of ventilation is used as has already been described in "SEYDLITZ" (Section II, Par.II).<br />
<br />
All working machinery (Electrically driven pumps, and electric motors for elevating, training, hoists, rammers, etc.) are apparently installed in the spacious working chamber below the gun platform.<br />
<br />
The arrangements in the Magazines as well as the transporting gear for passing shell and cartridges from them to the hoists are the same as those already more minutely described under battleship "GROSSER KÜRFURST."<br />
<br />
<center>K. "BAYERN".</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Class Ersatz "WÖRTH" about 30,000 tons disp.)</center><br />
<br />
This battleship, only recently completed, had to carry out exercises whilst at Kiel, and the Commission was invited to join for a cruise, which gave opportunity for a certain amount of inspection.<br />
<br />
The armament consists of eight 38 cm. (15") G.L. 45 guns in four double turrets apparently arranged as shown in the Almanac; sixteen 15 cm. (5.9") G.L. 45 guns in casemates and eight 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) anti-aircraft guns.<br />
<br />
38 cm. Gun Turret. (Fig. 15, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
The distance apart of the bore axes is 3700 mm. (12.1 ft.) for these guns[.] 8.8 cm. sub-calibre guns are provided, which are put in from outboard (i.e. muzzle end.)<br />
<br />
The Gunhouse, as in the turrets of the "HINDENBURG" is very roomy.<br />
<br />
In this turret there has been introduced no important alteration with respect to the munition hoists. Whereas in all previous ships the shot hoist was separate from the cartridge hoist, in this ship, as with us (the Austrian Navy), both hoists for one gun are combined in one trunk; and also instead of the shell and cartridge swings in the "HINDENBURG" (see above) munition wagons (W1, W2), which run on cross rails are introduced. The two main hoists (A1, A2) come up between the two guns. Besides these there are in addition two electrically driven auxiliary hoists (H1, H2).<br />
<br />
The round which arrives at the top of the hoist is taken out and landed, by means of the unloading rammer (U) in the munition wagon, which brings it to the rear of the particular gun in the loading position, whence it is loaded by means of the rammer.<br />
<br />
The munition wagons, rammers and unloading rammers are normally worked by hydraulic power (with auxiliary handworking gear); at the back of the turret are two principal operating positions, (ST1, ST2) which are raised to give a good all-round view, and where all the necessary manipulation for the foregoing hydraulic machinery is carried out.<br />
<br />
The munition hoists are also hydraulically worked, and electric drive is provided as an alternative. The elevating and breech mechanism gear are hydraulic (with alternative hand gear).<br />
<br />
The following sighting arrangements are provided :-<br />
<br />
:(a) For elevation - two side trunnion sights as well as two reserve sights in front.<br />
<br />
:(b) For training - a principal trainer's telescope in front between the two guns, as well as a side telescope as reserve.<br />
<br />
Asked whether any automatic firing apparatus was in contemplation, it was replied that a place for such apparatus was provided but the installation could not be expected till later, and depended on the solution of several problems which had yet to be experimented on.<br />
<br />
The large 8.2 m. (26.9 ft.) rangefinder is placed the same as in the "HINDENBURG".<br />
<br />
The ventilation of the turret is on the same principle as in the "HINDENBURG" and "SEYDLITZ", except that in addition there are two powerful electric fan motors between the guns.<br />
<br />
The Training is done electrically, as is also the alternative arrangement. Fig 15, Enc.3 gives a diagrammatic sketch of the arrangements. The controller gives 72 degrees of speed.<br />
<br />
For absorbing the shock in the training gear of single gun shooting there are provided, in the friction coupling box of the worm gearing, besides the friction plates (as in our own installations) two rings of strong springs above them - each ring containing six springs as shewn in Fig.17, Enc.3. Apparently any turret thrown off a small angle by a single round will be trained back to its original position by means of these springs.<br />
<br />
As in "HINDENBURG", so also in "BAYERN", the various machines for training[,] elevating, munition supply, rammers and unloading rammers are placed on the deck underneath the Gun platform (working chamber), and also the machines for the magazine and transport arrangements of munitions are similarly installed.<br />
<br />
In Fig. 18, Enc.3 is a diagrammatic sketch of the munition hoists and magazines from which it can be seen that the shell room is on the lowest level and has the magazine above it. The cartridge loading door (F1 for cartridges, G1 for shell) are fitted for flash protection with sliding shutters which are self-operating when the lift arrives at one or the other, i.e. when the lift arrives at the bottom, the shutter there will open and leave the loading hole (P) free, while the upper openings F1 and G1 will be shut and locked.<br />
<br />
An inspection of the shell room 38 cm. (15") showed that on these shells there is attached to the rearmost of the three upper driving bands a zinc band about 20 mm. (.78 in.) broad (similar to the driving bands). Experience has shown that this zinc ring is a very good anti-coppering device for the bore. It was apparently on the French front, at Verdun and in Flanders, that experiments with this arrangement were made; the results were very good and its introduction followed. The Army has also adopted it.<br />
<br />
The following is the situation with regard to 38 cm. (15 in.) shell. As opposed to the single type of shell (long calibre) in newly completing ships, here there are two :-<br />
<br />
:(a) A.P. shell, with cap, total length of shell 3.5 calibres.<br />
<br />
:(b) H.E. shell, uncapped, total length of shell 4.1 calibres. The total weight is 750 kg. (1653.5 lbs). The burster (not Trotyl, probably Heranit? 23.5 kg. (57.8 lbs.) for the A.P. shell and 67 kg. (147.7 lbs) for the H.E. The establishment allowed per [gun] is 90 A.P. and 30 H.E. The maximum range is 24 kilometres (26,247 yds.) with an angle of descent of 32 degrees, elevation of gun 247 degrees, time of flight 48 secs.<br />
<br />
:The charge is 87 kg. (191.8 lbs) in the main cartridge and 96 kg. (211.6 lbs.) in the foremost cartridge.<br />
<br />
:The rate of fire is one round per 40 seconds.<br />
<br />
15 cm. casemates. In these ships the flash protection for the 15 cm. (5.9") munition hoists in the casemates has been improved (Fig.20, Enc.3). In that a sheet iron chamber (K) has been built around the delivery opening which, by means of sliding plates (S1 and S2) can be shut off either from the trunk or from the munition tray. (G2.) For example, a shell arrives at the top of the hoist (G) - the shutter (S1) is raised in its guides by means of the lift mechanism, so that the shell can roll into the chamber (G1) while the shutter (S3) remains closed. Immediately afterwards the shutter (S1) closes the opening and the shutter (S2) raises in its guides and the shell rolls on the munition tray (G2). By this means the trunk is rendered flash proof at all stages of the operation.<br />
<br />
Submerged Flats. On board this ship there was also the opportunity to visit a submerged flat with two broadside tubes.<br />
<br />
In all there are five tubes (2 in each flat) and a bow tube. The calibre of the torpedoes is 60 cm. (23.6 in.) and the weight of a fully charged torpedo 2200 kg. (4850 lbs.). The explosive (? Heranit) weighing 250 kg. (531.1 lbs). The establishment per tube is four torpedoes - making in all 20 on board. The greatest torpedo range is 13 kilometres, 14,217 yds) with a medium speed setting of 28 knots.<br />
<br />
The flat that was visited (Fig.21, Enc.3) is very large and about 5 metres high, (16 ft.) so that it is perfectly feasible to turn any torpedo hanging on the purchase at the turntable (W1) on the overhead rails, so that is [sic] can be loaded into the port or starboard tube.<br />
<br />
The tubes (L1, L2) are side loading with very strong longitudinal holts [sic] on top (V1, V2) and fitted with a strong shield bar. For loading the torpedoes in the tubes, there are fitted near the tubes, on the same side on the side door, mechanical loading apparatus (quickloaders A1, A2), and on the opposite side are provided the rails (R1, R2) which serve for the adjustment (lever system) of the gyroscope of a torpedo lying in the tube.<br />
<br />
A torpedo is struck down from the upper deck through the trunk (E) and swung through the opening (O) into the flat, whence by means of a purchase (mechanically driven) it is run on to the tramways (S) and thence either to the bulkhead stowage or to a stowage over the tube.<br />
<br />
One must take this opportunity of noting that the overhead rails are not bolted to the actual deck, but are a separate structure, so as to avoid putting any vibration or other strain on to the armoured deck.<br />
<br />
If a torpedo is to be loaded it will be brought by means of the purchase to the exact ready stowage over the tube; then the hydraulic loader is operated by a lever; a grad [sic] with two arms seizes the torpedo in two specially cut away parts and draws it horizontally on to the guide rail of the loader, which then is lowered together with the torpedo. In the meantime the side door is mechanically unbolted and opened, so that the torpedo can be placed right in the tube (impulse frame). After this the guide rail and grab of the loader are withdrawn and raised, while the side door is shut and bolted. Loading by this means proceeds comparatively noiselessly, rapidly and precisely.<br />
<br />
The sluice is hydraulically worked, and after firing is operated by the return movement of the shield bar. When draining the tube the water can be pumped either overboard or into a well.<br />
<br />
The discharge is operated electrically from the Conning Tower or by hand.<br />
<br />
The sluice is hydraulically worked, and after firing is operated by the return movement of the shield bar. When draining the tube the water can be pumped either overboard or into a well.<br />
<br />
The discharge is operated electrically from the Conning Tower or by hand.<br />
<br />
<center>L. TORPEDO BOAT "G. 90".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1200 tons displacement.)</center><br />
<br />
From the Battleship "BAYERN" the Commission was brought back to Kiel in one of the newest torpedo boats (G.90), which offered an opportunity of seeing certain details.<br />
<br />
The gun armament consists of three 10.5 cm. (4.1") Guns on transferable mountings; the torpedo armament, of two single tubes forward and two double tubes for<nowiki>*</nowiki> [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. Note: Apparently a clerical error for 50 cm.(19.7")] 45 cm. (17.7") torpedoes in the after part. (See Fig. 22, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
The following details respecting the torpedo equipment were noted :<br />
<br />
Six torpedoes were carried, which remain stowed in the tubes; spare torpedoes are not carried on board, and no torpedo stowage is provided. The tubes of the twin mountings are not parallel but inclined outwards from each other, making an angle of 20° between the tubes.<br />
<br />
The reason for this lies in the method of torpedo boat attack. Torpedo craft always fire on the swing (in order to offer the full broadside target to the enemy fire for the shortest possible time), and the torpedoes from a twin mounting are are [sic] fired one after the other (the mounting remaining on a fixed bearing). The first torpedo having been fired, the boat continues to swing under helm and after 20° the second torpedo is fired.<br />
<br />
The training is done by means of a training gear at each tube, which can be understood from the detailed sketch (Fig. 23, Enc.3). By means of the hand crank (K) a worm and worm wheel (Zr) can be turned, this engages inthe [sic] training rack (Zs) and so the tube can be trained. The training pinion can, by means of a coupling clutch worked by the lever (H) be disconnected from the rack, should be required to train the mounting quickly, or for loading and unloading the torpedo by means of the training gear. This latter is accomplished by means of the windlass (W) mounted on the training shaft round which can be taken a line secured either to the nose or the tail of the torpedo. At the back part of the mounting is fitted a training brake which grips the rack.<br />
<br />
A director is fitted at each tube, and torpedoes are fired electrically from the bridge. At the rear of each tube are fitted two firing pushes (Abfeurungspöller), which can be operated either singly or together. In order to prevent firing from a tube which is not yet at the ready, the particular firing gear is held fast by a special locking gear fitted to the tube; its method of working can be seen from (Fig.24, Enc.3). The locking levers (St1 and St2) are only clear of the firing gear, when the rollers (R1 and R2), connected to the locking gear, are clear of the guide strip (G). This guide strip covers the arc in which firing is to be prevented. The springs.(F1 and F2) release the gear, as shewn in the sketch under (T).<br />
<br />
For torpedo transport on deck a special rail is fitted on the starboard side, on which was seen a fairly long transport wagon.<br />
<br />
<center>M. TRAWLER.</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Fitted out for Anti Submarine work)</center><br />
<br />
For fighting submarine boats trawlers are employed with the following :-<br />
<br />
:(a). A.S.rope nets fitted with two or four A.S.mines.<br />
<br />
:(b). Large Depth charges.<br />
<br />
:(c). Anti Submarine explosive Kite.<br />
<br />
::These appliances are described below.<br />
<br />
(a). Nets with A.S. Mines (Fig.25, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
These nets are made up from hemp rope (diameter of rope about 10 mm.); they are 250 m.long and of varying breadth (up to 20 m.) To a normal net two mines (M.M.) are attached (see Fig.25, Enc.3); for broader nets the mines are secured in pairs vertically - thus making four mines to a broad net. The mines are supported by their own large iron flat (S) while for the support of the nets smaller floats (S1) are placed on top.<br />
<br />
Each pair of nets also has an anchor and cable attached.<br />
<br />
The nets which are joined together are stowed with their mines in large shaped iron floats. The latter are stowed ready for shooting in two rows, (1 and 2, Fig.26, Enc3) on the top of the trawler. Shortly before action the primers are inserted through circular holes in the floats (1 hole per float).<br />
<br />
The shooting of nets one and two is carried out at a speed of 10 knots by one man. First , the first anchor of the first net is let go and the net with its mines dragged into the water, afterwards being anchored by the second anchor. Before, however, this latter is slipped the first anchor of the second net must be let go to ensure over-lapping.<br />
<br />
There are tiny holes in the floats by means of which just sufficient water can enter the floats so as to sink the net with its mines and floats at the end of an hour, and leave the area free again for traffic.<br />
<br />
These net mines (Fig.27, Enc.3) are contact mines with an explosive charge (1) from 12-13 kg. of Trotyl and consist of the mine case (M), firing mechanism (S), impact plate (P), distance pin (St), the safety lever (S1) and the primer (J) with the detonator (K).<br />
<br />
When the mine enters the water and reaches a depth of 5 metres the safety catch is released by a hydrostatic valve, which thus frees the detonator for the striker.<br />
<br />
Firing is effected in that by the impact of a submarine the impact plate (and with it the distance pin) are displaced, and by means of the latter the striker is freed and fires the mine by means of the firing spring (which is already cocked).<br />
<br />
(b). Depth charge (Fig., Enc.3).<br />
<br />
These depth charges are cylindrical in form and contain a large explosive charge of 60 kg. of Trotyl. They consist of the mine (M) and the float (S). The latter is connected to the mine by a strong steel wire (3 mm.), which is wound on a reel in the float. It fires (exactly like the depth charge of Korvetten Kapitän Schönthaler) because on reaching the set depth the tension on the wire operates the firing mechanism (Striker spring (F) is compressed as the striker (B) is raised by the grab (Z)) and thus frees the striker.<br />
<br />
The set depth can be adjusted from 5 to 5 (5 to 50?) metres (practically in the same way as in the Schönthaler Depth Charge) and it is to be noted that the time of explosion (1 to 5 secs) is adjustable by means of turning the pointer of the seconds scale (E) on the outside. The delay action itself operates by means of a disc similar to shrapnel.<br />
<br />
(c). Explosive Kite (Fig.30, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
The Kite (D) is made of wood and shaped as shown in Fig.31, inside is an explosive charge (the same size as the net mine, 12 - 13 kg., described in par. (a) above.<br />
<br />
The Kite is towed by a 15 mm. strong steel wire (T) whose core is an electric cableby [sic] means of which the kite is electrically exploded.<br />
<br />
The cable wire is wound on the winch (K), the ends being connected to the electric firing battery in the hollow drum.<br />
<br />
The towing wire is led from the winch over an adjustable brake (B) and from there over a roller (R) secured to a derrick (L) where the other end is connected to the charge.<br />
<br />
When the kite hits against a hard object (submarine) it is electrically fired.<br />
<br />
As a safety precaution the electric switch at the battery is only made when the kite is towing at the requisite speed.<br />
<br />
Trawlers tow at 10 knots, which causes a pull of 350 kg. on the wire.<br />
<br />
<center>N. ARSENAL WILHELMSHAVEN.</center><br />
<br />
Only a short visit to the gun shops was made. There about 1,000 civil workman [sic] were employed.<br />
<br />
In general the work carried out was similar to that in our own gun factories (repair of gun material, production of necessary equipment, magazine and shellroom machinery, examination and cleaning of bores of guns, the storage and preservation of magazine and shellroom fittings, small calibre guns, searchlights, range finders, etc.), only here the buildings, in particular the shops and storehouses, are modern throughout and planned on a spacious lay out.<br />
<br />
The drawing office is worthy of note, in it at that time the stowage plan of munitions for the Battle Cruiser "HINDENBURG" was in preparation. For the protection of such drawings there is provided a large fireproof room.<br />
<br />
To the gun shops belong :- the large mechanical shops, a smithy, a large carpenter's shop, a large shop for work on canvas, leather, and similar equipment, a plumber's shop, two very roomy storehouses for magazine material and a depot for various constructional materials; in the last named is a special,cellar for rubber and leather articles in which at the time there were gathered about 700,000 marks worth.<br />
<br />
A new large gun hall was under construction which is about 60 m. long and 25 m. broad. The building itself was nearly finished, only the installation and also the large travelling crane were not in place.<br />
<br />
Both high sliding doors (T1 T2) were operated by an electrically driven (alternative hand working) which at the side. The travelling crane (N) brings the material to the door, where a floating crane (S) with large overhang takes it over and provides for its further transport.<br />
<br />
While passing through the shop the decoppering of a 15 cm. (5.9) gun was seen. The decoppering machine was a brush withbvery [sic] fine steel bristles, as shewn in Fig.33. The head of the brush (K) is a cylindrical drum of strong plate, which before use is filled with petroleum and turpentine. On the head are fixed three bristle holding rings (H), which carry on their periphery the small steel bristles (B). These three bristle rings are separated by two intermediate rings (R).<br />
<br />
The fine steel wire used in the bristles is 0.2 mm. thick and must be softer than the material of the inner tube so as not to scratch the latter. The cleaning is accomplished by powerful brushing th [sic] through the bore, this action forcing out the petroleum mixture from the drum at the head of the brush into the bore.<br />
<br />
The decoppering device was very successful with the 15 cm. (5.9") gun; a small quantity of the copper scraping and two bristles were given to the Mission. (A bristle and a portion of copper scrapings accompany the reports (1 each) to the K.U.K.K.M. Marine Section (Austrian Admiralty) and to the (Austrian) Naval Technical Committee.)<br />
<br />
<center>O. ARSENAL KIEL.</center><br />
<br />
The "Artilleriewerkstätten" (Gun shops) at Kiel are in general the same as those at Wilhelmshaven described above, so that this amounted to an opportunity for closer description.<br />
<br />
The only noteworthy sight among the gunshops visited was one very large gunhall in which numerous guns are stowed, (among them some from ships that had been in the battle (Jutland); for the transport of the heaviest weights are two travelling cranes (each of 45 tons both cranes are employed together). For the further transport normal gauge rail tracks are provided.<br />
<br />
For the mechanical decoppering of guns a special scraper is used, whose action can be seen from Fig. 34. In the dial shaped head (K) are two difference scrapers (S1 S2), which by means of an inserting gear (E) can be placed exactly in the groove it is required to clean. The scraper (S1), cleans the base of the grooves, the scraper (S2) cleans the sides. The red (st) is guided so as to avoid any corners of the scraper<nowiki>*</nowiki> [I.D.Note: Apparently this guide rod arrangement keeps the scraper true in the groove.] This apparatus has proved its worth.<br />
<br />
Later on information from the Ordnance Department of the Admiralty showed that 30.5 and 28 cm. gun tubes, from which 60 - 100 rounds had been fired in the action, from later experimental firings at Krupps were found to have suffered from wear (actually about 20 mm.) which permitted overramming. After the conclusion of the experimental firings, only gun tubes of equ [sic] equal wear are sent to one and the same ship.<br />
<br />
Of very great interest is the information that many of the 25 cm. (13.7") guns, which were on the French front (6 on the Verdun front) had fired 600 - 800 rounds with full charge (range 36 kilometers, 39,376 yds.) with a diminished range of only 2 km., 2,187 yds. and no necessity for a new inner tube. The shell used in these guns were those provided with the anti-coppering zinc ring.<br />
<br />
The following summarize the points of the greatest importance.<br />
<br />
:1. Introduction of gas masks for each man, as of utmost importance.<br />
<br />
:2. Specially important is flash protection (including) cover plates for munition hoist trunks in turrets and casemates, shut off hatches and doors as well as partition of the magazines.).<br />
<br />
:3. As few cartridges as possible by the gun (in the gun house of a turret or in a casemate), because of the great danger of its ignition by a hit.<br />
<br />
:4. Abolition of the ready use position in the turrets (on account of point 3, above).<br />
<br />
:5. Many gun tubes 30.5 and 28 cm. (12" and 4" [sic]) have fired 60 - 100 rounds with only 20 mm. overramming.<br />
<br />
:6. Many gun tubes undergo experimental firing and are reissued only in similar tubes to one ship.<br />
<br />
:7. Automatic firing apparatus is not yet in use.<br />
<br />
:8. Gun coupling gear provided, but is only used in the event of danger to elevating gear.<br />
<br />
:9. Introduction of small calibre guns 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) only for anti-aircraft work.<br />
<br />
:10. Normally the turrets only fire salvoes, and only from one gun per turret.<br />
<br />
:11. Repulse of Torpedo boat attacks is achieved by broadside salvoes from the 15 cm. (5.9") guns - all in one target.<br />
<br />
:12. Normal turret machinery :-<br />
<br />
::Training{{pad|50px}}Electric (as is also reserve)<br />
<br />
::Elevating<br />
<br />
::Rammers<br />
<br />
::Unloading rammers{{pad|50px}}All hydraulic and<br />
<br />
::Breech mechanism and in some{{pad|30px}}hand control.<br />
<br />
::cases Munition wagons<br />
<br />
::Munition hoists - hydraulic - with electric reserve<br />
<br />
::Shell transport in shell rooms - electric<br />
<br />
:13. Observation of fall of shot :- in each top, 1 or two men in telephonic communication with the gunnery officer. (On 31st.May neither Aeroplanes or Zeppelins were present[)].<br />
<br />
:14. Fire control from gunnery officer's position by elevation pointer only.<br />
<br />
:15. All rangefinders stereoscopic normally 3 m. long instruments in armour domes in Turrets, in the latest ships 8 m. instruments projecting from sides below Turret roofs.<br />
<br />
:16. Large calibre projectiles are standard type armour shells with caps and sharply pointed explosive shells without cap are being reintroduced. For 15 cm. Guns (5.9") fused shell with base fuse and H.F. shell with a very sensitive nose fuse and a base fuse.<br />
<br />
:17. No ship expended all her heavy ammunition, at the most a little over 1/3 of the establishment.<br />
<br />
:18. Establishment for heavy guns 115 - 120 rounds per gun.<br />
<br />
:19. As an anti-coppering precaution for guns, projectiles are fitted with a zinc ring behind the rear driving band and in direct contact therewith.<br />
<br />
:20. English 38 cm. (15") and 34.3 cm (13.5") projectiles have apparently black powder as a bursting charge: bursting bad and effect not commensurate with the calibre.<br />
<br />
:21. The explosion of a large calibre projectile in a Turret always puts the same out of action.<br />
<br />
:22. Ventilation of Turrets insufficient.<br />
<br />
:23. Voice pipes 60 - 100 and 150 mm. calibre have no lagging and are provided with wooden stoppers or sponges wherewith to close the tube to gases.<br />
<br />
:24. Emergency lighting by means of Pocket lamps.<br />
<br />
:25. Torpedo nets are no longer carried.<br />
<br />
:26. All ranges below 15 km. heavy armour is generally pierced by 38 cm. (15")projectiles. [sic]<br />
<br />
:27. Submarine Defence. Mine nets, (? Depth charges) and Explosive Kites.<br />
<br />
Appendices 2 Sketches, Hits Appendix 1 and 2. One sheet of sketches to report. Appen. 3.<br />
<br />
In conclusion, one matter may be mentioned, which, on the occasion of the visit to the Arsenal at Wilhelmshaven and to the ships, attracted attention through its differing so greatly from our own arrangements. Viz, the handling procedure of consumable stores.<br />
<br />
The characteristic points of the Organisation of this Branch in the German Navy are, as follows :-<br />
<br />
:1. In the ships, the demanding, keeping and issuing of consumable stores is done by one officer under the special supervision of the Commander, who is responsible for the stores being on board, for maintaining them in proper condition, for stowing them efficiently and according to regulations and for the accuracy and completeness of the necessary accounts.<br>These officers are occupied by "Materialenverwalter" W.O.'s [Warrant Officers] who are well trained in the work of their branch and are selected from P.Os. [Petty Officers]<br />
<br />
:2. Money necessary for the Administrative work of the ship is remitted to the Captain in the form of a fixed sum and the expenditure of this is checked by the "Materialenverwalter".<br />
<br />
:3. The limit to the yearly expenditure of stores is fixed by a "Stores Credit" (estimate). Permission to exceed this limit must be obtained from the Admiralty and only in specially exceptional cases is permission for such excess to be requested afterwards.<br />
<br />
:4. The paymaster controls stores and the "Materialenverwalter" accounts and reports tomthe [sic] Captain whenever expenditure in excess of the quantity allowed is to be feared. The paymaster is not responsible for the accuracy of the entries made by the "Materialenverwalter" in books, etc.,kept [sic] by him.<br />
<br />
:5. The Office staff is at the disposal of the Captain to assist in accounting for consumable and non-consumable stores. This staff consists of one officer and the clerk, they are jointly responsible for reporting losses, deficiencies as compared with quantities shown by the books, necessary repairs and replacements. They also keep such records as are necessary to afford at any time a clear statement of the consumable and non-consumable stores and munition on board.<br />
<br />
:6. Stores are completed by demands on the Imperial Dockyards or depots by means of special forms. The consignment note serving as voucher.<br />
<br />
:Ship's demands are not checked by the Dockyards, the ships alone being responsible for the demand being in order.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}Pola, 4th. August, 1916.<br />
<br />
==See Also==<br />
*[[Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland]]<br />
<br />
==Footnotes==<br />
{{reflist}}<br />
<br />
==Bibliography==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
*''Almanach für die k. und k. Kriegsmarine 1917. Kriegsausgabe''. '''XXXVII'''. Pola: 1917.<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
[[Category:Battle of Jutland]]</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=User:Simon_Harley&diff=334779User:Simon Harley2024-03-24T20:07:27Z<p>Simon Harley: Made Changes.</p>
<hr />
<div>[[File:Confing.jpg|thumb|right|300px|The editor presenting a paper based on [[A Direct Train of Cordite]] at the British Commission for Maritime History's New Researchers' Conference, 2013.]] <br />
My name is '''Simon Harley''' and I am a thirty-eight year old researcher of the Royal Navy in the [[Dreadnought Era]].<br />
<br />
I currently live on the North-West coast of England. For the past 16 years I've been accumulating material on the [[Royal Navy Flag Officers of the Great War]], which will eventually form the basis of a multi-volume history of the Royal Navy, from Lord Fisher's going to sea up to the Treaty of Versailles. By providing a background to these Flag Officers' services from 1854 to 1914, their actions in the Great War will be put into their proper context.<br />
<br />
During the COVID-19 pandemic, and the consequent closure of archives, I started a new project on cordite handling at the Battle of Jutland which has (as of March 2024) matured into a 600 page work on the subject.<br />
<br />
If you have any questions or material relating to the subjects of this website, please [http://dreadnoughtproject.org/contact.php get in touch] or email me at simon AT-SIGN dreadnoughtproject.org. I would be especially happy to hear from descendants of naval officers who served in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.<br />
<br />
My personal website and blog can be found at [http://www.simonharley.com http://www.simonharley.com].<br />
<br />
Elected an Associate Fellow of the Royal Historical Society in 2024.<br />
<br />
One of the first recipients of the [https://www.chu.cam.ac.uk/news/news-and-events/the-first-colin-bell-award-winners-announced/ Colin Bell Award from Churchill College, Cambridge.]<br />
<br />
Invited to present a paper at the 2017 McMullen Naval History Symposium at the United States Naval Academy.<br />
<br />
Speaker at the 2013 New Researchers in Maritime History Conference hosted by the British Commission for Maritime History.<br />
<br />
Author of:<br />
<br />
*[http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00253359.2016.1167397 "'It's a Case of All or None': 'Jacky' Fisher's Advice to Winston Churchill, 1911"]. ''The Mariner's Mirror''. '''102''' (2): 174–190. doi:10.1080/00253359.2016.1167397.<br />
<br />
*[http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00253359.2016.1202488 "'A Distinct Point in Modern Naval Tactics'"]. ''The Mariner's Mirror''. '''102''' (3): 325–330. doi:10.1080/00253359.2016.1202488.<br />
<br />
*[http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00253359.2016.1240978 "Vice-Admiral Bethell's Third Fleet Battle Orders, about 1914"]. ''The Mariner's Mirror''. '''102''' (4): 442–443. doi:10.1080/00253359.2016.1240978.<br />
<br />
*[http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00253359.2017.1304709 "The Promotion of David Beatty to Rear-Admiral"]. ''The Mariner's Mirror''. '''103''' (2): 213–216. doi:10.1080/00253359.2017.1304709.<br />
<br />
*[http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00253359.2017.1348040 "War Course Attendance at Greenwich from 1900 to 1904"]. ''The Mariner's Mirror''. '''103''' (4): 471–474. doi:10.1080/00253359.2017.1348040.<br />
<br />
===Links===<br />
*[[User:Simon Harley/Library|Library]] &mdash; A list of ''some'' of my books. I'm always willing to share information or the books themselves on request.<br />
<br />
*[[User:Simon Harley/Archives|Archives]] &mdash; A list of ''some'' of the archival (i.e. primary) sources I have and need. If you can help acquire them, or are interested in the contents of some of them, please get in touch.<br />
<br />
*[[User:Simon Harley/Acknowledgements|Acknowledgements]] &mdash; Research like this requires a lot of time, luck, effort, and ''help''.<br />
<br />
===External Links===<br />
*[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:Simon_Harley My Wikipedia user page.]<br />
*[https://twitter.com/simonharley My 𝕏/Twitter page.]<br />
<br />
==Works in Progress==<br />
Far too many to list.<br />
<br />
''Review copies of new publications are always welcome.''</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Attach%C3%A9_Report_on_the_Battle_of_Jutland&diff=334778Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland2024-03-24T18:31:58Z<p>Simon Harley: /* Footnotes */</p>
<hr />
<div>Soon after the [[Battle of Jutland]] on 31 May &ndash; 1 June 1916 the Naval Attaché of the [[Austro-Hungarian Navy|Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Navy]] at the embassy in Berlin, ''Fregattenkapitäne'' Hieronymus Graf von Colloredo-Mannsfeld,<ref>''Schematismus für das K.u.K. Heer und für die Kriegsmarine für 1914''. p. 1270. ''Almanach für die k. und k. Kriegsmarine 1917''. p. 668.</ref> visited the [[High Sea Fleet]]. He composed a report on the battle for his superiors using first-hand accounts, interspersed here and there with his own observations. Being written so soon after the battle it provides an interesting, raw insight into the state of the [[Imperial German Navy]], even if some of the details turned out to be inaccurate.<br />
<br />
The version reproduced here is a translation in English apparently made by the [[Naval Intelligence Division (Royal Navy)|Naval Intelligence Division]] in 1919 from a copy which was subsequently returned to "F.N.A.", presumably the French Naval Attaché. A copy of the translation then made its way into the papers of the British Cabinet, from where historian Arthur J. Marder obtained a copy which is in his papers.<ref>Folder bearing number N.I.D. 087/19. Marder papers, Special Collections and Archives, Langson Library, University of California, Irvine, MS-F002, Box 27.</ref> He does not appear to have used it for the 1966 edition of ''From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow'', Volume III, but certainly used it for the revised edition in 1978.<ref>A quote on p. 189 of the 1966 edition reads, "The Fleet is filled with enthusiasm and elated with victory.... All, down to the last seaman, believe in the strength of the Fleet and look forward to further encounters with confidence." This differs to the quote used on p. 234 of the 1978 edition, which is identical to that used here.</ref> Three weeks after transcribing Marder's copy, editor [[User:Simon Harley|Simon Harley]] found another copy in the papers of {{ViceRN}} [[John Ernest Troyte Harper|John E. T. Harper]].<ref>Harper papers, Churchill Archives Centre, JEHR 1/4.</ref><br />
<br />
It is perhaps worth comparing this translation with that made by Hungarian historian Mihály Krámli of a post-war copy of a slightly shorter version of the report in a Hungarian archive which has been published on the ''NavWeaps'' online resource.<ref>Krámli, Mihály. [http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-124.pdf "The Report on the Battle of Jutland by the Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché in Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Colloredo-Mannsfeld."] ''NavWeaps''.</ref><br />
<br />
The original grammar and punctuation of the typescript has been reproduced here wherever possible.<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
From:- Austrian Naval Attache in Berlin.<br />
<br />
To:- Commander-in-Chief, Pola.<br />
<div style="float:right;">Berlin,<br>17 June, 1916.</div><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<center><u>NAVAL ENGAGEMENT OF 31 MAY 1916.</u></center><br />
<br />
The following is a report of the naval proceedings of 31 May - 1 June, 1916, and also of the damage sustained by the German Fleet.<br />
<br />
During my 3-days' visit to Wilhelmshaven, followed by a cursory examination of the "MARKGRAF" and "KURFURST" at Hamburg, I endeavoured to gain merely a general idea of the results of gunfire and concentrated my attention on the course of the action itself.<br />
Admiral Scheer, whom I only saw for a short time as he left for Kiel to attend the funeral of his borther-in-law [sic], Lieut.-Commander Mohr,<ref>Carl Mohr of the ''Hamburg''.[http://www.denkmalprojekt.org/2023/vl_marineoffiz_zahlmstr_feuerwerks_torpedooffiz_beamte_wk1.html "Halbstocks die Flagge!"] ''Onlineprojekt Gefallenendenkmäler''. Our thanks to Ruiz Mateo Lutzow for finding this excellent source.</ref> who was killed in the action, very kindly arranged that his Chief of Staff, Captain Trotha, should give me an account of the whole proceedings, illustrated by plans, and that I should be furnished with all information. I have tried to fill in the gaps by conversations with officers whom I know; this has resulted in some contradictory statements, and several points remain obscure, the accounts from the various ships not having all come in.<br />
<br />
Many episodes will therefore be explained later and may appear in a different light, but, as regards the broad outlines which are of chief importance, the picture of this interesting engagement is fairly clear. The accompanying plan of the action was made in haste for the Kaiser and will therefore need much correction.<br />
<br />
The spirit pervading the Fleet can only be described as one of enthusiasm; they are intoxicated with victory. The heavy load weighing on them all, the dear that this war might end without an encounter of the Fleets, have vanished. They have learnt what fighting really means, they know themselves to be superior to the enemy as regards tactics, and that they were following the right lines and have nothing to unlearn; they know that their gunfire was more effective than that of the enemy, and that they can rely implicitly on their flotillas which have always been looked upon in the German Navy as one of the chief factors in an action. Finally they know that their largest ships can stand heavy fire and serious damage, that they leave nothing to be desired as regards construction and cannot be sunk easily. In short, they feel that the British, in spite of all their boasting, cannot overcome the German Fleet and have a considerable respect for it.<br />
<br />
This conviction imbues the whole Fleet, down to the last man, with confidence in their strength and a calm assurance regarding future encounters. At the same time they are free from over-confidence and from under-estimation of the enemy. On the contrary, the British fire-control and the enormous piercing power of their heavy shell at great distances have roused their admiration, so that a careless conception of the situation is not to be feared, the less so, as well-balanced minds such as those of Admiral Scheer and his Staff are unlikely to be led away by former successes to undertake rash enterprises in the future.<br />
<br />
They do not deny that they were extraordinarily fortunate, and that if the action had been prosecuted with energy on the British side, and if the "Nelson touch" had been in evidence, things might have gone very badly for Germany, especially as the British still had an intact Battle Squadron of 12 units at their disposal which had not yet taken part in the action. But they console themselves with the knowledge that no naval action was ever won without some stroke of luck.<br />
<br />
The Kaiser's visit, the day before my arrival, and his address to the Fleet gave great satisfaction, and subsequently many important personages arrive to inspect the ships, such as Prince Henry and the Grand Dukes of Mecklenburg and Oldenburg, and numbers of decorations were distributed. Vice-Admiral Scheer was promoted to Admiral, and he and Vice-Admiral Hipper received the Pour le Merite.<br />
<br />
I also visited Rear-Admiral Behncke, who was wounded and in hospital; his wounds are slight, a few small splinters in his head, elbow and knee, and he will probably soon be well again.<br />
<br />
<center><u>COURSE OF THE ACTION.</u></center><br />
<br />
The Commander-in-Chief intended to advance with the whole Fleet to the waters of the Skagerrak, in order to make his presence felt unpleasantly by disturbing the shipping, hoping thereby to lure on the British forces and in this manner to be in a position to attack a part of the British Fleet with superior or at least with equal forces. He reckoned that any movements of the British Fleet would be reported to him in good time by the submarines which had been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and he hoped that the airships would prove a better means of reconnoitring than any possessed by the enemy.<br />
<br />
Unfavourable weather prevented him for a considerable period from undertaking any operations, and, as the submarines were to return home on 1 June and be relieved by a new group, the 31 May was the last date for carrying out the planned advance.<br />
<br />
The cruisers left the Jade at 3 a.m., the Main Fleet at 4 a.m., steering an easterly course, and then, after passing Heligoland, a N.N.W'ly course. No reports were received from submarines. These were stationed chiefly off the Orkneys and the Firth of Forth, and the large group of Flanders boats were off the Thames and at the entrance to the Channel. <br />
<br />
While proceeding northwards, a few W/T messages were received, but they were corrupt, appeared to refer only to small formations and gave no clue to the movements of the Grand Fleet. The airships were unable to start in the morning, on account of the wind, and, as it blew hard throughout the day in the Heligoland Bight, they could not start until the early hours of 1 June. In this respect things did not go well, but Admiral Scheer decided nevertheless to continue on his course to the Skagerrak. <br />
<br />
This the account given by Captain von Trotha, who affirms that nothing was known of the presence of the British Fleet in the waters of the Skagerrak, and that there seemed no probability of encountering this Fleet before 1 June.<br />
<br />
There are some points here which I am unable to understand. The submarines are said to have been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and were to return home on 1 June to be relieved probably by a weaker group. For, If the same number of boats were to to keep watch off the English coast, why should 31 May have been the last day for the German Fleet to sail. The day of departure was, therefore, too late in any case, for, if no encounter was to be expected before 1 June, the boats stationed off the coast could not possibly encounter the damaged British ships, as was intended, for probably no damaged ships would be there before 2 June.<br />
<br />
The battleship "KONIG ALBERT" had to carry out repairs to her condensers and did not proceed with the Fleet. Von Trotha told me that there was no alternative and that a ship must carry out small overhauls regularly in a dockyard according to programme. But could it not be arranged, when one is taking the initiative, to choose one's moment for an advance and to have all the ships together for this short time? And why should just that moment be chosen when one of the most powerful ships of the "Kaiser" class is in the dockyard, instead, for instance, of one of the "Nassau" class with 11-in. guns.<br />
<br />
In addition, the "BAYERN" was to have joined up a few days later. After having waited so long, why should not the plan have been postponed for 2 or 3 weeks, instead of dispensing with the only ship carrying 15-in. guns.<br />
<br />
In the same manner they dispensed with air reconnaissance, from which they had expected so much.<br />
<br />
These considerations make me doubt whether the account given me is quite correct, and whether, on the contrary, they knew of certain movements of the British Fleet and considered the moment extremely favourable for an attack. Perhaps they only knew of Beatty's battle squadron, and thinking the Main Fleet was far away, hoped to entrap this squadron. In Berlin, they have much to say, even in military circles, about the British Fleet's intention to push through into the Baltic, and of Kitchener's mission having some connection with this. I consider this senseless, for it cannot be presemed [sic] that the British Fleet would leave their shores unprotected and do the Germans the favour of operating in the Baltic, which would certainly be a most advantageous area for the German Fleet. In any case, there appear to be discrepancies which will probably be explained at some later date.<br />
<br />
Scouting groups, battle cruisers and light cruisers, together with flotillas, preceded the Main Fleet by 50 - 60 miles. At 4 p.m. the light cruisers encountered some British battle cruisers. These at once opened fire on the light cruisers, at an estimated distance of 26,247 yds.; the range could be taken accurately. Though they did not obtain a hit, the salvoes fell so well that the German cruisers thought it advisable to turn away and fall back on their battle cruisers.<br />
<br />
As the British approached, these battle cruisers turned on to a southerly course, in order to lure the enemy on to the German Main Fleet. A running action, on a southerly course, ensued. The British were to starboard and to the west of the Germans, who had therefore the following advantage: in the North Sea, in summer, the western horizon is quite light and visibility towards the west is good, while towards the east, and in a still greater degree off the Jutland Coast, it is misty and visibility is bad and no silhouettes stand out against the eastern horizon. This phenomenon also played great part in the subsequent course of the action. The sun was still high and was not troublesome, and the British ships offered admirable targets. The sea was calm, the wind N.W. 1-2, altering subsequently through W. to S.W.<br />
<br />
The following British ships were recognised:-<br />
3 "Lion" class, 1 "Tiger" and 2 "Indefatigable" class; they were soon reinforced by 5 "Queen Elizabeth" class following astern.<br />
<br />
It is asserted that, judging from shell splinters, the ship of the "Tiger" class carried 15-in. guns, and that she was therefore the mysterious vessel which replaced the "TIGER" sunk on 24.1.15; as the last-named "TIGER" carried only 13.5-in.guns, this was taken as a further proof of her loss. The silhouette of the new "TIGER", however, is said to have resembled that of the old "TIGER" exactly. As the "Queen Elizabeths" soon opened fire also with 15-in. guns, I rather doubt this assertion regarding the "TIGER", and the various ships on this early part of the engagement are altogether somewhat at variance.<br />
<br />
On the German side the ships proceeded in the following sequence:- "LÜTZOW", Flagship of Vice-Admiral Hipper, "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN".<br />
<br />
As Hipper edged towards the enemy, the distance decreased to about 7655 yds. The German fire was unquestionably superior, but the speed of the British vessels was greater. After a short time the "INDEFATIGABLE" and "QUEEN MARY" blew up, and 2 battle-cruisers and two attacking destroyers were also accounted for. The "QUEEN MARY" must have been destroyed by the explosion of a magazine; she was torn in two halves, and a water-colour painted by an officer represents her enveloped in an enormous column of black smoke; she disappeared in a few seconds. Only one cadet was subsequently picked.<br />
<br />
The second battle cruiser disappeared under similar circumstances. The "VON DER TANN" claims to have accounted for one of these battle-cruisers by a broadside. But the "MOLTKE" fired 4 torpedoes and also claims this achievement.<br />
<br />
The Germans suffered very little during this phase of the action, the "MOLTKE" alone receiving hits on the starboard side. The fire of the British battle-cruisers is said not to have been nearly as good as that of the "QUEEN ELIZABETH" class later on.<br />
<br />
When they had approached the German Main Fleet, the British turned on to a contrary course and the German cruisers did the same. The German Main Fleet proceeded in divisions in starboard quarter-line, the 3rd Battle Squadron: 4 "König" class and 3 "Kaiser" class, Fleet Flagship, 1st Battle Squadron: 4 "Ostfriesland" class and 4 "Westfalen" class, and the 2nd Battle Squadron: 5 "Deutschland" class and the "Hessen". They endeavoured to effect a junction with the cruisers, but were unable to take part very effectually.<br />
<br />
The course of the action was now in a northerly direction, over the area which had just been traversed, and the British ships now drew ahead considerably and turned more and more towards the East; the Germans followed this movement, and in consequence the conditions of visibility became less and less favourable for them.<br />
<br />
The "Queen Elizabeths" now made their presence more greatly felt; one of them had dropped out, but I was unable to ascertain when this occurred.<br />
<br />
The course of the German Main Fleet at first led past the 2 disabled British destroyers, which were lying stopped. The crews had already taken to the boats and were picked up later on by German destroyers. As the Main Fleet was doubtful about the advisability of passing the destroyers while they were still afloat, they were sunk by a few broadsides. One of the officers who was picked up was in pyjamas and is said to have stayed in his cabin during the action. He declared "We did not expect so much resistance," while another said - "The battle is rather disappointing." It has been ascertained that these destroyers were greatly under-manned; their crews seemed very exhausted, which points to their having been in the water for a long time.<br />
<br />
While on this easterly course, the light cruisers of the fast 2nd Scouting Group: "FRANKFURT", "PILLAU", "ELBING" and "WIESBADEN", were heavily fired on from the N.E. and E. without their being able to see more than the gun flashes. In addition, they were under continual fire from the N., and while turning away to S.E. and S., they ascertained that they were opposed by an interminable line of British ships, which appeared at first to be on a N.W.'ly course, and had then evidently turned together on to a S.'ly course.<br />
<br />
It may be noted here that the battleships, and, generally speaking, the battle-cruisers also, never sighted the British Main Fleet, and saw nothing but the flashes of the guns and the effects of the fire. These British ships, about 25 in number, were only sighted by a few light cruisers and by the flotillas, and were counted by them as accurately as possible.<br />
<br />
Surrounded thus from the N. and the E. and under fire, the "WIESBADEN" was disabled, apparently by a hit in the engine-room. The Admiral noticed, it is true, that his leading ships must have encountered new and powerful forces and that they were turning away; but he thought it his duty to go to the assistance of the "WIESBADEN" and therefore continued on an easterly course.<br />
<br />
The van of the Main Fleet, led by the "KÖNIG" (Rear-Admiral Behncke) now came under heavy fire from right ahead; the "KÖNIG" turned away under this fire towards the S.E., whereupon the Commander-in-Chief ordered the whole line to "turn together" to starboard and gave up the idea of helping the "WIESBADEN". About this time Vice-Admiral Hipper transferred his flag from the "LÜTZOW" to the "MOLTKE" with the help of a destroyer, his W/T station being damaged.<br />
<br />
Hardly had the Main Fleet drawn away on a westerly course, before it was ascertained that the pressure was relaxing and the fire decreasing, and that the British were no longer pursuing so hotly. Scheer therefore ordered the ships to "turn together" back on to their former course, and made the signal 'R' = 'Engage the enemy'. This second advance may be termed the zenith of the action. Admiral Scheer gave his views on it approximately as follows:- "Those who make a study of this engagement will be very puzzled as to my object in advancing thus against the wall of British ships. The fact is that I had no particular object. I made the first advance because I had a feeling that I ought to endeavour to assist the "WIESBADEN" and because the situation ahead was quite obscure to me, for I saw nothing of the "LÜTZOW" and received no W/T reports. I soon saw, however, that the leading ships were coming under an overwhelming fire, and that I could not risk the Fleet on the "WIESBADEN'S" account. When I noticed that the British pressure had quite ceased and that the Fleet remained intact in my hands, I turned back, under the impression that the action could not end in this way and that I ought to seek contact with the enemy again."<br />
<br />
The situation during the first and second advances may serve as an example of what should not take place according to all the laws of tactics, for it could not have been worse; von Trotha said jokingly that, if an Admiral brought about such a situation at a war game or in manoeuvres, he would never be entrusted without another command. In the North, the "Queen Elizabeths", then the battle-cruisers, and from N.E. through E. to S.E., an endless line of battleships formed an arc round the German van and kept it under fire. Evidently it had fallen into the most perfect trap. In addition to this unfavourable tactical position, there was a further difficulty, namely that the German ships could be clearly distinguished while they themselves only saw the gun flashes, 4 or 5 to each salvo, but could find no target.<br />
<br />
The Gunnery Officer of the "MARKGRAF" told me that he could not fire at all during half-an-hour, and that they were at the mercy of the British broadsides. Critical though the position was, in theory, they think that experience justifies the conclusion that this 'crossing the T' is in reality not so disastrous at longer ranges; for, in spite of the enormous superiority of their fire, the British made comparatively few hits, the simple reason being that, when fire is thus concentrated on a few leading ships, there can be no question of improving the shooting by spotting.<br />
<br />
Given good tactical training and squadrons which work well together, it is always easy to retire rapidly from an unfavourable position and even possibly to reach an advantageous one.<br />
<br />
The small amount of damage sustained by the Main Fleet may be owing partly to the fact that the leading battle-cruisers drew the enemy's fire, thus relieving the battleships. Only the three leading ships, "KÖNIG", "GROSSER KURFÜRST" and "MARKGRAF" received several hits; while among all the other ships, the "KAISER", "HELGOLAND" and the "SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN" received one hit each, and the rest were not hit at all.<br />
<br />
Simultaneously with the battle-cruisers, which were ahead and pressing forward in quarter-line formation, the 6th and 9th Flotillas, left by the "REGENSBURG", also proceeded to a torpedo attack. Regarding this cruiser advance, the Commanding Officer of the "SEYDLITZ" told me that he was in such a position that he was able to avoid the British salvoes, for he altered course towards the point where each salvo fell and thus evaded the spotting correction.<br />
<br />
This torpedo attack was carried out with great determination and seems to have been completely successful, although nobody is able to state how many hits were obtained. The British ships overlapped somewhat and their line was almost unbroken, and, as about 100 torpedoes were fired, it is estimates that there must have been a considerable number of hits, some people affirm that there were 20, but I do not place much confidence in these figures and it is useless to trouble about them as nobody is certain.<br />
<br />
The boats were fired on by guns of all calibres, even the heaviest, but with little effect, only one boat being destroyed; two other boats had been sunk in an earlier attack during the cruiser action.<br />
<br />
The battle-cruisers were also attacked by British torpedoes, the "SEYDLITZ" being hit once. The "MOLTKE" was lucky, for, when close to the ship, one torpedo apparently had a gyro failure and ran parallel with her. The "LÜTZOW" was probably hit also.<br />
<br />
After the attack, the destroyers laid fog and a heavy smoke screen, which interposed between the Fleet; this benefitted not only the heavily-damaged "LÜTZOW" and "DERFFLINGER", whose nets had been shot away and were hanging down, but also the whole Fleet. It may also have made an impression on the British.<br />
<br />
The German Main Fleet and cruisers turned on a westerly course, fire having again entirely ceased; and the ships of the Main Fleet then turned gradually in succession and in inverse sequence from W. to S.W., subsequently steering towards Horns Reef.<br />
<br />
It is not known what the British did; all that is certain, is that they did not follow in pursuit and that nothing further was seen of their Main Fleet. It remained light until 11 p.m. (summer time), and it would not have been impossible, considering their superior speed, for them to have come within firing range. The Germans expected it too, and now have to content themselves with surmises about the British Commander-in-Chief's reasons for not doing so. It is probably that the unfavourable issue of the fleet part of the battle and the demoralising losses in ships took away any desire on Jellicoe's part for further fighting. His Fleet may have lost heavily and been severely shaken by the torpedo attack; and, as the Germans still had some intact flotillas at their disposal, he may have feared further strong torpedo attacks in the critical hours of twilight, for in the German Navy they say that Jellicoe fears their destroyers in particular.<br />
<br />
Nevertheless, the Germans were not under the impression of having shaken the British Fleet to the extent of obliging them to give up the struggle, and when the evening passed without further incident, they reckoned with certainty on encountering Jellicoe off Horns Reef at daybreak. They were the more astonished at his non-appearance when their air reconnaissance reported that on the morning of 1 June a squadron of 12 battle-ships was proceeding North from the southern part of North Sea and that it suddenly turned on to an opposite course and proceeded South.<br />
<br />
As it could not possibly have been the intention of the British Commander-in-Chief to let the German Fleet escape after having encountered it at last far from its base, and as he still had an intact battle-squadron at his disposal, one is compelled to take the view that he no longer felt strong enough for a second encounter; the achievement of the German Fleet must therefore be very highly thought of.<br />
<br />
During the night cruising following the action, numerous small episodes and minor engagements took place, of which no clear idea can be formed. <br />
<br />
In view of a possible fresh attack or of a possible pursuit on the part of the enemy, it was thought undesirable to leave the 2nd Battle Squadron either in the van or in the rear, it therefore took station to starboard and at first proceeded on an opening course from the other squadrons, and continued fairly independently during the night.<br />
<br />
The 1st Battle Squadron therefore led, with the "WESTFALEN" as guide, and it was followed by the 3rd Battle Squadron.<br />
<br />
After the action had been broken off, the 4 remaining battle cruisers were ahead to port, where they were suddenly again brought under heavy fire from the port side and from ahead, apparently by 3 or 4 battle cruisers. It is presumed that these were the remaining 3 or 4 older cruisers of the "Invincible" class, which Jellicoe probably always stationed ahead of the Main Fleet, for it would hardly have been possible for the "Lions", which were following in the rear in the British line, to have taken station ahead so quickly. The German battle cruisers, all severely damaged, did not feel able to withstand this fire and turned away to starboard, passing ahead of the Main Fleet and between it and the 2nd Battle Squadron, which proceeded quietly on their course and before which the mysterious ships retired, not to be sighted again.<br />
<br />
The battle-cruisers then gradually fell astern, and as they were making much water, and also owing to their differing speeds, they lost contact with the Main Fleet and with each other.<br />
<br />
The "LÜTZOW" had dropped out during the engagement and proceeded independently, accompanied by 4 destroyers. At first she was able to steam 14 knots, but her speed decreased rapidly and dropped finally to 4 knots. Her bows sank slowly, and when the whole forecastle was under water the Commanding Officer decided to leave the ship. The badly wounded were transferred carefully to the boats and the disembarkation was conducted in good order. A torpedo was then fired at the ship and this coup de grace sank her in deep water at about 1 o'clock, I believe.<br />
<br />
The "SEYDLITZ" was hardly in a better condition than the "LÜTZOW"; she also sank gradually by the bows till the water was almost level with the deck, and she had a heavy list to port, but she continued on her course. In the darkest hours of the night she suddenly sighted 3 large ships to port, quite close to. She turned away, made a British recognition signal and was not pursued. As bad luck would have it, the steaming light had short-circuited, could not be switched off and showed intermittently.<br />
<br />
The "DERFFLINGER", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN" followed the Main Fleet more or less and met with no particular experiences.<br />
<br />
The Main Fleet had to repulse a series of destroyer attacks and was also engaged by cruisers. The movements of these British cruisers, which came up singly, are incomprehensible and give the impression of having lost their heads. They appear to have received the order, judging by an intercepted W/T message, to proceed on a northerly and north-westerly course, and thereby they ran into the extended German line which they probably imagined they had passed to the South.<br />
<br />
One large cruiser (?"WARRIOR") proceeded unsuspectingly within 875 yds. of the line of battleships and came under concentrated fire from several ships before she could reply, so that she blew up enveloped in flames and disappeared in 47 seconds. The "BIRMINGHAM" seems to have been accounted for in a similar manner. The destroyers all approached in a really insane manner; frequently not from ahead but from a direction astern, scattered, singly or in pairs, or at most 3 together, never in large numbers. Most of them were disabled forthwith by a few salvoes and set on fire. The "WESTFALEN" distinguished herself particularly at this time.<br />
<br />
These burning destroyers strewn along the course, lit it up as if for a festival. Evidently the fires were largely due to the light American and Mexican oils; at any rate German firing trials on oil bunkers never caused any such conflagrations.<br />
<br />
The attacking boats directed shrapnel fire on the searchlights with fairly good results, the searchlights of two battleships and one light cruiser being hit.<br />
<br />
One large destroyer, which only recognised the danger at the last moment and endeavoured to avoid it by altering course was rammed by the "NASSAU", which put her helm over for this purpose. The boat exploded internally and sank.<br />
<br />
The only ships hit were the "POMMERN" in the 2ns Battle Squadron, and the "ROSTOCK". The "POMMERN" blew up at once and nobody was saved. The "ROSTOCK" was just passing between ships of the Main Fleet when she was hit; the loss of life on board was small.<br />
<br />
The Germans believe they destroyed 11 British destroyers in all. The manner in which these destroyers were handled has not left a good impression on the whole, and one has certainly lost respect for this weapon. The view is also taken that the boats are too large and offer too wide a target.<br />
<br />
The light cruiser "ELBING", like the "ROSTOCK", apparently wanted to break through the line from port to starboard under pressure from the British cruisers; she was, however, rammed by the "POSEN" and had to be abandoned in a sinking condition. The Germans also fired a torpedo into her.<br />
<br />
The "FRAUENLOB" and 2 destroyers were lost during the night; no details of their loss are known.<br />
<br />
Not far from Heligoland, the "OSTFRIESLAND", 7th of the line, struck a mine. This brings the account of the chief events of this exciting cruiser to an end.<br />
<br />
The German flotillas were detached from the Fleet to clear the area off the Jutland Coast, which was divided up into sectors. The flotillas stationed furthest to the North proceeded to the Skagerrak and through these straits into the Baltic and to Kiel.<br />
<br />
None of the flotillas sighted the British Main Fleet again, which proves that it must have turned away to the N. or N.W. immediately after the action. According to confidential reports the Fleet entered British ports as early as 1 June.<br />
<br />
Two British battleships, in a severely damaged condition and accompanied by destroyers, were sighted proceeding back to England. One was attacked by a submarine, but without success.<br />
<br />
On the morning of 1 June, in fairly misty weather, a Zeppelin sighted groups of British ships leaving the Channel on a N.E.'ly course. The reports were rather vague, as sometimes 6 and sometimes 12 ships were mentioned; but it seems most likely that 12 battleships and 3 cruisers were in question, and that they soon retired. The airship, which flew low at one time to get a clearer view, was also fired on.<br />
<br />
Some of the ships are said to have had tripod masts.<br />
<br />
The German Fleet, with the exception of "SEYDLITZ", reached the Jade in the afternoon. The "SEYDLITZ" could not cross the bar on account of being so much down by the bows, and it was not till the next day at high water that she was towed in, stern first.<br />
<br />
<center><u>MISCELLANEOUS.<br>TACTICS.</u></center><br />
<br />
The Germans ascribe their success to various causes, and in the first place to their own superiority as regards tactics. This is a point which every officer discusses, and it is constantly repeated that it all happened just as in tactical manoeuvres and in "battle exercises", and that things could not have gone better.<br />
<br />
Movements of squadrons, divisions and individual ships, "turns together" and alterations of course and speed, all went like clockwork and demonstrated the very great mobility of all formations.<br />
<br />
The W/T signalling system of the Main Fleet never failed, and its failure would have been immaterial, as the primary and secondary flag action signals, showing from several positions in the ship, were made simultaneously.<br />
<br />
All this was due to the peace training and the practical experience of the Flag Officers and Captains. Though in peace time the Commander-in-Chief had never commanded a Fleet, nor the Admirals a squadron, still the training carried out on the same lines for a number of years resulted in everything proceeding with the expected precision.<br />
<br />
The British, on the contrary, are said to have displayed a certain clumsiness as regards tactics and to have preferred turning together when "turning on to an opposite course" (Wendungen im Gegenmarsch), though this conclusion does not seem altogether justified from the description of the action.<br />
<br />
The ships kept station 547 yds. apart, and Vice-Admiral Schmidt told me that, in his opinion, this distance is too small for large ships and that he prefers 656 yds., as the shorter distances result in the ships getting bunched and overlapping during alterations of course. In order to relieve this during the first turn to starboard, the Fleet Flagship herself turned to port and then closed gradually into line. At night the distance was 656 yds.<br />
<br />
No interruption of W/T communication was occasioned by the enemy.<br />
<br />
<center><u>GUNNERY</u></center><br />
<br />
It is admitted that the British are superior as regards their gunnery technique. Their salvoes fall most astoundingly close together and aroused admiration on all sides. Some people affirm that they fell too close together, and that it was consequently difficult to cover a sufficiently large danger space.<br />
<br />
This is particularly the case with the heaviest calibres: 13.5-in. and 15-in. and the battle-cruisers' fire was noticeably inferior to that of the "Queen Elizabeth" class, for example.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> Literal translation; the meaning is not clear. - Tr.] The spread of the salvoes frequently only covered a few square yards. In the "KÖNIG" 3 rounds, out of a salvo of 4 rounds, hit between the capstan and the bridge.<br />
<br />
This is attributed to careful calibration, which the British have studied for a long time and which, as is well known, was abandoned by the German Navy after a few trials. The gunnery officers declare unanimously that it must unquestionably be re-introduced.<br />
<br />
The British range-finders are superior to the German, and the construction of their turrets enables them to shoot at ranges impossible for German guns. The question of range appears to be immaterial to the British, who fire at any range so long as visibility permits.<br />
<br />
The Germans are fully convinced of the great superiority of 15-in. guns over all others, and deplore the fact that, owing to the predominant conservative tendencies in the German Navy, this calibre was not introduced until so lately. Vice-Admiral Gerdes, the Head of the Armament Department, is responsible for this, for he always opposed it on the ground that the poor visibility in German waters and the consequent short ranges rendered an increase of calibre useless; he considered the German 12-in. gun to be an altogether superior weapon, capable of competing with every other.<br />
<br />
In one respect the British seem behindhand as compared with the Germans: namely that they cannot alter range quickly enough and they are too dependent on the range clock. The British rely on steady fire at long range, and they adapt their tactics to this and avoid alterations of course and range most assiduously.<br />
<br />
The Germans, on the contrary, in their firing practices always work with big and rapid alterations of range and exercise firing while turning, so that the gunnery officers consider they have an advantage in this respect.<br />
<br />
The Turn on to an opposite course was certainly not advantageous for the German Fleet, but in this particular instance it made little difference, as the German ships were already unable to find a target; besides which, it must have disconcerted the British and it prevented them from obtaining good results with their fire. The salvoes fell very close together round the ships, but few hits were obtained. The rate of fire in the British ships is said to have been fair, but not excessive. Some people affirm that it was very modest.<br />
<br />
The British shell had great penetrating power, and from all reasonable distances the main armour was generally pierced clean through. The shell splinters picked up prove conclusively that at least 2 kinds of shell were used, differing considerably in material and quality. One kind of shell had a very thick wall and an extremely small explosive charge, it might almost be called a solid shot. It seems to have broken up frequently without exploding and the fuse did not function. Its explosive power, if it possessed any at all, was quite inconsiderable, and it is presumed that the explosives used was not high explosive.<br />
<br />
It appears from the splinters of these 15-in. shell that the wall was 6.3 - 6.7 ins. (16 - 17 cm.), so that the hollow space cannot measure more than 2.4 ins. - 1.8 ins. (4 - 6 cm.). It is true that the large pieces into which these shell broke pierced everything in their course and often went right through the whole ship, unless they struck an armoured part. Several intact heads were found, with and without caps, and also entire bases.<br />
<br />
The second kind of shell had considerably thinner walls, only about half as thick, but it also often broke up into quite large pieces and displayed no great explosive power, and little or no incendiary power.<br />
<br />
It appears therefore that the British aimed only at attaining penetrating power, and the Germans are of opinion that they do not possess (rohrsicheren)* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D.Note.- This appears to be a special fuse which is very delicate, but safe until it has left the gun.] fuses for high explosive shell; this was their opinion before the war also.<br />
<br />
They believe that the high explosive power of the German ammunition gives them a great advantage which may partly counterbalance the smaller calibre of their guns and perhaps also their inferior gunnery. In any case, the effect of the German shell at the point of impact was very considerable.<br />
<br />
The fact that the ships blew up must be attributed to explosions in their magazines. (In this connection one may recall a turret of the "SEYDLITZ" being hit in the action of 24 January, 1915; see my report No.47 ex 15). The turret armour must have been pierced and the shells in the turret must have been exploded. The British have no metal cartridge-cases and also no cartridge-holders such as the Germans have, but they keep their cartridges in locked boxes which are perhaps not flash-proof enough. It seems therefore, from the incident experienced by the "SEYDLITZ", that this must constitute a particular danger to British ships. In this last action also turrets in German ships were frequently hit; further details are given in the account of damage sustained.<br />
<br />
After having compared the hits received in the German ships with the observations of results on enemy targets, it may be safely affirmed that the explosive power of the German shells exceeds that of the British; this was already known after the action of 24 January 1915. The Germans are therefore very much annoyed that they had no 15-in. guns to fire, as they are persuaded that ships so knocked about (eingedeckte) as, for example, the "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" would have been completely destroyed by German shell.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. Note.- The writer appears to mean that if German 15-in. shell had been used against "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" these ships would have been sunk.]<br />
<br />
It may be noted here that the "BAYERN", the first of their ships to carry 15-in. guns, will not join the Fleet for another few days, and the "BADEN" not until the autumn.<br />
<br />
Medium armament played no part, only a few hits were obtained and they did little damage.<br />
<br />
The British fired part-salvoes, like the Germans; full salvoes may have been fired now and again.<br />
<br />
The method of repulsing destroyer attacks, which has previously been reported, namely the 'turning away' and firing on one, or at most two boats, proved to be sound, and the repulsing of attacks both by day and night offered no difficulties.<br />
<br />
As regards gunnery, it may also be mentioned that the fire-control apparatus worked without a hitch and withstood the heaviest shocks. The elevation pointers worked admirably. A few ships were not yet fitted with them.<br />
<br />
<center><u>Torpedo.</u></center><br />
<br />
As regards torpedo work the Germans consider themselves very much superior. There were prolonged discussions about depriving Flotilla Leaders of their independence and putting them under the orders of a Leader Ship, but they are now convinced that this is necessary to ensure the flotillas attacking at the right moment and all together.<br />
<br />
The flotillas were led by the 2 leader Ships "ROSTOCK" and "REGENSBURG", the first having 2 flotillas and the second 3 flotillas allocated to them. The remaining 2 flotillas accompanied the Main Fleet or the battle-cruisers. The leaders carried out their duties with great daring and circumspection. The attacks of the British were weak and scattered, and could therefore have little or only occasional success.<br />
<br />
The German 2nd Flotilla, composed of the larger 1500 ton boats were held back instead of being sent to attack. Although these boats are spoken of very highly and are indispensable for certain enterprises, the view is now taken that they are too large and too valuable to be used for attacking during an action. This Flotilla proceeded to Zeebrugge immediately after the action and arrived there safely. It is to be employed in preventing the British from blockading the harbour with nets, and thus make it impossible for the German submarines to proceed out.<br />
<br />
As far as I have heard, the "MOLTKE" alone of the larger ships fired 4 torpedoes.<br />
<br />
Submarines were not in evidence. No German submarines were present; on the other hand a German destroyer claims to have rammed a British submarine. This claim appears to be erroneous, at least it was declared to be nonsense by the Chief of Staff. The submarines failed as regards scouting and also doing the pursuit.<br />
<br />
Some people state that a British aeroplane was sighted to the northward, and that it had apparently risen from a cruiser. It played no part in the action.<br />
<br />
The use of "Höschter"* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. note:- Probably the name of the inventor.] fog seems to have been of good service, it and the smoke made by the destroyers having completely masked the Main Fleet and its movements at critical moments.<br />
<br />
<center><u>SPEED</u></center><br />
<br />
The advantage of speed lay entirely with the British, not only as regards the Main Fleet on account of the "Deutschland" class, but also as regards the battle-cruisers. The latter are said to have proved considerably faster than the German battle cruisers, an unpleasant experience which had already been made on 25 January 1915. This alone proves that the British are talking nonsense when they assert that the German Fleet sought safety in flight; on the contrary, it was far from its bases and entirely in the power of the British, who either did not wish to take advantage of their superior speed, or were unable to do so on account of the damage sustained. The visibility was no worse than it had been during the day and Jellicoe may have even welcomed the "Höschter" fog which would enable him to plead bad visibility as a reason for abandoning the pursuit. On the German side in the light of experience the factor of speed in the battleships is considered very important. But the moderate depths of the German harbours limits the draught of the ships, and make it particularly difficult for German builders to do much in this respect. In spite of greater length and higher horse power the most modern cruisers "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ" and "LÜTZOW" attained only a quite inconsiderable increase of speed in comparison with the older "GOEBEN" class, and proved a disappointment in this particular.<br />
<br />
The question whether the older battleships should take part in an important engagement was not easy to decide. The 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons composed of the "WITTLESBACH" and "BARBAROSSA" class, re-commissioned at the beginning of the war, were intended to be used in such actions, but have long since been paid off; some have been disarmed and employed as guardships and instructional ships, etc. It was considered however, that the 2nd Battle Squadron, composed of the most modern of the older ships, would be of some service in the action; but this squadron was in a privileged position, inasmuch as it was merely attached to the 1st and 3rd Battle Squadrons and its Admiral was allowed to operate independently and select the position he thought best. On this occasion it kept station quite well and did not prove a hindrance, but, on the other hand, it did not come under any heavy fire. This must be considered very fortunate, for, in view of the damage sustained by other ships and in view of the fact that the British shell pierced all armour above or below water even at the longest range, it is certain that every ship of this class would have been sunk by a few hits, as their internal sub-division is not proof against large inrushes of water.<br />
<br />
The loss of the "Pommern", which gives the British an opportunity for a hollow triumph, also teaches a clear lesson. The Chief of Staff told me that they will probably consider carefully before again exposing this Squadron to danger; therefore this action will have further confirmed the complete worthlessness of all Dreadnought types [sic] and will condemn them as old iron.<br />
<br />
<center><u>TORPEDO NETS.</u></center><br />
<br />
The torpedo nets of the battle cruisers are all badly damaged and the gear so knocked about by gunfire that they were almost useless. This was particularly the case with the "Derfflinger", where the after port nets were hanging in the water, and would have fallen across the propeller had they not chanced to remain held up by a temporary lashing. The ship was obliged to stop during the action to secure the nets, and they might easily have occasioned the loss of the ship.<br />
<br />
For this reason all the nets, together with the booms, were unshipped immediately after the ships' return, to everybody's satisfaction. They will not be carried any more, except perhaps for operations in the Baltic, where the ships may be obliged to anchor at sea.<br />
<br />
<center><u>LEAK-STOPPING SERVICE.</u></center><br />
<br />
The leak-stopping service which had been systematically developed, worked admirably and the Germans are convinced that they owe much to it. They believed that the "Seydlitz" could not have been brought in if the strengthening of the bulkheads, etc., had not been so thoroughly exercised and if the personnel had not been so well trained.<br />
<br />
It is also said, that in the "Lutzow", which had only been in commission for 2 months, was naturally not up to the mark in this respect, and that it is not impossible that small shortcomings, for which of course nobody can be blamed, were responsible for the ship sinking. The "Lutzow" was an unfortunate ship altogether. First her turbines collapsed, thus delaying her commissioning for 6 months, then she immediately struck a mine, and she was hardly out of dockyard hands before she was sunk.<br />
<br />
<center><u>DANGER FROM GAS FUMES.</u></center><br />
<br />
Only 2 days before sailing, a large number of the ships, and fortunately exactly those that came most under fire, namely battle-cruisers and the 3rd Squadron, were supplied with gas masks fitted with alkali cartridges for the whole crew and a plentiful reserve (in the "Seydlitz" 1500 masks for about 1200 men). The masks are similar to those used in the army for poisonous gases. Each man carries a mask slung round him, if he is not actually wearing it.<br />
<br />
I was told emphatically by all the officers, that, in their experience, these masks are absolutely necessary and not only saved many lives but enabled the men to carry on in parts of the ship which they would otherwise have been compelled to leave.<br />
<br />
The gases from shells, mines and torpedoes penetrate in an incredible manner through ventilators, telephone leads, etc. to compartments far away from the point of impact. In many cases the masks enabled large numbers of the guns' crews to escape from turrets that were hit, and to help out others who were badly wounded. In one case the men in one of the main engine rooms were able to remain at their posts after gas had penetrated, until the engine-room was ventilated.<br />
<br />
The Fleet breathing apparatus (Flottenathmer) is preferable to masks in some cases, but it cannot be supplied to everyone and it hampers one's movements, which the masks do not.<br />
<br />
On account of the great danger from gases, it is also advisable to fit hinged flaps in all shafts, and to have wooden bungs to fit the voice-pipes, keeping a hammer at hand to hammer them into the mouth-pieces.<br />
<br />
They tell me that it proved very useful to keep all the personnel employed below, such as in central control rooms, engine-rooms, torpedo flats, etc. continually informed of what was going on. The men get nervous, particularly at first, with the tremendous shocks caused by shell falling close to the ship, though the shocks are felt less on deck, and such information gives them confidence and they like knowing what is going on above them.<br />
<br />
<center><u>DAMAGE</u></center><br />
<br />
The distribution of ships needing repair in the various dockyards is as follows:-<br />
<br />
The "König" proceeded at once to Kiel and is under repair at Howaldt's yard. I did not see her.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" and "Moltke" in Blohm and Voss yard, Hamburg, the first in the Imperial Dock.<br />
<br />
The "Kurfürst["] in Vulkan Yard, Hamburg.<br />
<br />
The "Derfflinger" was first docked in Wilhelmshaven and the leaks temporarily stopped, she then proceeded to the Imperial dockyard, Kiel. The "Seydlitz" will now be docked in the large dock at Wilhelmshaven; during my stay the "Seydlitz" was still in the lock.<br />
<br />
The "Von der Tann", "Ostfriesland" and "Helgoland" will be repaired in dry docks in Wilhelmshaven. No other large ships require to be docked.<br />
<br />
"<u>Seydlitz</u>" The number of hits was still uncertain, as the whole forepart of the ship up to the upper deck was still under water, and it is not known what she looks like below water. The ship was brought into the lock with difficulty, and as she is 43 ft. down by the bows, she cannot be taken into harbour. They will not venture to dock the ship inside the lock, and intend first to raise her bows slightly.<br />
<br />
The roof and guns of the fore turret and anchors, cables etc., have already been unshipped, and they now intend to bring caissons alongside and pump out the fore part sufficiently to enable her to enter the harbour.<br />
<br />
The great inrush of water, that flooded more or less the whole fore part of the ship as far as the first boiler-room bulkhead, was caused by a number of hits. Firstly, one of the belt armour plates forward on the port side is missing, having fallen off. Secondly, there are believed to be at least 2 or 3 more hits below water, forward on the port side; for the list and the settling down had already become ominous when the ship was hit at the edge of the upper deck, port side, abreast the bridge; this was followed by an inrush of water in the battery deck, which did a great amount of damage.<br />
<br />
In addition, during the day action, she was hit by a torpedo on the starboard side under the forward 5.9 in. gun, which caused her to settle down still more by the bows. This gun was so much damaged by the shock from underneath as to be disabled.<br />
<br />
Further, there are 4 severe hits in the ship's side (mess deck, port side, forward of the turret), which also demolished the port capstan.<br />
<br />
These shell, or shell splinters, naturally penetrated to the armoured deck, so that the entire fore part of the ship above and below the armoured deck is holed in many places, allowing free passage for the water. The fore part of the ship was struck therefore by at least 8 or 9 shells and one torpedo.<br />
<br />
Apparently the only compartments which are not flooded, are the bow torpedo flats and the central control room. The former is being pumped out continuously, as a great deal of water is flowing in from above. The torpedo control room had to be abandoned, as the forward partition was not watertight. The central control room abaft this was not abandoned, but of its 2 entrances from the starboard and port passages, only the port one can be used, as the starboard one is flooded.<br />
<br />
The gunnery control room is far further aft and was not affected.<br />
<br />
The ship has a list of 7° to port, and as she has now been slightly raised, about 1¾ ft. of her bows are above water; at one time it was up to the level of the deck.<br />
<br />
While under way the forward boiler room bulkhead had to withstand most of the pressure; supports have been built up everywhere, but it leaks in places.<br />
<br />
The other hits of consequences were those in the turrets. The fore starboard turret No.2 received a direct hit on the fore face of the revolving structure. One curved plate was forced out, but fortunately the main effect of the explosion was outward. The right hand gun was disabled by slight damage to the mounting; with this exception the turret remained in action and kept up fire.<br />
<br />
The right hand gun of turret No.3 received a direct hit, which cut out a wide groove along the tube of the gun. The left hand gun continued to fire.<br />
<br />
The barbette of turret No.4 was hit on a level with the rammer, and the armour was pierced clean through. This hit is of special interest, as the "Seydlitz" received a similar hit and at the same level in turret No.5 on 24th January 1915, which caused a fire, disabled both the after turrets and killed all the guns' crews. This last time, however, the damage was slight. There was no ready ammunition in the turret, and only one cartridge was exploded, in contrast to the (6200 Kg.) 13,670 lbs. of powder on Jan.1915. The turret officer and a large number of the gun's crews were saved by their gas masks. The destruction caused by splinters was, however, considerable and the turret was abandoned, as it was not possible to continue fire from it. This was a 13.5 in. shell, at 15,310 yds. range, strength of armour pierced 8.6 inches.<br />
<br />
After the turret had been abandoned, it was hit a second time in the after side of the revolving part, which was pierced; this of course increased the havoc in the interior.<br />
<br />
Turret No.5 was hit in the roof. The shell richochetted, and the roof is slightly dented. Nobody was hurt and the turret continued to fire.<br />
<br />
In the "Seydlitz" therefore, all the turrets were hit, with the exception of the foremost turret, and one was hit twice.<br />
<br />
A further hit pierced the 5.9 in. (150mm.) casemate armour of the aftermost 5.9 in. starboard gun, No.2. The deck was pierced from beneath, and splinters also pierced the splinter bulkhead. The gun was disabled and all the crew were killed, with the exception of the ship's chaplain who happened to be in the casemate and must be watched over by a special guardian angel.<br />
<br />
A similar hit, with a 15 in. shell, struck the casemate armour of the 6-in. gun No.7 and exploded in the casemate. Men were killed, the gun was disabled and the splinter bulkhead pierced by large splinters. This time again, surprise was aroused by the comparatively small damage caused by a large calibre shell.<br />
<br />
"<u>Derfflinger</u>". One shell hit the armour belt forward of the hawse pipe, probably at the junction of 2 plates, as 2 plates broke away. The plates underneath were consequently strained apart and a great deal of water flowed in.<br />
<br />
The armour belt on the port side also received 2 further hits in the centre and was pierced clean through. The splinters penetrated more than half way through the ship, and in one case a piece of plating was driven half way though the ship. These hits, combined perhaps with others, destroyed the nets and their supports in several places.<br />
<br />
The two after turrets received direct hits, in one case on the roof, in the other case in the barbette above the deck; the armour was pierced and the upper portions of the turrets burnt out and severely damaged, but the flames did not penetrate to the magazines. The crew in the upper part of the turret were killed, and both turrets were disabled. This occurred at an early stage of the action.<br />
<br />
The guns at high elevation cannot yet be dismounted, as everything is wedged in, but they do not appear to be damaged.<br />
<br />
The muzzles were carried away off the 4 foremost 6 in. (15 cm.) guns on the port side; two of them probably having been accounted for by one and the same shell which hit the armour. One gun, the muzzle of which was perhaps damaged by a splinter, afterwards burst, the tube splitting open in the shape of a tulip.<br />
<br />
The "Derfflinger" received a few other hits of no particular interest. She appears the next most severely damaged ship after the "Lützow".<br />
<br />
The "<u>Moltke</u>" only received 5 hits, all of them during that part of the action which took place on a southerly course; while the cruisers mentioned above received most of the hits on the port side, consequently during the later stages of the action.<br />
<br />
One shell pieced the bulwarks in the after part of the ship above the armour, passed through the ship and struck the armour on the port side from inside, about 3.3 ft. below the water-line. One plate was forced out and is missing. The inrush of water was considerable. The after compartments, above the armoured deck which remained intact, were all more or less flooded.<br />
<br />
The second hit was further forward, below the armour belt. The shell exploded in a bunker, but the armoured deck held and no water penetrated it from below. The neighbouring bunkers made little water and could be pumped out.<br />
<br />
Another shell struck the 5.9 in. armour in the upper bunker, above the water-line. The armoured deck again held, but the inner wall of the bunker parted, and the battery deck was pierced from below, a 6 in. gun being damaged and disabled.<br />
<br />
In the fore part of the ship a shell struck the armour belt below the water-line. The plate remained intact and was driven in about 8 inches. The compartment was flooded, but the torpedo bulkhead remained watertight. A neighbouring compartment leaked slightly, the rivets having parted.<br />
<br />
The fifth case of damage, namely a plate beneath the armour belt being driven and pressed in, was probably not due to a direct hit, but to splinters of a shell which fell short.<br />
<br />
"<u>Von der Tann</u>". A shell hit and pierced the lower part of the 3.9 in. armour belt in the after part of the ship to starboard. The compartments above the armoured deck, and some of those on the deck above, were flooded. The chief effect of the shell was outside the ship, but it bent the plates below the otherwise undamaged armoured deck, so that a considerable amount of water flowed into the compartments below the armoured deck. The after torpedo flat was flooded half way up, and the men in the starboard steering engine room were shut in for a long time owing to the exits being blocked.<br />
<br />
The fore turret was hit on the starboard side on the upper edge of the barbette and a semi-circular armour plate was forced out. The machinery of the turret was so badly knocked about that the turret was disabled.<br />
<br />
The hydraulic piping was damaged, so that all the heavy armament was put out of action temporarily. Strangely enough, though men were wounded none were killed.<br />
<br />
The aftermost turret was hit in the barbette. The armour was pierced, but the effect of the shell was exterior, the turret sustained little internal damage, so that the handgear of the turret remained in action. The turret was wedged in one place and could not revolve; they succeeded, however, in cutting off with oxy-acetylene the piece of revolving part which was jammed against the inner side of the barbette thus getting rid of the obstruction.<br />
<br />
Outside the turret, the shell did considerable damage; some splinters striking downwards, bent the armoured deck and pierced it in places. As far as I know, the armoured deck sustained no further damage, and this was of little importance.<br />
<br />
The after conning-tower was hit and a piece of the armour torn away; the occupants, including the 3rd gunnery officer, were killed. Splinters struck downwards to the engine-room ventilation hatches, but were stopped by the armoured gratings.<br />
<br />
"<u>Ostfriesland"</u> was struck by a mine below the foremost port turret. The whole measures 197 ft.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. note:- Literal translation is 12 times 5 metres large.] The torpedo bulkhead is only slightly torn, and the inrush of water was only local.<br />
<br />
"<u>Helgoland</u>". A 13.5 in. shell hit the 7.9 in. armour belt forward on the port side and pierced it. The shell appears to have broken only as no explosive action can be traced. The range was about 14,217 yds.<br />
<br />
"<u>Nassau</u>" rammed a British destroyer, or rather, the destroyer ran into her forward on the port side. Her bows must have lifted right up, for her hawse-pipe remained on board the "Nassau", so firmly wedged into the side of the upper deck that it will have to be cut out. The "Nassau's" side below the deck is torn away for 33 ft. The destroyer then glanced off the "Nassau's" side and exploded internally. One of the crew remained behind in one of the nets, but fell into the water when the "Nassau" fired a salvo.<br />
<br />
The "Nassau" was hit by shrapnel from attacking destroyers in the foremost searchlight group, both port searchlights were put out of action. The searchlight control and electric cables were destroyed and many of the searchlight crews were killed. The after searchlight group was hit in a similar manner, and one of the searchlights was disabled.<br />
<br />
The "Rhineland" and a light cruiser were also hit in a similar manner.<br />
<br />
I have seen all the above mentioned ships in Wilhelmshaven.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" and "Kurfürst" were at Hamburg, but unfortunately I am unable to report much about them. They had already been under repair for several days, and the damage was to some extent made good. Besides this, the conditions were not favourable for undisturbed examination: commissioners from the Imperial Navy Office were on board, besides crowds of workmen, the noise was deafening and it was pouring with rain. Consequently I took no notes on the spot and relied on my memory, which however fails me now among the very many received of similar cases. I am therefore unable to report each hit with accuracy.<br />
<br />
This is immaterial, however, as there were no particularly interesting hits, and none of the ships had been hit in the turrets. The armour had been pierced in several places, the effect and character of the hits being similar in all cases; the hits on unarmoured parts were of little consequence.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" was hit aft on the port side of the water line just on a junction of two plates, a piece of equal size being torn away from each plate. The shell then struck the sloping part of the armoured deck and the splinters ricochetted and passed right through the ship. These plates have already been removed.<br />
<br />
A casemate was pierced and the gun disabled.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" is the only ship whose mast was hit, the mast remained standing and has now been removed.<br />
<br />
The spotting platform had to be abandoned, as communications with the conning tower was cut off. This was the only hit received in a conning tower; it only grazed the upper edge and glanced off, and the men inside hardly noticed it.<br />
<br />
The port engine was disabled, not in consequence of damage to the turbine which is in good condition, but owing to one of the main propeller bearings becoming overheated. The cause of this is not clear, but it is believed to be due to concussions. The ship was well able to keep station with her two remaining engines.<br />
<br />
The "<u>Kurfürst</u>" suffered especially from a great inrush of water forward on the port side, above the armoured deck; it was caused by a hit in the armour belt. No further damage of importance was sustained.<br />
<br />
With regard to time necessary for repair to these ships, it is not yet possible to say anything definite, as it is still undecided whether they shall undergo thorough repair or not. The chief difficulty is the manufacture of new armour plates; but some of the holed plates can, no doubt, be left in position for the present.<br />
<br />
A considerable time will be needed to repair some of the turrets of the battle-cruisers, but here too, they will contrive to get things done. For instance, the "Von der Tann" is to have an entire turret out of a ship of the "Nassau" class, probably the foremost turret, and this ship will be left without a turret for some time. They talk a great deal also of transferring guns, and they will perhaps make use of those intended for the "Hindenburg", which will not be completed will the late autumn.<br />
<br />
It may be presumed that the battleships will be ready for sea in 4-6 weeks, and the battle-cruisers, particularly the "Seydlitz", in not less than 4 months. Naturally work is going on day and night, and repairs are given priority over all new construction.<br />
<br />
The damage sustained by light cruisers and destroyers is inconsiderable. The "Hamburg" had a funnel shot away. As these ships seem to be of minor importance, I did not trouble further about them.<br />
<br />
As our Allies appear not to have the intention of communicating to us what effect the examination of damages sustained will have on their construction in the future, we must endeavour to ascertain this as time goes on by means of cross questioning and by studying their new constructions in detail. I do not feel called upon to draw premature and rash conclusions to-day, on the strength of impressions received, but this will not prevent me from giving a summary of my opinion and of the opinions expresses in my hearing.<br />
<br />
Firstly, it is a remarkable fact that in all the ships that have returned home, all the engine and boiler-rooms are undamaged; the "Lützow" is no exception to this, as she proceeded under her own steam until late in the night after the action. I have also been assured by the Imperial Navy Office, after an inspection carried out by the Chief Engineer, that not a single auxiliary engine was defective. The only boiler-room put out of action was the foremost one in the "Seydlitz" where the bulkhead gave a little, allowing water to penetrate through rivet holes and cracks when the ship was under way. The conclusion may therefore be drawn that these vital parts of the ship are sufficiently protected and that the armour belt of the usual German thicknesses, though it cannot stop the shells, at least fulfils its purpose by breaking them up. Consequently it has become almost impossible even for the largest splinters of 15 in. shell to penetrate through armoured deck or torpedo bulkhead in engine and boiler rooms.<br />
<br />
Even at these long ranges and steep angles there was no question of the armoured decks being pierced; but the fitting of strong gratings over the hatches, which prevented the engines of the "Von der Tann" from sustaining severe damage, appears very necessary.<br />
<br />
The torpedo bulkheads also resisted shells, mines and torpedoes effectually; and in cases where slight damage was sustained, it had no further consequences than the flooding of the compartment affected.<br />
<br />
Perhaps it would be advisable to construct a specially strong boiler-room bulkhead, similar to a torpedo bulkhead, so that it could not be damaged by splinters or water-pressure.<br />
<br />
The inspection of the "Seydlitz" has left me with the impression that the commanding officer of the "Seydlitz" expected rather too much of his ship, and that nothing short of extraordinary good luck enabled her to be brought back. At one time when the whole forepart of the ship was flooded and the bows were under water, he proceeded occasionally with revolutions for 22 knots, just in order to show how seaworthy his ship was, so he told me. This may have been very sporting, or perhaps it may have been necessary under the circumstances in order not to drop too far behind and be overtaken by the enemy, but it certainly was not good seamanship, and if his stokehold bulkhead had burst, the "Seydlitz" would have gone down like the "Lutzow", where the circumstances appear to have been very similar. Later on he decreased speed and finally proceeded stern first.<br />
<br />
I therefore think it not impossible that the loss of the "Lützow", which is said to have been proceeded at 14 knots for a time, was also due only to recklessly high speed, and that the ship might have been saved if she had proceeded stern first or been taken in tow.<br />
<br />
As the danger from water-pressure must always be greatest from ahead, it would certainly be advisable to take special preventative measures against it.<br />
<br />
Vice-Admiral Schmidt told me that, in his opinion, the armoured belt ought to be strongest in the centre, and possible in the afterpart to protect the steering engines, and possibly in the bows, but that it ought not to taper off gradually from the centre to the extremities. He was also entirely in favour of a protected upper deck forming a second armoured deck.<br />
<br />
The admirably thorough system of internal division in the German ships and the floating capability thus attained is the finest proof of the merit of German construction which pursued this aim, and it shows that Admiral von Tirpitz, the creator of the Battle Fleet of to-day, was right when he upheld the principle that, above all things, the ships must be capable of remaining afloat and must not sink or heel over, and that everything else is of secondary consideration.<br />
<br />
The large number of hits in the turrets is remarkable, and it is generally considered that the turret armour should be appreciably stronger, especially in the lower part of the barbettes; for it is not only the disablement of the guns that comes into question, serious though this might be, but also the blowing up of magazines and the total destruction of the ship, as the wide shaft down to the magazines cannot possibly be made completely flash-proof. This is the most vital part of the ship. It is only owing to the small explosive charges in British shells, that there were no explosions of magazines in the German ships.<br />
<br />
Everything possible had been done after the action of 24.1.15 to ensure protection against this danger; the ready ammunition was removed from the top of the hoists and wherever possible all the openings in shafts leading down below were fitted with flaps, covers and heavy asbestos mats, while German ammunition is particularly carefully stowed and packed in cases with screwed-on covers.<br />
<br />
The disasters on the British side are a proof that this is a question of the greatest importance. It must also be taken into consideration that while any other damage turret may take months.<br />
<br />
The numerous hits in turrets would appear to justify the opinion of those who decided against triple turrets, on the ground [sic] that if one was disabled it would put too many heavy guns out of action.<br />
<br />
A hit in a casemate will of course destroy it and disable the gun, but this is of little consequence. Care must be taken here also not to have any ready ammunition, and to close the ammunition hand-up hermetically with heavy asbestos mats at the magazine end also. With the German "Paternoster" (dredger hoist) the ammunition lifts this mat as it comes up and the mat then falls to and closes the opening, which is a practical arrangement.<br />
<br />
Other hits through unarmoured parts, which destroyed more or less small gear and at the first glance give an impression of terrible havoc, are really of no consequence.<br />
<br />
In the "Von der Tann" they wanted to flood a turret magazine. This was impossible, as the flooding valve in the battery, or between deck was piled up with debris, cabin fittings, etc., and was inaccessible. Fortunately the flooding of the magazine turned out to be unnecessary. The Executive Officer remarked to me how critical such a trivial matter might become, and that one could not be careful enough about choosing the positions for the flooding valves, which must be kept clear of easily destructible objects.<br />
<br />
The man-hole covers in the decks, coal shoots [chutes], etc., were pointed out to me as dangerous, as they may be burst open by pressure of gas from below, thus causing damage and giving passage to the gases. These covers should be secured in a different manner and much more firmly.<br />
<br />
The flooding and draining system worked admirably, and is hardly capable of improvement. The only disadvantage is that the compartments above the armoured deck have no draining arrangements. This should be provided. A list, consequent on an inrush of water, could always be corrected by flooding an opposite compartment. This is an important matter both as affecting gunnery and personnel.<br />
<br />
The searchlights, which were not taken down in the German ships, all came out of the action undamaged; anxiety on their account was therefore unfounded. It was very unpleasant when attacking boats fired on the searchlights, and it is therefore considered necessary to fit light armour protection on the masts for the crews of the searchlight control and electric cables.<br />
<br />
Damage from flames is nowhere visible. The Germans are now rather amused at the care with which interior partitions were scraped.<br />
<br />
I could not help comparing the German ships with the Russian battleship "Orel", which I saw in Madzurn after the battle of Tsushima. If I remember rightly, the "Orel" had 5 severe hits and 40 hits with medium-calibre shell.<br />
<br />
The enormous explosive power of the Shimosa shell, which breaks up into minute splinters, did not do the slightest damage to the vital parts of the ship, but the upper deck was transformed into a confused heap of ruins. Superstructure, bridges, masts, funnels, etc., were destroyed, guns dismounted and fires started.<br />
<br />
Nothing of the kind is to be seen in the German ships, outwardly only a few more or less clean shell holes are visible, and they look so orderly and so little damaged that they do not appear to have gone through an action.<br />
<br />
It is true that the upper decks are said to have been littered with countless splinters, but they flew on to the decks from shells which struck the water, the ship receiving violent shocks.<br />
<br />
The holes in the armour show the characteristic concentric cracks round the hole and the radial splashes, the latter proving that the shells exploded on impact or at the latest, as they passed through. In many cases, as already noted, the force of the explosion was external and only pieces of plate, and possibly the head of the shell were driven in.<br />
<br />
<center><u>FLAG OFFICERS OF THE FLEET AND LEADERS</u></center><br />
<br />
{|<br />
| Commander-in-Chief:<br />
| Vice Admiral Scheer<br />
|-<br />
| <u>I Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Vice Admiral Schmidt<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Engelhard<br />
|-<br />
| <u>II Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Mauve<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Baron von Dalwigh<br />
|-<br />
| <u>III Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Behncke<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Nordmann<br />
|-<br />
| Officer commanding the Scouting Forces and<br>Commanding 1st Scouting Group<br />
| Vice Admiral Hipper<br />
|-<br />
| " 2nd " "<br />
| Rear Admiral Bodicker<br />
|-<br />
| " 4th " "<br />
| Commodore "Captain" v. Reuter<br />
|-<br />
| Leaders of Destroyers<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| in "Rostock"<br />
| Commodore "Captain" Michelsen<br />
|-<br />
| in Regensburg<br />
| Commodore "Captain" Heinrich<br />
|-<br />
| Leader of submarines<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| In Hamburg<br />
| Captain Bauer<br />
|}<br />
<br />
<center><u>REMARKS</u></center><br />
<br />
The lecture on the action, upon which this report is based, was illustrated by a plan prepared in haste for H.M. the Kaiser, and a copy was promised to me. But the Admiral Staff does not wish to part with this first incomplete draft, and the preparation of an accurate plan has not yet been completed, as the Admiral Staff is not yet in possession of all the details.<br />
<br />
In time to be included in this report I have only received the sketch of the first stage of the battle, namely the cruiser action on a southerly course, together with a small sketch of the situation when the action was broken off; both are enclosed.<br />
<br />
I conclude from the sketch of the cruiser action, that the accounts given to me were not quite accurate; for instance, the assertion of the commanding officer of the "Moltke" that the shortest range at that stage was 7,650 yds. and that he had accounted for one of the armoured cruisers with a torpedo.<br />
<br />
The sketch shows that the "Indefatigable" was probably first destroyed by gun fire from the "Von der Tann", and later the "Queen Mary" by gunfire from the "Derfflinger", and that the range was never less than 14,220 yds.<br />
<br />
The loss of "V. 27" and "V. 29" and of 4 British destroyers is also apparent, while I was only told of two.<br />
<br />
In the original sketch, 2 British armoured cruisers are also shown as having fallen out during this stage, but this is not shown on the accompanying sketch and probably took place later.<br />
<br />
I was told by the Admiral Staff that the accompanying sketches are not to be taken as strictly accurate.<br />
<br />
It is requested that the sketches and course of the action and the account of damages may be treated as strictly confidential.<br />
<br />
==See Also==<br />
*[[Austro-Hungarian Naval Report on German Warships after Jutland]]<br />
<br />
==Footnotes==<br />
{{reflist}}<br />
<br />
==Bibliography==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
*''Schematismus für das K.u.K. Heer und für die Kriegsmarine für 1914. Separatausgabe''. Wien: 1914.<br />
*''Almanach für die k. und k. Kriegsmarine 1917. Kriegsausgabe''. '''XXXVII'''. Pola: 1917.<br />
*[[Arthur Marder (Naval Historian)|Marder, Arthur J.]] (1966). ''From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919: Jutland and After, May 1916–December 1916''. '''Volume III'''. London: Oxford University Press.<br />
*{{MarderFDSFIII}}<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
==External Links==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
*[http://www.denkmalprojekt.org/2023/vl_marineoffiz_zahlmstr_feuerwerks_torpedooffiz_beamte_wk1.html "Halbstocks die Flagge!"] ''Onlineprojekt Gefallenendenkmäler''.<br />
*Krámli, Mihály. [http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-124.pdf "The Report on the Battle of Jutland by the Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché in Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Colloredo-Mannsfeld."] ''NavWeaps''.<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
[[Category:Battle of Jutland]]</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Report_on_German_Warships_after_Jutland&diff=334777Austro-Hungarian Naval Report on German Warships after Jutland2024-03-24T18:27:23Z<p>Simon Harley: Made Changes.</p>
<hr />
<div>In the papers of Vice-Admiral [[John Ernest Troyte Harper|John E. T. Harper]] (author of the ''Record of the Battle of Jutland'') is a copy of an English translation of an Austro-Hungarian Navy report on German Imperial Navy warships after the [[Battle of Jutland]].<ref>Harper papers. Churchill Archives Centre. JEHR 1/4. This research was made possible by the [https://www.chu.cam.ac.uk/news/news-and-events/the-first-colin-bell-award-winners-announced/ Colin Bell Award, a grant from the Colin Bell Fund at Churchill College, Cambridge].</ref> It was prepared by ''Marineartillerie-Oberingenieure 2. Klasse'' Georg Schindler. This report is in many ways more detailed than that of ''Fregattenkapitäne'' Hieronymus Graf von Colloredo-Mannsfeld [[Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland|prepared immediately after Jutland]], which is also in Harper's papers. The references to "I.D." notes suggest that, like Colloredo-Mannsfeld's report, this was a translation prepared in the [[Naval Intelligence Division (Royal Navy)|Naval Intelligence Division]]. Transcriber [[User:Simon Harley|Simon Harley]] has faithfully reproduced the many typing errors in the translation.<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
REPORT by a Mission undertaken in accordance with Order. Section 4 M.S. No.1746 of 1916.<br />
----<br />
<br />
On the inspection of German Warships which took part in the Battle of the Skaggerak (Jutland), 31st.May - 1st.June 1916; on Wilhelmshaven, Hamburg and Kiel, and on other inspections of ships and bases.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}By Georg Schindler,<br />
<br />
{{pad|580px}}Gunnery Engineer, 2nd Class.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}AUSTRIAN NAVY.<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
The only details which have been dealt with are those which were of Gunnery interest.<br />
<br />
{|<br />
| A.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "SEYDLITZ"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| B.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "OSTFRIESLAND"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| C.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "VON DER TANN"<br />
| were<br />
|-<br />
| D.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "GROSSER KÜRFURST"<br />
| in<br />
|-<br />
| E.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"&nbsp;<br />
| "MARKGRAF"<br />
| engagement.<br />
|-<br />
| F.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "MOLTKE"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| G.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"<br />
| "DERFFLINGER"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| H.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "KÖNIG"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| J.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "HINDENBURG" (building)<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| K.<br />
| Large Battleship<br />
| "BAYERN"<br />
| rowspan=2 | } Newly commissioned<br />
|-<br />
| L.<br />
| T.B.D.<br />
| "G.90"<br />
|-<br />
| M.<br />
| colspan=3 | Fishing vessels Anti-Submarine armament, etc.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| N.<br />
| colspan=3 | Short inspection of the Ordnance Workshops in the Arsenal in Wilhelmshaven. <br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| O.<br />
| Ditto in Kiel.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|}<br />
<br />
Ships under A.B.C.J. and M. were in Wilhelmshaven. D.E.F. in Hamburg and G.H.K.L. in Kiel.<br />
<br />
In the following reports on each ship, Section 1 deals with the effect of enemy hits on ships A. to H. above, in conjunction with the two attached ship sketches (Enclosures 1 and 2). [Not attached.]<br />
<br />
Of the hits marked in the sketches those of a gunnery interest are distinguished by red ink. Section II gives general remarks concerning the ships in question.<br />
<br />
Further a report is submitted on installations in newly commissioned ships (K. and L.) also on a ship still under construction (J.), as well as means of combating submarines installed in Fishing vessels (M.) and finally, briefly on the Ordnance workshops in the Naval Arsenals (N. and O.).<br />
<br />
A. "SEYDLITZ" (Enclosure 1).<br />
<br />
This Cruiser received 24 shell hits (38 cm. 34.3 cm. and 30.5 cm.)(15", 13.5" and 12") and one Torpedo hit.<br />
<br />
Except for 1 shell hit (apparently 34.3 cm.) (13.5") on the starboard side forward (Hits nos.2-4) and one hit no.16 (38 cm.?) in the starboard after 15 cm. (6") casemate all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all Gun tubes, Guns and many fittings had been dismantled and landed.<br />
<br />
<center>I. Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
<br />
1. A large calibre shell (hit no.8) struck the 2nd. 15 cm. port casemate (from forward), put the gun out of action and killed or seriously wounded the majority of the gun's crew.<br />
<br />
2. A 38 cm. shell exploded in the 4th 15 cm. casemate (hit No.13) the gun was similarly damaged, and 2 men (wounded) remained alive of the crew.<br />
<br />
3. In the port after 15 cm. casemate, No.6 gun, (hit No.15) had the same effect as the two described above.<br />
<br />
4. A 38 cm. shell (hit No.16) penetrated the armoured bulkhead on starboard side aft, near the last 15 cm. casemate, close to the curve of the armour (Fig.1, Enc.3) destroyed the 15 cm. gun and killed most of the gun crew.<br />
<br />
Of the twelve 15 cm. guns it appears that 2 port and 4 starboard fired unceasingly until the end.<br />
<br />
5. No.2 Turret (starboard) received a hit from port on the vertical turret armour (hit No.21) to the right of the right gun. Part of the nose of the shell pierced the armour anddestroyed [sic] the cradle and training gear of the right gun. The left was undamaged. The turret remained in action with this gun.<br />
<br />
6. An interesting hit is to be seen on the right 28 cm. gun of No.3 Turret port. The gun was on one of the jetties of the arsenal and could be examined. A large calibre shell hit the aforesaid gun a glancing blow just outside the turret, producing at the point of impact, a considerable elliptical scoop on the outside, causing a fracture of the inner tube and in addition bent the gun so that the axis of the tube at the muzzle was (as far as could be estimated) 200 mm. (about 8 in.) out of line.<br />
<br />
The cradle of this gun was split, the trunnions somewhat bent and the caps thereof partially opened out.<br />
<br />
The left gun of this turret, however, remained serviceable and the Turret could continue firing without interruption.<br />
<br />
7. A 34.3 cm. (13.5") shell (hit No.18) pierced the vertical armour of the revolving structure of No.4 Turret superimposed to the left of the left gun exploded inside the turret, ignited the cartridges which were ready for loading, put the turret out of action and killed all the crew (about 70 men) except 6.<br />
<br />
T [sic] This turret, already out of action, received another hit later from a 38 cm. (15") shell (hit No.17) this projectile struck the revolving Turret armour close to the lower edge at the right rear of the turret, and partially penetrated the turret.<br />
<br />
8. A Large calibre shell tore off the roof of the after (No.5) turret. (Geschossgeller ? ricochet). The turret suffered no appreciable damage inside.<br />
<br />
The remaining hits are being dealt with in the report on ship construction.≠ [I.D. Note: The original of this report can, unfortunately, not be obtained.]<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
<center>II Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
1. Extensive "flash" protection was already installed in "SEYDLITZ".<br />
<br />
(a) The openings for bringing 28 cm. cartridges into the lower loading chamber of the Ammunition Hoist can be shut off with sliding doors (schubtüren ?). The supply scuttles from the magazines are fitted with hinged flaps which open upwards on each side (Fig.3, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
(b) The 15 cm. (5.9") Ammunition hoists at the supply position in the casemates are fitted with a "closing flap" which shuts automatically, but its own weight assisted by a spring, immediately after the ammunition has rolled out on to the Ammunition Tray (which is placed in a horizontal position by a Paternoster apparatus (endless chain) (Fig.4, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
2. Apparently Gas Masks are employed in all ships. The method of use is the same as in the German Army. <u>Every</u> man was supplied with a mask (as it happened 2 days before action). These masks were to be brought into use immediately there was any evidence of suffocating gases, and they were so far successful that, according to the opinions of officers, at least one ship, if not two, was saved by their use.<br />
<br />
3. Enemy "shorts" usually exploded on hitting the water, with the result that, (as in the cases of shells exploding on board), splinters of various sizes struck guns among other things, and caused damage, but in practically every case no stoppage of firing from the gun resulted. Shell splinters also entered Conning Towers and Turrets through the sighting slits. But they caused no internal damage as their force was broken by their passage through the deeps [sic] slits. (Fig.5, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
4. In Turret firing. Salvoes were gradually used, and always with <u>only one</u> gun of each turret.<br />
<br />
5. For transmission of orders to the guns (also to 15 cm. (5.9" guns) from the Gunnery Officers position (in the Conning Tower) Elevation pointers are used which are mounted (<u>separately</u>) on brackets away from the Turret armour.<br />
<br />
6. Ranges of the individual rangefinders are shown on a circular scale (range receiver) by means of electrically worked pointers. All these dials are mounter [sic] in a circular box (Fig.6, Enc.3) so that the ranges of the same object shown by several rangefinders (Pointers in similar direction)[.] Further, it is possible to cut out one or other of the dials if the Rangetaker concerned is ranging badly.<br />
<br />
7. Repulse of Destroyers is carried out invariably by means of broadside salvoes of 15 cm. (5.9) guns etc. and one target only is always used. But the Gunlayer is only to fire when sights are exactly on the target.<br />
<br />
8. The 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) guns were not used in the battle. It is understood that in the future guns of this calibre, will only be retained on board as anti-aircraft guns, as was laid down for all ships.<br />
<br />
9. (a) The empty 26 cm. (11") cartridge cases are thrown out of the turrets on to the deck through openings in rear of the Gun platforms (2 per turret). A covering flap, opening downwards when the cases are thrown out, automatically closes the hole by means of a spring (Fig.7, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
(b) The fired 15 cm. (5.9") cartridge are placed in a large hanging net in the casemate, and are only removed from the casemate during a lull in the firing. It was stated that a very large number of fired cases (including Large Calibre ones) were collected and brought back.<br />
<br />
10. The voice pipes are made of 60,100 and 150 mm. diameter (2.4 in., 3.8 in.,and 6 in.). (The last named are called Schallrohre and are intended for short distances). Voice pipes are not lagged.<br />
<br />
11. The ventilation of the Turrets is similar to the method employed in our newer ships. A Fan placed between the two guns, sucks, on the one hand the powder gases from the breeches by means of a ventilation pipe from each gun when the breech is opened and on the other hand draws them away from the roof of the turret on the gun platform another fan, portable, and continually running, was installed when sucked in fresh air through a hose and passed it into the interior of the turret bymeans [sic] of a second hose. If any man had any difficulty in breathing he inhaled fresh air through the second hose. But even this method only afforded partial relief.<br />
<br />
12. All Gunnery machinery (hydraulic and electric) appears to have function correctly.<br />
<br />
13. From the Gunnery point of view there were no serious fires (magazines of any description), for which the "Flash door" protection described in Section II Miscellaneous, Pars. I (a) and (b) is principally responsible. All cartridges actually in a turret or casemate,when [sic] an enemy shell burst in the turret or casemate, were exploded in every case. Therefore the rule was most strictly enforced that only the absolute minimum of ammunition was kept ready at the guns.<br />
<br />
14. "SEYDLITZ" had 1150 28 cm. (11" shell) on board, of which 450 were expended. (No ship expended all her ammunition).<br />
<br />
15. The torpedo nets were not actually a hindrance in the action but they sustained heavy damage fromenemy [sic] hits and splinters so that parts of them hung down over the ships side.<br />
<br />
In future these nets being useless ballast will no longer be carried. This is already the case in the new battleship "BAYERN".<br />
<br />
<center>B. "OSTRFRIESLAND".</center><br />
<br />
<center>I. Hits. (Enclosure 1).</center><br />
<br />
This Battleship received no shell hits, but was struck by a mine onthe [sic] starboard side forward. The detailed description is contained in the report on Ship Construction.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
At the time of the inspection of this ship the 30.5 cm. (12") Ammunition was being embarked. The shells were being slung from the Quay on to the Deck by means of a powerful floating crane in bundles (of about 5 projectiles). All cartridges are enclosed in long water-tight zinc containers, fitted with stiffening bands. They were being rolled on board carefully across broad planks and stowed in the Magazines. If several rounds of ready ammunition have to be stowed in the Turret, the charges are always kept in the zinc cylinders.<br />
<br />
The 30.5 cm. (12") and also 28 cm. (11") projectiles are (according to the statement of the Gunnery Officer of this ship, Lt.Comdr.Lauenstein) of one description throughout, capped and fitted with base fuse. Total weight 405 kg. (about 890 lbs.) Bursting charge 12 to 13 kg. (26½ to 29 lbs.) of Trotyl. In the latest ships, however, "Armour piercing" and "high explosive" shell (but with a new explosive for bursting charge) are again to be used, as is already the case with the 28 cm. (15") shell in the Battleship "BAYERN".<br />
<br />
For the 15 cm.(5.9") guns it is reported that there are two types of shell in use.<br />
<br />
:(a) Fused shell with base fuses.<br />
<br />
:(b) High explosive shell,with a very sensitive nose fuse and a base fuse.<br />
<br />
<center>C. "VON DER TANN". (Enclosure 1.)</center><br />
<br />
This Battle Cruiser received 4 hits from large calibre shells (all on the starboard side).<br />
<br />
<center>I.Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
<br />
(1). The foremost 28 cm. (11") Turret was hit in the Barbette on the starboard side. The shell exploded and the armour was just penetrated (Hit No.1). Three men in the turret sustained burns (not very severe) from the "Flash". But the Turret was placed out of action as the armour at the point of impact was bulged inwards and jammed the Turret.<br />
<br />
(2). The after Conning Tower was similarly hit (Hit No.2)[.] But the shell only caused a shaking of the Tower and all apparatus inside remained intact.<br />
<br />
(3.) A shell exploded in the neighbourhood of the after Turret No.4 (Hit No.3). The effect on the Turret was only evident in a shaking, and the armour in the vicinity of the explosion was very slightly indented but without doing any damage so that the Turret continued in action.<br />
<br />
(4). No.4 hit is only of slight constructional interest.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
(1). In this ship, as in "OSTFRIESLAND", the question as to whether the collection of scraps of metal (coming from driving bands or Cartridge cases) in the Breech made any difference to the condition of the breech was answered in the negative.<br />
<br />
(2). The maximum rate of fire of the 28 cm. (11") guns of this Cruiser, as well as of the 30.5 cm. (12") guns of the "OSTFRIESLAND" is stated to have reached 3 - 4 rounds per minute in peace time.<br />
<br />
(3). The arrangement in the 28 cm. (11") turrets is in principle the same as in "SEYDLITZ" or as in the 30.5 cm. (12") guns of the large Battle Cruiser "HINDENBURG" (now building), with the exception of a few improvements in the last named ship. But while in the later ships (30.5 cm. 12") hydraulic rammers with reserve Hand ramming are installed "VON DER TANN" has only double Hand rammers, which are hung under the Turret roof.<br />
<br />
<center>D. "GROSSER KURFÜRST."</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Effects of shell hits (Enclosure 1).</center><br />
<br />
The ship was hit 8 times (large calibre) all from the port side.<br />
<br />
:(1) Hit No.4 (presumably 34 cm. 13.5") exploded before the Barbette armour of the foremost Turret.<br>Apart from breaking off small pieces of the hard armour (? Panzerschichte) and a slight shaking of the turret no damage was done to the Turret fittings. A fragment struck the upper surface of a sight slot and remained in the slot, while a good deal of gas entered the Turret and necessitated the use of gas masks by the crew for some time.<br />
<br />
:(2). A further heavy shell (Hit No.6) struck the port 15 cm.(5.9") Casemate (3rd. from forward) killed 10 of the crew of 14, but damaged the gun so little that after about 12 minutes the gun's crew having been made up, it was brought into action again. Two cartridges which were in the casemate were ignited.<br />
<br />
:(3). The other hits are only of constructional interest.<br />
<br />
:Some 30.5 cm. (12") and 15 cm. (5.9") guns were damaged on the outside by splinters from "shorts", but sustained no other damage.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
The Magazine arrangements in this ship were somewhat more minutely examined as well as reports made concerning them. (The arrangements described below are also used in the other ships).<br />
<br />
The shell bins and shell transport to the shell hoist are shown in Fig. 8, Enc.3) diagrammatically.<br />
<br />
A shell grab (Z) worked by 2 electric motors automatically controlled is used to transport the shell from the bins to the waiting tray fixed round the trunk (Turmraum) (A 1.-4). This grab is suspended from a broad length of wire sword matting, the latter can be wound up or down round a drum (Wa), if the transporting shaft (T) which is provided with two diametrical opposite longitudinal feathers is turned in the corresponding direction. Shaft (T) is fitted into drum (Wa). By this the grab is wound up or down. The grab is moved horizontally by the carrier (R), which holds the above-mentioned revolving drum, being drawn to one side or the other by an endless rope, worked electrically along the shaft (T). To assist the long shaft a deck rail is fitted above it which carries the weights, (Projectile grab and drum with carrier), the carrier being suspended from the rail. The electrical starting levers for both motors are fitted in the shell handing room.<br />
<br />
If it is required to get a shell out of the bin, the motor operating the horizontal movement of the grab is started. Then the long transporting drum is turned correspondingly by the 2nd.motor, thereby lowering the grab, which grips the shell by automatic pressure. Thereupon, by turning the shaft in the opposite direction the shell is raised, transported to the waiting tray (A) of which 4 are provided and placed on it. This waiting tray is so arranged that a shell can be landed only in the one position in order to prevent an inverted landing on the shell bogie relative to the entry in the hoist. The shell bogie is fitted with the same stops as the waiting tray.<br />
<br />
From the waiting tray the shell can be placed on either of the two shell bogies (which are rigidly joined to each other). The latter run easily with rollers on a circular rail, and can not only be adjusted exactly at the waiting tray by means of spring stops, but can also be coupled to the shell hoist in the loading position.<br />
<br />
In the shell rooms (lower deck) the shells are stowed in bins four to five deep (Fig.9, Enc.3)[.] The copper driving bands are protected by a broad covering band of strong canvas the ends of which are sewn together with (twine ?). Only rope is placed between the individual shells as a preventative against damage. Two vertical wooden batten are secured to the side walls of the shell bins - right and left.<br />
<br />
In order to ensure the grab gripping the shell as near as possible round the centre of gravity, each shell has a white ring painted round it.<br />
<br />
It is to be noted that the shell room cannot be shut off (water tightly) from the shell handing room as the large openings in the dividing Bulkhead, through which the transport carrier passes, are always open.<br />
<br />
In addition projectiles are stowed in many ships in the corners of the shell handing room itself in fixed bins.<br />
<br />
The 30.5 (12") cartridges are stowed in their water tight zinc cylinders in special stowage fittings in the magazines. These stowages are made of angle Iron and sheet plates. (There is no wood in the fittings).<br />
<br />
The Magazines, (2 decks from the bottom) in contrast to the shell room, are separated from the Magazine handing room, by a means of thin sheet bulkheads, in which the passage ways are fitted with double doors and the circular openings for handing cartridges are fitted with double covering flaps (the latter have already been remarked on in "SEYDLITZ" Section 11, Fig.3, Enc.3.[)]<br />
<br />
For transport of cartridges in the Magazines the transporting gear shewn in Fig.10, Enc.3 is available. This consists of a double rail (R) in which a horizontal (sheet iron) tray, semicircular in section can be moved up and down in guides by means of a hand differential purchase (F). The Tray can then be brought to the exact level of the cartridge. The Transporting gear is suspended from an overhead rail,(S) and also runs in a guide rail on the deck (SS). The cartridge is pushed on to the tray and the transporter then brought to the cartridge handing hole, and after opening the double flaps, transferred to the Turret.<br />
<br />
The Turret appliances correspond in general to those in "HINDENBURG", about which data are described later. But an exception must be made in the case of the size and installation of the Rangefinders (Fig.11, Enc.3).In "KURFÜRST" the Rangefinders about 3 meters (10 ft.) long are fitted in hoods in the front of the Turret, while "HINDENBURG" the 8 metre (26 ft.) range finders are already being fitted in the same way as will be the case in our 35 cm. (about 14") turrets, now building.<br />
<br />
<center>E. "MARKGRAF".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This Battleship was hit 5 times by big guns and all from the port side.<br />
<br />
Only hit No.2 is of gunnery interest. This entered the next to the last 15 cm. (5.(') [5.9"] casemate on the port side and exploded, killing the crew and putting gun out of action for the remainder of the battle, though it did not damage it very seriously.<br />
<br />
Several splinters from this shell pierced the bulkhead and entered the next casemate (forward) and killed or wounded several men. But this gun was brought into action again after an interval of about 10 minutes to make up the crew.<br />
<br />
<center>11. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
In the case of this ship also, splinters from enemy shorts entered the Conning Tower, but without causing any damage to either personnel or Materiel.<br />
<br />
During the whole engagement about 250 rounds of 30 cm. (12") ammunition was fired, i.e. about one fifth of the total supply on board.<br />
<br />
<center>F. "MOLTKE".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This ship was hit 4 times by heavy shell (all from the starboard side).<br />
<br />
One shell (Hit No.3) pierced the upper side armour and burst behind the latter inside the ship. It also caused some damage outside to No.4.15 cm. (5.9") casemate starboard (from forward) killing or wounding several men, but causing little damage to the gun. This gun was again brought into action after about 15 minutes.<br />
<br />
<center>11. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
"MOLTKE" was the only ship from which 4 Torpedoes were fired (not in salvo, but one after the other). On board, it was stated by officers that "QUEEN MARY" was fired at and hit at about 10 kilometres (10,935 yds.), and that this was the cause of the rapid sinking of this Battle Cruiser. Officers of other ships, however, were not of this opinion, as when "MOLTKE" fired the distance from "QUEEN MARY" was about 13 kilometres (14,217 yds.) and that the torpedoes have not this range; so that only Gunnery can be taken into consideration.<br />
<br />
In the "MOLTKE", splinters from short bursting shells also entered the Conning Tower, without, however, causing any noteworthy damage.<br />
<br />
<center>G. "DERFFLINGER".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This Battle Cruiser was hit the largest number of times, viz:- 30, of these 20 were of heavy calibre and all came from the port side.<br />
<br />
:(1) A 15" shell pierced the roof of N.4 30.5 cm. (12") Turret (hit No.5) exploded inside the Turret, thereby igniting all the charges which were there (apparently only two) and killed all the Turret's crew, (74 men including reserve crew), except 2 men who were able to get away (wounded).<br />
<br />
:The Turret itself was put out of action because (as was the case in all these hits on Turrets) much damage was done to the various instruments and appliances by the splinters and flash.<br />
<br />
:It is worthy of note that the electric cables in the Turret were comparatively uninjured.<br />
<br />
:(2). Turret No.3 was also hit by a 38 cm. (15") shell (hit No.6). The projectile penetrated the Barbette armour and took with it a large piece of plating into the interior of the Turret. The 74 men of the Turret's crew (as in the hit described above[)] for the most part were killed, only 6 men getting away wounded. It is observed that an 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) gun which was 3½ metres (about 11½ ft.) away from the point of impact, was completely undamaged, although the deck below the spot, and in the immediate vicinity of this gun, was badly damaged.<br />
<br />
:Nos.3 and 4 Turrets were only put out of action towards the end of the engagement.<br />
<br />
:The two foremost Turrets remained completely intact, although the Barbette armour of the second Turret showed a fairly large scrape from a (very glancing) shell hit. But this caused no further damage to the Turret (hit No.13).<br />
<br />
:(4). The Conning Tower was hit on the starboard side on the edge. But only small pieces of the brittle face of the armoured plates splintered off, and in the Tower itself only one elevation-pointer ceased to function.<br />
<br />
:(5). Very severe damage was done by a large calibre shell (hit No.20) which exploded close to the casemate of the No.2 15 cm. (5.9) gun port, which not only damaged this gun, but also put the two neighbouring 15 cm. (5.9") guns out of action. The first named gun was principally severely damaged on the chase, and the chase of the foremost 15 cm. (5.9") gun was indented to such an extent by splinters, that it could not be fired again. The other gun in the vicinity was so shaken up by the powerful explosion, that it could not be moved again. The casualties sustained by the gun's crews were in contrast comparatively small. (1 man killed and several severely or slightly wounded at the first named gun[)].<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
A large fragment of a 38 cm. (15") shell (which failed to explode), was exhibited on board (as is shown in Fig.12, Enc.3)[.] The much distorted fuze was also found.<br />
<br />
<center>H. "KÖNIG".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits.</center><br />
<br />
There were 13 hits (large calibre) identified all from the port side and above the waterline.<br />
<br />
:(1). A 34.3 cm. (13.5) shell hit the port foremost 15 cm. (5.9") casemate. (Hit No.9). A large piece of armour plating was carried into the casemate, where the shell exploded, killed the gun's crew (11 men) and put the gun out of action. The armour plate went further, penetrated the bulkhead, entered the galley, destroyed it and killed more men.<br />
<br />
:(2). Another 34.3 cm. (13.5") shell penetrated the second 15 cm. (5.9") casemate (hit No.8) and exploded, making the gun useless and, by penetrating the deck also caused much damage in the compartment below. The crew of this gun was by chance not at the moment in the casemate, as they had gone out for a short time on account of gas from the explosion in the first 15 cm. (5.9) casemate (which had occurred just previously.) The result was that there were no killed or wounded among the gun's crew.<br />
<br />
:(3). The traces of a shell were visible on the roof of the foremost 30.5 (12") Turret. (Hit No.11.) The projectile damaged the Rangefinder cover, and tore off a piece of it, rendering the Rangefinder useless. No other damage was caused by this hit.<br />
<br />
:(4). The roof of the Conning Tower was similarly gazed [sic] by a shell, which left a scratch but caused no other damage to the Tower or its instruments, etc.<br />
<br />
<center>J. "HINDENBURG."</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Apparently about 30,000 tons displacement)</center><br />
<br />
This Cruiser, now building will be given an armament of 8 30.5 cm. (12") guns 50 cal. (in four double turrets, 2 forward and 2 aft as in "DERFFLINGER") and 14 15 cm. (5.9") and 8.8 cm[.] (22 pr.) Anti-aircraft guns.<br />
<br />
The foremost superimposed Turret (No.2) was mostly built in, and a short inspection of it was made.<br />
<br />
The Gun-platform is especially roomy. The distance apart of the centres of the two gun barrels being estimated at about 3 metres (10 feet approx.)[.] The complete arrangement of the gun-platform can be seen in the diagrammatic Sketch (Fig.13, Enc.3). The 2 shell hoists (G) are side by side between the gun and to the left of the left gun, (and right of the right gun) are the two ammunition hoists (P).<br />
<br />
The up-coming ammunition is placed in its slide (TT) in the rear by means of unloading rammers (so-called "Umlauder"), whence it rolls on to the loading Tray, and finally on to the shell swings or cartridge swings, which by swinging across, brings the shell or cartridges one after the other to the rear of the gun for loading.<br />
<br />
The two rammers are hydraulic chain Rammers (with reserve hand drive). In the space at the rear of the platform there are :- an entrance opening (E) and two openings (A) for passing out firedcartridge [sic] cases. These openings (A) are constructed similarly to those more exactly described under "SEYDLITZ" (Sec.II. Par.9).<br />
<br />
The Breeches are worked hydraulically (the reserve method being by hand.)<br />
<br />
The principle can be gathered from Fig.14, Enc.3 . A bar with a tooth edged point (Z), (which can be worked up or down hydraulically) turns the Traversing shaft by means of cog wheels (R1, R2, R3) and opens or shuts the breech. The Water-pressure is led to the mechanism through two flexible hoses. If the cog wheel R3 is placed out of gear with R2, the hydraulic system is shut off.<br />
<br />
For elevating,Trunnion [sic] sights are provided and for training a sighting telescope is fitted in front between the guns.<br />
<br />
The Rangefinder (about 8 metres long) which was not yet on board, is to be fitted in the front of the Turret above the guns (under the roof as already referred to under "KURFÜRST")[.] Only the two side openings in the armour could be seen.<br />
<br />
Elevating is worked hydraulically (Reserve system by hand). (The ammunition hoists are also worked hydraulically, but here the alternative system is electric).<br />
<br />
A gun coupling is fitted in this ship as in all later ships. But these couplings are apparently only for use when it is desired to elevate a gun whose elevating gear has been damaged.<br />
<br />
The normal Turret Training gear and also the reserve system is only worked by electric motors.<br />
<br />
The same system of ventilation is used as has already been described in "SEYDLITZ" (Section II, Par.II).<br />
<br />
All working machinery (Electrically driven pumps, and electric motors for elevating, training, hoists, rammers, etc.) are apparently installed in the spacious working chamber below the gun platform.<br />
<br />
The arrangements in the Magazines as well as the transporting gear for passing shell and cartridges from them to the hoists are the same as those already more minutely described under battleship "GROSSER KÜRFURST."<br />
<br />
<center>K. "BAYERN".</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Class Ersatz "WÖRTH" about 30,000 tons disp.)</center><br />
<br />
This battleship, only recently completed, had to carry out exercises whilst at Kiel, and the Commission was invited to join for a cruise, which gave opportunity for a certain amount of inspection.<br />
<br />
The armament consists of eight 38 cm. (15") G.L. 45 guns in four double turrets apparently arranged as shown in the Almanac; sixteen 15 cm. (5.9") G.L. 45 guns in casemates and eight 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) anti-aircraft guns.<br />
<br />
38 cm. Gun Turret. (Fig. 15, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
The distance apart of the bore axes is 3700 mm. (12.1 ft.) for these guns[.] 8.8 cm. sub-calibre guns are provided, which are put in from outboard (i.e. muzzle end.)<br />
<br />
The Gunhouse, as in the turrets of the "HINDENBURG" is very roomy.<br />
<br />
In this turret there has been introduced no important alteration with respect to the munition hoists. Whereas in all previous ships the shot hoist was separate from the cartridge hoist, in this ship, as with us (the Austrian Navy), both hoists for one gun are combined in one trunk; and also instead of the shell and cartridge swings in the "HINDENBURG" (see above) munition wagons (W1, W2), which run on cross rails are introduced. The two main hoists (A1, A2) come up between the two guns. Besides these there are in addition two electrically driven auxiliary hoists (H1, H2).<br />
<br />
The round which arrives at the top of the hoist is taken out and landed, by means of the unloading rammer (U) in the munition wagon, which brings it to the rear of the particular gun in the loading position, whence it is loaded by means of the rammer.<br />
<br />
The munition wagons, rammers and unloading rammers are normally worked by hydraulic power (with auxiliary handworking gear); at the back of the turret are two principal operating positions, (ST1, ST2) which are raised to give a good all-round view, and where all the necessary manipulation for the foregoing hydraulic machinery is carried out.<br />
<br />
The munition hoists are also hydraulically worked, and electric drive is provided as an alternative. The elevating and breech mechanism gear are hydraulic (with alternative hand gear).<br />
<br />
The following sighting arrangements are provided :-<br />
<br />
:(a) For elevation - two side trunnion sights as well as two reserve sights in front.<br />
<br />
:(b) For training - a principal trainer's telescope in front between the two guns, as well as a side telescope as reserve.<br />
<br />
Asked whether any automatic firing apparatus was in contemplation, it was replied that a place for such apparatus was provided but the installation could not be expected till later, and depended on the solution of several problems which had yet to be experimented on.<br />
<br />
The large 8.2 m. (26.9 ft.) rangefinder is placed the same as in the "HINDENBURG".<br />
<br />
The ventilation of the turret is on the same principle as in the "HINDENBURG" and "SEYDLITZ", except that in addition there are two powerful electric fan motors between the guns.<br />
<br />
The Training is done electrically, as is also the alternative arrangement. Fig 15, Enc.3 gives a diagrammatic sketch of the arrangements. The controller gives 72 degrees of speed.<br />
<br />
For absorbing the shock in the training gear of single gun shooting there are provided, in the friction coupling box of the worm gearing, besides the friction plates (as in our own installations) two rings of strong springs above them - each ring containing six springs as shewn in Fig.17, Enc.3. Apparently any turret thrown off a small angle by a single round will be trained back to its original position by means of these springs.<br />
<br />
As in "HINDENBURG", so also in "BAYERN", the various machines for training[,] elevating, munition supply, rammers and unloading rammers are placed on the deck underneath the Gun platform (working chamber), and also the machines for the magazine and transport arrangements of munitions are similarly installed.<br />
<br />
In Fig. 18, Enc.3 is a diagrammatic sketch of the munition hoists and magazines from which it can be seen that the shell room is on the lowest level and has the magazine above it. The cartridge loading door (F1 for cartridges, G1 for shell) are fitted for flash protection with sliding shutters which are self-operating when the lift arrives at one or the other, i.e. when the lift arrives at the bottom, the shutter there will open and leave the loading hole (P) free, while the upper openings F1 and G1 will be shut and locked.<br />
<br />
An inspection of the shell room 38 cm. (15") showed that on these shells there is attached to the rearmost of the three upper driving bands a zinc band about 20 mm. (.78 in.) broad (similar to the driving bands). Experience has shown that this zinc ring is a very good anti-coppering device for the bore. It was apparently on the French front, at Verdun and in Flanders, that experiments with this arrangement were made; the results were very good and its introduction followed. The Army has also adopted it.<br />
<br />
The following is the situation with regard to 38 cm. (15 in.) shell. As opposed to the single type of shell (long calibre) in newly completing ships, here there are two :-<br />
<br />
:(a) A.P. shell, with cap, total length of shell 3.5 calibres.<br />
<br />
:(b) H.E. shell, uncapped, total length of shell 4.1 calibres. The total weight is 750 kg. (1653.5 lbs). The burster (not Trotyl, probably Heranit? 23.5 kg. (57.8 lbs.) for the A.P. shell and 67 kg. (147.7 lbs) for the H.E. The establishment allowed per [gun] is 90 A.P. and 30 H.E. The maximum range is 24 kilometres (26,247 yds.) with an angle of descent of 32 degrees, elevation of gun 247 degrees, time of flight 48 secs.<br />
<br />
:The charge is 87 kg. (191.8 lbs) in the main cartridge and 96 kg. (211.6 lbs.) in the foremost cartridge.<br />
<br />
:The rate of fire is one round per 40 seconds.<br />
<br />
15 cm. casemates. In these ships the flash protection for the 15 cm. (5.9") munition hoists in the casemates has been improved (Fig.20, Enc.3). In that a sheet iron chamber (K) has been built around the delivery opening which, by means of sliding plates (S1 and S2) can be shut off either from the trunk or from the munition tray. (G2.) For example, a shell arrives at the top of the hoist (G) - the shutter (S1) is raised in its guides by means of the lift mechanism, so that the shell can roll into the chamber (G1) while the shutter (S3) remains closed. Immediately afterwards the shutter (S1) closes the opening and the shutter (S2) raises in its guides and the shell rolls on the munition tray (G2). By this means the trunk is rendered flash proof at all stages of the operation.<br />
<br />
Submerged Flats. On board this ship there was also the opportunity to visit a submerged flat with two broadside tubes.<br />
<br />
In all there are five tubes (2 in each flat) and a bow tube. The calibre of the torpedoes is 60 cm. (23.6 in.) and the weight of a fully charged torpedo 2200 kg. (4850 lbs.). The explosive (? Heranit) weighing 250 kg. (531.1 lbs). The establishment per tube is four torpedoes - making in all 20 on board. The greatest torpedo range is 13 kilometres, 14,217 yds) with a medium speed setting of 28 knots.<br />
<br />
The flat that was visited (Fig.21, Enc.3) is very large and about 5 metres high, (16 ft.) so that it is perfectly feasible to turn any torpedo hanging on the purchase at the turntable (W1) on the overhead rails, so that is [sic] can be loaded into the port or starboard tube.<br />
<br />
The tubes (L1, L2) are side loading with very strong longitudinal holts [sic] on top (V1, V2) and fitted with a strong shield bar. For loading the torpedoes in the tubes, there are fitted near the tubes, on the same side on the side door, mechanical loading apparatus (quickloaders A1, A2), and on the opposite side are provided the rails (R1, R2) which serve for the adjustment (lever system) of the gyroscope of a torpedo lying in the tube.<br />
<br />
A torpedo is struck down from the upper deck through the trunk (E) and swung through the opening (O) into the flat, whence by means of a purchase (mechanically driven) it is run on to the tramways (S) and thence either to the bulkhead stowage or to a stowage over the tube.<br />
<br />
One must take this opportunity of noting that the overhead rails are not bolted to the actual deck, but are a separate structure, so as to avoid putting any vibration or other strain on to the armoured deck.<br />
<br />
If a torpedo is to be loaded it will be brought by means of the purchase to the exact ready stowage over the tube; then the hydraulic loader is operated by a lever; a grad [sic] with two arms seizes the torpedo in two specially cut away parts and draws it horizontally on to the guide rail of the loader, which then is lowered together with the torpedo. In the meantime the side door is mechanically unbolted and opened, so that the torpedo can be placed right in the tube (impulse frame). After this the guide rail and grab of the loader are withdrawn and raised, while the side door is shut and bolted. Loading by this means proceeds comparatively noiselessly, rapidly and precisely.<br />
<br />
The sluice is hydraulically worked, and after firing is operated by the return movement of the shield bar. When draining the tube the water can be pumped either overboard or into a well.<br />
<br />
The discharge is operated electrically from the Conning Tower or by hand.<br />
<br />
The sluice is hydraulically worked, and after firing is operated by the return movement of the shield bar. When draining the tube the water can be pumped either overboard or into a well.<br />
<br />
The discharge is operated electrically from the Conning Tower or by hand.<br />
<br />
<center>L. TORPEDO BOAT "G. 90".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1200 tons displacement.)</center><br />
<br />
From the Battleship "BAYERN" the Commission was brought back to Kiel in one of the newest torpedo boats (G.90), which offered an opportunity of seeing certain details.<br />
<br />
The gun armament consists of three 10.5 cm. (4.1") Guns on transferable mountings; the torpedo armament, of two single tubes forward and two double tubes for<nowiki>*</nowiki> [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. Note: Apparently a clerical error for 50 cm.(19.7")] 45 cm. (17.7") torpedoes in the after part. (See Fig. 22, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
The following details respecting the torpedo equipment were noted :<br />
<br />
Six torpedoes were carried, which remain stowed in the tubes; spare torpedoes are not carried on board, and no torpedo stowage is provided. The tubes of the twin mountings are not parallel but inclined outwards from each other, making an angle of 20° between the tubes.<br />
<br />
The reason for this lies in the method of torpedo boat attack. Torpedo craft always fire on the swing (in order to offer the full broadside target to the enemy fire for the shortest possible time), and the torpedoes from a twin mounting are are [sic] fired one after the other (the mounting remaining on a fixed bearing). The first torpedo having been fired, the boat continues to swing under helm and after 20° the second torpedo is fired.<br />
<br />
The training is done by means of a training gear at each tube, which can be understood from the detailed sketch (Fig. 23, Enc.3). By means of the hand crank (K) a worm and worm wheel (Zr) can be turned, this engages inthe [sic] training rack (Zs) and so the tube can be trained. The training pinion can, by means of a coupling clutch worked by the lever (H) be disconnected from the rack, should be required to train the mounting quickly, or for loading and unloading the torpedo by means of the training gear. This latter is accomplished by means of the windlass (W) mounted on the training shaft round which can be taken a line secured either to the nose or the tail of the torpedo. At the back part of the mounting is fitted a training brake which grips the rack.<br />
<br />
A director is fitted at each tube, and torpedoes are fired electrically from the bridge. At the rear of each tube are fitted two firing pushes (Abfeurungspöller), which can be operated either singly or together. In order to prevent firing from a tube which is not yet at the ready, the particular firing gear is held fast by a special locking gear fitted to the tube; its method of working can be seen from (Fig.24, Enc.3). The locking levers (St1 and St2) are only clear of the firing gear, when the rollers (R1 and R2), connected to the locking gear, are clear of the guide strip (G). This guide strip covers the arc in which firing is to be prevented. The springs.(F1 and F2) release the gear, as shewn in the sketch under (T).<br />
<br />
For torpedo transport on deck a special rail is fitted on the starboard side, on which was seen a fairly long transport wagon.<br />
<br />
<center>M. TRAWLER.</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Fitted out for Anti Submarine work)</center><br />
<br />
For fighting submarine boats trawlers are employed with the following :-<br />
<br />
:(a). A.S.rope nets fitted with two or four A.S.mines.<br />
<br />
:(b). Large Depth charges.<br />
<br />
:(c). Anti Submarine explosive Kite.<br />
<br />
::These appliances are described below.<br />
<br />
(a). Nets with A.S. Mines (Fig.25, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
These nets are made up from hemp rope (diameter of rope about 10 mm.); they are 250 m.long and of varying breadth (up to 20 m.) To a normal net two mines (M.M.) are attached (see Fig.25, Enc.3); for broader nets the mines are secured in pairs vertically - thus making four mines to a broad net. The mines are supported by their own large iron flat (S) while for the support of the nets smaller floats (S1) are placed on top.<br />
<br />
Each pair of nets also has an anchor and cable attached.<br />
<br />
The nets which are joined together are stowed with their mines in large shaped iron floats. The latter are stowed ready for shooting in two rows, (1 and 2, Fig.26, Enc3) on the top of the trawler. Shortly before action the primers are inserted through circular holes in the floats (1 hole per float).<br />
<br />
The shooting of nets one and two is carried out at a speed of 10 knots by one man. First , the first anchor of the first net is let go and the net with its mines dragged into the water, afterwards being anchored by the second anchor. Before, however, this latter is slipped the first anchor of the second net must be let go to ensure over-lapping.<br />
<br />
There are tiny holes in the floats by means of which just sufficient water can enter the floats so as to sink the net with its mines and floats at the end of an hour, and leave the area free again for traffic.<br />
<br />
These net mines (Fig.27, Enc.3) are contact mines with an explosive charge (1) from 12-13 kg. of Trotyl and consist of the mine case (M), firing mechanism (S), impact plate (P), distance pin (St), the safety lever (S1) and the primer (J) with the detonator (K).<br />
<br />
When the mine enters the water and reaches a depth of 5 metres the safety catch is released by a hydrostatic valve, which thus frees the detonator for the striker.<br />
<br />
Firing is effected in that by the impact of a submarine the impact plate (and with it the distance pin) are displaced, and by means of the latter the striker is freed and fires the mine by means of the firing spring (which is already cocked).<br />
<br />
(b). Depth charge (Fig., Enc.3).<br />
<br />
These depth charges are cylindrical in form and contain a large explosive charge of 60 kg. of Trotyl. They consist of the mine (M) and the float (S). The latter is connected to the mine by a strong steel wire (3 mm.), which is wound on a reel in the float. It fires (exactly like the depth charge of Korvetten Kapitän Schönthaler) because on reaching the set depth the tension on the wire operates the firing mechanism (Striker spring (F) is compressed as the striker (B) is raised by the grab (Z)) and thus frees the striker.<br />
<br />
The set depth can be adjusted from 5 to 5 (5 to 50?) metres (practically in the same way as in the Schönthaler Depth Charge) and it is to be noted that the time of explosion (1 to 5 secs) is adjustable by means of turning the pointer of the seconds scale (E) on the outside. The delay action itself operates by means of a disc similar to shrapnel.<br />
<br />
(c). Explosive Kite (Fig.30, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
The Kite (D) is made of wood and shaped as shown in Fig.31, inside is an explosive charge (the same size as the net mine, 12 - 13 kg., described in par. (a) above.<br />
<br />
The Kite is towed by a 15 mm. strong steel wire (T) whose core is an electric cableby [sic] means of which the kite is electrically exploded.<br />
<br />
The cable wire is wound on the winch (K), the ends being connected to the electric firing battery in the hollow drum.<br />
<br />
The towing wire is led from the winch over an adjustable brake (B) and from there over a roller (R) secured to a derrick (L) where the other end is connected to the charge.<br />
<br />
When the kite hits against a hard object (submarine) it is electrically fired.<br />
<br />
As a safety precaution the electric switch at the battery is only made when the kite is towing at the requisite speed.<br />
<br />
Trawlers tow at 10 knots, which causes a pull of 350 kg. on the wire.<br />
<br />
<center>N. ARSENAL WILHELMSHAVEN.</center><br />
<br />
Only a short visit to the gun shops was made. There about 1,000 civil workman [sic] were employed.<br />
<br />
In general the work carried out was similar to that in our own gun factories (repair of gun material, production of necessary equipment, magazine and shellroom machinery, examination and cleaning of bores of guns, the storage and preservation of magazine and shellroom fittings, small calibre guns, searchlights, range finders, etc.), only here the buildings, in particular the shops and storehouses, are modern throughout and planned on a spacious lay out.<br />
<br />
The drawing office is worthy of note, in it at that time the stowage plan of munitions for the Battle Cruiser "HINDENBURG" was in preparation. For the protection of such drawings there is provided a large fireproof room.<br />
<br />
To the gun shops belong :- the large mechanical shops, a smithy, a large carpenter's shop, a large shop for work on canvas, leather, and similar equipment, a plumber's shop, two very roomy storehouses for magazine material and a depot for various constructional materials; in the last named is a special,cellar for rubber and leather articles in which at the time there were gathered about 700,000 marks worth.<br />
<br />
A new large gun hall was under construction which is about 60 m. long and 25 m. broad. The building itself was nearly finished, only the installation and also the large travelling crane were not in place.<br />
<br />
Both high sliding doors (T1 T2) were operated by an electrically driven (alternative hand working) which at the side. The travelling crane (N) brings the material to the door, where a floating crane (S) with large overhang takes it over and provides for its further transport.<br />
<br />
While passing through the shop the decoppering of a 15 cm. (5.9) gun was seen. The decoppering machine was a brush withbvery [sic] fine steel bristles, as shewn in Fig.33. The head of the brush (K) is a cylindrical drum of strong plate, which before use is filled with petroleum and turpentine. On the head are fixed three bristle holding rings (H), which carry on their periphery the small steel bristles (B). These three bristle rings are separated by two intermediate rings (R).<br />
<br />
The fine steel wire used in the bristles is 0.2 mm. thick and must be softer than the material of the inner tube so as not to scratch the latter. The cleaning is accomplished by powerful brushing th [sic] through the bore, this action forcing out the petroleum mixture from the drum at the head of the brush into the bore.<br />
<br />
The decoppering device was very successful with the 15 cm. (5.9") gun; a small quantity of the copper scraping and two bristles were given to the Mission. (A bristle and a portion of copper scrapings accompany the reports (1 each) to the K.U.K.K.M. Marine Section (Austrian Admiralty) and to the (Austrian) Naval Technical Committee.)<br />
<br />
<center>O. ARSENAL KIEL.</center><br />
<br />
The "Artilleriewerkstätten" (Gun shops) at Kiel are in general the same as those at Wilhelmshaven described above, so that this amounted to an opportunity for closer description.<br />
<br />
The only noteworthy sight among the gunshops visited was one very large gunhall in which numerous guns are stowed, (among them some from ships that had been in the battle (Jutland); for the transport of the heaviest weights are two travelling cranes (each of 45 tons both cranes are employed together). For the further transport normal gauge rail tracks are provided.<br />
<br />
For the mechanical decoppering of guns a special scraper is used, whose action can be seen from Fig. 34. In the dial shaped head (K) are two difference scrapers (S1 S2), which by means of an inserting gear (E) can be placed exactly in the groove it is required to clean. The scraper (S1), cleans the base of the grooves, the scraper (S2) cleans the sides. The red (st) is guided so as to avoid any corners of the scraper<nowiki>*</nowiki> [I.D.Note: Apparently this guide rod arrangement keeps the scraper true in the groove.] This apparatus has proved its worth.<br />
<br />
Later on information from the Ordnance Department of the Admiralty showed that 30.5 and 28 cm. gun tubes, from which 60 - 100 rounds had been fired in the action, from later experimental firings at Krupps were found to have suffered from wear (actually about 20 mm.) which permitted overramming. After the conclusion of the experimental firings, only gun tubes of equ [sic] equal wear are sent to one and the same ship.<br />
<br />
Of very great interest is the information that many of the 25 cm. (13.7") guns, which were on the French front (6 on the Verdun front) had fired 600 - 800 rounds with full charge (range 36 kilometers, 39,376 yds.) with a diminished range of only 2 km., 2,187 yds. and no necessity for a new inner tube. The shell used in these guns were those provided with the anti-coppering zinc ring.<br />
<br />
The following summarize the points of the greatest importance.<br />
<br />
:1. Introduction of gas masks for each man, as of utmost importance.<br />
<br />
:2. Specially important is flash protection (including) cover plates for munition hoist trunks in turrets and casemates, shut off hatches and doors as well as partition of the magazines.).<br />
<br />
:3. As few cartridges as possible by the gun (in the gun house of a turret or in a casemate), because of the great danger of its ignition by a hit.<br />
<br />
:4. Abolition of the ready use position in the turrets (on account of point 3, above).<br />
<br />
:5. Many gun tubes 30.5 and 28 cm. (12" and 4" [sic]) have fired 60 - 100 rounds with only 20 mm. overramming.<br />
<br />
:6. Many gun tubes undergo experimental firing and are reissued only in similar tubes to one ship.<br />
<br />
:7. Automatic firing apparatus is not yet in use.<br />
<br />
:8. Gun coupling gear provided, but is only used in the event of danger to elevating gear.<br />
<br />
:9. Introduction of small calibre guns 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) only for anti-aircraft work.<br />
<br />
:10. Normally the turrets only fire salvoes, and only from one gun per turret.<br />
<br />
:11. Repulse of Torpedo boat attacks is achieved by broadside salvoes from the 15 cm. (5.9") guns - all in one target.<br />
<br />
:12. Normal turret machinery :-<br />
<br />
::Training{{pad|50px}}Electric (as is also reserve)<br />
<br />
::Elevating<br />
<br />
::Rammers<br />
<br />
::Unloading rammers{{pad|50px}}All hydraulic and<br />
<br />
::Breech mechanism and in some{{pad|30px}}hand control.<br />
<br />
::cases Munition wagons<br />
<br />
::Munition hoists - hydraulic - with electric reserve<br />
<br />
::Shell transport in shell rooms - electric<br />
<br />
:13. Observation of fall of shot :- in each top, 1 or two men in telephonic communication with the gunnery officer. (On 31st.May neither Aeroplanes or Zeppelins were present[)].<br />
<br />
:14. Fire control from gunnery officer's position by elevation pointer only.<br />
<br />
:15. All rangefinders stereoscopic normally 3 m. long instruments in armour domes in Turrets, in the latest ships 8 m. instruments projecting from sides below Turret roofs.<br />
<br />
:16. Large calibre projectiles are standard type armour shells with caps and sharply pointed explosive shells without cap are being reintroduced. For 15 cm. Guns (5.9") fused shell with base fuse and H.F. shell with a very sensitive nose fuse and a base fuse.<br />
<br />
:17. No ship expended all her heavy ammunition, at the most a little over 1/3 of the establishment.<br />
<br />
:18. Establishment for heavy guns 115 - 120 rounds per gun.<br />
<br />
:19. As an anti-coppering precaution for guns, projectiles are fitted with a zinc ring behind the rear driving band and in direct contact therewith.<br />
<br />
:20. English 38 cm. (15") and 34.3 cm (13.5") projectiles have apparently black powder as a bursting charge: bursting bad and effect not commensurate with the calibre.<br />
<br />
:21. The explosion of a large calibre projectile in a Turret always puts the same out of action.<br />
<br />
:22. Ventilation of Turrets insufficient.<br />
<br />
:23. Voice pipes 60 - 100 and 150 mm. calibre have no lagging and are provided with wooden stoppers or sponges wherewith to close the tube to gases.<br />
<br />
:24. Emergency lighting by means of Pocket lamps.<br />
<br />
:25. Torpedo nets are no longer carried.<br />
<br />
:26. All ranges below 15 km. heavy armour is generally pierced by 38 cm. (15")projectiles. [sic]<br />
<br />
:27. Submarine Defence. Mine nets, (? Depth charges) and Explosive Kites.<br />
<br />
Appendices 2 Sketches, Hits Appendix 1 and 2. One sheet of sketches to report. Appen. 3.<br />
<br />
In conclusion, one matter may be mentioned, which, on the occasion of the visit to the Arsenal at Wilhelmshaven and to the ships, attracted attention through its differing so greatly from our own arrangements. Viz, the handling procedure of consumable stores.<br />
<br />
The characteristic points of the Organisation of this Branch in the German Navy are, as follows :-<br />
<br />
:1. In the ships, the demanding, keeping and issuing of consumable stores is done by one officer under the special supervision of the Commander, who is responsible for the stores being on board, for maintaining them in proper condition, for stowing them efficiently and according to regulations and for the accuracy and completeness of the necessary accounts.<br>These officers are occupied by "Materialenverwalter" W.O.'s [Warrant Officers] who are well trained in the work of their branch and are selected from P.Os. [Petty Officers]<br />
<br />
:2. Money necessary for the Administrative work of the ship is remitted to the Captain in the form of a fixed sum and the expenditure of this is checked by the "Materialenverwalter".<br />
<br />
:3. The limit to the yearly expenditure of stores is fixed by a "Stores Credit" (estimate). Permission to exceed this limit must be obtained from the Admiralty and only in specially exceptional cases is permission for such excess to be requested afterwards.<br />
<br />
:4. The paymaster controls stores and the "Materialenverwalter" accounts and reports tomthe [sic] Captain whenever expenditure in excess of the quantity allowed is to be feared. The paymaster is not responsible for the accuracy of the entries made by the "Materialenverwalter" in books, etc.,kept [sic] by him.<br />
<br />
:5. The Office staff is at the disposal of the Captain to assist in accounting for consumable and non-consumable stores. This staff consists of one officer and the clerk, they are jointly responsible for reporting losses, deficiencies as compared with quantities shown by the books, necessary repairs and replacements. They also keep such records as are necessary to afford at any time a clear statement of the consumable and non-consumable stores and munition on board.<br />
<br />
:6. Stores are completed by demands on the Imperial Dockyards or depots by means of special forms. The consignment note serving as voucher.<br />
<br />
:Ship's demands are not checked by the Dockyards, the ships alone being responsible for the demand being in order.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}Pola, 4th. August, 1916.<br />
<br />
==See Also==<br />
*[[Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland]]<br />
<br />
==Footnotes==<br />
{{reflist}}<br />
<br />
[[Category:Battle of Jutland]]</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Report_on_German_Warships_after_Jutland&diff=334776Austro-Hungarian Naval Report on German Warships after Jutland2024-03-24T18:24:29Z<p>Simon Harley: Made Changes.</p>
<hr />
<div>In the papers of Vice-Admiral [[John Ernest Troyte Harper|John E. T. Harper]] (author of the ''Record of the Battle of Jutland'') is a copy of an English translation of an Austro-Hungarian Navy report on German Imperial Navy warships after the [[Battle of Jutland]].<ref>Harper papers. Churchill Archives Centre. JEHR 1/4. This research was made possible by the Colin Bell Award, a grant from the Colin Bell Fund at Churchill College, Cambridge.</ref> It was prepared by ''Marineartillerie-Oberingenieure 2. Klasse'' Georg Schindler. This report is in many ways more detailed than that of ''Fregattenkapitäne'' Hieronymus Graf von Colloredo-Mannsfeld [[Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland|prepared immediately after Jutland]], which is also in Harper's papers. The references to I.D. Notes suggest that, like Colloredo-Mannsfeld's report, this was a translation prepared in the [[Naval Intelligence Division (Royal Navy)|Naval Intelligence Division]]. Transcriber [[User:Simon Harley|Simon Harley]] has faithfully reproduced the many typing errors in the translation.<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
REPORT by a Mission undertaken in accordance with Order. Section 4 M.S. No.1746 of 1916.<br />
----<br />
<br />
On the inspection of German Warships which took part in the Battle of the Skaggerak (Jutland), 31st.May - 1st.June 1916; on Wilhelmshaven, Hamburg and Kiel, and on other inspections of ships and bases.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}By Georg Schindler,<br />
<br />
{{pad|580px}}Gunnery Engineer, 2nd Class.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}AUSTRIAN NAVY.<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
The only details which have been dealt with are those which were of Gunnery interest.<br />
<br />
{|<br />
| A.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "SEYDLITZ"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| B.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "OSTFRIESLAND"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| C.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "VON DER TANN"<br />
| were<br />
|-<br />
| D.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "GROSSER KÜRFURST"<br />
| in<br />
|-<br />
| E.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"&nbsp;<br />
| "MARKGRAF"<br />
| engagement.<br />
|-<br />
| F.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "MOLTKE"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| G.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"<br />
| "DERFFLINGER"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| H.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "KÖNIG"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| J.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "HINDENBURG" (building)<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| K.<br />
| Large Battleship<br />
| "BAYERN"<br />
| rowspan=2 | } Newly commissioned<br />
|-<br />
| L.<br />
| T.B.D.<br />
| "G.90"<br />
|-<br />
| M.<br />
| colspan=3 | Fishing vessels Anti-Submarine armament, etc.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| N.<br />
| colspan=3 | Short inspection of the Ordnance Workshops in the Arsenal in Wilhelmshaven. <br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| O.<br />
| Ditto in Kiel.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|}<br />
<br />
Ships under A.B.C.J. and M. were in Wilhelmshaven. D.E.F. in Hamburg and G.H.K.L. in Kiel.<br />
<br />
In the following reports on each ship, Section 1 deals with the effect of enemy hits on ships A. to H. above, in conjunction with the two attached ship sketches (Enclosures 1 and 2). [Not attached.]<br />
<br />
Of the hits marked in the sketches those of a gunnery interest are distinguished by red ink. Section II gives general remarks concerning the ships in question.<br />
<br />
Further a report is submitted on installations in newly commissioned ships (K. and L.) also on a ship still under construction (J.), as well as means of combating submarines installed in Fishing vessels (M.) and finally, briefly on the Ordnance workshops in the Naval Arsenals (N. and O.).<br />
<br />
A. "SEYDLITZ" (Enclosure 1).<br />
<br />
This Cruiser received 24 shell hits (38 cm. 34.3 cm. and 30.5 cm.)(15", 13.5" and 12") and one Torpedo hit.<br />
<br />
Except for 1 shell hit (apparently 34.3 cm.) (13.5") on the starboard side forward (Hits nos.2-4) and one hit no.16 (38 cm.?) in the starboard after 15 cm. (6") casemate all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all Gun tubes, Guns and many fittings had been dismantled and landed.<br />
<br />
<center>I. Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
<br />
1. A large calibre shell (hit no.8) struck the 2nd. 15 cm. port casemate (from forward), put the gun out of action and killed or seriously wounded the majority of the gun's crew.<br />
<br />
2. A 38 cm. shell exploded in the 4th 15 cm. casemate (hit No.13) the gun was similarly damaged, and 2 men (wounded) remained alive of the crew.<br />
<br />
3. In the port after 15 cm. casemate, No.6 gun, (hit No.15) had the same effect as the two described above.<br />
<br />
4. A 38 cm. shell (hit No.16) penetrated the armoured bulkhead on starboard side aft, near the last 15 cm. casemate, close to the curve of the armour (Fig.1, Enc.3) destroyed the 15 cm. gun and killed most of the gun crew.<br />
<br />
Of the twelve 15 cm. guns it appears that 2 port and 4 starboard fired unceasingly until the end.<br />
<br />
5. No.2 Turret (starboard) received a hit from port on the vertical turret armour (hit No.21) to the right of the right gun. Part of the nose of the shell pierced the armour anddestroyed [sic] the cradle and training gear of the right gun. The left was undamaged. The turret remained in action with this gun.<br />
<br />
6. An interesting hit is to be seen on the right 28 cm. gun of No.3 Turret port. The gun was on one of the jetties of the arsenal and could be examined. A large calibre shell hit the aforesaid gun a glancing blow just outside the turret, producing at the point of impact, a considerable elliptical scoop on the outside, causing a fracture of the inner tube and in addition bent the gun so that the axis of the tube at the muzzle was (as far as could be estimated) 200 mm. (about 8 in.) out of line.<br />
<br />
The cradle of this gun was split, the trunnions somewhat bent and the caps thereof partially opened out.<br />
<br />
The left gun of this turret, however, remained serviceable and the Turret could continue firing without interruption.<br />
<br />
7. A 34.3 cm. (13.5") shell (hit No.18) pierced the vertical armour of the revolving structure of No.4 Turret superimposed to the left of the left gun exploded inside the turret, ignited the cartridges which were ready for loading, put the turret out of action and killed all the crew (about 70 men) except 6.<br />
<br />
T [sic] This turret, already out of action, received another hit later from a 38 cm. (15") shell (hit No.17) this projectile struck the revolving Turret armour close to the lower edge at the right rear of the turret, and partially penetrated the turret.<br />
<br />
8. A Large calibre shell tore off the roof of the after (No.5) turret. (Geschossgeller ? ricochet). The turret suffered no appreciable damage inside.<br />
<br />
The remaining hits are being dealt with in the report on ship construction.≠ [I.D. Note: The original of this report can, unfortunately, not be obtained.]<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
<center>II Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
1. Extensive "flash" protection was already installed in "SEYDLITZ".<br />
<br />
(a) The openings for bringing 28 cm. cartridges into the lower loading chamber of the Ammunition Hoist can be shut off with sliding doors (schubtüren ?). The supply scuttles from the magazines are fitted with hinged flaps which open upwards on each side (Fig.3, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
(b) The 15 cm. (5.9") Ammunition hoists at the supply position in the casemates are fitted with a "closing flap" which shuts automatically, but its own weight assisted by a spring, immediately after the ammunition has rolled out on to the Ammunition Tray (which is placed in a horizontal position by a Paternoster apparatus (endless chain) (Fig.4, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
2. Apparently Gas Masks are employed in all ships. The method of use is the same as in the German Army. <u>Every</u> man was supplied with a mask (as it happened 2 days before action). These masks were to be brought into use immediately there was any evidence of suffocating gases, and they were so far successful that, according to the opinions of officers, at least one ship, if not two, was saved by their use.<br />
<br />
3. Enemy "shorts" usually exploded on hitting the water, with the result that, (as in the cases of shells exploding on board), splinters of various sizes struck guns among other things, and caused damage, but in practically every case no stoppage of firing from the gun resulted. Shell splinters also entered Conning Towers and Turrets through the sighting slits. But they caused no internal damage as their force was broken by their passage through the deeps [sic] slits. (Fig.5, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
4. In Turret firing. Salvoes were gradually used, and always with <u>only one</u> gun of each turret.<br />
<br />
5. For transmission of orders to the guns (also to 15 cm. (5.9" guns) from the Gunnery Officers position (in the Conning Tower) Elevation pointers are used which are mounted (<u>separately</u>) on brackets away from the Turret armour.<br />
<br />
6. Ranges of the individual rangefinders are shown on a circular scale (range receiver) by means of electrically worked pointers. All these dials are mounter [sic] in a circular box (Fig.6, Enc.3) so that the ranges of the same object shown by several rangefinders (Pointers in similar direction)[.] Further, it is possible to cut out one or other of the dials if the Rangetaker concerned is ranging badly.<br />
<br />
7. Repulse of Destroyers is carried out invariably by means of broadside salvoes of 15 cm. (5.9) guns etc. and one target only is always used. But the Gunlayer is only to fire when sights are exactly on the target.<br />
<br />
8. The 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) guns were not used in the battle. It is understood that in the future guns of this calibre, will only be retained on board as anti-aircraft guns, as was laid down for all ships.<br />
<br />
9. (a) The empty 26 cm. (11") cartridge cases are thrown out of the turrets on to the deck through openings in rear of the Gun platforms (2 per turret). A covering flap, opening downwards when the cases are thrown out, automatically closes the hole by means of a spring (Fig.7, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
(b) The fired 15 cm. (5.9") cartridge are placed in a large hanging net in the casemate, and are only removed from the casemate during a lull in the firing. It was stated that a very large number of fired cases (including Large Calibre ones) were collected and brought back.<br />
<br />
10. The voice pipes are made of 60,100 and 150 mm. diameter (2.4 in., 3.8 in.,and 6 in.). (The last named are called Schallrohre and are intended for short distances). Voice pipes are not lagged.<br />
<br />
11. The ventilation of the Turrets is similar to the method employed in our newer ships. A Fan placed between the two guns, sucks, on the one hand the powder gases from the breeches by means of a ventilation pipe from each gun when the breech is opened and on the other hand draws them away from the roof of the turret on the gun platform another fan, portable, and continually running, was installed when sucked in fresh air through a hose and passed it into the interior of the turret bymeans [sic] of a second hose. If any man had any difficulty in breathing he inhaled fresh air through the second hose. But even this method only afforded partial relief.<br />
<br />
12. All Gunnery machinery (hydraulic and electric) appears to have function correctly.<br />
<br />
13. From the Gunnery point of view there were no serious fires (magazines of any description), for which the "Flash door" protection described in Section II Miscellaneous, Pars. I (a) and (b) is principally responsible. All cartridges actually in a turret or casemate,when [sic] an enemy shell burst in the turret or casemate, were exploded in every case. Therefore the rule was most strictly enforced that only the absolute minimum of ammunition was kept ready at the guns.<br />
<br />
14. "SEYDLITZ" had 1150 28 cm. (11" shell) on board, of which 450 were expended. (No ship expended all her ammunition).<br />
<br />
15. The torpedo nets were not actually a hindrance in the action but they sustained heavy damage fromenemy [sic] hits and splinters so that parts of them hung down over the ships side.<br />
<br />
In future these nets being useless ballast will no longer be carried. This is already the case in the new battleship "BAYERN".<br />
<br />
<center>B. "OSTRFRIESLAND".</center><br />
<br />
<center>I. Hits. (Enclosure 1).</center><br />
<br />
This Battleship received no shell hits, but was struck by a mine onthe [sic] starboard side forward. The detailed description is contained in the report on Ship Construction.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
At the time of the inspection of this ship the 30.5 cm. (12") Ammunition was being embarked. The shells were being slung from the Quay on to the Deck by means of a powerful floating crane in bundles (of about 5 projectiles). All cartridges are enclosed in long water-tight zinc containers, fitted with stiffening bands. They were being rolled on board carefully across broad planks and stowed in the Magazines. If several rounds of ready ammunition have to be stowed in the Turret, the charges are always kept in the zinc cylinders.<br />
<br />
The 30.5 cm. (12") and also 28 cm. (11") projectiles are (according to the statement of the Gunnery Officer of this ship, Lt.Comdr.Lauenstein) of one description throughout, capped and fitted with base fuse. Total weight 405 kg. (about 890 lbs.) Bursting charge 12 to 13 kg. (26½ to 29 lbs.) of Trotyl. In the latest ships, however, "Armour piercing" and "high explosive" shell (but with a new explosive for bursting charge) are again to be used, as is already the case with the 28 cm. (15") shell in the Battleship "BAYERN".<br />
<br />
For the 15 cm.(5.9") guns it is reported that there are two types of shell in use.<br />
<br />
:(a) Fused shell with base fuses.<br />
<br />
:(b) High explosive shell,with a very sensitive nose fuse and a base fuse.<br />
<br />
<center>C. "VON DER TANN". (Enclosure 1.)</center><br />
<br />
This Battle Cruiser received 4 hits from large calibre shells (all on the starboard side).<br />
<br />
<center>I.Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
<br />
(1). The foremost 28 cm. (11") Turret was hit in the Barbette on the starboard side. The shell exploded and the armour was just penetrated (Hit No.1). Three men in the turret sustained burns (not very severe) from the "Flash". But the Turret was placed out of action as the armour at the point of impact was bulged inwards and jammed the Turret.<br />
<br />
(2). The after Conning Tower was similarly hit (Hit No.2)[.] But the shell only caused a shaking of the Tower and all apparatus inside remained intact.<br />
<br />
(3.) A shell exploded in the neighbourhood of the after Turret No.4 (Hit No.3). The effect on the Turret was only evident in a shaking, and the armour in the vicinity of the explosion was very slightly indented but without doing any damage so that the Turret continued in action.<br />
<br />
(4). No.4 hit is only of slight constructional interest.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
(1). In this ship, as in "OSTFRIESLAND", the question as to whether the collection of scraps of metal (coming from driving bands or Cartridge cases) in the Breech made any difference to the condition of the breech was answered in the negative.<br />
<br />
(2). The maximum rate of fire of the 28 cm. (11") guns of this Cruiser, as well as of the 30.5 cm. (12") guns of the "OSTFRIESLAND" is stated to have reached 3 - 4 rounds per minute in peace time.<br />
<br />
(3). The arrangement in the 28 cm. (11") turrets is in principle the same as in "SEYDLITZ" or as in the 30.5 cm. (12") guns of the large Battle Cruiser "HINDENBURG" (now building), with the exception of a few improvements in the last named ship. But while in the later ships (30.5 cm. 12") hydraulic rammers with reserve Hand ramming are installed "VON DER TANN" has only double Hand rammers, which are hung under the Turret roof.<br />
<br />
<center>D. "GROSSER KURFÜRST."</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Effects of shell hits (Enclosure 1).</center><br />
<br />
The ship was hit 8 times (large calibre) all from the port side.<br />
<br />
:(1) Hit No.4 (presumably 34 cm. 13.5") exploded before the Barbette armour of the foremost Turret.<br>Apart from breaking off small pieces of the hard armour (? Panzerschichte) and a slight shaking of the turret no damage was done to the Turret fittings. A fragment struck the upper surface of a sight slot and remained in the slot, while a good deal of gas entered the Turret and necessitated the use of gas masks by the crew for some time.<br />
<br />
:(2). A further heavy shell (Hit No.6) struck the port 15 cm.(5.9") Casemate (3rd. from forward) killed 10 of the crew of 14, but damaged the gun so little that after about 12 minutes the gun's crew having been made up, it was brought into action again. Two cartridges which were in the casemate were ignited.<br />
<br />
:(3). The other hits are only of constructional interest.<br />
<br />
:Some 30.5 cm. (12") and 15 cm. (5.9") guns were damaged on the outside by splinters from "shorts", but sustained no other damage.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
The Magazine arrangements in this ship were somewhat more minutely examined as well as reports made concerning them. (The arrangements described below are also used in the other ships).<br />
<br />
The shell bins and shell transport to the shell hoist are shown in Fig. 8, Enc.3) diagrammatically.<br />
<br />
A shell grab (Z) worked by 2 electric motors automatically controlled is used to transport the shell from the bins to the waiting tray fixed round the trunk (Turmraum) (A 1.-4). This grab is suspended from a broad length of wire sword matting, the latter can be wound up or down round a drum (Wa), if the transporting shaft (T) which is provided with two diametrical opposite longitudinal feathers is turned in the corresponding direction. Shaft (T) is fitted into drum (Wa). By this the grab is wound up or down. The grab is moved horizontally by the carrier (R), which holds the above-mentioned revolving drum, being drawn to one side or the other by an endless rope, worked electrically along the shaft (T). To assist the long shaft a deck rail is fitted above it which carries the weights, (Projectile grab and drum with carrier), the carrier being suspended from the rail. The electrical starting levers for both motors are fitted in the shell handing room.<br />
<br />
If it is required to get a shell out of the bin, the motor operating the horizontal movement of the grab is started. Then the long transporting drum is turned correspondingly by the 2nd.motor, thereby lowering the grab, which grips the shell by automatic pressure. Thereupon, by turning the shaft in the opposite direction the shell is raised, transported to the waiting tray (A) of which 4 are provided and placed on it. This waiting tray is so arranged that a shell can be landed only in the one position in order to prevent an inverted landing on the shell bogie relative to the entry in the hoist. The shell bogie is fitted with the same stops as the waiting tray.<br />
<br />
From the waiting tray the shell can be placed on either of the two shell bogies (which are rigidly joined to each other). The latter run easily with rollers on a circular rail, and can not only be adjusted exactly at the waiting tray by means of spring stops, but can also be coupled to the shell hoist in the loading position.<br />
<br />
In the shell rooms (lower deck) the shells are stowed in bins four to five deep (Fig.9, Enc.3)[.] The copper driving bands are protected by a broad covering band of strong canvas the ends of which are sewn together with (twine ?). Only rope is placed between the individual shells as a preventative against damage. Two vertical wooden batten are secured to the side walls of the shell bins - right and left.<br />
<br />
In order to ensure the grab gripping the shell as near as possible round the centre of gravity, each shell has a white ring painted round it.<br />
<br />
It is to be noted that the shell room cannot be shut off (water tightly) from the shell handing room as the large openings in the dividing Bulkhead, through which the transport carrier passes, are always open.<br />
<br />
In addition projectiles are stowed in many ships in the corners of the shell handing room itself in fixed bins.<br />
<br />
The 30.5 (12") cartridges are stowed in their water tight zinc cylinders in special stowage fittings in the magazines. These stowages are made of angle Iron and sheet plates. (There is no wood in the fittings).<br />
<br />
The Magazines, (2 decks from the bottom) in contrast to the shell room, are separated from the Magazine handing room, by a means of thin sheet bulkheads, in which the passage ways are fitted with double doors and the circular openings for handing cartridges are fitted with double covering flaps (the latter have already been remarked on in "SEYDLITZ" Section 11, Fig.3, Enc.3.[)]<br />
<br />
For transport of cartridges in the Magazines the transporting gear shewn in Fig.10, Enc.3 is available. This consists of a double rail (R) in which a horizontal (sheet iron) tray, semicircular in section can be moved up and down in guides by means of a hand differential purchase (F). The Tray can then be brought to the exact level of the cartridge. The Transporting gear is suspended from an overhead rail,(S) and also runs in a guide rail on the deck (SS). The cartridge is pushed on to the tray and the transporter then brought to the cartridge handing hole, and after opening the double flaps, transferred to the Turret.<br />
<br />
The Turret appliances correspond in general to those in "HINDENBURG", about which data are described later. But an exception must be made in the case of the size and installation of the Rangefinders (Fig.11, Enc.3).In "KURFÜRST" the Rangefinders about 3 meters (10 ft.) long are fitted in hoods in the front of the Turret, while "HINDENBURG" the 8 metre (26 ft.) range finders are already being fitted in the same way as will be the case in our 35 cm. (about 14") turrets, now building.<br />
<br />
<center>E. "MARKGRAF".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This Battleship was hit 5 times by big guns and all from the port side.<br />
<br />
Only hit No.2 is of gunnery interest. This entered the next to the last 15 cm. (5.(') [5.9"] casemate on the port side and exploded, killing the crew and putting gun out of action for the remainder of the battle, though it did not damage it very seriously.<br />
<br />
Several splinters from this shell pierced the bulkhead and entered the next casemate (forward) and killed or wounded several men. But this gun was brought into action again after an interval of about 10 minutes to make up the crew.<br />
<br />
<center>11. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
In the case of this ship also, splinters from enemy shorts entered the Conning Tower, but without causing any damage to either personnel or Materiel.<br />
<br />
During the whole engagement about 250 rounds of 30 cm. (12") ammunition was fired, i.e. about one fifth of the total supply on board.<br />
<br />
<center>F. "MOLTKE".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This ship was hit 4 times by heavy shell (all from the starboard side).<br />
<br />
One shell (Hit No.3) pierced the upper side armour and burst behind the latter inside the ship. It also caused some damage outside to No.4.15 cm. (5.9") casemate starboard (from forward) killing or wounding several men, but causing little damage to the gun. This gun was again brought into action after about 15 minutes.<br />
<br />
<center>11. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
"MOLTKE" was the only ship from which 4 Torpedoes were fired (not in salvo, but one after the other). On board, it was stated by officers that "QUEEN MARY" was fired at and hit at about 10 kilometres (10,935 yds.), and that this was the cause of the rapid sinking of this Battle Cruiser. Officers of other ships, however, were not of this opinion, as when "MOLTKE" fired the distance from "QUEEN MARY" was about 13 kilometres (14,217 yds.) and that the torpedoes have not this range; so that only Gunnery can be taken into consideration.<br />
<br />
In the "MOLTKE", splinters from short bursting shells also entered the Conning Tower, without, however, causing any noteworthy damage.<br />
<br />
<center>G. "DERFFLINGER".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This Battle Cruiser was hit the largest number of times, viz:- 30, of these 20 were of heavy calibre and all came from the port side.<br />
<br />
:(1) A 15" shell pierced the roof of N.4 30.5 cm. (12") Turret (hit No.5) exploded inside the Turret, thereby igniting all the charges which were there (apparently only two) and killed all the Turret's crew, (74 men including reserve crew), except 2 men who were able to get away (wounded).<br />
<br />
:The Turret itself was put out of action because (as was the case in all these hits on Turrets) much damage was done to the various instruments and appliances by the splinters and flash.<br />
<br />
:It is worthy of note that the electric cables in the Turret were comparatively uninjured.<br />
<br />
:(2). Turret No.3 was also hit by a 38 cm. (15") shell (hit No.6). The projectile penetrated the Barbette armour and took with it a large piece of plating into the interior of the Turret. The 74 men of the Turret's crew (as in the hit described above[)] for the most part were killed, only 6 men getting away wounded. It is observed that an 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) gun which was 3½ metres (about 11½ ft.) away from the point of impact, was completely undamaged, although the deck below the spot, and in the immediate vicinity of this gun, was badly damaged.<br />
<br />
:Nos.3 and 4 Turrets were only put out of action towards the end of the engagement.<br />
<br />
:The two foremost Turrets remained completely intact, although the Barbette armour of the second Turret showed a fairly large scrape from a (very glancing) shell hit. But this caused no further damage to the Turret (hit No.13).<br />
<br />
:(4). The Conning Tower was hit on the starboard side on the edge. But only small pieces of the brittle face of the armoured plates splintered off, and in the Tower itself only one elevation-pointer ceased to function.<br />
<br />
:(5). Very severe damage was done by a large calibre shell (hit No.20) which exploded close to the casemate of the No.2 15 cm. (5.9) gun port, which not only damaged this gun, but also put the two neighbouring 15 cm. (5.9") guns out of action. The first named gun was principally severely damaged on the chase, and the chase of the foremost 15 cm. (5.9") gun was indented to such an extent by splinters, that it could not be fired again. The other gun in the vicinity was so shaken up by the powerful explosion, that it could not be moved again. The casualties sustained by the gun's crews were in contrast comparatively small. (1 man killed and several severely or slightly wounded at the first named gun[)].<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
A large fragment of a 38 cm. (15") shell (which failed to explode), was exhibited on board (as is shown in Fig.12, Enc.3)[.] The much distorted fuze was also found.<br />
<br />
<center>H. "KÖNIG".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits.</center><br />
<br />
There were 13 hits (large calibre) identified all from the port side and above the waterline.<br />
<br />
:(1). A 34.3 cm. (13.5) shell hit the port foremost 15 cm. (5.9") casemate. (Hit No.9). A large piece of armour plating was carried into the casemate, where the shell exploded, killed the gun's crew (11 men) and put the gun out of action. The armour plate went further, penetrated the bulkhead, entered the galley, destroyed it and killed more men.<br />
<br />
:(2). Another 34.3 cm. (13.5") shell penetrated the second 15 cm. (5.9") casemate (hit No.8) and exploded, making the gun useless and, by penetrating the deck also caused much damage in the compartment below. The crew of this gun was by chance not at the moment in the casemate, as they had gone out for a short time on account of gas from the explosion in the first 15 cm. (5.9) casemate (which had occurred just previously.) The result was that there were no killed or wounded among the gun's crew.<br />
<br />
:(3). The traces of a shell were visible on the roof of the foremost 30.5 (12") Turret. (Hit No.11.) The projectile damaged the Rangefinder cover, and tore off a piece of it, rendering the Rangefinder useless. No other damage was caused by this hit.<br />
<br />
:(4). The roof of the Conning Tower was similarly gazed [sic] by a shell, which left a scratch but caused no other damage to the Tower or its instruments, etc.<br />
<br />
<center>J. "HINDENBURG."</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Apparently about 30,000 tons displacement)</center><br />
<br />
This Cruiser, now building will be given an armament of 8 30.5 cm. (12") guns 50 cal. (in four double turrets, 2 forward and 2 aft as in "DERFFLINGER") and 14 15 cm. (5.9") and 8.8 cm[.] (22 pr.) Anti-aircraft guns.<br />
<br />
The foremost superimposed Turret (No.2) was mostly built in, and a short inspection of it was made.<br />
<br />
The Gun-platform is especially roomy. The distance apart of the centres of the two gun barrels being estimated at about 3 metres (10 feet approx.)[.] The complete arrangement of the gun-platform can be seen in the diagrammatic Sketch (Fig.13, Enc.3). The 2 shell hoists (G) are side by side between the gun and to the left of the left gun, (and right of the right gun) are the two ammunition hoists (P).<br />
<br />
The up-coming ammunition is placed in its slide (TT) in the rear by means of unloading rammers (so-called "Umlauder"), whence it rolls on to the loading Tray, and finally on to the shell swings or cartridge swings, which by swinging across, brings the shell or cartridges one after the other to the rear of the gun for loading.<br />
<br />
The two rammers are hydraulic chain Rammers (with reserve hand drive). In the space at the rear of the platform there are :- an entrance opening (E) and two openings (A) for passing out firedcartridge [sic] cases. These openings (A) are constructed similarly to those more exactly described under "SEYDLITZ" (Sec.II. Par.9).<br />
<br />
The Breeches are worked hydraulically (the reserve method being by hand.)<br />
<br />
The principle can be gathered from Fig.14, Enc.3 . A bar with a tooth edged point (Z), (which can be worked up or down hydraulically) turns the Traversing shaft by means of cog wheels (R1, R2, R3) and opens or shuts the breech. The Water-pressure is led to the mechanism through two flexible hoses. If the cog wheel R3 is placed out of gear with R2, the hydraulic system is shut off.<br />
<br />
For elevating,Trunnion [sic] sights are provided and for training a sighting telescope is fitted in front between the guns.<br />
<br />
The Rangefinder (about 8 metres long) which was not yet on board, is to be fitted in the front of the Turret above the guns (under the roof as already referred to under "KURFÜRST")[.] Only the two side openings in the armour could be seen.<br />
<br />
Elevating is worked hydraulically (Reserve system by hand). (The ammunition hoists are also worked hydraulically, but here the alternative system is electric).<br />
<br />
A gun coupling is fitted in this ship as in all later ships. But these couplings are apparently only for use when it is desired to elevate a gun whose elevating gear has been damaged.<br />
<br />
The normal Turret Training gear and also the reserve system is only worked by electric motors.<br />
<br />
The same system of ventilation is used as has already been described in "SEYDLITZ" (Section II, Par.II).<br />
<br />
All working machinery (Electrically driven pumps, and electric motors for elevating, training, hoists, rammers, etc.) are apparently installed in the spacious working chamber below the gun platform.<br />
<br />
The arrangements in the Magazines as well as the transporting gear for passing shell and cartridges from them to the hoists are the same as those already more minutely described under battleship "GROSSER KÜRFURST."<br />
<br />
<center>K. "BAYERN".</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Class Ersatz "WÖRTH" about 30,000 tons disp.)</center><br />
<br />
This battleship, only recently completed, had to carry out exercises whilst at Kiel, and the Commission was invited to join for a cruise, which gave opportunity for a certain amount of inspection.<br />
<br />
The armament consists of eight 38 cm. (15") G.L. 45 guns in four double turrets apparently arranged as shown in the Almanac; sixteen 15 cm. (5.9") G.L. 45 guns in casemates and eight 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) anti-aircraft guns.<br />
<br />
38 cm. Gun Turret. (Fig. 15, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
The distance apart of the bore axes is 3700 mm. (12.1 ft.) for these guns[.] 8.8 cm. sub-calibre guns are provided, which are put in from outboard (i.e. muzzle end.)<br />
<br />
The Gunhouse, as in the turrets of the "HINDENBURG" is very roomy.<br />
<br />
In this turret there has been introduced no important alteration with respect to the munition hoists. Whereas in all previous ships the shot hoist was separate from the cartridge hoist, in this ship, as with us (the Austrian Navy), both hoists for one gun are combined in one trunk; and also instead of the shell and cartridge swings in the "HINDENBURG" (see above) munition wagons (W1, W2), which run on cross rails are introduced. The two main hoists (A1, A2) come up between the two guns. Besides these there are in addition two electrically driven auxiliary hoists (H1, H2).<br />
<br />
The round which arrives at the top of the hoist is taken out and landed, by means of the unloading rammer (U) in the munition wagon, which brings it to the rear of the particular gun in the loading position, whence it is loaded by means of the rammer.<br />
<br />
The munition wagons, rammers and unloading rammers are normally worked by hydraulic power (with auxiliary handworking gear); at the back of the turret are two principal operating positions, (ST1, ST2) which are raised to give a good all-round view, and where all the necessary manipulation for the foregoing hydraulic machinery is carried out.<br />
<br />
The munition hoists are also hydraulically worked, and electric drive is provided as an alternative. The elevating and breech mechanism gear are hydraulic (with alternative hand gear).<br />
<br />
The following sighting arrangements are provided :-<br />
<br />
:(a) For elevation - two side trunnion sights as well as two reserve sights in front.<br />
<br />
:(b) For training - a principal trainer's telescope in front between the two guns, as well as a side telescope as reserve.<br />
<br />
Asked whether any automatic firing apparatus was in contemplation, it was replied that a place for such apparatus was provided but the installation could not be expected till later, and depended on the solution of several problems which had yet to be experimented on.<br />
<br />
The large 8.2 m. (26.9 ft.) rangefinder is placed the same as in the "HINDENBURG".<br />
<br />
The ventilation of the turret is on the same principle as in the "HINDENBURG" and "SEYDLITZ", except that in addition there are two powerful electric fan motors between the guns.<br />
<br />
The Training is done electrically, as is also the alternative arrangement. Fig 15, Enc.3 gives a diagrammatic sketch of the arrangements. The controller gives 72 degrees of speed.<br />
<br />
For absorbing the shock in the training gear of single gun shooting there are provided, in the friction coupling box of the worm gearing, besides the friction plates (as in our own installations) two rings of strong springs above them - each ring containing six springs as shewn in Fig.17, Enc.3. Apparently any turret thrown off a small angle by a single round will be trained back to its original position by means of these springs.<br />
<br />
As in "HINDENBURG", so also in "BAYERN", the various machines for training[,] elevating, munition supply, rammers and unloading rammers are placed on the deck underneath the Gun platform (working chamber), and also the machines for the magazine and transport arrangements of munitions are similarly installed.<br />
<br />
In Fig. 18, Enc.3 is a diagrammatic sketch of the munition hoists and magazines from which it can be seen that the shell room is on the lowest level and has the magazine above it. The cartridge loading door (F1 for cartridges, G1 for shell) are fitted for flash protection with sliding shutters which are self-operating when the lift arrives at one or the other, i.e. when the lift arrives at the bottom, the shutter there will open and leave the loading hole (P) free, while the upper openings F1 and G1 will be shut and locked.<br />
<br />
An inspection of the shell room 38 cm. (15") showed that on these shells there is attached to the rearmost of the three upper driving bands a zinc band about 20 mm. (.78 in.) broad (similar to the driving bands). Experience has shown that this zinc ring is a very good anti-coppering device for the bore. It was apparently on the French front, at Verdun and in Flanders, that experiments with this arrangement were made; the results were very good and its introduction followed. The Army has also adopted it.<br />
<br />
The following is the situation with regard to 38 cm. (15 in.) shell. As opposed to the single type of shell (long calibre) in newly completing ships, here there are two :-<br />
<br />
:(a) A.P. shell, with cap, total length of shell 3.5 calibres.<br />
<br />
:(b) H.E. shell, uncapped, total length of shell 4.1 calibres. The total weight is 750 kg. (1653.5 lbs). The burster (not Trotyl, probably Heranit? 23.5 kg. (57.8 lbs.) for the A.P. shell and 67 kg. (147.7 lbs) for the H.E. The establishment allowed per [gun] is 90 A.P. and 30 H.E. The maximum range is 24 kilometres (26,247 yds.) with an angle of descent of 32 degrees, elevation of gun 247 degrees, time of flight 48 secs.<br />
<br />
:The charge is 87 kg. (191.8 lbs) in the main cartridge and 96 kg. (211.6 lbs.) in the foremost cartridge.<br />
<br />
:The rate of fire is one round per 40 seconds.<br />
<br />
15 cm. casemates. In these ships the flash protection for the 15 cm. (5.9") munition hoists in the casemates has been improved (Fig.20, Enc.3). In that a sheet iron chamber (K) has been built around the delivery opening which, by means of sliding plates (S1 and S2) can be shut off either from the trunk or from the munition tray. (G2.) For example, a shell arrives at the top of the hoist (G) - the shutter (S1) is raised in its guides by means of the lift mechanism, so that the shell can roll into the chamber (G1) while the shutter (S3) remains closed. Immediately afterwards the shutter (S1) closes the opening and the shutter (S2) raises in its guides and the shell rolls on the munition tray (G2). By this means the trunk is rendered flash proof at all stages of the operation.<br />
<br />
Submerged Flats. On board this ship there was also the opportunity to visit a submerged flat with two broadside tubes.<br />
<br />
In all there are five tubes (2 in each flat) and a bow tube. The calibre of the torpedoes is 60 cm. (23.6 in.) and the weight of a fully charged torpedo 2200 kg. (4850 lbs.). The explosive (? Heranit) weighing 250 kg. (531.1 lbs). The establishment per tube is four torpedoes - making in all 20 on board. The greatest torpedo range is 13 kilometres, 14,217 yds) with a medium speed setting of 28 knots.<br />
<br />
The flat that was visited (Fig.21, Enc.3) is very large and about 5 metres high, (16 ft.) so that it is perfectly feasible to turn any torpedo hanging on the purchase at the turntable (W1) on the overhead rails, so that is [sic] can be loaded into the port or starboard tube.<br />
<br />
The tubes (L1, L2) are side loading with very strong longitudinal holts [sic] on top (V1, V2) and fitted with a strong shield bar. For loading the torpedoes in the tubes, there are fitted near the tubes, on the same side on the side door, mechanical loading apparatus (quickloaders A1, A2), and on the opposite side are provided the rails (R1, R2) which serve for the adjustment (lever system) of the gyroscope of a torpedo lying in the tube.<br />
<br />
A torpedo is struck down from the upper deck through the trunk (E) and swung through the opening (O) into the flat, whence by means of a purchase (mechanically driven) it is run on to the tramways (S) and thence either to the bulkhead stowage or to a stowage over the tube.<br />
<br />
One must take this opportunity of noting that the overhead rails are not bolted to the actual deck, but are a separate structure, so as to avoid putting any vibration or other strain on to the armoured deck.<br />
<br />
If a torpedo is to be loaded it will be brought by means of the purchase to the exact ready stowage over the tube; then the hydraulic loader is operated by a lever; a grad [sic] with two arms seizes the torpedo in two specially cut away parts and draws it horizontally on to the guide rail of the loader, which then is lowered together with the torpedo. In the meantime the side door is mechanically unbolted and opened, so that the torpedo can be placed right in the tube (impulse frame). After this the guide rail and grab of the loader are withdrawn and raised, while the side door is shut and bolted. Loading by this means proceeds comparatively noiselessly, rapidly and precisely.<br />
<br />
The sluice is hydraulically worked, and after firing is operated by the return movement of the shield bar. When draining the tube the water can be pumped either overboard or into a well.<br />
<br />
The discharge is operated electrically from the Conning Tower or by hand.<br />
<br />
The sluice is hydraulically worked, and after firing is operated by the return movement of the shield bar. When draining the tube the water can be pumped either overboard or into a well.<br />
<br />
The discharge is operated electrically from the Conning Tower or by hand.<br />
<br />
<center>L. TORPEDO BOAT "G. 90".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1200 tons displacement.)</center><br />
<br />
From the Battleship "BAYERN" the Commission was brought back to Kiel in one of the newest torpedo boats (G.90), which offered an opportunity of seeing certain details.<br />
<br />
The gun armament consists of three 10.5 cm. (4.1") Guns on transferable mountings; the torpedo armament, of two single tubes forward and two double tubes for<nowiki>*</nowiki> [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. Note: Apparently a clerical error for 50 cm.(19.7")] 45 cm. (17.7") torpedoes in the after part. (See Fig. 22, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
The following details respecting the torpedo equipment were noted :<br />
<br />
Six torpedoes were carried, which remain stowed in the tubes; spare torpedoes are not carried on board, and no torpedo stowage is provided. The tubes of the twin mountings are not parallel but inclined outwards from each other, making an angle of 20° between the tubes.<br />
<br />
The reason for this lies in the method of torpedo boat attack. Torpedo craft always fire on the swing (in order to offer the full broadside target to the enemy fire for the shortest possible time), and the torpedoes from a twin mounting are are [sic] fired one after the other (the mounting remaining on a fixed bearing). The first torpedo having been fired, the boat continues to swing under helm and after 20° the second torpedo is fired.<br />
<br />
The training is done by means of a training gear at each tube, which can be understood from the detailed sketch (Fig. 23, Enc.3). By means of the hand crank (K) a worm and worm wheel (Zr) can be turned, this engages inthe [sic] training rack (Zs) and so the tube can be trained. The training pinion can, by means of a coupling clutch worked by the lever (H) be disconnected from the rack, should be required to train the mounting quickly, or for loading and unloading the torpedo by means of the training gear. This latter is accomplished by means of the windlass (W) mounted on the training shaft round which can be taken a line secured either to the nose or the tail of the torpedo. At the back part of the mounting is fitted a training brake which grips the rack.<br />
<br />
A director is fitted at each tube, and torpedoes are fired electrically from the bridge. At the rear of each tube are fitted two firing pushes (Abfeurungspöller), which can be operated either singly or together. In order to prevent firing from a tube which is not yet at the ready, the particular firing gear is held fast by a special locking gear fitted to the tube; its method of working can be seen from (Fig.24, Enc.3). The locking levers (St1 and St2) are only clear of the firing gear, when the rollers (R1 and R2), connected to the locking gear, are clear of the guide strip (G). This guide strip covers the arc in which firing is to be prevented. The springs.(F1 and F2) release the gear, as shewn in the sketch under (T).<br />
<br />
For torpedo transport on deck a special rail is fitted on the starboard side, on which was seen a fairly long transport wagon.<br />
<br />
<center>M. TRAWLER.</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Fitted out for Anti Submarine work)</center><br />
<br />
For fighting submarine boats trawlers are employed with the following :-<br />
<br />
:(a). A.S.rope nets fitted with two or four A.S.mines.<br />
<br />
:(b). Large Depth charges.<br />
<br />
:(c). Anti Submarine explosive Kite.<br />
<br />
::These appliances are described below.<br />
<br />
(a). Nets with A.S. Mines (Fig.25, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
These nets are made up from hemp rope (diameter of rope about 10 mm.); they are 250 m.long and of varying breadth (up to 20 m.) To a normal net two mines (M.M.) are attached (see Fig.25, Enc.3); for broader nets the mines are secured in pairs vertically - thus making four mines to a broad net. The mines are supported by their own large iron flat (S) while for the support of the nets smaller floats (S1) are placed on top.<br />
<br />
Each pair of nets also has an anchor and cable attached.<br />
<br />
The nets which are joined together are stowed with their mines in large shaped iron floats. The latter are stowed ready for shooting in two rows, (1 and 2, Fig.26, Enc3) on the top of the trawler. Shortly before action the primers are inserted through circular holes in the floats (1 hole per float).<br />
<br />
The shooting of nets one and two is carried out at a speed of 10 knots by one man. First , the first anchor of the first net is let go and the net with its mines dragged into the water, afterwards being anchored by the second anchor. Before, however, this latter is slipped the first anchor of the second net must be let go to ensure over-lapping.<br />
<br />
There are tiny holes in the floats by means of which just sufficient water can enter the floats so as to sink the net with its mines and floats at the end of an hour, and leave the area free again for traffic.<br />
<br />
These net mines (Fig.27, Enc.3) are contact mines with an explosive charge (1) from 12-13 kg. of Trotyl and consist of the mine case (M), firing mechanism (S), impact plate (P), distance pin (St), the safety lever (S1) and the primer (J) with the detonator (K).<br />
<br />
When the mine enters the water and reaches a depth of 5 metres the safety catch is released by a hydrostatic valve, which thus frees the detonator for the striker.<br />
<br />
Firing is effected in that by the impact of a submarine the impact plate (and with it the distance pin) are displaced, and by means of the latter the striker is freed and fires the mine by means of the firing spring (which is already cocked).<br />
<br />
(b). Depth charge (Fig., Enc.3).<br />
<br />
These depth charges are cylindrical in form and contain a large explosive charge of 60 kg. of Trotyl. They consist of the mine (M) and the float (S). The latter is connected to the mine by a strong steel wire (3 mm.), which is wound on a reel in the float. It fires (exactly like the depth charge of Korvetten Kapitän Schönthaler) because on reaching the set depth the tension on the wire operates the firing mechanism (Striker spring (F) is compressed as the striker (B) is raised by the grab (Z)) and thus frees the striker.<br />
<br />
The set depth can be adjusted from 5 to 5 (5 to 50?) metres (practically in the same way as in the Schönthaler Depth Charge) and it is to be noted that the time of explosion (1 to 5 secs) is adjustable by means of turning the pointer of the seconds scale (E) on the outside. The delay action itself operates by means of a disc similar to shrapnel.<br />
<br />
(c). Explosive Kite (Fig.30, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
The Kite (D) is made of wood and shaped as shown in Fig.31, inside is an explosive charge (the same size as the net mine, 12 - 13 kg., described in par. (a) above.<br />
<br />
The Kite is towed by a 15 mm. strong steel wire (T) whose core is an electric cableby [sic] means of which the kite is electrically exploded.<br />
<br />
The cable wire is wound on the winch (K), the ends being connected to the electric firing battery in the hollow drum.<br />
<br />
The towing wire is led from the winch over an adjustable brake (B) and from there over a roller (R) secured to a derrick (L) where the other end is connected to the charge.<br />
<br />
When the kite hits against a hard object (submarine) it is electrically fired.<br />
<br />
As a safety precaution the electric switch at the battery is only made when the kite is towing at the requisite speed.<br />
<br />
Trawlers tow at 10 knots, which causes a pull of 350 kg. on the wire.<br />
<br />
<center>N. ARSENAL WILHELMSHAVEN.</center><br />
<br />
Only a short visit to the gun shops was made. There about 1,000 civil workman [sic] were employed.<br />
<br />
In general the work carried out was similar to that in our own gun factories (repair of gun material, production of necessary equipment, magazine and shellroom machinery, examination and cleaning of bores of guns, the storage and preservation of magazine and shellroom fittings, small calibre guns, searchlights, range finders, etc.), only here the buildings, in particular the shops and storehouses, are modern throughout and planned on a spacious lay out.<br />
<br />
The drawing office is worthy of note, in it at that time the stowage plan of munitions for the Battle Cruiser "HINDENBURG" was in preparation. For the protection of such drawings there is provided a large fireproof room.<br />
<br />
To the gun shops belong :- the large mechanical shops, a smithy, a large carpenter's shop, a large shop for work on canvas, leather, and similar equipment, a plumber's shop, two very roomy storehouses for magazine material and a depot for various constructional materials; in the last named is a special,cellar for rubber and leather articles in which at the time there were gathered about 700,000 marks worth.<br />
<br />
A new large gun hall was under construction which is about 60 m. long and 25 m. broad. The building itself was nearly finished, only the installation and also the large travelling crane were not in place.<br />
<br />
Both high sliding doors (T1 T2) were operated by an electrically driven (alternative hand working) which at the side. The travelling crane (N) brings the material to the door, where a floating crane (S) with large overhang takes it over and provides for its further transport.<br />
<br />
While passing through the shop the decoppering of a 15 cm. (5.9) gun was seen. The decoppering machine was a brush withbvery [sic] fine steel bristles, as shewn in Fig.33. The head of the brush (K) is a cylindrical drum of strong plate, which before use is filled with petroleum and turpentine. On the head are fixed three bristle holding rings (H), which carry on their periphery the small steel bristles (B). These three bristle rings are separated by two intermediate rings (R).<br />
<br />
The fine steel wire used in the bristles is 0.2 mm. thick and must be softer than the material of the inner tube so as not to scratch the latter. The cleaning is accomplished by powerful brushing th [sic] through the bore, this action forcing out the petroleum mixture from the drum at the head of the brush into the bore.<br />
<br />
The decoppering device was very successful with the 15 cm. (5.9") gun; a small quantity of the copper scraping and two bristles were given to the Mission. (A bristle and a portion of copper scrapings accompany the reports (1 each) to the K.U.K.K.M. Marine Section (Austrian Admiralty) and to the (Austrian) Naval Technical Committee.)<br />
<br />
<center>O. ARSENAL KIEL.</center><br />
<br />
The "Artilleriewerkstätten" (Gun shops) at Kiel are in general the same as those at Wilhelmshaven described above, so that this amounted to an opportunity for closer description.<br />
<br />
The only noteworthy sight among the gunshops visited was one very large gunhall in which numerous guns are stowed, (among them some from ships that had been in the battle (Jutland); for the transport of the heaviest weights are two travelling cranes (each of 45 tons both cranes are employed together). For the further transport normal gauge rail tracks are provided.<br />
<br />
For the mechanical decoppering of guns a special scraper is used, whose action can be seen from Fig. 34. In the dial shaped head (K) are two difference scrapers (S1 S2), which by means of an inserting gear (E) can be placed exactly in the groove it is required to clean. The scraper (S1), cleans the base of the grooves, the scraper (S2) cleans the sides. The red (st) is guided so as to avoid any corners of the scraper<nowiki>*</nowiki> [I.D.Note: Apparently this guide rod arrangement keeps the scraper true in the groove.] This apparatus has proved its worth.<br />
<br />
Later on information from the Ordnance Department of the Admiralty showed that 30.5 and 28 cm. gun tubes, from which 60 - 100 rounds had been fired in the action, from later experimental firings at Krupps were found to have suffered from wear (actually about 20 mm.) which permitted overramming. After the conclusion of the experimental firings, only gun tubes of equ [sic] equal wear are sent to one and the same ship.<br />
<br />
Of very great interest is the information that many of the 25 cm. (13.7") guns, which were on the French front (6 on the Verdun front) had fired 600 - 800 rounds with full charge (range 36 kilometers, 39,376 yds.) with a diminished range of only 2 km., 2,187 yds. and no necessity for a new inner tube. The shell used in these guns were those provided with the anti-coppering zinc ring.<br />
<br />
The following summarize the points of the greatest importance.<br />
<br />
:1. Introduction of gas masks for each man, as of utmost importance.<br />
<br />
:2. Specially important is flash protection (including) cover plates for munition hoist trunks in turrets and casemates, shut off hatches and doors as well as partition of the magazines.).<br />
<br />
:3. As few cartridges as possible by the gun (in the gun house of a turret or in a casemate), because of the great danger of its ignition by a hit.<br />
<br />
:4. Abolition of the ready use position in the turrets (on account of point 3, above).<br />
<br />
:5. Many gun tubes 30.5 and 28 cm. (12" and 4" [sic]) have fired 60 - 100 rounds with only 20 mm. overramming.<br />
<br />
:6. Many gun tubes undergo experimental firing and are reissued only in similar tubes to one ship.<br />
<br />
:7. Automatic firing apparatus is not yet in use.<br />
<br />
:8. Gun coupling gear provided, but is only used in the event of danger to elevating gear.<br />
<br />
:9. Introduction of small calibre guns 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) only for anti-aircraft work.<br />
<br />
:10. Normally the turrets only fire salvoes, and only from one gun per turret.<br />
<br />
:11. Repulse of Torpedo boat attacks is achieved by broadside salvoes from the 15 cm. (5.9") guns - all in one target.<br />
<br />
:12. Normal turret machinery :-<br />
<br />
::Training{{pad|50px}}Electric (as is also reserve)<br />
<br />
::Elevating<br />
<br />
::Rammers<br />
<br />
::Unloading rammers{{pad|50px}}All hydraulic and<br />
<br />
::Breech mechanism and in some{{pad|30px}}hand control.<br />
<br />
::cases Munition wagons<br />
<br />
::Munition hoists - hydraulic - with electric reserve<br />
<br />
::Shell transport in shell rooms - electric<br />
<br />
:13. Observation of fall of shot :- in each top, 1 or two men in telephonic communication with the gunnery officer. (On 31st.May neither Aeroplanes or Zeppelins were present[)].<br />
<br />
:14. Fire control from gunnery officer's position by elevation pointer only.<br />
<br />
:15. All rangefinders stereoscopic normally 3 m. long instruments in armour domes in Turrets, in the latest ships 8 m. instruments projecting from sides below Turret roofs.<br />
<br />
:16. Large calibre projectiles are standard type armour shells with caps and sharply pointed explosive shells without cap are being reintroduced. For 15 cm. Guns (5.9") fused shell with base fuse and H.F. shell with a very sensitive nose fuse and a base fuse.<br />
<br />
:17. No ship expended all her heavy ammunition, at the most a little over 1/3 of the establishment.<br />
<br />
:18. Establishment for heavy guns 115 - 120 rounds per gun.<br />
<br />
:19. As an anti-coppering precaution for guns, projectiles are fitted with a zinc ring behind the rear driving band and in direct contact therewith.<br />
<br />
20. English 38 cm. (15") and 34.3 cm (13.5") projectiles have apparently black powder as a bursting charge: bursting bad and effect not commensurate with the calibre.<br />
<br />
:21. The explosion of a large calibre projectile in a Turret always puts the same out of action.<br />
<br />
:22. Ventilation of Turrets insufficient.<br />
<br />
:23. Voice pipes 60 - 100 and 150 mm. calibre have no lagging and are provided with wooden stoppers or sponges wherewith to close the tube to gases.<br />
<br />
:24. Emergency lighting by means of Pocket lamps.<br />
<br />
:25. Torpedo nets are no longer carried.<br />
<br />
:26. All ranges below 15 km. heavy armour is generally pierced by 38 cm. (15")projectiles. [sic]<br />
<br />
:27. Submarine Defence. Mine nets, (? Depth charges) and Explosive Kites.<br />
<br />
Appendices 2 Sketches, Hits Appendix 1 and 2. One sheet of sketches to report. Appen. 3.<br />
<br />
In conclusion, one matter may be mentioned, which, on the occasion of the visit to the Arsenal at Wilhelmshaven and to the ships, attracted attention through its differing so greatly from our own arrangements. Viz, the handling procedure of consumable stores.<br />
<br />
The characteristic points of the Organisation of this Branch in the German Navy are, as follows :-<br />
<br />
:1. In the ships, the demanding, keeping and issuing of consumable stores is done by one officer under the special supervision of the Commander, who is responsible for the stores being on board, for maintaining them in proper condition, for stowing them efficiently and according to regulations and for the accuracy and completeness of the necessary accounts.<br>These officers are occupied by "Materialenverwalter" W.O.'s [Warrant Officers] who are well trained in the work of their branch and are selected from P.Os. [Petty Officers]<br />
<br />
:2. Money necessary for the Administrative work of the ship is remitted to the Captain in the form of a fixed sum and the expenditure of this is checked by the "Materialenverwalter".<br />
<br />
:3. The limit to the yearly expenditure of stores is fixed by a "Stores Credit" (estimate). Permission to exceed this limit must be obtained from the Admiralty and only in specially exceptional cases is permission for such excess to be requested afterwards.<br />
<br />
:4. The paymaster controls stores and the "Materialenverwalter" accounts and reports tomthe [sic] Captain whenever expenditure in excess of the quantity allowed is to be feared. The paymaster is not responsible for the accuracy of the entries made by the "Materialenverwalter" in books, etc.,kept [sic] by him.<br />
<br />
:5. The Office staff is at the disposal of the Captain to assist in accounting for consumable and non-consumable stores. This staff consists of one officer and the clerk, they are jointly responsible for reporting losses, deficiencies as compared with quantities shown by the books, necessary repairs and replacements. They also keep such records as are necessary to afford at any time a clear statement of the consumable and non-consumable stores and munition on board.<br />
<br />
:6. Stores are completed by demands on the Imperial Dockyards or depots by means of special forms. The consignment note serving as voucher.<br />
<br />
:Ship's demands are not checked by the Dockyards, the ships alone being responsible for the demand being in order.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}Pola, 4th. August, 1916.<br />
<br />
==See Also==<br />
*[[Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland]]<br />
<br />
==Footnotes==<br />
{{reflist}}<br />
<br />
[[Category:Battle of Jutland]]</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Report_on_German_Warships_after_Jutland&diff=334775Austro-Hungarian Naval Report on German Warships after Jutland2024-03-24T18:22:21Z<p>Simon Harley: Simon Harley moved page User:Simon Harley/Austro-Hungarian Report on German Jutland Damage to Austro-Hungarian Naval Report on German Warships after Jutland without leaving a redirect</p>
<hr />
<div>In the papers of Vice-Admiral [[John Ernest Troyte Harper|John E. T. Harper]] (author of the ''Record of the Battle of Jutland'') is a copy of a translation of an Austro-Hungarian Navy report on German Imperial Navy warships after the [[Battle of Jutland]].<ref>Harper papers. Churchill Archives Centre. JEHR 1/4. This research was made possible by the Colin Bell Award, a grant from the Colin Bell Fund at Churchill College, Cambridge.</ref> It was prepared by ''Marineartillerie-Oberingenieure 2. Klasse'' Georg Schindler. This report is in many ways more detailed than that of ''Fregattenkapitäne'' Hieronymus Graf von Colloredo-Mannsfeld [[Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland|prepared immediately after Jutland]], which is also in Harper's papers. The references to I.D. Notes suggest that, like Colloredo-Mannsfeld's report, this was a translation prepared in the [[Naval Intelligence Division (Royal Navy)|Naval Intelligence Division]].<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
REPORT by a Mission undertaken in accordance with Order. Section 4 M.S. No.1746 of 1916.<br />
----<br />
<br />
On the inspection of German Warships which took part in the Battle of the Skaggerak (Jutland), 31st.May - 1st.June 1916; on Wilhelmshaven, Hamburg and Kiel, and on other inspections of ships and bases.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}By Georg Schindler,<br />
<br />
{{pad|580px}}Gunnery Engineer, 2nd Class.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}AUSTRIAN NAVY.<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
The only details which have been dealt with are those which were of Gunnery interest.<br />
<br />
{|<br />
| A.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "SEYDLITZ"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| B.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "OSTFRIESLAND"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| C.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "VON DER TANN"<br />
| were<br />
|-<br />
| D.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "GROSSER KÜRFURST"<br />
| in<br />
|-<br />
| E.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"&nbsp;<br />
| "MARKGRAF"<br />
| engagement.<br />
|-<br />
| F.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "MOLTKE"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| G.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"<br />
| "DERFFLINGER"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| H.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "KÖNIG"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| J.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "HINDENBURG" (building)<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| K.<br />
| Large Battleship<br />
| "BAYERN"<br />
| rowspan=2 | } Newly commissioned<br />
|-<br />
| L.<br />
| T.B.D.<br />
| "G.90"<br />
|-<br />
| M.<br />
| colspan=3 | Fishing vessels Anti-Submarine armament, etc.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| N.<br />
| colspan=3 | Short inspection of the Ordnance Workshops in the Arsenal in Wilhelmshaven. <br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| O.<br />
| Ditto in Kiel.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|}<br />
<br />
Ships under A.B.C.J. and M. were in Wilhelmshaven. D.E.F. in Hamburg and G.H.K.L. in Kiel.<br />
<br />
In the following reports on each ship, Section 1 deals with the effect of enemy hits on ships A. to H. above, in conjunction with the two attached ship sketches (Enclosures 1 and 2). [Not attached.]<br />
<br />
Of the hits marked in the sketches those of a gunnery interest are distinguished by red ink. Section II gives general remarks concerning the ships in question.<br />
<br />
Further a report is submitted on installations in newly commissioned ships (K. and L.) also on a ship still under construction (J.), as well as means of combating submarines installed in Fishing vessels (M.) and finally, briefly on the Ordnance workshops in the Naval Arsenals (N. and O.).<br />
<br />
A. "SEYDLITZ" (Enclosure 1).<br />
<br />
This Cruiser received 24 shell hits (38 cm. 34.3 cm. and 30.5 cm.)(15", 13.5" and 12") and one Torpedo hit.<br />
<br />
Except for 1 shell hit (apparently 34.3 cm.) (13.5") on the starboard side forward (Hits nos.2-4) and one hit no.16 (38 cm.?) in the starboard after 15 cm. (6") casemate all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all Gun tubes, Guns and many fittings had been dismantled and landed.<br />
<br />
<center>I. Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
<br />
1. A large calibre shell (hit no.8) struck the 2nd. 15 cm. port casemate (from forward), put the gun out of action and killed or seriously wounded the majority of the gun's crew.<br />
<br />
2. A 38 cm. shell exploded in the 4th 15 cm. casemate (hit No.13) the gun was similarly damaged, and 2 men (wounded) remained alive of the crew.<br />
<br />
3. In the port after 15 cm. casemate, No.6 gun, (hit No.15) had the same effect as the two described above.<br />
<br />
4. A 38 cm. shell (hit No.16) penetrated the armoured bulkhead on starboard side aft, near the last 15 cm. casemate, close to the curve of the armour (Fig.1, Enc.3) destroyed the 15 cm. gun and killed most of the gun crew.<br />
<br />
Of the twelve 15 cm. guns it appears that 2 port and 4 starboard fired unceasingly until the end.<br />
<br />
5. No.2 Turret (starboard) received a hit from port on the vertical turret armour (hit No.21) to the right of the right gun. Part of the nose of the shell pierced the armour anddestroyed [sic] the cradle and training gear of the right gun. The left was undamaged. The turret remained in action with this gun.<br />
<br />
6. An interesting hit is to be seen on the right 28 cm. gun of No.3 Turret port. The gun was on one of the jetties of the arsenal and could be examined. A large calibre shell hit the aforesaid gun a glancing blow just outside the turret, producing at the point of impact, a considerable elliptical scoop on the outside, causing a fracture of the inner tube and in addition bent the gun so that the axis of the tube at the muzzle was (as far as could be estimated) 200 mm. (about 8 in.) out of line.<br />
<br />
The cradle of this gun was split, the trunnions somewhat bent and the caps thereof partially opened out.<br />
<br />
The left gun of this turret, however, remained serviceable and the Turret could continue firing without interruption.<br />
<br />
7. A 34.3 cm. (13.5") shell (hit No.18) pierced the vertical armour of the revolving structure of No.4 Turret superimposed to the left of the left gun exploded inside the turret, ignited the cartridges which were ready for loading, put the turret out of action and killed all the crew (about 70 men) except 6.<br />
<br />
T [sic] This turret, already out of action, received another hit later from a 38 cm. (15") shell (hit No.17) this projectile struck the revolving Turret armour close to the lower edge at the right rear of the turret, and partially penetrated the turret.<br />
<br />
8. A Large calibre shell tore off the roof of the after (No.5) turret. (Geschossgeller ? ricochet). The turret suffered no appreciable damage inside.<br />
<br />
The remaining hits are being dealt with in the report on ship construction.≠ [I.D. Note: The original of this report can, unfortunately, not be obtained.]<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
<center>II Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
1. Extensive "flash" protection was already installed in "SEYDLITZ".<br />
<br />
(a) The openings for bringing 28 cm. cartridges into the lower loading chamber of the Ammunition Hoist can be shut off with sliding doors (schubtüren ?). The supply scuttles from the magazines are fitted with hinged flaps which open upwards on each side (Fig.3, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
(b) The 15 cm. (5.9") Ammunition hoists at the supply position in the casemates are fitted with a "closing flap" which shuts automatically, but its own weight assisted by a spring, immediately after the ammunition has rolled out on to the Ammunition Tray (which is placed in a horizontal position by a Paternoster apparatus (endless chain) (Fig.4, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
2. Apparently Gas Masks are employed in all ships. The method of use is the same as in the German Army. <u>Every</u> man was supplied with a mask (as it happened 2 days before action). These masks were to be brought into use immediately there was any evidence of suffocating gases, and they were so far successful that, according to the opinions of officers, at least one ship, if not two, was saved by their use.<br />
<br />
3. Enemy "shorts" usually exploded on hitting the water, with the result that, (as in the cases of shells exploding on board), splinters of various sizes struck guns among other things, and caused damage, but in practically every case no stoppage of firing from the gun resulted. Shell splinters also entered Conning Towers and Turrets through the sighting slits. But they caused no internal damage as their force was broken by their passage through the deeps [sic] slits. (Fig.5, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
4. In Turret firing. Salvoes were gradually used, and always with <u>only one</u> gun of each turret.<br />
<br />
5. For transmission of orders to the guns (also to 15 cm. (5.9" guns) from the Gunnery Officers position (in the Conning Tower) Elevation pointers are used which are mounted (<u>separately</u>) on brackets away from the Turret armour.<br />
<br />
6. Ranges of the individual rangefinders are shown on a circular scale (range receiver) by means of electrically worked pointers. All these dials are mounter [sic] in a circular box (Fig.6, Enc.3) so that the ranges of the same object shown by several rangefinders (Pointers in similar direction)[.] Further, it is possible to cut out one or other of the dials if the Rangetaker concerned is ranging badly.<br />
<br />
7. Repulse of Destroyers is carried out invariably by means of broadside salvoes of 15 cm. (5.9) guns etc. and one target only is always used. But the Gunlayer is only to fire when sights are exactly on the target.<br />
<br />
8. The 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) guns were not used in the battle. It is understood that in the future guns of this calibre, will only be retained on board as anti-aircraft guns, as was laid down for all ships.<br />
<br />
9. (a) The empty 26 cm. (11") cartridge cases are thrown out of the turrets on to the deck through openings in rear of the Gun platforms (2 per turret). A covering flap, opening downwards when the cases are thrown out, automatically closes the hole by means of a spring (Fig.7, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
(b) The fired 15 cm. (5.9") cartridge are placed in a large hanging net in the casemate, and are only removed from the casemate during a lull in the firing. It was stated that a very large number of fired cases (including Large Calibre ones) were collected and brought back.<br />
<br />
10. The voice pipes are made of 60,100 and 150 mm. diameter (2.4 in., 3.8 in.,and 6 in.). (The last named are called Schallrohre and are intended for short distances). Voice pipes are not lagged.<br />
<br />
11. The ventilation of the Turrets is similar to the method employed in our newer ships. A Fan placed between the two guns, sucks, on the one hand the powder gases from the breeches by means of a ventilation pipe from each gun when the breech is opened and on the other hand draws them away from the roof of the turret on the gun platform another fan, portable, and continually running, was installed when sucked in fresh air through a hose and passed it into the interior of the turret bymeans [sic] of a second hose. If any man had any difficulty in breathing he inhaled fresh air through the second hose. But even this method only afforded partial relief.<br />
<br />
12. All Gunnery machinery (hydraulic and electric) appears to have function correctly.<br />
<br />
13. From the Gunnery point of view there were no serious fires (magazines of any description), for which the "Flash door" protection described in Section II Miscellaneous, Pars. I (a) and (b) is principally responsible. All cartridges actually in a turret or casemate,when [sic] an enemy shell burst in the turret or casemate, were exploded in every case. Therefore the rule was most strictly enforced that only the absolute minimum of ammunition was kept ready at the guns.<br />
<br />
14. "SEYDLITZ" had 1150 28 cm. (11" shell) on board, of which 450 were expended. (No ship expended all her ammunition).<br />
<br />
15. The torpedo nets were not actually a hindrance in the action but they sustained heavy damage fromenemy [sic] hits and splinters so that parts of them hung down over the ships side.<br />
<br />
In future these nets being useless ballast will no longer be carried. This is already the case in the new battleship "BAYERN".<br />
<br />
<center>B. "OSTRFRIESLAND".</center><br />
<br />
<center>I. Hits. (Enclosure 1).</center><br />
<br />
This Battleship received no shell hits, but was struck by a mine onthe [sic] starboard side forward. The detailed description is contained in the report on Ship Construction.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
At the time of the inspection of this ship the 30.5 cm. (12") Ammunition was being embarked. The shells were being slung from the Quay on to the Deck by means of a powerful floating crane in bundles (of about 5 projectiles). All cartridges are enclosed in long water-tight zinc containers, fitted with stiffening bands. They were being rolled on board carefully across broad planks and stowed in the Magazines. If several rounds of ready ammunition have to be stowed in the Turret, the charges are always kept in the zinc cylinders.<br />
<br />
The 30.5 cm. (12") and also 28 cm. (11") projectiles are (according to the statement of the Gunnery Officer of this ship, Lt.Comdr.Lauenstein) of one description throughout, capped and fitted with base fuse. Total weight 405 kg. (about 890 lbs.) Bursting charge 12 to 13 kg. (26½ to 29 lbs.) of Trotyl. In the latest ships, however, "Armour piercing" and "high explosive" shell (but with a new explosive for bursting charge) are again to be used, as is already the case with the 28 cm. (15") shell in the Battleship "BAYERN".<br />
<br />
For the 15 cm.(5.9") guns it is reported that there are two types of shell in use.<br />
<br />
:(a) Fused shell with base fuses.<br />
<br />
:(b) High explosive shell,with a very sensitive nose fuse and a base fuse.<br />
<br />
<center>C. "VON DER TANN". (Enclosure 1.)</center><br />
<br />
This Battle Cruiser received 4 hits from large calibre shells (all on the starboard side).<br />
<br />
<center>I.Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
<br />
(1). The foremost 28 cm. (11") Turret was hit in the Barbette on the starboard side. The shell exploded and the armour was just penetrated (Hit No.1). Three men in the turret sustained burns (not very severe) from the "Flash". But the Turret was placed out of action as the armour at the point of impact was bulged inwards and jammed the Turret.<br />
<br />
(2). The after Conning Tower was similarly hit (Hit No.2)[.] But the shell only caused a shaking of the Tower and all apparatus inside remained intact.<br />
<br />
(3.) A shell exploded in the neighbourhood of the after Turret No.4 (Hit No.3). The effect on the Turret was only evident in a shaking, and the armour in the vicinity of the explosion was very slightly indented but without doing any damage so that the Turret continued in action.<br />
<br />
(4). No.4 hit is only of slight constructional interest.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
(1). In this ship, as in "OSTFRIESLAND", the question as to whether the collection of scraps of metal (coming from driving bands or Cartridge cases) in the Breech made any difference to the condition of the breech was answered in the negative.<br />
<br />
(2). The maximum rate of fire of the 28 cm. (11") guns of this Cruiser, as well as of the 30.5 cm. (12") guns of the "OSTFRIESLAND" is stated to have reached 3 - 4 rounds per minute in peace time.<br />
<br />
(3). The arrangement in the 28 cm. (11") turrets is in principle the same as in "SEYDLITZ" or as in the 30.5 cm. (12") guns of the large Battle Cruiser "HINDENBURG" (now building), with the exception of a few improvements in the last named ship. But while in the later ships (30.5 cm. 12") hydraulic rammers with reserve Hand ramming are installed "VON DER TANN" has only double Hand rammers, which are hung under the Turret roof.<br />
<br />
<center>D. "GROSSER KURFÜRST."</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Effects of shell hits (Enclosure 1).</center><br />
<br />
The ship was hit 8 times (large calibre) all from the port side.<br />
<br />
:(1) Hit No.4 (presumably 34 cm. 13.5") exploded before the Barbette armour of the foremost Turret.<br>Apart from breaking off small pieces of the hard armour (? Panzerschichte) and a slight shaking of the turret no damage was done to the Turret fittings. A fragment struck the upper surface of a sight slot and remained in the slot, while a good deal of gas entered the Turret and necessitated the use of gas masks by the crew for some time.<br />
<br />
:(2). A further heavy shell (Hit No.6) struck the port 15 cm.(5.9") Casemate (3rd. from forward) killed 10 of the crew of 14, but damaged the gun so little that after about 12 minutes the gun's crew having been made up, it was brought into action again. Two cartridges which were in the casemate were ignited.<br />
<br />
:(3). The other hits are only of constructional interest.<br />
<br />
:Some 30.5 cm. (12") and 15 cm. (5.9") guns were damaged on the outside by splinters from "shorts", but sustained no other damage.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
The Magazine arrangements in this ship were somewhat more minutely examined as well as reports made concerning them. (The arrangements described below are also used in the other ships).<br />
<br />
The shell bins and shell transport to the shell hoist are shown in Fig. 8, Enc.3) diagrammatically.<br />
<br />
A shell grab (Z) worked by 2 electric motors automatically controlled is used to transport the shell from the bins to the waiting tray fixed round the trunk (Turmraum) (A 1.-4). This grab is suspended from a broad length of wire sword matting, the latter can be wound up or down round a drum (Wa), if the transporting shaft (T) which is provided with two diametrical opposite longitudinal feathers is turned in the corresponding direction. Shaft (T) is fitted into drum (Wa). By this the grab is wound up or down. The grab is moved horizontally by the carrier (R), which holds the above-mentioned revolving drum, being drawn to one side or the other by an endless rope, worked electrically along the shaft (T). To assist the long shaft a deck rail is fitted above it which carries the weights, (Projectile grab and drum with carrier), the carrier being suspended from the rail. The electrical starting levers for both motors are fitted in the shell handing room.<br />
<br />
If it is required to get a shell out of the bin, the motor operating the horizontal movement of the grab is started. Then the long transporting drum is turned correspondingly by the 2nd.motor, thereby lowering the grab, which grips the shell by automatic pressure. Thereupon, by turning the shaft in the opposite direction the shell is raised, transported to the waiting tray (A) of which 4 are provided and placed on it. This waiting tray is so arranged that a shell can be landed only in the one position in order to prevent an inverted landing on the shell bogie relative to the entry in the hoist. The shell bogie is fitted with the same stops as the waiting tray.<br />
<br />
From the waiting tray the shell can be placed on either of the two shell bogies (which are rigidly joined to each other). The latter run easily with rollers on a circular rail, and can not only be adjusted exactly at the waiting tray by means of spring stops, but can also be coupled to the shell hoist in the loading position.<br />
<br />
In the shell rooms (lower deck) the shells are stowed in bins four to five deep (Fig.9, Enc.3)[.] The copper driving bands are protected by a broad covering band of strong canvas the ends of which are sewn together with (twine ?). Only rope is placed between the individual shells as a preventative against damage. Two vertical wooden batten are secured to the side walls of the shell bins - right and left.<br />
<br />
In order to ensure the grab gripping the shell as near as possible round the centre of gravity, each shell has a white ring painted round it.<br />
<br />
It is to be noted that the shell room cannot be shut off (water tightly) from the shell handing room as the large openings in the dividing Bulkhead, through which the transport carrier passes, are always open.<br />
<br />
In addition projectiles are stowed in many ships in the corners of the shell handing room itself in fixed bins.<br />
<br />
The 30.5 (12") cartridges are stowed in their water tight zinc cylinders in special stowage fittings in the magazines. These stowages are made of angle Iron and sheet plates. (There is no wood in the fittings).<br />
<br />
The Magazines, (2 decks from the bottom) in contrast to the shell room, are separated from the Magazine handing room, by a means of thin sheet bulkheads, in which the passage ways are fitted with double doors and the circular openings for handing cartridges are fitted with double covering flaps (the latter have already been remarked on in "SEYDLITZ" Section 11, Fig.3, Enc.3.[)]<br />
<br />
For transport of cartridges in the Magazines the transporting gear shewn in Fig.10, Enc.3 is available. This consists of a double rail (R) in which a horizontal (sheet iron) tray, semicircular in section can be moved up and down in guides by means of a hand differential purchase (F). The Tray can then be brought to the exact level of the cartridge. The Transporting gear is suspended from an overhead rail,(S) and also runs in a guide rail on the deck (SS). The cartridge is pushed on to the tray and the transporter then brought to the cartridge handing hole, and after opening the double flaps, transferred to the Turret.<br />
<br />
The Turret appliances correspond in general to those in "HINDENBURG", about which data are described later. But an exception must be made in the case of the size and installation of the Rangefinders (Fig.11, Enc.3).In "KURFÜRST" the Rangefinders about 3 meters (10 ft.) long are fitted in hoods in the front of the Turret, while "HINDENBURG" the 8 metre (26 ft.) range finders are already being fitted in the same way as will be the case in our 35 cm. (about 14") turrets, now building.<br />
<br />
<center>E. "MARKGRAF".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This Battleship was hit 5 times by big guns and all from the port side.<br />
<br />
Only hit No.2 is of gunnery interest. This entered the next to the last 15 cm. (5.(') [5.9"] casemate on the port side and exploded, killing the crew and putting gun out of action for the remainder of the battle, though it did not damage it very seriously.<br />
<br />
Several splinters from this shell pierced the bulkhead and entered the next casemate (forward) and killed or wounded several men. But this gun was brought into action again after an interval of about 10 minutes to make up the crew.<br />
<br />
<center>11. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
In the case of this ship also, splinters from enemy shorts entered the Conning Tower, but without causing any damage to either personnel or Materiel.<br />
<br />
During the whole engagement about 250 rounds of 30 cm. (12") ammunition was fired, i.e. about one fifth of the total supply on board.<br />
<br />
<center>F. "MOLTKE".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This ship was hit 4 times by heavy shell (all from the starboard side).<br />
<br />
One shell (Hit No.3) pierced the upper side armour and burst behind the latter inside the ship. It also caused some damage outside to No.4.15 cm. (5.9") casemate starboard (from forward) killing or wounding several men, but causing little damage to the gun. This gun was again brought into action after about 15 minutes.<br />
<br />
<center>11. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
"MOLTKE" was the only ship from which 4 Torpedoes were fired (not in salvo, but one after the other). On board, it was stated by officers that "QUEEN MARY" was fired at and hit at about 10 kilometres (10,935 yds.), and that this was the cause of the rapid sinking of this Battle Cruiser. Officers of other ships, however, were not of this opinion, as when "MOLTKE" fired the distance from "QUEEN MARY" was about 13 kilometres (14,217 yds.) and that the torpedoes have not this range; so that only Gunnery can be taken into consideration.<br />
<br />
In the "MOLTKE", splinters from short bursting shells also entered the Conning Tower, without, however, causing any noteworthy damage.<br />
<br />
<center>G. "DERFFLINGER".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This Battle Cruiser was hit the largest number of times, viz:- 30, of these 20 were of heavy calibre and all came from the port side.<br />
<br />
:(1) A 15" shell pierced the roof of N.4 30.5 cm. (12") Turret (hit No.5) exploded inside the Turret, thereby igniting all the charges which were there (apparently only two) and killed all the Turret's crew, (74 men including reserve crew), except 2 men who were able to get away (wounded).<br />
<br />
:The Turret itself was put out of action because (as was the case in all these hits on Turrets) much damage was done to the various instruments and appliances by the splinters and flash.<br />
<br />
:It is worthy of note that the electric cables in the Turret were comparatively uninjured.<br />
<br />
:(2). Turret No.3 was also hit by a 38 cm. (15") shell (hit No.6). The projectile penetrated the Barbette armour and took with it a large piece of plating into the interior of the Turret. The 74 men of the Turret's crew (as in the hit described above[)] for the most part were killed, only 6 men getting away wounded. It is observed that an 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) gun which was 3½ metres (about 11½ ft.) away from the point of impact, was completely undamaged, although the deck below the spot, and in the immediate vicinity of this gun, was badly damaged.<br />
<br />
:Nos.3 and 4 Turrets were only put out of action towards the end of the engagement.<br />
<br />
:The two foremost Turrets remained completely intact, although the Barbette armour of the second Turret showed a fairly large scrape from a (very glancing) shell hit. But this caused no further damage to the Turret (hit No.13).<br />
<br />
:(4). The Conning Tower was hit on the starboard side on the edge. But only small pieces of the brittle face of the armoured plates splintered off, and in the Tower itself only one elevation-pointer ceased to function.<br />
<br />
:(5). Very severe damage was done by a large calibre shell (hit No.20) which exploded close to the casemate of the No.2 15 cm. (5.9) gun port, which not only damaged this gun, but also put the two neighbouring 15 cm. (5.9") guns out of action. The first named gun was principally severely damaged on the chase, and the chase of the foremost 15 cm. (5.9") gun was indented to such an extent by splinters, that it could not be fired again. The other gun in the vicinity was so shaken up by the powerful explosion, that it could not be moved again. The casualties sustained by the gun's crews were in contrast comparatively small. (1 man killed and several severely or slightly wounded at the first named gun[)].<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
A large fragment of a 38 cm. (15") shell (which failed to explode), was exhibited on board (as is shown in Fig.12, Enc.3)[.] The much distorted fuze was also found.<br />
<br />
<center>H. "KÖNIG".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits.</center><br />
<br />
There were 13 hits (large calibre) identified all from the port side and above the waterline.<br />
<br />
:(1). A 34.3 cm. (13.5) shell hit the port foremost 15 cm. (5.9") casemate. (Hit No.9). A large piece of armour plating was carried into the casemate, where the shell exploded, killed the gun's crew (11 men) and put the gun out of action. The armour plate went further, penetrated the bulkhead, entered the galley, destroyed it and killed more men.<br />
<br />
:(2). Another 34.3 cm. (13.5") shell penetrated the second 15 cm. (5.9") casemate (hit No.8) and exploded, making the gun useless and, by penetrating the deck also caused much damage in the compartment below. The crew of this gun was by chance not at the moment in the casemate, as they had gone out for a short time on account of gas from the explosion in the first 15 cm. (5.9) casemate (which had occurred just previously.) The result was that there were no killed or wounded among the gun's crew.<br />
<br />
:(3). The traces of a shell were visible on the roof of the foremost 30.5 (12") Turret. (Hit No.11.) The projectile damaged the Rangefinder cover, and tore off a piece of it, rendering the Rangefinder useless. No other damage was caused by this hit.<br />
<br />
:(4). The roof of the Conning Tower was similarly gazed [sic] by a shell, which left a scratch but caused no other damage to the Tower or its instruments, etc.<br />
<br />
<center>J. "HINDENBURG."</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Apparently about 30,000 tons displacement)</center><br />
<br />
This Cruiser, now building will be given an armament of 8 30.5 cm. (12") guns 50 cal. (in four double turrets, 2 forward and 2 aft as in "DERFFLINGER") and 14 15 cm. (5.9") and 8.8 cm[.] (22 pr.) Anti-aircraft guns.<br />
<br />
The foremost superimposed Turret (No.2) was mostly built in, and a short inspection of it was made.<br />
<br />
The Gun-platform is especially roomy. The distance apart of the centres of the two gun barrels being estimated at about 3 metres (10 feet approx.)[.] The complete arrangement of the gun-platform can be seen in the diagrammatic Sketch (Fig.13, Enc.3). The 2 shell hoists (G) are side by side between the gun and to the left of the left gun, (and right of the right gun) are the two ammunition hoists (P).<br />
<br />
The up-coming ammunition is placed in its slide (TT) in the rear by means of unloading rammers (so-called "Umlauder"), whence it rolls on to the loading Tray, and finally on to the shell swings or cartridge swings, which by swinging across, brings the shell or cartridges one after the other to the rear of the gun for loading.<br />
<br />
The two rammers are hydraulic chain Rammers (with reserve hand drive). In the space at the rear of the platform there are :- an entrance opening (E) and two openings (A) for passing out firedcartridge [sic] cases. These openings (A) are constructed similarly to those more exactly described under "SEYDLITZ" (Sec.II. Par.9).<br />
<br />
The Breeches are worked hydraulically (the reserve method being by hand.)<br />
<br />
The principle can be gathered from Fig.14, Enc.3 . A bar with a tooth edged point (Z), (which can be worked up or down hydraulically) turns the Traversing shaft by means of cog wheels (R1, R2, R3) and opens or shuts the breech. The Water-pressure is led to the mechanism through two flexible hoses. If the cog wheel R3 is placed out of gear with R2, the hydraulic system is shut off.<br />
<br />
For elevating,Trunnion [sic] sights are provided and for training a sighting telescope is fitted in front between the guns.<br />
<br />
The Rangefinder (about 8 metres long) which was not yet on board, is to be fitted in the front of the Turret above the guns (under the roof as already referred to under "KURFÜRST")[.] Only the two side openings in the armour could be seen.<br />
<br />
Elevating is worked hydraulically (Reserve system by hand). (The ammunition hoists are also worked hydraulically, but here the alternative system is electric).<br />
<br />
A gun coupling is fitted in this ship as in all later ships. But these couplings are apparently only for use when it is desired to elevate a gun whose elevating gear has been damaged.<br />
<br />
The normal Turret Training gear and also the reserve system is only worked by electric motors.<br />
<br />
The same system of ventilation is used as has already been described in "SEYDLITZ" (Section II, Par.II).<br />
<br />
All working machinery (Electrically driven pumps, and electric motors for elevating, training, hoists, rammers, etc.) are apparently installed in the spacious working chamber below the gun platform.<br />
<br />
The arrangements in the Magazines as well as the transporting gear for passing shell and cartridges from them to the hoists are the same as those already more minutely described under battleship "GROSSER KÜRFURST."<br />
<br />
<center>K. "BAYERN".</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Class Ersatz "WÖRTH" about 30,000 tons disp.)</center><br />
<br />
This battleship, only recently completed, had to carry out exercises whilst at Kiel, and the Commission was invited to join for a cruise, which gave opportunity for a certain amount of inspection.<br />
<br />
The armament consists of eight 38 cm. (15") G.L. 45 guns in four double turrets apparently arranged as shown in the Almanac; sixteen 15 cm. (5.9") G.L. 45 guns in casemates and eight 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) anti-aircraft guns.<br />
<br />
38 cm. Gun Turret. (Fig. 15, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
The distance apart of the bore axes is 3700 mm. (12.1 ft.) for these guns[.] 8.8 cm. sub-calibre guns are provided, which are put in from outboard (i.e. muzzle end.)<br />
<br />
The Gunhouse, as in the turrets of the "HINDENBURG" is very roomy.<br />
<br />
In this turret there has been introduced no important alteration with respect to the munition hoists. Whereas in all previous ships the shot hoist was separate from the cartridge hoist, in this ship, as with us (the Austrian Navy), both hoists for one gun are combined in one trunk; and also instead of the shell and cartridge swings in the "HINDENBURG" (see above) munition wagons (W1, W2), which run on cross rails are introduced. The two main hoists (A1, A2) come up between the two guns. Besides these there are in addition two electrically driven auxiliary hoists (H1, H2).<br />
<br />
The round which arrives at the top of the hoist is taken out and landed, by means of the unloading rammer (U) in the munition wagon, which brings it to the rear of the particular gun in the loading position, whence it is loaded by means of the rammer.<br />
<br />
The munition wagons, rammers and unloading rammers are normally worked by hydraulic power (with auxiliary handworking gear); at the back of the turret are two principal operating positions, (ST1, ST2) which are raised to give a good all-round view, and where all the necessary manipulation for the foregoing hydraulic machinery is carried out.<br />
<br />
The munition hoists are also hydraulically worked, and electric drive is provided as an alternative. The elevating and breech mechanism gear are hydraulic (with alternative hand gear).<br />
<br />
The following sighting arrangements are provided :-<br />
<br />
:(a) For elevation - two side trunnion sights as well as two reserve sights in front.<br />
<br />
:(b) For training - a principal trainer's telescope in front between the two guns, as well as a side telescope as reserve.<br />
<br />
Asked whether any automatic firing apparatus was in contemplation, it was replied that a place for such apparatus was provided but the installation could not be expected till later, and depended on the solution of several problems which had yet to be experimented on.<br />
<br />
The large 8.2 m. (26.9 ft.) rangefinder is placed the same as in the "HINDENBURG".<br />
<br />
The ventilation of the turret is on the same principle as in the "HINDENBURG" and "SEYDLITZ", except that in addition there are two powerful electric fan motors between the guns.<br />
<br />
The Training is done electrically, as is also the alternative arrangement. Fig 15, Enc.3 gives a diagrammatic sketch of the arrangements. The controller gives 72 degrees of speed.<br />
<br />
For absorbing the shock in the training gear of single gun shooting there are provided, in the friction coupling box of the worm gearing, besides the friction plates (as in our own installations) two rings of strong springs above them - each ring containing six springs as shewn in Fig.17, Enc.3. Apparently any turret thrown off a small angle by a single round will be trained back to its original position by means of these springs.<br />
<br />
As in "HINDENBURG", so also in "BAYERN", the various machines for training[,] elevating, munition supply, rammers and unloading rammers are placed on the deck underneath the Gun platform (working chamber), and also the machines for the magazine and transport arrangements of munitions are similarly installed.<br />
<br />
In Fig. 18, Enc.3 is a diagrammatic sketch of the munition hoists and magazines from which it can be seen that the shell room is on the lowest level and has the magazine above it. The cartridge loading door (F1 for cartridges, G1 for shell) are fitted for flash protection with sliding shutters which are self-operating when the lift arrives at one or the other, i.e. when the lift arrives at the bottom, the shutter there will open and leave the loading hole (P) free, while the upper openings F1 and G1 will be shut and locked.<br />
<br />
An inspection of the shell room 38 cm. (15") showed that on these shells there is attached to the rearmost of the three upper driving bands a zinc band about 20 mm. (.78 in.) broad (similar to the driving bands). Experience has shown that this zinc ring is a very good anti-coppering device for the bore. It was apparently on the French front, at Verdun and in Flanders, that experiments with this arrangement were made; the results were very good and its introduction followed. The Army has also adopted it.<br />
<br />
The following is the situation with regard to 38 cm. (15 in.) shell. As opposed to the single type of shell (long calibre) in newly completing ships, here there are two :-<br />
<br />
:(a) A.P. shell, with cap, total length of shell 3.5 calibres.<br />
<br />
:(b) H.E. shell, uncapped, total length of shell 4.1 calibres. The total weight is 750 kg. (1653.5 lbs). The burster (not Trotyl, probably Heranit? 23.5 kg. (57.8 lbs.) for the A.P. shell and 67 kg. (147.7 lbs) for the H.E. The establishment allowed per [gun] is 90 A.P. and 30 H.E. The maximum range is 24 kilometres (26,247 yds.) with an angle of descent of 32 degrees, elevation of gun 247 degrees, time of flight 48 secs.<br />
<br />
:The charge is 87 kg. (191.8 lbs) in the main cartridge and 96 kg. (211.6 lbs.) in the foremost cartridge.<br />
<br />
:The rate of fire is one round per 40 seconds.<br />
<br />
15 cm. casemates. In these ships the flash protection for the 15 cm. (5.9") munition hoists in the casemates has been improved (Fig.20, Enc.3). In that a sheet iron chamber (K) has been built around the delivery opening which, by means of sliding plates (S1 and S2) can be shut off either from the trunk or from the munition tray. (G2.) For example, a shell arrives at the top of the hoist (G) - the shutter (S1) is raised in its guides by means of the lift mechanism, so that the shell can roll into the chamber (G1) while the shutter (S3) remains closed. Immediately afterwards the shutter (S1) closes the opening and the shutter (S2) raises in its guides and the shell rolls on the munition tray (G2). By this means the trunk is rendered flash proof at all stages of the operation.<br />
<br />
Submerged Flats. On board this ship there was also the opportunity to visit a submerged flat with two broadside tubes.<br />
<br />
In all there are five tubes (2 in each flat) and a bow tube. The calibre of the torpedoes is 60 cm. (23.6 in.) and the weight of a fully charged torpedo 2200 kg. (4850 lbs.). The explosive (? Heranit) weighing 250 kg. (531.1 lbs). The establishment per tube is four torpedoes - making in all 20 on board. The greatest torpedo range is 13 kilometres, 14,217 yds) with a medium speed setting of 28 knots.<br />
<br />
The flat that was visited (Fig.21, Enc.3) is very large and about 5 metres high, (16 ft.) so that it is perfectly feasible to turn any torpedo hanging on the purchase at the turntable (W1) on the overhead rails, so that is [sic] can be loaded into the port or starboard tube.<br />
<br />
The tubes (L1, L2) are side loading with very strong longitudinal holts [sic] on top (V1, V2) and fitted with a strong shield bar. For loading the torpedoes in the tubes, there are fitted near the tubes, on the same side on the side door, mechanical loading apparatus (quickloaders A1, A2), and on the opposite side are provided the rails (R1, R2) which serve for the adjustment (lever system) of the gyroscope of a torpedo lying in the tube.<br />
<br />
A torpedo is struck down from the upper deck through the trunk (E) and swung through the opening (O) into the flat, whence by means of a purchase (mechanically driven) it is run on to the tramways (S) and thence either to the bulkhead stowage or to a stowage over the tube.<br />
<br />
One must take this opportunity of noting that the overhead rails are not bolted to the actual deck, but are a separate structure, so as to avoid putting any vibration or other strain on to the armoured deck.<br />
<br />
If a torpedo is to be loaded it will be brought by means of the purchase to the exact ready stowage over the tube; then the hydraulic loader is operated by a lever; a grad [sic] with two arms seizes the torpedo in two specially cut away parts and draws it horizontally on to the guide rail of the loader, which then is lowered together with the torpedo. In the meantime the side door is mechanically unbolted and opened, so that the torpedo can be placed right in the tube (impulse frame). After this the guide rail and grab of the loader are withdrawn and raised, while the side door is shut and bolted. Loading by this means proceeds comparatively noiselessly, rapidly and precisely.<br />
<br />
The sluice is hydraulically worked, and after firing is operated by the return movement of the shield bar. When draining the tube the water can be pumped either overboard or into a well.<br />
<br />
The discharge is operated electrically from the Conning Tower or by hand.<br />
<br />
The sluice is hydraulically worked, and after firing is operated by the return movement of the shield bar. When draining the tube the water can be pumped either overboard or into a well.<br />
<br />
The discharge is operated electrically from the Conning Tower or by hand.<br />
<br />
<center>L. TORPEDO BOAT "G. 90".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1200 tons displacement.)</center><br />
<br />
From the Battleship "BAYERN" the Commission was brought back to Kiel in one of the newest torpedo boats (G.90), which offered an opportunity of seeing certain details.<br />
<br />
The gun armament consists of three 10.5 cm. (4.1") Guns on transferable mountings; the torpedo armament, of two single tubes forward and two double tubes for<nowiki>*</nowiki> [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. Note: Apparently a clerical error for 50 cm.(19.7")] 45 cm. (17.7") torpedoes in the after part. (See Fig. 22, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
The following details respecting the torpedo equipment were noted :<br />
<br />
Six torpedoes were carried, which remain stowed in the tubes; spare torpedoes are not carried on board, and no torpedo stowage is provided. The tubes of the twin mountings are not parallel but inclined outwards from each other, making an angle of 20° between the tubes.<br />
<br />
The reason for this lies in the method of torpedo boat attack. Torpedo craft always fire on the swing (in order to offer the full broadside target to the enemy fire for the shortest possible time), and the torpedoes from a twin mounting are are [sic] fired one after the other (the mounting remaining on a fixed bearing). The first torpedo having been fired, the boat continues to swing under helm and after 20° the second torpedo is fired.<br />
<br />
The training is done by means of a training gear at each tube, which can be understood from the detailed sketch (Fig. 23, Enc.3). By means of the hand crank (K) a worm and worm wheel (Zr) can be turned, this engages inthe [sic] training rack (Zs) and so the tube can be trained. The training pinion can, by means of a coupling clutch worked by the lever (H) be disconnected from the rack, should be required to train the mounting quickly, or for loading and unloading the torpedo by means of the training gear. This latter is accomplished by means of the windlass (W) mounted on the training shaft round which can be taken a line secured either to the nose or the tail of the torpedo. At the back part of the mounting is fitted a training brake which grips the rack.<br />
<br />
A director is fitted at each tube, and torpedoes are fired electrically from the bridge. At the rear of each tube are fitted two firing pushes (Abfeurungspöller), which can be operated either singly or together. In order to prevent firing from a tube which is not yet at the ready, the particular firing gear is held fast by a special locking gear fitted to the tube; its method of working can be seen from (Fig.24, Enc.3). The locking levers (St1 and St2) are only clear of the firing gear, when the rollers (R1 and R2), connected to the locking gear, are clear of the guide strip (G). This guide strip covers the arc in which firing is to be prevented. The springs.(F1 and F2) release the gear, as shewn in the sketch under (T).<br />
<br />
For torpedo transport on deck a special rail is fitted on the starboard side, on which was seen a fairly long transport wagon.<br />
<br />
<center>M. TRAWLER.</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Fitted out for Anti Submarine work)</center><br />
<br />
For fighting submarine boats trawlers are employed with the following :-<br />
<br />
:(a). A.S.rope nets fitted with two or four A.S.mines.<br />
<br />
:(b). Large Depth charges.<br />
<br />
:(c). Anti Submarine explosive Kite.<br />
<br />
::These appliances are described below.<br />
<br />
(a). Nets with A.S. Mines (Fig.25, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
These nets are made up from hemp rope (diameter of rope about 10 mm.); they are 250 m.long and of varying breadth (up to 20 m.) To a normal net two mines (M.M.) are attached (see Fig.25, Enc.3); for broader nets the mines are secured in pairs vertically - thus making four mines to a broad net. The mines are supported by their own large iron flat (S) while for the support of the nets smaller floats (S1) are placed on top.<br />
<br />
Each pair of nets also has an anchor and cable attached.<br />
<br />
The nets which are joined together are stowed with their mines in large shaped iron floats. The latter are stowed ready for shooting in two rows, (1 and 2, Fig.26, Enc3) on the top of the trawler. Shortly before action the primers are inserted through circular holes in the floats (1 hole per float).<br />
<br />
The shooting of nets one and two is carried out at a speed of 10 knots by one man. First , the first anchor of the first net is let go and the net with its mines dragged into the water, afterwards being anchored by the second anchor. Before, however, this latter is slipped the first anchor of the second net must be let go to ensure over-lapping.<br />
<br />
There are tiny holes in the floats by means of which just sufficient water can enter the floats so as to sink the net with its mines and floats at the end of an hour, and leave the area free again for traffic.<br />
<br />
These net mines (Fig.27, Enc.3) are contact mines with an explosive charge (1) from 12-13 kg. of Trotyl and consist of the mine case (M), firing mechanism (S), impact plate (P), distance pin (St), the safety lever (S1) and the primer (J) with the detonator (K).<br />
<br />
When the mine enters the water and reaches a depth of 5 metres the safety catch is released by a hydrostatic valve, which thus frees the detonator for the striker.<br />
<br />
Firing is effected in that by the impact of a submarine the impact plate (and with it the distance pin) are displaced, and by means of the latter the striker is freed and fires the mine by means of the firing spring (which is already cocked).<br />
<br />
(b). Depth charge (Fig., Enc.3).<br />
<br />
These depth charges are cylindrical in form and contain a large explosive charge of 60 kg. of Trotyl. They consist of the mine (M) and the float (S). The latter is connected to the mine by a strong steel wire (3 mm.), which is wound on a reel in the float. It fires (exactly like the depth charge of Korvetten Kapitän Schönthaler) because on reaching the set depth the tension on the wire operates the firing mechanism (Striker spring (F) is compressed as the striker (B) is raised by the grab (Z)) and thus frees the striker.<br />
<br />
The set depth can be adjusted from 5 to 5 (5 to 50?) metres (practically in the same way as in the Schönthaler Depth Charge) and it is to be noted that the time of explosion (1 to 5 secs) is adjustable by means of turning the pointer of the seconds scale (E) on the outside. The delay action itself operates by means of a disc similar to shrapnel.<br />
<br />
(c). Explosive Kite (Fig.30, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
The Kite (D) is made of wood and shaped as shown in Fig.31, inside is an explosive charge (the same size as the net mine, 12 - 13 kg., described in par. (a) above.<br />
<br />
The Kite is towed by a 15 mm. strong steel wire (T) whose core is an electric cableby [sic] means of which the kite is electrically exploded.<br />
<br />
The cable wire is wound on the winch (K), the ends being connected to the electric firing battery in the hollow drum.<br />
<br />
The towing wire is led from the winch over an adjustable brake (B) and from there over a roller (R) secured to a derrick (L) where the other end is connected to the charge.<br />
<br />
When the kite hits against a hard object (submarine) it is electrically fired.<br />
<br />
As a safety precaution the electric switch at the battery is only made when the kite is towing at the requisite speed.<br />
<br />
Trawlers tow at 10 knots, which causes a pull of 350 kg. on the wire.<br />
<br />
<center>N. ARSENAL WILHELMSHAVEN.</center><br />
<br />
Only a short visit to the gun shops was made. There about 1,000 civil workman [sic] were employed.<br />
<br />
In general the work carried out was similar to that in our own gun factories (repair of gun material, production of necessary equipment, magazine and shellroom machinery, examination and cleaning of bores of guns, the storage and preservation of magazine and shellroom fittings, small calibre guns, searchlights, range finders, etc.), only here the buildings, in particular the shops and storehouses, are modern throughout and planned on a spacious lay out.<br />
<br />
The drawing office is worthy of note, in it at that time the stowage plan of munitions for the Battle Cruiser "HINDENBURG" was in preparation. For the protection of such drawings there is provided a large fireproof room.<br />
<br />
To the gun shops belong :- the large mechanical shops, a smithy, a large carpenter's shop, a large shop for work on canvas, leather, and similar equipment, a plumber's shop, two very roomy storehouses for magazine material and a depot for various constructional materials; in the last named is a special,cellar for rubber and leather articles in which at the time there were gathered about 700,000 marks worth.<br />
<br />
A new large gun hall was under construction which is about 60 m. long and 25 m. broad. The building itself was nearly finished, only the installation and also the large travelling crane were not in place.<br />
<br />
Both high sliding doors (T1 T2) were operated by an electrically driven (alternative hand working) which at the side. The travelling crane (N) brings the material to the door, where a floating crane (S) with large overhang takes it over and provides for its further transport.<br />
<br />
While passing through the shop the decoppering of a 15 cm. (5.9) gun was seen. The decoppering machine was a brush withbvery [sic] fine steel bristles, as shewn in Fig.33. The head of the brush (K) is a cylindrical drum of strong plate, which before use is filled with petroleum and turpentine. On the head are fixed three bristle holding rings (H), which carry on their periphery the small steel bristles (B). These three bristle rings are separated by two intermediate rings (R).<br />
<br />
The fine steel wire used in the bristles is 0.2 mm. thick and must be softer than the material of the inner tube so as not to scratch the latter. The cleaning is accomplished by powerful brushing th [sic] through the bore, this action forcing out the petroleum mixture from the drum at the head of the brush into the bore.<br />
<br />
The decoppering device was very successful with the 15 cm. (5.9") gun; a small quantity of the copper scraping and two bristles were given to the Mission. (A bristle and a portion of copper scrapings accompany the reports (1 each) to the K.U.K.K.M. Marine Section (Austrian Admiralty) and to the (Austrian) Naval Technical Committee.)<br />
<br />
<center>O. ARSENAL KIEL.</center><br />
<br />
The "Artilleriewerkstätten" (Gun shops) at Kiel are in general the same as those at Wilhelmshaven described above, so that this amounted to an opportunity for closer description.<br />
<br />
The only noteworthy sight among the gunshops visited was one very large gunhall in which numerous guns are stowed, (among them some from ships that had been in the battle (Jutland); for the transport of the heaviest weights are two travelling cranes (each of 45 tons both cranes are employed together). For the further transport normal gauge rail tracks are provided.<br />
<br />
For the mechanical decoppering of guns a special scraper is used, whose action can be seen from Fig. 34. In the dial shaped head (K) are two difference scrapers (S1 S2), which by means of an inserting gear (E) can be placed exactly in the groove it is required to clean. The scraper (S1), cleans the base of the grooves, the scraper (S2) cleans the sides. The red (st) is guided so as to avoid any corners of the scraper<nowiki>*</nowiki> [I.D.Note: Apparently this guide rod arrangement keeps the scraper true in the groove.] This apparatus has proved its worth.<br />
<br />
Later on information from the Ordnance Department of the Admiralty showed that 30.5 and 28 cm. gun tubes, from which 60 - 100 rounds had been fired in the action, from later experimental firings at Krupps were found to have suffered from wear (actually about 20 mm.) which permitted overramming. After the conclusion of the experimental firings, only gun tubes of equ [sic] equal wear are sent to one and the same ship.<br />
<br />
Of very great interest is the information that many of the 25 cm. (13.7") guns, which were on the French front (6 on the Verdun front) had fired 600 - 800 rounds with full charge (range 36 kilometers, 39,376 yds.) with a diminished range of only 2 km., 2,187 yds. and no necessity for a new inner tube. The shell used in these guns were those provided with the anti-coppering zinc ring.<br />
<br />
The following summarize the points of the greatest importance.<br />
<br />
:1. Introduction of gas masks for each man, as of utmost importance.<br />
<br />
:2. Specially important is flash protection (including) cover plates for munition hoist trunks in turrets and casemates, shut off hatches and doors as well as partition of the magazines.).<br />
<br />
:3. As few cartridges as possible by the gun (in the gun house of a turret or in a casemate), because of the great danger of its ignition by a hit.<br />
<br />
:4. Abolition of the ready use position in the turrets (on account of point 3, above).<br />
<br />
:5. Many gun tubes 30.5 and 28 cm. (12" and 4" [sic]) have fired 60 - 100 rounds with only 20 mm. overramming.<br />
<br />
:6. Many gun tubes undergo experimental firing and are reissued only in similar tubes to one ship.<br />
<br />
:7. Automatic firing apparatus is not yet in use.<br />
<br />
:8. Gun coupling gear provided, but is only used in the event of danger to elevating gear.<br />
<br />
:9. Introduction of small calibre guns 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) only for anti-aircraft work.<br />
<br />
:10. Normally the turrets only fire salvoes, and only from one gun per turret.<br />
<br />
:11. Repulse of Torpedo boat attacks is achieved by broadside salvoes from the 15 cm. (5.9") guns - all in one target.<br />
<br />
:12. Normal turret machinery :-<br />
<br />
::Training{{pad|50px}}Electric (as is also reserve)<br />
<br />
::Elevating<br />
<br />
::Rammers<br />
<br />
::Unloading rammers{{pad|50px}}All hydraulic and<br />
<br />
::Breech mechanism and in some{{pad|30px}}hand control.<br />
<br />
::cases Munition wagons<br />
<br />
::Munition hoists - hydraulic - with electric reserve<br />
<br />
::Shell transport in shell rooms - electric<br />
<br />
:13. Observation of fall of shot :- in each top, 1 or two men in telephonic communication with the gunnery officer. (On 31st.May neither Aeroplanes or Zeppelins were present[)].<br />
<br />
:14. Fire control from gunnery officer's position by elevation pointer only.<br />
<br />
:15. All rangefinders stereoscopic normally 3 m. long instruments in armour domes in Turrets, in the latest ships 8 m. instruments projecting from sides below Turret roofs.<br />
<br />
:16. Large calibre projectiles are standard type armour shells with caps and sharply pointed explosive shells without cap are being reintroduced. For 15 cm. Guns (5.9") fused shell with base fuse and H.F. shell with a very sensitive nose fuse and a base fuse.<br />
<br />
:17. No ship expended all her heavy ammunition, at the most a little over 1/3 of the establishment.<br />
<br />
:18. Establishment for heavy guns 115 - 120 rounds per gun.<br />
<br />
:19. As an anti-coppering precaution for guns, projectiles are fitted with a zinc ring behind the rear driving band and in direct contact therewith.<br />
<br />
20. English 38 cm. (15") and 34.3 cm (13.5") projectiles have apparently black powder as a bursting charge: bursting bad and effect not commensurate with the calibre.<br />
<br />
:21. The explosion of a large calibre projectile in a Turret always puts the same out of action.<br />
<br />
:22. Ventilation of Turrets insufficient.<br />
<br />
:23. Voice pipes 60 - 100 and 150 mm. calibre have no lagging and are provided with wooden stoppers or sponges wherewith to close the tube to gases.<br />
<br />
:24. Emergency lighting by means of Pocket lamps.<br />
<br />
:25. Torpedo nets are no longer carried.<br />
<br />
:26. All ranges below 15 km. heavy armour is generally pierced by 38 cm. (15")projectiles. [sic]<br />
<br />
:27. Submarine Defence. Mine nets, (? Depth charges) and Explosive Kites.<br />
<br />
Appendices 2 Sketches, Hits Appendix 1 and 2. One sheet of sketches to report. Appen. 3.<br />
<br />
In conclusion, one matter may be mentioned, which, on the occasion of the visit to the Arsenal at Wilhelmshaven and to the ships, attracted attention through its differing so greatly from our own arrangements. Viz, the handling procedure of consumable stores.<br />
<br />
The characteristic points of the Organisation of this Branch in the German Navy are, as follows :-<br />
<br />
:1. In the ships, the demanding, keeping and issuing of consumable stores is done by one officer under the special supervision of the Commander, who is responsible for the stores being on board, for maintaining them in proper condition, for stowing them efficiently and according to regulations and for the accuracy and completeness of the necessary accounts.<br>These officers are occupied by "Materialenverwalter" W.O.'s [Warrant Officers] who are well trained in the work of their branch and are selected from P.Os. [Petty Officers]<br />
<br />
:2. Money necessary for the Administrative work of the ship is remitted to the Captain in the form of a fixed sum and the expenditure of this is checked by the "Materialenverwalter".<br />
<br />
:3. The limit to the yearly expenditure of stores is fixed by a "Stores Credit" (estimate). Permission to exceed this limit must be obtained from the Admiralty and only in specially exceptional cases is permission for such excess to be requested afterwards.<br />
<br />
:4. The paymaster controls stores and the "Materialenverwalter" accounts and reports tomthe [sic] Captain whenever expenditure in excess of the quantity allowed is to be feared. The paymaster is not responsible for the accuracy of the entries made by the "Materialenverwalter" in books, etc.,kept [sic] by him.<br />
<br />
:5. The Office staff is at the disposal of the Captain to assist in accounting for consumable and non-consumable stores. This staff consists of one officer and the clerk, they are jointly responsible for reporting losses, deficiencies as compared with quantities shown by the books, necessary repairs and replacements. They also keep such records as are necessary to afford at any time a clear statement of the consumable and non-consumable stores and munition on board.<br />
<br />
:6. Stores are completed by demands on the Imperial Dockyards or depots by means of special forms. The consignment note serving as voucher.<br />
<br />
:Ship's demands are not checked by the Dockyards, the ships alone being responsible for the demand being in order.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}Pola, 4th. August, 1916.<br />
<br />
==See Also==<br />
*[[Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland]]<br />
<br />
==Footnotes==<br />
{{reflist}}<br />
<br />
[[Category:Battle of Jutland]]</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Report_on_German_Warships_after_Jutland&diff=334774Austro-Hungarian Naval Report on German Warships after Jutland2024-03-24T18:21:08Z<p>Simon Harley: Made Changes.</p>
<hr />
<div>In the papers of Vice-Admiral [[John Ernest Troyte Harper|John E. T. Harper]] (author of the ''Record of the Battle of Jutland'') is a copy of a translation of an Austro-Hungarian Navy report on German Imperial Navy warships after the [[Battle of Jutland]].<ref>Harper papers. Churchill Archives Centre. JEHR 1/4. This research was made possible by the Colin Bell Award, a grant from the Colin Bell Fund at Churchill College, Cambridge.</ref> It was prepared by ''Marineartillerie-Oberingenieure 2. Klasse'' Georg Schindler. This report is in many ways more detailed than that of ''Fregattenkapitäne'' Hieronymus Graf von Colloredo-Mannsfeld [[Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland|prepared immediately after Jutland]], which is also in Harper's papers. The references to I.D. Notes suggest that, like Colloredo-Mannsfeld's report, this was a translation prepared in the [[Naval Intelligence Division (Royal Navy)|Naval Intelligence Division]].<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
REPORT by a Mission undertaken in accordance with Order. Section 4 M.S. No.1746 of 1916.<br />
----<br />
<br />
On the inspection of German Warships which took part in the Battle of the Skaggerak (Jutland), 31st.May - 1st.June 1916; on Wilhelmshaven, Hamburg and Kiel, and on other inspections of ships and bases.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}By Georg Schindler,<br />
<br />
{{pad|580px}}Gunnery Engineer, 2nd Class.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}AUSTRIAN NAVY.<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
The only details which have been dealt with are those which were of Gunnery interest.<br />
<br />
{|<br />
| A.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "SEYDLITZ"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| B.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "OSTFRIESLAND"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| C.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "VON DER TANN"<br />
| were<br />
|-<br />
| D.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "GROSSER KÜRFURST"<br />
| in<br />
|-<br />
| E.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"&nbsp;<br />
| "MARKGRAF"<br />
| engagement.<br />
|-<br />
| F.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "MOLTKE"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| G.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"<br />
| "DERFFLINGER"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| H.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "KÖNIG"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| J.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "HINDENBURG" (building)<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| K.<br />
| Large Battleship<br />
| "BAYERN"<br />
| rowspan=2 | } Newly commissioned<br />
|-<br />
| L.<br />
| T.B.D.<br />
| "G.90"<br />
|-<br />
| M.<br />
| colspan=3 | Fishing vessels Anti-Submarine armament, etc.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| N.<br />
| colspan=3 | Short inspection of the Ordnance Workshops in the Arsenal in Wilhelmshaven. <br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| O.<br />
| Ditto in Kiel.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|}<br />
<br />
Ships under A.B.C.J. and M. were in Wilhelmshaven. D.E.F. in Hamburg and G.H.K.L. in Kiel.<br />
<br />
In the following reports on each ship, Section 1 deals with the effect of enemy hits on ships A. to H. above, in conjunction with the two attached ship sketches (Enclosures 1 and 2). [Not attached.]<br />
<br />
Of the hits marked in the sketches those of a gunnery interest are distinguished by red ink. Section II gives general remarks concerning the ships in question.<br />
<br />
Further a report is submitted on installations in newly commissioned ships (K. and L.) also on a ship still under construction (J.), as well as means of combating submarines installed in Fishing vessels (M.) and finally, briefly on the Ordnance workshops in the Naval Arsenals (N. and O.).<br />
<br />
A. "SEYDLITZ" (Enclosure 1).<br />
<br />
This Cruiser received 24 shell hits (38 cm. 34.3 cm. and 30.5 cm.)(15", 13.5" and 12") and one Torpedo hit.<br />
<br />
Except for 1 shell hit (apparently 34.3 cm.) (13.5") on the starboard side forward (Hits nos.2-4) and one hit no.16 (38 cm.?) in the starboard after 15 cm. (6") casemate all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all Gun tubes, Guns and many fittings had been dismantled and landed.<br />
<br />
<center>I. Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
<br />
1. A large calibre shell (hit no.8) struck the 2nd. 15 cm. port casemate (from forward), put the gun out of action and killed or seriously wounded the majority of the gun's crew.<br />
<br />
2. A 38 cm. shell exploded in the 4th 15 cm. casemate (hit No.13) the gun was similarly damaged, and 2 men (wounded) remained alive of the crew.<br />
<br />
3. In the port after 15 cm. casemate, No.6 gun, (hit No.15) had the same effect as the two described above.<br />
<br />
4. A 38 cm. shell (hit No.16) penetrated the armoured bulkhead on starboard side aft, near the last 15 cm. casemate, close to the curve of the armour (Fig.1, Enc.3) destroyed the 15 cm. gun and killed most of the gun crew.<br />
<br />
Of the twelve 15 cm. guns it appears that 2 port and 4 starboard fired unceasingly until the end.<br />
<br />
5. No.2 Turret (starboard) received a hit from port on the vertical turret armour (hit No.21) to the right of the right gun. Part of the nose of the shell pierced the armour anddestroyed [sic] the cradle and training gear of the right gun. The left was undamaged. The turret remained in action with this gun.<br />
<br />
6. An interesting hit is to be seen on the right 28 cm. gun of No.3 Turret port. The gun was on one of the jetties of the arsenal and could be examined. A large calibre shell hit the aforesaid gun a glancing blow just outside the turret, producing at the point of impact, a considerable elliptical scoop on the outside, causing a fracture of the inner tube and in addition bent the gun so that the axis of the tube at the muzzle was (as far as could be estimated) 200 mm. (about 8 in.) out of line.<br />
<br />
The cradle of this gun was split, the trunnions somewhat bent and the caps thereof partially opened out.<br />
<br />
The left gun of this turret, however, remained serviceable and the Turret could continue firing without interruption.<br />
<br />
7. A 34.3 cm. (13.5") shell (hit No.18) pierced the vertical armour of the revolving structure of No.4 Turret superimposed to the left of the left gun exploded inside the turret, ignited the cartridges which were ready for loading, put the turret out of action and killed all the crew (about 70 men) except 6.<br />
<br />
T [sic] This turret, already out of action, received another hit later from a 38 cm. (15") shell (hit No.17) this projectile struck the revolving Turret armour close to the lower edge at the right rear of the turret, and partially penetrated the turret.<br />
<br />
8. A Large calibre shell tore off the roof of the after (No.5) turret. (Geschossgeller ? ricochet). The turret suffered no appreciable damage inside.<br />
<br />
The remaining hits are being dealt with in the report on ship construction.≠ [I.D. Note: The original of this report can, unfortunately, not be obtained.]<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
<center>II Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
1. Extensive "flash" protection was already installed in "SEYDLITZ".<br />
<br />
(a) The openings for bringing 28 cm. cartridges into the lower loading chamber of the Ammunition Hoist can be shut off with sliding doors (schubtüren ?). The supply scuttles from the magazines are fitted with hinged flaps which open upwards on each side (Fig.3, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
(b) The 15 cm. (5.9") Ammunition hoists at the supply position in the casemates are fitted with a "closing flap" which shuts automatically, but its own weight assisted by a spring, immediately after the ammunition has rolled out on to the Ammunition Tray (which is placed in a horizontal position by a Paternoster apparatus (endless chain) (Fig.4, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
2. Apparently Gas Masks are employed in all ships. The method of use is the same as in the German Army. <u>Every</u> man was supplied with a mask (as it happened 2 days before action). These masks were to be brought into use immediately there was any evidence of suffocating gases, and they were so far successful that, according to the opinions of officers, at least one ship, if not two, was saved by their use.<br />
<br />
3. Enemy "shorts" usually exploded on hitting the water, with the result that, (as in the cases of shells exploding on board), splinters of various sizes struck guns among other things, and caused damage, but in practically every case no stoppage of firing from the gun resulted. Shell splinters also entered Conning Towers and Turrets through the sighting slits. But they caused no internal damage as their force was broken by their passage through the deeps [sic] slits. (Fig.5, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
4. In Turret firing. Salvoes were gradually used, and always with <u>only one</u> gun of each turret.<br />
<br />
5. For transmission of orders to the guns (also to 15 cm. (5.9" guns) from the Gunnery Officers position (in the Conning Tower) Elevation pointers are used which are mounted (<u>separately</u>) on brackets away from the Turret armour.<br />
<br />
6. Ranges of the individual rangefinders are shown on a circular scale (range receiver) by means of electrically worked pointers. All these dials are mounter [sic] in a circular box (Fig.6, Enc.3) so that the ranges of the same object shown by several rangefinders (Pointers in similar direction)[.] Further, it is possible to cut out one or other of the dials if the Rangetaker concerned is ranging badly.<br />
<br />
7. Repulse of Destroyers is carried out invariably by means of broadside salvoes of 15 cm. (5.9) guns etc. and one target only is always used. But the Gunlayer is only to fire when sights are exactly on the target.<br />
<br />
8. The 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) guns were not used in the battle. It is understood that in the future guns of this calibre, will only be retained on board as anti-aircraft guns, as was laid down for all ships.<br />
<br />
9. (a) The empty 26 cm. (11") cartridge cases are thrown out of the turrets on to the deck through openings in rear of the Gun platforms (2 per turret). A covering flap, opening downwards when the cases are thrown out, automatically closes the hole by means of a spring (Fig.7, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
(b) The fired 15 cm. (5.9") cartridge are placed in a large hanging net in the casemate, and are only removed from the casemate during a lull in the firing. It was stated that a very large number of fired cases (including Large Calibre ones) were collected and brought back.<br />
<br />
10. The voice pipes are made of 60,100 and 150 mm. diameter (2.4 in., 3.8 in.,and 6 in.). (The last named are called Schallrohre and are intended for short distances). Voice pipes are not lagged.<br />
<br />
11. The ventilation of the Turrets is similar to the method employed in our newer ships. A Fan placed between the two guns, sucks, on the one hand the powder gases from the breeches by means of a ventilation pipe from each gun when the breech is opened and on the other hand draws them away from the roof of the turret on the gun platform another fan, portable, and continually running, was installed when sucked in fresh air through a hose and passed it into the interior of the turret bymeans [sic] of a second hose. If any man had any difficulty in breathing he inhaled fresh air through the second hose. But even this method only afforded partial relief.<br />
<br />
12. All Gunnery machinery (hydraulic and electric) appears to have function correctly.<br />
<br />
13. From the Gunnery point of view there were no serious fires (magazines of any description), for which the "Flash door" protection described in Section II Miscellaneous, Pars. I (a) and (b) is principally responsible. All cartridges actually in a turret or casemate,when [sic] an enemy shell burst in the turret or casemate, were exploded in every case. Therefore the rule was most strictly enforced that only the absolute minimum of ammunition was kept ready at the guns.<br />
<br />
14. "SEYDLITZ" had 1150 28 cm. (11" shell) on board, of which 450 were expended. (No ship expended all her ammunition).<br />
<br />
15. The torpedo nets were not actually a hindrance in the action but they sustained heavy damage fromenemy [sic] hits and splinters so that parts of them hung down over the ships side.<br />
<br />
In future these nets being useless ballast will no longer be carried. This is already the case in the new battleship "BAYERN".<br />
<br />
<center>B. "OSTRFRIESLAND".</center><br />
<br />
<center>I. Hits. (Enclosure 1).</center><br />
<br />
This Battleship received no shell hits, but was struck by a mine onthe [sic] starboard side forward. The detailed description is contained in the report on Ship Construction.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
At the time of the inspection of this ship the 30.5 cm. (12") Ammunition was being embarked. The shells were being slung from the Quay on to the Deck by means of a powerful floating crane in bundles (of about 5 projectiles). All cartridges are enclosed in long water-tight zinc containers, fitted with stiffening bands. They were being rolled on board carefully across broad planks and stowed in the Magazines. If several rounds of ready ammunition have to be stowed in the Turret, the charges are always kept in the zinc cylinders.<br />
<br />
The 30.5 cm. (12") and also 28 cm. (11") projectiles are (according to the statement of the Gunnery Officer of this ship, Lt.Comdr.Lauenstein) of one description throughout, capped and fitted with base fuse. Total weight 405 kg. (about 890 lbs.) Bursting charge 12 to 13 kg. (26½ to 29 lbs.) of Trotyl. In the latest ships, however, "Armour piercing" and "high explosive" shell (but with a new explosive for bursting charge) are again to be used, as is already the case with the 28 cm. (15") shell in the Battleship "BAYERN".<br />
<br />
For the 15 cm.(5.9") guns it is reported that there are two types of shell in use.<br />
<br />
:(a) Fused shell with base fuses.<br />
<br />
:(b) High explosive shell,with a very sensitive nose fuse and a base fuse.<br />
<br />
<center>C. "VON DER TANN". (Enclosure 1.)</center><br />
<br />
This Battle Cruiser received 4 hits from large calibre shells (all on the starboard side).<br />
<br />
<center>I.Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
<br />
(1). The foremost 28 cm. (11") Turret was hit in the Barbette on the starboard side. The shell exploded and the armour was just penetrated (Hit No.1). Three men in the turret sustained burns (not very severe) from the "Flash". But the Turret was placed out of action as the armour at the point of impact was bulged inwards and jammed the Turret.<br />
<br />
(2). The after Conning Tower was similarly hit (Hit No.2)[.] But the shell only caused a shaking of the Tower and all apparatus inside remained intact.<br />
<br />
(3.) A shell exploded in the neighbourhood of the after Turret No.4 (Hit No.3). The effect on the Turret was only evident in a shaking, and the armour in the vicinity of the explosion was very slightly indented but without doing any damage so that the Turret continued in action.<br />
<br />
(4). No.4 hit is only of slight constructional interest.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
(1). In this ship, as in "OSTFRIESLAND", the question as to whether the collection of scraps of metal (coming from driving bands or Cartridge cases) in the Breech made any difference to the condition of the breech was answered in the negative.<br />
<br />
(2). The maximum rate of fire of the 28 cm. (11") guns of this Cruiser, as well as of the 30.5 cm. (12") guns of the "OSTFRIESLAND" is stated to have reached 3 - 4 rounds per minute in peace time.<br />
<br />
(3). The arrangement in the 28 cm. (11") turrets is in principle the same as in "SEYDLITZ" or as in the 30.5 cm. (12") guns of the large Battle Cruiser "HINDENBURG" (now building), with the exception of a few improvements in the last named ship. But while in the later ships (30.5 cm. 12") hydraulic rammers with reserve Hand ramming are installed "VON DER TANN" has only double Hand rammers, which are hung under the Turret roof.<br />
<br />
<center>D. "GROSSER KURFÜRST."</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Effects of shell hits (Enclosure 1).</center><br />
<br />
The ship was hit 8 times (large calibre) all from the port side.<br />
<br />
:(1) Hit No.4 (presumably 34 cm. 13.5") exploded before the Barbette armour of the foremost Turret.<br>Apart from breaking off small pieces of the hard armour (? Panzerschichte) and a slight shaking of the turret no damage was done to the Turret fittings. A fragment struck the upper surface of a sight slot and remained in the slot, while a good deal of gas entered the Turret and necessitated the use of gas masks by the crew for some time.<br />
<br />
:(2). A further heavy shell (Hit No.6) struck the port 15 cm.(5.9") Casemate (3rd. from forward) killed 10 of the crew of 14, but damaged the gun so little that after about 12 minutes the gun's crew having been made up, it was brought into action again. Two cartridges which were in the casemate were ignited.<br />
<br />
:(3). The other hits are only of constructional interest.<br />
<br />
:Some 30.5 cm. (12") and 15 cm. (5.9") guns were damaged on the outside by splinters from "shorts", but sustained no other damage.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
The Magazine arrangements in this ship were somewhat more minutely examined as well as reports made concerning them. (The arrangements described below are also used in the other ships).<br />
<br />
The shell bins and shell transport to the shell hoist are shown in Fig. 8, Enc.3) diagrammatically.<br />
<br />
A shell grab (Z) worked by 2 electric motors automatically controlled is used to transport the shell from the bins to the waiting tray fixed round the trunk (Turmraum) (A 1.-4). This grab is suspended from a broad length of wire sword matting, the latter can be wound up or down round a drum (Wa), if the transporting shaft (T) which is provided with two diametrical opposite longitudinal feathers is turned in the corresponding direction. Shaft (T) is fitted into drum (Wa). By this the grab is wound up or down. The grab is moved horizontally by the carrier (R), which holds the above-mentioned revolving drum, being drawn to one side or the other by an endless rope, worked electrically along the shaft (T). To assist the long shaft a deck rail is fitted above it which carries the weights, (Projectile grab and drum with carrier), the carrier being suspended from the rail. The electrical starting levers for both motors are fitted in the shell handing room.<br />
<br />
If it is required to get a shell out of the bin, the motor operating the horizontal movement of the grab is started. Then the long transporting drum is turned correspondingly by the 2nd.motor, thereby lowering the grab, which grips the shell by automatic pressure. Thereupon, by turning the shaft in the opposite direction the shell is raised, transported to the waiting tray (A) of which 4 are provided and placed on it. This waiting tray is so arranged that a shell can be landed only in the one position in order to prevent an inverted landing on the shell bogie relative to the entry in the hoist. The shell bogie is fitted with the same stops as the waiting tray.<br />
<br />
From the waiting tray the shell can be placed on either of the two shell bogies (which are rigidly joined to each other). The latter run easily with rollers on a circular rail, and can not only be adjusted exactly at the waiting tray by means of spring stops, but can also be coupled to the shell hoist in the loading position.<br />
<br />
In the shell rooms (lower deck) the shells are stowed in bins four to five deep (Fig.9, Enc.3)[.] The copper driving bands are protected by a broad covering band of strong canvas the ends of which are sewn together with (twine ?). Only rope is placed between the individual shells as a preventative against damage. Two vertical wooden batten are secured to the side walls of the shell bins - right and left.<br />
<br />
In order to ensure the grab gripping the shell as near as possible round the centre of gravity, each shell has a white ring painted round it.<br />
<br />
It is to be noted that the shell room cannot be shut off (water tightly) from the shell handing room as the large openings in the dividing Bulkhead, through which the transport carrier passes, are always open.<br />
<br />
In addition projectiles are stowed in many ships in the corners of the shell handing room itself in fixed bins.<br />
<br />
The 30.5 (12") cartridges are stowed in their water tight zinc cylinders in special stowage fittings in the magazines. These stowages are made of angle Iron and sheet plates. (There is no wood in the fittings).<br />
<br />
The Magazines, (2 decks from the bottom) in contrast to the shell room, are separated from the Magazine handing room, by a means of thin sheet bulkheads, in which the passage ways are fitted with double doors and the circular openings for handing cartridges are fitted with double covering flaps (the latter have already been remarked on in "SEYDLITZ" Section 11, Fig.3, Enc.3.[)]<br />
<br />
For transport of cartridges in the Magazines the transporting gear shewn in Fig.10, Enc.3 is available. This consists of a double rail (R) in which a horizontal (sheet iron) tray, semicircular in section can be moved up and down in guides by means of a hand differential purchase (F). The Tray can then be brought to the exact level of the cartridge. The Transporting gear is suspended from an overhead rail,(S) and also runs in a guide rail on the deck (SS). The cartridge is pushed on to the tray and the transporter then brought to the cartridge handing hole, and after opening the double flaps, transferred to the Turret.<br />
<br />
The Turret appliances correspond in general to those in "HINDENBURG", about which data are described later. But an exception must be made in the case of the size and installation of the Rangefinders (Fig.11, Enc.3).In "KURFÜRST" the Rangefinders about 3 meters (10 ft.) long are fitted in hoods in the front of the Turret, while "HINDENBURG" the 8 metre (26 ft.) range finders are already being fitted in the same way as will be the case in our 35 cm. (about 14") turrets, now building.<br />
<br />
<center>E. "MARKGRAF".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This Battleship was hit 5 times by big guns and all from the port side.<br />
<br />
Only hit No.2 is of gunnery interest. This entered the next to the last 15 cm. (5.(') [5.9"] casemate on the port side and exploded, killing the crew and putting gun out of action for the remainder of the battle, though it did not damage it very seriously.<br />
<br />
Several splinters from this shell pierced the bulkhead and entered the next casemate (forward) and killed or wounded several men. But this gun was brought into action again after an interval of about 10 minutes to make up the crew.<br />
<br />
<center>11. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
In the case of this ship also, splinters from enemy shorts entered the Conning Tower, but without causing any damage to either personnel or Materiel.<br />
<br />
During the whole engagement about 250 rounds of 30 cm. (12") ammunition was fired, i.e. about one fifth of the total supply on board.<br />
<br />
<center>F. "MOLTKE".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This ship was hit 4 times by heavy shell (all from the starboard side).<br />
<br />
One shell (Hit No.3) pierced the upper side armour and burst behind the latter inside the ship. It also caused some damage outside to No.4.15 cm. (5.9") casemate starboard (from forward) killing or wounding several men, but causing little damage to the gun. This gun was again brought into action after about 15 minutes.<br />
<br />
<center>11. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
"MOLTKE" was the only ship from which 4 Torpedoes were fired (not in salvo, but one after the other). On board, it was stated by officers that "QUEEN MARY" was fired at and hit at about 10 kilometres (10,935 yds.), and that this was the cause of the rapid sinking of this Battle Cruiser. Officers of other ships, however, were not of this opinion, as when "MOLTKE" fired the distance from "QUEEN MARY" was about 13 kilometres (14,217 yds.) and that the torpedoes have not this range; so that only Gunnery can be taken into consideration.<br />
<br />
In the "MOLTKE", splinters from short bursting shells also entered the Conning Tower, without, however, causing any noteworthy damage.<br />
<br />
<center>G. "DERFFLINGER".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This Battle Cruiser was hit the largest number of times, viz:- 30, of these 20 were of heavy calibre and all came from the port side.<br />
<br />
:(1) A 15" shell pierced the roof of N.4 30.5 cm. (12") Turret (hit No.5) exploded inside the Turret, thereby igniting all the charges which were there (apparently only two) and killed all the Turret's crew, (74 men including reserve crew), except 2 men who were able to get away (wounded).<br />
<br />
:The Turret itself was put out of action because (as was the case in all these hits on Turrets) much damage was done to the various instruments and appliances by the splinters and flash.<br />
<br />
:It is worthy of note that the electric cables in the Turret were comparatively uninjured.<br />
<br />
:(2). Turret No.3 was also hit by a 38 cm. (15") shell (hit No.6). The projectile penetrated the Barbette armour and took with it a large piece of plating into the interior of the Turret. The 74 men of the Turret's crew (as in the hit described above[)] for the most part were killed, only 6 men getting away wounded. It is observed that an 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) gun which was 3½ metres (about 11½ ft.) away from the point of impact, was completely undamaged, although the deck below the spot, and in the immediate vicinity of this gun, was badly damaged.<br />
<br />
:Nos.3 and 4 Turrets were only put out of action towards the end of the engagement.<br />
<br />
:The two foremost Turrets remained completely intact, although the Barbette armour of the second Turret showed a fairly large scrape from a (very glancing) shell hit. But this caused no further damage to the Turret (hit No.13).<br />
<br />
:(4). The Conning Tower was hit on the starboard side on the edge. But only small pieces of the brittle face of the armoured plates splintered off, and in the Tower itself only one elevation-pointer ceased to function.<br />
<br />
:(5). Very severe damage was done by a large calibre shell (hit No.20) which exploded close to the casemate of the No.2 15 cm. (5.9) gun port, which not only damaged this gun, but also put the two neighbouring 15 cm. (5.9") guns out of action. The first named gun was principally severely damaged on the chase, and the chase of the foremost 15 cm. (5.9") gun was indented to such an extent by splinters, that it could not be fired again. The other gun in the vicinity was so shaken up by the powerful explosion, that it could not be moved again. The casualties sustained by the gun's crews were in contrast comparatively small. (1 man killed and several severely or slightly wounded at the first named gun[)].<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
A large fragment of a 38 cm. (15") shell (which failed to explode), was exhibited on board (as is shown in Fig.12, Enc.3)[.] The much distorted fuze was also found.<br />
<br />
<center>H. "KÖNIG".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits.</center><br />
<br />
There were 13 hits (large calibre) identified all from the port side and above the waterline.<br />
<br />
:(1). A 34.3 cm. (13.5) shell hit the port foremost 15 cm. (5.9") casemate. (Hit No.9). A large piece of armour plating was carried into the casemate, where the shell exploded, killed the gun's crew (11 men) and put the gun out of action. The armour plate went further, penetrated the bulkhead, entered the galley, destroyed it and killed more men.<br />
<br />
:(2). Another 34.3 cm. (13.5") shell penetrated the second 15 cm. (5.9") casemate (hit No.8) and exploded, making the gun useless and, by penetrating the deck also caused much damage in the compartment below. The crew of this gun was by chance not at the moment in the casemate, as they had gone out for a short time on account of gas from the explosion in the first 15 cm. (5.9) casemate (which had occurred just previously.) The result was that there were no killed or wounded among the gun's crew.<br />
<br />
:(3). The traces of a shell were visible on the roof of the foremost 30.5 (12") Turret. (Hit No.11.) The projectile damaged the Rangefinder cover, and tore off a piece of it, rendering the Rangefinder useless. No other damage was caused by this hit.<br />
<br />
:(4). The roof of the Conning Tower was similarly gazed [sic] by a shell, which left a scratch but caused no other damage to the Tower or its instruments, etc.<br />
<br />
<center>J. "HINDENBURG."</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Apparently about 30,000 tons displacement)</center><br />
<br />
This Cruiser, now building will be given an armament of 8 30.5 cm. (12") guns 50 cal. (in four double turrets, 2 forward and 2 aft as in "DERFFLINGER") and 14 15 cm. (5.9") and 8.8 cm[.] (22 pr.) Anti-aircraft guns.<br />
<br />
The foremost superimposed Turret (No.2) was mostly built in, and a short inspection of it was made.<br />
<br />
The Gun-platform is especially roomy. The distance apart of the centres of the two gun barrels being estimated at about 3 metres (10 feet approx.)[.] The complete arrangement of the gun-platform can be seen in the diagrammatic Sketch (Fig.13, Enc.3). The 2 shell hoists (G) are side by side between the gun and to the left of the left gun, (and right of the right gun) are the two ammunition hoists (P).<br />
<br />
The up-coming ammunition is placed in its slide (TT) in the rear by means of unloading rammers (so-called "Umlauder"), whence it rolls on to the loading Tray, and finally on to the shell swings or cartridge swings, which by swinging across, brings the shell or cartridges one after the other to the rear of the gun for loading.<br />
<br />
The two rammers are hydraulic chain Rammers (with reserve hand drive). In the space at the rear of the platform there are :- an entrance opening (E) and two openings (A) for passing out firedcartridge [sic] cases. These openings (A) are constructed similarly to those more exactly described under "SEYDLITZ" (Sec.II. Par.9).<br />
<br />
The Breeches are worked hydraulically (the reserve method being by hand.)<br />
<br />
The principle can be gathered from Fig.14, Enc.3 . A bar with a tooth edged point (Z), (which can be worked up or down hydraulically) turns the Traversing shaft by means of cog wheels (R1, R2, R3) and opens or shuts the breech. The Water-pressure is led to the mechanism through two flexible hoses. If the cog wheel R3 is placed out of gear with R2, the hydraulic system is shut off.<br />
<br />
For elevating,Trunnion [sic] sights are provided and for training a sighting telescope is fitted in front between the guns.<br />
<br />
The Rangefinder (about 8 metres long) which was not yet on board, is to be fitted in the front of the Turret above the guns (under the roof as already referred to under "KURFÜRST")[.] Only the two side openings in the armour could be seen.<br />
<br />
Elevating is worked hydraulically (Reserve system by hand). (The ammunition hoists are also worked hydraulically, but here the alternative system is electric).<br />
<br />
A gun coupling is fitted in this ship as in all later ships. But these couplings are apparently only for use when it is desired to elevate a gun whose elevating gear has been damaged.<br />
<br />
The normal Turret Training gear and also the reserve system is only worked by electric motors.<br />
<br />
The same system of ventilation is used as has already been described in "SEYDLITZ" (Section II, Par.II).<br />
<br />
All working machinery (Electrically driven pumps, and electric motors for elevating, training, hoists, rammers, etc.) are apparently installed in the spacious working chamber below the gun platform.<br />
<br />
The arrangements in the Magazines as well as the transporting gear for passing shell and cartridges from them to the hoists are the same as those already more minutely described under battleship "GROSSER KÜRFURST."<br />
<br />
<center>K. "BAYERN".</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Class Ersatz "WÖRTH" about 30,000 tons disp.)</center><br />
<br />
This battleship, only recently completed, had to carry out exercises whilst at Kiel, and the Commission was invited to join for a cruise, which gave opportunity for a certain amount of inspection.<br />
<br />
The armament consists of eight 38 cm. (15") G.L. 45 guns in four double turrets apparently arranged as shown in the Almanac; sixteen 15 cm. (5.9") G.L. 45 guns in casemates and eight 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) anti-aircraft guns.<br />
<br />
38 cm. Gun Turret. (Fig. 15, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
The distance apart of the bore axes is 3700 mm. (12.1 ft.) for these guns[.] 8.8 cm. sub-calibre guns are provided, which are put in from outboard (i.e. muzzle end.)<br />
<br />
The Gunhouse, as in the turrets of the "HINDENBURG" is very roomy.<br />
<br />
In this turret there has been introduced no important alteration with respect to the munition hoists. Whereas in all previous ships the shot hoist was separate from the cartridge hoist, in this ship, as with us (the Austrian Navy), both hoists for one gun are combined in one trunk; and also instead of the shell and cartridge swings in the "HINDENBURG" (see above) munition wagons (W1, W2), which run on cross rails are introduced. The two main hoists (A1, A2) come up between the two guns. Besides these there are in addition two electrically driven auxiliary hoists (H1, H2).<br />
<br />
The round which arrives at the top of the hoist is taken out and landed, by means of the unloading rammer (U) in the munition wagon, which brings it to the rear of the particular gun in the loading position, whence it is loaded by means of the rammer.<br />
<br />
The munition wagons, rammers and unloading rammers are normally worked by hydraulic power (with auxiliary handworking gear); at the back of the turret are two principal operating positions, (ST1, ST2) which are raised to give a good all-round view, and where all the necessary manipulation for the foregoing hydraulic machinery is carried out.<br />
<br />
The munition hoists are also hydraulically worked, and electric drive is provided as an alternative. The elevating and breech mechanism gear are hydraulic (with alternative hand gear).<br />
<br />
The following sighting arrangements are provided :-<br />
<br />
:(a) For elevation - two side trunnion sights as well as two reserve sights in front.<br />
<br />
:(b) For training - a principal trainer's telescope in front between the two guns, as well as a side telescope as reserve.<br />
<br />
Asked whether any automatic firing apparatus was in contemplation, it was replied that a place for such apparatus was provided but the installation could not be expected till later, and depended on the solution of several problems which had yet to be experimented on.<br />
<br />
The large 8.2 m. (26.9 ft.) rangefinder is placed the same as in the "HINDENBURG".<br />
<br />
The ventilation of the turret is on the same principle as in the "HINDENBURG" and "SEYDLITZ", except that in addition there are two powerful electric fan motors between the guns.<br />
<br />
The Training is done electrically, as is also the alternative arrangement. Fig 15, Enc.3 gives a diagrammatic sketch of the arrangements. The controller gives 72 degrees of speed.<br />
<br />
For absorbing the shock in the training gear of single gun shooting there are provided, in the friction coupling box of the worm gearing, besides the friction plates (as in our own installations) two rings of strong springs above them - each ring containing six springs as shewn in Fig.17, Enc.3. Apparently any turret thrown off a small angle by a single round will be trained back to its original position by means of these springs.<br />
<br />
As in "HINDENBURG", so also in "BAYERN", the various machines for training[,] elevating, munition supply, rammers and unloading rammers are placed on the deck underneath the Gun platform (working chamber), and also the machines for the magazine and transport arrangements of munitions are similarly installed.<br />
<br />
In Fig. 18, Enc.3 is a diagrammatic sketch of the munition hoists and magazines from which it can be seen that the shell room is on the lowest level and has the magazine above it. The cartridge loading door (F1 for cartridges, G1 for shell) are fitted for flash protection with sliding shutters which are self-operating when the lift arrives at one or the other, i.e. when the lift arrives at the bottom, the shutter there will open and leave the loading hole (P) free, while the upper openings F1 and G1 will be shut and locked.<br />
<br />
An inspection of the shell room 38 cm. (15") showed that on these shells there is attached to the rearmost of the three upper driving bands a zinc band about 20 mm. (.78 in.) broad (similar to the driving bands). Experience has shown that this zinc ring is a very good anti-coppering device for the bore. It was apparently on the French front, at Verdun and in Flanders, that experiments with this arrangement were made; the results were very good and its introduction followed. The Army has also adopted it.<br />
<br />
The following is the situation with regard to 38 cm. (15 in.) shell. As opposed to the single type of shell (long calibre) in newly completing ships, here there are two :-<br />
<br />
:(a) A.P. shell, with cap, total length of shell 3.5 calibres.<br />
<br />
:(b) H.E. shell, uncapped, total length of shell 4.1 calibres. The total weight is 750 kg. (1653.5 lbs). The burster (not Trotyl, probably Heranit? 23.5 kg. (57.8 lbs.) for the A.P. shell and 67 kg. (147.7 lbs) for the H.E. The establishment allowed per [gun] is 90 A.P. and 30 H.E. The maximum range is 24 kilometres (26,247 yds.) with an angle of descent of 32 degrees, elevation of gun 247 degrees, time of flight 48 secs.<br />
<br />
:The charge is 87 kg. (191.8 lbs) in the main cartridge and 96 kg. (211.6 lbs.) in the foremost cartridge.<br />
<br />
:The rate of fire is one round per 40 seconds.<br />
<br />
15 cm. casemates. In these ships the flash protection for the 15 cm. (5.9") munition hoists in the casemates has been improved (Fig.20, Enc.3). In that a sheet iron chamber (K) has been built around the delivery opening which, by means of sliding plates (S1 and S2) can be shut off either from the trunk or from the munition tray. (G2.) For example, a shell arrives at the top of the hoist (G) - the shutter (S1) is raised in its guides by means of the lift mechanism, so that the shell can roll into the chamber (G1) while the shutter (S3) remains closed. Immediately afterwards the shutter (S1) closes the opening and the shutter (S2) raises in its guides and the shell rolls on the munition tray (G2). By this means the trunk is rendered flash proof at all stages of the operation.<br />
<br />
Submerged Flats. On board this ship there was also the opportunity to visit a submerged flat with two broadside tubes.<br />
<br />
In all there are five tubes (2 in each flat) and a bow tube. The calibre of the torpedoes is 60 cm. (23.6 in.) and the weight of a fully charged torpedo 2200 kg. (4850 lbs.). The explosive (? Heranit) weighing 250 kg. (531.1 lbs). The establishment per tube is four torpedoes - making in all 20 on board. The greatest torpedo range is 13 kilometres, 14,217 yds) with a medium speed setting of 28 knots.<br />
<br />
The flat that was visited (Fig.21, Enc.3) is very large and about 5 metres high, (16 ft.) so that it is perfectly feasible to turn any torpedo hanging on the purchase at the turntable (W1) on the overhead rails, so that is [sic] can be loaded into the port or starboard tube.<br />
<br />
The tubes (L1, L2) are side loading with very strong longitudinal holts [sic] on top (V1, V2) and fitted with a strong shield bar. For loading the torpedoes in the tubes, there are fitted near the tubes, on the same side on the side door, mechanical loading apparatus (quickloaders A1, A2), and on the opposite side are provided the rails (R1, R2) which serve for the adjustment (lever system) of the gyroscope of a torpedo lying in the tube.<br />
<br />
A torpedo is struck down from the upper deck through the trunk (E) and swung through the opening (O) into the flat, whence by means of a purchase (mechanically driven) it is run on to the tramways (S) and thence either to the bulkhead stowage or to a stowage over the tube.<br />
<br />
One must take this opportunity of noting that the overhead rails are not bolted to the actual deck, but are a separate structure, so as to avoid putting any vibration or other strain on to the armoured deck.<br />
<br />
If a torpedo is to be loaded it will be brought by means of the purchase to the exact ready stowage over the tube; then the hydraulic loader is operated by a lever; a grad [sic] with two arms seizes the torpedo in two specially cut away parts and draws it horizontally on to the guide rail of the loader, which then is lowered together with the torpedo. In the meantime the side door is mechanically unbolted and opened, so that the torpedo can be placed right in the tube (impulse frame). After this the guide rail and grab of the loader are withdrawn and raised, while the side door is shut and bolted. Loading by this means proceeds comparatively noiselessly, rapidly and precisely.<br />
<br />
The sluice is hydraulically worked, and after firing is operated by the return movement of the shield bar. When draining the tube the water can be pumped either overboard or into a well.<br />
<br />
The discharge is operated electrically from the Conning Tower or by hand.<br />
<br />
The sluice is hydraulically worked, and after firing is operated by the return movement of the shield bar. When draining the tube the water can be pumped either overboard or into a well.<br />
<br />
The discharge is operated electrically from the Conning Tower or by hand.<br />
<br />
<center>L. TORPEDO BOAT "G. 90".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1200 tons displacement.)</center><br />
<br />
From the Battleship "BAYERN" the Commission was brought back to Kiel in one of the newest torpedo boats (G.90), which offered an opportunity of seeing certain details.<br />
<br />
The gun armament consists of three 10.5 cm. (4.1") Guns on transferable mountings; the torpedo armament, of two single tubes forward and two double tubes for<nowiki>*</nowiki> [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. Note: Apparently a clerical error for 50 cm.(19.7")] 45 cm. (17.7") torpedoes in the after part. (See Fig. 22, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
The following details respecting the torpedo equipment were noted :<br />
<br />
Six torpedoes were carried, which remain stowed in the tubes; spare torpedoes are not carried on board, and no torpedo stowage is provided. The tubes of the twin mountings are not parallel but inclined outwards from each other, making an angle of 20° between the tubes.<br />
<br />
The reason for this lies in the method of torpedo boat attack. Torpedo craft always fire on the swing (in order to offer the full broadside target to the enemy fire for the shortest possible time), and the torpedoes from a twin mounting are are [sic] fired one after the other (the mounting remaining on a fixed bearing). The first torpedo having been fired, the boat continues to swing under helm and after 20° the second torpedo is fired.<br />
<br />
The training is done by means of a training gear at each tube, which can be understood from the detailed sketch (Fig. 23, Enc.3). By means of the hand crank (K) a worm and worm wheel (Zr) can be turned, this engages inthe [sic] training rack (Zs) and so the tube can be trained. The training pinion can, by means of a coupling clutch worked by the lever (H) be disconnected from the rack, should be required to train the mounting quickly, or for loading and unloading the torpedo by means of the training gear. This latter is accomplished by means of the windlass (W) mounted on the training shaft round which can be taken a line secured either to the nose or the tail of the torpedo. At the back part of the mounting is fitted a training brake which grips the rack.<br />
<br />
A director is fitted at each tube, and torpedoes are fired electrically from the bridge. At the rear of each tube are fitted two firing pushes (Abfeurungspöller), which can be operated either singly or together. In order to prevent firing from a tube which is not yet at the ready, the particular firing gear is held fast by a special locking gear fitted to the tube; its method of working can be seen from (Fig.24, Enc.3). The locking levers (St1 and St2) are only clear of the firing gear, when the rollers (R1 and R2), connected to the locking gear, are clear of the guide strip (G). This guide strip covers the arc in which firing is to be prevented. The springs.(F1 and F2) release the gear, as shewn in the sketch under (T).<br />
<br />
For torpedo transport on deck a special rail is fitted on the starboard side, on which was seen a fairly long transport wagon.<br />
<br />
<center>M. TRAWLER.</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Fitted out for Anti Submarine work)</center><br />
<br />
For fighting submarine boats trawlers are employed with the following :-<br />
<br />
:(a). A.S.rope nets fitted with two or four A.S.mines.<br />
<br />
:(b). Large Depth charges.<br />
<br />
:(c). Anti Submarine explosive Kite.<br />
<br />
::These appliances are described below.<br />
<br />
(a). Nets with A.S. Mines (Fig.25, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
These nets are made up from hemp rope (diameter of rope about 10 mm.); they are 250 m.long and of varying breadth (up to 20 m.) To a normal net two mines (M.M.) are attached (see Fig.25, Enc.3); for broader nets the mines are secured in pairs vertically - thus making four mines to a broad net. The mines are supported by their own large iron flat (S) while for the support of the nets smaller floats (S1) are placed on top.<br />
<br />
Each pair of nets also has an anchor and cable attached.<br />
<br />
The nets which are joined together are stowed with their mines in large shaped iron floats. The latter are stowed ready for shooting in two rows, (1 and 2, Fig.26, Enc3) on the top of the trawler. Shortly before action the primers are inserted through circular holes in the floats (1 hole per float).<br />
<br />
The shooting of nets one and two is carried out at a speed of 10 knots by one man. First , the first anchor of the first net is let go and the net with its mines dragged into the water, afterwards being anchored by the second anchor. Before, however, this latter is slipped the first anchor of the second net must be let go to ensure over-lapping.<br />
<br />
There are tiny holes in the floats by means of which just sufficient water can enter the floats so as to sink the net with its mines and floats at the end of an hour, and leave the area free again for traffic.<br />
<br />
These net mines (Fig.27, Enc.3) are contact mines with an explosive charge (1) from 12-13 kg. of Trotyl and consist of the mine case (M), firing mechanism (S), impact plate (P), distance pin (St), the safety lever (S1) and the primer (J) with the detonator (K).<br />
<br />
When the mine enters the water and reaches a depth of 5 metres the safety catch is released by a hydrostatic valve, which thus frees the detonator for the striker.<br />
<br />
Firing is effected in that by the impact of a submarine the impact plate (and with it the distance pin) are displaced, and by means of the latter the striker is freed and fires the mine by means of the firing spring (which is already cocked).<br />
<br />
(b). Depth charge (Fig., Enc.3).<br />
<br />
These depth charges are cylindrical in form and contain a large explosive charge of 60 kg. of Trotyl. They consist of the mine (M) and the float (S). The latter is connected to the mine by a strong steel wire (3 mm.), which is wound on a reel in the float. It fires (exactly like the depth charge of Korvetten Kapitän Schönthaler) because on reaching the set depth the tension on the wire operates the firing mechanism (Striker spring (F) is compressed as the striker (B) is raised by the grab (Z)) and thus frees the striker.<br />
<br />
The set depth can be adjusted from 5 to 5 (5 to 50?) metres (practically in the same way as in the Schönthaler Depth Charge) and it is to be noted that the time of explosion (1 to 5 secs) is adjustable by means of turning the pointer of the seconds scale (E) on the outside. The delay action itself operates by means of a disc similar to shrapnel.<br />
<br />
(c). Explosive Kite (Fig.30, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
The Kite (D) is made of wood and shaped as shown in Fig.31, inside is an explosive charge (the same size as the net mine, 12 - 13 kg., described in par. (a) above.<br />
<br />
The Kite is towed by a 15 mm. strong steel wire (T) whose core is an electric cableby [sic] means of which the kite is electrically exploded.<br />
<br />
The cable wire is wound on the winch (K), the ends being connected to the electric firing battery in the hollow drum.<br />
<br />
The towing wire is led from the winch over an adjustable brake (B) and from there over a roller (R) secured to a derrick (L) where the other end is connected to the charge.<br />
<br />
When the kite hits against a hard object (submarine) it is electrically fired.<br />
<br />
As a safety precaution the electric switch at the battery is only made when the kite is towing at the requisite speed.<br />
<br />
Trawlers tow at 10 knots, which causes a pull of 350 kg. on the wire.<br />
<br />
<center>N. ARSENAL WILHELMSHAVEN.</center><br />
<br />
Only a short visit to the gun shops was made. There about 1,000 civil workman [sic] were employed.<br />
<br />
In general the work carried out was similar to that in our own gun factories (repair of gun material, production of necessary equipment, magazine and shellroom machinery, examination and cleaning of bores of guns, the storage and preservation of magazine and shellroom fittings, small calibre guns, searchlights, range finders, etc.), only here the buildings, in particular the shops and storehouses, are modern throughout and planned on a spacious lay out.<br />
<br />
The drawing office is worthy of note, in it at that time the stowage plan of munitions for the Battle Cruiser "HINDENBURG" was in preparation. For the protection of such drawings there is provided a large fireproof room.<br />
<br />
To the gun shops belong :- the large mechanical shops, a smithy, a large carpenter's shop, a large shop for work on canvas, leather, and similar equipment, a plumber's shop, two very roomy storehouses for magazine material and a depot for various constructional materials; in the last named is a special,cellar for rubber and leather articles in which at the time there were gathered about 700,000 marks worth.<br />
<br />
A new large gun hall was under construction which is about 60 m. long and 25 m. broad. The building itself was nearly finished, only the installation and also the large travelling crane were not in place.<br />
<br />
Both high sliding doors (T1 T2) were operated by an electrically driven (alternative hand working) which at the side. The travelling crane (N) brings the material to the door, where a floating crane (S) with large overhang takes it over and provides for its further transport.<br />
<br />
While passing through the shop the decoppering of a 15 cm. (5.9) gun was seen. The decoppering machine was a brush withbvery [sic] fine steel bristles, as shewn in Fig.33. The head of the brush (K) is a cylindrical drum of strong plate, which before use is filled with petroleum and turpentine. On the head are fixed three bristle holding rings (H), which carry on their periphery the small steel bristles (B). These three bristle rings are separated by two intermediate rings (R).<br />
<br />
The fine steel wire used in the bristles is 0.2 mm. thick and must be softer than the material of the inner tube so as not to scratch the latter. The cleaning is accomplished by powerful brushing th [sic] through the bore, this action forcing out the petroleum mixture from the drum at the head of the brush into the bore.<br />
<br />
The decoppering device was very successful with the 15 cm. (5.9") gun; a small quantity of the copper scraping and two bristles were given to the Mission. (A bristle and a portion of copper scrapings accompany the reports (1 each) to the K.U.K.K.M. Marine Section (Austrian Admiralty) and to the (Austrian) Naval Technical Committee.)<br />
<br />
<center>O. ARSENAL KIEL.</center><br />
<br />
The "Artilleriewerkstätten" (Gun shops) at Kiel are in general the same as those at Wilhelmshaven described above, so that this amounted to an opportunity for closer description.<br />
<br />
The only noteworthy sight among the gunshops visited was one very large gunhall in which numerous guns are stowed, (among them some from ships that had been in the battle (Jutland); for the transport of the heaviest weights are two travelling cranes (each of 45 tons both cranes are employed together). For the further transport normal gauge rail tracks are provided.<br />
<br />
For the mechanical decoppering of guns a special scraper is used, whose action can be seen from Fig. 34. In the dial shaped head (K) are two difference scrapers (S1 S2), which by means of an inserting gear (E) can be placed exactly in the groove it is required to clean. The scraper (S1), cleans the base of the grooves, the scraper (S2) cleans the sides. The red (st) is guided so as to avoid any corners of the scraper<nowiki>*</nowiki> [I.D.Note: Apparently this guide rod arrangement keeps the scraper true in the groove.] This apparatus has proved its worth.<br />
<br />
Later on information from the Ordnance Department of the Admiralty showed that 30.5 and 28 cm. gun tubes, from which 60 - 100 rounds had been fired in the action, from later experimental firings at Krupps were found to have suffered from wear (actually about 20 mm.) which permitted overramming. After the conclusion of the experimental firings, only gun tubes of equ [sic] equal wear are sent to one and the same ship.<br />
<br />
Of very great interest is the information that many of the 25 cm. (13.7") guns, which were on the French front (6 on the Verdun front) had fired 600 - 800 rounds with full charge (range 36 kilometers, 39,376 yds.) with a diminished range of only 2 km., 2,187 yds. and no necessity for a new inner tube. The shell used in these guns were those provided with the anti-coppering zinc ring.<br />
<br />
The following summarize the points of the greatest importance.<br />
<br />
:1. Introduction of gas masks for each man, as of utmost importance.<br />
<br />
:2. Specially important is flash protection (including) cover plates for munition hoist trunks in turrets and casemates, shut off hatches and doors as well as partition of the magazines.).<br />
<br />
:3. As few cartridges as possible by the gun (in the gun house of a turret or in a casemate), because of the great danger of its ignition by a hit.<br />
<br />
:4. Abolition of the ready use position in the turrets (on account of point 3, above).<br />
<br />
:5. Many gun tubes 30.5 and 28 cm. (12" and 4" [sic]) have fired 60 - 100 rounds with only 20 mm. overramming.<br />
<br />
:6. Many gun tubes undergo experimental firing and are reissued only in similar tubes to one ship.<br />
<br />
:7. Automatic firing apparatus is not yet in use.<br />
<br />
:8. Gun coupling gear provided, but is only used in the event of danger to elevating gear.<br />
<br />
:9. Introduction of small calibre guns 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) only for anti-aircraft work.<br />
<br />
:10. Normally the turrets only fire salvoes, and only from one gun per turret.<br />
<br />
:11. Repulse of Torpedo boat attacks is achieved by broadside salvoes from the 15 cm. (5.9") guns - all in one target.<br />
<br />
:12. Normal turret machinery :-<br />
<br />
::Training{{pad|50px}}Electric (as is also reserve)<br />
<br />
::Elevating<br />
<br />
::Rammers<br />
<br />
::Unloading rammers{{pad|50px}}All hydraulic and<br />
<br />
::Breech mechanism and in some{{pad|30px}}hand control.<br />
<br />
::cases Munition wagons<br />
<br />
::Munition hoists - hydraulic - with electric reserve<br />
<br />
::Shell transport in shell rooms - electric<br />
<br />
:13. Observation of fall of shot :- in each top, 1 or two men in telephonic communication with the gunnery officer. (On 31st.May neither Aeroplanes or Zeppelins were present[)].<br />
<br />
:14. Fire control from gunnery officer's position by elevation pointer only.<br />
<br />
:15. All rangefinders stereoscopic normally 3 m. long instruments in armour domes in Turrets, in the latest ships 8 m. instruments projecting from sides below Turret roofs.<br />
<br />
:16. Large calibre projectiles are standard type armour shells with caps and sharply pointed explosive shells without cap are being reintroduced. For 15 cm. Guns (5.9") fused shell with base fuse and H.F. shell with a very sensitive nose fuse and a base fuse.<br />
<br />
:17. No ship expended all her heavy ammunition, at the most a little over 1/3 of the establishment.<br />
<br />
:18. Establishment for heavy guns 115 - 120 rounds per gun.<br />
<br />
:19. As an anti-coppering precaution for guns, projectiles are fitted with a zinc ring behind the rear driving band and in direct contact therewith.<br />
<br />
20. English 38 cm. (15") and 34.3 cm (13.5") projectiles have apparently black powder as a bursting charge: bursting bad and effect not commensurate with the calibre.<br />
<br />
:21. The explosion of a large calibre projectile in a Turret always puts the same out of action.<br />
<br />
:22. Ventilation of Turrets insufficient.<br />
<br />
:23. Voice pipes 60 - 100 and 150 mm. calibre have no lagging and are provided with wooden stoppers or sponges wherewith to close the tube to gases.<br />
<br />
:24. Emergency lighting by means of Pocket lamps.<br />
<br />
:25. Torpedo nets are no longer carried.<br />
<br />
:26. All ranges below 15 km. heavy armour is generally pierced by 38 cm. (15")projectiles. [sic]<br />
<br />
:27. Submarine Defence. Mine nets, (? Depth charges) and Explosive Kites.<br />
<br />
Appendices 2 Sketches, Hits Appendix 1 and 2. One sheet of sketches to report. Appen. 3.<br />
<br />
In conclusion, one matter may be mentioned, which, on the occasion of the visit to the Arsenal at Wilhelmshaven and to the ships, attracted attention through its differing so greatly from our own arrangements. Viz, the handling procedure of consumable stores.<br />
<br />
The characteristic points of the Organisation of this Branch in the German Navy are, as follows :-<br />
<br />
:1. In the ships, the demanding, keeping and issuing of consumable stores is done by one officer under the special supervision of the Commander, who is responsible for the stores being on board, for maintaining them in proper condition, for stowing them efficiently and according to regulations and for the accuracy and completeness of the necessary accounts.<br>These officers are occupied by "Materialenverwalter" W.O.'s [Warrant Officers] who are well trained in the work of their branch and are selected from P.Os. [Petty Officers]<br />
<br />
:2. Money necessary for the Administrative work of the ship is remitted to the Captain in the form of a fixed sum and the expenditure of this is checked by the "Materialenverwalter".<br />
<br />
:3. The limit to the yearly expenditure of stores is fixed by a "Stores Credit" (estimate). Permission to exceed this limit must be obtained from the Admiralty and only in specially exceptional cases is permission for such excess to be requested afterwards.<br />
<br />
:4. The paymaster controls stores and the "Materialenverwalter" accounts and reports tomthe [sic] Captain whenever expenditure in excess of the quantity allowed is to be feared. The paymaster is not responsible for the accuracy of the entries made by the "Materialenverwalter" in books, etc.,kept [sic] by him.<br />
<br />
:5. The Office staff is at the disposal of the Captain to assist in accounting for consumable and non-consumable stores. This staff consists of one officer and the clerk, they are jointly responsible for reporting losses, deficiencies as compared with quantities shown by the books, necessary repairs and replacements. They also keep such records as are necessary to afford at any time a clear statement of the consumable and non-consumable stores and munition on board.<br />
<br />
:6. Stores are completed by demands on the Imperial Dockyards or depots by means of special forms. The consignment note serving as voucher.<br />
<br />
:Ship's demands are not checked by the Dockyards, the ships alone being responsible for the demand being in order.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}Pola, 4th. August, 1916.<br />
<br />
==See Also==<br />
*[[Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland]]<br />
<br />
==Footnotes==<br />
{{reflist}}<br />
<br />
[[Category:Battle of Jutland]]</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Report_on_German_Warships_after_Jutland&diff=334773Austro-Hungarian Naval Report on German Warships after Jutland2024-03-24T17:56:24Z<p>Simon Harley: /* Report */</p>
<hr />
<div>In the papers of Vice-Admiral [[John Ernest Troyte Harper|John E. T. Harper]] is a copy of a translation of an Austro-Hungarian Navy report on German Imperial Navy warships after the [[Battle of Jutland]].<ref>Harper papers. Churchill Archives Centre. JEHR 1/4. This research was made possible by the Colin Bell Award, a grant from the Colin Bell Fund at Churchill College, Cambridge.</ref> It was prepared by ''Marineartillerie-Oberingenieure 2. Klasse'' Georg Schindler. This report is in many ways more detailed than that of ''Fregattenkapitäne'' Hieronymus Graf von Colloredo-Mannsfeld [[Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland|prepared immediately after Jutland]], which is also in Harper's papers. The references to I.D. Notes suggest that, like Colloredo-Mannsfeld's report, this was a translation prepared in the [[Naval Intelligence Division (Royal Navy)|Naval Intelligence Division]].<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
REPORT by a Mission undertaken in accordance with Order. Section 4 M.S. No.1746 of 1916.<br />
----<br />
<br />
On the inspection of German Warships which took part in the Battle of the Skaggerak (Jutland), 31st.May - 1st.June 1916; on Wilhelmshaven, Hamburg and Kiel, and on other inspections of ships and bases.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}By Georg Schindler,<br />
<br />
{{pad|580px}}Gunnery Engineer, 2nd Class.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}AUSTRIAN NAVY.<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
The only details which have been dealt with are those which were of Gunnery interest.<br />
<br />
{|<br />
| A.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "SEYDLITZ"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| B.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "OSTFRIESLAND"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| C.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "VON DER TANN"<br />
| were<br />
|-<br />
| D.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "GROSSER KÜRFURST"<br />
| in<br />
|-<br />
| E.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"&nbsp;<br />
| "MARKGRAF"<br />
| engagement.<br />
|-<br />
| F.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "MOLTKE"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| G.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"<br />
| "DERFFLINGER"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| H.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "KÖNIG"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| J.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "HINDENBURG" (building)<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| K.<br />
| Large Battleship<br />
| "BAYERN"<br />
| rowspan=2 | } Newly commissioned<br />
|-<br />
| L.<br />
| T.B.D.<br />
| "G.90"<br />
|-<br />
| M.<br />
| colspan=3 | Fishing vessels Anti-Submarine armament, etc.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| N.<br />
| colspan=3 | Short inspection of the Ordnance Workshops in the Arsenal in Wilhelmshaven. <br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| O.<br />
| Ditto in Kiel.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|}<br />
<br />
Ships under A.B.C.J. and M. were in Wilhelmshaven. D.E.F. in Hamburg and G.H.K.L. in Kiel.<br />
<br />
In the following reports on each ship, Section 1 deals with the effect of enemy hits on ships A. to H. above, in conjunction with the two attached ship sketches (Enclosures 1 and 2). [Not attached.]<br />
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Of the hits marked in the sketches those of a gunnery interest are distinguished by red ink. Section II gives general remarks concerning the ships in question.<br />
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Further a report is submitted on installations in newly commissioned ships (K. and L.) also on a ship still under construction (J.), as well as means of combating submarines installed in Fishing vessels (M.) and finally, briefly on the Ordnance workshops in the Naval Arsenals (N. and O.).<br />
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A. "SEYDLITZ" (Enclosure 1).<br />
<br />
This Cruiser received 24 shell hits (38 cm. 34.3 cm. and 30.5 cm.)(15", 13.5" and 12") and one Torpedo hit.<br />
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Except for 1 shell hit (apparently 34.3 cm.) (13.5") on the starboard side forward (Hits nos.2-4) and one hit no.16 (38 cm.?) in the starboard after 15 cm. (6") casemate all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all Gun tubes, Guns and many fittings had been dismantled and landed.<br />
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<center>I. Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
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1. A large calibre shell (hit no.8) struck the 2nd. 15 cm. port casemate (from forward), put the gun out of action and killed or seriously wounded the majority of the gun's crew.<br />
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2. A 38 cm. shell exploded in the 4th 15 cm. casemate (hit No.13) the gun was similarly damaged, and 2 men (wounded) remained alive of the crew.<br />
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3. In the port after 15 cm. casemate, No.6 gun, (hit No.15) had the same effect as the two described above.<br />
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4. A 38 cm. shell (hit No.16) penetrated the armoured bulkhead on starboard side aft, near the last 15 cm. casemate, close to the curve of the armour (Fig.1, Enc.3) destroyed the 15 cm. gun and killed most of the gun crew.<br />
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Of the twelve 15 cm. guns it appears that 2 port and 4 starboard fired unceasingly until the end.<br />
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5. No.2 Turret (starboard) received a hit from port on the vertical turret armour (hit No.21) to the right of the right gun. Part of the nose of the shell pierced the armour anddestroyed [sic] the cradle and training gear of the right gun. The left was undamaged. The turret remained in action with this gun.<br />
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6. An interesting hit is to be seen on the right 28 cm. gun of No.3 Turret port. The gun was on one of the jetties of the arsenal and could be examined. A large calibre shell hit the aforesaid gun a glancing blow just outside the turret, producing at the point of impact, a considerable elliptical scoop on the outside, causing a fracture of the inner tube and in addition bent the gun so that the axis of the tube at the muzzle was (as far as could be estimated) 200 mm. (about 8 in.) out of line.<br />
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The cradle of this gun was split, the trunnions somewhat bent and the caps thereof partially opened out.<br />
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The left gun of this turret, however, remained serviceable and the Turret could continue firing without interruption.<br />
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7. A 34.3 cm. (13.5") shell (hit No.18) pierced the vertical armour of the revolving structure of No.4 Turret superimposed to the left of the left gun exploded inside the turret, ignited the cartridges which were ready for loading, put the turret out of action and killed all the crew (about 70 men) except 6.<br />
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T [sic] This turret, already out of action, received another hit later from a 38 cm. (15") shell (hit No.17) this projectile struck the revolving Turret armour close to the lower edge at the right rear of the turret, and partially penetrated the turret.<br />
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8. A Large calibre shell tore off the roof of the after (No.5) turret. (Geschossgeller ? ricochet). The turret suffered no appreciable damage inside.<br />
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The remaining hits are being dealt with in the report on ship construction.≠ [I.D. Note: The original of this report can, unfortunately, not be obtained.]<br />
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----<br />
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<center>II Miscellaneous.</center><br />
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1. Extensive "flash" protection was already installed in "SEYDLITZ".<br />
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(a) The openings for bringing 28 cm. cartridges into the lower loading chamber of the Ammunition Hoist can be shut off with sliding doors (schubtüren ?). The supply scuttles from the magazines are fitted with hinged flaps which open upwards on each side (Fig.3, Enc.3).<br />
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(b) The 15 cm. (5.9") Ammunition hoists at the supply position in the casemates are fitted with a "closing flap" which shuts automatically, but its own weight assisted by a spring, immediately after the ammunition has rolled out on to the Ammunition Tray (which is placed in a horizontal position by a Paternoster apparatus (endless chain) (Fig.4, Enc.3).<br />
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2. Apparently Gas Masks are employed in all ships. The method of use is the same as in the German Army. <u>Every</u> man was supplied with a mask (as it happened 2 days before action). These masks were to be brought into use immediately there was any evidence of suffocating gases, and they were so far successful that, according to the opinions of officers, at least one ship, if not two, was saved by their use.<br />
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3. Enemy "shorts" usually exploded on hitting the water, with the result that, (as in the cases of shells exploding on board), splinters of various sizes struck guns among other things, and caused damage, but in practically every case no stoppage of firing from the gun resulted. Shell splinters also entered Conning Towers and Turrets through the sighting slits. But they caused no internal damage as their force was broken by their passage through the deeps [sic] slits. (Fig.5, Enc.3).<br />
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4. In Turret firing. Salvoes were gradually used, and always with <u>only one</u> gun of each turret.<br />
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5. For transmission of orders to the guns (also to 15 cm. (5.9" guns) from the Gunnery Officers position (in the Conning Tower) Elevation pointers are used which are mounted (<u>separately</u>) on brackets away from the Turret armour.<br />
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6. Ranges of the individual rangefinders are shown on a circular scale (range receiver) by means of electrically worked pointers. All these dials are mounter [sic] in a circular box (Fig.6, Enc.3) so that the ranges of the same object shown by several rangefinders (Pointers in similar direction)[.] Further, it is possible to cut out one or other of the dials if the Rangetaker concerned is ranging badly.<br />
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7. Repulse of Destroyers is carried out invariably by means of broadside salvoes of 15 cm. (5.9) guns etc. and one target only is always used. But the Gunlayer is only to fire when sights are exactly on the target.<br />
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8. The 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) guns were not used in the battle. It is understood that in the future guns of this calibre, will only be retained on board as anti-aircraft guns, as was laid down for all ships.<br />
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9. (a) The empty 26 cm. (11") cartridge cases are thrown out of the turrets on to the deck through openings in rear of the Gun platforms (2 per turret). A covering flap, opening downwards when the cases are thrown out, automatically closes the hole by means of a spring (Fig.7, Enc.3).<br />
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(b) The fired 15 cm. (5.9") cartridge are placed in a large hanging net in the casemate, and are only removed from the casemate during a lull in the firing. It was stated that a very large number of fired cases (including Large Calibre ones) were collected and brought back.<br />
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10. The voice pipes are made of 60,100 and 150 mm. diameter (2.4 in., 3.8 in.,and 6 in.). (The last named are called Schallrohre and are intended for short distances). Voice pipes are not lagged.<br />
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11. The ventilation of the Turrets is similar to the method employed in our newer ships. A Fan placed between the two guns, sucks, on the one hand the powder gases from the breeches by means of a ventilation pipe from each gun when the breech is opened and on the other hand draws them away from the roof of the turret on the gun platform another fan, portable, and continually running, was installed when sucked in fresh air through a hose and passed it into the interior of the turret bymeans [sic] of a second hose. If any man had any difficulty in breathing he inhaled fresh air through the second hose. But even this method only afforded partial relief.<br />
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12. All Gunnery machinery (hydraulic and electric) appears to have function correctly.<br />
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13. From the Gunnery point of view there were no serious fires (magazines of any description), for which the "Flash door" protection described in Section II Miscellaneous, Pars. I (a) and (b) is principally responsible. All cartridges actually in a turret or casemate,when [sic] an enemy shell burst in the turret or casemate, were exploded in every case. Therefore the rule was most strictly enforced that only the absolute minimum of ammunition was kept ready at the guns.<br />
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14. "SEYDLITZ" had 1150 28 cm. (11" shell) on board, of which 450 were expended. (No ship expended all her ammunition).<br />
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15. The torpedo nets were not actually a hindrance in the action but they sustained heavy damage fromenemy [sic] hits and splinters so that parts of them hung down over the ships side.<br />
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In future these nets being useless ballast will no longer be carried. This is already the case in the new battleship "BAYERN".<br />
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<center>B. "OSTRFRIESLAND".</center><br />
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<center>I. Hits. (Enclosure 1).</center><br />
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This Battleship received no shell hits, but was struck by a mine onthe [sic] starboard side forward. The detailed description is contained in the report on Ship Construction.<br />
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<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
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At the time of the inspection of this ship the 30.5 cm. (12") Ammunition was being embarked. The shells were being slung from the Quay on to the Deck by means of a powerful floating crane in bundles (of about 5 projectiles). All cartridges are enclosed in long water-tight zinc containers, fitted with stiffening bands. They were being rolled on board carefully across broad planks and stowed in the Magazines. If several rounds of ready ammunition have to be stowed in the Turret, the charges are always kept in the zinc cylinders.<br />
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The 30.5 cm. (12") and also 28 cm. (11") projectiles are (according to the statement of the Gunnery Officer of this ship, Lt.Comdr.Lauenstein) of one description throughout, capped and fitted with base fuse. Total weight 405 kg. (about 890 lbs.) Bursting charge 12 to 13 kg. (26½ to 29 lbs.) of Trotyl. In the latest ships, however, "Armour piercing" and "high explosive" shell (but with a new explosive for bursting charge) are again to be used, as is already the case with the 28 cm. (15") shell in the Battleship "BAYERN".<br />
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For the 15 cm.(5.9") guns it is reported that there are two types of shell in use.<br />
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:(a) Fused shell with base fuses.<br />
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:(b) High explosive shell,with a very sensitive nose fuse and a base fuse.<br />
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<center>C. "VON DER TANN". (Enclosure 1.)</center><br />
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This Battle Cruiser received 4 hits from large calibre shells (all on the starboard side).<br />
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<center>I.Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
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(1). The foremost 28 cm. (11") Turret was hit in the Barbette on the starboard side. The shell exploded and the armour was just penetrated (Hit No.1). Three men in the turret sustained burns (not very severe) from the "Flash". But the Turret was placed out of action as the armour at the point of impact was bulged inwards and jammed the Turret.<br />
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(2). The after Conning Tower was similarly hit (Hit No.2)[.] But the shell only caused a shaking of the Tower and all apparatus inside remained intact.<br />
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(3.) A shell exploded in the neighbourhood of the after Turret No.4 (Hit No.3). The effect on the Turret was only evident in a shaking, and the armour in the vicinity of the explosion was very slightly indented but without doing any damage so that the Turret continued in action.<br />
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(4). No.4 hit is only of slight constructional interest.<br />
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<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
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(1). In this ship, as in "OSTFRIESLAND", the question as to whether the collection of scraps of metal (coming from driving bands or Cartridge cases) in the Breech made any difference to the condition of the breech was answered in the negative.<br />
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(2). The maximum rate of fire of the 28 cm. (11") guns of this Cruiser, as well as of the 30.5 cm. (12") guns of the "OSTFRIESLAND" is stated to have reached 3 - 4 rounds per minute in peace time.<br />
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(3). The arrangement in the 28 cm. (11") turrets is in principle the same as in "SEYDLITZ" or as in the 30.5 cm. (12") guns of the large Battle Cruiser "HINDENBURG" (now building), with the exception of a few improvements in the last named ship. But while in the later ships (30.5 cm. 12") hydraulic rammers with reserve Hand ramming are installed "VON DER TANN" has only double Hand rammers, which are hung under the Turret roof.<br />
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<center>D. "GROSSER KURFÜRST."</center><br />
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<center>1. Effects of shell hits (Enclosure 1).</center><br />
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The ship was hit 8 times (large calibre) all from the port side.<br />
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:(1) Hit No.4 (presumably 34 cm. 13.5") exploded before the Barbette armour of the foremost Turret.<br>Apart from breaking off small pieces of the hard armour (? Panzerschichte) and a slight shaking of the turret no damage was done to the Turret fittings. A fragment struck the upper surface of a sight slot and remained in the slot, while a good deal of gas entered the Turret and necessitated the use of gas masks by the crew for some time.<br />
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:(2). A further heavy shell (Hit No.6) struck the port 15 cm.(5.9") Casemate (3rd. from forward) killed 10 of the crew of 14, but damaged the gun so little that after about 12 minutes the gun's crew having been made up, it was brought into action again. Two cartridges which were in the casemate were ignited.<br />
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:(3). The other hits are only of constructional interest.<br />
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:Some 30.5 cm. (12") and 15 cm. (5.9") guns were damaged on the outside by splinters from "shorts", but sustained no other damage.<br />
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<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
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The Magazine arrangements in this ship were somewhat more minutely examined as well as reports made concerning them. (The arrangements described below are also used in the other ships).<br />
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The shell bins and shell transport to the shell hoist are shown in Fig. 8, Enc.3) diagrammatically.<br />
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A shell grab (Z) worked by 2 electric motors automatically controlled is used to transport the shell from the bins to the waiting tray fixed round the trunk (Turmraum) (A 1.-4). This grab is suspended from a broad length of wire sword matting, the latter can be wound up or down round a drum (Wa), if the transporting shaft (T) which is provided with two diametrical opposite longitudinal feathers is turned in the corresponding direction. Shaft (T) is fitted into drum (Wa). By this the grab is wound up or down. The grab is moved horizontally by the carrier (R), which holds the above-mentioned revolving drum, being drawn to one side or the other by an endless rope, worked electrically along the shaft (T). To assist the long shaft a deck rail is fitted above it which carries the weights, (Projectile grab and drum with carrier), the carrier being suspended from the rail. The electrical starting levers for both motors are fitted in the shell handing room.<br />
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If it is required to get a shell out of the bin, the motor operating the horizontal movement of the grab is started. Then the long transporting drum is turned correspondingly by the 2nd.motor, thereby lowering the grab, which grips the shell by automatic pressure. Thereupon, by turning the shaft in the opposite direction the shell is raised, transported to the waiting tray (A) of which 4 are provided and placed on it. This waiting tray is so arranged that a shell can be landed only in the one position in order to prevent an inverted landing on the shell bogie relative to the entry in the hoist. The shell bogie is fitted with the same stops as the waiting tray.<br />
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From the waiting tray the shell can be placed on either of the two shell bogies (which are rigidly joined to each other). The latter run easily with rollers on a circular rail, and can not only be adjusted exactly at the waiting tray by means of spring stops, but can also be coupled to the shell hoist in the loading position.<br />
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In the shell rooms (lower deck) the shells are stowed in bins four to five deep (Fig.9, Enc.3)[.] The copper driving bands are protected by a broad covering band of strong canvas the ends of which are sewn together with (twine ?). Only rope is placed between the individual shells as a preventative against damage. Two vertical wooden batten are secured to the side walls of the shell bins - right and left.<br />
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In order to ensure the grab gripping the shell as near as possible round the centre of gravity, each shell has a white ring painted round it.<br />
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It is to be noted that the shell room cannot be shut off (water tightly) from the shell handing room as the large openings in the dividing Bulkhead, through which the transport carrier passes, are always open.<br />
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In addition projectiles are stowed in many ships in the corners of the shell handing room itself in fixed bins.<br />
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The 30.5 (12") cartridges are stowed in their water tight zinc cylinders in special stowage fittings in the magazines. These stowages are made of angle Iron and sheet plates. (There is no wood in the fittings).<br />
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The Magazines, (2 decks from the bottom) in contrast to the shell room, are separated from the Magazine handing room, by a means of thin sheet bulkheads, in which the passage ways are fitted with double doors and the circular openings for handing cartridges are fitted with double covering flaps (the latter have already been remarked on in "SEYDLITZ" Section 11, Fig.3, Enc.3.[)]<br />
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For transport of cartridges in the Magazines the transporting gear shewn in Fig.10, Enc.3 is available. This consists of a double rail (R) in which a horizontal (sheet iron) tray, semicircular in section can be moved up and down in guides by means of a hand differential purchase (F). The Tray can then be brought to the exact level of the cartridge. The Transporting gear is suspended from an overhead rail,(S) and also runs in a guide rail on the deck (SS). The cartridge is pushed on to the tray and the transporter then brought to the cartridge handing hole, and after opening the double flaps, transferred to the Turret.<br />
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The Turret appliances correspond in general to those in "HINDENBURG", about which data are described later. But an exception must be made in the case of the size and installation of the Rangefinders (Fig.11, Enc.3).In "KURFÜRST" the Rangefinders about 3 meters (10 ft.) long are fitted in hoods in the front of the Turret, while "HINDENBURG" the 8 metre (26 ft.) range finders are already being fitted in the same way as will be the case in our 35 cm. (about 14") turrets, now building.<br />
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<center>E. "MARKGRAF".</center><br />
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<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
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This Battleship was hit 5 times by big guns and all from the port side.<br />
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Only hit No.2 is of gunnery interest. This entered the next to the last 15 cm. (5.(') [5.9"] casemate on the port side and exploded, killing the crew and putting gun out of action for the remainder of the battle, though it did not damage it very seriously.<br />
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Several splinters from this shell pierced the bulkhead and entered the next casemate (forward) and killed or wounded several men. But this gun was brought into action again after an interval of about 10 minutes to make up the crew.<br />
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<center>11. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
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In the case of this ship also, splinters from enemy shorts entered the Conning Tower, but without causing any damage to either personnel or Materiel.<br />
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During the whole engagement about 250 rounds of 30 cm. (12") ammunition was fired, i.e. about one fifth of the total supply on board.<br />
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<center>F. "MOLTKE".</center><br />
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<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
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This ship was hit 4 times by heavy shell (all from the starboard side).<br />
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One shell (Hit No.3) pierced the upper side armour and burst behind the latter inside the ship. It also caused some damage outside to No.4.15 cm. (5.9") casemate starboard (from forward) killing or wounding several men, but causing little damage to the gun. This gun was again brought into action after about 15 minutes.<br />
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<center>11. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
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"MOLTKE" was the only ship from which 4 Torpedoes were fired (not in salvo, but one after the other). On board, it was stated by officers that "QUEEN MARY" was fired at and hit at about 10 kilometres (10,935 yds.), and that this was the cause of the rapid sinking of this Battle Cruiser. Officers of other ships, however, were not of this opinion, as when "MOLTKE" fired the distance from "QUEEN MARY" was about 13 kilometres (14,217 yds.) and that the torpedoes have not this range; so that only Gunnery can be taken into consideration.<br />
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In the "MOLTKE", splinters from short bursting shells also entered the Conning Tower, without, however, causing any noteworthy damage.<br />
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<center>G. "DERFFLINGER".</center><br />
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<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
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This Battle Cruiser was hit the largest number of times, viz:- 30, of these 20 were of heavy calibre and all came from the port side.<br />
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:(1) A 15" shell pierced the roof of N.4 30.5 cm. (12") Turret (hit No.5) exploded inside the Turret, thereby igniting all the charges which were there (apparently only two) and killed all the Turret's crew, (74 men including reserve crew), except 2 men who were able to get away (wounded).<br />
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:The Turret itself was put out of action because (as was the case in all these hits on Turrets) much damage was done to the various instruments and appliances by the splinters and flash.<br />
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:It is worthy of note that the electric cables in the Turret were comparatively uninjured.<br />
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:(2). Turret No.3 was also hit by a 38 cm. (15") shell (hit No.6). The projectile penetrated the Barbette armour and took with it a large piece of plating into the interior of the Turret. The 74 men of the Turret's crew (as in the hit described above[)] for the most part were killed, only 6 men getting away wounded. It is observed that an 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) gun which was 3½ metres (about 11½ ft.) away from the point of impact, was completely undamaged, although the deck below the spot, and in the immediate vicinity of this gun, was badly damaged.<br />
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:Nos.3 and 4 Turrets were only put out of action towards the end of the engagement.<br />
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:The two foremost Turrets remained completely intact, although the Barbette armour of the second Turret showed a fairly large scrape from a (very glancing) shell hit. But this caused no further damage to the Turret (hit No.13).<br />
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:(4). The Conning Tower was hit on the starboard side on the edge. But only small pieces of the brittle face of the armoured plates splintered off, and in the Tower itself only one elevation-pointer ceased to function.<br />
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:(5). Very severe damage was done by a large calibre shell (hit No.20) which exploded close to the casemate of the No.2 15 cm. (5.9) gun port, which not only damaged this gun, but also put the two neighbouring 15 cm. (5.9") guns out of action. The first named gun was principally severely damaged on the chase, and the chase of the foremost 15 cm. (5.9") gun was indented to such an extent by splinters, that it could not be fired again. The other gun in the vicinity was so shaken up by the powerful explosion, that it could not be moved again. The casualties sustained by the gun's crews were in contrast comparatively small. (1 man killed and several severely or slightly wounded at the first named gun[)].<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
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A large fragment of a 38 cm. (15") shell (which failed to explode), was exhibited on board (as is shown in Fig.12, Enc.3)[.] The much distorted fuze was also found.<br />
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<center>H. "KÖNIG".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits.</center><br />
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There were 13 hits (large calibre) identified all from the port side and above the waterline.<br />
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:(1). A 34.3 cm. (13.5) shell hit the port foremost 15 cm. (5.9") casemate. (Hit No.9). A large piece of armour plating was carried into the casemate, where the shell exploded, killed the gun's crew (11 men) and put the gun out of action. The armour plate went further, penetrated the bulkhead, entered the galley, destroyed it and killed more men.<br />
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:(2). Another 34.3 cm. (13.5") shell penetrated the second 15 cm. (5.9") casemate (hit No.8) and exploded, making the gun useless and, by penetrating the deck also caused much damage in the compartment below. The crew of this gun was by chance not at the moment in the casemate, as they had gone out for a short time on account of gas from the explosion in the first 15 cm. (5.9) casemate (which had occurred just previously.) The result was that there were no killed or wounded among the gun's crew.<br />
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:(3). The traces of a shell were visible on the roof of the foremost 30.5 (12") Turret. (Hit No.11.) The projectile damaged the Rangefinder cover, and tore off a piece of it, rendering the Rangefinder useless. No other damage was caused by this hit.<br />
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:(4). The roof of the Conning Tower was similarly gazed [sic] by a shell, which left a scratch but caused no other damage to the Tower or its instruments, etc.<br />
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<center>J. "HINDENBURG."</center><br />
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<center>(Apparently about 30,000 tons displacement)</center><br />
<br />
This Cruiser, now building will be given an armament of 8 30.5 cm. (12") guns 50 cal. (in four double turrets, 2 forward and 2 aft as in "DERFFLINGER") and 14 15 cm. (5.9") and 8.8 cm[.] (22 pr.) Anti-aircraft guns.<br />
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The foremost superimposed Turret (No.2) was mostly built in, and a short inspection of it was made.<br />
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The Gun-platform is especially roomy. The distance apart of the centres of the two gun barrels being estimated at about 3 metres (10 feet approx.)[.] The complete arrangement of the gun-platform can be seen in the diagrammatic Sketch (Fig.13, Enc.3). The 2 shell hoists (G) are side by side between the gun and to the left of the left gun, (and right of the right gun) are the two ammunition hoists (P).<br />
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The up-coming ammunition is placed in its slide (TT) in the rear by means of unloading rammers (so-called "Umlauder"), whence it rolls on to the loading Tray, and finally on to the shell swings or cartridge swings, which by swinging across, brings the shell or cartridges one after the other to the rear of the gun for loading.<br />
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The two rammers are hydraulic chain Rammers (with reserve hand drive). In the space at the rear of the platform there are :- an entrance opening (E) and two openings (A) for passing out firedcartridge [sic] cases. These openings (A) are constructed similarly to those more exactly described under "SEYDLITZ" (Sec.II. Par.9).<br />
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The Breeches are worked hydraulically (the reserve method being by hand.)<br />
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The principle can be gathered from Fig.14, Enc.3 . A bar with a tooth edged point (Z), (which can be worked up or down hydraulically) turns the Traversing shaft by means of cog wheels (R1, R2, R3) and opens or shuts the breech. The Water-pressure is led to the mechanism through two flexible hoses. If the cog wheel R3 is placed out of gear with R2, the hydraulic system is shut off.<br />
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For elevating,Trunnion [sic] sights are provided and for training a sighting telescope is fitted in front between the guns.<br />
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The Rangefinder (about 8 metres long) which was not yet on board, is to be fitted in the front of the Turret above the guns (under the roof as already referred to under "KURFÜRST")[.] Only the two side openings in the armour could be seen.<br />
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Elevating is worked hydraulically (Reserve system by hand). (The ammunition hoists are also worked hydraulically, but here the alternative system is electric).<br />
<br />
A gun coupling is fitted in this ship as in all later ships. But these couplings are apparently only for use when it is desired to elevate a gun whose elevating gear has been damaged.<br />
<br />
The normal Turret Training gear and also the reserve system is only worked by electric motors.<br />
<br />
The same system of ventilation is used as has already been described in "SEYDLITZ" (Section II, Par.II).<br />
<br />
All working machinery (Electrically driven pumps, and electric motors for elevating, training, hoists, rammers, etc.) are apparently installed in the spacious working chamber below the gun platform.<br />
<br />
The arrangements in the Magazines as well as the transporting gear for passing shell and cartridges from them to the hoists are the same as those already more minutely described under battleship "GROSSER KÜRFURST."<br />
<br />
<center>K. "BAYERN".</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Class Ersatz "WÖRTH" about 30,000 tons disp.)</center><br />
<br />
This battleship, only recently completed, had to carry out exercises whilst at Kiel, and the Commission was invited to join for a cruise, which gave opportunity for a certain amount of inspection.<br />
<br />
The armament consists of eight 38 cm. (15") G.L. 45 guns in four double turrets apparently arranged as shown in the Almanac; sixteen 15 cm. (5.9") G.L. 45 guns in casemates and eight 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) anti-aircraft guns.<br />
<br />
38 cm. Gun Turret. (Fig. 15, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
The distance apart of the bore axes is 3700 mm. (12.1 ft.) for these guns[.] 8.8 cm. sub-calibre guns are provided, which are put in from outboard (i.e. muzzle end.)<br />
<br />
The Gunhouse, as in the turrets of the "HINDENBURG" is very roomy.<br />
<br />
In this turret there has been introduced no important alteration with respect to the munition hoists. Whereas in all previous ships the shot hoist was separate from the cartridge hoist, in this ship, as with us (the Austrian Navy), both hoists for one gun are combined in one trunk; and also instead of the shell and cartridge swings in the "HINDENBURG" (see above) munition wagons (W1, W2), which run on cross rails are introduced. The two main hoists (A1, A2) come up between the two guns. Besides these there are in addition two electrically driven auxiliary hoists (H1, H2).<br />
<br />
The round which arrives at the top of the hoist is taken out and landed, by means of the unloading rammer (U) in the munition wagon, which brings it to the rear of the particular gun in the loading position, whence it is loaded by means of the rammer.<br />
<br />
The munition wagons, rammers and unloading rammers are normally worked by hydraulic power (with auxiliary handworking gear); at the back of the turret are two principal operating positions, (ST1, ST2) which are raised to give a good all-round view, and where all the necessary manipulation for the foregoing hydraulic machinery is carried out.<br />
<br />
The munition hoists are also hydraulically worked, and electric drive is provided as an alternative. The elevating and breech mechanism gear are hydraulic (with alternative hand gear).<br />
<br />
The following sighting arrangements are provided :-<br />
<br />
:(a) For elevation - two side trunnion sights as well as two reserve sights in front.<br />
<br />
:(b) For training - a principal trainer's telescope in front between the two guns, as well as a side telescope as reserve.<br />
<br />
Asked whether any automatic firing apparatus was in contemplation, it was replied that a place for such apparatus was provided but the installation could not be expected till later, and depended on the solution of several problems which had yet to be experimented on.<br />
<br />
The large 8.2 m. (26.9 ft.) rangefinder is placed the same as in the "HINDENBURG".<br />
<br />
The ventilation of the turret is on the same principle as in the "HINDENBURG" and "SEYDLITZ", except that in addition there are two powerful electric fan motors between the guns.<br />
<br />
The Training is done electrically, as is also the alternative arrangement. Fig 15, Enc.3 gives a diagrammatic sketch of the arrangements. The controller gives 72 degrees of speed.<br />
<br />
For absorbing the shock in the training gear of single gun shooting there are provided, in the friction coupling box of the worm gearing, besides the friction plates (as in our own installations) two rings of strong springs above them - each ring containing six springs as shewn in Fig.17, Enc.3. Apparently any turret thrown off a small angle by a single round will be trained back to its original position by means of these springs.<br />
<br />
As in "HINDENBURG", so also in "BAYERN", the various machines for training[,] elevating, munition supply, rammers and unloading rammers are placed on the deck underneath the Gun platform (working chamber), and also the machines for the magazine and transport arrangements of munitions are similarly installed.<br />
<br />
In Fig. 18, Enc.3 is a diagrammatic sketch of the munition hoists and magazines from which it can be seen that the shell room is on the lowest level and has the magazine above it. The cartridge loading door (F1 for cartridges, G1 for shell) are fitted for flash protection with sliding shutters which are self-operating when the lift arrives at one or the other, i.e. when the lift arrives at the bottom, the shutter there will open and leave the loading hole (P) free, while the upper openings F1 and G1 will be shut and locked.<br />
<br />
An inspection of the shell room 38 cm. (15") showed that on these shells there is attached to the rearmost of the three upper driving bands a zinc band about 20 mm. (.78 in.) broad (similar to the driving bands). Experience has shown that this zinc ring is a very good anti-coppering device for the bore. It was apparently on the French front, at Verdun and in Flanders, that experiments with this arrangement were made; the results were very good and its introduction followed. The Army has also adopted it.<br />
<br />
The following is the situation with regard to 38 cm. (15 in.) shell. As opposed to the single type of shell (long calibre) in newly completing ships, here there are two :-<br />
<br />
:(a) A.P. shell, with cap, total length of shell 3.5 calibres.<br />
<br />
:(b) H.E. shell, uncapped, total length of shell 4.1 calibres. The total weight is 750 kg. (1653.5 lbs). The burster (not Trotyl, probably Heranit? 23.5 kg. (57.8 lbs.) for the A.P. shell and 67 kg. (147.7 lbs) for the H.E. The establishment allowed per [gun] is 90 A.P. and 30 H.E. The maximum range is 24 kilometres (26,247 yds.) with an angle of descent of 32 degrees, elevation of gun 247 degrees, time of flight 48 secs.<br />
<br />
:The charge is 87 kg. (191.8 lbs) in the main cartridge and 96 kg. (211.6 lbs.) in the foremost cartridge.<br />
<br />
:The rate of fire is one round per 40 seconds.<br />
<br />
15 cm. casemates. In these ships the flash protection for the 15 cm. (5.9") munition hoists in the casemates has been improved (Fig.20, Enc.3). In that a sheet iron chamber (K) has been built around the delivery opening which, by means of sliding plates (S1 and S2) can be shut off either from the trunk or from the munition tray. (G2.) For example, a shell arrives at the top of the hoist (G) - the shutter (S1) is raised in its guides by means of the lift mechanism, so that the shell can roll into the chamber (G1) while the shutter (S3) remains closed. Immediately afterwards the shutter (S1) closes the opening and the shutter (S2) raises in its guides and the shell rolls on the munition tray (G2). By this means the trunk is rendered flash proof at all stages of the operation.<br />
<br />
Submerged Flats. On board this ship there was also the opportunity to visit a submerged flat with two broadside tubes.<br />
<br />
In all there are five tubes (2 in each flat) and a bow tube. The calibre of the torpedoes is 60 cm. (23.6 in.) and the weight of a fully charged torpedo 2200 kg. (4850 lbs.). The explosive (? Heranit) weighing 250 kg. (531.1 lbs). The establishment per tube is four torpedoes - making in all 20 on board. The greatest torpedo range is 13 kilometres, 14,217 yds) with a medium speed setting of 28 knots.<br />
<br />
The flat that was visited (Fig.21, Enc.3) is very large and about 5 metres high, (16 ft.) so that it is perfectly feasible to turn any torpedo hanging on the purchase at the turntable (W1) on the overhead rails, so that is [sic] can be loaded into the port or starboard tube.<br />
<br />
The tubes (L1, L2) are side loading with very strong longitudinal holts [sic] on top (V1, V2) and fitted with a strong shield bar. For loading the torpedoes in the tubes, there are fitted near the tubes, on the same side on the side door, mechanical loading apparatus (quickloaders A1, A2), and on the opposite side are provided the rails (R1, R2) which serve for the adjustment (lever system) of the gyroscope of a torpedo lying in the tube.<br />
<br />
A torpedo is struck down from the upper deck through the trunk (E) and swung through the opening (O) into the flat, whence by means of a purchase (mechanically driven) it is run on to the tramways (S) and thence either to the bulkhead stowage or to a stowage over the tube.<br />
<br />
One must take this opportunity of noting that the overhead rails are not bolted to the actual deck, but are a separate structure, so as to avoid putting any vibration or other strain on to the armoured deck.<br />
<br />
If a torpedo is to be loaded it will be brought by means of the purchase to the exact ready stowage over the tube; then the hydraulic loader is operated by a lever; a grad [sic] with two arms seizes the torpedo in two specially cut away parts and draws it horizontally on to the guide rail of the loader, which then is lowered together with the torpedo. In the meantime the side door is mechanically unbolted and opened, so that the torpedo can be placed right in the tube (impulse frame). After this the guide rail and grab of the loader are withdrawn and raised, while the side door is shut and bolted. Loading by this means proceeds comparatively noiselessly, rapidly and precisely.<br />
<br />
The sluice is hydraulically worked, and after firing is operated by the return movement of the shield bar. When draining the tube the water can be pumped either overboard or into a well.<br />
<br />
The discharge is operated electrically from the Conning Tower or by hand.<br />
<br />
The sluice is hydraulically worked, and after firing is operated by the return movement of the shield bar. When draining the tube the water can be pumped either overboard or into a well.<br />
<br />
The discharge is operated electrically from the Conning Tower or by hand.<br />
<br />
<center>L. TORPEDO BOAT "G. 90".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1200 tons displacement.)</center><br />
<br />
From the Battleship "BAYERN" the Commission was brought back to Kiel in one of the newest torpedo boats (G.90), which offered an opportunity of seeing certain details.<br />
<br />
The gun armament consists of three 10.5 cm. (4.1") Guns on transferable mountings; the torpedo armament, of two single tubes forward and two double tubes for<nowiki>*</nowiki> [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. Note: Apparently a clerical error for 50 cm.(19.7")] 45 cm. (17.7") torpedoes in the after part. (See Fig. 22, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
The following details respecting the torpedo equipment were noted :<br />
<br />
Six torpedoes were carried, which remain stowed in the tubes; spare torpedoes are not carried on board, and no torpedo stowage is provided. The tubes of the twin mountings are not parallel but inclined outwards from each other, making an angle of 20° between the tubes.<br />
<br />
The reason for this lies in the method of torpedo boat attack. Torpedo craft always fire on the swing (in order to offer the full broadside target to the enemy fire for the shortest possible time), and the torpedoes from a twin mounting are are [sic] fired one after the other (the mounting remaining on a fixed bearing). The first torpedo having been fired, the boat continues to swing under helm and after 20° the second torpedo is fired.<br />
<br />
The training is done by means of a training gear at each tube, which can be understood from the detailed sketch (Fig. 23, Enc.3). By means of the hand crank (K) a worm and worm wheel (Zr) can be turned, this engages inthe [sic] training rack (Zs) and so the tube can be trained. The training pinion can, by means of a coupling clutch worked by the lever (H) be disconnected from the rack, should be required to train the mounting quickly, or for loading and unloading the torpedo by means of the training gear. This latter is accomplished by means of the windlass (W) mounted on the training shaft round which can be taken a line secured either to the nose or the tail of the torpedo. At the back part of the mounting is fitted a training brake which grips the rack.<br />
<br />
A director is fitted at each tube, and torpedoes are fired electrically from the bridge. At the rear of each tube are fitted two firing pushes (Abfeurungspöller), which can be operated either singly or together. In order to prevent firing from a tube which is not yet at the ready, the particular firing gear is held fast by a special locking gear fitted to the tube; its method of working can be seen from (Fig.24, Enc.3). The locking levers (St1 and St2) are only clear of the firing gear, when the rollers (R1 and R2), connected to the locking gear, are clear of the guide strip (G). This guide strip covers the arc in which firing is to be prevented. The springs.(F1 and F2) release the gear, as shewn in the sketch under (T).<br />
<br />
For torpedo transport on deck a special rail is fitted on the starboard side, on which was seen a fairly long transport wagon.<br />
<br />
<center>M. TRAWLER.</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Fitted out for Anti Submarine work)</center><br />
<br />
For fighting submarine boats trawlers are employed with the following :-<br />
<br />
:(a). A.S.rope nets fitted with two or four A.S.mines.<br />
<br />
:(b). Large Depth charges.<br />
<br />
:(c). Anti Submarine explosive Kite.<br />
<br />
::These appliances are described below.<br />
<br />
(a). Nets with A.S. Mines (Fig.25, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
These nets are made up from hemp rope (diameter of rope about 10 mm.); they are 250 m.long and of varying breadth (up to 20 m.) To a normal net two mines (M.M.) are attached (see Fig.25, Enc.3); for broader nets the mines are secured in pairs vertically - thus making four mines to a broad net. The mines are supported by their own large iron flat (S) while for the support of the nets smaller floats (S1) are placed on top.<br />
<br />
Each pair of nets also has an anchor and cable attached.<br />
<br />
The nets which are joined together are stowed with their mines in large shaped iron floats. The latter are stowed ready for shooting in two rows, (1 and 2, Fig.26, Enc3) on the top of the trawler. Shortly before action the primers are inserted through circular holes in the floats (1 hole per float).<br />
<br />
The shooting of nets one and two is carried out at a speed of 10 knots by one man. First , the first anchor of the first net is let go and the net with its mines dragged into the water, afterwards being anchored by the second anchor. Before, however, this latter is slipped the first anchor of the second net must be let go to ensure over-lapping.<br />
<br />
There are tiny holes in the floats by means of which just sufficient water can enter the floats so as to sink the net with its mines and floats at the end of an hour, and leave the area free again for traffic.<br />
<br />
These net mines (Fig.27, Enc.3) are contact mines with an explosive charge (1) from 12-13 kg. of Trotyl and consist of the mine case (M), firing mechanism (S), impact plate (P), distance pin (St), the safety lever (S1) and the primer (J) with the detonator (K).<br />
<br />
When the mine enters the water and reaches a depth of 5 metres the safety catch is released by a hydrostatic valve, which thus frees the detonator for the striker.<br />
<br />
Firing is effected in that by the impact of a submarine the impact plate (and with it the distance pin) are displaced, and by means of the latter the striker is freed and fires the mine by means of the firing spring (which is already cocked).<br />
<br />
(b). Depth charge (Fig., Enc.3).<br />
<br />
These depth charges are cylindrical in form and contain a large explosive charge of 60 kg. of Trotyl. They consist of the mine (M) and the float (S). The latter is connected to the mine by a strong steel wire (3 mm.), which is wound on a reel in the float. It fires (exactly like the depth charge of Korvetten Kapitän Schönthaler) because on reaching the set depth the tension on the wire operates the firing mechanism (Striker spring (F) is compressed as the striker (B) is raised by the grab (Z)) and thus frees the striker.<br />
<br />
The set depth can be adjusted from 5 to 5 (5 to 50?) metres (practically in the same way as in the Schönthaler Depth Charge) and it is to be noted that the time of explosion (1 to 5 secs) is adjustable by means of turning the pointer of the seconds scale (E) on the outside. The delay action itself operates by means of a disc similar to shrapnel.<br />
<br />
(c). Explosive Kite (Fig.30, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
The Kite (D) is made of wood and shaped as shown in Fig.31, inside is an explosive charge (the same size as the net mine, 12 - 13 kg., described in par. (a) above.<br />
<br />
The Kite is towed by a 15 mm. strong steel wire (T) whose core is an electric cableby [sic] means of which the kite is electrically exploded.<br />
<br />
The cable wire is wound on the winch (K), the ends being connected to the electric firing battery in the hollow drum.<br />
<br />
The towing wire is led from the winch over an adjustable brake (B) and from there over a roller (R) secured to a derrick (L) where the other end is connected to the charge.<br />
<br />
When the kite hits against a hard object (submarine) it is electrically fired.<br />
<br />
As a safety precaution the electric switch at the battery is only made when the kite is towing at the requisite speed.<br />
<br />
Trawlers tow at 10 knots, which causes a pull of 350 kg. on the wire.<br />
<br />
<center>N. ARSENAL WILHELMSHAVEN.</center><br />
<br />
Only a short visit to the gun shops was made. There about 1,000 civil workman [sic] were employed.<br />
<br />
In general the work carried out was similar to that in our own gun factories (repair of gun material, production of necessary equipment, magazine and shellroom machinery, examination and cleaning of bores of guns, the storage and preservation of magazine and shellroom fittings, small calibre guns, searchlights, range finders, etc.), only here the buildings, in particular the shops and storehouses, are modern throughout and planned on a spacious lay out.<br />
<br />
The drawing office is worthy of note, in it at that time the stowage plan of munitions for the Battle Cruiser "HINDENBURG" was in preparation. For the protection of such drawings there is provided a large fireproof room.<br />
<br />
To the gun shops belong :- the large mechanical shops, a smithy, a large carpenter's shop, a large shop for work on canvas, leather, and similar equipment, a plumber's shop, two very roomy storehouses for magazine material and a depot for various constructional materials; in the last named is a special,cellar for rubber and leather articles in which at the time there were gathered about 700,000 marks worth.<br />
<br />
A new large gun hall was under construction which is about 60 m. long and 25 m. broad. The building itself was nearly finished, only the installation and also the large travelling crane were not in place.<br />
<br />
Both high sliding doors (T1 T2) were operated by an electrically driven (alternative hand working) which at the side. The travelling crane (N) brings the material to the door, where a floating crane (S) with large overhang takes it over and provides for its further transport.<br />
<br />
While passing through the shop the decoppering of a 15 cm. (5.9) gun was seen. The decoppering machine was a brush withbvery [sic] fine steel bristles, as shewn in Fig.33. The head of the brush (K) is a cylindrical drum of strong plate, which before use is filled with petroleum and turpentine. On the head are fixed three bristle holding rings (H), which carry on their periphery the small steel bristles (B). These three bristle rings are separated by two intermediate rings (R).<br />
<br />
The fine steel wire used in the bristles is 0.2 mm. thick and must be softer than the material of the inner tube so as not to scratch the latter. The cleaning is accomplished by powerful brushing th [sic] through the bore, this action forcing out the petroleum mixture from the drum at the head of the brush into the bore.<br />
<br />
The decoppering device was very successful with the 15 cm. (5.9") gun; a small quantity of the copper scraping and two bristles were given to the Mission. (A bristle and a portion of copper scrapings accompany the reports (1 each) to the K.U.K.K.M. Marine Section (Austrian Admiralty) and to the (Austrian) Naval Technical Committee.)<br />
<br />
<center>O. ARSENAL KIEL.</center><br />
<br />
The "Artilleriewerkstätten" (Gun shops) at Kiel are in general the same as those at Wilhelmshaven described above, so that this amounted to an opportunity for closer description.<br />
<br />
The only noteworthy sight among the gunshops visited was one very large gunhall in which numerous guns are stowed, (among them some from ships that had been in the battle (Jutland); for the transport of the heaviest weights are two travelling cranes (each of 45 tons both cranes are employed together). For the further transport normal gauge rail tracks are provided.<br />
<br />
For the mechanical decoppering of guns a special scraper is used, whose action can be seen from Fig. 34. In the dial shaped head (K) are two difference scrapers (S1 S2), which by means of an inserting gear (E) can be placed exactly in the groove it is required to clean. The scraper (S1), cleans the base of the grooves, the scraper (S2) cleans the sides. The red (st) is guided so as to avoid any corners of the scraper<nowiki>*</nowiki> [I.D.Note: Apparently this guide rod arrangement keeps the scraper true in the groove.] This apparatus has proved its worth.<br />
<br />
Later on information from the Ordnance Department of the Admiralty showed that 30.5 and 28 cm. gun tubes, from which 60 - 100 rounds had been fired in the action, from later experimental firings at Krupps were found to have suffered from wear (actually about 20 mm.) which permitted overramming. After the conclusion of the experimental firings, only gun tubes of equ [sic] equal wear are sent to one and the same ship.<br />
<br />
Of very great interest is the information that many of the 25 cm. (13.7") guns, which were on the French front (6 on the Verdun front) had fired 600 - 800 rounds with full charge (range 36 kilometers, 39,376 yds.) with a diminished range of only 2 km., 2,187 yds. and no necessity for a new inner tube. The shell used in these guns were those provided with the anti-coppering zinc ring.<br />
<br />
The following summarize the points of the greatest importance.<br />
<br />
:1. Introduction of gas masks for each man, as of utmost importance.<br />
<br />
:2. Specially important is flash protection (including) cover plates for munition hoist trunks in turrets and casemates, shut off hatches and doors as well as partition of the magazines.).<br />
<br />
:3. As few cartridges as possible by the gun (in the gun house of a turret or in a casemate), because of the great danger of its ignition by a hit.<br />
<br />
:4. Abolition of the ready use position in the turrets (on account of point 3, above).<br />
<br />
:5. Many gun tubes 30.5 and 28 cm. (12" and 4" [sic]) have fired 60 - 100 rounds with only 20 mm. overramming.<br />
<br />
:6. Many gun tubes undergo experimental firing and are reissued only in similar tubes to one ship.<br />
<br />
:7. Automatic firing apparatus is not yet in use.<br />
<br />
:8. Gun coupling gear provided, but is only used in the event of danger to elevating gear.<br />
<br />
:9. Introduction of small calibre guns 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) only for anti-aircraft work.<br />
<br />
:10. Normally the turrets only fire salvoes, and only from one gun per turret.<br />
<br />
:11. Repulse of Torpedo boat attacks is achieved by broadside salvoes from the 15 cm. (5.9") guns - all in one target.<br />
<br />
:12. Normal turret machinery :-<br />
<br />
::Training{{pad|50px}}Electric (as is also reserve)<br />
<br />
::Elevating<br />
<br />
::Rammers<br />
<br />
::Unloading rammers{{pad|50px}}All hydraulic and<br />
<br />
::Breech mechanism and in some{{pad|30px}}hand control.<br />
<br />
::cases Munition wagons<br />
<br />
::Munition hoists - hydraulic - with electric reserve<br />
<br />
::Shell transport in shell rooms - electric<br />
<br />
:13. Observation of fall of shot :- in each top, 1 or two men in telephonic communication with the gunnery officer. (On 31st.May neither Aeroplanes or Zeppelins were present[)].<br />
<br />
:14. Fire control from gunnery officer's position by elevation pointer only.<br />
<br />
:15. All rangefinders stereoscopic normally 3 m. long instruments in armour domes in Turrets, in the latest ships 8 m. instruments projecting from sides below Turret roofs.<br />
<br />
:16. Large calibre projectiles are standard type armour shells with caps and sharply pointed explosive shells without cap are being reintroduced. For 15 cm. Guns (5.9") fused shell with base fuse and H.F. shell with a very sensitive nose fuse and a base fuse.<br />
<br />
:17. No ship expended all her heavy ammunition, at the most a little over 1/3 of the establishment.<br />
<br />
:18. Establishment for heavy guns 115 - 120 rounds per gun.<br />
<br />
:19. As an anti-coppering precaution for guns, projectiles are fitted with a zinc ring behind the rear driving band and in direct contact therewith.<br />
<br />
20. English 38 cm. (15") and 34.3 cm (13.5") projectiles have apparently black powder as a bursting charge: bursting bad and effect not commensurate with the calibre.<br />
<br />
:21. The explosion of a large calibre projectile in a Turret always puts the same out of action.<br />
<br />
:22. Ventilation of Turrets insufficient.<br />
<br />
:23. Voice pipes 60 - 100 and 150 mm. calibre have no lagging and are provided with wooden stoppers or sponges wherewith to close the tube to gases.<br />
<br />
:24. Emergency lighting by means of Pocket lamps.<br />
<br />
:25. Torpedo nets are no longer carried.<br />
<br />
:26. All ranges below 15 km. heavy armour is generally pierced by 38 cm. (15")projectiles. [sic]<br />
<br />
:27. Submarine Defence. Mine nets, (? Depth charges) and Explosive Kites.<br />
<br />
Appendices 2 Sketches, Hits Appendix 1 and 2. One sheet of sketches to report. Appen. 3.<br />
<br />
In conclusion, one matter may be mentioned, which, on the occasion of the visit to the Arsenal at Wilhelmshaven and to the ships, attracted attention through its differing so greatly from our own arrangements. Viz, the handling procedure of consumable stores.<br />
<br />
The characteristic points of the Organisation of this Branch in the German Navy are, as follows :-<br />
<br />
:1. In the ships, the demanding, keeping and issuing of consumable stores is done by one officer under the special supervision of the Commander, who is responsible for the stores being on board, for maintaining them in proper condition, for stowing them efficiently and according to regulations and for the accuracy and completeness of the necessary accounts.<br>These officers are occupied by "Materialenverwalter" W.O.'s [Warrant Officers] who are well trained in the work of their branch and are selected from P.Os. [Petty Officers]<br />
<br />
:2. Money necessary for the Administrative work of the ship is remitted to the Captain in the form of a fixed sum and the expenditure of this is checked by the "Materialenverwalter".<br />
<br />
:3. The limit to the yearly expenditure of stores is fixed by a "Stores Credit" (estimate). Permission to exceed this limit must be obtained from the Admiralty and only in specially exceptional cases is permission for such excess to be requested afterwards.<br />
<br />
:4. The paymaster controls stores and the "Materialenverwalter" accounts and reports tomthe [sic] Captain whenever expenditure in excess of the quantity allowed is to be feared. The paymaster is not responsible for the accuracy of the entries made by the "Materialenverwalter" in books, etc.,kept [sic] by him.<br />
<br />
:5. The Office staff is at the disposal of the Captain to assist in accounting for consumable and non-consumable stores. This staff consists of one officer and the clerk, they are jointly responsible for reporting losses, deficiencies as compared with quantities shown by the books, necessary repairs and replacements. They also keep such records as are necessary to afford at any time a clear statement of the consumable and non-consumable stores and munition on board.<br />
<br />
:6. Stores are completed by demands on the Imperial Dockyards or depots by means of special forms. The consignment note serving as voucher.<br />
<br />
:Ship's demands are not checked by the Dockyards, the ships alone being responsible for the demand being in order.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}Pola, 4th. August, 1916.<br />
<br />
==See Also==<br />
*[[Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland]]<br />
<br />
==Footnotes==<br />
{{reflist}}</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Report_on_German_Warships_after_Jutland&diff=334772Austro-Hungarian Naval Report on German Warships after Jutland2024-03-24T16:45:13Z<p>Simon Harley: /* Report */</p>
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<div>In the papers of Vice-Admiral [[John Ernest Troyte Harper|John E. T. Harper]] is a copy of a translation of an Austro-Hungarian Navy report on German Imperial Navy warships after the [[Battle of Jutland]].<ref>Harper papers. Churchill Archives Centre. JEHR 1/4. This research was made possible by the Colin Bell Award, a grant from the Colin Bell Fund at Churchill College, Cambridge.</ref> It was prepared by ''Marineartillerie-Oberingenieure 2. Klasse'' Georg Schindler. This report is in many ways more detailed than that of ''Fregattenkapitäne'' Hieronymus Graf von Colloredo-Mannsfeld [[Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland|prepared immediately after Jutland]], which is also in Harper's papers. The references to I.D. Notes suggest that, like Colloredo-Mannsfeld's report, this was a translation prepared in the [[Naval Intelligence Division (Royal Navy)|Naval Intelligence Division]].<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
REPORT by a Mission undertaken in accordance with Order. Section 4 M.S. No.1746 of 1916.<br />
----<br />
<br />
On the inspection of German Warships which took part in the Battle of the Skaggerak (Jutland), 31st.May - 1st.June 1916; on Wilhelmshaven, Hamburg and Kiel, and on other inspections of ships and bases.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}By Georg Schindler,<br />
<br />
{{pad|580px}}Gunnery Engineer, 2nd Class.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}AUSTRIAN NAVY.<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
The only details which have been dealt with are those which were of Gunnery interest.<br />
<br />
{|<br />
| A.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "SEYDLITZ"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| B.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "OSTFRIESLAND"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| C.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "VON DER TANN"<br />
| were<br />
|-<br />
| D.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "GROSSER KÜRFURST"<br />
| in<br />
|-<br />
| E.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"&nbsp;<br />
| "MARKGRAF"<br />
| engagement.<br />
|-<br />
| F.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "MOLTKE"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| G.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"<br />
| "DERFFLINGER"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| H.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "KÖNIG"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| J.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "HINDENBURG" (building)<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| K.<br />
| Large Battleship<br />
| "BAYERN"<br />
| rowspan=2 | } Newly commissioned<br />
|-<br />
| L.<br />
| T.B.D.<br />
| "G.90"<br />
|-<br />
| M.<br />
| colspan=3 | Fishing vessels Anti-Submarine armament, etc.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| N.<br />
| colspan=3 | Short inspection of the Ordnance Workshops in the Arsenal in Wilhelmshaven. <br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| O.<br />
| Ditto in Kiel.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|}<br />
<br />
Ships under A.B.C.J. and M. were in Wilhelmshaven. D.E.F. in Hamburg and G.H.K.L. in Kiel.<br />
<br />
In the following reports on each ship, Section 1 deals with the effect of enemy hits on ships A. to H. above, in conjunction with the two attached ship sketches (Enclosures 1 and 2). [Not attached.]<br />
<br />
Of the hits marked in the sketches those of a gunnery interest are distinguished by red ink. Section II gives general remarks concerning the ships in question.<br />
<br />
Further a report is submitted on installations in newly commissioned ships (K. and L.) also on a ship still under construction (J.), as well as means of combating submarines installed in Fishing vessels (M.) and finally, briefly on the Ordnance workshops in the Naval Arsenals (N. and O.).<br />
<br />
A. "SEYDLITZ" (Enclosure 1).<br />
<br />
This Cruiser received 24 shell hits (38 cm. 34.3 cm. and 30.5 cm.)(15", 13.5" and 12") and one Torpedo hit.<br />
<br />
Except for 1 shell hit (apparently 34.3 cm.) (13.5") on the starboard side forward (Hits nos.2-4) and one hit no.16 (38 cm.?) in the starboard after 15 cm. (6") casemate all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all Gun tubes, Guns and many fittings had been dismantled and landed.<br />
<br />
<center>I. Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
<br />
1. A large calibre shell (hit no.8) struck the 2nd. 15 cm. port casemate (from forward), put the gun out of action and killed or seriously wounded the majority of the gun's crew.<br />
<br />
2. A 38 cm. shell exploded in the 4th 15 cm. casemate (hit No.13) the gun was similarly damaged, and 2 men (wounded) remained alive of the crew.<br />
<br />
3. In the port after 15 cm. casemate, No.6 gun, (hit No.15) had the same effect as the two described above.<br />
<br />
4. A 38 cm. shell (hit No.16) penetrated the armoured bulkhead on starboard side aft, near the last 15 cm. casemate, close to the curve of the armour (Fig.1, Enc.3) destroyed the 15 cm. gun and killed most of the gun crew.<br />
<br />
Of the twelve 15 cm. guns it appears that 2 port and 4 starboard fired unceasingly until the end.<br />
<br />
5. No.2 Turret (starboard) received a hit from port on the vertical turret armour (hit No.21) to the right of the right gun. Part of the nose of the shell pierced the armour anddestroyed [sic] the cradle and training gear of the right gun. The left was undamaged. The turret remained in action with this gun.<br />
<br />
6. An interesting hit is to be seen on the right 28 cm. gun of No.3 Turret port. The gun was on one of the jetties of the arsenal and could be examined. A large calibre shell hit the aforesaid gun a glancing blow just outside the turret, producing at the point of impact, a considerable elliptical scoop on the outside, causing a fracture of the inner tube and in addition bent the gun so that the axis of the tube at the muzzle was (as far as could be estimated) 200 mm. (about 8 in.) out of line.<br />
<br />
The cradle of this gun was split, the trunnions somewhat bent and the caps thereof partially opened out.<br />
<br />
The left gun of this turret, however, remained serviceable and the Turret could continue firing without interruption.<br />
<br />
7. A 34.3 cm. (13.5") shell (hit No.18) pierced the vertical armour of the revolving structure of No.4 Turret superimposed to the left of the left gun exploded inside the turret, ignited the cartridges which were ready for loading, put the turret out of action and killed all the crew (about 70 men) except 6.<br />
<br />
T [sic] This turret, already out of action, received another hit later from a 38 cm. (15") shell (hit No.17) this projectile struck the revolving Turret armour close to the lower edge at the right rear of the turret, and partially penetrated the turret.<br />
<br />
8. A Large calibre shell tore off the roof of the after (No.5) turret. (Geschossgeller ? ricochet). The turret suffered no appreciable damage inside.<br />
<br />
The remaining hits are being dealt with in the report on ship construction.≠ [I.D. Note: The original of this report can, unfortunately, not be obtained.]<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
<center>II Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
1. Extensive "flash" protection was already installed in "SEYDLITZ".<br />
<br />
(a) The openings for bringing 28 cm. cartridges into the lower loading chamber of the Ammunition Hoist can be shut off with sliding doors (schubtüren ?). The supply scuttles from the magazines are fitted with hinged flaps which open upwards on each side (Fig.3, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
(b) The 15 cm. (5.9") Ammunition hoists at the supply position in the casemates are fitted with a "closing flap" which shuts automatically, but its own weight assisted by a spring, immediately after the ammunition has rolled out on to the Ammunition Tray (which is placed in a horizontal position by a Paternoster apparatus (endless chain) (Fig.4, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
2. Apparently Gas Masks are employed in all ships. The method of use is the same as in the German Army. <u>Every</u> man was supplied with a mask (as it happened 2 days before action). These masks were to be brought into use immediately there was any evidence of suffocating gases, and they were so far successful that, according to the opinions of officers, at least one ship, if not two, was saved by their use.<br />
<br />
3. Enemy "shorts" usually exploded on hitting the water, with the result that, (as in the cases of shells exploding on board), splinters of various sizes struck guns among other things, and caused damage, but in practically every case no stoppage of firing from the gun resulted. Shell splinters also entered Conning Towers and Turrets through the sighting slits. But they caused no internal damage as their force was broken by their passage through the deeps [sic] slits. (Fig.5, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
4. In Turret firing. Salvoes were gradually used, and always with <u>only one</u> gun of each turret.<br />
<br />
5. For transmission of orders to the guns (also to 15 cm. (5.9" guns) from the Gunnery Officers position (in the Conning Tower) Elevation pointers are used which are mounted (<u>separately</u>) on brackets away from the Turret armour.<br />
<br />
6. Ranges of the individual rangefinders are shown on a circular scale (range receiver) by means of electrically worked pointers. All these dials are mounter [sic] in a circular box (Fig.6, Enc.3) so that the ranges of the same object shown by several rangefinders (Pointers in similar direction)[.] Further, it is possible to cut out one or other of the dials if the Rangetaker concerned is ranging badly.<br />
<br />
7. Repulse of Destroyers is carried out invariably by means of broadside salvoes of 15 cm. (5.9) guns etc. and one target only is always used. But the Gunlayer is only to fire when sights are exactly on the target.<br />
<br />
8. The 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) guns were not used in the battle. It is understood that in the future guns of this calibre, will only be retained on board as anti-aircraft guns, as was laid down for all ships.<br />
<br />
9. (a) The empty 26 cm. (11") cartridge cases are thrown out of the turrets on to the deck through openings in rear of the Gun platforms (2 per turret). A covering flap, opening downwards when the cases are thrown out, automatically closes the hole by means of a spring (Fig.7, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
(b) The fired 15 cm. (5.9") cartridge are placed in a large hanging net in the casemate, and are only removed from the casemate during a lull in the firing. It was stated that a very large number of fired cases (including Large Calibre ones) were collected and brought back.<br />
<br />
10. The voice pipes are made of 60,100 and 150 mm. diameter (2.4 in., 3.8 in.,and 6 in.). (The last named are called Schallrohre and are intended for short distances). Voice pipes are not lagged.<br />
<br />
11. The ventilation of the Turrets is similar to the method employed in our newer ships. A Fan placed between the two guns, sucks, on the one hand the powder gases from the breeches by means of a ventilation pipe from each gun when the breech is opened and on the other hand draws them away from the roof of the turret on the gun platform another fan, portable, and continually running, was installed when sucked in fresh air through a hose and passed it into the interior of the turret bymeans [sic] of a second hose. If any man had any difficulty in breathing he inhaled fresh air through the second hose. But even this method only afforded partial relief.<br />
<br />
12. All Gunnery machinery (hydraulic and electric) appears to have function correctly.<br />
<br />
13. From the Gunnery point of view there were no serious fires (magazines of any description), for which the "Flash door" protection described in Section II Miscellaneous, Pars. I (a) and (b) is principally responsible. All cartridges actually in a turret or casemate,when [sic] an enemy shell burst in the turret or casemate, were exploded in every case. Therefore the rule was most strictly enforced that only the absolute minimum of ammunition was kept ready at the guns.<br />
<br />
14. "SEYDLITZ" had 1150 28 cm. (11" shell) on board, of which 450 were expended. (No ship expended all her ammunition).<br />
<br />
15. The torpedo nets were not actually a hindrance in the action but they sustained heavy damage fromenemy [sic] hits and splinters so that parts of them hung down over the ships side.<br />
<br />
In future these nets being useless ballast will no longer be carried. This is already the case in the new battleship "BAYERN".<br />
<br />
<center>B. "OSTRFRIESLAND".</center><br />
<br />
<center>I. Hits. (Enclosure 1).</center><br />
<br />
This Battleship received no shell hits, but was struck by a mine onthe [sic] starboard side forward. The detailed description is contained in the report on Ship Construction.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
At the time of the inspection of this ship the 30.5 cm. (12") Ammunition was being embarked. The shells were being slung from the Quay on to the Deck by means of a powerful floating crane in bundles (of about 5 projectiles). All cartridges are enclosed in long water-tight zinc containers, fitted with stiffening bands. They were being rolled on board carefully across broad planks and stowed in the Magazines. If several rounds of ready ammunition have to be stowed in the Turret, the charges are always kept in the zinc cylinders.<br />
<br />
The 30.5 cm. (12") and also 28 cm. (11") projectiles are (according to the statement of the Gunnery Officer of this ship, Lt.Comdr.Lauenstein) of one description throughout, capped and fitted with base fuse. Total weight 405 kg. (about 890 lbs.) Bursting charge 12 to 13 kg. (26½ to 29 lbs.) of Trotyl. In the latest ships, however, "Armour piercing" and "high explosive" shell (but with a new explosive for bursting charge) are again to be used, as is already the case with the 28 cm. (15") shell in the Battleship "BAYERN".<br />
<br />
For the 15 cm.(5.9") guns it is reported that there are two types of shell in use.<br />
<br />
:(a) Fused shell with base fuses.<br />
<br />
:(b) High explosive shell,with a very sensitive nose fuse and a base fuse.<br />
<br />
<center>C. "VON DER TANN". (Enclosure 1.)</center><br />
<br />
This Battle Cruiser received 4 hits from large calibre shells (all on the starboard side).<br />
<br />
<center>I.Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
<br />
(1). The foremost 28 cm. (11") Turret was hit in the Barbette on the starboard side. The shell exploded and the armour was just penetrated (Hit No.1). Three men in the turret sustained burns (not very severe) from the "Flash". But the Turret was placed out of action as the armour at the point of impact was bulged inwards and jammed the Turret.<br />
<br />
(2). The after Conning Tower was similarly hit (Hit No.2)[.] But the shell only caused a shaking of the Tower and all apparatus inside remained intact.<br />
<br />
(3.) A shell exploded in the neighbourhood of the after Turret No.4 (Hit No.3). The effect on the Turret was only evident in a shaking, and the armour in the vicinity of the explosion was very slightly indented but without doing any damage so that the Turret continued in action.<br />
<br />
(4). No.4 hit is only of slight constructional interest.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
(1). In this ship, as in "OSTFRIESLAND", the question as to whether the collection of scraps of metal (coming from driving bands or Cartridge cases) in the Breech made any difference to the condition of the breech was answered in the negative.<br />
<br />
(2). The maximum rate of fire of the 28 cm. (11") guns of this Cruiser, as well as of the 30.5 cm. (12") guns of the "OSTFRIESLAND" is stated to have reached 3 - 4 rounds per minute in peace time.<br />
<br />
(3). The arrangement in the 28 cm. (11") turrets is in principle the same as in "SEYDLITZ" or as in the 30.5 cm. (12") guns of the large Battle Cruiser "HINDENBURG" (now building), with the exception of a few improvements in the last named ship. But while in the later ships (30.5 cm. 12") hydraulic rammers with reserve Hand ramming are installed "VON DER TANN" has only double Hand rammers, which are hung under the Turret roof.<br />
<br />
<center>D. "GROSSER KURFÜRST."</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Effects of shell hits (Enclosure 1).</center><br />
<br />
The ship was hit 8 times (large calibre) all from the port side.<br />
<br />
:(1) Hit No.4 (presumably 34 cm. 13.5") exploded before the Barbette armour of the foremost Turret.<br>Apart from breaking off small pieces of the hard armour (? Panzerschichte) and a slight shaking of the turret no damage was done to the Turret fittings. A fragment struck the upper surface of a sight slot and remained in the slot, while a good deal of gas entered the Turret and necessitated the use of gas masks by the crew for some time.<br />
<br />
:(2). A further heavy shell (Hit No.6) struck the port 15 cm.(5.9") Casemate (3rd. from forward) killed 10 of the crew of 14, but damaged the gun so little that after about 12 minutes the gun's crew having been made up, it was brought into action again. Two cartridges which were in the casemate were ignited.<br />
<br />
:(3). The other hits are only of constructional interest.<br />
<br />
:Some 30.5 cm. (12") and 15 cm. (5.9") guns were damaged on the outside by splinters from "shorts", but sustained no other damage.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
The Magazine arrangements in this ship were somewhat more minutely examined as well as reports made concerning them. (The arrangements described below are also used in the other ships).<br />
<br />
The shell bins and shell transport to the shell hoist are shown in Fig. 8, Enc.3) diagrammatically.<br />
<br />
A shell grab (Z) worked by 2 electric motors automatically controlled is used to transport the shell from the bins to the waiting tray fixed round the trunk (Turmraum) (A 1.-4). This grab is suspended from a broad length of wire sword matting, the latter can be wound up or down round a drum (Wa), if the transporting shaft (T) which is provided with two diametrical opposite longitudinal feathers is turned in the corresponding direction. Shaft (T) is fitted into drum (Wa). By this the grab is wound up or down. The grab is moved horizontally by the carrier (R), which holds the above-mentioned revolving drum, being drawn to one side or the other by an endless rope, worked electrically along the shaft (T). To assist the long shaft a deck rail is fitted above it which carries the weights, (Projectile grab and drum with carrier), the carrier being suspended from the rail. The electrical starting levers for both motors are fitted in the shell handing room.<br />
<br />
If it is required to get a shell out of the bin, the motor operating the horizontal movement of the grab is started. Then the long transporting drum is turned correspondingly by the 2nd.motor, thereby lowering the grab, which grips the shell by automatic pressure. Thereupon, by turning the shaft in the opposite direction the shell is raised, transported to the waiting tray (A) of which 4 are provided and placed on it. This waiting tray is so arranged that a shell can be landed only in the one position in order to prevent an inverted landing on the shell bogie relative to the entry in the hoist. The shell bogie is fitted with the same stops as the waiting tray.<br />
<br />
From the waiting tray the shell can be placed on either of the two shell bogies (which are rigidly joined to each other). The latter run easily with rollers on a circular rail, and can not only be adjusted exactly at the waiting tray by means of spring stops, but can also be coupled to the shell hoist in the loading position.<br />
<br />
In the shell rooms (lower deck) the shells are stowed in bins four to five deep (Fig.9, Enc.3)[.] The copper driving bands are protected by a broad covering band of strong canvas the ends of which are sewn together with (twine ?). Only rope is placed between the individual shells as a preventative against damage. Two vertical wooden batten are secured to the side walls of the shell bins - right and left.<br />
<br />
In order to ensure the grab gripping the shell as near as possible round the centre of gravity, each shell has a white ring painted round it.<br />
<br />
It is to be noted that the shell room cannot be shut off (water tightly) from the shell handing room as the large openings in the dividing Bulkhead, through which the transport carrier passes, are always open.<br />
<br />
In addition projectiles are stowed in many ships in the corners of the shell handing room itself in fixed bins.<br />
<br />
The 30.5 (12") cartridges are stowed in their water tight zinc cylinders in special stowage fittings in the magazines. These stowages are made of angle Iron and sheet plates. (There is no wood in the fittings).<br />
<br />
The Magazines, (2 decks from the bottom) in contrast to the shell room, are separated from the Magazine handing room, by a means of thin sheet bulkheads, in which the passage ways are fitted with double doors and the circular openings for handing cartridges are fitted with double covering flaps (the latter have already been remarked on in "SEYDLITZ" Section 11, Fig.3, Enc.3.[)]<br />
<br />
For transport of cartridges in the Magazines the transporting gear shewn in Fig.10, Enc.3 is available. This consists of a double rail (R) in which a horizontal (sheet iron) tray, semicircular in section can be moved up and down in guides by means of a hand differential purchase (F). The Tray can then be brought to the exact level of the cartridge. The Transporting gear is suspended from an overhead rail,(S) and also runs in a guide rail on the deck (SS). The cartridge is pushed on to the tray and the transporter then brought to the cartridge handing hole, and after opening the double flaps, transferred to the Turret.<br />
<br />
The Turret appliances correspond in general to those in "HINDENBURG", about which data are described later. But an exception must be made in the case of the size and installation of the Rangefinders (Fig.11, Enc.3).In "KURFÜRST" the Rangefinders about 3 meters (10 ft.) long are fitted in hoods in the front of the Turret, while "HINDENBURG" the 8 metre (26 ft.) range finders are already being fitted in the same way as will be the case in our 35 cm. (about 14") turrets, now building.<br />
<br />
<center>E. "MARKGRAF".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This Battleship was hit 5 times by big guns and all from the port side.<br />
<br />
Only hit No.2 is of gunnery interest. This entered the next to the last 15 cm. (5.(') [5.9"] casemate on the port side and exploded, killing the crew and putting gun out of action for the remainder of the battle, though it did not damage it very seriously.<br />
<br />
Several splinters from this shell pierced the bulkhead and entered the next casemate (forward) and killed or wounded several men. But this gun was brought into action again after an interval of about 10 minutes to make up the crew.<br />
<br />
<center>11. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
In the case of this ship also, splinters from enemy shorts entered the Conning Tower, but without causing any damage to either personnel or Materiel.<br />
<br />
During the whole engagement about 250 rounds of 30 cm. (12") ammunition was fired, i.e. about one fifth of the total supply on board.<br />
<br />
<center>F. "MOLTKE".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This ship was hit 4 times by heavy shell (all from the starboard side).<br />
<br />
One shell (Hit No.3) pierced the upper side armour and burst behind the latter inside the ship. It also caused some damage outside to No.4.15 cm. (5.9") casemate starboard (from forward) killing or wounding several men, but causing little damage to the gun. This gun was again brought into action after about 15 minutes.<br />
<br />
<center>11. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
"MOLTKE" was the only ship from which 4 Torpedoes were fired (not in salvo, but one after the other). On board, it was stated by officers that "QUEEN MARY" was fired at and hit at about 10 kilometres (10,935 yds.), and that this was the cause of the rapid sinking of this Battle Cruiser. Officers of other ships, however, were not of this opinion, as when "MOLTKE" fired the distance from "QUEEN MARY" was about 13 kilometres (14,217 yds.) and that the torpedoes have not this range; so that only Gunnery can be taken into consideration.<br />
<br />
In the "MOLTKE", splinters from short bursting shells also entered the Conning Tower, without, however, causing any noteworthy damage.<br />
<br />
<center>G. "DERFFLINGER".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This Battle Cruiser was hit the largest number of times, viz:- 30, of these 20 were of heavy calibre and all came from the port side.<br />
<br />
:(1) A 15" shell pierced the roof of N.4 30.5 cm. (12") Turret (hit No.5) exploded inside the Turret, thereby igniting all the charges which were there (apparently only two) and killed all the Turret's crew, (74 men including reserve crew), except 2 men who were able to get away (wounded).<br />
<br />
:The Turret itself was put out of action because (as was the case in all these hits on Turrets) much damage was done to the various instruments and appliances by the splinters and flash.<br />
<br />
:It is worthy of note that the electric cables in the Turret were comparatively uninjured.<br />
<br />
:(2). Turret No.3 was also hit by a 38 cm. (15") shell (hit No.6). The projectile penetrated the Barbette armour and took with it a large piece of plating into the interior of the Turret. The 74 men of the Turret's crew (as in the hit described above[)] for the most part were killed, only 6 men getting away wounded. It is observed that an 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) gun which was 3½ metres (about 11½ ft.) away from the point of impact, was completely undamaged, although the deck below the spot, and in the immediate vicinity of this gun, was badly damaged.<br />
<br />
:Nos.3 and 4 Turrets were only put out of action towards the end of the engagement.<br />
<br />
:The two foremost Turrets remained completely intact, although the Barbette armour of the second Turret showed a fairly large scrape from a (very glancing) shell hit. But this caused no further damage to the Turret (hit No.13).<br />
<br />
:(4). The Conning Tower was hit on the starboard side on the edge. But only small pieces of the brittle face of the armoured plates splintered off, and in the Tower itself only one elevation-pointer ceased to function.<br />
<br />
:(5). Very severe damage was done by a large calibre shell (hit No.20) which exploded close to the casemate of the No.2 15 cm. (5.9) gun port, which not only damaged this gun, but also put the two neighbouring 15 cm. (5.9") guns out of action. The first named gun was principally severely damaged on the chase, and the chase of the foremost 15 cm. (5.9") gun was indented to such an extent by splinters, that it could not be fired again. The other gun in the vicinity was so shaken up by the powerful explosion, that it could not be moved again. The casualties sustained by the gun's crews were in contrast comparatively small. (1 man killed and several severely or slightly wounded at the first named gun[)].<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
A large fragment of a 38 cm. (15") shell (which failed to explode), was exhibited on board (as is shown in Fig.12, Enc.3)[.] The much distorted fuze was also found.<br />
<br />
<center>H. "KÖNIG".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits.</center><br />
<br />
There were 13 hits (large calibre) identified all from the port side and above the waterline.<br />
<br />
:(1). A 34.3 cm. (13.5) shell hit the port foremost 15 cm. (5.9") casemate. (Hit No.9). A large piece of armour plating was carried into the casemate, where the shell exploded, killed the gun's crew (11 men) and put the gun out of action. The armour plate went further, penetrated the bulkhead, entered the galley, destroyed it and killed more men.<br />
<br />
:(2). Another 34.3 cm. (13.5") shell penetrated the second 15 cm. (5.9") casemate (hit No.8) and exploded, making the gun useless and, by penetrating the deck also caused much damage in the compartment below. The crew of this gun was by chance not at the moment in the casemate, as they had gone out for a short time on account of gas from the explosion in the first 15 cm. (5.9) casemate (which had occurred just previously.) The result was that there were no killed or wounded among the gun's crew.<br />
<br />
:(3). The traces of a shell were visible on the roof of the foremost 30.5 (12") Turret. (Hit No.11.) The projectile damaged the Rangefinder cover, and tore off a piece of it, rendering the Rangefinder useless. No other damage was caused by this hit.<br />
<br />
:(4). The roof of the Conning Tower was similarly gazed [sic] by a shell, which left a scratch but caused no other damage to the Tower or its instruments, etc.<br />
<br />
<center>J. "HINDENBURG."</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Apparently about 30,000 tons displacement)</center><br />
<br />
This Cruiser, now building will be given an armament of 8 30.5 cm. (12") guns 50 cal. (in four double turrets, 2 forward and 2 aft as in "DERFFLINGER") and 14 15 cm. (5.9") and 8.8 cm[.] (22 pr.) Anti-aircraft guns.<br />
<br />
The foremost superimposed Turret (No.2) was mostly built in, and a short inspection of it was made.<br />
<br />
The Gun-platform is especially roomy. The distance apart of the centres of the two gun barrels being estimated at about 3 metres (10 feet approx.)[.] The complete arrangement of the gun-platform can be seen in the diagrammatic Sketch (Fig.13, Enc.3). The 2 shell hoists (G) are side by side between the gun and to the left of the left gun, (and right of the right gun) are the two ammunition hoists (P).<br />
<br />
The up-coming ammunition is placed in its slide (TT) in the rear by means of unloading rammers (so-called "Umlauder"), whence it rolls on to the loading Tray, and finally on to the shell swings or cartridge swings, which by swinging across, brings the shell or cartridges one after the other to the rear of the gun for loading.<br />
<br />
The two rammers are hydraulic chain Rammers (with reserve hand drive). In the space at the rear of the platform there are :- an entrance opening (E) and two openings (A) for passing out firedcartridge [sic] cases. These openings (A) are constructed similarly to those more exactly described under "SEYDLITZ" (Sec.II. Par.9).<br />
<br />
The Breeches are worked hydraulically (the reserve method being by hand.)<br />
<br />
The principle can be gathered from Fig.14, Enc.3 . A bar with a tooth edged point (Z), (which can be worked up or down hydraulically) turns the Traversing shaft by means of cog wheels (R1, R2, R3) and opens or shuts the breech. The Water-pressure is led to the mechanism through two flexible hoses. If the cog wheel R3 is placed out of gear with R2, the hydraulic system is shut off.<br />
<br />
For elevating,Trunnion [sic] sights are provided and for training a sighting telescope is fitted in front between the guns.<br />
<br />
The Rangefinder (about 8 metres long) which was not yet on board, is to be fitted in the front of the Turret above the guns (under the roof as already referred to under "KURFÜRST")[.] Only the two side openings in the armour could be seen.<br />
<br />
Elevating is worked hydraulically (Reserve system by hand). (The ammunition hoists are also worked hydraulically, but here the alternative system is electric).<br />
<br />
A gun coupling is fitted in this ship as in all later ships. But these couplings are apparently only for use when it is desired to elevate a gun whose elevating gear has been damaged.<br />
<br />
The normal Turret Training gear and also the reserve system is only worked by electric motors.<br />
<br />
The same system of ventilation is used as has already been described in "SEYDLITZ" (Section II, Par.II).<br />
<br />
All working machinery (Electrically driven pumps, and electric motors for elevating, training, hoists, rammers, etc.) are apparently installed in the spacious working chamber below the gun platform.<br />
<br />
The arrangements in the Magazines as well as the transporting gear for passing shell and cartridges from them to the hoists are the same as those already more minutely described under battleship "GROSSER KÜRFURST."<br />
<br />
<center>K. "BAYERN".</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Class Ersatz "WÖRTH" about 30,000 tons disp.)</center><br />
<br />
This battleship, only recently completed, had to carry out exercises whilst at Kiel, and the Commission was invited to join for a cruise, which gave opportunity for a certain amount of inspection.<br />
<br />
The armament consists of eight 38 cm. (15") G.L. 45 guns in four double turrets apparently arranged as shown in the Almanac; sixteen 15 cm. (5.9") G.L. 45 guns in casemates and eight 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) anti-aircraft guns.<br />
<br />
38 cm. Gun Turret. (Fig. 15, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
The distance apart of the bore axes is 3700 mm. (12.1 ft.) for these guns[.] 8.8 cm. sub-calibre guns are provided, which are put in from outboard (i.e. muzzle end.)<br />
<br />
The Gunhouse, as in the turrets of the "HINDENBURG" is very roomy.<br />
<br />
In this turret there has been introduced no important alteration with respect to the munition hoists. Whereas in all previous ships the shot hoist was separate from the cartridge hoist, in this ship, as with us (the Austrian Navy), both hoists for one gun are combined in one trunk; and also instead of the shell and cartridge swings in the "HINDENBURG" (see above) munition wagons (W1, W2), which run on cross rails are introduced. The two main hoists (A1, A2) come up between the two guns. Besides these there are in addition two electrically driven auxiliary hoists (H1, H2).<br />
<br />
The round which arrives at the top of the hoist is taken out and landed, by means of the unloading rammer (U) in the munition wagon, which brings it to the rear of the particular gun in the loading position, whence it is loaded by means of the rammer.<br />
<br />
The munition wagons, rammers and unloading rammers are normally worked by hydraulic power (with auxiliary handworking gear); at the back of the turret are two principal operating positions, (ST1, ST2) which are raised to give a good all-round view, and where all the necessary manipulation for the foregoing hydraulic machinery is carried out.<br />
<br />
The munition hoists are also hydraulically worked, and electric drive is provided as an alternative. The elevating and breech mechanism gear are hydraulic (with alternative hand gear).<br />
<br />
The following sighting arrangements are provided :-<br />
<br />
:(a) For elevation - two side trunnion sights as well as two reserve sights in front.<br />
<br />
:(b) For training - a principal trainer's telescope in front between the two guns, as well as a side telescope as reserve.<br />
<br />
Asked whether any automatic firing apparatus was in contemplation, it was replied that a place for such apparatus was provided but the installation could not be expected till later, and depended on the solution of several problems which had yet to be experimented on.<br />
<br />
The large 8.2 m. (26.9 ft.) rangefinder is placed the same as in the "HINDENBURG".<br />
<br />
The ventilation of the turret is on the same principle as in the "HINDENBURG" and "SEYDLITZ", except that in addition there are two powerful electric fan motors between the guns.<br />
<br />
The Training is done electrically, as is also the alternative arrangement. Fig 15, Enc.3 gives a diagrammatic sketch of the arrangements. The controller gives 72 degrees of speed.<br />
<br />
For absorbing the shock in the training gear of single gun shooting there are provided, in the friction coupling box of the worm gearing, besides the friction plates (as in our own installations) two rings of strong springs above them - each ring containing six springs as shewn in Fig.17, Enc.3. Apparently any turret thrown off a small angle by a single round will be trained back to its original position by means of these springs.<br />
<br />
As in "HINDENBURG", so also in "BAYERN", the various machines for training[,] elevating, munition supply, rammers and unloading rammers are placed on the deck underneath the Gun platform (working chamber), and also the machines for the magazine and transport arrangements of munitions are similarly installed.<br />
<br />
In Fig. 18, Enc.3 is a diagrammatic sketch of the munition hoists and magazines from which it can be seen that the shell room is on the lowest level and has the magazine above it. The cartridge loading door (F1 for cartridges, G1 for shell) are fitted for flash protection with sliding shutters which are self-operating when the lift arrives at one or the other, i.e. when the lift arrives at the bottom, the shutter there will open and leave the loading hole (P) free, while the upper openings F1 and G1 will be shut and locked.<br />
<br />
An inspection of the shell room 38 cm. (15") showed that on these shells there is attached to the rearmost of the three upper driving bands a zinc band about 20 mm. (.78 in.) broad (similar to the driving bands). Experience has shown that this zinc ring is a very good anti-coppering device for the bore. It was apparently on the French front, at Verdun and in Flanders, that experiments with this arrangement were made; the results were very good and its introduction followed. The Army has also adopted it.<br />
<br />
The following is the situation with regard to 38 cm. (15 in.) shell. As opposed to the single type of shell (long calibre) in newly completing ships, here there are two :-<br />
<br />
:(a) A.P. shell, with cap, total length of shell 3.5 calibres.<br />
<br />
:(b) H.E. shell, uncapped, total length of shell 4.1 calibres. The total weight is 750 kg. (1653.5 lbs). The burster (not Trotyl, probably Heranit? 23.5 kg. (57.8 lbs.) for the A.P. shell and 67 kg. (147.7 lbs) for the H.E. The establishment allowed per [gun] is 90 A.P. and 30 H.E. The maximum range is 24 kilometres (26,247 yds.) with an angle of descent of 32 degrees, elevation of gun 247 degrees, time of flight 48 secs.<br />
<br />
:The charge is 87 kg. (191.8 lbs) in the main cartridge and 96 kg. (211.6 lbs.) in the foremost cartridge.<br />
<br />
:The rate of fire is one round per 40 seconds.<br />
<br />
15 cm. casemates. In these ships the flash protection for the 15 cm. (5.9") munition hoists in the casemates has been improved (Fig.20, Enc.3). In that a sheet iron chamber (K) has been built around the delivery opening which, by means of sliding plates (S1 and S2) can be shut off either from the trunk or from the munition tray. (G2.) For example, a shell arrives at the top of the hoist (G) - the shutter (S1) is raised in its guides by means of the lift mechanism, so that the shell can roll into the chamber (G1) while the shutter (S3) remains closed. Immediately afterwards the shutter (S1) closes the opening and the shutter (S2) raises in its guides and the shell rolls on the munition tray (G2). By this means the trunk is rendered flash proof at all stages of the operation.<br />
<br />
Submerged Flats. On board this ship there was also the opportunity to visit a submerged flat with two broadside tubes.<br />
<br />
In all there are five tubes (2 in each flat) and a bow tube. The calibre of the torpedoes is 60 cm. (23.6 in.) and the weight of a fully charged torpedo 2200 kg. (4850 lbs.). The explosive (? Heranit) weighing 250 kg. (531.1 lbs). The establishment per tube is four torpedoes - making in all 20 on board. The greatest torpedo range is 13 kilometres, 14,217 yds) with a medium speed setting of 28 knots.<br />
<br />
The flat that was visited (Fig.21, Enc.3) is very large and about 5 metres high, (16 ft.) so that it is perfectly feasible to turn any torpedo hanging on the purchase at the turntable (W1) on the overhead rails, so that is [sic] can be loaded into the port or starboard tube.<br />
<br />
The tubes (L1, L2) are side loading with very strong longitudinal holts [sic] on top (V1, V2) and fitted with a strong shield bar. For loading the torpedoes in the tubes, there are fitted near the tubes, on the same side on the side door, mechanical loading apparatus (quickloaders A1, A2), and on the opposite side are provided the rails (R1, R2) which serve for the adjustment (lever system) of the gyroscope of a torpedo lying in the tube.<br />
<br />
A torpedo is struck down from the upper deck through the trunk (E) and swung through the opening (O) into the flat, whence by means of a purchase (mechanically driven) it is run on to the tramways (S) and thence either to the bulkhead stowage or to a stowage over the tube.<br />
<br />
One must take this opportunity of noting that the overhead rails are not bolted to the actual deck, but are a separate structure, so as to avoid putting any vibration or other strain on to the armoured deck.<br />
<br />
If a torpedo is to be loaded it will be brought by means of the purchase to the exact ready stowage over the tube; then the hydraulic loader is operated by a lever; a grad [sic] with two arms seizes the torpedo in two specially cut away parts and draws it horizontally on to the guide rail of the loader, which then is lowered together with the torpedo. In the meantime the side door is mechanically unbolted and opened, so that the torpedo can be placed right in the tube (impulse frame). After this the guide rail and grab of the loader are withdrawn and raised, while the side door is shut and bolted. Loading by this means proceeds comparatively noiselessly, rapidly and precisely.<br />
<br />
The sluice is hydraulically worked, and after firing is operated by the return movement of the shield bar. When draining the tube the water can be pumped either overboard or into a well.<br />
<br />
The discharge is operated electrically from the Conning Tower or by hand.<br />
<br />
The sluice is hydraulically worked, and after firing is operated by the return movement of the shield bar. When draining the tube the water can be pumped either overboard or into a well.<br />
<br />
The discharge is operated electrically from the Conning Tower or by hand.<br />
<br />
<center>L. TORPEDO BOAT "G. 90".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1200 tons displacement.)</center><br />
<br />
From the Battleship "BAYERN" the Commission was brought back to Kiel in one of the newest torpedo boats (G.90), which offered an opportunity of seeing certain details.<br />
<br />
The gun armament consists of three 10.5 cm. (4.1") Guns on transferable mountings; the torpedo armament, of two single tubes forward and two double tubes for<nowiki>*</nowiki> [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. Note: Apparently a clerical error for 50 cm.(19.7")] 45 cm. (17.7") torpedoes in the after part. (See Fig. 22, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
The following details respecting the torpedo equipment were noted :<br />
<br />
Six torpedoes were carried, which remain stowed in the tubes; spare torpedoes are not carried on board, and no torpedo stowage is provided. The tubes of the twin mountings are not parallel but inclined outwards from each other, making an angle of 20° between the tubes.<br />
<br />
The reason for this lies in the method of torpedo boat attack. Torpedo craft always fire on the swing (in order to offer the full broadside target to the enemy fire for the shortest possible time), and the torpedoes from a twin mounting are are [sic] fired one after the other (the mounting remaining on a fixed bearing). The first torpedo having been fired, the boat continues to swing under helm and after 20° the second torpedo is fired.<br />
<br />
The training is done by means of a training gear at each tube, which can be understood from the detailed sketch (Fig. 23, Enc.3). By means of the hand crank (K) a worm and worm wheel (Zr) can be turned, this engages inthe [sic] training rack (Zs) and so the tube can be trained. The training pinion can, by means of a coupling clutch worked by the lever (H) be disconnected from the rack, should be required to train the mounting quickly, or for loading and unloading the torpedo by means of the training gear. This latter is accomplished by means of the windlass (W) mounted on the training shaft round which can be taken a line secured either to the nose or the tail of the torpedo. At the back part of the mounting is fitted a training brake which grips the rack.<br />
<br />
A director is fitted at each tube, and torpedoes are fired electrically from the bridge. At the rear of each tube are fitted two firing pushes (Abfeurungspöller), which can be operated either singly or together. In order to prevent firing from a tube which is not yet at the ready, the particular firing gear is held fast by a special locking gear fitted to the tube; its method of working can be seen from (Fig.24, Enc.3). The locking levers (St1 and St2) are only clear of the firing gear, when the rollers (R1 and R2), connected to the locking gear, are clear of the guide strip (G). This guide strip covers the arc in which firing is to be prevented. The springs.(F1 and F2) release the gear, as shewn in the sketch under (T).<br />
<br />
For torpedo transport on deck a special rail is fitted on the starboard side, on which was seen a fairly long transport wagon.<br />
<br />
<center>M. TRAWLER.</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Fitted out for Anti Submarine work)</center><br />
<br />
For fighting submarine boats trawlers are employed with the following :-<br />
<br />
:(a). A.S.rope nets fitted with two or four A.S.mines.<br />
<br />
:(b). Large Depth charges.<br />
<br />
:(c). Anti Submarine explosive Kite.<br />
<br />
::These appliances are described below.<br />
<br />
(a). Nets with A.S. Mines (Fig.25, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
These nets are made up from hemp rope (diameter of rope about 10 mm.); they are 250 m.long and of varying breadth (up to 20 m.) To a normal net two mines (M.M.) are attached (see Fig.25, Enc.3); for broader nets the mines are secured in pairs vertically - thus making four mines to a broad net. The mines are supported by their own large iron flat (S) while for the support of the nets smaller floats (S1) are placed on top.<br />
<br />
Each pair of nets also has an anchor and cable attached.<br />
<br />
The nets which are joined together are stowed with their mines in large shaped iron floats. The latter are stowed ready for shooting in two rows, (1 and 2, Fig.26, Enc3) on the top of the trawler. Shortly before action the primers are inserted through circular holes in the floats (1 hole per float).<br />
<br />
The shooting of nets one and two is carried out at a speed of 10 knots by one man. First , the first anchor of the first net is let go and the net with its mines dragged into the water, afterwards being anchored by the second anchor. Before, however, this latter is slipped the first anchor of the second net must be let go to ensure over-lapping.<br />
<br />
There are tiny holes in the floats by means of which just sufficient water can enter the floats so as to sink the net with its mines and floats at the end of an hour, and leave the area free again for traffic.<br />
<br />
These net mines (Fig.27, Enc.3) are contact mines with an explosive charge (1) from 12-13 kg. of Trotyl and consist of the mine case (M), firing mechanism (S), impact plate (P), distance pin (St), the safety lever (S1) and the primer (J) with the detonator (K).<br />
<br />
When the mine enters the water and reaches a depth of 5 metres the safety catch is released by a hydrostatic valve, which thus frees the detonator for the striker.<br />
<br />
Firing is effected in that by the impact of a submarine the impact plate (and with it the distance pin) are displaced, and by means of the latter the striker is freed and fires the mine by means of the firing spring (which is already cocked).<br />
<br />
(b). Depth charge (Fig., Enc.3).<br />
<br />
These depth charges are cylindrical in form and contain a large explosive charge of 60 kg. of Trotyl. They consist of the mine (M) and the float (S). The latter is connected to the mine by a strong steel wire (3 mm.), which is wound on a reel in the float. It fires (exactly like the depth charge of Korvetten Kapitän Schönthaler) because on reaching the set depth the tension on the wire operates the firing mechanism (Striker spring (F) is compressed as the striker (B) is raised by the grab (Z)) and thus frees the striker.<br />
<br />
The set depth can be adjusted from 5 to 5 (5 to 50?) metres (practically in the same way as in the Schönthaler Depth Charge) and it is to be noted that the time of explosion (1 to 5 secs) is adjustable by means of turning the pointer of the seconds scale (E) on the outside. The delay action itself operates by means of a disc similar to shrapnel.<br />
<br />
(c). Explosive Kite (Fig.30, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
The Kite (D) is made of wood and shaped as shown in Fig.31, inside is an explosive charge (the same size as the net mine, 12 - 13 kg., described in par. (a) above.<br />
<br />
The Kite is towed by a 15 mm. strong steel wire (T) whose core is an electric cableby [sic] means of which the kite is electrically exploded.<br />
<br />
The cable wire is wound on the winch (K), the ends being connected to the electric firing battery in the hollow drum.<br />
<br />
The towing wire is led from the winch over an adjustable brake (B) and from there over a roller (R) secured to a derrick (L) where the other end is connected to the charge.<br />
<br />
When the kite hits against a hard object (submarine) it is electrically fired.<br />
<br />
As a safety precaution the electric switch at the battery is only made when the kite is towing at the requisite speed.<br />
<br />
Trawlers tow at 10 knots, which causes a pull of 350 kg. on the wire.<br />
<br />
<center>N. ARSENAL WILHELMSHAVEN.</center><br />
<br />
Only a short visit to the gun shops was made. There about 1,000 civil workman [sic] were employed.<br />
<br />
In general the work carried out was similar to that in our own gun factories (repair of gun material, production of necessary equipment, magazine and shellroom machinery, examination and cleaning of bores of guns, the storage and preservation of magazine and shellroom fittings, small calibre guns, searchlights, range finders, etc.), only here the buildings, in particular the shops and storehouses, are modern throughout and planned on a spacious lay out.<br />
<br />
The drawing office is worthy of note, in it at that time the stowage plan of munitions for the Battle Cruiser "HINDENBURG" was in preparation. For the protection of such drawings there is provided a large fireproof room.<br />
<br />
To the gun shops belong :- the large mechanical shops, a smithy, a large carpenter's shop, a large shop for work on canvas, leather, and similar equipment, a plumber's shop, two very roomy storehouses for magazine material and a depot for various constructional materials; in the last named is a special,cellar for rubber and leather articles in which at the time there were gathered about 700,000 marks worth.<br />
<br />
A new large gun hall was under construction which is about 60 m. long and 25 m. broad. The building itself was nearly finished, only the installation and also the large travelling crane were not in place.<br />
<br />
Both high sliding doors (T1 T2) were operated by an electrically driven (alternative hand working) which at the side. The travelling crane (N) brings the material to the door, where a floating crane (S) with large overhang takes it over and provides for its further transport.<br />
<br />
While passing through the shop the decoppering of a 15 cm. (5.9) gun was seen. The decoppering machine was a brush withbvery [sic] fine steel bristles, as shewn in Fig.33. The head of the brush (K) is a cylindrical drum of strong plate, which before use is filled with petroleum and turpentine. On the head are fixed three bristle holding rings (H), which carry on their periphery the small steel bristles (B). These three bristle rings are separated by two intermediate rings (R).<br />
<br />
The fine steel wire used in the bristles is 0.2 mm. thick and must be softer than the material of the inner tube so as not to scratch the latter. The cleaning is accomplished by powerful brushing th [sic] through the bore, this action forcing out the petroleum mixture from the drum at the head of the brush into the bore.<br />
<br />
The decoppering device was very successful with the 15 cm. (5.9") gun; a small quantity of the copper scraping and two bristles were given to the Mission. (A bristle and a portion of copper scrapings accompany the reports (1 each) to the K.U.K.K.M. Marine Section (Austrian Admiralty) and to the (Austrian) Naval Technical Committee.)<br />
<br />
<center>O. ARSENAL KIEL.</center><br />
<br />
The "Artilleriewerkstätten" (Gun shops) at Kiel are in general the same as those at Wilhelmshaven described above, so that this amounted to an opportunity for closer description.<br />
<br />
The only noteworthy sight among the gunshops visited was one very large gunhall in which numerous guns are stowed, (among them some from ships that had been in the battle (Jutland); for the transport of the heaviest weights are two travelling cranes (each of 45 tons both cranes are employed together). For the further transport normal gauge rail tracks are provided.<br />
<br />
For the mechanical decoppering of guns a special scraper is used, whose action can be seen from Fig. 34. In the dial shaped head (K) are two difference scrapers (S1 S2), which by means of an inserting gear (E) can be placed exactly in the groove it is required to clean. The scraper (S1), cleans the base of the grooves, the scraper (S2) cleans the sides. The red (st) is guided so as to avoid any corners of the scraper<nowiki>*</nowiki> [I.D.Note: Apparently this guide rod arrangement keeps the scraper true in the groove.] This apparatus has proved its worth.<br />
<br />
Later on information from the Ordnance Department of the Admiralty showed that 30.5 and 28 cm. gun tubes, from which 60 - 100 rounds had been fired in the action, from later experimental firings at Krupps were found to have suffered from wear (actually about 20 mm.) which permitted overramming. After the conclusion of the experimental firings, only gun tubes of equ [sic] equal wear are sent to one and the same ship.<br />
<br />
Of very great interest is the information that many of the 25 cm. (13.7") guns, which were on the French front (6 on the Verdun front) had fired 600 - 800 rounds with full charge (range 36 kilometers, 39,376 yds.) with a diminished range of only 2 km., 2,187 yds. and no necessity for a new inner tube. The shell used in these guns were those provided with the anti-coppering zinc ring.<br />
<br />
The following summarize the points of the greatest importance.<br />
<br />
:1. Introduction of gas masks for each man, as of utmost importance.<br />
<br />
:2. Specially important is flash protection (including) cover plates for munition hoist trunks in turrets and casemates, shut off hatches and doors as well as partition of the magazines.).<br />
<br />
:3. As few cartridges as possible by the gun (in the gun house of a turret or in a casemate), because of the great danger of its ignition by a hit.<br />
<br />
:4. Abolition of the ready use position in the turrets (on account of point 3, above).<br />
<br />
:5. Many gun tubes 30.5 and 28 cm. (12" and 4" [sic]) have fired 60 - 100 rounds with only 20 mm. overramming.<br />
<br />
:6. Many gun tubes undergo experimental firing and are reissued only in similar tubes to one ship.<br />
<br />
:7. Automatic firing apparatus is not yet in use.<br />
<br />
:8. Gun coupling gear provided, but is only used in the event of danger to elevating gear.<br />
<br />
:9. Introduction of small calibre guns 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) only for anti-aircraft work.<br />
<br />
:10. Normally the turrets only fire salvoes, and only from one gun per turret.<br />
<br />
==See Also==<br />
*[[Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland]]<br />
<br />
==Footnotes==<br />
{{reflist}}</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Report_on_German_Warships_after_Jutland&diff=334771Austro-Hungarian Naval Report on German Warships after Jutland2024-03-24T15:14:18Z<p>Simon Harley: Made Changes.</p>
<hr />
<div>In the papers of Vice-Admiral [[John Ernest Troyte Harper|John E. T. Harper]] is a copy of a translation of an Austro-Hungarian Navy report on German Imperial Navy warships after the [[Battle of Jutland]].<ref>Harper papers. Churchill Archives Centre. JEHR 1/4. This research was made possible by the Colin Bell Award, a grant from the Colin Bell Fund at Churchill College, Cambridge.</ref> It was prepared by ''Marineartillerie-Oberingenieure 2. Klasse'' Georg Schindler. This report is in many ways more detailed than that of ''Fregattenkapitäne'' Hieronymus Graf von Colloredo-Mannsfeld [[Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland|prepared immediately after Jutland]], which is also in Harper's papers. The references to I.D. Notes suggest that, like Colloredo-Mannsfeld's report, this was a translation prepared in the [[Naval Intelligence Division (Royal Navy)|Naval Intelligence Division]].<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
REPORT by a Mission undertaken in accordance with Order. Section 4 M.S. No.1746 of 1916.<br />
----<br />
<br />
On the inspection of German Warships which took part in the Battle of the Skaggerak (Jutland), 31st.May - 1st.June 1916; on Wilhelmshaven, Hamburg and Kiel, and on other inspections of ships and bases.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}By Georg Schindler,<br />
<br />
{{pad|580px}}Gunnery Engineer, 2nd Class.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}AUSTRIAN NAVY.<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
The only details which have been dealt with are those which were of Gunnery interest.<br />
<br />
{|<br />
| A.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "SEYDLITZ"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| B.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "OSTFRIESLAND"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| C.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "VON DER TANN"<br />
| were<br />
|-<br />
| D.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "GROSSER KÜRFURST"<br />
| in<br />
|-<br />
| E.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"&nbsp;<br />
| "MARKGRAF"<br />
| engagement.<br />
|-<br />
| F.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "MOLTKE"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| G.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"<br />
| "DERFFLINGER"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| H.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "KÖNIG"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| J.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "HINDENBURG" (building)<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| K.<br />
| Large Battleship<br />
| "BAYERN"<br />
| rowspan=2 | } Newly commissioned<br />
|-<br />
| L.<br />
| T.B.D.<br />
| "G.90"<br />
|-<br />
| M.<br />
| colspan=3 | Fishing vessels Anti-Submarine armament, etc.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| N.<br />
| colspan=3 | Short inspection of the Ordnance Workshops in the Arsenal in Wilhelmshaven. <br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| O.<br />
| Ditto in Kiel.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|}<br />
<br />
Ships under A.B.C.J. and M. were in Wilhelmshaven. D.E.F. in Hamburg and G.H.K.L. in Kiel.<br />
<br />
In the following reports on each ship, Section 1 deals with the effect of enemy hits on ships A. to H. above, in conjunction with the two attached ship sketches (Enclosures 1 and 2). [Not attached.]<br />
<br />
Of the hits marked in the sketches those of a gunnery interest are distinguished by red ink. Section II gives general remarks concerning the ships in question.<br />
<br />
Further a report is submitted on installations in newly commissioned ships (K. and L.) also on a ship still under construction (J.), as well as means of combating submarines installed in Fishing vessels (M.) and finally, briefly on the Ordnance workshops in the Naval Arsenals (N. and O.).<br />
<br />
A. "SEYDLITZ" (Enclosure 1).<br />
<br />
This Cruiser received 24 shell hits (38 cm. 34.3 cm. and 30.5 cm.)(15", 13.5" and 12") and one Torpedo hit.<br />
<br />
Except for 1 shell hit (apparently 34.3 cm.) (13.5") on the starboard side forward (Hits nos.2-4) and one hit no.16 (38 cm.?) in the starboard after 15 cm. (6") casemate all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all Gun tubes, Guns and many fittings had been dismantled and landed.<br />
<br />
<center>I. Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
<br />
1. A large calibre shell (hit no.8) struck the 2nd. 15 cm. port casemate (from forward), put the gun out of action and killed or seriously wounded the majority of the gun's crew.<br />
<br />
2. A 38 cm. shell exploded in the 4th 15 cm. casemate (hit No.13) the gun was similarly damaged, and 2 men (wounded) remained alive of the crew.<br />
<br />
3. In the port after 15 cm. casemate, No.6 gun, (hit No.15) had the same effect as the two described above.<br />
<br />
4. A 38 cm. shell (hit No.16) penetrated the armoured bulkhead on starboard side aft, near the last 15 cm. casemate, close to the curve of the armour (Fig.1, Enc.3) destroyed the 15 cm. gun and killed most of the gun crew.<br />
<br />
Of the twelve 15 cm. guns it appears that 2 port and 4 starboard fired unceasingly until the end.<br />
<br />
5. No.2 Turret (starboard) received a hit from port on the vertical turret armour (hit No.21) to the right of the right gun. Part of the nose of the shell pierced the armour anddestroyed [sic] the cradle and training gear of the right gun. The left was undamaged. The turret remained in action with this gun.<br />
<br />
6. An interesting hit is to be seen on the right 28 cm. gun of No.3 Turret port. The gun was on one of the jetties of the arsenal and could be examined. A large calibre shell hit the aforesaid gun a glancing blow just outside the turret, producing at the point of impact, a considerable elliptical scoop on the outside, causing a fracture of the inner tube and in addition bent the gun so that the axis of the tube at the muzzle was (as far as could be estimated) 200 mm. (about 8 in.) out of line.<br />
<br />
The cradle of this gun was split, the trunnions somewhat bent and the caps thereof partially opened out.<br />
<br />
The left gun of this turret, however, remained serviceable and the Turret could continue firing without interruption.<br />
<br />
7. A 34.3 cm. (13.5") shell (hit No.18) pierced the vertical armour of the revolving structure of No.4 Turret superimposed to the left of the left gun exploded inside the turret, ignited the cartridges which were ready for loading, put the turret out of action and killed all the crew (about 70 men) except 6.<br />
<br />
T [sic] This turret, already out of action, received another hit later from a 38 cm. (15") shell (hit No.17) this projectile struck the revolving Turret armour close to the lower edge at the right rear of the turret, and partially penetrated the turret.<br />
<br />
8. A Large calibre shell tore off the roof of the after (No.5) turret. (Geschossgeller ? ricochet). The turret suffered no appreciable damage inside.<br />
<br />
The remaining hits are being dealt with in the report on ship construction.≠ [I.D. Note: The original of this report can, unfortunately, not be obtained.]<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
<center>II Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
1. Extensive "flash" protection was already installed in "SEYDLITZ".<br />
<br />
(a) The openings for bringing 28 cm. cartridges into the lower loading chamber of the Ammunition Hoist can be shut off with sliding doors (schubtüren ?). The supply scuttles from the magazines are fitted with hinged flaps which open upwards on each side (Fig.3, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
(b) The 15 cm. (5.9") Ammunition hoists at the supply position in the casemates are fitted with a "closing flap" which shuts automatically, but its own weight assisted by a spring, immediately after the ammunition has rolled out on to the Ammunition Tray (which is placed in a horizontal position by a Paternoster apparatus (endless chain) (Fig.4, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
2. Apparently Gas Masks are employed in all ships. The method of use is the same as in the German Army. <u>Every</u> man was supplied with a mask (as it happened 2 days before action). These masks were to be brought into use immediately there was any evidence of suffocating gases, and they were so far successful that, according to the opinions of officers, at least one ship, if not two, was saved by their use.<br />
<br />
3. Enemy "shorts" usually exploded on hitting the water, with the result that, (as in the cases of shells exploding on board), splinters of various sizes struck guns among other things, and caused damage, but in practically every case no stoppage of firing from the gun resulted. Shell splinters also entered Conning Towers and Turrets through the sighting slits. But they caused no internal damage as their force was broken by their passage through the deeps [sic] slits. (Fig.5, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
4. In Turret firing. Salvoes were gradually used, and always with <u>only one</u> gun of each turret.<br />
<br />
5. For transmission of orders to the guns (also to 15 cm. (5.9" guns) from the Gunnery Officers position (in the Conning Tower) Elevation pointers are used which are mounted (<u>separately</u>) on brackets away from the Turret armour.<br />
<br />
6. Ranges of the individual rangefinders are shown on a circular scale (range receiver) by means of electrically worked pointers. All these dials are mounter [sic] in a circular box (Fig.6, Enc.3) so that the ranges of the same object shown by several rangefinders (Pointers in similar direction)[.] Further, it is possible to cut out one or other of the dials if the Rangetaker concerned is ranging badly.<br />
<br />
7. Repulse of Destroyers is carried out invariably by means of broadside salvoes of 15 cm. (5.9) guns etc. and one target only is always used. But the Gunlayer is only to fire when sights are exactly on the target.<br />
<br />
8. The 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) guns were not used in the battle. It is understood that in the future guns of this calibre, will only be retained on board as anti-aircraft guns, as was laid down for all ships.<br />
<br />
9. (a) The empty 26 cm. (11") cartridge cases are thrown out of the turrets on to the deck through openings in rear of the Gun platforms (2 per turret). A covering flap, opening downwards when the cases are thrown out, automatically closes the hole by means of a spring (Fig.7, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
(b) The fired 15 cm. (5.9") cartridge are placed in a large hanging net in the casemate, and are only removed from the casemate during a lull in the firing. It was stated that a very large number of fired cases (including Large Calibre ones) were collected and brought back.<br />
<br />
10. The voice pipes are made of 60,100 and 150 mm. diameter (2.4 in., 3.8 in.,and 6 in.). (The last named are called Schallrohre and are intended for short distances). Voice pipes are not lagged.<br />
<br />
11. The ventilation of the Turrets is similar to the method employed in our newer ships. A Fan placed between the two guns, sucks, on the one hand the powder gases from the breeches by means of a ventilation pipe from each gun when the breech is opened and on the other hand draws them away from the roof of the turret on the gun platform another fan, portable, and continually running, was installed when sucked in fresh air through a hose and passed it into the interior of the turret bymeans [sic] of a second hose. If any man had any difficulty in breathing he inhaled fresh air through the second hose. But even this method only afforded partial relief.<br />
<br />
12. All Gunnery machinery (hydraulic and electric) appears to have function correctly.<br />
<br />
13. From the Gunnery point of view there were no serious fires (magazines of any description), for which the "Flash door" protection described in Section II Miscellaneous, Pars. I (a) and (b) is principally responsible. All cartridges actually in a turret or casemate,when [sic] an enemy shell burst in the turret or casemate, were exploded in every case. Therefore the rule was most strictly enforced that only the absolute minimum of ammunition was kept ready at the guns.<br />
<br />
14. "SEYDLITZ" had 1150 28 cm. (11" shell) on board, of which 450 were expended. (No ship expended all her ammunition).<br />
<br />
15. The torpedo nets were not actually a hindrance in the action but they sustained heavy damage fromenemy [sic] hits and splinters so that parts of them hung down over the ships side.<br />
<br />
In future these nets being useless ballast will no longer be carried. This is already the case in the new battleship "BAYERN".<br />
<br />
<center>B. "OSTRFRIESLAND".</center><br />
<br />
<center>I. Hits. (Enclosure 1).</center><br />
<br />
This Battleship received no shell hits, but was struck by a mine onthe [sic] starboard side forward. The detailed description is contained in the report on Ship Construction.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
At the time of the inspection of this ship the 30.5 cm. (12") Ammunition was being embarked. The shells were being slung from the Quay on to the Deck by means of a powerful floating crane in bundles (of about 5 projectiles). All cartridges are enclosed in long water-tight zinc containers, fitted with stiffening bands. They were being rolled on board carefully across broad planks and stowed in the Magazines. If several rounds of ready ammunition have to be stowed in the Turret, the charges are always kept in the zinc cylinders.<br />
<br />
The 30.5 cm. (12") and also 28 cm. (11") projectiles are (according to the statement of the Gunnery Officer of this ship, Lt.Comdr.Lauenstein) of one description throughout, capped and fitted with base fuse. Total weight 405 kg. (about 890 lbs.) Bursting charge 12 to 13 kg. (26½ to 29 lbs.) of Trotyl. In the latest ships, however, "Armour piercing" and "high explosive" shell (but with a new explosive for bursting charge) are again to be used, as is already the case with the 28 cm. (15") shell in the Battleship "BAYERN".<br />
<br />
For the 15 cm.(5.9") guns it is reported that there are two types of shell in use.<br />
<br />
:(a) Fused shell with base fuses.<br />
<br />
:(b) High explosive shell,with a very sensitive nose fuse and a base fuse.<br />
<br />
<center>C. "VON DER TANN". (Enclosure 1.)</center><br />
<br />
This Battle Cruiser received 4 hits from large calibre shells (all on the starboard side).<br />
<br />
<center>I.Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
<br />
(1). The foremost 28 cm. (11") Turret was hit in the Barbette on the starboard side. The shell exploded and the armour was just penetrated (Hit No.1). Three men in the turret sustained burns (not very severe) from the "Flash". But the Turret was placed out of action as the armour at the point of impact was bulged inwards and jammed the Turret.<br />
<br />
(2). The after Conning Tower was similarly hit (Hit No.2)[.] But the shell only caused a shaking of the Tower and all apparatus inside remained intact.<br />
<br />
(3.) A shell exploded in the neighbourhood of the after Turret No.4 (Hit No.3). The effect on the Turret was only evident in a shaking, and the armour in the vicinity of the explosion was very slightly indented but without doing any damage so that the Turret continued in action.<br />
<br />
(4). No.4 hit is only of slight constructional interest.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
(1). In this ship, as in "OSTFRIESLAND", the question as to whether the collection of scraps of metal (coming from driving bands or Cartridge cases) in the Breech made any difference to the condition of the breech was answered in the negative.<br />
<br />
(2). The maximum rate of fire of the 28 cm. (11") guns of this Cruiser, as well as of the 30.5 cm. (12") guns of the "OSTFRIESLAND" is stated to have reached 3 - 4 rounds per minute in peace time.<br />
<br />
(3). The arrangement in the 28 cm. (11") turrets is in principle the same as in "SEYDLITZ" or as in the 30.5 cm. (12") guns of the large Battle Cruiser "HINDENBURG" (now building), with the exception of a few improvements in the last named ship. But while in the later ships (30.5 cm. 12") hydraulic rammers with reserve Hand ramming are installed "VON DER TANN" has only double Hand rammers, which are hung under the Turret roof.<br />
<br />
<center>D. "GROSSER KURFÜRST."</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Effects of shell hits (Enclosure 1).</center><br />
<br />
The ship was hit 8 times (large calibre) all from the port side.<br />
<br />
:(1) Hit No.4 (presumably 34 cm. 13.5") exploded before the Barbette armour of the foremost Turret.<br>Apart from breaking off small pieces of the hard armour (? Panzerschichte) and a slight shaking of the turret no damage was done to the Turret fittings. A fragment struck the upper surface of a sight slot and remained in the slot, while a good deal of gas entered the Turret and necessitated the use of gas masks by the crew for some time.<br />
<br />
:(2). A further heavy shell (Hit No.6) struck the port 15 cm.(5.9") Casemate (3rd. from forward) killed 10 of the crew of 14, but damaged the gun so little that after about 12 minutes the gun's crew having been made up, it was brought into action again. Two cartridges which were in the casemate were ignited.<br />
<br />
:(3). The other hits are only of constructional interest.<br />
<br />
:Some 30.5 cm. (12") and 15 cm. (5.9") guns were damaged on the outside by splinters from "shorts", but sustained no other damage.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
The Magazine arrangements in this ship were somewhat more minutely examined as well as reports made concerning them. (The arrangements described below are also used in the other ships).<br />
<br />
The shell bins and shell transport to the shell hoist are shown in Fig. 8, Enc.3) diagrammatically.<br />
<br />
A shell grab (Z) worked by 2 electric motors automatically controlled is used to transport the shell from the bins to the waiting tray fixed round the trunk (Turmraum) (A 1.-4). This grab is suspended from a broad length of wire sword matting, the latter can be wound up or down round a drum (Wa), if the transporting shaft (T) which is provided with two diametrical opposite longitudinal feathers is turned in the corresponding direction. Shaft (T) is fitted into drum (Wa). By this the grab is wound up or down. The grab is moved horizontally by the carrier (R), which holds the above-mentioned revolving drum, being drawn to one side or the other by an endless rope, worked electrically along the shaft (T). To assist the long shaft a deck rail is fitted above it which carries the weights, (Projectile grab and drum with carrier), the carrier being suspended from the rail. The electrical starting levers for both motors are fitted in the shell handing room.<br />
<br />
If it is required to get a shell out of the bin, the motor operating the horizontal movement of the grab is started. Then the long transporting drum is turned correspondingly by the 2nd.motor, thereby lowering the grab, which grips the shell by automatic pressure. Thereupon, by turning the shaft in the opposite direction the shell is raised, transported to the waiting tray (A) of which 4 are provided and placed on it. This waiting tray is so arranged that a shell can be landed only in the one position in order to prevent an inverted landing on the shell bogie relative to the entry in the hoist. The shell bogie is fitted with the same stops as the waiting tray.<br />
<br />
From the waiting tray the shell can be placed on either of the two shell bogies (which are rigidly joined to each other). The latter run easily with rollers on a circular rail, and can not only be adjusted exactly at the waiting tray by means of spring stops, but can also be coupled to the shell hoist in the loading position.<br />
<br />
In the shell rooms (lower deck) the shells are stowed in bins four to five deep (Fig.9, Enc.3)[.] The copper driving bands are protected by a broad covering band of strong canvas the ends of which are sewn together with (twine ?). Only rope is placed between the individual shells as a preventative against damage. Two vertical wooden batten are secured to the side walls of the shell bins - right and left.<br />
<br />
In order to ensure the grab gripping the shell as near as possible round the centre of gravity, each shell has a white ring painted round it.<br />
<br />
It is to be noted that the shell room cannot be shut off (water tightly) from the shell handing room as the large openings in the dividing Bulkhead, through which the transport carrier passes, are always open.<br />
<br />
In addition projectiles are stowed in many ships in the corners of the shell handing room itself in fixed bins.<br />
<br />
The 30.5 (12") cartridges are stowed in their water tight zinc cylinders in special stowage fittings in the magazines. These stowages are made of angle Iron and sheet plates. (There is no wood in the fittings).<br />
<br />
The Magazines, (2 decks from the bottom) in contrast to the shell room, are separated from the Magazine handing room, by a means of thin sheet bulkheads, in which the passage ways are fitted with double doors and the circular openings for handing cartridges are fitted with double covering flaps (the latter have already been remarked on in "SEYDLITZ" Section 11, Fig.3, Enc.3.[)]<br />
<br />
For transport of cartridges in the Magazines the transporting gear shewn in Fig.10, Enc.3 is available. This consists of a double rail (R) in which a horizontal (sheet iron) tray, semicircular in section can be moved up and down in guides by means of a hand differential purchase (F). The Tray can then be brought to the exact level of the cartridge. The Transporting gear is suspended from an overhead rail,(S) and also runs in a guide rail on the deck (SS). The cartridge is pushed on to the tray and the transporter then brought to the cartridge handing hole, and after opening the double flaps, transferred to the Turret.<br />
<br />
The Turret appliances correspond in general to those in "HINDENBURG", about which data are described later. But an exception must be made in the case of the size and installation of the Rangefinders (Fig.11, Enc.3).In "KURFÜRST" the Rangefinders about 3 meters (10 ft.) long are fitted in hoods in the front of the Turret, while "HINDENBURG" the 8 metre (26 ft.) range finders are already being fitted in the same way as will be the case in our 35 cm. (about 14") turrets, now building.<br />
<br />
<center>E. "MARKGRAF".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This Battleship was hit 5 times by big guns and all from the port side.<br />
<br />
Only hit No.2 is of gunnery interest. This entered the next to the last 15 cm. (5.(') [5.9"] casemate on the port side and exploded, killing the crew and putting gun out of action for the remainder of the battle, though it did not damage it very seriously.<br />
<br />
Several splinters from this shell pierced the bulkhead and entered the next casemate (forward) and killed or wounded several men. But this gun was brought into action again after an interval of about 10 minutes to make up the crew.<br />
<br />
<center>11. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
In the case of this ship also, splinters from enemy shorts entered the Conning Tower, but without causing any damage to either personnel or Materiel.<br />
<br />
During the whole engagement about 250 rounds of 30 cm. (12") ammunition was fired, i.e. about one fifth of the total supply on board.<br />
<br />
<center>F. "MOLTKE".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This ship was hit 4 times by heavy shell (all from the starboard side).<br />
<br />
One shell (Hit No.3) pierced the upper side armour and burst behind the latter inside the ship. It also caused some damage outside to No.4.15 cm. (5.9") casemate starboard (from forward) killing or wounding several men, but causing little damage to the gun. This gun was again brought into action after about 15 minutes.<br />
<br />
<center>11. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
"MOLTKE" was the only ship from which 4 Torpedoes were fired (not in salvo, but one after the other). On board, it was stated by officers that "QUEEN MARY" was fired at and hit at about 10 kilometres (10,935 yds.), and that this was the cause of the rapid sinking of this Battle Cruiser. Officers of other ships, however, were not of this opinion, as when "MOLTKE" fired the distance from "QUEEN MARY" was about 13 kilometres (14,217 yds.) and that the torpedoes have not this range; so that only Gunnery can be taken into consideration.<br />
<br />
In the "MOLTKE", splinters from short bursting shells also entered the Conning Tower, without, however, causing any noteworthy damage.<br />
<br />
<center>G. "DERFFLINGER".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This Battle Cruiser was hit the largest number of times, viz:- 30, of these 20 were of heavy calibre and all came from the port side.<br />
<br />
:(1) A 15" shell pierced the roof of N.4 30.5 cm. (12") Turret (hit No.5) exploded inside the Turret, thereby igniting all the charges which were there (apparently only two) and killed all the Turret's crew, (74 men including reserve crew), except 2 men who were able to get away (wounded).<br />
<br />
:The Turret itself was put out of action because (as was the case in all these hits on Turrets) much damage was done to the various instruments and appliances by the splinters and flash.<br />
<br />
:It is worthy of note that the electric cables in the Turret were comparatively uninjured.<br />
<br />
:(2). Turret No.3 was also hit by a 38 cm. (15") shell (hit No.6). The projectile penetrated the Barbette armour and took with it a large piece of plating into the interior of the Turret. The 74 men of the Turret's crew (as in the hit described above[)] for the most part were killed, only 6 men getting away wounded. It is observed that an 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) gun which was 3½ metres (about 11½ ft.) away from the point of impact, was completely undamaged, although the deck below the spot, and in the immediate vicinity of this gun, was badly damaged.<br />
<br />
:Nos.3 and 4 Turrets were only put out of action towards the end of the engagement.<br />
<br />
:The two foremost Turrets remained completely intact, although the Barbette armour of the second Turret showed a fairly large scrape from a (very glancing) shell hit. But this caused no further damage to the Turret (hit No.13).<br />
<br />
:(4). The Conning Tower was hit on the starboard side on the edge. But only small pieces of the brittle face of the armoured plates splintered off, and in the Tower itself only one elevation-pointer ceased to function.<br />
<br />
:(5). Very severe damage was done by a large calibre shell (hit No.20) which exploded close to the casemate of the No.2 15 cm. (5.9) gun port, which not only damaged this gun, but also put the two neighbouring 15 cm. (5.9") guns out of action. The first named gun was principally severely damaged on the chase, and the chase of the foremost 15 cm. (5.9") gun was indented to such an extent by splinters, that it could not be fired again. The other gun in the vicinity was so shaken up by the powerful explosion, that it could not be moved again. The casualties sustained by the gun's crews were in contrast comparatively small. (1 man killed and several severely or slightly wounded at the first named gun[)].<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
A large fragment of a 38 cm. (15") shell (which failed to explode), was exhibited on board (as is shown in Fig.12, Enc.3)[.] The much distorted fuze was also found.<br />
<br />
<center>H. "KÖNIG".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits.</center><br />
<br />
There were 13 hits (large calibre) identified all from the port side and above the waterline.<br />
<br />
:(1). A 34.3 cm. (13.5) shell hit the port foremost 15 cm. (5.9") casemate. (Hit No.9). A large piece of armour plating was carried into the casemate, where the shell exploded, killed the gun's crew (11 men) and put the gun out of action. The armour plate went further, penetrated the bulkhead, entered the galley, destroyed it and killed more men.<br />
<br />
:(2). Another 34.3 cm. (13.5") shell penetrated the second 15 cm. (5.9") casemate (hit No.8) and exploded, making the gun useless and, by penetrating the deck also caused much damage in the compartment below. The crew of this gun was by chance not at the moment in the casemate, as they had gone out for a short time on account of gas from the explosion in the first 15 cm. (5.9) casemate (which had occurred just previously.) The result was that there were no killed or wounded among the gun's crew.<br />
<br />
:(3). The traces of a shell were visible on the roof of the foremost 30.5 (12") Turret. (Hit No.11.) The projectile damaged the Rangefinder cover, and tore off a piece of it, rendering the Rangefinder useless. No other damage was caused by this hit.<br />
<br />
:(4). The roof of the Conning Tower was similarly gazed [sic] by a shell, which left a scratch but caused no other damage to the Tower or its instruments, etc.<br />
<br />
<center>J. "HINDENBURG."</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Apparently about 30,000 tons displacement)</center><br />
<br />
This Cruiser, now building will be given an armament of 8 30.5 cm. (12") guns 50 cal. (in four double turrets, 2 forward and 2 aft as in "DERFFLINGER") and 14 15 cm. (5.9") and 8.8 cm[.] (22 pr.) Anti-aircraft guns.<br />
<br />
The foremost superimposed Turret (No.2) was mostly built in, and a short inspection of it was made.<br />
<br />
The Gun-platform is especially roomy. The distance apart of the centres of the two gun barrels being estimated at about 3 metres (10 feet approx.)[.] The complete arrangement of the gun-platform can be seen in the diagrammatic Sketch (Fig.13, Enc.3). The 2 shell hoists (G) are side by side between the gun and to the left of the left gun, (and right of the right gun) are the two ammunition hoists (P).<br />
<br />
The up-coming ammunition is placed in its slide (TT) in the rear by means of unloading rammers (so-called "Umlauder"), whence it rolls on to the loading Tray, and finally on to the shell swings or cartridge swings, which by swinging across, brings the shell or cartridges one after the other to the rear of the gun for loading.<br />
<br />
The two rammers are hydraulic chain Rammers (with reserve hand drive). In the space at the rear of the platform there are :- an entrance opening (E) and two openings (A) for passing out firedcartridge [sic] cases. These openings (A) are constructed similarly to those more exactly described under "SEYDLITZ" (Sec.II. Par.9).<br />
<br />
The Breeches are worked hydraulically (the reserve method being by hand.)<br />
<br />
The principle can be gathered from Fig.14, Enc.3 . A bar with a tooth edged point (Z), (which can be worked up or down hydraulically) turns the Traversing shaft by means of cog wheels (R1, R2, R3) and opens or shuts the breech. The Water-pressure is led to the mechanism through two flexible hoses. If the cog wheel R3 is placed out of gear with R2, the hydraulic system is shut off.<br />
<br />
For elevating,Trunnion [sic] sights are provided and for training a sighting telescope is fitted in front between the guns.<br />
<br />
The Rangefinder (about 8 metres long) which was not yet on board, is to be fitted in the front of the Turret above the guns (under the roof as already referred to under "KURFÜRST")[.] Only the two side openings in the armour could be seen.<br />
<br />
Elevating is worked hydraulically (Reserve system by hand). (The ammunition hoists are also worked hydraulically, but here the alternative system is electric).<br />
<br />
A gun coupling is fitted in this ship as in all later ships. But these couplings are apparently only for use when it is desired to elevate a gun whose elevating gear has been damaged.<br />
<br />
The normal Turret Training gear and also the reserve system is only worked by electric motors.<br />
<br />
The same system of ventilation is used as has already been described in "SEYDLITZ" (Section II, Par.II).<br />
<br />
All working machinery (Electrically driven pumps, and electric motors for elevating, training, hoists, rammers, etc.) are apparently installed in the spacious working chamber below the gun platform.<br />
<br />
The arrangements in the Magazines as well as the transporting gear for passing shell and cartridges from them to the hoists are the same as those already more minutely described under battleship "GROSSER KÜRFURST."<br />
<br />
<center>K. "BAYERN".</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Class Ersatz "WÖRTH" about 30,000 tons disp.)</center><br />
<br />
This battleship, only recently completed, had to carry out exercises whilst at Kiel, and the Commission was invited to join for a cruise, which gave opportunity for a certain amount of inspection.<br />
<br />
The armament consists of eight 38 cm. (15") G.L. 45 guns in four double turrets apparently arranged as shown in the Almanac; sixteen 15 cm. (5.9") G.L. 45 guns in casemates and eight 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) anti-aircraft guns.<br />
<br />
38 cm. Gun Turret. (Fig. 15, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
The distance apart of the bore axes is 3700 mm. (12.1 ft.) for these guns[.] 8.8 cm. sub-calibre guns are provided, which are put in from outboard (i.e. muzzle end.)<br />
<br />
The Gunhouse, as in the turrets of the "HINDENBURG" is very roomy.<br />
<br />
In this turret there has been introduced no important alteration with respect to the munition hoists. Whereas in all previous ships the shot hoist was separate from the cartridge hoist, in this ship, as with us (the Austrian Navy), both hoists for one gun are combined in one trunk; and also instead of the shell and cartridge swings in the "HINDENBURG" (see above) munition wagons (W1, W2), which run on cross rails are introduced. The two main hoists (A1, A2) come up between the two guns. Besides these there are in addition two electrically driven auxiliary hoists (H1, H2).<br />
<br />
The round which arrives at the top of the hoist is taken out and landed, by means of the unloading rammer (U) in the munition wagon, which brings it to the rear of the particular gun in the loading position, whence it is loaded by means of the rammer.<br />
<br />
The munition wagons, rammers and unloading rammers are normally worked by hydraulic power (with auxiliary handworking gear); at the back of the turret are two principal operating positions, (ST1, ST2) which are raised to give a good all-round view, and where all the necessary manipulation for the foregoing hydraulic machinery is carried out.<br />
<br />
The munition hoists are also hydraulically worked, and electric drive is provided as an alternative. The elevating and breech mechanism gear are hydraulic (with alternative hand gear).<br />
<br />
The following sighting arrangements are provided :-<br />
<br />
:(a) For elevation - two side trunnion sights as well as two reserve sights in front.<br />
<br />
:(b) For training - a principal trainer's telescope in front between the two guns, as well as a side telescope as reserve.<br />
<br />
Asked whether any automatic firing apparatus was in contemplation, it was replied that a place for such apparatus was provided but the installation could not be expected till later, and depended on the solution of several problems which had yet to be experimented on.<br />
<br />
The large 8.2 m. (26.9 ft.) rangefinder is placed the same as in the "HINDENBURG".<br />
<br />
The ventilation of the turret is on the same principle as in the "HINDENBURG" and "SEYDLITZ", except that in addition there are two powerful electric fan motors between the guns.<br />
<br />
The Training is done electrically, as is also the alternative arrangement. Fig 15, Enc.3 gives a diagrammatic sketch of the arrangements. The controller gives 72 degrees of speed.<br />
<br />
For absorbing the shock in the training gear of single gun shooting there are provided, in the friction coupling box of the worm gearing, besides the friction plates (as in our own installations) two rings of strong springs above them - each ring containing six springs as shewn in Fig.17, Enc.3. Apparently any turret thrown off a small angle by a single round will be trained back to its original position by means of these springs.<br />
<br />
As in "HINDENBURG", so also in "BAYERN", the various machines for training[,] elevating, munition supply, rammers and unloading rammers are placed on the deck underneath the Gun platform (working chamber), and also the machines for the magazine and transport arrangements of munitions are similarly installed.<br />
<br />
In Fig. 18, Enc.3 is a diagrammatic sketch of the munition hoists and magazines from which it can be seen that the shell room is on the lowest level and has the magazine above it. The cartridge loading door (F1 for cartridges, G1 for shell) are fitted for flash protection with sliding shutters which are self-operating when the lift arrives at one or the other, i.e. when the lift arrives at the bottom, the shutter there will open and leave the loading hole (P) free, while the upper openings F1 and G1 will be shut and locked.<br />
<br />
An inspection of the shell room 38 cm. (15") showed that on these shells there is attached to the rearmost of the three upper driving bands a zinc band about 20 mm. (.78 in.) broad (similar to the driving bands). Experience has shown that this zinc ring is a very good anti-coppering device for the bore. It was apparently on the French front, at Verdun and in Flanders, that experiments with this arrangement were made; the results were very good and its introduction followed. The Army has also adopted it.<br />
<br />
The following is the situation with regard to 38 cm. (15 in.) shell. As opposed to the single type of shell (long calibre) in newly completing ships, here there are two :-<br />
<br />
:(a) A.P. shell, with cap, total length of shell 3.5 calibres.<br />
<br />
:(b) H.E. shell, uncapped, total length of shell 4.1 calibres. The total weight is 750 kg. (1653.5 lbs). The burster (not Trotyl, probably Heranit? 23.5 kg. (57.8 lbs.) for the A.P. shell and 67 kg. (147.7 lbs) for the H.E. The establishment allowed per [gun] is 90 A.P. and 30 H.E. The maximum range is 24 kilometres (26,247 yds.) with an angle of descent of 32 degrees, elevation of gun 247 degrees, time of flight 48 secs.<br />
<br />
:The charge is 87 kg. (191.8 lbs) in the main cartridge and 96 kg. (211.6 lbs.) in the foremost cartridge.<br />
<br />
:The rate of fire is one round per 40 seconds.<br />
<br />
15 cm. casemates. In these ships the flash protection for the 15 cm. (5.9") munition hoists in the casemates has been improved (Fig.20, Enc.3). In that a sheet iron chamber (K) has been built around the delivery opening which, by means of sliding plates (S1 and S2) can be shut off either from the trunk or from the munition tray. (G2.) For example, a shell arrives at the top of the hoist (G) - the shutter (S1) is raised in its guides by means of the lift mechanism, so that the shell can roll into the chamber (G1) while the shutter (S3) remains closed. Immediately afterwards the shutter (S1) closes the opening and the shutter (S2) raises in its guides and the shell rolls on the munition tray (G2). By this means the trunk is rendered flash proof at all stages of the operation.<br />
<br />
Submerged Flats. On board this ship there was also the opportunity to visit a submerged flat with two broadside tubes.<br />
<br />
In all there are five tubes (2 in each flat) and a bow tube. The calibre of the torpedoes is 60 cm. (23.6 in.) and the weight of a fully charged torpedo 2200 kg. (4850 lbs.). The explosive (? Heranit) weighing 250 kg. (531.1 lbs). The establishment per tube is four torpedoes - making in all 20 on board. The greatest torpedo range is 13 kilometres, 14,217 yds) with a medium speed setting of 28 knots.<br />
<br />
The flat that was visited (Fig.21, Enc.3) is very large and about 5 metres high, (16 ft.) so that it is perfectly feasible to turn any torpedo hanging on the purchase at the turntable (W1) on the overhead rails, so that is [sic] can be loaded into the port or starboard tube.<br />
<br />
The tubes (L1, L2) are side loading with very strong longitudinal holts [sic] on top (V1, V2) and fitted with a strong shield bar. For loading the torpedoes in the tubes, there are fitted near the tubes, on the same side on the side door, mechanical loading apparatus (quickloaders A1, A2), and on the opposite side are provided the rails (R1, R2) which serve for the adjustment (lever system) of the gyroscope of a torpedo lying in the tube.<br />
<br />
A torpedo is struck down from the upper deck through the trunk (E) and swung through the opening (O) into the flat, whence by means of a purchase (mechanically driven) it is run on to the tramways (S) and thence either to the bulkhead stowage or to a stowage over the tube.<br />
<br />
One must take this opportunity of noting that the overhead rails are not bolted to the actual deck, but are a separate structure, so as to avoid putting any vibration or other strain on to the armoured deck.<br />
<br />
If a torpedo is to be loaded it will be brought by means of the purchase to the exact ready stowage over the tube; then the hydraulic loader is operated by a lever; a grad [sic] with two arms seizes the torpedo in two specially cut away parts and draws it horizontally on to the guide rail of the loader, which then is lowered together with the torpedo. In the meantime the side door is mechanically unbolted and opened, so that the torpedo can be placed right in the tube (impulse frame). After this the guide rail and grab of the loader are withdrawn and raised, while the side door is shut and bolted. Loading by this means proceeds comparatively noiselessly, rapidly and precisely.<br />
<br />
The sluice is hydraulically worked, and after firing is operated by the return movement of the shield bar. When draining the tube the water can be pumped either overboard or into a well.<br />
<br />
The discharge is operated electrically from the Conning Tower or by hand.<br />
<br />
The sluice is hydraulically worked, and after firing is operated by the return movement of the shield bar. When draining the tube the water can be pumped either overboard or into a well.<br />
<br />
The discharge is operated electrically from the Conning Tower or by hand.<br />
<br />
<center>L. TORPEDO BOAT "G. 90".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1200 tons displacement.)</center><br />
<br />
From the Battleship "BAYERN" the Commission was brought back to Kiel in one of the newest torpedo boats (G.90), which offered an opportunity of seeing certain details.<br />
<br />
The gun armament consists of three 10.5 cm. (4.1") Guns on transferable mountings; the torpedo armament, of two single tubes forward and two double tubes for<nowiki>*</nowiki> [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. Note: Apparently a clerical error for 50 cm.(19.7")] 45 cm. (17.7") torpedoes in the after part. (See Fig. 22, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
The following details respecting the torpedo equipment were noted :<br />
<br />
Six torpedoes were carried, which remain stowed in the tubes; spare torpedoes are not carried on board, and no torpedo stowage is provided. The tubes of the twin mountings are not parallel but inclined outwards from each other, making an angle of 20° between the tubes.<br />
<br />
The reason for this lies in the method of torpedo boat attack. Torpedo craft always fire on the swing (in order to offer the full broadside target to the enemy fire for the shortest possible time), and the torpedoes from a twin mounting are are [sic] fired one after the other (the mounting remaining on a fixed bearing). The first torpedo having been fired, the boat continues to swing under helm and after 20° the second torpedo is fired.<br />
<br />
The training is done by means of a training gear at each tube, which can be understood from the detailed sketch (Fig. 23, Enc.3). By means of the hand crank (K) a worm and worm wheel (Zr) can be turned, this engages inthe [sic] training rack (Zs) and so the tube can be trained. The training pinion can, by means of a coupling clutch worked by the lever (H) be disconnected from the rack, should be required to train the mounting quickly, or for loading and unloading the torpedo by means of the training gear. This latter is accomplished by means of the windlass (W) mounted on the training shaft round which can be taken a line secured either to the nose or the tail of the torpedo. At the back part of the mounting is fitted a training brake which grips the rack.<br />
<br />
A director is fitted at each tube, and torpedoes are fired electrically from the bridge. At the rear of each tube are fitted two firing pushes (Abfeurungspöller), which can be operated either singly or together. In order to prevent firing from a tube which is not yet at the ready, the particular firing gear is held fast by a special locking gear fitted to the tube; its method of working can be seen from (Fig.24, Enc.3). The locking levers (St1 and St2) are only clear of the firing gear, when the rollers (R1 and R2), connected to the locking gear, are clear of the guide strip (G). This guide strip covers the arc in which firing is to be prevented. The springs.(F1 and F2) release the gear, as shewn in the sketch under (T).<br />
<br />
For torpedo transport on deck a special rail is fitted on the starboard side, on which was seen a fairly long transport wagon.<br />
<br />
<center>M. TRAWLER.</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Fitted out for Anti Submarine work)</center><br />
<br />
For fighting submarine boats trawlers are employed with the following :-<br />
<br />
:(a). A.S.rope nets fitted with two or four A.S.mines.<br />
<br />
:(b). Large Depth charges.<br />
<br />
:(c). Anti Submarine explosive Kite.<br />
<br />
::These appliances are described below.<br />
<br />
(a). Nets with A.S. Mines (Fig.25, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
These nets are made up from hemp rope (diameter of rope about 10 mm.); they are 250 m.long and of varying breadth (up to 20 m.) To a normal net two mines (M.M.) are attached (see Fig.25, Enc.3); for broader nets the mines are secured in pairs vertically - thus making four mines to a broad net. The mines are supported by their own large iron flat (S) while for the support of the nets smaller floats (S1) are placed on top.<br />
<br />
Each pair of nets also has an anchor and cable attached.<br />
<br />
The nets which are joined together are stowed with their mines in large shaped iron floats. The latter are stowed ready for shooting in two rows, (1 and 2, Fig.26, Enc3) on the top of the trawler. Shortly before action the primers are inserted through circular holes in the floats (1 hole per float).<br />
<br />
The shooting of nets one and two is carried out at a speed of 10 knots by one man. First , the first anchor of the first net is let go and the net with its mines dragged into the water, afterwards being anchored by the second anchor. Before, however, this latter is slipped the first anchor of the second net must be let go to ensure over-lapping.<br />
<br />
There are tiny holes in the floats by means of which just sufficient water can enter the floats so as to sink the net with its mines and floats at the end of an hour, and leave the area free again for traffic.<br />
<br />
These net mines (Fig.27, Enc.3) are contact mines with an explosive charge (1) from 12-13 kg. of Trotyl and consist of the mine case (M), firing mechanism (S), impact plate (P), distance pin (St), the safety lever (S1) and the primer (J) with the detonator (K).<br />
<br />
When the mine enters the water and reaches a depth of 5 metres the safety catch is released by a hydrostatic valve, which thus frees the detonator for the striker.<br />
<br />
Firing is effected in that by the impact of a submarine the impact plate (and with it the distance pin) are displaced, and by means of the latter the striker is freed and fires the mine by means of the firing spring (which is already cocked).<br />
<br />
(b). Depth charge (Fig., Enc.3).<br />
<br />
These depth charges are cylindrical in form and contain a large explosive charge of 60 kg. of Trotyl. They consist of the mine (M) and the float (S). The latter is connected to the mine by a strong steel wire (3 mm.), which is wound on a reel in the float. It fires (exactly like the depth charge of Korvetten Kapitän Schönthaler) because on reaching the set depth the tension on the wire operates the firing mechanism (Striker spring (F) is compressed as the striker (B) is raised by the grab (Z)) and thus frees the striker.<br />
<br />
The set depth can be adjusted from 5 to 5 (5 to 50?) metres (practically in the same way as in the Schönthaler Depth Charge) and it is to be noted that the time of explosion (1 to 5 secs) is adjustable by means of turning the pointer of the seconds scale (E) on the outside. The delay action itself operates by means of a disc similar to shrapnel.<br />
<br />
(c). Explosive Kite (Fig.30, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
The Kite (D) is made of wood and shaped as shown in Fig.31, inside is an explosive charge (the same size as the net mine, 12 - 13 kg., described in par. (a) above.<br />
<br />
The Kite is towed by a 15 mm. strong steel wire (T) whose core is an electric cableby [sic] means of which the kite is electrically exploded.<br />
<br />
The cable wire is wound on the winch (K), the ends being connected to the electric firing battery in the hollow drum.<br />
<br />
The towing wire is led from the winch over an adjustable brake (B) and from there over a roller (R) secured to a derrick (L) where the other end is connected to the charge.<br />
<br />
When the kite hits against a hard object (submarine) it is electrically fired.<br />
<br />
As a safety precaution the electric switch at the battery is only made when the kite is towing at the requisite speed.<br />
<br />
Trawlers tow at 10 knots, which causes a pull of 350 kg. on the wire.<br />
<br />
<center>N. ARSENAL WILHELMSHAVEN.</center><br />
<br />
Only a short visit to the gun shops was made. There about 1,000 civil workman [sic] were employed.<br />
<br />
In general the work carried out was similar to that in our own gun factories (repair of gun material, production of necessary equipment, magazine and shellroom machinery, examination and cleaning of bores of guns, the storage and preservation of magazine and shellroom fittings, small calibre guns, searchlights, range finders, etc.), only here the buildings, in particular the shops and storehouses, are modern throughout and planned on a spacious lay out.<br />
<br />
The drawing office is worthy of note, in it at that time the stowage plan of munitions for the Battle Cruiser "HINDENBURG" was in preparation. For the protection of such drawings there is provided a large fireproof room.<br />
<br />
To the gun shops belong :- the large mechanical shops, a smithy, a large carpenter's shop, a large shop for work on canvas, leather, and similar equipment, a plumber's shop, two very roomy storehouses for magazine material and a depot for various constructional materials; in the last named is a special,cellar for rubber and leather articles in which at the time there were gathered about 700,000 marks worth.<br />
<br />
A new large gun hall was under construction which is about 60 m. long and 25 m. broad. The building itself was nearly finished, only the installation and also the large travelling crane were not in place.<br />
<br />
Both high sliding doors (T1 T2) were operated by an electrically driven (alternative hand working) which at the side. The travelling crane (N) brings the material to the door, where a floating crane (S) with large overhang takes it over and provides for its further transport.<br />
<br />
==See Also==<br />
*[[Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland]]<br />
<br />
==Footnotes==<br />
{{reflist}}</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Report_on_German_Warships_after_Jutland&diff=334770Austro-Hungarian Naval Report on German Warships after Jutland2024-03-24T13:59:46Z<p>Simon Harley: /* Report */</p>
<hr />
<div>In the papers of Vice-Admiral [[John Ernest Troyte Harper|John E. T. Harper]] is a copy of a translation of an Austro-Hungarian Navy report on German Imperial Navy warships after the [[Battle of Jutland]].<ref>Harper papers. Churchill Archives Centre. JEHR 1/4. This research was made possible by the Colin Bell Award, a grant from the Colin Bell Fund at Churchill College, Cambridge.</ref> It was prepared by ''Marineartillerie-Oberingenieure 2. Klasse'' Georg Schindler. This report is in many ways more detailed than that of ''Fregattenkapitäne'' Hieronymus Graf von Colloredo-Mannsfeld [[Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland|prepared immediately after Jutland]].<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
REPORT by a Mission undertaken in accordance with Order. Section 4 M.S. No.1746 of 1916.<br />
----<br />
<br />
On the inspection of German Warships which took part in the Battle of the Skaggerak (Jutland), 31st.May - 1st.June 1916; on Wilhelmshaven, Hamburg and Kiel, and on other inspections of ships and bases.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}By Georg Schindler,<br />
<br />
{{pad|580px}}Gunnery Engineer, 2nd Class.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}AUSTRIAN NAVY.<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
The only details which have been dealt with are those which were of Gunnery interest.<br />
<br />
{|<br />
| A.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "SEYDLITZ"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| B.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "OSTFRIESLAND"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| C.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "VON DER TANN"<br />
| were<br />
|-<br />
| D.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "GROSSER KÜRFURST"<br />
| in<br />
|-<br />
| E.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"&nbsp;<br />
| "MARKGRAF"<br />
| engagement.<br />
|-<br />
| F.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "MOLTKE"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| G.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"<br />
| "DERFFLINGER"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| H.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "KÖNIG"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| J.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "HINDENBURG" (building)<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| K.<br />
| Large Battleship<br />
| "BAYERN"<br />
| rowspan=2 | } Newly commissioned<br />
|-<br />
| L.<br />
| T.B.D.<br />
| "G.90"<br />
|-<br />
| M.<br />
| colspan=3 | Fishing vessels Anti-Submarine armament, etc.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| N.<br />
| colspan=3 | Short inspection of the Ordnance Workshops in the Arsenal in Wilhelmshaven. <br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| O.<br />
| Ditto in Kiel.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|}<br />
<br />
Ships under A.B.C.J. and M. were in Wilhelmshaven. D.E.F. in Hamburg and G.H.K.L. in Kiel.<br />
<br />
In the following reports on each ship, Section 1 deals with the effect of enemy hits on ships A. to H. above, in conjunction with the two attached ship sketches (Enclosures 1 and 2). [Not attached.]<br />
<br />
Of the hits marked in the sketches those of a gunnery interest are distinguished by red ink. Section II gives general remarks concerning the ships in question.<br />
<br />
Further a report is submitted on installations in newly commissioned ships (K. and L.) also on a ship still under construction (J.), as well as means of combating submarines installed in Fishing vessels (M.) and finally, briefly on the Ordnance workshops in the Naval Arsenals (N. and O.).<br />
<br />
A. "SEYDLITZ" (Enclosure 1).<br />
<br />
This Cruiser received 24 shell hits (38 cm. 34.3 cm. and 30.5 cm.)(15", 13.5" and 12") and one Torpedo hit.<br />
<br />
Except for 1 shell hit (apparently 34.3 cm.) (13.5") on the starboard side forward (Hits nos.2-4) and one hit no.16 (38 cm.?) in the starboard after 15 cm. (6") casemate all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all Gun tubes, Guns and many fittings had been dismantled and landed.<br />
<br />
<center>I. Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
<br />
1. A large calibre shell (hit no.8) struck the 2nd. 15 cm. port casemate (from forward), put the gun out of action and killed or seriously wounded the majority of the gun's crew.<br />
<br />
2. A 38 cm. shell exploded in the 4th 15 cm. casemate (hit No.13) the gun was similarly damaged, and 2 men (wounded) remained alive of the crew.<br />
<br />
3. In the port after 15 cm. casemate, No.6 gun, (hit No.15) had the same effect as the two described above.<br />
<br />
4. A 38 cm. shell (hit No.16) penetrated the armoured bulkhead on starboard side aft, near the last 15 cm. casemate, close to the curve of the armour (Fig.1, Enc.3) destroyed the 15 cm. gun and killed most of the gun crew.<br />
<br />
Of the twelve 15 cm. guns it appears that 2 port and 4 starboard fired unceasingly until the end.<br />
<br />
5. No.2 Turret (starboard) received a hit from port on the vertical turret armour (hit No.21) to the right of the right gun. Part of the nose of the shell pierced the armour anddestroyed [sic] the cradle and training gear of the right gun. The left was undamaged. The turret remained in action with this gun.<br />
<br />
6. An interesting hit is to be seen on the right 28 cm. gun of No.3 Turret port. The gun was on one of the jetties of the arsenal and could be examined. A large calibre shell hit the aforesaid gun a glancing blow just outside the turret, producing at the point of impact, a considerable elliptical scoop on the outside, causing a fracture of the inner tube and in addition bent the gun so that the axis of the tube at the muzzle was (as far as could be estimated) 200 mm. (about 8 in.) out of line.<br />
<br />
The cradle of this gun was split, the trunnions somewhat bent and the caps thereof partially opened out.<br />
<br />
The left gun of this turret, however, remained serviceable and the Turret could continue firing without interruption.<br />
<br />
7. A 34.3 cm. (13.5") shell (hit No.18) pierced the vertical armour of the revolving structure of No.4 Turret superimposed to the left of the left gun exploded inside the turret, ignited the cartridges which were ready for loading, put the turret out of action and killed all the crew (about 70 men) except 6.<br />
<br />
T [sic] This turret, already out of action, received another hit later from a 38 cm. (15") shell (hit No.17) this projectile struck the revolving Turret armour close to the lower edge at the right rear of the turret, and partially penetrated the turret.<br />
<br />
8. A Large calibre shell tore off the roof of the after (No.5) turret. (Geschossgeller ? ricochet). The turret suffered no appreciable damage inside.<br />
<br />
The remaining hits are being dealt with in the report on ship construction.≠ [I.D. Note: The original of this report can, unfortunately, not be obtained.]<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
<center>II Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
1. Extensive "flash" protection was already installed in "SEYDLITZ".<br />
<br />
(a) The openings for bringing 28 cm. cartridges into the lower loading chamber of the Ammunition Hoist can be shut off with sliding doors (schubtüren ?). The supply scuttles from the magazines are fitted with hinged flaps which open upwards on each side (Fig.3, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
(b) The 15 cm. (5.9") Ammunition hoists at the supply position in the casemates are fitted with a "closing flap" which shuts automatically, but its own weight assisted by a spring, immediately after the ammunition has rolled out on to the Ammunition Tray (which is placed in a horizontal position by a Paternoster apparatus (endless chain) (Fig.4, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
2. Apparently Gas Masks are employed in all ships. The method of use is the same as in the German Army. <u>Every</u> man was supplied with a mask (as it happened 2 days before action). These masks were to be brought into use immediately there was any evidence of suffocating gases, and they were so far successful that, according to the opinions of officers, at least one ship, if not two, was saved by their use.<br />
<br />
3. Enemy "shorts" usually exploded on hitting the water, with the result that, (as in the cases of shells exploding on board), splinters of various sizes struck guns among other things, and caused damage, but in practically every case no stoppage of firing from the gun resulted. Shell splinters also entered Conning Towers and Turrets through the sighting slits. But they caused no internal damage as their force was broken by their passage through the deeps [sic] slits. (Fig.5, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
4. In Turret firing. Salvoes were gradually used, and always with <u>only one</u> gun of each turret.<br />
<br />
5. For transmission of orders to the guns (also to 15 cm. (5.9" guns) from the Gunnery Officers position (in the Conning Tower) Elevation pointers are used which are mounted (<u>separately</u>) on brackets away from the Turret armour.<br />
<br />
6. Ranges of the individual rangefinders are shown on a circular scale (range receiver) by means of electrically worked pointers. All these dials are mounter [sic] in a circular box (Fig.6, Enc.3) so that the ranges of the same object shown by several rangefinders (Pointers in similar direction)[.] Further, it is possible to cut out one or other of the dials if the Rangetaker concerned is ranging badly.<br />
<br />
7. Repulse of Destroyers is carried out invariably by means of broadside salvoes of 15 cm. (5.9) guns etc. and one target only is always used. But the Gunlayer is only to fire when sights are exactly on the target.<br />
<br />
8. The 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) guns were not used in the battle. It is understood that in the future guns of this calibre, will only be retained on board as anti-aircraft guns, as was laid down for all ships.<br />
<br />
9. (a) The empty 26 cm. (11") cartridge cases are thrown out of the turrets on to the deck through openings in rear of the Gun platforms (2 per turret). A covering flap, opening downwards when the cases are thrown out, automatically closes the hole by means of a spring (Fig.7, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
(b) The fired 15 cm. (5.9") cartridge are placed in a large hanging net in the casemate, and are only removed from the casemate during a lull in the firing. It was stated that a very large number of fired cases (including Large Calibre ones) were collected and brought back.<br />
<br />
10. The voice pipes are made of 60,100 and 150 mm. diameter (2.4 in., 3.8 in.,and 6 in.). (The last named are called Schallrohre and are intended for short distances). Voice pipes are not lagged.<br />
<br />
11. The ventilation of the Turrets is similar to the method employed in our newer ships. A Fan placed between the two guns, sucks, on the one hand the powder gases from the breeches by means of a ventilation pipe from each gun when the breech is opened and on the other hand draws them away from the roof of the turret on the gun platform another fan, portable, and continually running, was installed when sucked in fresh air through a hose and passed it into the interior of the turret bymeans [sic] of a second hose. If any man had any difficulty in breathing he inhaled fresh air through the second hose. But even this method only afforded partial relief.<br />
<br />
12. All Gunnery machinery (hydraulic and electric) appears to have function correctly.<br />
<br />
13. From the Gunnery point of view there were no serious fires (magazines of any description), for which the "Flash door" protection described in Section II Miscellaneous, Pars. I (a) and (b) is principally responsible. All cartridges actually in a turret or casemate,when [sic] an enemy shell burst in the turret or casemate, were exploded in every case. Therefore the rule was most strictly enforced that only the absolute minimum of ammunition was kept ready at the guns.<br />
<br />
14. "SEYDLITZ" had 1150 28 cm. (11" shell) on board, of which 450 were expended. (No ship expended all her ammunition).<br />
<br />
15. The torpedo nets were not actually a hindrance in the action but they sustained heavy damage fromenemy [sic] hits and splinters so that parts of them hung down over the ships side.<br />
<br />
In future these nets being useless ballast will no longer be carried. This is already the case in the new battleship "BAYERN".<br />
<br />
<center>B. "OSTRFRIESLAND".</center><br />
<br />
<center>I. Hits. (Enclosure 1).</center><br />
<br />
This Battleship received no shell hits, but was struck by a mine onthe [sic] starboard side forward. The detailed description is contained in the report on Ship Construction.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
At the time of the inspection of this ship the 30.5 cm. (12") Ammunition was being embarked. The shells were being slung from the Quay on to the Deck by means of a powerful floating crane in bundles (of about 5 projectiles). All cartridges are enclosed in long water-tight zinc containers, fitted with stiffening bands. They were being rolled on board carefully across broad planks and stowed in the Magazines. If several rounds of ready ammunition have to be stowed in the Turret, the charges are always kept in the zinc cylinders.<br />
<br />
The 30.5 cm. (12") and also 28 cm. (11") projectiles are (according to the statement of the Gunnery Officer of this ship, Lt.Comdr.Lauenstein) of one description throughout, capped and fitted with base fuse. Total weight 405 kg. (about 890 lbs.) Bursting charge 12 to 13 kg. (26½ to 29 lbs.) of Trotyl. In the latest ships, however, "Armour piercing" and "high explosive" shell (but with a new explosive for bursting charge) are again to be used, as is already the case with the 28 cm. (15") shell in the Battleship "BAYERN".<br />
<br />
For the 15 cm.(5.9") guns it is reported that there are two types of shell in use.<br />
<br />
:(a) Fused shell with base fuses.<br />
<br />
:(b) High explosive shell,with a very sensitive nose fuse and a base fuse.<br />
<br />
<center>C. "VON DER TANN". (Enclosure 1.)</center><br />
<br />
This Battle Cruiser received 4 hits from large calibre shells (all on the starboard side).<br />
<br />
<center>I.Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
<br />
(1). The foremost 28 cm. (11") Turret was hit in the Barbette on the starboard side. The shell exploded and the armour was just penetrated (Hit No.1). Three men in the turret sustained burns (not very severe) from the "Flash". But the Turret was placed out of action as the armour at the point of impact was bulged inwards and jammed the Turret.<br />
<br />
(2). The after Conning Tower was similarly hit (Hit No.2)[.] But the shell only caused a shaking of the Tower and all apparatus inside remained intact.<br />
<br />
(3.) A shell exploded in the neighbourhood of the after Turret No.4 (Hit No.3). The effect on the Turret was only evident in a shaking, and the armour in the vicinity of the explosion was very slightly indented but without doing any damage so that the Turret continued in action.<br />
<br />
(4). No.4 hit is only of slight constructional interest.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
(1). In this ship, as in "OSTFRIESLAND", the question as to whether the collection of scraps of metal (coming from driving bands or Cartridge cases) in the Breech made any difference to the condition of the breech was answered in the negative.<br />
<br />
(2). The maximum rate of fire of the 28 cm. (11") guns of this Cruiser, as well as of the 30.5 cm. (12") guns of the "OSTFRIESLAND" is stated to have reached 3 - 4 rounds per minute in peace time.<br />
<br />
(3). The arrangement in the 28 cm. (11") turrets is in principle the same as in "SEYDLITZ" or as in the 30.5 cm. (12") guns of the large Battle Cruiser "HINDENBURG" (now building), with the exception of a few improvements in the last named ship. But while in the later ships (30.5 cm. 12") hydraulic rammers with reserve Hand ramming are installed "VON DER TANN" has only double Hand rammers, which are hung under the Turret roof.<br />
<br />
<center>D. "GROSSER KURFÜRST."</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Effects of shell hits (Enclosure 1).</center><br />
<br />
The ship was hit 8 times (large calibre) all from the port side.<br />
<br />
:(1) Hit No.4 (presumably 34 cm. 13.5") exploded before the Barbette armour of the foremost Turret.<br>Apart from breaking off small pieces of the hard armour (? Panzerschichte) and a slight shaking of the turret no damage was done to the Turret fittings. A fragment struck the upper surface of a sight slot and remained in the slot, while a good deal of gas entered the Turret and necessitated the use of gas masks by the crew for some time.<br />
<br />
:(2). A further heavy shell (Hit No.6) struck the port 15 cm.(5.9") Casemate (3rd. from forward) killed 10 of the crew of 14, but damaged the gun so little that after about 12 minutes the gun's crew having been made up, it was brought into action again. Two cartridges which were in the casemate were ignited.<br />
<br />
:(3). The other hits are only of constructional interest.<br />
<br />
:Some 30.5 cm. (12") and 15 cm. (5.9") guns were damaged on the outside by splinters from "shorts", but sustained no other damage.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
The Magazine arrangements in this ship were somewhat more minutely examined as well as reports made concerning them. (The arrangements described below are also used in the other ships).<br />
<br />
The shell bins and shell transport to the shell hoist are shown in Fig. 8, Enc.3) diagrammatically.<br />
<br />
A shell grab (Z) worked by 2 electric motors automatically controlled is used to transport the shell from the bins to the waiting tray fixed round the trunk (Turmraum) (A 1.-4). This grab is suspended from a broad length of wire sword matting, the latter can be wound up or down round a drum (Wa), if the transporting shaft (T) which is provided with two diametrical opposite longitudinal feathers is turned in the corresponding direction. Shaft (T) is fitted into drum (Wa). By this the grab is wound up or down. The grab is moved horizontally by the carrier (R), which holds the above-mentioned revolving drum, being drawn to one side or the other by an endless rope, worked electrically along the shaft (T). To assist the long shaft a deck rail is fitted above it which carries the weights, (Projectile grab and drum with carrier), the carrier being suspended from the rail. The electrical starting levers for both motors are fitted in the shell handing room.<br />
<br />
If it is required to get a shell out of the bin, the motor operating the horizontal movement of the grab is started. Then the long transporting drum is turned correspondingly by the 2nd.motor, thereby lowering the grab, which grips the shell by automatic pressure. Thereupon, by turning the shaft in the opposite direction the shell is raised, transported to the waiting tray (A) of which 4 are provided and placed on it. This waiting tray is so arranged that a shell can be landed only in the one position in order to prevent an inverted landing on the shell bogie relative to the entry in the hoist. The shell bogie is fitted with the same stops as the waiting tray.<br />
<br />
From the waiting tray the shell can be placed on either of the two shell bogies (which are rigidly joined to each other). The latter run easily with rollers on a circular rail, and can not only be adjusted exactly at the waiting tray by means of spring stops, but can also be coupled to the shell hoist in the loading position.<br />
<br />
In the shell rooms (lower deck) the shells are stowed in bins four to five deep (Fig.9, Enc.3)[.] The copper driving bands are protected by a broad covering band of strong canvas the ends of which are sewn together with (twine ?). Only rope is placed between the individual shells as a preventative against damage. Two vertical wooden batten are secured to the side walls of the shell bins - right and left.<br />
<br />
In order to ensure the grab gripping the shell as near as possible round the centre of gravity, each shell has a white ring painted round it.<br />
<br />
It is to be noted that the shell room cannot be shut off (water tightly) from the shell handing room as the large openings in the dividing Bulkhead, through which the transport carrier passes, are always open.<br />
<br />
In addition projectiles are stowed in many ships in the corners of the shell handing room itself in fixed bins.<br />
<br />
The 30.5 (12") cartridges are stowed in their water tight zinc cylinders in special stowage fittings in the magazines. These stowages are made of angle Iron and sheet plates. (There is no wood in the fittings).<br />
<br />
The Magazines, (2 decks from the bottom) in contrast to the shell room, are separated from the Magazine handing room, by a means of thin sheet bulkheads, in which the passage ways are fitted with double doors and the circular openings for handing cartridges are fitted with double covering flaps (the latter have already been remarked on in "SEYDLITZ" Section 11, Fig.3, Enc.3.[)]<br />
<br />
For transport of cartridges in the Magazines the transporting gear shewn in Fig.10, Enc.3 is available. This consists of a double rail (R) in which a horizontal (sheet iron) tray, semicircular in section can be moved up and down in guides by means of a hand differential purchase (F). The Tray can then be brought to the exact level of the cartridge. The Transporting gear is suspended from an overhead rail,(S) and also runs in a guide rail on the deck (SS). The cartridge is pushed on to the tray and the transporter then brought to the cartridge handing hole, and after opening the double flaps, transferred to the Turret.<br />
<br />
The Turret appliances correspond in general to those in "HINDENBURG", about which data are described later. But an exception must be made in the case of the size and installation of the Rangefinders (Fig.11, Enc.3).In "KURFÜRST" the Rangefinders about 3 meters (10 ft.) long are fitted in hoods in the front of the Turret, while "HINDENBURG" the 8 metre (26 ft.) range finders are already being fitted in the same way as will be the case in our 35 cm. (about 14") turrets, now building.<br />
<br />
<center>E. "MARKGRAF".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This Battleship was hit 5 times by big guns and all from the port side.<br />
<br />
Only hit No.2 is of gunnery interest. This entered the next to the last 15 cm. (5.(') [5.9"] casemate on the port side and exploded, killing the crew and putting gun out of action for the remainder of the battle, though it did not damage it very seriously.<br />
<br />
Several splinters from this shell pierced the bulkhead and entered the next casemate (forward) and killed or wounded several men. But this gun was brought into action again after an interval of about 10 minutes to make up the crew.<br />
<br />
<center>11. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
In the case of this ship also, splinters from enemy shorts entered the Conning Tower, but without causing any damage to either personnel or Materiel.<br />
<br />
During the whole engagement about 250 rounds of 30 cm. (12") ammunition was fired, i.e. about one fifth of the total supply on board.<br />
<br />
<center>F. "MOLTKE".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This ship was hit 4 times by heavy shell (all from the starboard side).<br />
<br />
One shell (Hit No.3) pierced the upper side armour and burst behind the latter inside the ship. It also caused some damage outside to No.4.15 cm. (5.9") casemate starboard (from forward) killing or wounding several men, but causing little damage to the gun. This gun was again brought into action after about 15 minutes.<br />
<br />
<center>11. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
"MOLTKE" was the only ship from which 4 Torpedoes were fired (not in salvo, but one after the other). On board, it was stated by officers that "QUEEN MARY" was fired at and hit at about 10 kilometres (10,935 yds.), and that this was the cause of the rapid sinking of this Battle Cruiser. Officers of other ships, however, were not of this opinion, as when "MOLTKE" fired the distance from "QUEEN MARY" was about 13 kilometres (14,217 yds.) and that the torpedoes have not this range; so that only Gunnery can be taken into consideration.<br />
<br />
In the "MOLTKE", splinters from short bursting shells also entered the Conning Tower, without, however, causing any noteworthy damage.<br />
<br />
<center>G. "DERFFLINGER".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This Battle Cruiser was hit the largest number of times, viz:- 30, of these 20 were of heavy calibre and all came from the port side.<br />
<br />
:(1) A 15" shell pierced the roof of N.4 30.5 cm. (12") Turret (hit No.5) exploded inside the Turret, thereby igniting all the charges which were there (apparently only two) and killed all the Turret's crew, (74 men including reserve crew), except 2 men who were able to get away (wounded).<br />
<br />
:The Turret itself was put out of action because (as was the case in all these hits on Turrets) much damage was done to the various instruments and appliances by the splinters and flash.<br />
<br />
:It is worthy of note that the electric cables in the Turret were comparatively uninjured.<br />
<br />
:(2). Turret No.3 was also hit by a 38 cm. (15") shell (hit No.6). The projectile penetrated the Barbette armour and took with it a large piece of plating into the interior of the Turret. The 74 men of the Turret's crew (as in the hit described above[)] for the most part were killed, only 6 men getting away wounded. It is observed that an 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) gun which was 3½ metres (about 11½ ft.) away from the point of impact, was completely undamaged, although the deck below the spot, and in the immediate vicinity of this gun, was badly damaged.<br />
<br />
:Nos.3 and 4 Turrets were only put out of action towards the end of the engagement.<br />
<br />
:The two foremost Turrets remained completely intact, although the Barbette armour of the second Turret showed a fairly large scrape from a (very glancing) shell hit. But this caused no further damage to the Turret (hit No.13).<br />
<br />
:(4). The Conning Tower was hit on the starboard side on the edge. But only small pieces of the brittle face of the armoured plates splintered off, and in the Tower itself only one elevation-pointer ceased to function.<br />
<br />
:(5). Very severe damage was done by a large calibre shell (hit No.20) which exploded close to the casemate of the No.2 15 cm. (5.9) gun port, which not only damaged this gun, but also put the two neighbouring 15 cm. (5.9") guns out of action. The first named gun was principally severely damaged on the chase, and the chase of the foremost 15 cm. (5.9") gun was indented to such an extent by splinters, that it could not be fired again. The other gun in the vicinity was so shaken up by the powerful explosion, that it could not be moved again. The casualties sustained by the gun's crews were in contrast comparatively small. (1 man killed and several severely or slightly wounded at the first named gun[)].<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
A large fragment of a 38 cm. (15") shell (which failed to explode), was exhibited on board (as is shown in Fig.12, Enc.3)[.] The much distorted fuze was also found.<br />
<br />
<center>H. "KÖNIG".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits.</center><br />
<br />
There were 13 hits (large calibre) identified all from the port side and above the waterline.<br />
<br />
:(1). A 34.3 cm. (13.5) shell hit the port foremost 15 cm. (5.9") casemate. (Hit No.9). A large piece of armour plating was carried into the casemate, where the shell exploded, killed the gun's crew (11 men) and put the gun out of action. The armour plate went further, penetrated the bulkhead, entered the galley, destroyed it and killed more men.<br />
<br />
:(2). Another 34.3 cm. (13.5") shell penetrated the second 15 cm. (5.9") casemate (hit No.8) and exploded, making the gun useless and, by penetrating the deck also caused much damage in the compartment below. The crew of this gun was by chance not at the moment in the casemate, as they had gone out for a short time on account of gas from the explosion in the first 15 cm. (5.9) casemate (which had occurred just previously.) The result was that there were no killed or wounded among the gun's crew.<br />
<br />
:(3). The traces of a shell were visible on the roof of the foremost 30.5 (12") Turret. (Hit No.11.) The projectile damaged the Rangefinder cover, and tore off a piece of it, rendering the Rangefinder useless. No other damage was caused by this hit.<br />
<br />
:(4). The roof of the Conning Tower was similarly gazed [sic] by a shell, which left a scratch but caused no other damage to the Tower or its instruments, etc.<br />
<br />
<center>J. "HINDENBURG."</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Apparently about 30,000 tons displacement)</center><br />
<br />
This Cruiser, now building will be given an armament of 8 30.5 cm. (12") guns 50 cal. (in four double turrets, 2 forward and 2 aft as in "DERFFLINGER") and 14 15 cm. (5.9") and 8.8 cm[.] (22 pr.) Anti-aircraft guns.<br />
<br />
The foremost superimposed Turret (No.2) was mostly built in, and a short inspection of it was made.<br />
<br />
The Gun-platform is especially roomy. The distance apart of the centres of the two gun barrels being estimated at about 3 metres (10 feet approx.)[.] The complete arrangement of the gun-platform can be seen in the diagrammatic Sketch (Fig.13, Enc.3). The 2 shell hoists (G) are side by side between the gun and to the left of the left gun, (and right of the right gun) are the two ammunition hoists (P).<br />
<br />
The up-coming ammunition is placed in its slide (TT) in the rear by means of unloading rammers (so-called "Umlauder"), whence it rolls on to the loading Tray, and finally on to the shell swings or cartridge swings, which by swinging across, brings the shell or cartridges one after the other to the rear of the gun for loading.<br />
<br />
The two rammers are hydraulic chain Rammers (with reserve hand drive). In the space at the rear of the platform there are :- an entrance opening (E) and two openings (A) for passing out firedcartridge [sic] cases. These openings (A) are constructed similarly to those more exactly described under "SEYDLITZ" (Sec.II. Par.9).<br />
<br />
The Breeches are worked hydraulically (the reserve method being by hand.)<br />
<br />
The principle can be gathered from Fig.14, Enc.3 . A bar with a tooth edged point (Z), (which can be worked up or down hydraulically) turns the Traversing shaft by means of cog wheels (R1, R2, R3) and opens or shuts the breech. The Water-pressure is led to the mechanism through two flexible hoses. If the cog wheel R3 is placed out of gear with R2, the hydraulic system is shut off.<br />
<br />
For elevating,Trunnion [sic] sights are provided and for training a sighting telescope is fitted in front between the guns.<br />
<br />
The Rangefinder (about 8 metres long) which was not yet on board, is to be fitted in the front of the Turret above the guns (under the roof as already referred to under "KURFÜRST")[.] Only the two side openings in the armour could be seen.<br />
<br />
Elevating is worked hydraulically (Reserve system by hand). (The ammunition hoists are also worked hydraulically, but here the alternative system is electric).<br />
<br />
A gun coupling is fitted in this ship as in all later ships. But these couplings are apparently only for use when it is desired to elevate a gun whose elevating gear has been damaged.<br />
<br />
The normal Turret Training gear and also the reserve system is only worked by electric motors.<br />
<br />
The same system of ventilation is used as has already been described in "SEYDLITZ" (Section II, Par.II).<br />
<br />
All working machinery (Electrically driven pumps, and electric motors for elevating, training, hoists, rammers, etc.) are apparently installed in the spacious working chamber below the gun platform.<br />
<br />
The arrangements in the Magazines as well as the transporting gear for passing shell and cartridges from them to the hoists are the same as those already more minutely described under battleship "GROSSER KÜRFURST."<br />
<br />
<center>K. "BAYERN".</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Class Ersatz "WÖRTH" about 30,000 tons disp.)</center><br />
<br />
This battleship, only recently completed, had to carry out exercises whilst at Kiel, and the Commission was invited to join for a cruise, which gave opportunity for a certain amount of inspection.<br />
<br />
The armament consists of eight 38 cm. (15") G.L. 45 guns in four double turrets apparently arranged as shown in the Almanac; sixteen 15 cm. (5.9") G.L. 45 guns in casemates and eight 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) anti-aircraft guns.<br />
<br />
38 cm. Gun Turret. (Fig. 15, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
The distance apart of the bore axes is 3700 mm. (12.1 ft.) for these guns[.] 8.8 cm. sub-calibre guns are provided, which are put in from outboard (i.e. muzzle end.)<br />
<br />
The Gunhouse, as in the turrets of the "HINDENBURG" is very roomy.<br />
<br />
In this turret there has been introduced no important alteration with respect to the munition hoists. Whereas in all previous ships the shot hoist was separate from the cartridge hoist, in this ship, as with us (the Austrian Navy), both hoists for one gun are combined in one trunk; and also instead of the shell and cartridge swings in the "HINDENBURG" (see above) munition wagons (W1, W2), which run on cross rails are introduced. The two main hoists (A1, A2) come up between the two guns. Besides these there are in addition two electrically driven auxiliary hoists (H1, H2).<br />
<br />
The round which arrives at the top of the hoist is taken out and landed, by means of the unloading rammer (U) in the munition wagon, which brings it to the rear of the particular gun in the loading position, whence it is loaded by means of the rammer.<br />
<br />
The munition wagons, rammers and unloading rammers are normally worked by hydraulic power (with auxiliary handworking gear); at the back of the turret are two principal operating positions, (ST1, ST2) which are raised to give a good all-round view, and where all the necessary manipulation for the foregoing hydraulic machinery is carried out.<br />
<br />
The munition hoists are also hydraulically worked, and electric drive is provided as an alternative. The elevating and breech mechanism gear are hydraulic (with alternative hand gear).<br />
<br />
The following sighting arrangements are provided :-<br />
<br />
:(a) For elevation - two side trunnion sights as well as two reserve sights in front.<br />
<br />
:(b) For training - a principal trainer's telescope in front between the two guns, as well as a side telescope as reserve.<br />
<br />
Asked whether any automatic firing apparatus was in contemplation, it was replied that a place for such apparatus was provided but the installation could not be expected till later, and depended on the solution of several problems which had yet to be experimented on.<br />
<br />
The large 8.2 m. (26.9 ft.) rangefinder is placed the same as in the "HINDENBURG".<br />
<br />
The ventilation of the turret is on the same principle as in the "HINDENBURG" and "SEYDLITZ", except that in addition there are two powerful electric fan motors between the guns.<br />
<br />
The Training is done electrically, as is also the alternative arrangement. Fig 15, Enc.3 gives a diagrammatic sketch of the arrangements. The controller gives 72 degrees of speed.<br />
<br />
For absorbing the shock in the training gear of single gun shooting there are provided, in the friction coupling box of the worm gearing, besides the friction plates (as in our own installations) two rings of strong springs above them - each ring containing six springs as shewn in Fig.17, Enc.3. Apparently any turret thrown off a small angle by a single round will be trained back to its original position by means of these springs.<br />
<br />
As in "HINDENBURG", so also in "BAYERN", the various machines for training[,] elevating, munition supply, rammers and unloading rammers are placed on the deck underneath the Gun platform (working chamber), and also the machines for the magazine and transport arrangements of munitions are similarly installed.<br />
<br />
In Fig. 18, Enc.3 is a diagrammatic sketch of the munition hoists and magazines from which it can be seen that the shell room is on the lowest level and has the magazine above it. The cartridge loading door (F1 for cartridges, G1 for shell) are fitted for flash protection with sliding shutters which are self-operating when the lift arrives at one or the other, i.e. when the lift arrives at the bottom, the shutter there will open and leave the loading hole (P) free, while the upper openings F1 and G1 will be shut and locked.<br />
<br />
An inspection of the shell room 38 cm. (15") showed that on these shells there is attached to the rearmost of the three upper driving bands a zinc band about 20 mm. (.78 in.) broad (similar to the driving bands). Experience has shown that this zinc ring is a very good anti-coppering device for the bore. It was apparently on the French front, at Verdun and in Flanders, that experiments with this arrangement were made; the results were very good and its introduction followed. The Army has also adopted it.<br />
<br />
The following is the situation with regard to 38 cm. (15 in.) shell. As opposed to the single type of shell (long calibre) in newly completing ships, here there are two :-<br />
<br />
:(a) A.P. shell, with cap, total length of shell 3.5 calibres.<br />
<br />
:(b) H.E. shell, uncapped, total length of shell 4.1 calibres. The total weight is 750 kg. (1653.5 lbs). The burster (not Trotyl, probably Heranit? 23.5 kg. (57.8 lbs.) for the A.P. shell and 67 kg. (147.7 lbs) for the H.E. The establishment allowed per [gun] is 90 A.P. and 30 H.E. The maximum range is 24 kilometres (26,247 yds.) with an angle of descent of 32 degrees, elevation of gun 247 degrees, time of flight 48 secs.<br />
<br />
:The charge is 87 kg. (191.8 lbs) in the main cartridge and 96 kg. (211.6 lbs.) in the foremost cartridge.<br />
<br />
:The rate of fire is one round per 40 seconds.<br />
<br />
15 cm. casemates. In these ships the flash protection for the 15 cm. (5.9") munition hoists in the casemates has been improved (Fig.20, Enc.3). In that a sheet iron chamber (K) has been built around the delivery opening which, by means of sliding plates (S1 and S2) can be shut off either from the trunk or from the munition tray. (G2.) For example, a shell arrives at the top of the hoist (G) - the shutter (S1) is raised in its guides by means of the lift mechanism, so that the shell can roll into the chamber (G1) while the shutter (S3) remains closed. Immediately afterwards the shutter (S1) closes the opening and the shutter (S2) raises in its guides and the shell rolls on the munition tray (G2). By this means the trunk is rendered flash proof at all stages of the operation.<br />
<br />
Submerged Flats. On board this ship there was also the opportunity to visit a submerged flat with two broadside tubes.<br />
<br />
In all there are five tubes (2 in each flat) and a bow tube. The calibre of the torpedoes is 60 cm. (23.6 in.) and the weight of a fully charged torpedo 2200 kg. (4850 lbs.). The explosive (? Heranit) weighing 250 kg. (531.1 lbs). The establishment per tube is four torpedoes - making in all 20 on board. The greatest torpedo range is 13 kilometres, 14,217 yds) with a medium speed setting of 28 knots.<br />
<br />
The flat that was visited (Fig.21, Enc.3) is very large and about 5 metres high, (16 ft.) so that it is perfectly feasible to turn any torpedo hanging on the purchase at the turntable (W1) on the overhead rails, so that is [sic] can be loaded into the port or starboard tube.<br />
<br />
The tubes (L1, L2) are side loading with very strong longitudinal holts [sic] on top (V1, V2) and fitted with a strong shield bar. For loading the torpedoes in the tubes, there are fitted near the tubes, on the same side on the side door, mechanical loading apparatus (quickloaders A1, A2), and on the opposite side are provided the rails (R1, R2) which serve for the adjustment (lever system) of the gyroscope of a torpedo lying in the tube.<br />
<br />
A torpedo is struck down from the upper deck through the trunk (E) and swung through the opening (O) into the flat, whence by means of a purchase (mechanically driven) it is run on to the tramways (S) and thence either to the bulkhead stowage or to a stowage over the tube.<br />
<br />
One must take this opportunity of noting that the overhead rails are not bolted to the actual deck, but are a separate structure, so as to avoid putting any vibration or other strain on to the armoured deck.<br />
<br />
If a torpedo is to be loaded it will be brought by means of the purchase to the exact ready stowage over the tube; then the hydraulic loader is operated by a lever; a grad [sic] with two arms seizes the torpedo in two specially cut away parts and draws it horizontally on to the guide rail of the loader, which then is lowered together with the torpedo. In the meantime the side door is mechanically unbolted and opened, so that the torpedo can be placed right in the tube (impulse frame). After this the guide rail and grab of the loader are withdrawn and raised, while the side door is shut and bolted. Loading by this means proceeds comparatively noiselessly, rapidly and precisely.<br />
<br />
The sluice is hydraulically worked, and after firing is operated by the return movement of the shield bar. When draining the tube the water can be pumped either overboard or into a well.<br />
<br />
The discharge is operated electrically from the Conning Tower or by hand.<br />
<br />
The sluice is hydraulically worked, and after firing is operated by the return movement of the shield bar. When draining the tube the water can be pumped either overboard or into a well.<br />
<br />
The discharge is operated electrically from the Conning Tower or by hand.<br />
<br />
<center>L. TORPEDO BOAT "G. 90".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1200 tons displacement.)</center><br />
<br />
From the Battleship "BAYERN" the Commission was brought back to Kiel in one of the newest torpedo boats (G.90), which offered an opportunity of seeing certain details.<br />
<br />
The gun armament consists of three 10.5 cm. (4.1") Guns on transferable mountings; the torpedo armament, of two single tubes forward and two double tubes for<nowiki>*</nowiki> [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. Note: Apparently a clerical error for 50 cm.(19.7")] 45 cm. (17.7") torpedoes in the after part. (See Fig. 22, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
The following details respecting the torpedo equipment were noted :<br />
<br />
Six torpedoes were carried, which remain stowed in the tubes; spare torpedoes are not carried on board, and no torpedo stowage is provided. The tubes of the twin mountings are not parallel but inclined outwards from each other, making an angle of 20° between the tubes.<br />
<br />
The reason for this lies in the method of torpedo boat attack. Torpedo craft always fire on the swing (in order to offer the full broadside target to the enemy fire for the shortest possible time), and the torpedoes from a twin mounting are are [sic] fired one after the other (the mounting remaining on a fixed bearing). The first torpedo having been fired, the boat continues to swing under helm and after 20° the second torpedo is fired.<br />
<br />
The training is done by means of a training gear at each tube, which can be understood from the detailed sketch (Fig. 23, Enc.3). By means of the hand crank (K) a worm and worm wheel (Zr) can be turned, this engages inthe [sic] training rack (Zs) and so the tube can be trained. The training pinion can, by means of a coupling clutch worked by the lever (H) be disconnected from the rack, should be required to train the mounting quickly, or for loading and unloading the torpedo by means of the training gear. This latter is accomplished by means of the windlass (W) mounted on the training shaft round which can be taken a line secured either to the nose or the tail of the torpedo. At the back part of the mounting is fitted a training brake which grips the rack.<br />
<br />
A director is fitted at each tube, and torpedoes are fired electrically from the bridge. At the rear of each tube are fitted two firing pushes (Abfeurungspöller), which can be operated either singly or together. In order to prevent firing from a tube which is not yet at the ready, the particular firing gear is held fast by a special locking gear fitted to the tube; its method of working can be seen from (Fig.24, Enc.3). The locking levers (St1 and St2) are only clear of the firing gear, when the rollers (R1 and R2), connected to the locking gear, are clear of the guide strip (G). This guide strip covers the arc in which firing is to be prevented. The springs.(F1 and F2) release the gear, as shewn in the sketch under (T).<br />
<br />
For torpedo transport on deck a special rail is fitted on the starboard side, on which was seen a fairly long transport wagon.<br />
<br />
<center>M. TRAWLER.</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Fitted out for Anti Submarine work)</center><br />
<br />
For fighting submarine boats trawlers are employed with the following :-<br />
<br />
:(a). A.S.rope nets fitted with two or four A.S.mines.<br />
<br />
:(b). Large Depth charges.<br />
<br />
:(c). Anti Submarine explosive Kite.<br />
<br />
::These appliances are described below.<br />
<br />
(a). Nets with A.S. Mines (Fig.25, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
These nets are made up from hemp rope (diameter of rope about 10 mm.); they are 250 m.long and of varying breadth (up to 20 m.) To a normal net two mines (M.M.) are attached (see Fig.25, Enc.3); for broader nets the mines are secured in pairs vertically - thus making four mines to a broad net. The mines are supported by their own large iron flat (S) while for the support of the nets smaller floats (S1) are placed on top.<br />
<br />
Each pair of nets also has an anchor and cable attached.<br />
<br />
The nets which are joined together are stowed with their mines in large shaped iron floats. The latter are stowed ready for shooting in two rows, (1 and 2, Fig.26, Enc3) on the top of the trawler. Shortly before action the primers are inserted through circular holes in the floats (1 hole per float).<br />
<br />
The shooting of nets one and two is carried out at a speed of 10 knots by one man. First , the first anchor of the first net is let go and the net with its mines dragged into the water, afterwards being anchored by the second anchor. Before, however, this latter is slipped the first anchor of the second net must be let go to ensure over-lapping.<br />
<br />
There are tiny holes in the floats by means of which just sufficient water can enter the floats so as to sink the net with its mines and floats at the end of an hour, and leave the area free again for traffic.<br />
<br />
These net mines (Fig.27, Enc.3) are contact mines with an explosive charge (1) from 12-13 kg. of Trotyl and consist of the mine case (M), firing mechanism (S), impact plate (P), distance pin (St), the safety lever (S1) and the primer (J) with the detonator (K).<br />
<br />
When the mine enters the water and reaches a depth of 5 metres the safety catch is released by a hydrostatic valve, which thus frees the detonator for the striker.<br />
<br />
Firing is effected in that by the impact of a submarine the impact plate (and with it the distance pin) are displaced, and by means of the latter the striker is freed and fires the mine by means of the firing spring (which is already cocked).<br />
<br />
(b). Depth charge (Fig., Enc.3).<br />
<br />
These depth charges are cylindrical in form and contain a large explosive charge of 60 kg. of Trotyl. They consist of the mine (M) and the float (S). The latter is connected to the mine by a strong steel wire (3 mm.), which is wound on a reel in the float. It fires (exactly like the depth charge of Korvetten Kapitän Schönthaler) because on reaching the set depth the tension on the wire operates the firing mechanism (Striker spring (F) is compressed as the striker (B) is raised by the grab (Z)) and thus frees the striker.<br />
<br />
The set depth can be adjusted from 5 to 5 (5 to 50?) metres (practically in the same way as in the Schönthaler Depth Charge) and it is to be noted that the time of explosion (1 to 5 secs) is adjustable by means of turning the pointer of the seconds scale (E) on the outside. The delay action itself operates by means of a disc similar to shrapnel.<br />
<br />
(c). Explosive Kite (Fig.30, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
The Kite (D) is made of wood and shaped as shown in Fig.31, inside is an explosive charge (the same size as the net mine, 12 - 13 kg., described in par. (a) above.<br />
<br />
The Kite is towed by a 15 mm. strong steel wire (T) whose core is an electric cableby [sic] means of which the kite is electrically exploded.<br />
<br />
The cable wire is wound on the winch (K), the ends being connected to the electric firing battery in the hollow drum.<br />
<br />
The towing wire is led from the winch over an adjustable brake (B) and from there over a roller (R) secured to a derrick (L) where the other end is connected to the charge.<br />
<br />
When the kite hits against a hard object (submarine) it is electrically fired.<br />
<br />
As a safety precaution the electric switch at the battery is only made when the kite is towing at the requisite speed.<br />
<br />
Trawlers tow at 10 knots, which causes a pull of 350 kg. on the wire.<br />
<br />
<center>N. ARSENAL WILHELMSHAVEN.</center><br />
<br />
Only a short visit to the gun shops was made. There about 1,000 civil workman [sic] were employed.<br />
<br />
==See Also==<br />
*[[Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland]]<br />
<br />
==Footnotes==<br />
{{reflist}}</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Report_on_German_Warships_after_Jutland&diff=334769Austro-Hungarian Naval Report on German Warships after Jutland2024-03-24T11:51:59Z<p>Simon Harley: /* Report */</p>
<hr />
<div>In the papers of Vice-Admiral [[John Ernest Troyte Harper|John E. T. Harper]] is a copy of a translation of an Austro-Hungarian Navy report on German Imperial Navy warships after the [[Battle of Jutland]].<ref>Harper papers. Churchill Archives Centre. JEHR 1/4. This research was made possible by the Colin Bell Award, a grant from the Colin Bell Fund at Churchill College, Cambridge.</ref> It was prepared by ''Marineartillerie-Oberingenieure 2. Klasse'' Georg Schindler. This report is in many ways more detailed than that of ''Fregattenkapitäne'' Hieronymus Graf von Colloredo-Mannsfeld [[Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland|prepared immediately after Jutland]].<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
REPORT by a Mission undertaken in accordance with Order. Section 4 M.S. No.1746 of 1916.<br />
----<br />
<br />
On the inspection of German Warships which took part in the Battle of the Skaggerak (Jutland), 31st.May - 1st.June 1916; on Wilhelmshaven, Hamburg and Kiel, and on other inspections of ships and bases.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}By Georg Schindler,<br />
<br />
{{pad|580px}}Gunnery Engineer, 2nd Class.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}AUSTRIAN NAVY.<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
The only details which have been dealt with are those which were of Gunnery interest.<br />
<br />
{|<br />
| A.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "SEYDLITZ"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| B.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "OSTFRIESLAND"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| C.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "VON DER TANN"<br />
| were<br />
|-<br />
| D.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "GROSSER KÜRFURST"<br />
| in<br />
|-<br />
| E.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"&nbsp;<br />
| "MARKGRAF"<br />
| engagement.<br />
|-<br />
| F.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "MOLTKE"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| G.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"<br />
| "DERFFLINGER"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| H.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "KÖNIG"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| J.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "HINDENBURG" (building)<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| K.<br />
| Large Battleship<br />
| "BAYERN"<br />
| rowspan=2 | } Newly commissioned<br />
|-<br />
| L.<br />
| T.B.D.<br />
| "G.90"<br />
|-<br />
| M.<br />
| colspan=3 | Fishing vessels Anti-Submarine armament, etc.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| N.<br />
| colspan=3 | Short inspection of the Ordnance Workshops in the Arsenal in Wilhelmshaven. <br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| O.<br />
| Ditto in Kiel.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|}<br />
<br />
Ships under A.B.C.J. and M. were in Wilhelmshaven. D.E.F. in Hamburg and G.H.K.L. in Kiel.<br />
<br />
In the following reports on each ship, Section 1 deals with the effect of enemy hits on ships A. to H. above, in conjunction with the two attached ship sketches (Enclosures 1 and 2). [Not attached.]<br />
<br />
Of the hits marked in the sketches those of a gunnery interest are distinguished by red ink. Section II gives general remarks concerning the ships in question.<br />
<br />
Further a report is submitted on installations in newly commissioned ships (K. and L.) also on a ship still under construction (J.), as well as means of combating submarines installed in Fishing vessels (M.) and finally, briefly on the Ordnance workshops in the Naval Arsenals (N. and O.).<br />
<br />
A. "SEYDLITZ" (Enclosure 1).<br />
<br />
This Cruiser received 24 shell hits (38 cm. 34.3 cm. and 30.5 cm.)(15", 13.5" and 12") and one Torpedo hit.<br />
<br />
Except for 1 shell hit (apparently 34.3 cm.) (13.5") on the starboard side forward (Hits nos.2-4) and one hit no.16 (38 cm.?) in the starboard after 15 cm. (6") casemate all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all Gun tubes, Guns and many fittings had been dismantled and landed.<br />
<br />
<center>I. Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
<br />
1. A large calibre shell (hit no.8) struck the 2nd. 15 cm. port casemate (from forward), put the gun out of action and killed or seriously wounded the majority of the gun's crew.<br />
<br />
2. A 38 cm. shell exploded in the 4th 15 cm. casemate (hit No.13) the gun was similarly damaged, and 2 men (wounded) remained alive of the crew.<br />
<br />
3. In the port after 15 cm. casemate, No.6 gun, (hit No.15) had the same effect as the two described above.<br />
<br />
4. A 38 cm. shell (hit No.16) penetrated the armoured bulkhead on starboard side aft, near the last 15 cm. casemate, close to the curve of the armour (Fig.1, Enc.3) destroyed the 15 cm. gun and killed most of the gun crew.<br />
<br />
Of the twelve 15 cm. guns it appears that 2 port and 4 starboard fired unceasingly until the end.<br />
<br />
5. No.2 Turret (starboard) received a hit from port on the vertical turret armour (hit No.21) to the right of the right gun. Part of the nose of the shell pierced the armour anddestroyed [sic] the cradle and training gear of the right gun. The left was undamaged. The turret remained in action with this gun.<br />
<br />
6. An interesting hit is to be seen on the right 28 cm. gun of No.3 Turret port. The gun was on one of the jetties of the arsenal and could be examined. A large calibre shell hit the aforesaid gun a glancing blow just outside the turret, producing at the point of impact, a considerable elliptical scoop on the outside, causing a fracture of the inner tube and in addition bent the gun so that the axis of the tube at the muzzle was (as far as could be estimated) 200 mm. (about 8 in.) out of line.<br />
<br />
The cradle of this gun was split, the trunnions somewhat bent and the caps thereof partially opened out.<br />
<br />
The left gun of this turret, however, remained serviceable and the Turret could continue firing without interruption.<br />
<br />
7. A 34.3 cm. (13.5") shell (hit No.18) pierced the vertical armour of the revolving structure of No.4 Turret superimposed to the left of the left gun exploded inside the turret, ignited the cartridges which were ready for loading, put the turret out of action and killed all the crew (about 70 men) except 6.<br />
<br />
T [sic] This turret, already out of action, received another hit later from a 38 cm. (15") shell (hit No.17) this projectile struck the revolving Turret armour close to the lower edge at the right rear of the turret, and partially penetrated the turret.<br />
<br />
8. A Large calibre shell tore off the roof of the after (No.5) turret. (Geschossgeller ? ricochet). The turret suffered no appreciable damage inside.<br />
<br />
The remaining hits are being dealt with in the report on ship construction.≠ [I.D. Note: The original of this report can, unfortunately, not be obtained.]<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
<center>II Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
1. Extensive "flash" protection was already installed in "SEYDLITZ".<br />
<br />
(a) The openings for bringing 28 cm. cartridges into the lower loading chamber of the Ammunition Hoist can be shut off with sliding doors (schubtüren ?). The supply scuttles from the magazines are fitted with hinged flaps which open upwards on each side (Fig.3, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
(b) The 15 cm. (5.9") Ammunition hoists at the supply position in the casemates are fitted with a "closing flap" which shuts automatically, but its own weight assisted by a spring, immediately after the ammunition has rolled out on to the Ammunition Tray (which is placed in a horizontal position by a Paternoster apparatus (endless chain) (Fig.4, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
2. Apparently Gas Masks are employed in all ships. The method of use is the same as in the German Army. <u>Every</u> man was supplied with a mask (as it happened 2 days before action). These masks were to be brought into use immediately there was any evidence of suffocating gases, and they were so far successful that, according to the opinions of officers, at least one ship, if not two, was saved by their use.<br />
<br />
3. Enemy "shorts" usually exploded on hitting the water, with the result that, (as in the cases of shells exploding on board), splinters of various sizes struck guns among other things, and caused damage, but in practically every case no stoppage of firing from the gun resulted. Shell splinters also entered Conning Towers and Turrets through the sighting slits. But they caused no internal damage as their force was broken by their passage through the deeps [sic] slits. (Fig.5, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
4. In Turret firing. Salvoes were gradually used, and always with <u>only one</u> gun of each turret.<br />
<br />
5. For transmission of orders to the guns (also to 15 cm. (5.9" guns) from the Gunnery Officers position (in the Conning Tower) Elevation pointers are used which are mounted (<u>separately</u>) on brackets away from the Turret armour.<br />
<br />
6. Ranges of the individual rangefinders are shown on a circular scale (range receiver) by means of electrically worked pointers. All these dials are mounter [sic] in a circular box (Fig.6, Enc.3) so that the ranges of the same object shown by several rangefinders (Pointers in similar direction)[.] Further, it is possible to cut out one or other of the dials if the Rangetaker concerned is ranging badly.<br />
<br />
7. Repulse of Destroyers is carried out invariably by means of broadside salvoes of 15 cm. (5.9) guns etc. and one target only is always used. But the Gunlayer is only to fire when sights are exactly on the target.<br />
<br />
8. The 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) guns were not used in the battle. It is understood that in the future guns of this calibre, will only be retained on board as anti-aircraft guns, as was laid down for all ships.<br />
<br />
9. (a) The empty 26 cm. (11") cartridge cases are thrown out of the turrets on to the deck through openings in rear of the Gun platforms (2 per turret). A covering flap, opening downwards when the cases are thrown out, automatically closes the hole by means of a spring (Fig.7, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
(b) The fired 15 cm. (5.9") cartridge are placed in a large hanging net in the casemate, and are only removed from the casemate during a lull in the firing. It was stated that a very large number of fired cases (including Large Calibre ones) were collected and brought back.<br />
<br />
10. The voice pipes are made of 60,100 and 150 mm. diameter (2.4 in., 3.8 in.,and 6 in.). (The last named are called Schallrohre and are intended for short distances). Voice pipes are not lagged.<br />
<br />
11. The ventilation of the Turrets is similar to the method employed in our newer ships. A Fan placed between the two guns, sucks, on the one hand the powder gases from the breeches by means of a ventilation pipe from each gun when the breech is opened and on the other hand draws them away from the roof of the turret on the gun platform another fan, portable, and continually running, was installed when sucked in fresh air through a hose and passed it into the interior of the turret bymeans [sic] of a second hose. If any man had any difficulty in breathing he inhaled fresh air through the second hose. But even this method only afforded partial relief.<br />
<br />
12. All Gunnery machinery (hydraulic and electric) appears to have function correctly.<br />
<br />
13. From the Gunnery point of view there were no serious fires (magazines of any description), for which the "Flash door" protection described in Section II Miscellaneous, Pars. I (a) and (b) is principally responsible. All cartridges actually in a turret or casemate,when [sic] an enemy shell burst in the turret or casemate, were exploded in every case. Therefore the rule was most strictly enforced that only the absolute minimum of ammunition was kept ready at the guns.<br />
<br />
14. "SEYDLITZ" had 1150 28 cm. (11" shell) on board, of which 450 were expended. (No ship expended all her ammunition).<br />
<br />
15. The torpedo nets were not actually a hindrance in the action but they sustained heavy damage fromenemy [sic] hits and splinters so that parts of them hung down over the ships side.<br />
<br />
In future these nets being useless ballast will no longer be carried. This is already the case in the new battleship "BAYERN".<br />
<br />
<center>B. "OSTRFRIESLAND".</center><br />
<br />
<center>I. Hits. (Enclosure 1).</center><br />
<br />
This Battleship received no shell hits, but was struck by a mine onthe [sic] starboard side forward. The detailed description is contained in the report on Ship Construction.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
At the time of the inspection of this ship the 30.5 cm. (12") Ammunition was being embarked. The shells were being slung from the Quay on to the Deck by means of a powerful floating crane in bundles (of about 5 projectiles). All cartridges are enclosed in long water-tight zinc containers, fitted with stiffening bands. They were being rolled on board carefully across broad planks and stowed in the Magazines. If several rounds of ready ammunition have to be stowed in the Turret, the charges are always kept in the zinc cylinders.<br />
<br />
The 30.5 cm. (12") and also 28 cm. (11") projectiles are (according to the statement of the Gunnery Officer of this ship, Lt.Comdr.Lauenstein) of one description throughout, capped and fitted with base fuse. Total weight 405 kg. (about 890 lbs.) Bursting charge 12 to 13 kg. (26½ to 29 lbs.) of Trotyl. In the latest ships, however, "Armour piercing" and "high explosive" shell (but with a new explosive for bursting charge) are again to be used, as is already the case with the 28 cm. (15") shell in the Battleship "BAYERN".<br />
<br />
For the 15 cm.(5.9") guns it is reported that there are two types of shell in use.<br />
<br />
:(a) Fused shell with base fuses.<br />
<br />
:(b) High explosive shell,with a very sensitive nose fuse and a base fuse.<br />
<br />
<center>C. "VON DER TANN". (Enclosure 1.)</center><br />
<br />
This Battle Cruiser received 4 hits from large calibre shells (all on the starboard side).<br />
<br />
<center>I.Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
<br />
(1). The foremost 28 cm. (11") Turret was hit in the Barbette on the starboard side. The shell exploded and the armour was just penetrated (Hit No.1). Three men in the turret sustained burns (not very severe) from the "Flash". But the Turret was placed out of action as the armour at the point of impact was bulged inwards and jammed the Turret.<br />
<br />
(2). The after Conning Tower was similarly hit (Hit No.2)[.] But the shell only caused a shaking of the Tower and all apparatus inside remained intact.<br />
<br />
(3.) A shell exploded in the neighbourhood of the after Turret No.4 (Hit No.3). The effect on the Turret was only evident in a shaking, and the armour in the vicinity of the explosion was very slightly indented but without doing any damage so that the Turret continued in action.<br />
<br />
(4). No.4 hit is only of slight constructional interest.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
(1). In this ship, as in "OSTFRIESLAND", the question as to whether the collection of scraps of metal (coming from driving bands or Cartridge cases) in the Breech made any difference to the condition of the breech was answered in the negative.<br />
<br />
(2). The maximum rate of fire of the 28 cm. (11") guns of this Cruiser, as well as of the 30.5 cm. (12") guns of the "OSTFRIESLAND" is stated to have reached 3 - 4 rounds per minute in peace time.<br />
<br />
(3). The arrangement in the 28 cm. (11") turrets is in principle the same as in "SEYDLITZ" or as in the 30.5 cm. (12") guns of the large Battle Cruiser "HINDENBURG" (now building), with the exception of a few improvements in the last named ship. But while in the later ships (30.5 cm. 12") hydraulic rammers with reserve Hand ramming are installed "VON DER TANN" has only double Hand rammers, which are hung under the Turret roof.<br />
<br />
<center>D. "GROSSER KURFÜRST."</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Effects of shell hits (Enclosure 1).</center><br />
<br />
The ship was hit 8 times (large calibre) all from the port side.<br />
<br />
:(1) Hit No.4 (presumably 34 cm. 13.5") exploded before the Barbette armour of the foremost Turret.<br>Apart from breaking off small pieces of the hard armour (? Panzerschichte) and a slight shaking of the turret no damage was done to the Turret fittings. A fragment struck the upper surface of a sight slot and remained in the slot, while a good deal of gas entered the Turret and necessitated the use of gas masks by the crew for some time.<br />
<br />
:(2). A further heavy shell (Hit No.6) struck the port 15 cm.(5.9") Casemate (3rd. from forward) killed 10 of the crew of 14, but damaged the gun so little that after about 12 minutes the gun's crew having been made up, it was brought into action again. Two cartridges which were in the casemate were ignited.<br />
<br />
:(3). The other hits are only of constructional interest.<br />
<br />
:Some 30.5 cm. (12") and 15 cm. (5.9") guns were damaged on the outside by splinters from "shorts", but sustained no other damage.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
The Magazine arrangements in this ship were somewhat more minutely examined as well as reports made concerning them. (The arrangements described below are also used in the other ships).<br />
<br />
The shell bins and shell transport to the shell hoist are shown in Fig. 8, Enc.3) diagrammatically.<br />
<br />
A shell grab (Z) worked by 2 electric motors automatically controlled is used to transport the shell from the bins to the waiting tray fixed round the trunk (Turmraum) (A 1.-4). This grab is suspended from a broad length of wire sword matting, the latter can be wound up or down round a drum (Wa), if the transporting shaft (T) which is provided with two diametrical opposite longitudinal feathers is turned in the corresponding direction. Shaft (T) is fitted into drum (Wa). By this the grab is wound up or down. The grab is moved horizontally by the carrier (R), which holds the above-mentioned revolving drum, being drawn to one side or the other by an endless rope, worked electrically along the shaft (T). To assist the long shaft a deck rail is fitted above it which carries the weights, (Projectile grab and drum with carrier), the carrier being suspended from the rail. The electrical starting levers for both motors are fitted in the shell handing room.<br />
<br />
If it is required to get a shell out of the bin, the motor operating the horizontal movement of the grab is started. Then the long transporting drum is turned correspondingly by the 2nd.motor, thereby lowering the grab, which grips the shell by automatic pressure. Thereupon, by turning the shaft in the opposite direction the shell is raised, transported to the waiting tray (A) of which 4 are provided and placed on it. This waiting tray is so arranged that a shell can be landed only in the one position in order to prevent an inverted landing on the shell bogie relative to the entry in the hoist. The shell bogie is fitted with the same stops as the waiting tray.<br />
<br />
From the waiting tray the shell can be placed on either of the two shell bogies (which are rigidly joined to each other). The latter run easily with rollers on a circular rail, and can not only be adjusted exactly at the waiting tray by means of spring stops, but can also be coupled to the shell hoist in the loading position.<br />
<br />
In the shell rooms (lower deck) the shells are stowed in bins four to five deep (Fig.9, Enc.3)[.] The copper driving bands are protected by a broad covering band of strong canvas the ends of which are sewn together with (twine ?). Only rope is placed between the individual shells as a preventative against damage. Two vertical wooden batten are secured to the side walls of the shell bins - right and left.<br />
<br />
In order to ensure the grab gripping the shell as near as possible round the centre of gravity, each shell has a white ring painted round it.<br />
<br />
It is to be noted that the shell room cannot be shut off (water tightly) from the shell handing room as the large openings in the dividing Bulkhead, through which the transport carrier passes, are always open.<br />
<br />
In addition projectiles are stowed in many ships in the corners of the shell handing room itself in fixed bins.<br />
<br />
The 30.5 (12") cartridges are stowed in their water tight zinc cylinders in special stowage fittings in the magazines. These stowages are made of angle Iron and sheet plates. (There is no wood in the fittings).<br />
<br />
The Magazines, (2 decks from the bottom) in contrast to the shell room, are separated from the Magazine handing room, by a means of thin sheet bulkheads, in which the passage ways are fitted with double doors and the circular openings for handing cartridges are fitted with double covering flaps (the latter have already been remarked on in "SEYDLITZ" Section 11, Fig.3, Enc.3.[)]<br />
<br />
For transport of cartridges in the Magazines the transporting gear shewn in Fig.10, Enc.3 is available. This consists of a double rail (R) in which a horizontal (sheet iron) tray, semicircular in section can be moved up and down in guides by means of a hand differential purchase (F). The Tray can then be brought to the exact level of the cartridge. The Transporting gear is suspended from an overhead rail,(S) and also runs in a guide rail on the deck (SS). The cartridge is pushed on to the tray and the transporter then brought to the cartridge handing hole, and after opening the double flaps, transferred to the Turret.<br />
<br />
The Turret appliances correspond in general to those in "HINDENBURG", about which data are described later. But an exception must be made in the case of the size and installation of the Rangefinders (Fig.11, Enc.3).In "KURFÜRST" the Rangefinders about 3 meters (10 ft.) long are fitted in hoods in the front of the Turret, while "HINDENBURG" the 8 metre (26 ft.) range finders are already being fitted in the same way as will be the case in our 35 cm. (about 14") turrets, now building.<br />
<br />
<center>E. "MARKGRAF".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This Battleship was hit 5 times by big guns and all from the port side.<br />
<br />
Only hit No.2 is of gunnery interest. This entered the next to the last 15 cm. (5.(') [5.9"] casemate on the port side and exploded, killing the crew and putting gun out of action for the remainder of the battle, though it did not damage it very seriously.<br />
<br />
Several splinters from this shell pierced the bulkhead and entered the next casemate (forward) and killed or wounded several men. But this gun was brought into action again after an interval of about 10 minutes to make up the crew.<br />
<br />
<center>11. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
In the case of this ship also, splinters from enemy shorts entered the Conning Tower, but without causing any damage to either personnel or Materiel.<br />
<br />
During the whole engagement about 250 rounds of 30 cm. (12") ammunition was fired, i.e. about one fifth of the total supply on board.<br />
<br />
<center>F. "MOLTKE".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This ship was hit 4 times by heavy shell (all from the starboard side).<br />
<br />
One shell (Hit No.3) pierced the upper side armour and burst behind the latter inside the ship. It also caused some damage outside to No.4.15 cm. (5.9") casemate starboard (from forward) killing or wounding several men, but causing little damage to the gun. This gun was again brought into action after about 15 minutes.<br />
<br />
<center>11. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
"MOLTKE" was the only ship from which 4 Torpedoes were fired (not in salvo, but one after the other). On board, it was stated by officers that "QUEEN MARY" was fired at and hit at about 10 kilometres (10,935 yds.), and that this was the cause of the rapid sinking of this Battle Cruiser. Officers of other ships, however, were not of this opinion, as when "MOLTKE" fired the distance from "QUEEN MARY" was about 13 kilometres (14,217 yds.) and that the torpedoes have not this range; so that only Gunnery can be taken into consideration.<br />
<br />
In the "MOLTKE", splinters from short bursting shells also entered the Conning Tower, without, however, causing any noteworthy damage.<br />
<br />
<center>G. "DERFFLINGER".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This Battle Cruiser was hit the largest number of times, viz:- 30, of these 20 were of heavy calibre and all came from the port side.<br />
<br />
:(1) A 15" shell pierced the roof of N.4 30.5 cm. (12") Turret (hit No.5) exploded inside the Turret, thereby igniting all the charges which were there (apparently only two) and killed all the Turret's crew, (74 men including reserve crew), except 2 men who were able to get away (wounded).<br />
<br />
:The Turret itself was put out of action because (as was the case in all these hits on Turrets) much damage was done to the various instruments and appliances by the splinters and flash.<br />
<br />
:It is worthy of note that the electric cables in the Turret were comparatively uninjured.<br />
<br />
:(2). Turret No.3 was also hit by a 38 cm. (15") shell (hit No.6). The projectile penetrated the Barbette armour and took with it a large piece of plating into the interior of the Turret. The 74 men of the Turret's crew (as in the hit described above[)] for the most part were killed, only 6 men getting away wounded. It is observed that an 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) gun which was 3½ metres (about 11½ ft.) away from the point of impact, was completely undamaged, although the deck below the spot, and in the immediate vicinity of this gun, was badly damaged.<br />
<br />
:Nos.3 and 4 Turrets were only put out of action towards the end of the engagement.<br />
<br />
:The two foremost Turrets remained completely intact, although the Barbette armour of the second Turret showed a fairly large scrape from a (very glancing) shell hit. But this caused no further damage to the Turret (hit No.13).<br />
<br />
:(4). The Conning Tower was hit on the starboard side on the edge. But only small pieces of the brittle face of the armoured plates splintered off, and in the Tower itself only one elevation-pointer ceased to function.<br />
<br />
:(5). Very severe damage was done by a large calibre shell (hit No.20) which exploded close to the casemate of the No.2 15 cm. (5.9) gun port, which not only damaged this gun, but also put the two neighbouring 15 cm. (5.9") guns out of action. The first named gun was principally severely damaged on the chase, and the chase of the foremost 15 cm. (5.9") gun was indented to such an extent by splinters, that it could not be fired again. The other gun in the vicinity was so shaken up by the powerful explosion, that it could not be moved again. The casualties sustained by the gun's crews were in contrast comparatively small. (1 man killed and several severely or slightly wounded at the first named gun[)].<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
A large fragment of a 38 cm. (15") shell (which failed to explode), was exhibited on board (as is shown in Fig.12, Enc.3)[.] The much distorted fuze was also found.<br />
<br />
<center>H. "KÖNIG".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits.</center><br />
<br />
There were 13 hits (large calibre) identified all from the port side and above the waterline.<br />
<br />
:(1). A 34.3 cm. (13.5) shell hit the port foremost 15 cm. (5.9") casemate. (Hit No.9). A large piece of armour plating was carried into the casemate, where the shell exploded, killed the gun's crew (11 men) and put the gun out of action. The armour plate went further, penetrated the bulkhead, entered the galley, destroyed it and killed more men.<br />
<br />
:(2). Another 34.3 cm. (13.5") shell penetrated the second 15 cm. (5.9") casemate (hit No.8) and exploded, making the gun useless and, by penetrating the deck also caused much damage in the compartment below. The crew of this gun was by chance not at the moment in the casemate, as they had gone out for a short time on account of gas from the explosion in the first 15 cm. (5.9) casemate (which had occurred just previously.) The result was that there were no killed or wounded among the gun's crew.<br />
<br />
:(3). The traces of a shell were visible on the roof of the foremost 30.5 (12") Turret. (Hit No.11.) The projectile damaged the Rangefinder cover, and tore off a piece of it, rendering the Rangefinder useless. No other damage was caused by this hit.<br />
<br />
:(4). The roof of the Conning Tower was similarly gazed [sic] by a shell, which left a scratch but caused no other damage to the Tower or its instruments, etc.<br />
<br />
<center>J. "HINDENBURG."</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Apparently about 30,000 tons displacement)</center><br />
<br />
This Cruiser, now building will be given an armament of 8 30.5 cm. (12") guns 50 cal. (in four double turrets, 2 forward and 2 aft as in "DERFFLINGER") and 14 15 cm. (5.9") and 8.8 cm[.] (22 pr.) Anti-aircraft guns.<br />
<br />
The foremost superimposed Turret (No.2) was mostly built in, and a short inspection of it was made.<br />
<br />
The Gun-platform is especially roomy. The distance apart of the centres of the two gun barrels being estimated at about 3 metres (10 feet approx.)[.] The complete arrangement of the gun-platform can be seen in the diagrammatic Sketch (Fig.13, Enc.3). The 2 shell hoists (G) are side by side between the gun and to the left of the left gun, (and right of the right gun) are the two ammunition hoists (P).<br />
<br />
The up-coming ammunition is placed in its slide (TT) in the rear by means of unloading rammers (so-called "Umlauder"), whence it rolls on to the loading Tray, and finally on to the shell swings or cartridge swings, which by swinging across, brings the shell or cartridges one after the other to the rear of the gun for loading.<br />
<br />
The two rammers are hydraulic chain Rammers (with reserve hand drive). In the space at the rear of the platform there are :- an entrance opening (E) and two openings (A) for passing out firedcartridge [sic] cases. These openings (A) are constructed similarly to those more exactly described under "SEYDLITZ" (Sec.II. Par.9).<br />
<br />
The Breeches are worked hydraulically (the reserve method being by hand.)<br />
<br />
The principle can be gathered from Fig.14, Enc.3 . A bar with a tooth edged point (Z), (which can be worked up or down hydraulically) turns the Traversing shaft by means of cog wheels (R1, R2, R3) and opens or shuts the breech. The Water-pressure is led to the mechanism through two flexible hoses. If the cog wheel R3 is placed out of gear with R2, the hydraulic system is shut off.<br />
<br />
For elevating,Trunnion [sic] sights are provided and for training a sighting telescope is fitted in front between the guns.<br />
<br />
The Rangefinder (about 8 metres long) which was not yet on board, is to be fitted in the front of the Turret above the guns (under the roof as already referred to under "KURFÜRST")[.] Only the two side openings in the armour could be seen.<br />
<br />
Elevating is worked hydraulically (Reserve system by hand). (The ammunition hoists are also worked hydraulically, but here the alternative system is electric).<br />
<br />
A gun coupling is fitted in this ship as in all later ships. But these couplings are apparently only for use when it is desired to elevate a gun whose elevating gear has been damaged.<br />
<br />
The normal Turret Training gear and also the reserve system is only worked by electric motors.<br />
<br />
The same system of ventilation is used as has already been described in "SEYDLITZ" (Section II, Par.II).<br />
<br />
All working machinery (Electrically driven pumps, and electric motors for elevating, training, hoists, rammers, etc.) are apparently installed in the spacious working chamber below the gun platform.<br />
<br />
The arrangements in the Magazines as well as the transporting gear for passing shell and cartridges from them to the hoists are the same as those already more minutely described under battleship "GROSSER KÜRFURST."<br />
<br />
<center>K. "BAYERN".</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Class Ersatz "WÖRTH" about 30,000 tons disp.)</center><br />
<br />
This battleship, only recently completed, had to carry out exercises whilst at Kiel, and the Commission was invited to join for a cruise, which gave opportunity for a certain amount of inspection.<br />
<br />
The armament consists of eight 38 cm. (15") G.L. 45 guns in four double turrets apparently arranged as shown in the Almanac; sixteen 15 cm. (5.9") G.L. 45 guns in casemates and eight 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) anti-aircraft guns.<br />
<br />
38 cm. Gun Turret. (Fig. 15, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
The distance apart of the bore axes is 3700 mm. (12.1 ft.) for these guns[.] 8.8 cm. sub-calibre guns are provided, which are put in from outboard (i.e. muzzle end.)<br />
<br />
The Gunhouse, as in the turrets of the "HINDENBURG" is very roomy.<br />
<br />
In this turret there has been introduced no important alteration with respect to the munition hoists. Whereas in all previous ships the shot hoist was separate from the cartridge hoist, in this ship, as with us (the Austrian Navy), both hoists for one gun are combined in one trunk; and also instead of the shell and cartridge swings in the "HINDENBURG" (see above) munition wagons (W1, W2), which run on cross rails are introduced. The two main hoists (A1, A2) come up between the two guns. Besides these there are in addition two electrically driven auxiliary hoists (H1, H2).<br />
<br />
The round which arrives at the top of the hoist is taken out and landed, by means of the unloading rammer (U) in the munition wagon, which brings it to the rear of the particular gun in the loading position, whence it is loaded by means of the rammer.<br />
<br />
The munition wagons, rammers and unloading rammers are normally worked by hydraulic power (with auxiliary handworking gear); at the back of the turret are two principal operating positions, (ST1, ST2) which are raised to give a good all-round view, and where all the necessary manipulation for the foregoing hydraulic machinery is carried out.<br />
<br />
The munition hoists are also hydraulically worked, and electric drive is provided as an alternative. The elevating and breech mechanism gear are hydraulic (with alternative hand gear).<br />
<br />
The following sighting arrangements are provided :-<br />
<br />
:(a) For elevation - two side trunnion sights as well as two reserve sights in front.<br />
<br />
:(b) For training - a principal trainer's telescope in front between the two guns, as well as a side telescope as reserve.<br />
<br />
Asked whether any automatic firing apparatus was in contemplation, it was replied that a place for such apparatus was provided but the installation could not be expected till later, and depended on the solution of several problems which had yet to be experimented on.<br />
<br />
The large 8.2 m. (26.9 ft.) rangefinder is placed the same as in the "HINDENBURG".<br />
<br />
The ventilation of the turret is on the same principle as in the "HINDENBURG" and "SEYDLITZ", except that in addition there are two powerful electric fan motors between the guns.<br />
<br />
The Training is done electrically, as is also the alternative arrangement. Fig 15, Enc.3 gives a diagrammatic sketch of the arrangements. The controller gives 72 degrees of speed.<br />
<br />
For absorbing the shock in the training gear of single gun shooting there are provided, in the friction coupling box of the worm gearing, besides the friction plates (as in our own installations) two rings of strong springs above them - each ring containing six springs as shewn in Fig.17, Enc.3. Apparently any turret thrown off a small angle by a single round will be trained back to its original position by means of these springs.<br />
<br />
As in "HINDENBURG", so also in "BAYERN", the various machines for training[,] elevating, munition supply, rammers and unloading rammers are placed on the deck underneath the Gun platform (working chamber), and also the machines for the magazine and transport arrangements of munitions are similarly installed.<br />
<br />
In Fig. 18, Enc.3 is a diagrammatic sketch of the munition hoists and magazines from which it can be seen that the shell room is on the lowest level and has the magazine above it. The cartridge loading door (F1 for cartridges, G1 for shell) are fitted for flash protection with sliding shutters which are self-operating when the lift arrives at one or the other, i.e. when the lift arrives at the bottom, the shutter there will open and leave the loading hole (P) free, while the upper openings F1 and G1 will be shut and locked.<br />
<br />
An inspection of the shell room 38 cm. (15") showed that on these shells there is attached to the rearmost of the three upper driving bands a zinc band about 20 mm. (.78 in.) broad (similar to the driving bands). Experience has shown that this zinc ring is a very good anti-coppering device for the bore. It was apparently on the French front, at Verdun and in Flanders, that experiments with this arrangement were made; the results were very good and its introduction followed. The Army has also adopted it.<br />
<br />
The following is the situation with regard to 38 cm. (15 in.) shell. As opposed to the single type of shell (long calibre) in newly completing ships, here there are two :-<br />
<br />
:(a) A.P. shell, with cap, total length of shell 3.5 calibres.<br />
<br />
:(b) H.E. shell, uncapped, total length of shell 4.1 calibres. The total weight is 750 kg. (1653.5 lbs). The burster (not Trotyl, probably Heranit? 23.5 kg. (57.8 lbs.) for the A.P. shell and 67 kg. (147.7 lbs) for the H.E. The establishment allowed per [gun] is 90 A.P. and 30 H.E. The maximum range is 24 kilometres (26,247 yds.) with an angle of descent of 32 degrees, elevation of gun 247 degrees, time of flight 48 secs.<br />
<br />
:The charge is 87 kg. (191.8 lbs) in the main cartridge and 96 kg. (211.6 lbs.) in the foremost cartridge.<br />
<br />
:The rate of fire is one round per 40 seconds.<br />
<br />
15 cm. casemates. In these ships the flash protection for the 15 cm. (5.9") munition hoists in the casemates has been improved (Fig.20, Enc.3). In that a sheet iron chamber (K) has been built around the delivery opening which, by means of sliding plates (S1 and S2) can be shut off either from the trunk or from the munition tray. (G2.) For example, a shell arrives at the top of the hoist (G) - the shutter (S1) is raised in its guides by means of the lift mechanism, so that the shell can roll into the chamber (G1) while the shutter (S3) remains closed. Immediately afterwards the shutter (S1) closes the opening and the shutter (S2) raises in its guides and the shell rolls on the munition tray (G2). By this means the trunk is rendered flash proof at all stages of the operation.<br />
<br />
Submerged Flats. On board this ship there was also the opportunity to visit a submerged flat with two broadside tubes.<br />
<br />
In all there are five tubes (2 in each flat) and a bow tube. The calibre of the torpedoes is 60 cm. (23.6 in.) and the weight of a fully charged torpedo 2200 kg. (4850 lbs.). The explosive (? Heranit) weighing 250 kg. (531.1 lbs). The establishment per tube is four torpedoes - making in all 20 on board. The greatest torpedo range is 13 kilometres, 14,217 yds) with a medium speed setting of 28 knots.<br />
<br />
The flat that was visited (Fig.21, Enc.3) is very large and about 5 metres high, (16 ft.) so that it is perfectly feasible to turn any torpedo hanging on the purchase at the turntable (W1) on the overhead rails, so that is [sic] can be loaded into the port or starboard tube.<br />
<br />
The tubes (L1, L2) are side loading with very strong longitudinal holts [sic] on top (V1, V2) and fitted with a strong shield bar. For loading the torpedoes in the tubes, there are fitted near the tubes, on the same side on the side door, mechanical loading apparatus (quickloaders A1, A2), and on the opposite side are provided the rails (R1, R2) which serve for the adjustment (lever system) of the gyroscope of a torpedo lying in the tube.<br />
<br />
A torpedo is struck down from the upper deck through the trunk (E) and swung through the opening (O) into the flat, whence by means of a purchase (mechanically driven) it is run on to the tramways (S) and thence either to the bulkhead stowage or to a stowage over the tube.<br />
<br />
One must take this opportunity of noting that the overhead rails are not bolted to the actual deck, but are a separate structure, so as to avoid putting any vibration or other strain on to the armoured deck.<br />
<br />
If a torpedo is to be loaded it will be brought by means of the purchase to the exact ready stowage over the tube; then the hydraulic loader is operated by a lever; a grad [sic] with two arms seizes the torpedo in two specially cut away parts and draws it horizontally on to the guide rail of the loader, which then is lowered together with the torpedo. In the meantime the side door is mechanically unbolted and opened, so that the torpedo can be placed right in the tube (impulse frame). After this the guide rail and grab of the loader are withdrawn and raised, while the side door is shut and bolted. Loading by this means proceeds comparatively noiselessly, rapidly and precisely.<br />
<br />
The sluice is hydraulically worked, and after firing is operated by the return movement of the shield bar. When draining the tube the water can be pumped either overboard or into a well.<br />
<br />
The discharge is operated electrically from the Conning Tower or by hand.<br />
<br />
The sluice is hydraulically worked, and after firing is operated by the return movement of the shield bar. When draining the tube the water can be pumped either overboard or into a well.<br />
<br />
The discharge is operated electrically from the Conning Tower or by hand.<br />
<br />
<center>L. TORPEDO BOAT "G. 90".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1200 tons displacement.)</center><br />
<br />
From the Battleship "BAYERN" the Commission was brought back to Kiel in one of the newest torpedo boats (G.90), which offered an opportunity of seeing certain details.<br />
<br />
The gun armament consists of three 10.5 cm. (4.1") Guns on transferable mountings; the torpedo armament, of two single tubes forward and two double tubes for<nowiki>*</nowiki> [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. Note: Apparently a clerical error for 50 cm.(19.7")] 45 cm. (17.7") torpedoes in the after part. (See Fig. 22, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
The following details respecting the torpedo equipment were noted :<br />
<br />
Six torpedoes were carried, which remain stowed in the tubes; spare torpedoes are not carried on board, and no torpedo stowage is provided. The tubes of the twin mountings are not parallel but inclined outwards from each other, making an angle of 20° between the tubes.<br />
<br />
The reason for this lies in the method of torpedo boat attack. Torpedo craft always fire on the swing (in order to offer the full broadside target to the enemy fire for the shortest possible time), and the torpedoes from a twin mounting are are [sic] fired one after the other (the mounting remaining on a fixed bearing). The first torpedo having been fired, the boat continues to swing under helm and after 20° the second torpedo is fired.<br />
<br />
The training is done by means of a training gear at each tube, which can be understood from the detailed sketch (Fig. 23, Enc.3). By means of the hand crank (K) a worm and worm wheel (Zr) can be turned, this engages inthe [sic] training rack (Zs) and so the tube can be trained. The training pinion can, by means of a coupling clutch worked by the lever (H) be disconnected from the rack, should be required to train the mounting quickly, or for loading and unloading the torpedo by means of the training gear. This latter is accomplished by means of the windlass (W) mounted on the training shaft round which can be taken a line secured either to the nose or the tail of the torpedo. At the back part of the mounting is fitted a training brake which grips the rack.<br />
<br />
A director is fitted at each tube, and torpedoes are fired electrically from the bridge. At the rear of each tube are fitted two firing pushes (Abfeurungspöller), which can be operated either singly or together. In order to prevent firing from a tube which is not yet at the ready, the particular firing gear is held fast by a special locking gear fitted to the tube; its method of working can be seen from (Fig.24, Enc.3). The locking levers (St1 and St2) are only clear of the firing gear, when the rollers (R1 and R2), connected to the locking gear, are clear of the guide strip (G). This guide strip covers the arc in which firing is to be prevented. The springs.(F1 and F2) release the gear, as shewn in the sketch under (T).<br />
<br />
For torpedo transport on deck a special rail is fitted on the starboard side, on which was seen a fairly long transport wagon.<br />
<br />
<center>M. TRAWLER.</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Fitted out for Anti Submarine work)</center><br />
<br />
For fighting submarine boats trawlers are employed with the following :-<br />
<br />
:(a). A.S.rope nets fitted with two or four A.S.mines.<br />
<br />
:(b). Large Depth charges.<br />
<br />
:(c). Anti Submarine explosive Kite.<br />
<br />
::These appliances are described below.<br />
<br />
(a). Nets with A.S. Mines (Fig.25, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
These nets are made up from hemp rope (diameter of rope about 10 mm.); they are 250 m.long and of varying breadth (up to 20 m.) To a normal net two mines (M.M.) are attached (see Fig.25, Enc.3); for broader nets the mines are secured in pairs vertically - thus making four mines to a broad net. The mines are supported by their own large iron flat (S) while for the support of the nets smaller floats (S1) are placed on top.<br />
<br />
Each pair of nets also has an anchor and cable attached.<br />
<br />
The nets which are joined together are stowed with their mines in large shaped iron floats. The latter are stowed ready for shooting in two rows, (1 and 2, Fig.26, Enc3) on the top of the trawler. Shortly before action the primers are inserted through circular holes in the floats (1 hole per float).<br />
<br />
The shooting of nets one and two is carried out at a speed of 10 knots by one man. First , the first anchor of the first net is let go and the net with its mines dragged into the water, afterwards being anchored by the second anchor. Before, however, this latter is slipped the first anchor of the second net must be let go to ensure over-lapping.<br />
<br />
There are tiny holes in the floats by means of which just sufficient water can enter the floats so as to sink the net with its mines and floats at the end of an hour, and leave the area free again for traffic.<br />
<br />
These net mines (Fig.27, Enc.3) are contact mines with an explosive charge (1) from 12-13 kg. of Trotyl and consist of the mine case (M), firing mechanism (S), impact plate (P), distance pin (St), the safety lever (S1) and the primer (J) with the detonator (K).<br />
<br />
When the mine enters the water and reaches a depth of 5 metres the safety catch is released by a hydrostatic valve, which thus frees the detonator for the striker.<br />
<br />
Firing is effected in that by the impact of a submarine the impact plate (and with it the distance pin) are displaced, and by means of the latter the striker is freed and fires the mine by means of the firing spring (which is already cocked).<br />
<br />
==See Also==<br />
*[[Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland]]<br />
<br />
==Footnotes==<br />
{{reflist}}</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Report_on_German_Warships_after_Jutland&diff=334768Austro-Hungarian Naval Report on German Warships after Jutland2024-03-24T11:34:35Z<p>Simon Harley: Made Changes.</p>
<hr />
<div>In the papers of Vice-Admiral [[John Ernest Troyte Harper|John E. T. Harper]] is a copy of a translation of an Austro-Hungarian Navy report on German Imperial Navy warships after the [[Battle of Jutland]].<ref>Harper papers. Churchill Archives Centre. JEHR 1/4. This research was made possible by the Colin Bell Award, a grant from the Colin Bell Fund at Churchill College, Cambridge.</ref> It was prepared by ''Marineartillerie-Oberingenieure 2. Klasse'' Georg Schindler. This report is in many ways more detailed than that of ''Fregattenkapitäne'' Hieronymus Graf von Colloredo-Mannsfeld [[Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland|prepared immediately after Jutland]].<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
REPORT by a Mission undertaken in accordance with Order. Section 4 M.S. No.1746 of 1916.<br />
----<br />
<br />
On the inspection of German Warships which took part in the Battle of the Skaggerak (Jutland), 31st.May - 1st.June 1916; on Wilhelmshaven, Hamburg and Kiel, and on other inspections of ships and bases.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}By Georg Schindler,<br />
<br />
{{pad|580px}}Gunnery Engineer, 2nd Class.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}AUSTRIAN NAVY.<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
The only details which have been dealt with are those which were of Gunnery interest.<br />
<br />
{|<br />
| A.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "SEYDLITZ"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| B.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "OSTFRIESLAND"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| C.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "VON DER TANN"<br />
| were<br />
|-<br />
| D.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "GROSSER KÜRFURST"<br />
| in<br />
|-<br />
| E.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"&nbsp;<br />
| "MARKGRAF"<br />
| engagement.<br />
|-<br />
| F.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "MOLTKE"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| G.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"<br />
| "DERFFLINGER"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| H.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "KÖNIG"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| J.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "HINDENBURG" (building)<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| K.<br />
| Large Battleship<br />
| "BAYERN"<br />
| rowspan=2 | } Newly commissioned<br />
|-<br />
| L.<br />
| T.B.D.<br />
| "G.90"<br />
|-<br />
| M.<br />
| colspan=3 | Fishing vessels Anti-Submarine armament, etc.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| N.<br />
| colspan=3 | Short inspection of the Ordnance Workshops in the Arsenal in Wilhelmshaven. <br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| O.<br />
| Ditto in Kiel.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|}<br />
<br />
Ships under A.B.C.J. and M. were in Wilhelmshaven. D.E.F. in Hamburg and G.H.K.L. in Kiel.<br />
<br />
In the following reports on each ship, Section 1 deals with the effect of enemy hits on ships A. to H. above, in conjunction with the two attached ship sketches (Enclosures 1 and 2). [Not attached.]<br />
<br />
Of the hits marked in the sketches those of a gunnery interest are distinguished by red ink. Section II gives general remarks concerning the ships in question.<br />
<br />
Further a report is submitted on installations in newly commissioned ships (K. and L.) also on a ship still under construction (J.), as well as means of combating submarines installed in Fishing vessels (M.) and finally, briefly on the Ordnance workshops in the Naval Arsenals (N. and O.).<br />
<br />
A. "SEYDLITZ" (Enclosure 1).<br />
<br />
This Cruiser received 24 shell hits (38 cm. 34.3 cm. and 30.5 cm.)(15", 13.5" and 12") and one Torpedo hit.<br />
<br />
Except for 1 shell hit (apparently 34.3 cm.) (13.5") on the starboard side forward (Hits nos.2-4) and one hit no.16 (38 cm.?) in the starboard after 15 cm. (6") casemate all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all Gun tubes, Guns and many fittings had been dismantled and landed.<br />
<br />
<center>I. Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
<br />
1. A large calibre shell (hit no.8) struck the 2nd. 15 cm. port casemate (from forward), put the gun out of action and killed or seriously wounded the majority of the gun's crew.<br />
<br />
2. A 38 cm. shell exploded in the 4th 15 cm. casemate (hit No.13) the gun was similarly damaged, and 2 men (wounded) remained alive of the crew.<br />
<br />
3. In the port after 15 cm. casemate, No.6 gun, (hit No.15) had the same effect as the two described above.<br />
<br />
4. A 38 cm. shell (hit No.16) penetrated the armoured bulkhead on starboard side aft, near the last 15 cm. casemate, close to the curve of the armour (Fig.1, Enc.3) destroyed the 15 cm. gun and killed most of the gun crew.<br />
<br />
Of the twelve 15 cm. guns it appears that 2 port and 4 starboard fired unceasingly until the end.<br />
<br />
5. No.2 Turret (starboard) received a hit from port on the vertical turret armour (hit No.21) to the right of the right gun. Part of the nose of the shell pierced the armour anddestroyed [sic] the cradle and training gear of the right gun. The left was undamaged. The turret remained in action with this gun.<br />
<br />
6. An interesting hit is to be seen on the right 28 cm. gun of No.3 Turret port. The gun was on one of the jetties of the arsenal and could be examined. A large calibre shell hit the aforesaid gun a glancing blow just outside the turret, producing at the point of impact, a considerable elliptical scoop on the outside, causing a fracture of the inner tube and in addition bent the gun so that the axis of the tube at the muzzle was (as far as could be estimated) 200 mm. (about 8 in.) out of line.<br />
<br />
The cradle of this gun was split, the trunnions somewhat bent and the caps thereof partially opened out.<br />
<br />
The left gun of this turret, however, remained serviceable and the Turret could continue firing without interruption.<br />
<br />
7. A 34.3 cm. (13.5") shell (hit No.18) pierced the vertical armour of the revolving structure of No.4 Turret superimposed to the left of the left gun exploded inside the turret, ignited the cartridges which were ready for loading, put the turret out of action and killed all the crew (about 70 men) except 6.<br />
<br />
T [sic] This turret, already out of action, received another hit later from a 38 cm. (15") shell (hit No.17) this projectile struck the revolving Turret armour close to the lower edge at the right rear of the turret, and partially penetrated the turret.<br />
<br />
8. A Large calibre shell tore off the roof of the after (No.5) turret. (Geschossgeller ? ricochet). The turret suffered no appreciable damage inside.<br />
<br />
The remaining hits are being dealt with in the report on ship construction.≠ [I.D. Note: The original of this report can, unfortunately, not be obtained.]<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
<center>II Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
1. Extensive "flash" protection was already installed in "SEYDLITZ".<br />
<br />
(a) The openings for bringing 28 cm. cartridges into the lower loading chamber of the Ammunition Hoist can be shut off with sliding doors (schubtüren ?). The supply scuttles from the magazines are fitted with hinged flaps which open upwards on each side (Fig.3, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
(b) The 15 cm. (5.9") Ammunition hoists at the supply position in the casemates are fitted with a "closing flap" which shuts automatically, but its own weight assisted by a spring, immediately after the ammunition has rolled out on to the Ammunition Tray (which is placed in a horizontal position by a Paternoster apparatus (endless chain) (Fig.4, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
2. Apparently Gas Masks are employed in all ships. The method of use is the same as in the German Army. <u>Every</u> man was supplied with a mask (as it happened 2 days before action). These masks were to be brought into use immediately there was any evidence of suffocating gases, and they were so far successful that, according to the opinions of officers, at least one ship, if not two, was saved by their use.<br />
<br />
3. Enemy "shorts" usually exploded on hitting the water, with the result that, (as in the cases of shells exploding on board), splinters of various sizes struck guns among other things, and caused damage, but in practically every case no stoppage of firing from the gun resulted. Shell splinters also entered Conning Towers and Turrets through the sighting slits. But they caused no internal damage as their force was broken by their passage through the deeps [sic] slits. (Fig.5, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
4. In Turret firing. Salvoes were gradually used, and always with <u>only one</u> gun of each turret.<br />
<br />
5. For transmission of orders to the guns (also to 15 cm. (5.9" guns) from the Gunnery Officers position (in the Conning Tower) Elevation pointers are used which are mounted (<u>separately</u>) on brackets away from the Turret armour.<br />
<br />
6. Ranges of the individual rangefinders are shown on a circular scale (range receiver) by means of electrically worked pointers. All these dials are mounter [sic] in a circular box (Fig.6, Enc.3) so that the ranges of the same object shown by several rangefinders (Pointers in similar direction)[.] Further, it is possible to cut out one or other of the dials if the Rangetaker concerned is ranging badly.<br />
<br />
7. Repulse of Destroyers is carried out invariably by means of broadside salvoes of 15 cm. (5.9) guns etc. and one target only is always used. But the Gunlayer is only to fire when sights are exactly on the target.<br />
<br />
8. The 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) guns were not used in the battle. It is understood that in the future guns of this calibre, will only be retained on board as anti-aircraft guns, as was laid down for all ships.<br />
<br />
9. (a) The empty 26 cm. (11") cartridge cases are thrown out of the turrets on to the deck through openings in rear of the Gun platforms (2 per turret). A covering flap, opening downwards when the cases are thrown out, automatically closes the hole by means of a spring (Fig.7, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
(b) The fired 15 cm. (5.9") cartridge are placed in a large hanging net in the casemate, and are only removed from the casemate during a lull in the firing. It was stated that a very large number of fired cases (including Large Calibre ones) were collected and brought back.<br />
<br />
10. The voice pipes are made of 60,100 and 150 mm. diameter (2.4 in., 3.8 in.,and 6 in.). (The last named are called Schallrohre and are intended for short distances). Voice pipes are not lagged.<br />
<br />
11. The ventilation of the Turrets is similar to the method employed in our newer ships. A Fan placed between the two guns, sucks, on the one hand the powder gases from the breeches by means of a ventilation pipe from each gun when the breech is opened and on the other hand draws them away from the roof of the turret on the gun platform another fan, portable, and continually running, was installed when sucked in fresh air through a hose and passed it into the interior of the turret bymeans [sic] of a second hose. If any man had any difficulty in breathing he inhaled fresh air through the second hose. But even this method only afforded partial relief.<br />
<br />
12. All Gunnery machinery (hydraulic and electric) appears to have function correctly.<br />
<br />
13. From the Gunnery point of view there were no serious fires (magazines of any description), for which the "Flash door" protection described in Section II Miscellaneous, Pars. I (a) and (b) is principally responsible. All cartridges actually in a turret or casemate,when [sic] an enemy shell burst in the turret or casemate, were exploded in every case. Therefore the rule was most strictly enforced that only the absolute minimum of ammunition was kept ready at the guns.<br />
<br />
14. "SEYDLITZ" had 1150 28 cm. (11" shell) on board, of which 450 were expended. (No ship expended all her ammunition).<br />
<br />
15. The torpedo nets were not actually a hindrance in the action but they sustained heavy damage fromenemy [sic] hits and splinters so that parts of them hung down over the ships side.<br />
<br />
In future these nets being useless ballast will no longer be carried. This is already the case in the new battleship "BAYERN".<br />
<br />
<center>B. "OSTRFRIESLAND".</center><br />
<br />
<center>I. Hits. (Enclosure 1).</center><br />
<br />
This Battleship received no shell hits, but was struck by a mine onthe [sic] starboard side forward. The detailed description is contained in the report on Ship Construction.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
At the time of the inspection of this ship the 30.5 cm. (12") Ammunition was being embarked. The shells were being slung from the Quay on to the Deck by means of a powerful floating crane in bundles (of about 5 projectiles). All cartridges are enclosed in long water-tight zinc containers, fitted with stiffening bands. They were being rolled on board carefully across broad planks and stowed in the Magazines. If several rounds of ready ammunition have to be stowed in the Turret, the charges are always kept in the zinc cylinders.<br />
<br />
The 30.5 cm. (12") and also 28 cm. (11") projectiles are (according to the statement of the Gunnery Officer of this ship, Lt.Comdr.Lauenstein) of one description throughout, capped and fitted with base fuse. Total weight 405 kg. (about 890 lbs.) Bursting charge 12 to 13 kg. (26½ to 29 lbs.) of Trotyl. In the latest ships, however, "Armour piercing" and "high explosive" shell (but with a new explosive for bursting charge) are again to be used, as is already the case with the 28 cm. (15") shell in the Battleship "BAYERN".<br />
<br />
For the 15 cm.(5.9") guns it is reported that there are two types of shell in use.<br />
<br />
:(a) Fused shell with base fuses.<br />
<br />
:(b) High explosive shell,with a very sensitive nose fuse and a base fuse.<br />
<br />
<center>C. "VON DER TANN". (Enclosure 1.)</center><br />
<br />
This Battle Cruiser received 4 hits from large calibre shells (all on the starboard side).<br />
<br />
<center>I.Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
<br />
(1). The foremost 28 cm. (11") Turret was hit in the Barbette on the starboard side. The shell exploded and the armour was just penetrated (Hit No.1). Three men in the turret sustained burns (not very severe) from the "Flash". But the Turret was placed out of action as the armour at the point of impact was bulged inwards and jammed the Turret.<br />
<br />
(2). The after Conning Tower was similarly hit (Hit No.2)[.] But the shell only caused a shaking of the Tower and all apparatus inside remained intact.<br />
<br />
(3.) A shell exploded in the neighbourhood of the after Turret No.4 (Hit No.3). The effect on the Turret was only evident in a shaking, and the armour in the vicinity of the explosion was very slightly indented but without doing any damage so that the Turret continued in action.<br />
<br />
(4). No.4 hit is only of slight constructional interest.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
(1). In this ship, as in "OSTFRIESLAND", the question as to whether the collection of scraps of metal (coming from driving bands or Cartridge cases) in the Breech made any difference to the condition of the breech was answered in the negative.<br />
<br />
(2). The maximum rate of fire of the 28 cm. (11") guns of this Cruiser, as well as of the 30.5 cm. (12") guns of the "OSTFRIESLAND" is stated to have reached 3 - 4 rounds per minute in peace time.<br />
<br />
(3). The arrangement in the 28 cm. (11") turrets is in principle the same as in "SEYDLITZ" or as in the 30.5 cm. (12") guns of the large Battle Cruiser "HINDENBURG" (now building), with the exception of a few improvements in the last named ship. But while in the later ships (30.5 cm. 12") hydraulic rammers with reserve Hand ramming are installed "VON DER TANN" has only double Hand rammers, which are hung under the Turret roof.<br />
<br />
<center>D. "GROSSER KURFÜRST."</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Effects of shell hits (Enclosure 1).</center><br />
<br />
The ship was hit 8 times (large calibre) all from the port side.<br />
<br />
:(1) Hit No.4 (presumably 34 cm. 13.5") exploded before the Barbette armour of the foremost Turret.<br>Apart from breaking off small pieces of the hard armour (? Panzerschichte) and a slight shaking of the turret no damage was done to the Turret fittings. A fragment struck the upper surface of a sight slot and remained in the slot, while a good deal of gas entered the Turret and necessitated the use of gas masks by the crew for some time.<br />
<br />
:(2). A further heavy shell (Hit No.6) struck the port 15 cm.(5.9") Casemate (3rd. from forward) killed 10 of the crew of 14, but damaged the gun so little that after about 12 minutes the gun's crew having been made up, it was brought into action again. Two cartridges which were in the casemate were ignited.<br />
<br />
:(3). The other hits are only of constructional interest.<br />
<br />
:Some 30.5 cm. (12") and 15 cm. (5.9") guns were damaged on the outside by splinters from "shorts", but sustained no other damage.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
The Magazine arrangements in this ship were somewhat more minutely examined as well as reports made concerning them. (The arrangements described below are also used in the other ships).<br />
<br />
The shell bins and shell transport to the shell hoist are shown in Fig. 8, Enc.3) diagrammatically.<br />
<br />
A shell grab (Z) worked by 2 electric motors automatically controlled is used to transport the shell from the bins to the waiting tray fixed round the trunk (Turmraum) (A 1.-4). This grab is suspended from a broad length of wire sword matting, the latter can be wound up or down round a drum (Wa), if the transporting shaft (T) which is provided with two diametrical opposite longitudinal feathers is turned in the corresponding direction. Shaft (T) is fitted into drum (Wa). By this the grab is wound up or down. The grab is moved horizontally by the carrier (R), which holds the above-mentioned revolving drum, being drawn to one side or the other by an endless rope, worked electrically along the shaft (T). To assist the long shaft a deck rail is fitted above it which carries the weights, (Projectile grab and drum with carrier), the carrier being suspended from the rail. The electrical starting levers for both motors are fitted in the shell handing room.<br />
<br />
If it is required to get a shell out of the bin, the motor operating the horizontal movement of the grab is started. Then the long transporting drum is turned correspondingly by the 2nd.motor, thereby lowering the grab, which grips the shell by automatic pressure. Thereupon, by turning the shaft in the opposite direction the shell is raised, transported to the waiting tray (A) of which 4 are provided and placed on it. This waiting tray is so arranged that a shell can be landed only in the one position in order to prevent an inverted landing on the shell bogie relative to the entry in the hoist. The shell bogie is fitted with the same stops as the waiting tray.<br />
<br />
From the waiting tray the shell can be placed on either of the two shell bogies (which are rigidly joined to each other). The latter run easily with rollers on a circular rail, and can not only be adjusted exactly at the waiting tray by means of spring stops, but can also be coupled to the shell hoist in the loading position.<br />
<br />
In the shell rooms (lower deck) the shells are stowed in bins four to five deep (Fig.9, Enc.3)[.] The copper driving bands are protected by a broad covering band of strong canvas the ends of which are sewn together with (twine ?). Only rope is placed between the individual shells as a preventative against damage. Two vertical wooden batten are secured to the side walls of the shell bins - right and left.<br />
<br />
In order to ensure the grab gripping the shell as near as possible round the centre of gravity, each shell has a white ring painted round it.<br />
<br />
It is to be noted that the shell room cannot be shut off (water tightly) from the shell handing room as the large openings in the dividing Bulkhead, through which the transport carrier passes, are always open.<br />
<br />
In addition projectiles are stowed in many ships in the corners of the shell handing room itself in fixed bins.<br />
<br />
The 30.5 (12") cartridges are stowed in their water tight zinc cylinders in special stowage fittings in the magazines. These stowages are made of angle Iron and sheet plates. (There is no wood in the fittings).<br />
<br />
The Magazines, (2 decks from the bottom) in contrast to the shell room, are separated from the Magazine handing room, by a means of thin sheet bulkheads, in which the passage ways are fitted with double doors and the circular openings for handing cartridges are fitted with double covering flaps (the latter have already been remarked on in "SEYDLITZ" Section 11, Fig.3, Enc.3.[)]<br />
<br />
For transport of cartridges in the Magazines the transporting gear shewn in Fig.10, Enc.3 is available. This consists of a double rail (R) in which a horizontal (sheet iron) tray, semicircular in section can be moved up and down in guides by means of a hand differential purchase (F). The Tray can then be brought to the exact level of the cartridge. The Transporting gear is suspended from an overhead rail,(S) and also runs in a guide rail on the deck (SS). The cartridge is pushed on to the tray and the transporter then brought to the cartridge handing hole, and after opening the double flaps, transferred to the Turret.<br />
<br />
The Turret appliances correspond in general to those in "HINDENBURG", about which data are described later. But an exception must be made in the case of the size and installation of the Rangefinders (Fig.11, Enc.3).In "KURFÜRST" the Rangefinders about 3 meters (10 ft.) long are fitted in hoods in the front of the Turret, while "HINDENBURG" the 8 metre (26 ft.) range finders are already being fitted in the same way as will be the case in our 35 cm. (about 14") turrets, now building.<br />
<br />
<center>E. "MARKGRAF".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This Battleship was hit 5 times by big guns and all from the port side.<br />
<br />
Only hit No.2 is of gunnery interest. This entered the next to the last 15 cm. (5.(') [5.9"] casemate on the port side and exploded, killing the crew and putting gun out of action for the remainder of the battle, though it did not damage it very seriously.<br />
<br />
Several splinters from this shell pierced the bulkhead and entered the next casemate (forward) and killed or wounded several men. But this gun was brought into action again after an interval of about 10 minutes to make up the crew.<br />
<br />
<center>11. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
In the case of this ship also, splinters from enemy shorts entered the Conning Tower, but without causing any damage to either personnel or Materiel.<br />
<br />
During the whole engagement about 250 rounds of 30 cm. (12") ammunition was fired, i.e. about one fifth of the total supply on board.<br />
<br />
<center>F. "MOLTKE".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This ship was hit 4 times by heavy shell (all from the starboard side).<br />
<br />
One shell (Hit No.3) pierced the upper side armour and burst behind the latter inside the ship. It also caused some damage outside to No.4.15 cm. (5.9") casemate starboard (from forward) killing or wounding several men, but causing little damage to the gun. This gun was again brought into action after about 15 minutes.<br />
<br />
<center>11. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
"MOLTKE" was the only ship from which 4 Torpedoes were fired (not in salvo, but one after the other). On board, it was stated by officers that "QUEEN MARY" was fired at and hit at about 10 kilometres (10,935 yds.), and that this was the cause of the rapid sinking of this Battle Cruiser. Officers of other ships, however, were not of this opinion, as when "MOLTKE" fired the distance from "QUEEN MARY" was about 13 kilometres (14,217 yds.) and that the torpedoes have not this range; so that only Gunnery can be taken into consideration.<br />
<br />
In the "MOLTKE", splinters from short bursting shells also entered the Conning Tower, without, however, causing any noteworthy damage.<br />
<br />
<center>G. "DERFFLINGER".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This Battle Cruiser was hit the largest number of times, viz:- 30, of these 20 were of heavy calibre and all came from the port side.<br />
<br />
:(1) A 15" shell pierced the roof of N.4 30.5 cm. (12") Turret (hit No.5) exploded inside the Turret, thereby igniting all the charges which were there (apparently only two) and killed all the Turret's crew, (74 men including reserve crew), except 2 men who were able to get away (wounded).<br />
<br />
:The Turret itself was put out of action because (as was the case in all these hits on Turrets) much damage was done to the various instruments and appliances by the splinters and flash.<br />
<br />
:It is worthy of note that the electric cables in the Turret were comparatively uninjured.<br />
<br />
:(2). Turret No.3 was also hit by a 38 cm. (15") shell (hit No.6). The projectile penetrated the Barbette armour and took with it a large piece of plating into the interior of the Turret. The 74 men of the Turret's crew (as in the hit described above[)] for the most part were killed, only 6 men getting away wounded. It is observed that an 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) gun which was 3½ metres (about 11½ ft.) away from the point of impact, was completely undamaged, although the deck below the spot, and in the immediate vicinity of this gun, was badly damaged.<br />
<br />
:Nos.3 and 4 Turrets were only put out of action towards the end of the engagement.<br />
<br />
:The two foremost Turrets remained completely intact, although the Barbette armour of the second Turret showed a fairly large scrape from a (very glancing) shell hit. But this caused no further damage to the Turret (hit No.13).<br />
<br />
:(4). The Conning Tower was hit on the starboard side on the edge. But only small pieces of the brittle face of the armoured plates splintered off, and in the Tower itself only one elevation-pointer ceased to function.<br />
<br />
:(5). Very severe damage was done by a large calibre shell (hit No.20) which exploded close to the casemate of the No.2 15 cm. (5.9) gun port, which not only damaged this gun, but also put the two neighbouring 15 cm. (5.9") guns out of action. The first named gun was principally severely damaged on the chase, and the chase of the foremost 15 cm. (5.9") gun was indented to such an extent by splinters, that it could not be fired again. The other gun in the vicinity was so shaken up by the powerful explosion, that it could not be moved again. The casualties sustained by the gun's crews were in contrast comparatively small. (1 man killed and several severely or slightly wounded at the first named gun[)].<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
A large fragment of a 38 cm. (15") shell (which failed to explode), was exhibited on board (as is shown in Fig.12, Enc.3)[.] The much distorted fuze was also found.<br />
<br />
<center>H. "KÖNIG".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits.</center><br />
<br />
There were 13 hits (large calibre) identified all from the port side and above the waterline.<br />
<br />
:(1). A 34.3 cm. (13.5) shell hit the port foremost 15 cm. (5.9") casemate. (Hit No.9). A large piece of armour plating was carried into the casemate, where the shell exploded, killed the gun's crew (11 men) and put the gun out of action. The armour plate went further, penetrated the bulkhead, entered the galley, destroyed it and killed more men.<br />
<br />
:(2). Another 34.3 cm. (13.5") shell penetrated the second 15 cm. (5.9") casemate (hit No.8) and exploded, making the gun useless and, by penetrating the deck also caused much damage in the compartment below. The crew of this gun was by chance not at the moment in the casemate, as they had gone out for a short time on account of gas from the explosion in the first 15 cm. (5.9) casemate (which had occurred just previously.) The result was that there were no killed or wounded among the gun's crew.<br />
<br />
:(3). The traces of a shell were visible on the roof of the foremost 30.5 (12") Turret. (Hit No.11.) The projectile damaged the Rangefinder cover, and tore off a piece of it, rendering the Rangefinder useless. No other damage was caused by this hit.<br />
<br />
:(4). The roof of the Conning Tower was similarly gazed [sic] by a shell, which left a scratch but caused no other damage to the Tower or its instruments, etc.<br />
<br />
<center>J. "HINDENBURG."</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Apparently about 30,000 tons displacement)</center><br />
<br />
This Cruiser, now building will be given an armament of 8 30.5 cm. (12") guns 50 cal. (in four double turrets, 2 forward and 2 aft as in "DERFFLINGER") and 14 15 cm. (5.9") and 8.8 cm[.] (22 pr.) Anti-aircraft guns.<br />
<br />
The foremost superimposed Turret (No.2) was mostly built in, and a short inspection of it was made.<br />
<br />
The Gun-platform is especially roomy. The distance apart of the centres of the two gun barrels being estimated at about 3 metres (10 feet approx.)[.] The complete arrangement of the gun-platform can be seen in the diagrammatic Sketch (Fig.13, Enc.3). The 2 shell hoists (G) are side by side between the gun and to the left of the left gun, (and right of the right gun) are the two ammunition hoists (P).<br />
<br />
The up-coming ammunition is placed in its slide (TT) in the rear by means of unloading rammers (so-called "Umlauder"), whence it rolls on to the loading Tray, and finally on to the shell swings or cartridge swings, which by swinging across, brings the shell or cartridges one after the other to the rear of the gun for loading.<br />
<br />
The two rammers are hydraulic chain Rammers (with reserve hand drive). In the space at the rear of the platform there are :- an entrance opening (E) and two openings (A) for passing out firedcartridge [sic] cases. These openings (A) are constructed similarly to those more exactly described under "SEYDLITZ" (Sec.II. Par.9).<br />
<br />
The Breeches are worked hydraulically (the reserve method being by hand.)<br />
<br />
The principle can be gathered from Fig.14, Enc.3 . A bar with a tooth edged point (Z), (which can be worked up or down hydraulically) turns the Traversing shaft by means of cog wheels (R1, R2, R3) and opens or shuts the breech. The Water-pressure is led to the mechanism through two flexible hoses. If the cog wheel R3 is placed out of gear with R2, the hydraulic system is shut off.<br />
<br />
For elevating,Trunnion [sic] sights are provided and for training a sighting telescope is fitted in front between the guns.<br />
<br />
The Rangefinder (about 8 metres long) which was not yet on board, is to be fitted in the front of the Turret above the guns (under the roof as already referred to under "KURFÜRST")[.] Only the two side openings in the armour could be seen.<br />
<br />
Elevating is worked hydraulically (Reserve system by hand). (The ammunition hoists are also worked hydraulically, but here the alternative system is electric).<br />
<br />
A gun coupling is fitted in this ship as in all later ships. But these couplings are apparently only for use when it is desired to elevate a gun whose elevating gear has been damaged.<br />
<br />
The normal Turret Training gear and also the reserve system is only worked by electric motors.<br />
<br />
The same system of ventilation is used as has already been described in "SEYDLITZ" (Section II, Par.II).<br />
<br />
All working machinery (Electrically driven pumps, and electric motors for elevating, training, hoists, rammers, etc.) are apparently installed in the spacious working chamber below the gun platform.<br />
<br />
The arrangements in the Magazines as well as the transporting gear for passing shell and cartridges from them to the hoists are the same as those already more minutely described under battleship "GROSSER KÜRFURST."<br />
<br />
<center>K. "BAYERN".</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Class Ersatz "WÖRTH" about 30,000 tons disp.)</center><br />
<br />
This battleship, only recently completed, had to carry out exercises whilst at Kiel, and the Commission was invited to join for a cruise, which gave opportunity for a certain amount of inspection.<br />
<br />
The armament consists of eight 38 cm. (15") G.L. 45 guns in four double turrets apparently arranged as shown in the Almanac; sixteen 15 cm. (5.9") G.L. 45 guns in casemates and eight 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) anti-aircraft guns.<br />
<br />
38 cm. Gun Turret. (Fig. 15, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
The distance apart of the bore axes is 3700 mm. (12.1 ft.) for these guns[.] 8.8 cm. sub-calibre guns are provided, which are put in from outboard (i.e. muzzle end.)<br />
<br />
The Gunhouse, as in the turrets of the "HINDENBURG" is very roomy.<br />
<br />
In this turret there has been introduced no important alteration with respect to the munition hoists. Whereas in all previous ships the shot hoist was separate from the cartridge hoist, in this ship, as with us (the Austrian Navy), both hoists for one gun are combined in one trunk; and also instead of the shell and cartridge swings in the "HINDENBURG" (see above) munition wagons (W1, W2), which run on cross rails are introduced. The two main hoists (A1, A2) come up between the two guns. Besides these there are in addition two electrically driven auxiliary hoists (H1, H2).<br />
<br />
The round which arrives at the top of the hoist is taken out and landed, by means of the unloading rammer (U) in the munition wagon, which brings it to the rear of the particular gun in the loading position, whence it is loaded by means of the rammer.<br />
<br />
The munition wagons, rammers and unloading rammers are normally worked by hydraulic power (with auxiliary handworking gear); at the back of the turret are two principal operating positions, (ST1, ST2) which are raised to give a good all-round view, and where all the necessary manipulation for the foregoing hydraulic machinery is carried out.<br />
<br />
The munition hoists are also hydraulically worked, and electric drive is provided as an alternative. The elevating and breech mechanism gear are hydraulic (with alternative hand gear).<br />
<br />
The following sighting arrangements are provided :-<br />
<br />
:(a) For elevation - two side trunnion sights as well as two reserve sights in front.<br />
<br />
:(b) For training - a principal trainer's telescope in front between the two guns, as well as a side telescope as reserve.<br />
<br />
Asked whether any automatic firing apparatus was in contemplation, it was replied that a place for such apparatus was provided but the installation could not be expected till later, and depended on the solution of several problems which had yet to be experimented on.<br />
<br />
The large 8.2 m. (26.9 ft.) rangefinder is placed the same as in the "HINDENBURG".<br />
<br />
The ventilation of the turret is on the same principle as in the "HINDENBURG" and "SEYDLITZ", except that in addition there are two powerful electric fan motors between the guns.<br />
<br />
The Training is done electrically, as is also the alternative arrangement. Fig 15, Enc.3 gives a diagrammatic sketch of the arrangements. The controller gives 72 degrees of speed.<br />
<br />
For absorbing the shock in the training gear of single gun shooting there are provided, in the friction coupling box of the worm gearing, besides the friction plates (as in our own installations) two rings of strong springs above them - each ring containing six springs as shewn in Fig.17, Enc.3. Apparently any turret thrown off a small angle by a single round will be trained back to its original position by means of these springs.<br />
<br />
As in "HINDENBURG", so also in "BAYERN", the various machines for training[,] elevating, munition supply, rammers and unloading rammers are placed on the deck underneath the Gun platform (working chamber), and also the machines for the magazine and transport arrangements of munitions are similarly installed.<br />
<br />
In Fig. 18, Enc.3 is a diagrammatic sketch of the munition hoists and magazines from which it can be seen that the shell room is on the lowest level and has the magazine above it. The cartridge loading door (F1 for cartridges, G1 for shell) are fitted for flash protection with sliding shutters which are self-operating when the lift arrives at one or the other, i.e. when the lift arrives at the bottom, the shutter there will open and leave the loading hole (P) free, while the upper openings F1 and G1 will be shut and locked.<br />
<br />
An inspection of the shell room 38 cm. (15") showed that on these shells there is attached to the rearmost of the three upper driving bands a zinc band about 20 mm. (.78 in.) broad (similar to the driving bands). Experience has shown that this zinc ring is a very good anti-coppering device for the bore. It was apparently on the French front, at Verdun and in Flanders, that experiments with this arrangement were made; the results were very good and its introduction followed. The Army has also adopted it.<br />
<br />
The following is the situation with regard to 38 cm. (15 in.) shell. As opposed to the single type of shell (long calibre) in newly completing ships, here there are two :-<br />
<br />
:(a) A.P. shell, with cap, total length of shell 3.5 calibres.<br />
<br />
:(b) H.E. shell, uncapped, total length of shell 4.1 calibres. The total weight is 750 kg. (1653.5 lbs). The burster (not Trotyl, probably Heranit? 23.5 kg. (57.8 lbs.) for the A.P. shell and 67 kg. (147.7 lbs) for the H.E. The establishment allowed per [gun] is 90 A.P. and 30 H.E. The maximum range is 24 kilometres (26,247 yds.) with an angle of descent of 32 degrees, elevation of gun 247 degrees, time of flight 48 secs.<br />
<br />
:The charge is 87 kg. (191.8 lbs) in the main cartridge and 96 kg. (211.6 lbs.) in the foremost cartridge.<br />
<br />
:The rate of fire is one round per 40 seconds.<br />
<br />
15 cm. casemates. In these ships the flash protection for the 15 cm. (5.9") munition hoists in the casemates has been improved (Fig.20, Enc.3). In that a sheet iron chamber (K) has been built around the delivery opening which, by means of sliding plates (S1 and S2) can be shut off either from the trunk or from the munition tray. (G2.) For example, a shell arrives at the top of the hoist (G) - the shutter (S1) is raised in its guides by means of the lift mechanism, so that the shell can roll into the chamber (G1) while the shutter (S3) remains closed. Immediately afterwards the shutter (S1) closes the opening and the shutter (S2) raises in its guides and the shell rolls on the munition tray (G2). By this means the trunk is rendered flash proof at all stages of the operation.<br />
<br />
Submerged Flats. On board this ship there was also the opportunity to visit a submerged flat with two broadside tubes.<br />
<br />
In all there are five tubes (2 in each flat) and a bow tube. The calibre of the torpedoes is 60 cm. (23.6 in.) and the weight of a fully charged torpedo 2200 kg. (4850 lbs.). The explosive (? Heranit) weighing 250 kg. (531.1 lbs). The establishment per tube is four torpedoes - making in all 20 on board. The greatest torpedo range is 13 kilometres, 14,217 yds) with a medium speed setting of 28 knots.<br />
<br />
The flat that was visited (Fig.21, Enc.3) is very large and about 5 metres high, (16 ft.) so that it is perfectly feasible to turn any torpedo hanging on the purchase at the turntable (W1) on the overhead rails, so that is [sic] can be loaded into the port or starboard tube.<br />
<br />
The tubes (L1, L2) are side loading with very strong longitudinal holts [sic] on top (V1, V2) and fitted with a strong shield bar. For loading the torpedoes in the tubes, there are fitted near the tubes, on the same side on the side door, mechanical loading apparatus (quickloaders A1, A2), and on the opposite side are provided the rails (R1, R2) which serve for the adjustment (lever system) of the gyroscope of a torpedo lying in the tube.<br />
<br />
A torpedo is struck down from the upper deck through the trunk (E) and swung through the opening (O) into the flat, whence by means of a purchase (mechanically driven) it is run on to the tramways (S) and thence either to the bulkhead stowage or to a stowage over the tube.<br />
<br />
One must take this opportunity of noting that the overhead rails are not bolted to the actual deck, but are a separate structure, so as to avoid putting any vibration or other strain on to the armoured deck.<br />
<br />
If a torpedo is to be loaded it will be brought by means of the purchase to the exact ready stowage over the tube; then the hydraulic loader is operated by a lever; a grad [sic] with two arms seizes the torpedo in two specially cut away parts and draws it horizontally on to the guide rail of the loader, which then is lowered together with the torpedo. In the meantime the side door is mechanically unbolted and opened, so that the torpedo can be placed right in the tube (impulse frame). After this the guide rail and grab of the loader are withdrawn and raised, while the side door is shut and bolted. Loading by this means proceeds comparatively noiselessly, rapidly and precisely.<br />
<br />
The sluice is hydraulically worked, and after firing is operated by the return movement of the shield bar. When draining the tube the water can be pumped either overboard or into a well.<br />
<br />
The discharge is operated electrically from the Conning Tower or by hand.<br />
<br />
The sluice is hydraulically worked, and after firing is operated by the return movement of the shield bar. When draining the tube the water can be pumped either overboard or into a well.<br />
<br />
The discharge is operated electrically from the Conning Tower or by hand.<br />
<br />
<center>L. TORPEDO BOAT "G. 90".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1200 tons displacement.)</center><br />
<br />
From the Battleship "BAYERN" the Commission was brought back to Kiel in one of the newest torpedo boats (G.90), which offered an opportunity of seeing certain details.<br />
<br />
The gun armament consists of three 10.5 cm. (4.1") Guns on transferable mountings; the torpedo armament, of two single tubes forward and two double tubes for<nowiki>*</nowiki> [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. Note: Apparently a clerical error for 50 cm.(19.7")] 45 cm. (17.7") torpedoes in the after part. (See Fig. 22, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
The following details respecting the torpedo equipment were noted :<br />
<br />
Six torpedoes were carried, which remain stowed in the tubes; spare torpedoes are not carried on board, and no torpedo stowage is provided. The tubes of the twin mountings are not parallel but inclined outwards from each other, making an angle of 20° between the tubes.<br />
<br />
The reason for this lies in the method of torpedo boat attack. Torpedo craft always fire on the swing (in order to offer the full broadside target to the enemy fire for the shortest possible time), and the torpedoes from a twin mounting are are [sic] fired one after the other (the mounting remaining on a fixed bearing). The first torpedo having been fired, the boat continues to swing under helm and after 20° the second torpedo is fired.<br />
<br />
The training is done by means of a training gear at each tube, which can be understood from the detailed sketch (Fig. 23, Enc.3). By means of the hand crank (K) a worm and worm wheel (Zr) can be turned, this engages inthe [sic] training rack (Zs) and so the tube can be trained. The training pinion can, by means of a coupling clutch worked by the lever (H) be disconnected from the rack, should be required to train the mounting quickly, or for loading and unloading the torpedo by means of the training gear. This latter is accomplished by means of the windlass (W) mounted on the training shaft round which can be taken a line secured either to the nose or the tail of the torpedo. At the back part of the mounting is fitted a training brake which grips the rack.<br />
<br />
A director is fitted at each tube, and torpedoes are fired electrically from the bridge. At the rear of each tube are fitted two firing pushes (Abfeurungspöller), which can be operated either singly or together. In order to prevent firing from a tube which is not yet at the ready, the particular firing gear is held fast by a special locking gear fitted to the tube; its method of working can be seen from (Fig.24, Enc.3). The locking levers (St1 and St2) are only clear of the firing gear, when the rollers (R1 and R2), connected to the locking gear, are clear of the guide strip (G). This guide strip covers the arc in which firing is to be prevented. The springs.(F1 and F2) release the gear, as shewn in the sketch under (T).<br />
<br />
For torpedo transport on deck a special rail is fitted on the starboard side, on which was seen a fairly long transport wagon.<br />
<br />
==See Also==<br />
*[[Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland]]<br />
<br />
==Footnotes==<br />
{{reflist}}</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Report_on_German_Warships_after_Jutland&diff=334767Austro-Hungarian Naval Report on German Warships after Jutland2024-03-24T10:46:49Z<p>Simon Harley: /* Report */</p>
<hr />
<div>It was prepared by ''Marineartillerie-Oberingenieure 2. Klasse'' Georg Schindler. This report is in many ways more detailed than that of ''Fregattenkapitäne'' Hieronymus Graf von Colloredo-Mannsfeld [[Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland|prepared immediately after Jutland]].<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
REPORT by a Mission undertaken in accordance with Order. Section 4 M.S. No.1746 of 1916.<br />
----<br />
<br />
On the inspection of German Warships which took part in the Battle of the Skaggerak (Jutland), 31st.May - 1st.June 1916; on Wilhelmshaven, Hamburg and Kiel, and on other inspections of ships and bases.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}By Georg Schindler,<br />
<br />
{{pad|580px}}Gunnery Engineer, 2nd Class.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}AUSTRIAN NAVY.<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
The only details which have been dealt with are those which were of Gunnery interest.<br />
<br />
{|<br />
| A.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "SEYDLITZ"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| B.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "OSTFRIESLAND"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| C.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "VON DER TANN"<br />
| were<br />
|-<br />
| D.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "GROSSER KÜRFURST"<br />
| in<br />
|-<br />
| E.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"&nbsp;<br />
| "MARKGRAF"<br />
| engagement.<br />
|-<br />
| F.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "MOLTKE"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| G.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"<br />
| "DERFFLINGER"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| H.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "KÖNIG"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| J.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "HINDENBURG" (building)<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| K.<br />
| Large Battleship<br />
| "BAYERN"<br />
| rowspan=2 | } Newly commissioned<br />
|-<br />
| L.<br />
| T.B.D.<br />
| "G.90"<br />
|-<br />
| M.<br />
| colspan=3 | Fishing vessels Anti-Submarine armament, etc.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| N.<br />
| colspan=3 | Short inspection of the Ordnance Workshops in the Arsenal in Wilhelmshaven. <br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| O.<br />
| Ditto in Kiel.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|}<br />
<br />
Ships under A.B.C.J. and M. were in Wilhelmshaven. D.E.F. in Hamburg and G.H.K.L. in Kiel.<br />
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In the following reports on each ship, Section 1 deals with the effect of enemy hits on ships A. to H. above, in conjunction with the two attached ship sketches (Enclosures 1 and 2). [Not attached.]<br />
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Of the hits marked in the sketches those of a gunnery interest are distinguished by red ink. Section II gives general remarks concerning the ships in question.<br />
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Further a report is submitted on installations in newly commissioned ships (K. and L.) also on a ship still under construction (J.), as well as means of combating submarines installed in Fishing vessels (M.) and finally, briefly on the Ordnance workshops in the Naval Arsenals (N. and O.).<br />
<br />
A. "SEYDLITZ" (Enclosure 1).<br />
<br />
This Cruiser received 24 shell hits (38 cm. 34.3 cm. and 30.5 cm.)(15", 13.5" and 12") and one Torpedo hit.<br />
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Except for 1 shell hit (apparently 34.3 cm.) (13.5") on the starboard side forward (Hits nos.2-4) and one hit no.16 (38 cm.?) in the starboard after 15 cm. (6") casemate all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all Gun tubes, Guns and many fittings had been dismantled and landed.<br />
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<center>I. Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
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1. A large calibre shell (hit no.8) struck the 2nd. 15 cm. port casemate (from forward), put the gun out of action and killed or seriously wounded the majority of the gun's crew.<br />
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2. A 38 cm. shell exploded in the 4th 15 cm. casemate (hit No.13) the gun was similarly damaged, and 2 men (wounded) remained alive of the crew.<br />
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3. In the port after 15 cm. casemate, No.6 gun, (hit No.15) had the same effect as the two described above.<br />
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4. A 38 cm. shell (hit No.16) penetrated the armoured bulkhead on starboard side aft, near the last 15 cm. casemate, close to the curve of the armour (Fig.1, Enc.3) destroyed the 15 cm. gun and killed most of the gun crew.<br />
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Of the twelve 15 cm. guns it appears that 2 port and 4 starboard fired unceasingly until the end.<br />
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5. No.2 Turret (starboard) received a hit from port on the vertical turret armour (hit No.21) to the right of the right gun. Part of the nose of the shell pierced the armour anddestroyed [sic] the cradle and training gear of the right gun. The left was undamaged. The turret remained in action with this gun.<br />
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6. An interesting hit is to be seen on the right 28 cm. gun of No.3 Turret port. The gun was on one of the jetties of the arsenal and could be examined. A large calibre shell hit the aforesaid gun a glancing blow just outside the turret, producing at the point of impact, a considerable elliptical scoop on the outside, causing a fracture of the inner tube and in addition bent the gun so that the axis of the tube at the muzzle was (as far as could be estimated) 200 mm. (about 8 in.) out of line.<br />
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The cradle of this gun was split, the trunnions somewhat bent and the caps thereof partially opened out.<br />
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The left gun of this turret, however, remained serviceable and the Turret could continue firing without interruption.<br />
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7. A 34.3 cm. (13.5") shell (hit No.18) pierced the vertical armour of the revolving structure of No.4 Turret superimposed to the left of the left gun exploded inside the turret, ignited the cartridges which were ready for loading, put the turret out of action and killed all the crew (about 70 men) except 6.<br />
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T [sic] This turret, already out of action, received another hit later from a 38 cm. (15") shell (hit No.17) this projectile struck the revolving Turret armour close to the lower edge at the right rear of the turret, and partially penetrated the turret.<br />
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8. A Large calibre shell tore off the roof of the after (No.5) turret. (Geschossgeller ? ricochet). The turret suffered no appreciable damage inside.<br />
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The remaining hits are being dealt with in the report on ship construction.≠ [I.D. Note: The original of this report can, unfortunately, not be obtained.]<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
<center>II Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
1. Extensive "flash" protection was already installed in "SEYDLITZ".<br />
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(a) The openings for bringing 28 cm. cartridges into the lower loading chamber of the Ammunition Hoist can be shut off with sliding doors (schubtüren ?). The supply scuttles from the magazines are fitted with hinged flaps which open upwards on each side (Fig.3, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
(b) The 15 cm. (5.9") Ammunition hoists at the supply position in the casemates are fitted with a "closing flap" which shuts automatically, but its own weight assisted by a spring, immediately after the ammunition has rolled out on to the Ammunition Tray (which is placed in a horizontal position by a Paternoster apparatus (endless chain) (Fig.4, Enc.3).<br />
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2. Apparently Gas Masks are employed in all ships. The method of use is the same as in the German Army. <u>Every</u> man was supplied with a mask (as it happened 2 days before action). These masks were to be brought into use immediately there was any evidence of suffocating gases, and they were so far successful that, according to the opinions of officers, at least one ship, if not two, was saved by their use.<br />
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3. Enemy "shorts" usually exploded on hitting the water, with the result that, (as in the cases of shells exploding on board), splinters of various sizes struck guns among other things, and caused damage, but in practically every case no stoppage of firing from the gun resulted. Shell splinters also entered Conning Towers and Turrets through the sighting slits. But they caused no internal damage as their force was broken by their passage through the deeps [sic] slits. (Fig.5, Enc.3).<br />
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4. In Turret firing. Salvoes were gradually used, and always with <u>only one</u> gun of each turret.<br />
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5. For transmission of orders to the guns (also to 15 cm. (5.9" guns) from the Gunnery Officers position (in the Conning Tower) Elevation pointers are used which are mounted (<u>separately</u>) on brackets away from the Turret armour.<br />
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6. Ranges of the individual rangefinders are shown on a circular scale (range receiver) by means of electrically worked pointers. All these dials are mounter [sic] in a circular box (Fig.6, Enc.3) so that the ranges of the same object shown by several rangefinders (Pointers in similar direction)[.] Further, it is possible to cut out one or other of the dials if the Rangetaker concerned is ranging badly.<br />
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7. Repulse of Destroyers is carried out invariably by means of broadside salvoes of 15 cm. (5.9) guns etc. and one target only is always used. But the Gunlayer is only to fire when sights are exactly on the target.<br />
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8. The 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) guns were not used in the battle. It is understood that in the future guns of this calibre, will only be retained on board as anti-aircraft guns, as was laid down for all ships.<br />
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9. (a) The empty 26 cm. (11") cartridge cases are thrown out of the turrets on to the deck through openings in rear of the Gun platforms (2 per turret). A covering flap, opening downwards when the cases are thrown out, automatically closes the hole by means of a spring (Fig.7, Enc.3).<br />
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(b) The fired 15 cm. (5.9") cartridge are placed in a large hanging net in the casemate, and are only removed from the casemate during a lull in the firing. It was stated that a very large number of fired cases (including Large Calibre ones) were collected and brought back.<br />
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10. The voice pipes are made of 60,100 and 150 mm. diameter (2.4 in., 3.8 in.,and 6 in.). (The last named are called Schallrohre and are intended for short distances). Voice pipes are not lagged.<br />
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11. The ventilation of the Turrets is similar to the method employed in our newer ships. A Fan placed between the two guns, sucks, on the one hand the powder gases from the breeches by means of a ventilation pipe from each gun when the breech is opened and on the other hand draws them away from the roof of the turret on the gun platform another fan, portable, and continually running, was installed when sucked in fresh air through a hose and passed it into the interior of the turret bymeans [sic] of a second hose. If any man had any difficulty in breathing he inhaled fresh air through the second hose. But even this method only afforded partial relief.<br />
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12. All Gunnery machinery (hydraulic and electric) appears to have function correctly.<br />
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13. From the Gunnery point of view there were no serious fires (magazines of any description), for which the "Flash door" protection described in Section II Miscellaneous, Pars. I (a) and (b) is principally responsible. All cartridges actually in a turret or casemate,when [sic] an enemy shell burst in the turret or casemate, were exploded in every case. Therefore the rule was most strictly enforced that only the absolute minimum of ammunition was kept ready at the guns.<br />
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14. "SEYDLITZ" had 1150 28 cm. (11" shell) on board, of which 450 were expended. (No ship expended all her ammunition).<br />
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15. The torpedo nets were not actually a hindrance in the action but they sustained heavy damage fromenemy [sic] hits and splinters so that parts of them hung down over the ships side.<br />
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In future these nets being useless ballast will no longer be carried. This is already the case in the new battleship "BAYERN".<br />
<br />
<center>B. "OSTRFRIESLAND".</center><br />
<br />
<center>I. Hits. (Enclosure 1).</center><br />
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This Battleship received no shell hits, but was struck by a mine onthe [sic] starboard side forward. The detailed description is contained in the report on Ship Construction.<br />
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<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
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At the time of the inspection of this ship the 30.5 cm. (12") Ammunition was being embarked. The shells were being slung from the Quay on to the Deck by means of a powerful floating crane in bundles (of about 5 projectiles). All cartridges are enclosed in long water-tight zinc containers, fitted with stiffening bands. They were being rolled on board carefully across broad planks and stowed in the Magazines. If several rounds of ready ammunition have to be stowed in the Turret, the charges are always kept in the zinc cylinders.<br />
<br />
The 30.5 cm. (12") and also 28 cm. (11") projectiles are (according to the statement of the Gunnery Officer of this ship, Lt.Comdr.Lauenstein) of one description throughout, capped and fitted with base fuse. Total weight 405 kg. (about 890 lbs.) Bursting charge 12 to 13 kg. (26½ to 29 lbs.) of Trotyl. In the latest ships, however, "Armour piercing" and "high explosive" shell (but with a new explosive for bursting charge) are again to be used, as is already the case with the 28 cm. (15") shell in the Battleship "BAYERN".<br />
<br />
For the 15 cm.(5.9") guns it is reported that there are two types of shell in use.<br />
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:(a) Fused shell with base fuses.<br />
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:(b) High explosive shell,with a very sensitive nose fuse and a base fuse.<br />
<br />
<center>C. "VON DER TANN". (Enclosure 1.)</center><br />
<br />
This Battle Cruiser received 4 hits from large calibre shells (all on the starboard side).<br />
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<center>I.Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
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(1). The foremost 28 cm. (11") Turret was hit in the Barbette on the starboard side. The shell exploded and the armour was just penetrated (Hit No.1). Three men in the turret sustained burns (not very severe) from the "Flash". But the Turret was placed out of action as the armour at the point of impact was bulged inwards and jammed the Turret.<br />
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(2). The after Conning Tower was similarly hit (Hit No.2)[.] But the shell only caused a shaking of the Tower and all apparatus inside remained intact.<br />
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(3.) A shell exploded in the neighbourhood of the after Turret No.4 (Hit No.3). The effect on the Turret was only evident in a shaking, and the armour in the vicinity of the explosion was very slightly indented but without doing any damage so that the Turret continued in action.<br />
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(4). No.4 hit is only of slight constructional interest.<br />
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<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
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(1). In this ship, as in "OSTFRIESLAND", the question as to whether the collection of scraps of metal (coming from driving bands or Cartridge cases) in the Breech made any difference to the condition of the breech was answered in the negative.<br />
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(2). The maximum rate of fire of the 28 cm. (11") guns of this Cruiser, as well as of the 30.5 cm. (12") guns of the "OSTFRIESLAND" is stated to have reached 3 - 4 rounds per minute in peace time.<br />
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(3). The arrangement in the 28 cm. (11") turrets is in principle the same as in "SEYDLITZ" or as in the 30.5 cm. (12") guns of the large Battle Cruiser "HINDENBURG" (now building), with the exception of a few improvements in the last named ship. But while in the later ships (30.5 cm. 12") hydraulic rammers with reserve Hand ramming are installed "VON DER TANN" has only double Hand rammers, which are hung under the Turret roof.<br />
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<center>D. "GROSSER KURFÜRST."</center><br />
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<center>1. Effects of shell hits (Enclosure 1).</center><br />
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The ship was hit 8 times (large calibre) all from the port side.<br />
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:(1) Hit No.4 (presumably 34 cm. 13.5") exploded before the Barbette armour of the foremost Turret.<br>Apart from breaking off small pieces of the hard armour (? Panzerschichte) and a slight shaking of the turret no damage was done to the Turret fittings. A fragment struck the upper surface of a sight slot and remained in the slot, while a good deal of gas entered the Turret and necessitated the use of gas masks by the crew for some time.<br />
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:(2). A further heavy shell (Hit No.6) struck the port 15 cm.(5.9") Casemate (3rd. from forward) killed 10 of the crew of 14, but damaged the gun so little that after about 12 minutes the gun's crew having been made up, it was brought into action again. Two cartridges which were in the casemate were ignited.<br />
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:(3). The other hits are only of constructional interest.<br />
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:Some 30.5 cm. (12") and 15 cm. (5.9") guns were damaged on the outside by splinters from "shorts", but sustained no other damage.<br />
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<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
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The Magazine arrangements in this ship were somewhat more minutely examined as well as reports made concerning them. (The arrangements described below are also used in the other ships).<br />
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The shell bins and shell transport to the shell hoist are shown in Fig. 8, Enc.3) diagrammatically.<br />
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A shell grab (Z) worked by 2 electric motors automatically controlled is used to transport the shell from the bins to the waiting tray fixed round the trunk (Turmraum) (A 1.-4). This grab is suspended from a broad length of wire sword matting, the latter can be wound up or down round a drum (Wa), if the transporting shaft (T) which is provided with two diametrical opposite longitudinal feathers is turned in the corresponding direction. Shaft (T) is fitted into drum (Wa). By this the grab is wound up or down. The grab is moved horizontally by the carrier (R), which holds the above-mentioned revolving drum, being drawn to one side or the other by an endless rope, worked electrically along the shaft (T). To assist the long shaft a deck rail is fitted above it which carries the weights, (Projectile grab and drum with carrier), the carrier being suspended from the rail. The electrical starting levers for both motors are fitted in the shell handing room.<br />
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If it is required to get a shell out of the bin, the motor operating the horizontal movement of the grab is started. Then the long transporting drum is turned correspondingly by the 2nd.motor, thereby lowering the grab, which grips the shell by automatic pressure. Thereupon, by turning the shaft in the opposite direction the shell is raised, transported to the waiting tray (A) of which 4 are provided and placed on it. This waiting tray is so arranged that a shell can be landed only in the one position in order to prevent an inverted landing on the shell bogie relative to the entry in the hoist. The shell bogie is fitted with the same stops as the waiting tray.<br />
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From the waiting tray the shell can be placed on either of the two shell bogies (which are rigidly joined to each other). The latter run easily with rollers on a circular rail, and can not only be adjusted exactly at the waiting tray by means of spring stops, but can also be coupled to the shell hoist in the loading position.<br />
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In the shell rooms (lower deck) the shells are stowed in bins four to five deep (Fig.9, Enc.3)[.] The copper driving bands are protected by a broad covering band of strong canvas the ends of which are sewn together with (twine ?). Only rope is placed between the individual shells as a preventative against damage. Two vertical wooden batten are secured to the side walls of the shell bins - right and left.<br />
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In order to ensure the grab gripping the shell as near as possible round the centre of gravity, each shell has a white ring painted round it.<br />
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It is to be noted that the shell room cannot be shut off (water tightly) from the shell handing room as the large openings in the dividing Bulkhead, through which the transport carrier passes, are always open.<br />
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In addition projectiles are stowed in many ships in the corners of the shell handing room itself in fixed bins.<br />
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The 30.5 (12") cartridges are stowed in their water tight zinc cylinders in special stowage fittings in the magazines. These stowages are made of angle Iron and sheet plates. (There is no wood in the fittings).<br />
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The Magazines, (2 decks from the bottom) in contrast to the shell room, are separated from the Magazine handing room, by a means of thin sheet bulkheads, in which the passage ways are fitted with double doors and the circular openings for handing cartridges are fitted with double covering flaps (the latter have already been remarked on in "SEYDLITZ" Section 11, Fig.3, Enc.3.[)]<br />
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For transport of cartridges in the Magazines the transporting gear shewn in Fig.10, Enc.3 is available. This consists of a double rail (R) in which a horizontal (sheet iron) tray, semicircular in section can be moved up and down in guides by means of a hand differential purchase (F). The Tray can then be brought to the exact level of the cartridge. The Transporting gear is suspended from an overhead rail,(S) and also runs in a guide rail on the deck (SS). The cartridge is pushed on to the tray and the transporter then brought to the cartridge handing hole, and after opening the double flaps, transferred to the Turret.<br />
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The Turret appliances correspond in general to those in "HINDENBURG", about which data are described later. But an exception must be made in the case of the size and installation of the Rangefinders (Fig.11, Enc.3).In "KURFÜRST" the Rangefinders about 3 meters (10 ft.) long are fitted in hoods in the front of the Turret, while "HINDENBURG" the 8 metre (26 ft.) range finders are already being fitted in the same way as will be the case in our 35 cm. (about 14") turrets, now building.<br />
<br />
<center>E. "MARKGRAF".</center><br />
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<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
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This Battleship was hit 5 times by big guns and all from the port side.<br />
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Only hit No.2 is of gunnery interest. This entered the next to the last 15 cm. (5.(') [5.9"] casemate on the port side and exploded, killing the crew and putting gun out of action for the remainder of the battle, though it did not damage it very seriously.<br />
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Several splinters from this shell pierced the bulkhead and entered the next casemate (forward) and killed or wounded several men. But this gun was brought into action again after an interval of about 10 minutes to make up the crew.<br />
<br />
<center>11. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
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In the case of this ship also, splinters from enemy shorts entered the Conning Tower, but without causing any damage to either personnel or Materiel.<br />
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During the whole engagement about 250 rounds of 30 cm. (12") ammunition was fired, i.e. about one fifth of the total supply on board.<br />
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<center>F. "MOLTKE".</center><br />
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<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
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This ship was hit 4 times by heavy shell (all from the starboard side).<br />
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One shell (Hit No.3) pierced the upper side armour and burst behind the latter inside the ship. It also caused some damage outside to No.4.15 cm. (5.9") casemate starboard (from forward) killing or wounding several men, but causing little damage to the gun. This gun was again brought into action after about 15 minutes.<br />
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<center>11. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
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"MOLTKE" was the only ship from which 4 Torpedoes were fired (not in salvo, but one after the other). On board, it was stated by officers that "QUEEN MARY" was fired at and hit at about 10 kilometres (10,935 yds.), and that this was the cause of the rapid sinking of this Battle Cruiser. Officers of other ships, however, were not of this opinion, as when "MOLTKE" fired the distance from "QUEEN MARY" was about 13 kilometres (14,217 yds.) and that the torpedoes have not this range; so that only Gunnery can be taken into consideration.<br />
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In the "MOLTKE", splinters from short bursting shells also entered the Conning Tower, without, however, causing any noteworthy damage.<br />
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<center>G. "DERFFLINGER".</center><br />
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<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
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This Battle Cruiser was hit the largest number of times, viz:- 30, of these 20 were of heavy calibre and all came from the port side.<br />
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:(1) A 15" shell pierced the roof of N.4 30.5 cm. (12") Turret (hit No.5) exploded inside the Turret, thereby igniting all the charges which were there (apparently only two) and killed all the Turret's crew, (74 men including reserve crew), except 2 men who were able to get away (wounded).<br />
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:The Turret itself was put out of action because (as was the case in all these hits on Turrets) much damage was done to the various instruments and appliances by the splinters and flash.<br />
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:It is worthy of note that the electric cables in the Turret were comparatively uninjured.<br />
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:(2). Turret No.3 was also hit by a 38 cm. (15") shell (hit No.6). The projectile penetrated the Barbette armour and took with it a large piece of plating into the interior of the Turret. The 74 men of the Turret's crew (as in the hit described above[)] for the most part were killed, only 6 men getting away wounded. It is observed that an 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) gun which was 3½ metres (about 11½ ft.) away from the point of impact, was completely undamaged, although the deck below the spot, and in the immediate vicinity of this gun, was badly damaged.<br />
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:Nos.3 and 4 Turrets were only put out of action towards the end of the engagement.<br />
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:The two foremost Turrets remained completely intact, although the Barbette armour of the second Turret showed a fairly large scrape from a (very glancing) shell hit. But this caused no further damage to the Turret (hit No.13).<br />
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:(4). The Conning Tower was hit on the starboard side on the edge. But only small pieces of the brittle face of the armoured plates splintered off, and in the Tower itself only one elevation-pointer ceased to function.<br />
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:(5). Very severe damage was done by a large calibre shell (hit No.20) which exploded close to the casemate of the No.2 15 cm. (5.9) gun port, which not only damaged this gun, but also put the two neighbouring 15 cm. (5.9") guns out of action. The first named gun was principally severely damaged on the chase, and the chase of the foremost 15 cm. (5.9") gun was indented to such an extent by splinters, that it could not be fired again. The other gun in the vicinity was so shaken up by the powerful explosion, that it could not be moved again. The casualties sustained by the gun's crews were in contrast comparatively small. (1 man killed and several severely or slightly wounded at the first named gun[)].<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
A large fragment of a 38 cm. (15") shell (which failed to explode), was exhibited on board (as is shown in Fig.12, Enc.3)[.] The much distorted fuze was also found.<br />
<br />
<center>H. "KÖNIG".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits.</center><br />
<br />
There were 13 hits (large calibre) identified all from the port side and above the waterline.<br />
<br />
:(1). A 34.3 cm. (13.5) shell hit the port foremost 15 cm. (5.9") casemate. (Hit No.9). A large piece of armour plating was carried into the casemate, where the shell exploded, killed the gun's crew (11 men) and put the gun out of action. The armour plate went further, penetrated the bulkhead, entered the galley, destroyed it and killed more men.<br />
<br />
:(2). Another 34.3 cm. (13.5") shell penetrated the second 15 cm. (5.9") casemate (hit No.8) and exploded, making the gun useless and, by penetrating the deck also caused much damage in the compartment below. The crew of this gun was by chance not at the moment in the casemate, as they had gone out for a short time on account of gas from the explosion in the first 15 cm. (5.9) casemate (which had occurred just previously.) The result was that there were no killed or wounded among the gun's crew.<br />
<br />
:(3). The traces of a shell were visible on the roof of the foremost 30.5 (12") Turret. (Hit No.11.) The projectile damaged the Rangefinder cover, and tore off a piece of it, rendering the Rangefinder useless. No other damage was caused by this hit.<br />
<br />
:(4). The roof of the Conning Tower was similarly gazed [sic] by a shell, which left a scratch but caused no other damage to the Tower or its instruments, etc.<br />
<br />
<center>J. "HINDENBURG."</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Apparently about 30,000 tons displacement)</center><br />
<br />
This Cruiser, now building will be given an armament of 8 30.5 cm. (12") guns 50 cal. (in four double turrets, 2 forward and 2 aft as in "DERFFLINGER") and 14 15 cm. (5.9") and 8.8 cm[.] (22 pr.) Anti-aircraft guns.<br />
<br />
The foremost superimposed Turret (No.2) was mostly built in, and a short inspection of it was made.<br />
<br />
The Gun-platform is especially roomy. The distance apart of the centres of the two gun barrels being estimated at about 3 metres (10 feet approx.)[.] The complete arrangement of the gun-platform can be seen in the diagrammatic Sketch (Fig.13, Enc.3). The 2 shell hoists (G) are side by side between the gun and to the left of the left gun, (and right of the right gun) are the two ammunition hoists (P).<br />
<br />
The up-coming ammunition is placed in its slide (TT) in the rear by means of unloading rammers (so-called "Umlauder"), whence it rolls on to the loading Tray, and finally on to the shell swings or cartridge swings, which by swinging across, brings the shell or cartridges one after the other to the rear of the gun for loading.<br />
<br />
The two rammers are hydraulic chain Rammers (with reserve hand drive). In the space at the rear of the platform there are :- an entrance opening (E) and two openings (A) for passing out firedcartridge [sic] cases. These openings (A) are constructed similarly to those more exactly described under "SEYDLITZ" (Sec.II. Par.9).<br />
<br />
The Breeches are worked hydraulically (the reserve method being by hand.)<br />
<br />
The principle can be gathered from Fig.14, Enc.3 . A bar with a tooth edged point (Z), (which can be worked up or down hydraulically) turns the Traversing shaft by means of cog wheels (R1, R2, R3) and opens or shuts the breech. The Water-pressure is led to the mechanism through two flexible hoses. If the cog wheel R3 is placed out of gear with R2, the hydraulic system is shut off.<br />
<br />
For elevating,Trunnion [sic] sights are provided and for training a sighting telescope is fitted in front between the guns.<br />
<br />
The Rangefinder (about 8 metres long) which was not yet on board, is to be fitted in the front of the Turret above the guns (under the roof as already referred to under "KURFÜRST")[.] Only the two side openings in the armour could be seen.<br />
<br />
Elevating is worked hydraulically (Reserve system by hand). (The ammunition hoists are also worked hydraulically, but here the alternative system is electric).<br />
<br />
A gun coupling is fitted in this ship as in all later ships. But these couplings are apparently only for use when it is desired to elevate a gun whose elevating gear has been damaged.<br />
<br />
The normal Turret Training gear and also the reserve system is only worked by electric motors.<br />
<br />
The same system of ventilation is used as has already been described in "SEYDLITZ" (Section II, Par.II).<br />
<br />
All working machinery (Electrically driven pumps, and electric motors for elevating, training, hoists, rammers, etc.) are apparently installed in the spacious working chamber below the gun platform.<br />
<br />
The arrangements in the Magazines as well as the transporting gear for passing shell and cartridges from them to the hoists are the same as those already more minutely described under battleship "GROSSER KÜRFURST."<br />
<br />
<center>K. "BAYERN".</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Class Ersatz "WÖRTH" about 30,000 tons disp.)</center><br />
<br />
This battleship, only recently completed, had to carry out exercises whilst at Kiel, and the Commission was invited to join for a cruise, which gave opportunity for a certain amount of inspection.<br />
<br />
The armament consists of eight 38 cm. (15") G.L. 45 guns in four double turrets apparently arranged as shown in the Almanac; sixteen 15 cm. (5.9") G.L. 45 guns in casemates and eight 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) anti-aircraft guns.<br />
<br />
38 cm. Gun Turret. (Fig. 15, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
The distance apart of the bore axes is 3700 mm. (12.1 ft.) for these guns[.] 8.8 cm. sub-calibre guns are provided, which are put in from outboard (i.e. muzzle end.)<br />
<br />
The Gunhouse, as in the turrets of the "HINDENBURG" is very roomy.<br />
<br />
In this turret there has been introduced no important alteration with respect to the munition hoists. Whereas in all previous ships the shot hoist was separate from the cartridge hoist, in this ship, as with us (the Austrian Navy), both hoists for one gun are combined in one trunk; and also instead of the shell and cartridge swings in the "HINDENBURG" (see above) munition wagons (W1, W2), which run on cross rails are introduced. The two main hoists (A1, A2) come up between the two guns. Besides these there are in addition two electrically driven auxiliary hoists (H1, H2).<br />
<br />
The round which arrives at the top of the hoist is taken out and landed, by means of the unloading rammer (U) in the munition wagon, which brings it to the rear of the particular gun in the loading position, whence it is loaded by means of the rammer.<br />
<br />
The munition wagons, rammers and unloading rammers are normally worked by hydraulic power (with auxiliary handworking gear); at the back of the turret are two principal operating positions, (ST1, ST2) which are raised to give a good all-round view, and where all the necessary manipulation for the foregoing hydraulic machinery is carried out.<br />
<br />
The munition hoists are also hydraulically worked, and electric drive is provided as an alternative. The elevating and breech mechanism gear are hydraulic (with alternative hand gear).<br />
<br />
The following sighting arrangements are provided :-<br />
<br />
:(a) For elevation - two side trunnion sights as well as two reserve sights in front.<br />
<br />
:(b) For training - a principal trainer's telescope in front between the two guns, as well as a side telescope as reserve.<br />
<br />
Asked whether any automatic firing apparatus was in contemplation, it was replied that a place for such apparatus was provided but the installation could not be expected till later, and depended on the solution of several problems which had yet to be experimented on.<br />
<br />
The large 8.2 m. (26.9 ft.) rangefinder is placed the same as in the "HINDENBURG".<br />
<br />
The ventilation of the turret is on the same principle as in the "HINDENBURG" and "SEYDLITZ", except that in addition there are two powerful electric fan motors between the guns.<br />
<br />
The Training is done electrically, as is also the alternative arrangement. Fig 15, Enc.3 gives a diagrammatic sketch of the arrangements. The controller gives 72 degrees of speed.<br />
<br />
For absorbing the shock in the training gear of single gun shooting there are provided, in the friction coupling box of the worm gearing, besides the friction plates (as in our own installations) two rings of strong springs above them - each ring containing six springs as shewn in Fig.17, Enc.3. Apparently any turret thrown off a small angle by a single round will be trained back to its original position by means of these springs.<br />
<br />
As in "HINDENBURG", so also in "BAYERN", the various machines for training[,] elevating, munition supply, rammers and unloading rammers are placed on the deck underneath the Gun platform (working chamber), and also the machines for the magazine and transport arrangements of munitions are similarly installed.<br />
<br />
In Fig. 18, Enc.3 is a diagrammatic sketch of the munition hoists and magazines from which it can be seen that the shell room is on the lowest level and has the magazine above it. The cartridge loading door (F1 for cartridges, G1 for shell) are fitted for flash protection with sliding shutters which are self-operating when the lift arrives at one or the other, i.e. when the lift arrives at the bottom, the shutter there will open and leave the loading hole (P) free, while the upper openings F1 and G1 will be shut and locked.<br />
<br />
An inspection of the shell room 38 cm. (15") showed that on these shells there is attached to the rearmost of the three upper driving bands a zinc band about 20 mm. (.78 in.) broad (similar to the driving bands). Experience has shown that this zinc ring is a very good anti-coppering device for the bore. It was apparently on the French front, at Verdun and in Flanders, that experiments with this arrangement were made; the results were very good and its introduction followed. The Army has also adopted it.<br />
<br />
The following is the situation with regard to 38 cm. (15 in.) shell. As opposed to the single type of shell (long calibre) in newly completing ships, here there are two :-<br />
<br />
:(a) A.P. shell, with cap, total length of shell 3.5 calibres.<br />
<br />
:(b) H.E. shell, uncapped, total length of shell 4.1 calibres. The total weight is 750 kg. (1653.5 lbs). The burster (not Trotyl, probably Heranit? 23.5 kg. (57.8 lbs.) for the A.P. shell and 67 kg. (147.7 lbs) for the H.E. The establishment allowed per [gun] is 90 A.P. and 30 H.E. The maximum range is 24 kilometres (26,247 yds.) with an angle of descent of 32 degrees, elevation of gun 247 degrees, time of flight 48 secs.<br />
<br />
:The charge is 87 kg. (191.8 lbs) in the main cartridge and 96 kg. (211.6 lbs.) in the foremost cartridge.<br />
<br />
:The rate of fire is one round per 40 seconds.<br />
<br />
15 cm. casemates. In these ships the flash protection for the 15 cm. (5.9") munition hoists in the casemates has been improved (Fig.20, Enc.3). In that a sheet iron chamber (K) has been built around the delivery opening which, by means of sliding plates (S1 and S2) can be shut off either from the trunk or from the munition tray. (G2.) For example, a shell arrives at the top of the hoist (G) - the shutter (S1) is raised in its guides by means of the lift mechanism, so that the shell can roll into the chamber (G1) while the shutter (S3) remains closed. Immediately afterwards the shutter (S1) closes the opening and the shutter (S2) raises in its guides and the shell rolls on the munition tray (G2). By this means the trunk is rendered flash proof at all stages of the operation.<br />
<br />
Submerged Flats. On board this ship there was also the opportunity to visit a submerged flat with two broadside tubes.<br />
<br />
In all there are five tubes (2 in each flat) and a bow tube. The calibre of the torpedoes is 60 cm. (23.6 in.) and the weight of a fully charged torpedo 2200 kg. (4850 lbs.). The explosive (? Heranit) weighing 250 kg. (531.1 lbs). The establishment per tube is four torpedoes - making in all 20 on board. The greatest torpedo range is 13 kilometres, 14,217 yds) with a medium speed setting of 28 knots.<br />
<br />
The flat that was visited (Fig.21, Enc.3) is very large and about 5 metres high, (16 ft.) so that it is perfectly feasible to turn any torpedo hanging on the purchase at the turntable (W1) on the overhead rails, so that is [sic] can be loaded into the port or starboard tube.<br />
<br />
The tubes (L1, L2) are side loading with very strong longitudinal holts [sic] on top (V1, V2) and fitted with a strong shield bar. For loading the torpedoes in the tubes, there are fitted near the tubes, on the same side on the side door, mechanical loading apparatus (quickloaders A1, A2), and on the opposite side are provided the rails (R1, R2) which serve for the adjustment (lever system) of the gyroscope of a torpedo lying in the tube.<br />
<br />
A torpedo is struck down from the upper deck through the trunk (E) and swung through the opening (O) into the flat, whence by means of a purchase (mechanically driven) it is run on to the tramways (S) and thence either to the bulkhead stowage or to a stowage over the tube.<br />
<br />
One must take this opportunity of noting that the overhead rails are not bolted to the actual deck, but are a separate structure, so as to avoid putting any vibration or other strain on to the armoured deck.<br />
<br />
If a torpedo is to be loaded it will be brought by means of the purchase to the exact ready stowage over the tube; then the hydraulic loader is operated by a lever; a grad [sic] with two arms seizes the torpedo in two specially cut away parts and draws it horizontally on to the guide rail of the loader, which then is lowered together with the torpedo. In the meantime the side door is mechanically unbolted and opened, so that the torpedo can be placed right in the tube (impulse frame). After this the guide rail and grab of the loader are withdrawn and raised, while the side door is shut and bolted. Loading by this means proceeds comparatively noiselessly, rapidly and precisely.<br />
<br />
The sluice is hydraulically worked, and after firing is operated by the return movement of the shield bar. When draining the tube the water can be pumped either overboard or into a well.<br />
<br />
The discharge is operated electrically from the Conning Tower or by hand.<br />
<br />
The sluice is hydraulically worked, and after firing is operated by the return movement of the shield bar. When draining the tube the water can be pumped either overboard or into a well.<br />
<br />
The discharge is operated electrically from the Conning Tower or by hand.</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Report_on_German_Warships_after_Jutland&diff=334766Austro-Hungarian Naval Report on German Warships after Jutland2024-03-24T10:03:31Z<p>Simon Harley: /* Report */</p>
<hr />
<div>It was prepared by ''Marineartillerie-Oberingenieure 2. Klasse'' Georg Schindler. This report is in many ways more detailed than that of ''Fregattenkapitäne'' Hieronymus Graf von Colloredo-Mannsfeld [[Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland|prepared immediately after Jutland]].<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
REPORT by a Mission undertaken in accordance with Order. Section 4 M.S. No.1746 of 1916.<br />
----<br />
<br />
On the inspection of German Warships which took part in the Battle of the Skaggerak (Jutland), 31st.May - 1st.June 1916; on Wilhelmshaven, Hamburg and Kiel, and on other inspections of ships and bases.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}By Georg Schindler,<br />
<br />
{{pad|580px}}Gunnery Engineer, 2nd Class.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}AUSTRIAN NAVY.<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
The only details which have been dealt with are those which were of Gunnery interest.<br />
<br />
{|<br />
| A.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "SEYDLITZ"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| B.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "OSTFRIESLAND"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| C.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "VON DER TANN"<br />
| were<br />
|-<br />
| D.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "GROSSER KÜRFURST"<br />
| in<br />
|-<br />
| E.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"&nbsp;<br />
| "MARKGRAF"<br />
| engagement.<br />
|-<br />
| F.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "MOLTKE"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| G.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"<br />
| "DERFFLINGER"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| H.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "KÖNIG"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| J.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "HINDENBURG" (building)<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| K.<br />
| Large Battleship<br />
| "BAYERN"<br />
| rowspan=2 | } Newly commissioned<br />
|-<br />
| L.<br />
| T.B.D.<br />
| "G.90"<br />
|-<br />
| M.<br />
| colspan=3 | Fishing vessels Anti-Submarine armament, etc.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| N.<br />
| colspan=3 | Short inspection of the Ordnance Workshops in the Arsenal in Wilhelmshaven. <br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| O.<br />
| Ditto in Kiel.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|}<br />
<br />
Ships under A.B.C.J. and M. were in Wilhelmshaven. D.E.F. in Hamburg and G.H.K.L. in Kiel.<br />
<br />
In the following reports on each ship, Section 1 deals with the effect of enemy hits on ships A. to H. above, in conjunction with the two attached ship sketches (Enclosures 1 and 2). [Not attached.]<br />
<br />
Of the hits marked in the sketches those of a gunnery interest are distinguished by red ink. Section II gives general remarks concerning the ships in question.<br />
<br />
Further a report is submitted on installations in newly commissioned ships (K. and L.) also on a ship still under construction (J.), as well as means of combating submarines installed in Fishing vessels (M.) and finally, briefly on the Ordnance workshops in the Naval Arsenals (N. and O.).<br />
<br />
A. "SEYDLITZ" (Enclosure 1).<br />
<br />
This Cruiser received 24 shell hits (38 cm. 34.3 cm. and 30.5 cm.)(15", 13.5" and 12") and one Torpedo hit.<br />
<br />
Except for 1 shell hit (apparently 34.3 cm.) (13.5") on the starboard side forward (Hits nos.2-4) and one hit no.16 (38 cm.?) in the starboard after 15 cm. (6") casemate all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all Gun tubes, Guns and many fittings had been dismantled and landed.<br />
<br />
<center>I. Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
<br />
1. A large calibre shell (hit no.8) struck the 2nd. 15 cm. port casemate (from forward), put the gun out of action and killed or seriously wounded the majority of the gun's crew.<br />
<br />
2. A 38 cm. shell exploded in the 4th 15 cm. casemate (hit No.13) the gun was similarly damaged, and 2 men (wounded) remained alive of the crew.<br />
<br />
3. In the port after 15 cm. casemate, No.6 gun, (hit No.15) had the same effect as the two described above.<br />
<br />
4. A 38 cm. shell (hit No.16) penetrated the armoured bulkhead on starboard side aft, near the last 15 cm. casemate, close to the curve of the armour (Fig.1, Enc.3) destroyed the 15 cm. gun and killed most of the gun crew.<br />
<br />
Of the twelve 15 cm. guns it appears that 2 port and 4 starboard fired unceasingly until the end.<br />
<br />
5. No.2 Turret (starboard) received a hit from port on the vertical turret armour (hit No.21) to the right of the right gun. Part of the nose of the shell pierced the armour anddestroyed [sic] the cradle and training gear of the right gun. The left was undamaged. The turret remained in action with this gun.<br />
<br />
6. An interesting hit is to be seen on the right 28 cm. gun of No.3 Turret port. The gun was on one of the jetties of the arsenal and could be examined. A large calibre shell hit the aforesaid gun a glancing blow just outside the turret, producing at the point of impact, a considerable elliptical scoop on the outside, causing a fracture of the inner tube and in addition bent the gun so that the axis of the tube at the muzzle was (as far as could be estimated) 200 mm. (about 8 in.) out of line.<br />
<br />
The cradle of this gun was split, the trunnions somewhat bent and the caps thereof partially opened out.<br />
<br />
The left gun of this turret, however, remained serviceable and the Turret could continue firing without interruption.<br />
<br />
7. A 34.3 cm. (13.5") shell (hit No.18) pierced the vertical armour of the revolving structure of No.4 Turret superimposed to the left of the left gun exploded inside the turret, ignited the cartridges which were ready for loading, put the turret out of action and killed all the crew (about 70 men) except 6.<br />
<br />
T [sic] This turret, already out of action, received another hit later from a 38 cm. (15") shell (hit No.17) this projectile struck the revolving Turret armour close to the lower edge at the right rear of the turret, and partially penetrated the turret.<br />
<br />
8. A Large calibre shell tore off the roof of the after (No.5) turret. (Geschossgeller ? ricochet). The turret suffered no appreciable damage inside.<br />
<br />
The remaining hits are being dealt with in the report on ship construction.≠ [I.D. Note: The original of this report can, unfortunately, not be obtained.]<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
<center>II Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
1. Extensive "flash" protection was already installed in "SEYDLITZ".<br />
<br />
(a) The openings for bringing 28 cm. cartridges into the lower loading chamber of the Ammunition Hoist can be shut off with sliding doors (schubtüren ?). The supply scuttles from the magazines are fitted with hinged flaps which open upwards on each side (Fig.3, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
(b) The 15 cm. (5.9") Ammunition hoists at the supply position in the casemates are fitted with a "closing flap" which shuts automatically, but its own weight assisted by a spring, immediately after the ammunition has rolled out on to the Ammunition Tray (which is placed in a horizontal position by a Paternoster apparatus (endless chain) (Fig.4, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
2. Apparently Gas Masks are employed in all ships. The method of use is the same as in the German Army. <u>Every</u> man was supplied with a mask (as it happened 2 days before action). These masks were to be brought into use immediately there was any evidence of suffocating gases, and they were so far successful that, according to the opinions of officers, at least one ship, if not two, was saved by their use.<br />
<br />
3. Enemy "shorts" usually exploded on hitting the water, with the result that, (as in the cases of shells exploding on board), splinters of various sizes struck guns among other things, and caused damage, but in practically every case no stoppage of firing from the gun resulted. Shell splinters also entered Conning Towers and Turrets through the sighting slits. But they caused no internal damage as their force was broken by their passage through the deeps [sic] slits. (Fig.5, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
4. In Turret firing. Salvoes were gradually used, and always with <u>only one</u> gun of each turret.<br />
<br />
5. For transmission of orders to the guns (also to 15 cm. (5.9" guns) from the Gunnery Officers position (in the Conning Tower) Elevation pointers are used which are mounted (<u>separately</u>) on brackets away from the Turret armour.<br />
<br />
6. Ranges of the individual rangefinders are shown on a circular scale (range receiver) by means of electrically worked pointers. All these dials are mounter [sic] in a circular box (Fig.6, Enc.3) so that the ranges of the same object shown by several rangefinders (Pointers in similar direction)[.] Further, it is possible to cut out one or other of the dials if the Rangetaker concerned is ranging badly.<br />
<br />
7. Repulse of Destroyers is carried out invariably by means of broadside salvoes of 15 cm. (5.9) guns etc. and one target only is always used. But the Gunlayer is only to fire when sights are exactly on the target.<br />
<br />
8. The 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) guns were not used in the battle. It is understood that in the future guns of this calibre, will only be retained on board as anti-aircraft guns, as was laid down for all ships.<br />
<br />
9. (a) The empty 26 cm. (11") cartridge cases are thrown out of the turrets on to the deck through openings in rear of the Gun platforms (2 per turret). A covering flap, opening downwards when the cases are thrown out, automatically closes the hole by means of a spring (Fig.7, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
(b) The fired 15 cm. (5.9") cartridge are placed in a large hanging net in the casemate, and are only removed from the casemate during a lull in the firing. It was stated that a very large number of fired cases (including Large Calibre ones) were collected and brought back.<br />
<br />
10. The voice pipes are made of 60,100 and 150 mm. diameter (2.4 in., 3.8 in.,and 6 in.). (The last named are called Schallrohre and are intended for short distances). Voice pipes are not lagged.<br />
<br />
11. The ventilation of the Turrets is similar to the method employed in our newer ships. A Fan placed between the two guns, sucks, on the one hand the powder gases from the breeches by means of a ventilation pipe from each gun when the breech is opened and on the other hand draws them away from the roof of the turret on the gun platform another fan, portable, and continually running, was installed when sucked in fresh air through a hose and passed it into the interior of the turret bymeans [sic] of a second hose. If any man had any difficulty in breathing he inhaled fresh air through the second hose. But even this method only afforded partial relief.<br />
<br />
12. All Gunnery machinery (hydraulic and electric) appears to have function correctly.<br />
<br />
13. From the Gunnery point of view there were no serious fires (magazines of any description), for which the "Flash door" protection described in Section II Miscellaneous, Pars. I (a) and (b) is principally responsible. All cartridges actually in a turret or casemate,when [sic] an enemy shell burst in the turret or casemate, were exploded in every case. Therefore the rule was most strictly enforced that only the absolute minimum of ammunition was kept ready at the guns.<br />
<br />
14. "SEYDLITZ" had 1150 28 cm. (11" shell) on board, of which 450 were expended. (No ship expended all her ammunition).<br />
<br />
15. The torpedo nets were not actually a hindrance in the action but they sustained heavy damage fromenemy [sic] hits and splinters so that parts of them hung down over the ships side.<br />
<br />
In future these nets being useless ballast will no longer be carried. This is already the case in the new battleship "BAYERN".<br />
<br />
<center>B. "OSTRFRIESLAND".</center><br />
<br />
<center>I. Hits. (Enclosure 1).</center><br />
<br />
This Battleship received no shell hits, but was struck by a mine onthe [sic] starboard side forward. The detailed description is contained in the report on Ship Construction.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
At the time of the inspection of this ship the 30.5 cm. (12") Ammunition was being embarked. The shells were being slung from the Quay on to the Deck by means of a powerful floating crane in bundles (of about 5 projectiles). All cartridges are enclosed in long water-tight zinc containers, fitted with stiffening bands. They were being rolled on board carefully across broad planks and stowed in the Magazines. If several rounds of ready ammunition have to be stowed in the Turret, the charges are always kept in the zinc cylinders.<br />
<br />
The 30.5 cm. (12") and also 28 cm. (11") projectiles are (according to the statement of the Gunnery Officer of this ship, Lt.Comdr.Lauenstein) of one description throughout, capped and fitted with base fuse. Total weight 405 kg. (about 890 lbs.) Bursting charge 12 to 13 kg. (26½ to 29 lbs.) of Trotyl. In the latest ships, however, "Armour piercing" and "high explosive" shell (but with a new explosive for bursting charge) are again to be used, as is already the case with the 28 cm. (15") shell in the Battleship "BAYERN".<br />
<br />
For the 15 cm.(5.9") guns it is reported that there are two types of shell in use.<br />
<br />
:(a) Fused shell with base fuses.<br />
<br />
:(b) High explosive shell,with a very sensitive nose fuse and a base fuse.<br />
<br />
<center>C. "VON DER TANN". (Enclosure 1.)</center><br />
<br />
This Battle Cruiser received 4 hits from large calibre shells (all on the starboard side).<br />
<br />
<center>I.Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
<br />
(1). The foremost 28 cm. (11") Turret was hit in the Barbette on the starboard side. The shell exploded and the armour was just penetrated (Hit No.1). Three men in the turret sustained burns (not very severe) from the "Flash". But the Turret was placed out of action as the armour at the point of impact was bulged inwards and jammed the Turret.<br />
<br />
(2). The after Conning Tower was similarly hit (Hit No.2)[.] But the shell only caused a shaking of the Tower and all apparatus inside remained intact.<br />
<br />
(3.) A shell exploded in the neighbourhood of the after Turret No.4 (Hit No.3). The effect on the Turret was only evident in a shaking, and the armour in the vicinity of the explosion was very slightly indented but without doing any damage so that the Turret continued in action.<br />
<br />
(4). No.4 hit is only of slight constructional interest.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
(1). In this ship, as in "OSTFRIESLAND", the question as to whether the collection of scraps of metal (coming from driving bands or Cartridge cases) in the Breech made any difference to the condition of the breech was answered in the negative.<br />
<br />
(2). The maximum rate of fire of the 28 cm. (11") guns of this Cruiser, as well as of the 30.5 cm. (12") guns of the "OSTFRIESLAND" is stated to have reached 3 - 4 rounds per minute in peace time.<br />
<br />
(3). The arrangement in the 28 cm. (11") turrets is in principle the same as in "SEYDLITZ" or as in the 30.5 cm. (12") guns of the large Battle Cruiser "HINDENBURG" (now building), with the exception of a few improvements in the last named ship. But while in the later ships (30.5 cm. 12") hydraulic rammers with reserve Hand ramming are installed "VON DER TANN" has only double Hand rammers, which are hung under the Turret roof.<br />
<br />
<center>D. "GROSSER KURFÜRST."</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Effects of shell hits (Enclosure 1).</center><br />
<br />
The ship was hit 8 times (large calibre) all from the port side.<br />
<br />
:(1) Hit No.4 (presumably 34 cm. 13.5") exploded before the Barbette armour of the foremost Turret.<br>Apart from breaking off small pieces of the hard armour (? Panzerschichte) and a slight shaking of the turret no damage was done to the Turret fittings. A fragment struck the upper surface of a sight slot and remained in the slot, while a good deal of gas entered the Turret and necessitated the use of gas masks by the crew for some time.<br />
<br />
:(2). A further heavy shell (Hit No.6) struck the port 15 cm.(5.9") Casemate (3rd. from forward) killed 10 of the crew of 14, but damaged the gun so little that after about 12 minutes the gun's crew having been made up, it was brought into action again. Two cartridges which were in the casemate were ignited.<br />
<br />
:(3). The other hits are only of constructional interest.<br />
<br />
:Some 30.5 cm. (12") and 15 cm. (5.9") guns were damaged on the outside by splinters from "shorts", but sustained no other damage.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
The Magazine arrangements in this ship were somewhat more minutely examined as well as reports made concerning them. (The arrangements described below are also used in the other ships).<br />
<br />
The shell bins and shell transport to the shell hoist are shown in Fig. 8, Enc.3) diagrammatically.<br />
<br />
A shell grab (Z) worked by 2 electric motors automatically controlled is used to transport the shell from the bins to the waiting tray fixed round the trunk (Turmraum) (A 1.-4). This grab is suspended from a broad length of wire sword matting, the latter can be wound up or down round a drum (Wa), if the transporting shaft (T) which is provided with two diametrical opposite longitudinal feathers is turned in the corresponding direction. Shaft (T) is fitted into drum (Wa). By this the grab is wound up or down. The grab is moved horizontally by the carrier (R), which holds the above-mentioned revolving drum, being drawn to one side or the other by an endless rope, worked electrically along the shaft (T). To assist the long shaft a deck rail is fitted above it which carries the weights, (Projectile grab and drum with carrier), the carrier being suspended from the rail. The electrical starting levers for both motors are fitted in the shell handing room.<br />
<br />
If it is required to get a shell out of the bin, the motor operating the horizontal movement of the grab is started. Then the long transporting drum is turned correspondingly by the 2nd.motor, thereby lowering the grab, which grips the shell by automatic pressure. Thereupon, by turning the shaft in the opposite direction the shell is raised, transported to the waiting tray (A) of which 4 are provided and placed on it. This waiting tray is so arranged that a shell can be landed only in the one position in order to prevent an inverted landing on the shell bogie relative to the entry in the hoist. The shell bogie is fitted with the same stops as the waiting tray.<br />
<br />
From the waiting tray the shell can be placed on either of the two shell bogies (which are rigidly joined to each other). The latter run easily with rollers on a circular rail, and can not only be adjusted exactly at the waiting tray by means of spring stops, but can also be coupled to the shell hoist in the loading position.<br />
<br />
In the shell rooms (lower deck) the shells are stowed in bins four to five deep (Fig.9, Enc.3)[.] The copper driving bands are protected by a broad covering band of strong canvas the ends of which are sewn together with (twine ?). Only rope is placed between the individual shells as a preventative against damage. Two vertical wooden batten are secured to the side walls of the shell bins - right and left.<br />
<br />
In order to ensure the grab gripping the shell as near as possible round the centre of gravity, each shell has a white ring painted round it.<br />
<br />
It is to be noted that the shell room cannot be shut off (water tightly) from the shell handing room as the large openings in the dividing Bulkhead, through which the transport carrier passes, are always open.<br />
<br />
In addition projectiles are stowed in many ships in the corners of the shell handing room itself in fixed bins.<br />
<br />
The 30.5 (12") cartridges are stowed in their water tight zinc cylinders in special stowage fittings in the magazines. These stowages are made of angle Iron and sheet plates. (There is no wood in the fittings).<br />
<br />
The Magazines, (2 decks from the bottom) in contrast to the shell room, are separated from the Magazine handing room, by a means of thin sheet bulkheads, in which the passage ways are fitted with double doors and the circular openings for handing cartridges are fitted with double covering flaps (the latter have already been remarked on in "SEYDLITZ" Section 11, Fig.3, Enc.3.[)]<br />
<br />
For transport of cartridges in the Magazines the transporting gear shewn in Fig.10, Enc.3 is available. This consists of a double rail (R) in which a horizontal (sheet iron) tray, semicircular in section can be moved up and down in guides by means of a hand differential purchase (F). The Tray can then be brought to the exact level of the cartridge. The Transporting gear is suspended from an overhead rail,(S) and also runs in a guide rail on the deck (SS). The cartridge is pushed on to the tray and the transporter then brought to the cartridge handing hole, and after opening the double flaps, transferred to the Turret.<br />
<br />
The Turret appliances correspond in general to those in "HINDENBURG", about which data are described later. But an exception must be made in the case of the size and installation of the Rangefinders (Fig.11, Enc.3).In "KURFÜRST" the Rangefinders about 3 meters (10 ft.) long are fitted in hoods in the front of the Turret, while "HINDENBURG" the 8 metre (26 ft.) range finders are already being fitted in the same way as will be the case in our 35 cm. (about 14") turrets, now building.<br />
<br />
<center>E. "MARKGRAF".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This Battleship was hit 5 times by big guns and all from the port side.<br />
<br />
Only hit No.2 is of gunnery interest. This entered the next to the last 15 cm. (5.(') [5.9"] casemate on the port side and exploded, killing the crew and putting gun out of action for the remainder of the battle, though it did not damage it very seriously.<br />
<br />
Several splinters from this shell pierced the bulkhead and entered the next casemate (forward) and killed or wounded several men. But this gun was brought into action again after an interval of about 10 minutes to make up the crew.<br />
<br />
<center>11. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
In the case of this ship also, splinters from enemy shorts entered the Conning Tower, but without causing any damage to either personnel or Materiel.<br />
<br />
During the whole engagement about 250 rounds of 30 cm. (12") ammunition was fired, i.e. about one fifth of the total supply on board.<br />
<br />
<center>F. "MOLTKE".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This ship was hit 4 times by heavy shell (all from the starboard side).<br />
<br />
One shell (Hit No.3) pierced the upper side armour and burst behind the latter inside the ship. It also caused some damage outside to No.4.15 cm. (5.9") casemate starboard (from forward) killing or wounding several men, but causing little damage to the gun. This gun was again brought into action after about 15 minutes.<br />
<br />
<center>11. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
"MOLTKE" was the only ship from which 4 Torpedoes were fired (not in salvo, but one after the other). On board, it was stated by officers that "QUEEN MARY" was fired at and hit at about 10 kilometres (10,935 yds.), and that this was the cause of the rapid sinking of this Battle Cruiser. Officers of other ships, however, were not of this opinion, as when "MOLTKE" fired the distance from "QUEEN MARY" was about 13 kilometres (14,217 yds.) and that the torpedoes have not this range; so that only Gunnery can be taken into consideration.<br />
<br />
In the "MOLTKE", splinters from short bursting shells also entered the Conning Tower, without, however, causing any noteworthy damage.<br />
<br />
<center>G. "DERFFLINGER".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This Battle Cruiser was hit the largest number of times, viz:- 30, of these 20 were of heavy calibre and all came from the port side.<br />
<br />
:(1) A 15" shell pierced the roof of N.4 30.5 cm. (12") Turret (hit No.5) exploded inside the Turret, thereby igniting all the charges which were there (apparently only two) and killed all the Turret's crew, (74 men including reserve crew), except 2 men who were able to get away (wounded).<br />
<br />
:The Turret itself was put out of action because (as was the case in all these hits on Turrets) much damage was done to the various instruments and appliances by the splinters and flash.<br />
<br />
:It is worthy of note that the electric cables in the Turret were comparatively uninjured.<br />
<br />
:(2). Turret No.3 was also hit by a 38 cm. (15") shell (hit No.6). The projectile penetrated the Barbette armour and took with it a large piece of plating into the interior of the Turret. The 74 men of the Turret's crew (as in the hit described above[)] for the most part were killed, only 6 men getting away wounded. It is observed that an 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) gun which was 3½ metres (about 11½ ft.) away from the point of impact, was completely undamaged, although the deck below the spot, and in the immediate vicinity of this gun, was badly damaged.<br />
<br />
:Nos.3 and 4 Turrets were only put out of action towards the end of the engagement.<br />
<br />
:The two foremost Turrets remained completely intact, although the Barbette armour of the second Turret showed a fairly large scrape from a (very glancing) shell hit. But this caused no further damage to the Turret (hit No.13).<br />
<br />
:(4). The Conning Tower was hit on the starboard side on the edge. But only small pieces of the brittle face of the armoured plates splintered off, and in the Tower itself only one elevation-pointer ceased to function.<br />
<br />
:(5). Very severe damage was done by a large calibre shell (hit No.20) which exploded close to the casemate of the No.2 15 cm. (5.9) gun port, which not only damaged this gun, but also put the two neighbouring 15 cm. (5.9") guns out of action. The first named gun was principally severely damaged on the chase, and the chase of the foremost 15 cm. (5.9") gun was indented to such an extent by splinters, that it could not be fired again. The other gun in the vicinity was so shaken up by the powerful explosion, that it could not be moved again. The casualties sustained by the gun's crews were in contrast comparatively small. (1 man killed and several severely or slightly wounded at the first named gun[)].<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
A large fragment of a 38 cm. (15") shell (which failed to explode), was exhibited on board (as is shown in Fig.12, Enc.3)[.] The much distorted fuze was also found.<br />
<br />
<center>H. "KÖNIG".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits.</center><br />
<br />
There were 13 hits (large calibre) identified all from the port side and above the waterline.<br />
<br />
:(1). A 34.3 cm. (13.5) shell hit the port foremost 15 cm. (5.9") casemate. (Hit No.9). A large piece of armour plating was carried into the casemate, where the shell exploded, killed the gun's crew (11 men) and put the gun out of action. The armour plate went further, penetrated the bulkhead, entered the galley, destroyed it and killed more men.<br />
<br />
:(2). Another 34.3 cm. (13.5") shell penetrated the second 15 cm. (5.9") casemate (hit No.8) and exploded, making the gun useless and, by penetrating the deck also caused much damage in the compartment below. The crew of this gun was by chance not at the moment in the casemate, as they had gone out for a short time on account of gas from the explosion in the first 15 cm. (5.9) casemate (which had occurred just previously.) The result was that there were no killed or wounded among the gun's crew.<br />
<br />
:(3). The traces of a shell were visible on the roof of the foremost 30.5 (12") Turret. (Hit No.11.) The projectile damaged the Rangefinder cover, and tore off a piece of it, rendering the Rangefinder useless. No other damage was caused by this hit.<br />
<br />
:(4). The roof of the Conning Tower was similarly gazed [sic] by a shell, which left a scratch but caused no other damage to the Tower or its instruments, etc.<br />
<br />
<center>J. "HINDENBURG."</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Apparently about 30,000 tons displacement)</center><br />
<br />
This Cruiser, now building will be given an armament of 8 30.5 cm. (12") guns 50 cal. (in four double turrets, 2 forward and 2 aft as in "DERFFLINGER") and 14 15 cm. (5.9") and 8.8 cm[.] (22 pr.) Anti-aircraft guns.<br />
<br />
The foremost superimposed Turret (No.2) was mostly built in, and a short inspection of it was made.<br />
<br />
The Gun-platform is especially roomy. The distance apart of the centres of the two gun barrels being estimated at about 3 metres (10 feet approx.)[.] The complete arrangement of the gun-platform can be seen in the diagrammatic Sketch (Fig.13, Enc.3). The 2 shell hoists (G) are side by side between the gun and to the left of the left gun, (and right of the right gun) are the two ammunition hoists (P).<br />
<br />
The up-coming ammunition is placed in its slide (TT) in the rear by means of unloading rammers (so-called "Umlauder"), whence it rolls on to the loading Tray, and finally on to the shell swings or cartridge swings, which by swinging across, brings the shell or cartridges one after the other to the rear of the gun for loading.<br />
<br />
The two rammers are hydraulic chain Rammers (with reserve hand drive). In the space at the rear of the platform there are :- an entrance opening (E) and two openings (A) for passing out firedcartridge [sic] cases. These openings (A) are constructed similarly to those more exactly described under "SEYDLITZ" (Sec.II. Par.9).<br />
<br />
The Breeches are worked hydraulically (the reserve method being by hand.)<br />
<br />
The principle can be gathered from Fig.14, Enc.3 . A bar with a tooth edged point (Z), (which can be worked up or down hydraulically) turns the Traversing shaft by means of cog wheels (R1, R2, R3) and opens or shuts the breech. The Water-pressure is led to the mechanism through two flexible hoses. If the cog wheel R3 is placed out of gear with R2, the hydraulic system is shut off.<br />
<br />
For elevating,Trunnion [sic] sights are provided and for training a sighting telescope is fitted in front between the guns.<br />
<br />
The Rangefinder (about 8 metres long) which was not yet on board, is to be fitted in the front of the Turret above the guns (under the roof as already referred to under "KURFÜRST")[.] Only the two side openings in the armour could be seen.<br />
<br />
Elevating is worked hydraulically (Reserve system by hand). (The ammunition hoists are also worked hydraulically, but here the alternative system is electric).<br />
<br />
A gun coupling is fitted in this ship as in all later ships. But these couplings are apparently only for use when it is desired to elevate a gun whose elevating gear has been damaged.<br />
<br />
The normal Turret Training gear and also the reserve system is only worked by electric motors.<br />
<br />
The same system of ventilation is used as has already been described in "SEYDLITZ" (Section II, Par.II).<br />
<br />
All working machinery (Electrically driven pumps, and electric motors for elevating, training, hoists, rammers, etc.) are apparently installed in the spacious working chamber below the gun platform.<br />
<br />
The arrangements in the Magazines as well as the transporting gear for passing shell and cartridges from them to the hoists are the same as those already more minutely described under battleship "GROSSER KÜRFURST."<br />
<br />
<center>K. "BAYERN".</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Class Ersatz "WÖRTH" about 30,000 tons disp.)</center><br />
<br />
This battleship, only recently completed, had to carry out exercises whilst at Kiel, and the Commission was invited to join for a cruise, which gave opportunity for a certain amount of inspection.<br />
<br />
The armament consists of eight 38 cm. (15") G.L. 45 guns in four double turrets apparently arranged as shown in the Almanac; sixteen 15 cm. (5.9") G.L. 45 guns in casemates and eight 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) anti-aircraft guns.<br />
<br />
38 cm. Gun Turret. (Fig. 15, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
The distance apart of the bore axes is 3700 mm. (12.1 ft.) for these guns[.] 8.8 cm. sub-calibre guns are provided, which are put in from outboard (i.e. muzzle end.)<br />
<br />
The Gunhouse, as in the turrets of the "HINDENBURG" is very roomy.<br />
<br />
In this turret there has been introduced no important alteration with respect to the munition hoists. Whereas in all previous ships the shot hoist was separate from the cartridge hoist, in this ship, as with us (the Austrian Navy), both hoists for one gun are combined in one trunk; and also instead of the shell and cartridge swings in the "HINDENBURG" (see above) munition wagons (W1, W2), which run on cross rails are introduced. The two main hoists (A1, A2) come up between the two guns. Besides these there are in addition two electrically driven auxiliary hoists (H1, H2).<br />
<br />
The round which arrives at the top of the hoist is taken out and landed, by means of the unloading rammer (U) in the munition wagon, which brings it to the rear of the particular gun in the loading position, whence it is loaded by means of the rammer.<br />
<br />
The munition wagons, rammers and unloading rammers are normally worked by hydraulic power (with auxiliary handworking gear); at the back of the turret are two principal operating positions, (ST1, ST2) which are raised to give a good all-round view, and where all the necessary manipulation for the foregoing hydraulic machinery is carried out.<br />
<br />
The munition hoists are also hydraulically worked, and electric drive is provided as an alternative. The elevating and breech mechanism gear are hydraulic (with alternative hand gear).<br />
<br />
The following sighting arrangements are provided :-<br />
<br />
:(a) For elevation - two side trunnion sights as well as two reserve sights in front.<br />
<br />
:(b) For training - a principal trainer's telescope in front between the two guns, as well as a side telescope as reserve.<br />
<br />
Asked whether any automatic firing apparatus was in contemplation, it was replied that a place for such apparatus was provided but the installation could not be expected till later, and depended on the solution of several problems which had yet to be experimented on.<br />
<br />
The large 8.2 m. (26.9 ft.) rangefinder is placed the same as in the "HINDENBURG".<br />
<br />
The ventilation of the turret is on the same principle as in the "HINDENBURG" and "SEYDLITZ", except that in addition there are two powerful electric fan motors between the guns.<br />
<br />
The Training is done electrically, as is also the alternative arrangement. Fig 15, Enc.3 gives a diagrammatic sketch of the arrangements. The controller gives 72 degrees of speed.<br />
<br />
For absorbing the shock in the training gear of single gun shooting there are provided, in the friction coupling box of the worm gearing, besides the friction plates (as in our own installations) two rings of strong springs above them - each ring containing six springs as shewn in Fig.17, Enc.3. Apparently any turret thrown off a small angle by a single round will be trained back to its original position by means of these springs.<br />
<br />
As in "HINDENBURG", so also in "BAYERN", the various machines for training[,] elevating, munition supply, rammers and unloading rammers are placed on the deck underneath the Gun platform (working chamber), and also the machines for the magazine and transport arrangements of munitions are similarly installed.<br />
<br />
In Fig. 18, Enc.3 is a diagrammatic sketch of the munition hoists and magazines from which it can be seen that the shell room is on the lowest level and has the magazine above it. The cartridge loading door (F1 for cartridges, G1 for shell) are fitted for flash protection with sliding shutters which are self-operating when the lift arrives at one or the other, i.e. when the lift arrives at the bottom, the shutter there will open and leave the loading hole (P) free, while the upper openings F1 and G1 will be shut and locked.<br />
<br />
An inspection of the shell room 38 cm. (15") showed that on these shells there is attached to the rearmost of the three upper driving bands a zinc band about 20 mm. (.78 in.) broad (similar to the driving bands). Experience has shown that this zinc ring is a very good anti-coppering device for the bore. It was apparently on the French front, at Verdun and in Flanders, that experiments with this arrangement were made; the results were very good and its introduction followed. The Army has also adopted it.<br />
<br />
The following is the situation with regard to 38 cm. (15 in.) shell. As opposed to the single type of shell (long calibre) in newly completing ships, here there are two :-</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Report_on_German_Warships_after_Jutland&diff=334763Austro-Hungarian Naval Report on German Warships after Jutland2024-03-23T23:10:52Z<p>Simon Harley: /* Report */</p>
<hr />
<div>It was prepared by ''Marineartillerie-Oberingenieure 2. Klasse'' Georg Schindler. This report is in many ways more detailed than that of ''Fregattenkapitäne'' Hieronymus Graf von Colloredo-Mannsfeld [[Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland|prepared immediately after Jutland]].<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
REPORT by a Mission undertaken in accordance with Order. Section 4 M.S. No.1746 of 1916.<br />
----<br />
<br />
On the inspection of German Warships which took part in the Battle of the Skaggerak (Jutland), 31st.May - 1st.June 1916; on Wilhelmshaven, Hamburg and Kiel, and on other inspections of ships and bases.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}By Georg Schindler,<br />
<br />
{{pad|580px}}Gunnery Engineer, 2nd Class.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}AUSTRIAN NAVY.<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
The only details which have been dealt with are those which were of Gunnery interest.<br />
<br />
{|<br />
| A.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "SEYDLITZ"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| B.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "OSTFRIESLAND"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| C.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "VON DER TANN"<br />
| were<br />
|-<br />
| D.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "GROSSER KÜRFURST"<br />
| in<br />
|-<br />
| E.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"&nbsp;<br />
| "MARKGRAF"<br />
| engagement.<br />
|-<br />
| F.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "MOLTKE"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| G.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"<br />
| "DERFFLINGER"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| H.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "KÖNIG"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| J.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "HINDENBURG" (building)<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| K.<br />
| Large Battleship<br />
| "BAYERN"<br />
| rowspan=2 | } Newly commissioned<br />
|-<br />
| L.<br />
| T.B.D.<br />
| "G.90"<br />
|-<br />
| M.<br />
| colspan=3 | Fishing vessels Anti-Submarine armament, etc.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| N.<br />
| colspan=3 | Short inspection of the Ordnance Workshops in the Arsenal in Wilhelmshaven. <br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| O.<br />
| Ditto in Kiel.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|}<br />
<br />
Ships under A.B.C.J. and M. were in Wilhelmshaven. D.E.F. in Hamburg and G.H.K.L. in Kiel.<br />
<br />
In the following reports on each ship, Section 1 deals with the effect of enemy hits on ships A. to H. above, in conjunction with the two attached ship sketches (Enclosures 1 and 2). [Not attached.]<br />
<br />
Of the hits marked in the sketches those of a gunnery interest are distinguished by red ink. Section II gives general remarks concerning the ships in question.<br />
<br />
Further a report is submitted on installations in newly commissioned ships (K. and L.) also on a ship still under construction (J.), as well as means of combating submarines installed in Fishing vessels (M.) and finally, briefly on the Ordnance workshops in the Naval Arsenals (N. and O.).<br />
<br />
A. "SEYDLITZ" (Enclosure 1).<br />
<br />
This Cruiser received 24 shell hits (38 cm. 34.3 cm. and 30.5 cm.)(15", 13.5" and 12") and one Torpedo hit.<br />
<br />
Except for 1 shell hit (apparently 34.3 cm.) (13.5") on the starboard side forward (Hits nos.2-4) and one hit no.16 (38 cm.?) in the starboard after 15 cm. (6") casemate all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all Gun tubes, Guns and many fittings had been dismantled and landed.<br />
<br />
<center>I. Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
<br />
1. A large calibre shell (hit no.8) struck the 2nd. 15 cm. port casemate (from forward), put the gun out of action and killed or seriously wounded the majority of the gun's crew.<br />
<br />
2. A 38 cm. shell exploded in the 4th 15 cm. casemate (hit No.13) the gun was similarly damaged, and 2 men (wounded) remained alive of the crew.<br />
<br />
3. In the port after 15 cm. casemate, No.6 gun, (hit No.15) had the same effect as the two described above.<br />
<br />
4. A 38 cm. shell (hit No.16) penetrated the armoured bulkhead on starboard side aft, near the last 15 cm. casemate, close to the curve of the armour (Fig.1, Enc.3) destroyed the 15 cm. gun and killed most of the gun crew.<br />
<br />
Of the twelve 15 cm. guns it appears that 2 port and 4 starboard fired unceasingly until the end.<br />
<br />
5. No.2 Turret (starboard) received a hit from port on the vertical turret armour (hit No.21) to the right of the right gun. Part of the nose of the shell pierced the armour anddestroyed [sic] the cradle and training gear of the right gun. The left was undamaged. The turret remained in action with this gun.<br />
<br />
6. An interesting hit is to be seen on the right 28 cm. gun of No.3 Turret port. The gun was on one of the jetties of the arsenal and could be examined. A large calibre shell hit the aforesaid gun a glancing blow just outside the turret, producing at the point of impact, a considerable elliptical scoop on the outside, causing a fracture of the inner tube and in addition bent the gun so that the axis of the tube at the muzzle was (as far as could be estimated) 200 mm. (about 8 in.) out of line.<br />
<br />
The cradle of this gun was split, the trunnions somewhat bent and the caps thereof partially opened out.<br />
<br />
The left gun of this turret, however, remained serviceable and the Turret could continue firing without interruption.<br />
<br />
7. A 34.3 cm. (13.5") shell (hit No.18) pierced the vertical armour of the revolving structure of No.4 Turret superimposed to the left of the left gun exploded inside the turret, ignited the cartridges which were ready for loading, put the turret out of action and killed all the crew (about 70 men) except 6.<br />
<br />
T [sic] This turret, already out of action, received another hit later from a 38 cm. (15") shell (hit No.17) this projectile struck the revolving Turret armour close to the lower edge at the right rear of the turret, and partially penetrated the turret.<br />
<br />
8. A Large calibre shell tore off the roof of the after (No.5) turret. (Geschossgeller ? ricochet). The turret suffered no appreciable damage inside.<br />
<br />
The remaining hits are being dealt with in the report on ship construction.≠ [I.D. Note: The original of this report can, unfortunately, not be obtained.]<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
<center>II Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
1. Extensive "flash" protection was already installed in "SEYDLITZ".<br />
<br />
(a) The openings for bringing 28 cm. cartridges into the lower loading chamber of the Ammunition Hoist can be shut off with sliding doors (schubtüren ?). The supply scuttles from the magazines are fitted with hinged flaps which open upwards on each side (Fig.3, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
(b) The 15 cm. (5.9") Ammunition hoists at the supply position in the casemates are fitted with a "closing flap" which shuts automatically, but its own weight assisted by a spring, immediately after the ammunition has rolled out on to the Ammunition Tray (which is placed in a horizontal position by a Paternoster apparatus (endless chain) (Fig.4, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
2. Apparently Gas Masks are employed in all ships. The method of use is the same as in the German Army. <u>Every</u> man was supplied with a mask (as it happened 2 days before action). These masks were to be brought into use immediately there was any evidence of suffocating gases, and they were so far successful that, according to the opinions of officers, at least one ship, if not two, was saved by their use.<br />
<br />
3. Enemy "shorts" usually exploded on hitting the water, with the result that, (as in the cases of shells exploding on board), splinters of various sizes struck guns among other things, and caused damage, but in practically every case no stoppage of firing from the gun resulted. Shell splinters also entered Conning Towers and Turrets through the sighting slits. But they caused no internal damage as their force was broken by their passage through the deeps [sic] slits. (Fig.5, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
4. In Turret firing. Salvoes were gradually used, and always with <u>only one</u> gun of each turret.<br />
<br />
5. For transmission of orders to the guns (also to 15 cm. (5.9" guns) from the Gunnery Officers position (in the Conning Tower) Elevation pointers are used which are mounted (<u>separately</u>) on brackets away from the Turret armour.<br />
<br />
6. Ranges of the individual rangefinders are shown on a circular scale (range receiver) by means of electrically worked pointers. All these dials are mounter [sic] in a circular box (Fig.6, Enc.3) so that the ranges of the same object shown by several rangefinders (Pointers in similar direction)[.] Further, it is possible to cut out one or other of the dials if the Rangetaker concerned is ranging badly.<br />
<br />
7. Repulse of Destroyers is carried out invariably by means of broadside salvoes of 15 cm. (5.9) guns etc. and one target only is always used. But the Gunlayer is only to fire when sights are exactly on the target.<br />
<br />
8. The 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) guns were not used in the battle. It is understood that in the future guns of this calibre, will only be retained on board as anti-aircraft guns, as was laid down for all ships.<br />
<br />
9. (a) The empty 26 cm. (11") cartridge cases are thrown out of the turrets on to the deck through openings in rear of the Gun platforms (2 per turret). A covering flap, opening downwards when the cases are thrown out, automatically closes the hole by means of a spring (Fig.7, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
(b) The fired 15 cm. (5.9") cartridge are placed in a large hanging net in the casemate, and are only removed from the casemate during a lull in the firing. It was stated that a very large number of fired cases (including Large Calibre ones) were collected and brought back.<br />
<br />
10. The voice pipes are made of 60,100 and 150 mm. diameter (2.4 in., 3.8 in.,and 6 in.). (The last named are called Schallrohre and are intended for short distances). Voice pipes are not lagged.<br />
<br />
11. The ventilation of the Turrets is similar to the method employed in our newer ships. A Fan placed between the two guns, sucks, on the one hand the powder gases from the breeches by means of a ventilation pipe from each gun when the breech is opened and on the other hand draws them away from the roof of the turret on the gun platform another fan, portable, and continually running, was installed when sucked in fresh air through a hose and passed it into the interior of the turret bymeans [sic] of a second hose. If any man had any difficulty in breathing he inhaled fresh air through the second hose. But even this method only afforded partial relief.<br />
<br />
12. All Gunnery machinery (hydraulic and electric) appears to have function correctly.<br />
<br />
13. From the Gunnery point of view there were no serious fires (magazines of any description), for which the "Flash door" protection described in Section II Miscellaneous, Pars. I (a) and (b) is principally responsible. All cartridges actually in a turret or casemate,when [sic] an enemy shell burst in the turret or casemate, were exploded in every case. Therefore the rule was most strictly enforced that only the absolute minimum of ammunition was kept ready at the guns.<br />
<br />
14. "SEYDLITZ" had 1150 28 cm. (11" shell) on board, of which 450 were expended. (No ship expended all her ammunition).<br />
<br />
15. The torpedo nets were not actually a hindrance in the action but they sustained heavy damage fromenemy [sic] hits and splinters so that parts of them hung down over the ships side.<br />
<br />
In future these nets being useless ballast will no longer be carried. This is already the case in the new battleship "BAYERN".<br />
<br />
<center>B. "OSTRFRIESLAND".</center><br />
<br />
<center>I. Hits. (Enclosure 1).</center><br />
<br />
This Battleship received no shell hits, but was struck by a mine onthe [sic] starboard side forward. The detailed description is contained in the report on Ship Construction.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
At the time of the inspection of this ship the 30.5 cm. (12") Ammunition was being embarked. The shells were being slung from the Quay on to the Deck by means of a powerful floating crane in bundles (of about 5 projectiles). All cartridges are enclosed in long water-tight zinc containers, fitted with stiffening bands. They were being rolled on board carefully across broad planks and stowed in the Magazines. If several rounds of ready ammunition have to be stowed in the Turret, the charges are always kept in the zinc cylinders.<br />
<br />
The 30.5 cm. (12") and also 28 cm. (11") projectiles are (according to the statement of the Gunnery Officer of this ship, Lt.Comdr.Lauenstein) of one description throughout, capped and fitted with base fuse. Total weight 405 kg. (about 890 lbs.) Bursting charge 12 to 13 kg. (26½ to 29 lbs.) of Trotyl. In the latest ships, however, "Armour piercing" and "high explosive" shell (but with a new explosive for bursting charge) are again to be used, as is already the case with the 28 cm. (15") shell in the Battleship "BAYERN".<br />
<br />
For the 15 cm.(5.9") guns it is reported that there are two types of shell in use.<br />
<br />
:(a) Fused shell with base fuses.<br />
<br />
:(b) High explosive shell,with a very sensitive nose fuse and a base fuse.<br />
<br />
<center>C. "VON DER TANN". (Enclosure 1.)</center><br />
<br />
This Battle Cruiser received 4 hits from large calibre shells (all on the starboard side).<br />
<br />
<center>I.Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
<br />
(1). The foremost 28 cm. (11") Turret was hit in the Barbette on the starboard side. The shell exploded and the armour was just penetrated (Hit No.1). Three men in the turret sustained burns (not very severe) from the "Flash". But the Turret was placed out of action as the armour at the point of impact was bulged inwards and jammed the Turret.<br />
<br />
(2). The after Conning Tower was similarly hit (Hit No.2)[.] But the shell only caused a shaking of the Tower and all apparatus inside remained intact.<br />
<br />
(3.) A shell exploded in the neighbourhood of the after Turret No.4 (Hit No.3). The effect on the Turret was only evident in a shaking, and the armour in the vicinity of the explosion was very slightly indented but without doing any damage so that the Turret continued in action.<br />
<br />
(4). No.4 hit is only of slight constructional interest.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
(1). In this ship, as in "OSTFRIESLAND", the question as to whether the collection of scraps of metal (coming from driving bands or Cartridge cases) in the Breech made any difference to the condition of the breech was answered in the negative.<br />
<br />
(2). The maximum rate of fire of the 28 cm. (11") guns of this Cruiser, as well as of the 30.5 cm. (12") guns of the "OSTFRIESLAND" is stated to have reached 3 - 4 rounds per minute in peace time.<br />
<br />
(3). The arrangement in the 28 cm. (11") turrets is in principle the same as in "SEYDLITZ" or as in the 30.5 cm. (12") guns of the large Battle Cruiser "HINDENBURG" (now building), with the exception of a few improvements in the last named ship. But while in the later ships (30.5 cm. 12") hydraulic rammers with reserve Hand ramming are installed "VON DER TANN" has only double Hand rammers, which are hung under the Turret roof.<br />
<br />
<center>D. "GROSSER KURFÜRST."</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Effects of shell hits (Enclosure 1).</center><br />
<br />
The ship was hit 8 times (large calibre) all from the port side.<br />
<br />
:(1) Hit No.4 (presumably 34 cm. 13.5") exploded before the Barbette armour of the foremost Turret.<br>Apart from breaking off small pieces of the hard armour (? Panzerschichte) and a slight shaking of the turret no damage was done to the Turret fittings. A fragment struck the upper surface of a sight slot and remained in the slot, while a good deal of gas entered the Turret and necessitated the use of gas masks by the crew for some time.<br />
<br />
:(2). A further heavy shell (Hit No.6) struck the port 15 cm.(5.9") Casemate (3rd. from forward) killed 10 of the crew of 14, but damaged the gun so little that after about 12 minutes the gun's crew having been made up, it was brought into action again. Two cartridges which were in the casemate were ignited.<br />
<br />
:(3). The other hits are only of constructional interest.<br />
<br />
:Some 30.5 cm. (12") and 15 cm. (5.9") guns were damaged on the outside by splinters from "shorts", but sustained no other damage.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
The Magazine arrangements in this ship were somewhat more minutely examined as well as reports made concerning them. (The arrangements described below are also used in the other ships).<br />
<br />
The shell bins and shell transport to the shell hoist are shown in Fig. 8, Enc.3) diagrammatically.<br />
<br />
A shell grab (Z) worked by 2 electric motors automatically controlled is used to transport the shell from the bins to the waiting tray fixed round the trunk (Turmraum) (A 1.-4). This grab is suspended from a broad length of wire sword matting, the latter can be wound up or down round a drum (Wa), if the transporting shaft (T) which is provided with two diametrical opposite longitudinal feathers is turned in the corresponding direction. Shaft (T) is fitted into drum (Wa). By this the grab is wound up or down. The grab is moved horizontally by the carrier (R), which holds the above-mentioned revolving drum, being drawn to one side or the other by an endless rope, worked electrically along the shaft (T). To assist the long shaft a deck rail is fitted above it which carries the weights, (Projectile grab and drum with carrier), the carrier being suspended from the rail. The electrical starting levers for both motors are fitted in the shell handing room.<br />
<br />
If it is required to get a shell out of the bin, the motor operating the horizontal movement of the grab is started. Then the long transporting drum is turned correspondingly by the 2nd.motor, thereby lowering the grab, which grips the shell by automatic pressure. Thereupon, by turning the shaft in the opposite direction the shell is raised, transported to the waiting tray (A) of which 4 are provided and placed on it. This waiting tray is so arranged that a shell can be landed only in the one position in order to prevent an inverted landing on the shell bogie relative to the entry in the hoist. The shell bogie is fitted with the same stops as the waiting tray.<br />
<br />
From the waiting tray the shell can be placed on either of the two shell bogies (which are rigidly joined to each other). The latter run easily with rollers on a circular rail, and can not only be adjusted exactly at the waiting tray by means of spring stops, but can also be coupled to the shell hoist in the loading position.<br />
<br />
In the shell rooms (lower deck) the shells are stowed in bins four to five deep (Fig.9, Enc.3)[.] The copper driving bands are protected by a broad covering band of strong canvas the ends of which are sewn together with (twine ?). Only rope is placed between the individual shells as a preventative against damage. Two vertical wooden batten are secured to the side walls of the shell bins - right and left.<br />
<br />
In order to ensure the grab gripping the shell as near as possible round the centre of gravity, each shell has a white ring painted round it.<br />
<br />
It is to be noted that the shell room cannot be shut off (water tightly) from the shell handing room as the large openings in the dividing Bulkhead, through which the transport carrier passes, are always open.<br />
<br />
In addition projectiles are stowed in many ships in the corners of the shell handing room itself in fixed bins.<br />
<br />
The 30.5 (12") cartridges are stowed in their water tight zinc cylinders in special stowage fittings in the magazines. These stowages are made of angle Iron and sheet plates. (There is no wood in the fittings).<br />
<br />
The Magazines, (2 decks from the bottom) in contrast to the shell room, are separated from the Magazine handing room, by a means of thin sheet bulkheads, in which the passage ways are fitted with double doors and the circular openings for handing cartridges are fitted with double covering flaps (the latter have already been remarked on in "SEYDLITZ" Section 11, Fig.3, Enc.3.[)]<br />
<br />
For transport of cartridges in the Magazines the transporting gear shewn in Fig.10, Enc.3 is available. This consists of a double rail (R) in which a horizontal (sheet iron) tray, semicircular in section can be moved up and down in guides by means of a hand differential purchase (F). The Tray can then be brought to the exact level of the cartridge. The Transporting gear is suspended from an overhead rail,(S) and also runs in a guide rail on the deck (SS). The cartridge is pushed on to the tray and the transporter then brought to the cartridge handing hole, and after opening the double flaps, transferred to the Turret.<br />
<br />
The Turret appliances correspond in general to those in "HINDENBURG", about which data are described later. But an exception must be made in the case of the size and installation of the Rangefinders (Fig.11, Enc.3).In "KURFÜRST" the Rangefinders about 3 meters (10 ft.) long are fitted in hoods in the front of the Turret, while "HINDENBURG" the 8 metre (26 ft.) range finders are already being fitted in the same way as will be the case in our 35 cm. (about 14") turrets, now building.<br />
<br />
<center>E. "MARKGRAF".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This Battleship was hit 5 times by big guns and all from the port side.<br />
<br />
Only hit No.2 is of gunnery interest. This entered the next to the last 15 cm. (5.(') [5.9"] casemate on the port side and exploded, killing the crew and putting gun out of action for the remainder of the battle, though it did not damage it very seriously.<br />
<br />
Several splinters from this shell pierced the bulkhead and entered the next casemate (forward) and killed or wounded several men. But this gun was brought into action again after an interval of about 10 minutes to make up the crew.<br />
<br />
<center>11. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
In the case of this ship also, splinters from enemy shorts entered the Conning Tower, but without causing any damage to either personnel or Materiel.<br />
<br />
During the whole engagement about 250 rounds of 30 cm. (12") ammunition was fired, i.e. about one fifth of the total supply on board.<br />
<br />
<center>F. "MOLTKE".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This ship was hit 4 times by heavy shell (all from the starboard side).<br />
<br />
One shell (Hit No.3) pierced the upper side armour and burst behind the latter inside the ship. It also caused some damage outside to No.4.15 cm. (5.9") casemate starboard (from forward) killing or wounding several men, but causing little damage to the gun. This gun was again brought into action after about 15 minutes.<br />
<br />
<center>11. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
"MOLTKE" was the only ship from which 4 Torpedoes were fired (not in salvo, but one after the other). On board, it was stated by officers that "QUEEN MARY" was fired at and hit at about 10 kilometres (10,935 yds.), and that this was the cause of the rapid sinking of this Battle Cruiser. Officers of other ships, however, were not of this opinion, as when "MOLTKE" fired the distance from "QUEEN MARY" was about 13 kilometres (14,217 yds.) and that the torpedoes have not this range; so that only Gunnery can be taken into consideration.<br />
<br />
In the "MOLTKE", splinters from short bursting shells also entered the Conning Tower, without, however, causing any noteworthy damage.<br />
<br />
<center>G. "DERFFLINGER".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This Battle Cruiser was hit the largest number of times, viz:- 30, of these 20 were of heavy calibre and all came from the port side.<br />
<br />
:(1) A 15" shell pierced the roof of N.4 30.5 cm. (12") Turret (hit No.5) exploded inside the Turret, thereby igniting all the charges which were there (apparently only two) and killed all the Turret's crew, (74 men including reserve crew), except 2 men who were able to get away (wounded).<br />
<br />
:The Turret itself was put out of action because (as was the case in all these hits on Turrets) much damage was done to the various instruments and appliances by the splinters and flash.<br />
<br />
:It is worthy of note that the electric cables in the Turret were comparatively uninjured.<br />
<br />
:(2). Turret No.3 was also hit by a 38 cm. (15") shell (hit No.6). The projectile penetrated the Barbette armour and took with it a large piece of plating into the interior of the Turret. The 74 men of the Turret's crew (as in the hit described above[)] for the most part were killed, only 6 men getting away wounded. It is observed that an 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) gun which was 3½ metres (about 11½ ft.) away from the point of impact, was completely undamaged, although the deck below the spot, and in the immediate vicinity of this gun, was badly damaged.<br />
<br />
:Nos.3 and 4 Turrets were only put out of action towards the end of the engagement.<br />
<br />
:The two foremost Turrets remained completely intact, although the Barbette armour of the second Turret showed a fairly large scrape from a (very glancing) shell hit. But this caused no further damage to the Turret (hit No.13).<br />
<br />
:(4). The Conning Tower was hit on the starboard side on the edge. But only small pieces of the brittle face of the armoured plates splintered off, and in the Tower itself only one elevation-pointer ceased to function.<br />
<br />
:(5). Very severe damage was done by a large calibre shell (hit No.20) which exploded close to the casemate of the No.2 15 cm. (5.9) gun port, which not only damaged this gun, but also put the two neighbouring 15 cm. (5.9") guns out of action. The first named gun was principally severely damaged on the chase, and the chase of the foremost 15 cm. (5.9") gun was indented to such an extent by splinters, that it could not be fired again. The other gun in the vicinity was so shaken up by the powerful explosion, that it could not be moved again. The casualties sustained by the gun's crews were in contrast comparatively small. (1 man killed and several severely or slightly wounded at the first named gun[)].<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
A large fragment of a 38 cm. (15") shell (which failed to explode), was exhibited on board (as is shown in Fig.12, Enc.3)[.] The much distorted fuze was also found.<br />
<br />
<center>H. "KÖNIG".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits.</center><br />
<br />
There were 13 hits (large calibre) identified all from the port side and above the waterline.<br />
<br />
:(1). A 34.3 cm. (13.5) shell hit the port foremost 15 cm. (5.9") casemate. (Hit No.9). A large piece of armour plating was carried into the casemate, where the shell exploded, killed the gun's crew (11 men) and put the gun out of action. The armour plate went further, penetrated the bulkhead, entered the galley, destroyed it and killed more men.<br />
<br />
:(2). Another 34.3 cm. (13.5") shell penetrated the second 15 cm. (5.9") casemate (hit No.8) and exploded, making the gun useless and, by penetrating the deck also caused much damage in the compartment below. The crew of this gun was by chance not at the moment in the casemate, as they had gone out for a short time on account of gas from the explosion in the first 15 cm. (5.9) casemate (which had occurred just previously.) The result was that there were no killed or wounded among the gun's crew.<br />
<br />
:(3). The traces of a shell were visible on the roof of the foremost 30.5 (12") Turret. (Hit No.11.) The projectile damaged the Rangefinder cover, and tore off a piece of it, rendering the Rangefinder useless. No other damage was caused by this hit.<br />
<br />
:(4). The roof of the Conning Tower was similarly gazed [sic] by a shell, which left a scratch but caused no other damage to the Tower or its instruments, etc.<br />
<br />
<center>J. "HINDENBURG."</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Apparently about 30,000 tons displacement)</center><br />
<br />
This Cruiser, now building will be given an armament of 8 30.5 cm. (12") guns 50 cal. (in four double turrets, 2 forward and 2 aft as in "DERFFLINGER") and 14 15 cm. (5.9") and 8.8 cm[.] (22 pr.) Anti-aircraft guns.<br />
<br />
The foremost superimposed Turret (No.2) was mostly built in, and a short inspection of it was made.<br />
<br />
The Gun-platform is especially roomy. The distance apart of the centres of the two gun barrels being estimated at about 3 metres (10 feet approx.)[.] The complete arrangement of the gun-platform can be seen in the diagrammatic Sketch (Fig.13, Enc.3). The 2 shell hoists (G) are side by side between the gun and to the left of the left gun, (and right of the right gun) are the two ammunition hoists (P).<br />
<br />
The up-coming ammunition is placed in its slide (TT) in the rear by means of unloading rammers (so-called "Umlauder"), whence it rolls on to the loading Tray, and finally on to the shell swings or cartridge swings, which by swinging across, brings the shell or cartridges one after the other to the rear of the gun for loading.<br />
<br />
The two rammers are hydraulic chain Rammers (with reserve hand drive). In the space at the rear of the platform there are :- an entrance opening (E) and two openings (A) for passing out firedcartridge [sic] cases. These openings (A) are constructed similarly to those more exactly described under "SEYDLITZ" (Sec.II. Par.9).<br />
<br />
The Breeches are worked hydraulically (the reserve method being by hand.)<br />
<br />
The principle can be gathered from Fig.14, Enc.3 . A bar with a tooth edged point (Z), (which can be worked up or down hydraulically) turns the Traversing shaft by means of cog wheels (R1, R2, R3) and opens or shuts the breech. The Water-pressure is led to the mechanism through two flexible hoses. If the cog wheel R3 is placed out of gear with R2, the hydraulic system is shut off.<br />
<br />
For elevating,Trunnion sights are provided and for training a sighting telescope is fitted in front between the guns.<br />
<br />
The Rangefinder (about 8 metres long) which was not yet on board, is to be fitted in the front of the Turret above the guns (under the roof as already referred to under "KURFÜRST")[.] Only the two side openings in the armour could be seen.<br />
<br />
Elevating is worked hydraulically (Reserve system by hand). (The ammunition hoists are also worked hydraulically, but here the alternative system is electric).<br />
<br />
A gun coupling is fitted in this ship as in all later ships. But these couplings are apparently only for use when it is desired to elevate a gun whose elevating gear has been damaged.<br />
<br />
The normal Turret Training gear and also the reserve system is only worked by electric motors.<br />
<br />
The same system of ventilation is used as has already been described in "SEYDLITZ" (Section II, Par.II).<br />
<br />
All working machinery (Electrically driven pumps, and electric motors for elevating, training, hoists, rammers, etc.) are apparently installed in the spacious working chamber below the gun platform.<br />
<br />
The arrangements in the Magazines as well as the transporting gear for passing shell and cartridges from them to the hoists are the same as those already more minutely described under battleship "GROSSER KÜRFURST."<br />
<br />
<center>K. "BAYERN".</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Class Ersatz "WÖRTH" about 30,000 tons disp.)</center><br />
<br />
This battleship, only recently completed, had to carry out exercises whilst at Kiel, and the Commission was invited to join for a cruise, which gave opportunity for a certain amount of inspection.<br />
<br />
The armament consists of eight 38 cm. (15") G.L. 45 guns in four double turrets apparently arranged as shown in the Almanac; sixteen 15 cm. (5.9") G.L. 45 guns in casemates and eight 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) anti-aircraft guns.<br />
<br />
38 cm. Gun Turret. (Fig. 15, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
The distance apart of the bore axes is 3700 mm. (12.1 ft.) for these guns[.] 8.8 cm. sub-calibre guns are provided, which are put in from outboard (i.e. muzzle end.)<br />
<br />
The Gunhouse, as in the turrets of the "HINDENBURG" is very roomy.<br />
<br />
In this turret there has been introduced no important alteration with respect to the munition hoists. Whereas in all previous ships the shot hoist was separate from the cartridge hoist, in this ship, as with us (the Austrian Navy), both hoists for one gun are combined in one trunk; and also instead of the shell and cartridge swings in the "HINDENBURG" (see above) munition wagons (W1, W2), which run on cross rails are introduced. The two main hoists (A1, A2) come up between the two guns. Besides these there are in addition two electrically driven auxiliary hoists (H1, H2).<br />
<br />
The round which arrives at the top of the hoist is taken out and landed, by means of the unloading rammer (U) in the munition wagon, which brings it to the rear of the particular gun in the loading position, whence it is loaded by means of the rammer.<br />
<br />
The munition wagons, rammers and unloading rammers are normally worked by hydraulic power (with auxiliary handworking gear); at the back of the turret are two principal operating positions, (ST1, ST2) which are raised to give a good all-round view, and where all the necessary manipulation for the foregoing hydraulic machinery is carried out.<br />
<br />
The munition hoists are also hydraulically worked, and electric drive is provided as an alternative. The elevating and breech mechanism gear are hydraulic (with alternative hand gear).<br />
<br />
The following sighting arrangements are provided :-<br />
<br />
:(a) For elevation - two side trunnion sights as well as two reserve sights in front.<br />
<br />
:(b) For training - a principal trainer's telescope in front between the two guns, as well as a side telescope as reserve.<br />
<br />
Asked whether any automatic firing apparatus was in contemplation, it was replied that a place for such apparatus was provided but the installation could not be expected till later, and depended on the solution of several problems which had yet to be experimented on.<br />
<br />
The large 8.2 m. (26.9 ft.) rangefinder is placed the same as in the "HINDENBURG".</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Report_on_German_Warships_after_Jutland&diff=334762Austro-Hungarian Naval Report on German Warships after Jutland2024-03-23T22:57:31Z<p>Simon Harley: Made Changes.</p>
<hr />
<div>It was prepared by ''Marineartillerie-Oberingenieure 2. Klasse'' Georg Schindler. This report is in many ways more detailed than that of ''Fregattenkapitäne'' Hieronymus Graf von Colloredo-Mannsfeld [[Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland|prepared immediately after Jutland]].<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
REPORT by a Mission undertaken in accordance with Order. Section 4 M.S. No.1746 of 1916.<br />
----<br />
<br />
On the inspection of German Warships which took part in the Battle of the Skaggerak (Jutland), 31st.May - 1st.June 1916; on Wilhelmshaven, Hamburg and Kiel, and on other inspections of ships and bases.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}By Georg Schindler,<br />
<br />
{{pad|580px}}Gunnery Engineer, 2nd Class.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}AUSTRIAN NAVY.<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
The only details which have been dealt with are those which were of Gunnery interest.<br />
<br />
{|<br />
| A.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "SEYDLITZ"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| B.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "OSTFRIESLAND"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| C.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "VON DER TANN"<br />
| were<br />
|-<br />
| D.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "GROSSER KÜRFURST"<br />
| in<br />
|-<br />
| E.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"&nbsp;<br />
| "MARKGRAF"<br />
| engagement.<br />
|-<br />
| F.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "MOLTKE"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| G.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"<br />
| "DERFFLINGER"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| H.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "KÖNIG"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| J.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "HINDENBURG" (building)<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| K.<br />
| Large Battleship<br />
| "BAYERN"<br />
| rowspan=2 | } Newly commissioned<br />
|-<br />
| L.<br />
| T.B.D.<br />
| "G.90"<br />
|-<br />
| M.<br />
| colspan=3 | Fishing vessels Anti-Submarine armament, etc.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| N.<br />
| colspan=3 | Short inspection of the Ordnance Workshops in the Arsenal in Wilhelmshaven. <br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| O.<br />
| Ditto in Kiel.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|}<br />
<br />
Ships under A.B.C.J. and M. were in Wilhelmshaven. D.E.F. in Hamburg and G.H.K.L. in Kiel.<br />
<br />
In the following reports on each ship, Section 1 deals with the effect of enemy hits on ships A. to H. above, in conjunction with the two attached ship sketches (Enclosures 1 and 2). [Not attached.]<br />
<br />
Of the hits marked in the sketches those of a gunnery interest are distinguished by red ink. Section II gives general remarks concerning the ships in question.<br />
<br />
Further a report is submitted on installations in newly commissioned ships (K. and L.) also on a ship still under construction (J.), as well as means of combating submarines installed in Fishing vessels (M.) and finally, briefly on the Ordnance workshops in the Naval Arsenals (N. and O.).<br />
<br />
A. "SEYDLITZ" (Enclosure 1).<br />
<br />
This Cruiser received 24 shell hits (38 cm. 34.3 cm. and 30.5 cm.)(15", 13.5" and 12") and one Torpedo hit.<br />
<br />
Except for 1 shell hit (apparently 34.3 cm.) (13.5") on the starboard side forward (Hits nos.2-4) and one hit no.16 (38 cm.?) in the starboard after 15 cm. (6") casemate all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all Gun tubes, Guns and many fittings had been dismantled and landed.<br />
<br />
<center>I. Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
<br />
1. A large calibre shell (hit no.8) struck the 2nd. 15 cm. port casemate (from forward), put the gun out of action and killed or seriously wounded the majority of the gun's crew.<br />
<br />
2. A 38 cm. shell exploded in the 4th 15 cm. casemate (hit No.13) the gun was similarly damaged, and 2 men (wounded) remained alive of the crew.<br />
<br />
3. In the port after 15 cm. casemate, No.6 gun, (hit No.15) had the same effect as the two described above.<br />
<br />
4. A 38 cm. shell (hit No.16) penetrated the armoured bulkhead on starboard side aft, near the last 15 cm. casemate, close to the curve of the armour (Fig.1, Enc.3) destroyed the 15 cm. gun and killed most of the gun crew.<br />
<br />
Of the twelve 15 cm. guns it appears that 2 port and 4 starboard fired unceasingly until the end.<br />
<br />
5. No.2 Turret (starboard) received a hit from port on the vertical turret armour (hit No.21) to the right of the right gun. Part of the nose of the shell pierced the armour anddestroyed [sic] the cradle and training gear of the right gun. The left was undamaged. The turret remained in action with this gun.<br />
<br />
6. An interesting hit is to be seen on the right 28 cm. gun of No.3 Turret port. The gun was on one of the jetties of the arsenal and could be examined. A large calibre shell hit the aforesaid gun a glancing blow just outside the turret, producing at the point of impact, a considerable elliptical scoop on the outside, causing a fracture of the inner tube and in addition bent the gun so that the axis of the tube at the muzzle was (as far as could be estimated) 200 mm. (about 8 in.) out of line.<br />
<br />
The cradle of this gun was split, the trunnions somewhat bent and the caps thereof partially opened out.<br />
<br />
The left gun of this turret, however, remained serviceable and the Turret could continue firing without interruption.<br />
<br />
7. A 34.3 cm. (13.5") shell (hit No.18) pierced the vertical armour of the revolving structure of No.4 Turret superimposed to the left of the left gun exploded inside the turret, ignited the cartridges which were ready for loading, put the turret out of action and killed all the crew (about 70 men) except 6.<br />
<br />
T [sic] This turret, already out of action, received another hit later from a 38 cm. (15") shell (hit No.17) this projectile struck the revolving Turret armour close to the lower edge at the right rear of the turret, and partially penetrated the turret.<br />
<br />
8. A Large calibre shell tore off the roof of the after (No.5) turret. (Geschossgeller ? ricochet). The turret suffered no appreciable damage inside.<br />
<br />
The remaining hits are being dealt with in the report on ship construction.≠ [I.D. Note: The original of this report can, unfortunately, not be obtained.]<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
<center>II Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
1. Extensive "flash" protection was already installed in "SEYDLITZ".<br />
<br />
(a) The openings for bringing 28 cm. cartridges into the lower loading chamber of the Ammunition Hoist can be shut off with sliding doors (schubtüren ?). The supply scuttles from the magazines are fitted with hinged flaps which open upwards on each side (Fig.3, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
(b) The 15 cm. (5.9") Ammunition hoists at the supply position in the casemates are fitted with a "closing flap" which shuts automatically, but its own weight assisted by a spring, immediately after the ammunition has rolled out on to the Ammunition Tray (which is placed in a horizontal position by a Paternoster apparatus (endless chain) (Fig.4, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
2. Apparently Gas Masks are employed in all ships. The method of use is the same as in the German Army. <u>Every</u> man was supplied with a mask (as it happened 2 days before action). These masks were to be brought into use immediately there was any evidence of suffocating gases, and they were so far successful that, according to the opinions of officers, at least one ship, if not two, was saved by their use.<br />
<br />
3. Enemy "shorts" usually exploded on hitting the water, with the result that, (as in the cases of shells exploding on board), splinters of various sizes struck guns among other things, and caused damage, but in practically every case no stoppage of firing from the gun resulted. Shell splinters also entered Conning Towers and Turrets through the sighting slits. But they caused no internal damage as their force was broken by their passage through the deeps [sic] slits. (Fig.5, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
4. In Turret firing. Salvoes were gradually used, and always with <u>only one</u> gun of each turret.<br />
<br />
5. For transmission of orders to the guns (also to 15 cm. (5.9" guns) from the Gunnery Officers position (in the Conning Tower) Elevation pointers are used which are mounted (<u>separately</u>) on brackets away from the Turret armour.<br />
<br />
6. Ranges of the individual rangefinders are shown on a circular scale (range receiver) by means of electrically worked pointers. All these dials are mounter [sic] in a circular box (Fig.6, Enc.3) so that the ranges of the same object shown by several rangefinders (Pointers in similar direction)[.] Further, it is possible to cut out one or other of the dials if the Rangetaker concerned is ranging badly.<br />
<br />
7. Repulse of Destroyers is carried out invariably by means of broadside salvoes of 15 cm. (5.9) guns etc. and one target only is always used. But the Gunlayer is only to fire when sights are exactly on the target.<br />
<br />
8. The 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) guns were not used in the battle. It is understood that in the future guns of this calibre, will only be retained on board as anti-aircraft guns, as was laid down for all ships.<br />
<br />
9. (a) The empty 26 cm. (11") cartridge cases are thrown out of the turrets on to the deck through openings in rear of the Gun platforms (2 per turret). A covering flap, opening downwards when the cases are thrown out, automatically closes the hole by means of a spring (Fig.7, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
(b) The fired 15 cm. (5.9") cartridge are placed in a large hanging net in the casemate, and are only removed from the casemate during a lull in the firing. It was stated that a very large number of fired cases (including Large Calibre ones) were collected and brought back.<br />
<br />
10. The voice pipes are made of 60,100 and 150 mm. diameter (2.4 in., 3.8 in.,and 6 in.). (The last named are called Schallrohre and are intended for short distances). Voice pipes are not lagged.<br />
<br />
11. The ventilation of the Turrets is similar to the method employed in our newer ships. A Fan placed between the two guns, sucks, on the one hand the powder gases from the breeches by means of a ventilation pipe from each gun when the breech is opened and on the other hand draws them away from the roof of the turret on the gun platform another fan, portable, and continually running, was installed when sucked in fresh air through a hose and passed it into the interior of the turret bymeans [sic] of a second hose. If any man had any difficulty in breathing he inhaled fresh air through the second hose. But even this method only afforded partial relief.<br />
<br />
12. All Gunnery machinery (hydraulic and electric) appears to have function correctly.<br />
<br />
13. From the Gunnery point of view there were no serious fires (magazines of any description), for which the "Flash door" protection described in Section II Miscellaneous, Pars. I (a) and (b) is principally responsible. All cartridges actually in a turret or casemate,when [sic] an enemy shell burst in the turret or casemate, were exploded in every case. Therefore the rule was most strictly enforced that only the absolute minimum of ammunition was kept ready at the guns.<br />
<br />
14. "SEYDLITZ" had 1150 28 cm. (11" shell) on board, of which 450 were expended. (No ship expended all her ammunition).<br />
<br />
15. The torpedo nets were not actually a hindrance in the action but they sustained heavy damage fromenemy [sic] hits and splinters so that parts of them hung down over the ships side.<br />
<br />
In future these nets being useless ballast will no longer be carried. This is already the case in the new battleship "BAYERN".<br />
<br />
<center>B. "OSTRFRIESLAND".</center><br />
<br />
<center>I. Hits. (Enclosure 1).</center><br />
<br />
This Battleship received no shell hits, but was struck by a mine onthe [sic] starboard side forward. The detailed description is contained in the report on Ship Construction.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
At the time of the inspection of this ship the 30.5 cm. (12") Ammunition was being embarked. The shells were being slung from the Quay on to the Deck by means of a powerful floating crane in bundles (of about 5 projectiles). All cartridges are enclosed in long water-tight zinc containers, fitted with stiffening bands. They were being rolled on board carefully across broad planks and stowed in the Magazines. If several rounds of ready ammunition have to be stowed in the Turret, the charges are always kept in the zinc cylinders.<br />
<br />
The 30.5 cm. (12") and also 28 cm. (11") projectiles are (according to the statement of the Gunnery Officer of this ship, Lt.Comdr.Lauenstein) of one description throughout, capped and fitted with base fuse. Total weight 405 kg. (about 890 lbs.) Bursting charge 12 to 13 kg. (26½ to 29 lbs.) of Trotyl. In the latest ships, however, "Armour piercing" and "high explosive" shell (but with a new explosive for bursting charge) are again to be used, as is already the case with the 28 cm. (15") shell in the Battleship "BAYERN".<br />
<br />
For the 15 cm.(5.9") guns it is reported that there are two types of shell in use.<br />
<br />
:(a) Fused shell with base fuses.<br />
<br />
:(b) High explosive shell,with a very sensitive nose fuse and a base fuse.<br />
<br />
<center>C. "VON DER TANN". (Enclosure 1.)</center><br />
<br />
This Battle Cruiser received 4 hits from large calibre shells (all on the starboard side).<br />
<br />
<center>I.Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
<br />
(1). The foremost 28 cm. (11") Turret was hit in the Barbette on the starboard side. The shell exploded and the armour was just penetrated (Hit No.1). Three men in the turret sustained burns (not very severe) from the "Flash". But the Turret was placed out of action as the armour at the point of impact was bulged inwards and jammed the Turret.<br />
<br />
(2). The after Conning Tower was similarly hit (Hit No.2)[.] But the shell only caused a shaking of the Tower and all apparatus inside remained intact.<br />
<br />
(3.) A shell exploded in the neighbourhood of the after Turret No.4 (Hit No.3). The effect on the Turret was only evident in a shaking, and the armour in the vicinity of the explosion was very slightly indented but without doing any damage so that the Turret continued in action.<br />
<br />
(4). No.4 hit is only of slight constructional interest.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
(1). In this ship, as in "OSTFRIESLAND", the question as to whether the collection of scraps of metal (coming from driving bands or Cartridge cases) in the Breech made any difference to the condition of the breech was answered in the negative.<br />
<br />
(2). The maximum rate of fire of the 28 cm. (11") guns of this Cruiser, as well as of the 30.5 cm. (12") guns of the "OSTFRIESLAND" is stated to have reached 3 - 4 rounds per minute in peace time.<br />
<br />
(3). The arrangement in the 28 cm. (11") turrets is in principle the same as in "SEYDLITZ" or as in the 30.5 cm. (12") guns of the large Battle Cruiser "HINDENBURG" (now building), with the exception of a few improvements in the last named ship. But while in the later ships (30.5 cm. 12") hydraulic rammers with reserve Hand ramming are installed "VON DER TANN" has only double Hand rammers, which are hung under the Turret roof.<br />
<br />
<center>D. "GROSSER KURFÜRST."</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Effects of shell hits (Enclosure 1).</center><br />
<br />
The ship was hit 8 times (large calibre) all from the port side.<br />
<br />
:(1) Hit No.4 (presumably 34 cm. 13.5") exploded before the Barbette armour of the foremost Turret.<br>Apart from breaking off small pieces of the hard armour (? Panzerschichte) and a slight shaking of the turret no damage was done to the Turret fittings. A fragment struck the upper surface of a sight slot and remained in the slot, while a good deal of gas entered the Turret and necessitated the use of gas masks by the crew for some time.<br />
<br />
:(2). A further heavy shell (Hit No.6) struck the port 15 cm.(5.9") Casemate (3rd. from forward) killed 10 of the crew of 14, but damaged the gun so little that after about 12 minutes the gun's crew having been made up, it was brought into action again. Two cartridges which were in the casemate were ignited.<br />
<br />
:(3). The other hits are only of constructional interest.<br />
<br />
:Some 30.5 cm. (12") and 15 cm. (5.9") guns were damaged on the outside by splinters from "shorts", but sustained no other damage.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
The Magazine arrangements in this ship were somewhat more minutely examined as well as reports made concerning them. (The arrangements described below are also used in the other ships).<br />
<br />
The shell bins and shell transport to the shell hoist are shown in Fig. 8, Enc.3) diagrammatically.<br />
<br />
A shell grab (Z) worked by 2 electric motors automatically controlled is used to transport the shell from the bins to the waiting tray fixed round the trunk (Turmraum) (A 1.-4). This grab is suspended from a broad length of wire sword matting, the latter can be wound up or down round a drum (Wa), if the transporting shaft (T) which is provided with two diametrical opposite longitudinal feathers is turned in the corresponding direction. Shaft (T) is fitted into drum (Wa). By this the grab is wound up or down. The grab is moved horizontally by the carrier (R), which holds the above-mentioned revolving drum, being drawn to one side or the other by an endless rope, worked electrically along the shaft (T). To assist the long shaft a deck rail is fitted above it which carries the weights, (Projectile grab and drum with carrier), the carrier being suspended from the rail. The electrical starting levers for both motors are fitted in the shell handing room.<br />
<br />
If it is required to get a shell out of the bin, the motor operating the horizontal movement of the grab is started. Then the long transporting drum is turned correspondingly by the 2nd.motor, thereby lowering the grab, which grips the shell by automatic pressure. Thereupon, by turning the shaft in the opposite direction the shell is raised, transported to the waiting tray (A) of which 4 are provided and placed on it. This waiting tray is so arranged that a shell can be landed only in the one position in order to prevent an inverted landing on the shell bogie relative to the entry in the hoist. The shell bogie is fitted with the same stops as the waiting tray.<br />
<br />
From the waiting tray the shell can be placed on either of the two shell bogies (which are rigidly joined to each other). The latter run easily with rollers on a circular rail, and can not only be adjusted exactly at the waiting tray by means of spring stops, but can also be coupled to the shell hoist in the loading position.<br />
<br />
In the shell rooms (lower deck) the shells are stowed in bins four to five deep (Fig.9, Enc.3)[.] The copper driving bands are protected by a broad covering band of strong canvas the ends of which are sewn together with (twine ?). Only rope is placed between the individual shells as a preventative against damage. Two vertical wooden batten are secured to the side walls of the shell bins - right and left.<br />
<br />
In order to ensure the grab gripping the shell as near as possible round the centre of gravity, each shell has a white ring painted round it.<br />
<br />
It is to be noted that the shell room cannot be shut off (water tightly) from the shell handing room as the large openings in the dividing Bulkhead, through which the transport carrier passes, are always open.<br />
<br />
In addition projectiles are stowed in many ships in the corners of the shell handing room itself in fixed bins.<br />
<br />
The 30.5 (12") cartridges are stowed in their water tight zinc cylinders in special stowage fittings in the magazines. These stowages are made of angle Iron and sheet plates. (There is no wood in the fittings).<br />
<br />
The Magazines, (2 decks from the bottom) in contrast to the shell room, are separated from the Magazine handing room, by a means of thin sheet bulkheads, in which the passage ways are fitted with double doors and the circular openings for handing cartridges are fitted with double covering flaps (the latter have already been remarked on in "SEYDLITZ" Section 11, Fig.3, Enc.3.[)]<br />
<br />
For transport of cartridges in the Magazines the transporting gear shewn in Fig.10, Enc.3 is available. This consists of a double rail (R) in which a horizontal (sheet iron) tray, semicircular in section can be moved up and down in guides by means of a hand differential purchase (F). The Tray can then be brought to the exact level of the cartridge. The Transporting gear is suspended from an overhead rail,(S) and also runs in a guide rail on the deck (SS). The cartridge is pushed on to the tray and the transporter then brought to the cartridge handing hole, and after opening the double flaps, transferred to the Turret.<br />
<br />
The Turret appliances correspond in general to those in "HINDENBURG", about which data are described later. But an exception must be made in the case of the size and installation of the Rangefinders (Fig.11, Enc.3).In "KURFÜRST" the Rangefinders about 3 meters (10 ft.) long are fitted in hoods in the front of the Turret, while "HINDENBURG" the 8 metre (26 ft.) range finders are already being fitted in the same way as will be the case in our 35 cm. (about 14") turrets, now building.<br />
<br />
<center>E. "MARKGRAF".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This Battleship was hit 5 times by big guns and all from the port side.<br />
<br />
Only hit No.2 is of gunnery interest. This entered the next to the last 15 cm. (5.(') [5.9"] casemate on the port side and exploded, killing the crew and putting gun out of action for the remainder of the battle, though it did not damage it very seriously.<br />
<br />
Several splinters from this shell pierced the bulkhead and entered the next casemate (forward) and killed or wounded several men. But this gun was brought into action again after an interval of about 10 minutes to make up the crew.<br />
<br />
<center>11. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
In the case of this ship also, splinters from enemy shorts entered the Conning Tower, but without causing any damage to either personnel or Materiel.<br />
<br />
During the whole engagement about 250 rounds of 30 cm. (12") ammunition was fired, i.e. about one fifth of the total supply on board.<br />
<br />
<center>F. "MOLTKE".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This ship was hit 4 times by heavy shell (all from the starboard side).<br />
<br />
One shell (Hit No.3) pierced the upper side armour and burst behind the latter inside the ship. It also caused some damage outside to No.4.15 cm. (5.9") casemate starboard (from forward) killing or wounding several men, but causing little damage to the gun. This gun was again brought into action after about 15 minutes.<br />
<br />
<center>11. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
"MOLTKE" was the only ship from which 4 Torpedoes were fired (not in salvo, but one after the other). On board, it was stated by officers that "QUEEN MARY" was fired at and hit at about 10 kilometres (10,935 yds.), and that this was the cause of the rapid sinking of this Battle Cruiser. Officers of other ships, however, were not of this opinion, as when "MOLTKE" fired the distance from "QUEEN MARY" was about 13 kilometres (14,217 yds.) and that the torpedoes have not this range; so that only Gunnery can be taken into consideration.<br />
<br />
In the "MOLTKE", splinters from short bursting shells also entered the Conning Tower, without, however, causing any noteworthy damage.<br />
<br />
<center>G. "DERFFLINGER".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This Battle Cruiser was hit the largest number of times, viz:- 30, of these 20 were of heavy calibre and all came from the port side.<br />
<br />
:(1) A 15" shell pierced the roof of N.4 30.5 cm. (12") Turret (hit No.5) exploded inside the Turret, thereby igniting all the charges which were there (apparently only two) and killed all the Turret's crew, (74 men including reserve crew), except 2 men who were able to get away (wounded).<br />
<br />
:The Turret itself was put out of action because (as was the case in all these hits on Turrets) much damage was done to the various instruments and appliances by the splinters and flash.<br />
<br />
:It is worthy of note that the electric cables in the Turret were comparatively uninjured.<br />
<br />
:(2). Turret No.3 was also hit by a 38 cm. (15") shell (hit No.6). The projectile penetrated the Barbette armour and took with it a large piece of plating into the interior of the Turret. The 74 men of the Turret's crew (as in the hit described above[)] for the most part were killed, only 6 men getting away wounded. It is observed that an 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) gun which was 3½ metres (about 11½ ft.) away from the point of impact, was completely undamaged, although the deck below the spot, and in the immediate vicinity of this gun, was badly damaged.<br />
<br />
:Nos.3 and 4 Turrets were only put out of action towards the end of the engagement.<br />
<br />
:The two foremost Turrets remained completely intact, although the Barbette armour of the second Turret showed a fairly large scrape from a (very glancing) shell hit. But this caused no further damage to the Turret (hit No.13).<br />
<br />
:(4). The Conning Tower was hit on the starboard side on the edge. But only small pieces of the brittle face of the armoured plates splintered off, and in the Tower itself only one elevation-pointer ceased to function.<br />
<br />
:(5). Very severe damage was done by a large calibre shell (hit No.20) which exploded close to the casemate of the No.2 15 cm. (5.9) gun port, which not only damaged this gun, but also put the two neighbouring 15 cm. (5.9") guns out of action. The first named gun was principally severely damaged on the chase, and the chase of the foremost 15 cm. (5.9") gun was indented to such an extent by splinters, that it could not be fired again. The other gun in the vicinity was so shaken up by the powerful explosion, that it could not be moved again. The casualties sustained by the gun's crews were in contrast comparatively small. (1 man killed and several severely or slightly wounded at the first named gun[)].<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
A large fragment of a 38 cm. (15") shell (which failed to explode), was exhibited on board (as is shown in Fig.12, Enc.3)[.] The much distorted fuze was also found.<br />
<br />
<center>H. "KÖNIG".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits.</center><br />
<br />
There were 13 hits (large calibre) identified all from the port side and above the waterline.<br />
<br />
:(1). A 34.3 cm. (13.5) shell hit the port foremost 15 cm. (5.9") casemate. (Hit No.9). A large piece of armour plating was carried into the casemate, where the shell exploded, killed the gun's crew (11 men) and put the gun out of action. The armour plate went further, penetrated the bulkhead, entered the galley, destroyed it and killed more men.<br />
<br />
:(2). Another 34.3 cm. (13.5") shell penetrated the second 15 cm. (5.9") casemate (hit No.8) and exploded, making the gun useless and, by penetrating the deck also caused much damage in the compartment below. The crew of this gun was by chance not at the moment in the casemate, as they had gone out for a short time on account of gas from the explosion in the first 15 cm. (5.9) casemate (which had occurred just previously.) The result was that there were no killed or wounded among the gun's crew.<br />
<br />
:(3). The traces of a shell were visible on the roof of the foremost 30.5 (12") Turret. (Hit No.11.) The projectile damaged the Rangefinder cover, and tore off a piece of it, rendering the Rangefinder useless. No other damage was caused by this hit.<br />
<br />
:(4). The roof of the Conning Tower was similarly gazed [sic] by a shell, which left a scratch but caused no other damage to the Tower or its instruments, etc.<br />
<br />
<center>J. "HINDENBURG."</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Apparently about 30,000 tons displacement)</center><br />
<br />
This Cruiser, now building will be given an armament of 8 30.5 cm. (12") guns 50 cal. (in four double turrets, 2 forward and 2 aft as in "DERFFLINGER") and 14 15 cm. (5.9") and 8.8 cm[.] (22 pr.) Anti-aircraft guns.<br />
<br />
The foremost superimposed Turret (No.2) was mostly built in, and a short inspection of it was made.<br />
<br />
The Gun-platform is especially roomy. The distance apart of the centres of the two gun barrels being estimated at about 3 metres (10 feet approx.)[.] The complete arrangement of the gun-platform can be seen in the diagrammatic Sketch (Fig.13, Enc.3). The 2 shell hoists (G) are side by side between the gun and to the left of the left gun, (and right of the right gun) are the two ammunition hoists (P).<br />
<br />
The up-coming ammunition is placed in its slide (TT) in the rear by means of unloading rammers (so-called "Umlauder"), whence it rolls on to the loading Tray, and finally on to the shell swings or cartridge swings, which by swinging across, brings the shell or cartridges one after the other to the rear of the gun for loading.<br />
<br />
The two rammers are hydraulic chain Rammers (with reserve hand drive). In the space at the rear of the platform there are :- an entrance opening (E) and two openings (A) for passing out firedcartridge [sic] cases. These openings (A) are constructed similarly to those more exactly described under "SEYDLITZ" (Sec.II. Par.9).<br />
<br />
The Breeches are worked hydraulically (the reserve method being by hand.)<br />
<br />
The principle can be gathered from Fig.14, Enc.3 . A bar with a tooth edged point (Z), (which can be worked up or down hydraulically) turns the Traversing shaft by means of cog wheels (R1, R2, R3) and opens or shuts the breech. The Water-pressure is led to the mechanism through two flexible hoses. If the cog wheel R3 is placed out of gear with R2, the hydraulic system is shut off.<br />
<br />
For elevating,Trunnion sights are provided and for training a sighting telescope is fitted in front between the guns.<br />
<br />
The Rangefinder (about 8 metres long) which was not yet on board, is to be fitted in the front of the Turret above the guns (under the roof as already referred to under "KURFÜRST")[.] Only the two side openings in the armour could be seen.<br />
<br />
Elevating is worked hydraulically (Reserve system by hand). (The ammunition hoists are also worked hydraulically, but here the alternative system is electric).<br />
<br />
A gun coupling is fitted in this ship as in all later ships. But these couplings are apparently only for use when it is desired to elevate a gun whose elevating gear has been damaged.<br />
<br />
The normal Turret Training gear and also the reserve system is only worked by electric motors.<br />
<br />
The same system of ventilation is used as has already been described in "SEYDLITZ" (Section II, Par.II).<br />
<br />
All working machinery (Electrically driven pumps, and electric motors for elevating, training, hoists, rammers, etc.) are apparently installed in the spacious working chamber below the gun platform.<br />
<br />
The arrangements in the Magazines as well as the transporting gear for passing shell and cartridges from them to the hoists are the same as those already more minutely described under battleship "GROSSER KÜRFURST."<br />
<br />
<center>K. "BAYERN".</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Class Ersatz "WÖRTH" about 30,000 tons disp.)</center><br />
<br />
This battleship, only recently completed, had to carry out exercises whilst at Kiel, and the Commission was invited to join for a cruise, which gave opportunity for a certain amount of inspection.<br />
<br />
The armament consists of eight 38 cm. (15") G.L. 45 guns in four double turrets apparently arranged as shown in the Almanac; sixteen 15 cm. (5.9") G.L. 45 guns in casemates and eight 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) anti-aircraft guns.<br />
<br />
38 cm. Gun Turret. (Fig. 15, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
The distance apart of the bore axes is 3700 mm. (12.1 ft.) for these guns[.] 8.8 cm. sub-calibre guns are provided, which are put in from outboard (i.e. muzzle end.)<br />
<br />
The Gunhouse, as in the turrets of the "HINDENBURG" is very roomy.<br />
<br />
In this turret there has been introduced no important alteration with respect to the munition hoists. Whereas in all previous ships the shot hoist was separate from the cartridge hoist, in this ship, as with us (the Austrian Navy), both hoists for one gun are combined in one trunk; and also instead of the shell and cartridge swings in the "HINDENBURG" (see above) munition wagons (W1, W2), which run on cross rails are introduced. The two main hoists (A1, A2) come up between the two guns. Besides these there are in addition two electrically driven auxiliary hoists (H1, H2).</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Report_on_German_Warships_after_Jutland&diff=334761Austro-Hungarian Naval Report on German Warships after Jutland2024-03-22T18:11:44Z<p>Simon Harley: Made Changes.</p>
<hr />
<div>It was prepared by ''Marineartillerie-Oberingenieure 2. Klasse'' Georg Schindler. This report is in many ways more detailed than that of ''Fregattenkapitäne'' Hieronymus Graf von Colloredo-Mannsfeld [[Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland|prepared immediately after Jutland]].<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
REPORT by a Mission undertaken in accordance with Order. Section 4 M.S. No.1746 of 1916.<br />
----<br />
<br />
On the inspection of German Warships which took part in the Battle of the Skaggerak (Jutland), 31st.May - 1st.June 1916; on Wilhelmshaven, Hamburg and Kiel, and on other inspections of ships and bases.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}By Georg Schindler,<br />
<br />
{{pad|580px}}Gunnery Engineer, 2nd Class.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}AUSTRIAN NAVY.<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
The only details which have been dealt with are those which were of Gunnery interest.<br />
<br />
{|<br />
| A.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "SEYDLITZ"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| B.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "OSTFRIESLAND"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| C.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "VON DER TANN"<br />
| were<br />
|-<br />
| D.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "GROSSER KÜRFURST"<br />
| in<br />
|-<br />
| E.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"&nbsp;<br />
| "MARKGRAF"<br />
| engagement.<br />
|-<br />
| F.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "MOLTKE"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| G.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"<br />
| "DERFFLINGER"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| H.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "KÖNIG"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| J.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "HINDENBURG" (building)<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| K.<br />
| Large Battleship<br />
| "BAYERN"<br />
| rowspan=2 | } Newly commissioned<br />
|-<br />
| L.<br />
| T.B.D.<br />
| "G.90"<br />
|-<br />
| M.<br />
| colspan=3 | Fishing vessels Anti-Submarine armament, etc.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| N.<br />
| colspan=3 | Short inspection of the Ordnance Workshops in the Arsenal in Wilhelmshaven. <br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| O.<br />
| Ditto in Kiel.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|}<br />
<br />
Ships under A.B.C.J. and M. were in Wilhelmshaven. D.E.F. in Hamburg and G.H.K.L. in Kiel.<br />
<br />
In the following reports on each ship, Section 1 deals with the effect of enemy hits on ships A. to H. above, in conjunction with the two attached ship sketches (Enclosures 1 and 2). [Not attached.]<br />
<br />
Of the hits marked in the sketches those of a gunnery interest are distinguished by red ink. Section II gives general remarks concerning the ships in question.<br />
<br />
Further a report is submitted on installations in newly commissioned ships (K. and L.) also on a ship still under construction (J.), as well as means of combating submarines installed in Fishing vessels (M.) and finally, briefly on the Ordnance workshops in the Naval Arsenals (N. and O.).<br />
<br />
A. "SEYDLITZ" (Enclosure 1).<br />
<br />
This Cruiser received 24 shell hits (38 cm. 34.3 cm. and 30.5 cm.)(15", 13.5" and 12") and one Torpedo hit.<br />
<br />
Except for 1 shell hit (apparently 34.3 cm.) (13.5") on the starboard side forward (Hits nos.2-4) and one hit no.16 (38 cm.?) in the starboard after 15 cm. (6") casemate all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all Gun tubes, Guns and many fittings had been dismantled and landed.<br />
<br />
<center>I. Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
<br />
1. A large calibre shell (hit no.8) struck the 2nd. 15 cm. port casemate (from forward), put the gun out of action and killed or seriously wounded the majority of the gun's crew.<br />
<br />
2. A 38 cm. shell exploded in the 4th 15 cm. casemate (hit No.13) the gun was similarly damaged, and 2 men (wounded) remained alive of the crew.<br />
<br />
3. In the port after 15 cm. casemate, No.6 gun, (hit No.15) had the same effect as the two described above.<br />
<br />
4. A 38 cm. shell (hit No.16) penetrated the armoured bulkhead on starboard side aft, near the last 15 cm. casemate, close to the curve of the armour (Fig.1, Enc.3) destroyed the 15 cm. gun and killed most of the gun crew.<br />
<br />
Of the twelve 15 cm. guns it appears that 2 port and 4 starboard fired unceasingly until the end.<br />
<br />
5. No.2 Turret (starboard) received a hit from port on the vertical turret armour (hit No.21) to the right of the right gun. Part of the nose of the shell pierced the armour anddestroyed [sic] the cradle and training gear of the right gun. The left was undamaged. The turret remained in action with this gun.<br />
<br />
6. An interesting hit is to be seen on the right 28 cm. gun of No.3 Turret port. The gun was on one of the jetties of the arsenal and could be examined. A large calibre shell hit the aforesaid gun a glancing blow just outside the turret, producing at the point of impact, a considerable elliptical scoop on the outside, causing a fracture of the inner tube and in addition bent the gun so that the axis of the tube at the muzzle was (as far as could be estimated) 200 mm. (about 8 in.) out of line.<br />
<br />
The cradle of this gun was split, the trunnions somewhat bent and the caps thereof partially opened out.<br />
<br />
The left gun of this turret, however, remained serviceable and the Turret could continue firing without interruption.<br />
<br />
7. A 34.3 cm. (13.5") shell (hit No.18) pierced the vertical armour of the revolving structure of No.4 Turret superimposed to the left of the left gun exploded inside the turret, ignited the cartridges which were ready for loading, put the turret out of action and killed all the crew (about 70 men) except 6.<br />
<br />
T [sic] This turret, already out of action, received another hit later from a 38 cm. (15") shell (hit No.17) this projectile struck the revolving Turret armour close to the lower edge at the right rear of the turret, and partially penetrated the turret.<br />
<br />
8. A Large calibre shell tore off the roof of the after (No.5) turret. (Geschossgeller ? ricochet). The turret suffered no appreciable damage inside.<br />
<br />
The remaining hits are being dealt with in the report on ship construction.≠ [I.D. Note: The original of this report can, unfortunately, not be obtained.]<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
<center>II Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
1. Extensive "flash" protection was already installed in "SEYDLITZ".<br />
<br />
(a) The openings for bringing 28 cm. cartridges into the lower loading chamber of the Ammunition Hoist can be shut off with sliding doors (schubtüren ?). The supply scuttles from the magazines are fitted with hinged flaps which open upwards on each side (Fig.3, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
(b) The 15 cm. (5.9") Ammunition hoists at the supply position in the casemates are fitted with a "closing flap" which shuts automatically, but its own weight assisted by a spring, immediately after the ammunition has rolled out on to the Ammunition Tray (which is placed in a horizontal position by a Paternoster apparatus (endless chain) (Fig.4, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
2. Apparently Gas Masks are employed in all ships. The method of use is the same as in the German Army. <u>Every</u> man was supplied with a mask (as it happened 2 days before action). These masks were to be brought into use immediately there was any evidence of suffocating gases, and they were so far successful that, according to the opinions of officers, at least one ship, if not two, was saved by their use.<br />
<br />
3. Enemy "shorts" usually exploded on hitting the water, with the result that, (as in the cases of shells exploding on board), splinters of various sizes struck guns among other things, and caused damage, but in practically every case no stoppage of firing from the gun resulted. Shell splinters also entered Conning Towers and Turrets through the sighting slits. But they caused no internal damage as their force was broken by their passage through the deeps [sic] slits. (Fig.5, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
4. In Turret firing. Salvoes were gradually used, and always with <u>only one</u> gun of each turret.<br />
<br />
5. For transmission of orders to the guns (also to 15 cm. (5.9" guns) from the Gunnery Officers position (in the Conning Tower) Elevation pointers are used which are mounted (<u>separately</u>) on brackets away from the Turret armour.<br />
<br />
6. Ranges of the individual rangefinders are shown on a circular scale (range receiver) by means of electrically worked pointers. All these dials are mounter [sic] in a circular box (Fig.6, Enc.3) so that the ranges of the same object shown by several rangefinders (Pointers in similar direction)[.] Further, it is possible to cut out one or other of the dials if the Rangetaker concerned is ranging badly.<br />
<br />
7. Repulse of Destroyers is carried out invariably by means of broadside salvoes of 15 cm. (5.9) guns etc. and one target only is always used. But the Gunlayer is only to fire when sights are exactly on the target.<br />
<br />
8. The 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) guns were not used in the battle. It is understood that in the future guns of this calibre, will only be retained on board as anti-aircraft guns, as was laid down for all ships.<br />
<br />
9. (a) The empty 26 cm. (11") cartridge cases are thrown out of the turrets on to the deck through openings in rear of the Gun platforms (2 per turret). A covering flap, opening downwards when the cases are thrown out, automatically closes the hole by means of a spring (Fig.7, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
(b) The fired 15 cm. (5.9") cartridge are placed in a large hanging net in the casemate, and are only removed from the casemate during a lull in the firing. It was stated that a very large number of fired cases (including Large Calibre ones) were collected and brought back.<br />
<br />
10. The voice pipes are made of 60,100 and 150 mm. diameter (2.4 in., 3.8 in.,and 6 in.). (The last named are called Schallrohre and are intended for short distances). Voice pipes are not lagged.<br />
<br />
11. The ventilation of the Turrets is similar to the method employed in our newer ships. A Fan placed between the two guns, sucks, on the one hand the powder gases from the breeches by means of a ventilation pipe from each gun when the breech is opened and on the other hand draws them away from the roof of the turret on the gun platform another fan, portable, and continually running, was installed when sucked in fresh air through a hose and passed it into the interior of the turret bymeans [sic] of a second hose. If any man had any difficulty in breathing he inhaled fresh air through the second hose. But even this method only afforded partial relief.<br />
<br />
12. All Gunnery machinery (hydraulic and electric) appears to have function correctly.<br />
<br />
13. From the Gunnery point of view there were no serious fires (magazines of any description), for which the "Flash door" protection described in Section II Miscellaneous, Pars. I (a) and (b) is principally responsible. All cartridges actually in a turret or casemate,when [sic] an enemy shell burst in the turret or casemate, were exploded in every case. Therefore the rule was most strictly enforced that only the absolute minimum of ammunition was kept ready at the guns.<br />
<br />
14. "SEYDLITZ" had 1150 28 cm. (11" shell) on board, of which 450 were expended. (No ship expended all her ammunition).<br />
<br />
15. The torpedo nets were not actually a hindrance in the action but they sustained heavy damage fromenemy [sic] hits and splinters so that parts of them hung down over the ships side.<br />
<br />
In future these nets being useless ballast will no longer be carried. This is already the case in the new battleship "BAYERN".<br />
<br />
<center>B. "OSTRFRIESLAND".</center><br />
<br />
<center>I. Hits. (Enclosure 1).</center><br />
<br />
This Battleship received no shell hits, but was struck by a mine onthe [sic] starboard side forward. The detailed description is contained in the report on Ship Construction.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
At the time of the inspection of this ship the 30.5 cm. (12") Ammunition was being embarked. The shells were being slung from the Quay on to the Deck by means of a powerful floating crane in bundles (of about 5 projectiles). All cartridges are enclosed in long water-tight zinc containers, fitted with stiffening bands. They were being rolled on board carefully across broad planks and stowed in the Magazines. If several rounds of ready ammunition have to be stowed in the Turret, the charges are always kept in the zinc cylinders.<br />
<br />
The 30.5 cm. (12") and also 28 cm. (11") projectiles are (according to the statement of the Gunnery Officer of this ship, Lt.Comdr.Lauenstein) of one description throughout, capped and fitted with base fuse. Total weight 405 kg. (about 890 lbs.) Bursting charge 12 to 13 kg. (26½ to 29 lbs.) of Trotyl. In the latest ships, however, "Armour piercing" and "high explosive" shell (but with a new explosive for bursting charge) are again to be used, as is already the case with the 28 cm. (15") shell in the Battleship "BAYERN".<br />
<br />
For the 15 cm.(5.9") guns it is reported that there are two types of shell in use.<br />
<br />
:(a) Fused shell with base fuses.<br />
<br />
:(b) High explosive shell,with a very sensitive nose fuse and a base fuse.<br />
<br />
<center>C. "VON DER TANN". (Enclosure 1.)</center><br />
<br />
This Battle Cruiser received 4 hits from large calibre shells (all on the starboard side).<br />
<br />
<center>I.Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
<br />
(1). The foremost 28 cm. (11") Turret was hit in the Barbette on the starboard side. The shell exploded and the armour was just penetrated (Hit No.1). Three men in the turret sustained burns (not very severe) from the "Flash". But the Turret was placed out of action as the armour at the point of impact was bulged inwards and jammed the Turret.<br />
<br />
(2). The after Conning Tower was similarly hit (Hit No.2)[.] But the shell only caused a shaking of the Tower and all apparatus inside remained intact.<br />
<br />
(3.) A shell exploded in the neighbourhood of the after Turret No.4 (Hit No.3). The effect on the Turret was only evident in a shaking, and the armour in the vicinity of the explosion was very slightly indented but without doing any damage so that the Turret continued in action.<br />
<br />
(4). No.4 hit is only of slight constructional interest.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
(1). In this ship, as in "OSTFRIESLAND", the question as to whether the collection of scraps of metal (coming from driving bands or Cartridge cases) in the Breech made any difference to the condition of the breech was answered in the negative.<br />
<br />
(2). The maximum rate of fire of the 28 cm. (11") guns of this Cruiser, as well as of the 30.5 cm. (12") guns of the "OSTFRIESLAND" is stated to have reached 3 - 4 rounds per minute in peace time.<br />
<br />
(3). The arrangement in the 28 cm. (11") turrets is in principle the same as in "SEYDLITZ" or as in the 30.5 cm. (12") guns of the large Battle Cruiser "HINDENBURG" (now building), with the exception of a few improvements in the last named ship. But while in the later ships (30.5 cm. 12") hydraulic rammers with reserve Hand ramming are installed "VON DER TANN" has only double Hand rammers, which are hung under the Turret roof.<br />
<br />
<center>D. "GROSSER KURFÜRST."</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Effects of shell hits (Enclosure 1).</center><br />
<br />
The ship was hit 8 times (large calibre) all from the port side.<br />
<br />
:(1) Hit No.4 (presumably 34 cm. 13.5") exploded before the Barbette armour of the foremost Turret.<br>Apart from breaking off small pieces of the hard armour (? Panzerschichte) and a slight shaking of the turret no damage was done to the Turret fittings. A fragment struck the upper surface of a sight slot and remained in the slot, while a good deal of gas entered the Turret and necessitated the use of gas masks by the crew for some time.<br />
<br />
:(2). A further heavy shell (Hit No.6) struck the port 15 cm.(5.9") Casemate (3rd. from forward) killed 10 of the crew of 14, but damaged the gun so little that after about 12 minutes the gun's crew having been made up, it was brought into action again. Two cartridges which were in the casemate were ignited.<br />
<br />
:(3). The other hits are only of constructional interest.<br />
<br />
:Some 30.5 cm. (12") and 15 cm. (5.9") guns were damaged on the outside by splinters from "shorts", but sustained no other damage.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
The Magazine arrangements in this ship were somewhat more minutely examined as well as reports made concerning them. (The arrangements described below are also used in the other ships).<br />
<br />
The shell bins and shell transport to the shell hoist are shown in Fig. 8, Enc.3) diagrammatically.<br />
<br />
A shell grab (Z) worked by 2 electric motors automatically controlled is used to transport the shell from the bins to the waiting tray fixed round the trunk (Turmraum) (A 1.-4). This grab is suspended from a broad length of wire sword matting, the latter can be wound up or down round a drum (Wa), if the transporting shaft (T) which is provided with two diametrical opposite longitudinal feathers is turned in the corresponding direction. Shaft (T) is fitted into drum (Wa). By this the grab is wound up or down. The grab is moved horizontally by the carrier (R), which holds the above-mentioned revolving drum, being drawn to one side or the other by an endless rope, worked electrically along the shaft (T). To assist the long shaft a deck rail is fitted above it which carries the weights, (Projectile grab and drum with carrier), the carrier being suspended from the rail. The electrical starting levers for both motors are fitted in the shell handing room.<br />
<br />
If it is required to get a shell out of the bin, the motor operating the horizontal movement of the grab is started. Then the long transporting drum is turned correspondingly by the 2nd.motor, thereby lowering the grab, which grips the shell by automatic pressure. Thereupon, by turning the shaft in the opposite direction the shell is raised, transported to the waiting tray (A) of which 4 are provided and placed on it. This waiting tray is so arranged that a shell can be landed only in the one position in order to prevent an inverted landing on the shell bogie relative to the entry in the hoist. The shell bogie is fitted with the same stops as the waiting tray.<br />
<br />
From the waiting tray the shell can be placed on either of the two shell bogies (which are rigidly joined to each other). The latter run easily with rollers on a circular rail, and can not only be adjusted exactly at the waiting tray by means of spring stops, but can also be coupled to the shell hoist in the loading position.<br />
<br />
In the shell rooms (lower deck) the shells are stowed in bins four to five deep (Fig.9, Enc.3)[.] The copper driving bands are protected by a broad covering band of strong canvas the ends of which are sewn together with (twine ?). Only rope is placed between the individual shells as a preventative against damage. Two vertical wooden batten are secured to the side walls of the shell bins - right and left.<br />
<br />
In order to ensure the grab gripping the shell as near as possible round the centre of gravity, each shell has a white ring painted round it.<br />
<br />
It is to be noted that the shell room cannot be shut off (water tightly) from the shell handing room as the large openings in the dividing Bulkhead, through which the transport carrier passes, are always open.<br />
<br />
In addition projectiles are stowed in many ships in the corners of the shell handing room itself in fixed bins.<br />
<br />
The 30.5 (12") cartridges are stowed in their water tight zinc cylinders in special stowage fittings in the magazines. These stowages are made of angle Iron and sheet plates. (There is no wood in the fittings).<br />
<br />
The Magazines, (2 decks from the bottom) in contrast to the shell room, are separated from the Magazine handing room, by a means of thin sheet bulkheads, in which the passage ways are fitted with double doors and the circular openings for handing cartridges are fitted with double covering flaps (the latter have already been remarked on in "SEYDLITZ" Section 11, Fig.3, Enc.3.[)]<br />
<br />
For transport of cartridges in the Magazines the transporting gear shewn in Fig.10, Enc.3 is available. This consists of a double rail (R) in which a horizontal (sheet iron) tray, semicircular in section can be moved up and down in guides by means of a hand differential purchase (F). The Tray can then be brought to the exact level of the cartridge. The Transporting gear is suspended from an overhead rail,(S) and also runs in a guide rail on the deck (SS). The cartridge is pushed on to the tray and the transporter then brought to the cartridge handing hole, and after opening the double flaps, transferred to the Turret.<br />
<br />
The Turret appliances correspond in general to those in "HINDENBURG", about which data are described later. But an exception must be made in the case of the size and installation of the Rangefinders (Fig.11, Enc.3).In "KURFÜRST" the Rangefinders about 3 meters (10 ft.) long are fitted in hoods in the front of the Turret, while "HINDENBURG" the 8 metre (26 ft.) range finders are already being fitted in the same way as will be the case in our 35 cm. (about 14") turrets, now building.<br />
<br />
<center>E. "MARKGRAF".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This Battleship was hit 5 times by big guns and all from the port side.<br />
<br />
Only hit No.2 is of gunnery interest. This entered the next to the last 15 cm. (5.(') [5.9"] casemate on the port side and exploded, killing the crew and putting gun out of action for the remainder of the battle, though it did not damage it very seriously.<br />
<br />
Several splinters from this shell pierced the bulkhead and entered the next casemate (forward) and killed or wounded several men. But this gun was brought into action again after an interval of about 10 minutes to make up the crew.<br />
<br />
<center>11. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
In the case of this ship also, splinters from enemy shorts entered the Conning Tower, but without causing any damage to either personnel or Materiel.<br />
<br />
During the whole engagement about 250 rounds of 30 cm. (12") ammunition was fired, i.e. about one fifth of the total supply on board.<br />
<br />
<center>F. "MOLTKE".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This ship was hit 4 times by heavy shell (all from the starboard side).<br />
<br />
One shell (Hit No.3) pierced the upper side armour and burst behind the latter inside the ship. It also caused some damage outside to No.4.15 cm. (5.9") casemate starboard (from forward) killing or wounding several men, but causing little damage to the gun. This gun was again brought into action after about 15 minutes.<br />
<br />
<center>11. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
"MOLTKE" was the only ship from which 4 Torpedoes were fired (not in salvo, but one after the other). On board, it was stated by officers that "QUEEN MARY" was fired at and hit at about 10 kilometres (10,935 yds.), and that this was the cause of the rapid sinking of this Battle Cruiser. Officers of other ships, however, were not of this opinion, as when "MOLTKE" fired the distance from "QUEEN MARY" was about 13 kilometres (14,217 yds.) and that the torpedoes have not this range; so that only Gunnery can be taken into consideration.<br />
<br />
In the "MOLTKE", splinters from short bursting shells also entered the Conning Tower, without, however, causing any noteworthy damage.<br />
<br />
<center>G. "DERFFLINGER".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This Battle Cruiser was hit the largest number of times, viz:- 30, of these 20 were of heavy calibre and all came from the port side.<br />
<br />
:(1) A 15" shell pierced the roof of N.4 30.5 cm. (12") Turret (hit No.5) exploded inside the Turret, thereby igniting all the charges which were there (apparently only two) and killed all the Turret's crew, (74 men including reserve crew), except 2 men who were able to get away (wounded).<br />
<br />
:The Turret itself was put out of action because (as was the case in all these hits on Turrets) much damage was done to the various instruments and appliances by the splinters and flash.<br />
<br />
:It is worthy of note that the electric cables in the Turret were comparatively uninjured.<br />
<br />
:(2). Turret No.3 was also hit by a 38 cm. (15") shell (hit No.6). The projectile penetrated the Barbette armour and took with it a large piece of plating into the interior of the Turret. The 74 men of the Turret's crew (as in the hit described above[)] for the most part were killed, only 6 men getting away wounded. It is observed that an 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) gun which was 3½ metres (about 11½ ft.) away from the point of impact, was completely undamaged, although the deck below the spot, and in the immediate vicinity of this gun, was badly damaged.<br />
<br />
:Nos.3 and 4 Turrets were only put out of action towards the end of the engagement.<br />
<br />
:The two foremost Turrets remained completely intact, although the Barbette armour of the second Turret showed a fairly large scrape from a (very glancing) shell hit. But this caused no further damage to the Turret (hit No.13).<br />
<br />
:(4). The Conning Tower was hit on the starboard side on the edge. But only small pieces of the brittle face of the armoured plates splintered off, and in the Tower itself only one elevation-pointer ceased to function.<br />
<br />
:(5). Very severe damage was done by a large calibre shell (hit No.20) which exploded close to the casemate of the No.2 15 cm. (5.9) gun port, which not only damaged this gun, but also put the two neighbouring 15 cm. (5.9") guns out of action. The first named gun was principally severely damaged on the chase, and the chase of the foremost 15 cm. (5.9") gun was indented to such an extent by splinters, that it could not be fired again. The other gun in the vicinity was so shaken up by the powerful explosion, that it could not be moved again. The casualties sustained by the gun's crews were in contrast comparatively small. (1 man killed and several severely or slightly wounded at the first named gun[)].<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
A large fragment of a 38 cm. (15") shell (which failed to explode), was exhibited on board (as is shown in Fig.12, Enc.3)[.] The much distorted fuze was also found.<br />
<br />
<center>H. "KÖNIG".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits.</center><br />
<br />
There were 13 hits (large calibre) identified all from the port side and above the waterline.<br />
<br />
:(1). A 34.3 cm. (13.5) shell hit the port foremost 15 cm. (5.9") casemate. (Hit No.9). A large piece of armour plating was carried into the casemate, where the shell exploded, killed the gun's crew (11 men) and put the gun out of action. The armour plate went further, penetrated the bulkhead, entered the galley, destroyed it and killed more men.<br />
<br />
:(2). Another 34.3 cm. (13.5") shell penetrated the second 15 cm. (5.9") casemate (hit No.8) and exploded, making the gun useless and, by penetrating the deck also caused much damage in the compartment below. The crew of this gun was by chance not at the moment in the casemate, as they had gone out for a short time on account of gas from the explosion in the first 15 cm. (5.9) casemate (which had occurred just previously.) The result was that there were no killed or wounded among the gun's crew.<br />
<br />
:(3). The traces of a shell were visible on the roof of the foremost 30.5 (12") Turret. (Hit No.11.) The projectile damaged the Rangefinder cover, and tore off a piece of it, rendering the Rangefinder useless. No other damage was caused by this hit.<br />
<br />
:(4). The roof of the Conning Tower was similarly gazed [sic] by a shell, which left a scratch but caused no other damage to the Tower or its instruments, etc.<br />
<br />
<center>J. "HINDENBURG."</center><br />
<br />
<center>(Apparently about 30,000 tons displacement)</center><br />
<br />
This Cruiser, now building will be given an armament of 8 30.5 cm. (12") guns 50 cal. (in four double turrets, 2 forward and 2 aft as in "DERFFLINGER") and 14 15 cm. (5.9") and 8.8 cm[.] (22 pr.) Anti-aircraft guns.<br />
<br />
The foremost superimposed Turret (No.2) was mostly built in, and a short inspection of it was made.<br />
<br />
The Gun-platform is especially roomy. The distance apart of the centres of the two gun barrels being estimated at about 3 metres (10 feet approx.)[.] The complete arrangement of the gun-platform can be seen in the diagrammatic Sketch (Fig.13, Enc.3). The 2 shell hoists (G) are side by side between the gun and to the left of the left gun, (and right of the right gun) are the two ammunition hoists (P).<br />
<br />
The up-coming ammunition is placed in its slide (TT) in the rear by means of unloading rammers (so-called "Umlauder"), whence it rolls on to the loading Tray, and finally on to the shell swings or cartridge swings, which by swinging across, brings the shell or cartridges one after the other to the rear of the gun for loading.<br />
<br />
The two rammers are hydraulic chain Rammers (with reserve hand drive). In the space at the rear of the platform there are :- an entrance opening (E) and two openings (A) for passing out firedcartridge [sic] cases. These openings (A) are constructed similarly to those more exactly described under "SEYDLITZ" (Sec.II. Par.9).<br />
<br />
The Breeches are worked hydraulically (the reserve method being by hand.)<br />
<br />
The principle can be gathered from Fig.14, Enc.3 . A bar with a tooth edged point (Z), (which can be worked up or down hydraulically) turns the Traversing shaft by means of cog wheels (R1, R2, R3) and opens or shuts the breech. The Water-pressure is led to the mechanism through two flexible hoses. If the cog wheel R3 is placed out of gear with R2, the hydraulic system is shut off.<br />
<br />
For elevating,Trunnion sights are provided and for training a sighting telescope is fitted in front between the guns.<br />
<br />
The Rangefinder (about 8 metres long) which was not yet on board, is to be fitted in the front of the Turret above the guns (under the roof as already referred to under "KURFÜRST")[.] Only the two side openings in the armour could be seen.<br />
<br />
Elevating is worked hydraulically (Reserve system by hand). (The ammunition hoists are also worked hydraulically, but here the alternative system is electric).<br />
<br />
A gun coupling is fitted in this ship as in all later ships. But these couplings are apparently only for use when it is desired to elevate a gun whose elevating gear has been damaged.</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Report_on_German_Warships_after_Jutland&diff=334760Austro-Hungarian Naval Report on German Warships after Jutland2024-03-22T16:34:33Z<p>Simon Harley: Made Changes.</p>
<hr />
<div>It was prepared by ''Marineartillerie-Oberingenieure 2. Klasse'' Georg Schindler. This report is in many ways more detailed than that of ''Fregattenkapitäne'' Hieronymus Graf von Colloredo-Mannsfeld [[Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland|prepared immediately after Jutland]].<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
REPORT by a Mission undertaken in accordance with Order. Section 4 M.S. No.1746 of 1916.<br />
----<br />
<br />
On the inspection of German Warships which took part in the Battle of the Skaggerak (Jutland), 31st.May - 1st.June 1916; on Wilhelmshaven, Hamburg and Kiel, and on other inspections of ships and bases.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}By Georg Schindler,<br />
<br />
{{pad|580px}}Gunnery Engineer, 2nd Class.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}AUSTRIAN NAVY.<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
The only details which have been dealt with are those which were of Gunnery interest.<br />
<br />
{|<br />
| A.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "SEYDLITZ"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| B.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "OSTFRIESLAND"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| C.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "VON DER TANN"<br />
| were<br />
|-<br />
| D.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "GROSSER KÜRFURST"<br />
| in<br />
|-<br />
| E.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"&nbsp;<br />
| "MARKGRAF"<br />
| engagement.<br />
|-<br />
| F.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "MOLTKE"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| G.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"<br />
| "DERFFLINGER"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| H.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "KÖNIG"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| J.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "HINDENBURG" (building)<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| K.<br />
| Large Battleship<br />
| "BAYERN"<br />
| rowspan=2 | } Newly commissioned<br />
|-<br />
| L.<br />
| T.B.D.<br />
| "G.90"<br />
|-<br />
| M.<br />
| colspan=3 | Fishing vessels Anti-Submarine armament, etc.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| N.<br />
| colspan=3 | Short inspection of the Ordnance Workshops in the Arsenal in Wilhelmshaven. <br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| O.<br />
| Ditto in Kiel.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|}<br />
<br />
Ships under A.B.C.J. and M. were in Wilhelmshaven. D.E.F. in Hamburg and G.H.K.L. in Kiel.<br />
<br />
In the following reports on each ship, Section 1 deals with the effect of enemy hits on ships A. to H. above, in conjunction with the two attached ship sketches (Enclosures 1 and 2). [Not attached.]<br />
<br />
Of the hits marked in the sketches those of a gunnery interest are distinguished by red ink. Section II gives general remarks concerning the ships in question.<br />
<br />
Further a report is submitted on installations in newly commissioned ships (K. and L.) also on a ship still under construction (J.), as well as means of combating submarines installed in Fishing vessels (M.) and finally, briefly on the Ordnance workshops in the Naval Arsenals (N. and O.).<br />
<br />
A. "SEYDLITZ" (Enclosure 1).<br />
<br />
This Cruiser received 24 shell hits (38 cm. 34.3 cm. and 30.5 cm.)(15", 13.5" and 12") and one Torpedo hit.<br />
<br />
Except for 1 shell hit (apparently 34.3 cm.) (13.5") on the starboard side forward (Hits nos.2-4) and one hit no.16 (38 cm.?) in the starboard after 15 cm. (6") casemate all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all Gun tubes, Guns and many fittings had been dismantled and landed.<br />
<br />
<center>I. Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
<br />
1. A large calibre shell (hit no.8) struck the 2nd. 15 cm. port casemate (from forward), put the gun out of action and killed or seriously wounded the majority of the gun's crew.<br />
<br />
2. A 38 cm. shell exploded in the 4th 15 cm. casemate (hit No.13) the gun was similarly damaged, and 2 men (wounded) remained alive of the crew.<br />
<br />
3. In the port after 15 cm. casemate, No.6 gun, (hit No.15) had the same effect as the two described above.<br />
<br />
4. A 38 cm. shell (hit No.16) penetrated the armoured bulkhead on starboard side aft, near the last 15 cm. casemate, close to the curve of the armour (Fig.1, Enc.3) destroyed the 15 cm. gun and killed most of the gun crew.<br />
<br />
Of the twelve 15 cm. guns it appears that 2 port and 4 starboard fired unceasingly until the end.<br />
<br />
5. No.2 Turret (starboard) received a hit from port on the vertical turret armour (hit No.21) to the right of the right gun. Part of the nose of the shell pierced the armour anddestroyed [sic] the cradle and training gear of the right gun. The left was undamaged. The turret remained in action with this gun.<br />
<br />
6. An interesting hit is to be seen on the right 28 cm. gun of No.3 Turret port. The gun was on one of the jetties of the arsenal and could be examined. A large calibre shell hit the aforesaid gun a glancing blow just outside the turret, producing at the point of impact, a considerable elliptical scoop on the outside, causing a fracture of the inner tube and in addition bent the gun so that the axis of the tube at the muzzle was (as far as could be estimated) 200 mm. (about 8 in.) out of line.<br />
<br />
The cradle of this gun was split, the trunnions somewhat bent and the caps thereof partially opened out.<br />
<br />
The left gun of this turret, however, remained serviceable and the Turret could continue firing without interruption.<br />
<br />
7. A 34.3 cm. (13.5") shell (hit No.18) pierced the vertical armour of the revolving structure of No.4 Turret superimposed to the left of the left gun exploded inside the turret, ignited the cartridges which were ready for loading, put the turret out of action and killed all the crew (about 70 men) except 6.<br />
<br />
T [sic] This turret, already out of action, received another hit later from a 38 cm. (15") shell (hit No.17) this projectile struck the revolving Turret armour close to the lower edge at the right rear of the turret, and partially penetrated the turret.<br />
<br />
8. A Large calibre shell tore off the roof of the after (No.5) turret. (Geschossgeller ? ricochet). The turret suffered no appreciable damage inside.<br />
<br />
The remaining hits are being dealt with in the report on ship construction.≠ [I.D. Note: The original of this report can, unfortunately, not be obtained.]<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
<center>II Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
1. Extensive "flash" protection was already installed in "SEYDLITZ".<br />
<br />
(a) The openings for bringing 28 cm. cartridges into the lower loading chamber of the Ammunition Hoist can be shut off with sliding doors (schubtüren ?). The supply scuttles from the magazines are fitted with hinged flaps which open upwards on each side (Fig.3, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
(b) The 15 cm. (5.9") Ammunition hoists at the supply position in the casemates are fitted with a "closing flap" which shuts automatically, but its own weight assisted by a spring, immediately after the ammunition has rolled out on to the Ammunition Tray (which is placed in a horizontal position by a Paternoster apparatus (endless chain) (Fig.4, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
2. Apparently Gas Masks are employed in all ships. The method of use is the same as in the German Army. <u>Every</u> man was supplied with a mask (as it happened 2 days before action). These masks were to be brought into use immediately there was any evidence of suffocating gases, and they were so far successful that, according to the opinions of officers, at least one ship, if not two, was saved by their use.<br />
<br />
3. Enemy "shorts" usually exploded on hitting the water, with the result that, (as in the cases of shells exploding on board), splinters of various sizes struck guns among other things, and caused damage, but in practically every case no stoppage of firing from the gun resulted. Shell splinters also entered Conning Towers and Turrets through the sighting slits. But they caused no internal damage as their force was broken by their passage through the deeps [sic] slits. (Fig.5, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
4. In Turret firing. Salvoes were gradually used, and always with <u>only one</u> gun of each turret.<br />
<br />
5. For transmission of orders to the guns (also to 15 cm. (5.9" guns) from the Gunnery Officers position (in the Conning Tower) Elevation pointers are used which are mounted (<u>separately</u>) on brackets away from the Turret armour.<br />
<br />
6. Ranges of the individual rangefinders are shown on a circular scale (range receiver) by means of electrically worked pointers. All these dials are mounter [sic] in a circular box (Fig.6, Enc.3) so that the ranges of the same object shown by several rangefinders (Pointers in similar direction)[.] Further, it is possible to cut out one or other of the dials if the Rangetaker concerned is ranging badly.<br />
<br />
7. Repulse of Destroyers is carried out invariably by means of broadside salvoes of 15 cm. (5.9) guns etc. and one target only is always used. But the Gunlayer is only to fire when sights are exactly on the target.<br />
<br />
8. The 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) guns were not used in the battle. It is understood that in the future guns of this calibre, will only be retained on board as anti-aircraft guns, as was laid down for all ships.<br />
<br />
9. (a) The empty 26 cm. (11") cartridge cases are thrown out of the turrets on to the deck through openings in rear of the Gun platforms (2 per turret). A covering flap, opening downwards when the cases are thrown out, automatically closes the hole by means of a spring (Fig.7, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
(b) The fired 15 cm. (5.9") cartridge are placed in a large hanging net in the casemate, and are only removed from the casemate during a lull in the firing. It was stated that a very large number of fired cases (including Large Calibre ones) were collected and brought back.<br />
<br />
10. The voice pipes are made of 60,100 and 150 mm. diameter (2.4 in., 3.8 in.,and 6 in.). (The last named are called Schallrohre and are intended for short distances). Voice pipes are not lagged.<br />
<br />
11. The ventilation of the Turrets is similar to the method employed in our newer ships. A Fan placed between the two guns, sucks, on the one hand the powder gases from the breeches by means of a ventilation pipe from each gun when the breech is opened and on the other hand draws them away from the roof of the turret on the gun platform another fan, portable, and continually running, was installed when sucked in fresh air through a hose and passed it into the interior of the turret bymeans [sic] of a second hose. If any man had any difficulty in breathing he inhaled fresh air through the second hose. But even this method only afforded partial relief.<br />
<br />
12. All Gunnery machinery (hydraulic and electric) appears to have function correctly.<br />
<br />
13. From the Gunnery point of view there were no serious fires (magazines of any description), for which the "Flash door" protection described in Section II Miscellaneous, Pars. I (a) and (b) is principally responsible. All cartridges actually in a turret or casemate,when [sic] an enemy shell burst in the turret or casemate, were exploded in every case. Therefore the rule was most strictly enforced that only the absolute minimum of ammunition was kept ready at the guns.<br />
<br />
14. "SEYDLITZ" had 1150 28 cm. (11" shell) on board, of which 450 were expended. (No ship expended all her ammunition).<br />
<br />
15. The torpedo nets were not actually a hindrance in the action but they sustained heavy damage fromenemy [sic] hits and splinters so that parts of them hung down over the ships side.<br />
<br />
In future these nets being useless ballast will no longer be carried. This is already the case in the new battleship "BAYERN".<br />
<br />
<center>B. "OSTRFRIESLAND".</center><br />
<br />
<center>I. Hits. (Enclosure 1).</center><br />
<br />
This Battleship received no shell hits, but was struck by a mine onthe [sic] starboard side forward. The detailed description is contained in the report on Ship Construction.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
At the time of the inspection of this ship the 30.5 cm. (12") Ammunition was being embarked. The shells were being slung from the Quay on to the Deck by means of a powerful floating crane in bundles (of about 5 projectiles). All cartridges are enclosed in long water-tight zinc containers, fitted with stiffening bands. They were being rolled on board carefully across broad planks and stowed in the Magazines. If several rounds of ready ammunition have to be stowed in the Turret, the charges are always kept in the zinc cylinders.<br />
<br />
The 30.5 cm. (12") and also 28 cm. (11") projectiles are (according to the statement of the Gunnery Officer of this ship, Lt.Comdr.Lauenstein) of one description throughout, capped and fitted with base fuse. Total weight 405 kg. (about 890 lbs.) Bursting charge 12 to 13 kg. (26½ to 29 lbs.) of Trotyl. In the latest ships, however, "Armour piercing" and "high explosive" shell (but with a new explosive for bursting charge) are again to be used, as is already the case with the 28 cm. (15") shell in the Battleship "BAYERN".<br />
<br />
For the 15 cm.(5.9") guns it is reported that there are two types of shell in use.<br />
<br />
:(a) Fused shell with base fuses.<br />
<br />
:(b) High explosive shell,with a very sensitive nose fuse and a base fuse.<br />
<br />
<center>C. "VON DER TANN". (Enclosure 1.)</center><br />
<br />
This Battle Cruiser received 4 hits from large calibre shells (all on the starboard side).<br />
<br />
<center>I.Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
<br />
(1). The foremost 28 cm. (11") Turret was hit in the Barbette on the starboard side. The shell exploded and the armour was just penetrated (Hit No.1). Three men in the turret sustained burns (not very severe) from the "Flash". But the Turret was placed out of action as the armour at the point of impact was bulged inwards and jammed the Turret.<br />
<br />
(2). The after Conning Tower was similarly hit (Hit No.2)[.] But the shell only caused a shaking of the Tower and all apparatus inside remained intact.<br />
<br />
(3.) A shell exploded in the neighbourhood of the after Turret No.4 (Hit No.3). The effect on the Turret was only evident in a shaking, and the armour in the vicinity of the explosion was very slightly indented but without doing any damage so that the Turret continued in action.<br />
<br />
(4). No.4 hit is only of slight constructional interest.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
(1). In this ship, as in "OSTFRIESLAND", the question as to whether the collection of scraps of metal (coming from driving bands or Cartridge cases) in the Breech made any difference to the condition of the breech was answered in the negative.<br />
<br />
(2). The maximum rate of fire of the 28 cm. (11") guns of this Cruiser, as well as of the 30.5 cm. (12") guns of the "OSTFRIESLAND" is stated to have reached 3 - 4 rounds per minute in peace time.<br />
<br />
(3). The arrangement in the 28 cm. (11") turrets is in principle the same as in "SEYDLITZ" or as in the 30.5 cm. (12") guns of the large Battle Cruiser "HINDENBURG" (now building), with the exception of a few improvements in the last named ship. But while in the later ships (30.5 cm. 12") hydraulic rammers with reserve Hand ramming are installed "VON DER TANN" has only double Hand rammers, which are hung under the Turret roof.<br />
<br />
<center>D. "GROSSER KURFÜRST."</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Effects of shell hits (Enclosure 1).</center><br />
<br />
The ship was hit 8 times (large calibre) all from the port side.<br />
<br />
:(1) Hit No.4 (presumably 34 cm. 13.5") exploded before the Barbette armour of the foremost Turret.<br>Apart from breaking off small pieces of the hard armour (? Panzerschichte) and a slight shaking of the turret no damage was done to the Turret fittings. A fragment struck the upper surface of a sight slot and remained in the slot, while a good deal of gas entered the Turret and necessitated the use of gas masks by the crew for some time.<br />
<br />
:(2). A further heavy shell (Hit No.6) struck the port 15 cm.(5.9") Casemate (3rd. from forward) killed 10 of the crew of 14, but damaged the gun so little that after about 12 minutes the gun's crew having been made up, it was brought into action again. Two cartridges which were in the casemate were ignited.<br />
<br />
:(3). The other hits are only of constructional interest.<br />
<br />
:Some 30.5 cm. (12") and 15 cm. (5.9") guns were damaged on the outside by splinters from "shorts", but sustained no other damage.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
The Magazine arrangements in this ship were somewhat more minutely examined as well as reports made concerning them. (The arrangements described below are also used in the other ships).<br />
<br />
The shell bins and shell transport to the shell hoist are shown in Fig. 8, Enc.3) diagrammatically.<br />
<br />
A shell grab (Z) worked by 2 electric motors automatically controlled is used to transport the shell from the bins to the waiting tray fixed round the trunk (Turmraum) (A 1.-4). This grab is suspended from a broad length of wire sword matting, the latter can be wound up or down round a drum (Wa), if the transporting shaft (T) which is provided with two diametrical opposite longitudinal feathers is turned in the corresponding direction. Shaft (T) is fitted into drum (Wa). By this the grab is wound up or down. The grab is moved horizontally by the carrier (R), which holds the above-mentioned revolving drum, being drawn to one side or the other by an endless rope, worked electrically along the shaft (T). To assist the long shaft a deck rail is fitted above it which carries the weights, (Projectile grab and drum with carrier), the carrier being suspended from the rail. The electrical starting levers for both motors are fitted in the shell handing room.<br />
<br />
If it is required to get a shell out of the bin, the motor operating the horizontal movement of the grab is started. Then the long transporting drum is turned correspondingly by the 2nd.motor, thereby lowering the grab, which grips the shell by automatic pressure. Thereupon, by turning the shaft in the opposite direction the shell is raised, transported to the waiting tray (A) of which 4 are provided and placed on it. This waiting tray is so arranged that a shell can be landed only in the one position in order to prevent an inverted landing on the shell bogie relative to the entry in the hoist. The shell bogie is fitted with the same stops as the waiting tray.<br />
<br />
From the waiting tray the shell can be placed on either of the two shell bogies (which are rigidly joined to each other). The latter run easily with rollers on a circular rail, and can not only be adjusted exactly at the waiting tray by means of spring stops, but can also be coupled to the shell hoist in the loading position.<br />
<br />
In the shell rooms (lower deck) the shells are stowed in bins four to five deep (Fig.9, Enc.3)[.] The copper driving bands are protected by a broad covering band of strong canvas the ends of which are sewn together with (twine ?). Only rope is placed between the individual shells as a preventative against damage. Two vertical wooden batten are secured to the side walls of the shell bins - right and left.<br />
<br />
In order to ensure the grab gripping the shell as near as possible round the centre of gravity, each shell has a white ring painted round it.<br />
<br />
It is to be noted that the shell room cannot be shut off (water tightly) from the shell handing room as the large openings in the dividing Bulkhead, through which the transport carrier passes, are always open.<br />
<br />
In addition projectiles are stowed in many ships in the corners of the shell handing room itself in fixed bins.<br />
<br />
The 30.5 (12") cartridges are stowed in their water tight zinc cylinders in special stowage fittings in the magazines. These stowages are made of angle Iron and sheet plates. (There is no wood in the fittings).<br />
<br />
The Magazines, (2 decks from the bottom) in contrast to the shell room, are separated from the Magazine handing room, by a means of thin sheet bulkheads, in which the passage ways are fitted with double doors and the circular openings for handing cartridges are fitted with double covering flaps (the latter have already been remarked on in "SEYDLITZ" Section 11, Fig.3, Enc.3.[)]<br />
<br />
For transport of cartridges in the Magazines the transporting gear shewn in Fig.10, Enc.3 is available. This consists of a double rail (R) in which a horizontal (sheet iron) tray, semicircular in section can be moved up and down in guides by means of a hand differential purchase (F). The Tray can then be brought to the exact level of the cartridge. The Transporting gear is suspended from an overhead rail,(S) and also runs in a guide rail on the deck (SS). The cartridge is pushed on to the tray and the transporter then brought to the cartridge handing hole, and after opening the double flaps, transferred to the Turret.<br />
<br />
The Turret appliances correspond in general to those in "HINDENBURG", about which data are described later. But an exception must be made in the case of the size and installation of the Rangefinders (Fig.11, Enc.3).In "KURFÜRST" the Rangefinders about 3 meters (10 ft.) long are fitted in hoods in the front of the Turret, while "HINDENBURG" the 8 metre (26 ft.) range finders are already being fitted in the same way as will be the case in our 35 cm. (about 14") turrets, now building.<br />
<br />
<center>E. "MARKGRAF".</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Hits. (Enclosure 2).</center><br />
<br />
This Battleship was hit 5 times by big guns and all from the port side.<br />
<br />
Only hit No.2 is of gunnery interest. This entered the next to the last 15 cm. (5.(') [5.9"] casemate on the port side and exploded, killing the crew and putting gun out of action for the remainder of the battle, though it did not damage it very seriously.<br />
<br />
Several splinters from this shell pierced the bulkhead and entered the next casemate (forward) and killed or wounded several men. But this gun was brought into action again after an interval of about 10 minutes to make up the crew.<br />
<br />
<center>11. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
In the case of this ship also, splinters from enemy shorts entered the Conning Tower, but without causing any damage to either personnel or Materiel.<br />
<br />
During the whole engagement about 250 rounds of 30 cm. (12") ammunition was fired, i.e. about one fifth of the total supply on board.</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Report_on_German_Warships_after_Jutland&diff=334759Austro-Hungarian Naval Report on German Warships after Jutland2024-03-22T14:30:48Z<p>Simon Harley: Made Changes.</p>
<hr />
<div>It was prepared by ''Marineartillerie-Oberingenieure 2. Klasse'' Georg Schindler. This report is in many ways more detailed than that of ''Fregattenkapitäne'' Hieronymus Graf von Colloredo-Mannsfeld [[Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland|prepared immediately after Jutland]].<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
REPORT by a Mission undertaken in accordance with Order. Section 4 M.S. No.1746 of 1916.<br />
----<br />
<br />
On the inspection of German Warships which took part in the Battle of the Skaggerak (Jutland), 31st.May - 1st.June 1916; on Wilhelmshaven, Hamburg and Kiel, and on other inspections of ships and bases.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}By Georg Schindler,<br />
<br />
{{pad|580px}}Gunnery Engineer, 2nd Class.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}AUSTRIAN NAVY.<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
The only details which have been dealt with are those which were of Gunnery interest.<br />
<br />
{|<br />
| A.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "SEYDLITZ"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| B.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "OSTFRIESLAND"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| C.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "VON DER TANN"<br />
| were<br />
|-<br />
| D.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "GROSSER KÜRFURST"<br />
| in<br />
|-<br />
| E.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"&nbsp;<br />
| "MARKGRAF"<br />
| engagement.<br />
|-<br />
| F.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "MOLTKE"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| G.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"<br />
| "DERFFLINGER"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| H.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "KÖNIG"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| J.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "HINDENBURG" (building)<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| K.<br />
| Large Battleship<br />
| "BAYERN"<br />
| rowspan=2 | } Newly commissioned<br />
|-<br />
| L.<br />
| T.B.D.<br />
| "G.90"<br />
|-<br />
| M.<br />
| colspan=3 | Fishing vessels Anti-Submarine armament, etc.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| N.<br />
| colspan=3 | Short inspection of the Ordnance Workshops in the Arsenal in Wilhelmshaven. <br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| O.<br />
| Ditto in Kiel.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|}<br />
<br />
Ships under A.B.C.J. and M. were in Wilhelmshaven. D.E.F. in Hamburg and G.H.K.L. in Kiel.<br />
<br />
In the following reports on each ship, Section 1 deals with the effect of enemy hits on ships A. to H. above, in conjunction with the two attached ship sketches (Enclosures 1 and 2). [Not attached.]<br />
<br />
Of the hits marked in the sketches those of a gunnery interest are distinguished by red ink. Section II gives general remarks concerning the ships in question.<br />
<br />
Further a report is submitted on installations in newly commissioned ships (K. and L.) also on a ship still under construction (J.), as well as means of combating submarines installed in Fishing vessels (M.) and finally, briefly on the Ordnance workshops in the Naval Arsenals (N. and O.).<br />
<br />
A. "SEYDLITZ" (Enclosure 1).<br />
<br />
This Cruiser received 24 shell hits (38 cm. 34.3 cm. and 30.5 cm.)(15", 13.5" and 12") and one Torpedo hit.<br />
<br />
Except for 1 shell hit (apparently 34.3 cm.) (13.5") on the starboard side forward (Hits nos.2-4) and one hit no.16 (38 cm.?) in the starboard after 15 cm. (6") casemate all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all Gun tubes, Guns and many fittings had been dismantled and landed.<br />
<br />
<center>I. Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
<br />
1. A large calibre shell (hit no.8) struck the 2nd. 15 cm. port casemate (from forward), put the gun out of action and killed or seriously wounded the majority of the gun's crew.<br />
<br />
2. A 38 cm. shell exploded in the 4th 15 cm. casemate (hit No.13) the gun was similarly damaged, and 2 men (wounded) remained alive of the crew.<br />
<br />
3. In the port after 15 cm. casemate, No.6 gun, (hit No.15) had the same effect as the two described above.<br />
<br />
4. A 38 cm. shell (hit No.16) penetrated the armoured bulkhead on starboard side aft, near the last 15 cm. casemate, close to the curve of the armour (Fig.1, Enc.3) destroyed the 15 cm. gun and killed most of the gun crew.<br />
<br />
Of the twelve 15 cm. guns it appears that 2 port and 4 starboard fired unceasingly until the end.<br />
<br />
5. No.2 Turret (starboard) received a hit from port on the vertical turret armour (hit No.21) to the right of the right gun. Part of the nose of the shell pierced the armour anddestroyed [sic] the cradle and training gear of the right gun. The left was undamaged. The turret remained in action with this gun.<br />
<br />
6. An interesting hit is to be seen on the right 28 cm. gun of No.3 Turret port. The gun was on one of the jetties of the arsenal and could be examined. A large calibre shell hit the aforesaid gun a glancing blow just outside the turret, producing at the point of impact, a considerable elliptical scoop on the outside, causing a fracture of the inner tube and in addition bent the gun so that the axis of the tube at the muzzle was (as far as could be estimated) 200 mm. (about 8 in.) out of line.<br />
<br />
The cradle of this gun was split, the trunnions somewhat bent and the caps thereof partially opened out.<br />
<br />
The left gun of this turret, however, remained serviceable and the Turret could continue firing without interruption.<br />
<br />
7. A 34.3 cm. (13.5") shell (hit No.18) pierced the vertical armour of the revolving structure of No.4 Turret superimposed to the left of the left gun exploded inside the turret, ignited the cartridges which were ready for loading, put the turret out of action and killed all the crew (about 70 men) except 6.<br />
<br />
T [sic] This turret, already out of action, received another hit later from a 38 cm. (15") shell (hit No.17) this projectile struck the revolving Turret armour close to the lower edge at the right rear of the turret, and partially penetrated the turret.<br />
<br />
8. A Large calibre shell tore off the roof of the after (No.5) turret. (Geschossgeller ? ricochet). The turret suffered no appreciable damage inside.<br />
<br />
The remaining hits are being dealt with in the report on ship construction.≠ [I.D. Note: The original of this report can, unfortunately, not be obtained.]<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
<center>II Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
1. Extensive "flash" protection was already installed in "SEYDLITZ".<br />
<br />
(a) The openings for bringing 28 cm. cartridges into the lower loading chamber of the Ammunition Hoist can be shut off with sliding doors (schubtüren ?). The supply scuttles from the magazines are fitted with hinged flaps which open upwards on each side (Fig.3, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
(b) The 15 cm. (5.9") Ammunition hoists at the supply position in the casemates are fitted with a "closing flap" which shuts automatically, but its own weight assisted by a spring, immediately after the ammunition has rolled out on to the Ammunition Tray (which is placed in a horizontal position by a Paternoster apparatus (endless chain) (Fig.4, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
2. Apparently Gas Masks are employed in all ships. The method of use is the same as in the German Army. <u>Every</u> man was supplied with a mask (as it happened 2 days before action). These masks were to be brought into use immediately there was any evidence of suffocating gases, and they were so far successful that, according to the opinions of officers, at least one ship, if not two, was saved by their use.<br />
<br />
3. Enemy "shorts" usually exploded on hitting the water, with the result that, (as in the cases of shells exploding on board), splinters of various sizes struck guns among other things, and caused damage, but in practically every case no stoppage of firing from the gun resulted. Shell splinters also entered Conning Towers and Turrets through the sighting slits. But they caused no internal damage as their force was broken by their passage through the deeps [sic] slits. (Fig.5, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
4. In Turret firing. Salvoes were gradually used, and always with <u>only one</u> gun of each turret.<br />
<br />
5. For transmission of orders to the guns (also to 15 cm. (5.9" guns) from the Gunnery Officers position (in the Conning Tower) Elevation pointers are used which are mounted (<u>separately</u>) on brackets away from the Turret armour.<br />
<br />
6. Ranges of the individual rangefinders are shown on a circular scale (range receiver) by means of electrically worked pointers. All these dials are mounter [sic] in a circular box (Fig.6, Enc.3) so that the ranges of the same object shown by several rangefinders (Pointers in similar direction)[.] Further, it is possible to cut out one or other of the dials if the Rangetaker concerned is ranging badly.<br />
<br />
7. Repulse of Destroyers is carried out invariably by means of broadside salvoes of 15 cm. (5.9) guns etc. and one target only is always used. But the Gunlayer is only to fire when sights are exactly on the target.<br />
<br />
8. The 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) guns were not used in the battle. It is understood that in the future guns of this calibre, will only be retained on board as anti-aircraft guns, as was laid down for all ships.<br />
<br />
9. (a) The empty 26 cm. (11") cartridge cases are thrown out of the turrets on to the deck through openings in rear of the Gun platforms (2 per turret). A covering flap, opening downwards when the cases are thrown out, automatically closes the hole by means of a spring (Fig.7, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
(b) The fired 15 cm. (5.9") cartridge are placed in a large hanging net in the casemate, and are only removed from the casemate during a lull in the firing. It was stated that a very large number of fired cases (including Large Calibre ones) were collected and brought back.<br />
<br />
10. The voice pipes are made of 60,100 and 150 mm. diameter (2.4 in., 3.8 in.,and 6 in.). (The last named are called Schallrohre and are intended for short distances). Voice pipes are not lagged.<br />
<br />
11. The ventilation of the Turrets is similar to the method employed in our newer ships. A Fan placed between the two guns, sucks, on the one hand the powder gases from the breeches by means of a ventilation pipe from each gun when the breech is opened and on the other hand draws them away from the roof of the turret on the gun platform another fan, portable, and continually running, was installed when sucked in fresh air through a hose and passed it into the interior of the turret bymeans [sic] of a second hose. If any man had any difficulty in breathing he inhaled fresh air through the second hose. But even this method only afforded partial relief.<br />
<br />
12. All Gunnery machinery (hydraulic and electric) appears to have function correctly.<br />
<br />
13. From the Gunnery point of view there were no serious fires (magazines of any description), for which the "Flash door" protection described in Section II Miscellaneous, Pars. I (a) and (b) is principally responsible. All cartridges actually in a turret or casemate,when [sic] an enemy shell burst in the turret or casemate, were exploded in every case. Therefore the rule was most strictly enforced that only the absolute minimum of ammunition was kept ready at the guns.<br />
<br />
14. "SEYDLITZ" had 1150 28 cm. (11" shell) on board, of which 450 were expended. (No ship expended all her ammunition).<br />
<br />
15. The torpedo nets were not actually a hindrance in the action but they sustained heavy damage fromenemy [sic] hits and splinters so that parts of them hung down over the ships side.<br />
<br />
In future these nets being useless ballast will no longer be carried. This is already the case in the new battleship "BAYERN".<br />
<br />
<center>B. "OSTRFRIESLAND".</center><br />
<br />
<center>I. Hits. (Enclosure 1).</center><br />
<br />
This Battleship received no shell hits, but was struck by a mine onthe [sic] starboard side forward. The detailed description is contained in the report on Ship Construction.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
At the time of the inspection of this ship the 30.5 cm. (12") Ammunition was being embarked. The shells were being slung from the Quay on to the Deck by means of a powerful floating crane in bundles (of about 5 projectiles). All cartridges are enclosed in long water-tight zinc containers, fitted with stiffening bands. They were being rolled on board carefully across broad planks and stowed in the Magazines. If several rounds of ready ammunition have to be stowed in the Turret, the charges are always kept in the zinc cylinders.<br />
<br />
The 30.5 cm. (12") and also 28 cm. (11") projectiles are (according to the statement of the Gunnery Officer of this ship, Lt.Comdr.Lauenstein) of one description throughout, capped and fitted with base fuse. Total weight 405 kg. (about 890 lbs.) Bursting charge 12 to 13 kg. (26½ to 29 lbs.) of Trotyl. In the latest ships, however, "Armour piercing" and "high explosive" shell (but with a new explosive for bursting charge) are again to be used, as is already the case with the 28 cm. (15") shell in the Battleship "BAYERN".<br />
<br />
For the 15 cm.(5.9") guns it is reported that there are two types of shell in use.<br />
<br />
:(a) Fused shell with base fuses.<br />
<br />
:(b) High explosive shell,with a very sensitive nose fuse and a base fuse.<br />
<br />
<center>C. "VON DER TANN". (Enclosure 1.)</center><br />
<br />
This Battle Cruiser received 4 hits from large calibre shells (all on the starboard side).<br />
<br />
<center>I.Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
<br />
(1). The foremost 28 cm. (11") Turret was hit in the Barbette on the starboard side. The shell exploded and the armour was just penetrated (Hit No.1). Three men in the turret sustained burns (not very severe) from the "Flash". But the Turret was placed out of action as the armour at the point of impact was bulged inwards and jammed the Turret.<br />
<br />
(2). The after Conning Tower was similarly hit (Hit No.2)[.] But the shell only caused a shaking of the Tower and all apparatus inside remained intact.<br />
<br />
(3.) A shell exploded in the neighbourhood of the after Turret No.4 (Hit No.3). The effect on the Turret was only evident in a shaking, and the armour in the vicinity of the explosion was very slightly indented but without doing any damage so that the Turret continued in action.<br />
<br />
(4). No.4 hit is only of slight constructional interest.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
(1). In this ship, as in "OSTFRIESLAND", the question as to whether the collection of scraps of metal (coming from driving bands or Cartridge cases) in the Breech made any difference to the condition of the breech was answered in the negative.<br />
<br />
(2). The maximum rate of fire of the 28 cm. (11") guns of this Cruiser, as well as of the 30.5 cm. (12") guns of the "OSTFRIESLAND" is stated to have reached 3 - 4 rounds per minute in peace time.<br />
<br />
(3). The arrangement in the 28 cm. (11") turrets is in principle the same as in "SEYDLITZ" or as in the 30.5 cm. (12") guns of the large Battle Cruiser "HINDENBURG" (now building), with the exception of a few improvements in the last named ship. But while in the later ships (30.5 cm. 12") hydraulic rammers with reserve Hand ramming are installed "VON DER TANN" has only double Hand rammers, which are hung under the Turret roof.<br />
<br />
<center>D. "GROSSER KURFÜRST."</center><br />
<br />
<center>1. Effects of shell hits (Enclosure 1).</center><br />
<br />
The ship was hit 8 times (large calibre) all from the port side.<br />
<br />
:(1) Hit No.4 (presumably 34 cm. 13.5") exploded before the Barbette armour of the foremost Turret.<br>Apart from breaking off small pieces of the hard armour (? Panzerschichte) and a slight shaking of the turret no damage was done to the Turret fittings. A fragment struck the upper surface of a sight slot and remained in the slot, while a good deal of gas entered the Turret and necessitated the use of gas masks by the crew for some time.<br />
<br />
:(2). A further heavy shell (Hit No.6) struck the port 15 cm.(5.9") Casemate (3rd. from forward) killed 10 of the crew of 14, but damaged the gun so little that after about 12 minutes the gun's crew having been made up, it was brought into action again. Two cartridges which were in the casemate were ignited.<br />
<br />
:(3). The other hits are only of constructional interest.<br />
<br />
:Some 30.5 cm. (12") and 15 cm. (5.9") guns were damaged on the outside by splinters from "shorts", but sustained no other damage.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
The Magazine arrangements in this ship were somewhat more minutely examined as well as reports made concerning them. (The arrangements described below are also used in the other ships).<br />
<br />
The shell bins and shell transport to the shell hoist are shown in Fig. 8, Enc.3) diagrammatically.<br />
<br />
A shell grab (Z) worked by 2 electric motors automatically controlled is used to transport the shell from the bins to the waiting tray fixed round the trunk (Turmraum) (A 1.-4). This grab is suspended from a broad length of wire sword matting, the latter can be wound up or down round a drum (Wa), if the transporting shaft (T) which is provided with two diametrical opposite longitudinal feathers is turned in the corresponding direction. Shaft (T) is fitted into drum (Wa). By this the grab is wound up or down. The grab is moved horizontally by the carrier (R), which holds the above-mentioned revolving drum, being drawn to one side or the other by an endless rope, worked electrically along the shaft (T). To assist the long shaft a deck rail is fitted above it which carries the weights, (Projectile grab and drum with carrier), the carrier being suspended from the rail. The electrical starting levers for both motors are fitted in the shell handing room.</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Report_on_German_Warships_after_Jutland&diff=334758Austro-Hungarian Naval Report on German Warships after Jutland2024-03-22T14:10:49Z<p>Simon Harley: Made Changes.</p>
<hr />
<div>It was prepared by ''Marineartillerie-Oberingenieure 2. Klasse'' Georg Schindler. This report is in many ways more detailed than that of ''Fregattenkapitäne'' Hieronymus Graf von Colloredo-Mannsfeld [[Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland|prepared immediately after Jutland]].<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
REPORT by a Mission undertaken in accordance with Order. Section 4 M.S. No.1746 of 1916.<br />
----<br />
<br />
On the inspection of German Warships which took part in the Battle of the Skaggerak (Jutland), 31st.May - 1st.June 1916; on Wilhelmshaven, Hamburg and Kiel, and on other inspections of ships and bases.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}By Georg Schindler,<br />
<br />
{{pad|580px}}Gunnery Engineer, 2nd Class.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}AUSTRIAN NAVY.<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
The only details which have been dealt with are those which were of Gunnery interest.<br />
<br />
{|<br />
| A.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "SEYDLITZ"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| B.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "OSTFRIESLAND"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| C.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "VON DER TANN"<br />
| were<br />
|-<br />
| D.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "GROSSER KÜRFURST"<br />
| in<br />
|-<br />
| E.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"&nbsp;<br />
| "MARKGRAF"<br />
| engagement.<br />
|-<br />
| F.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "MOLTKE"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| G.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"<br />
| "DERFFLINGER"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| H.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "KÖNIG"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| J.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "HINDENBURG" (building)<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| K.<br />
| Large Battleship<br />
| "BAYERN"<br />
| rowspan=2 | } Newly commissioned<br />
|-<br />
| L.<br />
| T.B.D.<br />
| "G.90"<br />
|-<br />
| M.<br />
| colspan=3 | Fishing vessels Anti-Submarine armament, etc.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| N.<br />
| colspan=3 | Short inspection of the Ordnance Workshops in the Arsenal in Wilhelmshaven. <br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| O.<br />
| Ditto in Kiel.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|}<br />
<br />
Ships under A.B.C.J. and M. were in Wilhelmshaven. D.E.F. in Hamburg and G.H.K.L. in Kiel.<br />
<br />
In the following reports on each ship, Section 1 deals with the effect of enemy hits on ships A. to H. above, in conjunction with the two attached ship sketches (Enclosures 1 and 2). [Not attached.]<br />
<br />
Of the hits marked in the sketches those of a gunnery interest are distinguished by red ink. Section II gives general remarks concerning the ships in question.<br />
<br />
Further a report is submitted on installations in newly commissioned ships (K. and L.) also on a ship still under construction (J.), as well as means of combating submarines installed in Fishing vessels (M.) and finally, briefly on the Ordnance workshops in the Naval Arsenals (N. and O.).<br />
<br />
A. "SEYDLITZ" (Enclosure 1).<br />
<br />
This Cruiser received 24 shell hits (38 cm. 34.3 cm. and 30.5 cm.)(15", 13.5" and 12") and one Torpedo hit.<br />
<br />
Except for 1 shell hit (apparently 34.3 cm.) (13.5") on the starboard side forward (Hits nos.2-4) and one hit no.16 (38 cm.?) in the starboard after 15 cm. (6") casemate all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all Gun tubes, Guns and many fittings had been dismantled and landed.<br />
<br />
<center>I. Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
<br />
1. A large calibre shell (hit no.8) struck the 2nd. 15 cm. port casemate (from forward), put the gun out of action and killed or seriously wounded the majority of the gun's crew.<br />
<br />
2. A 38 cm. shell exploded in the 4th 15 cm. casemate (hit No.13) the gun was similarly damaged, and 2 men (wounded) remained alive of the crew.<br />
<br />
3. In the port after 15 cm. casemate, No.6 gun, (hit No.15) had the same effect as the two described above.<br />
<br />
4. A 38 cm. shell (hit No.16) penetrated the armoured bulkhead on starboard side aft, near the last 15 cm. casemate, close to the curve of the armour (Fig.1, Enc.3) destroyed the 15 cm. gun and killed most of the gun crew.<br />
<br />
Of the twelve 15 cm. guns it appears that 2 port and 4 starboard fired unceasingly until the end.<br />
<br />
5. No.2 Turret (starboard) received a hit from port on the vertical turret armour (hit No.21) to the right of the right gun. Part of the nose of the shell pierced the armour anddestroyed [sic] the cradle and training gear of the right gun. The left was undamaged. The turret remained in action with this gun.<br />
<br />
6. An interesting hit is to be seen on the right 28 cm. gun of No.3 Turret port. The gun was on one of the jetties of the arsenal and could be examined. A large calibre shell hit the aforesaid gun a glancing blow just outside the turret, producing at the point of impact, a considerable elliptical scoop on the outside, causing a fracture of the inner tube and in addition bent the gun so that the axis of the tube at the muzzle was (as far as could be estimated) 200 mm. (about 8 in.) out of line.<br />
<br />
The cradle of this gun was split, the trunnions somewhat bent and the caps thereof partially opened out.<br />
<br />
The left gun of this turret, however, remained serviceable and the Turret could continue firing without interruption.<br />
<br />
7. A 34.3 cm. (13.5") shell (hit No.18) pierced the vertical armour of the revolving structure of No.4 Turret superimposed to the left of the left gun exploded inside the turret, ignited the cartridges which were ready for loading, put the turret out of action and killed all the crew (about 70 men) except 6.<br />
<br />
T [sic] This turret, already out of action, received another hit later from a 38 cm. (15") shell (hit No.17) this projectile struck the revolving Turret armour close to the lower edge at the right rear of the turret, and partially penetrated the turret.<br />
<br />
8. A Large calibre shell tore off the roof of the after (No.5) turret. (Geschossgeller ? ricochet). The turret suffered no appreciable damage inside.<br />
<br />
The remaining hits are being dealt with in the report on ship construction.≠ [I.D. Note: The original of this report can, unfortunately, not be obtained.]<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
<center>II Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
1. Extensive "flash" protection was already installed in "SEYDLITZ".<br />
<br />
(a) The openings for bringing 28 cm. cartridges into the lower loading chamber of the Ammunition Hoist can be shut off with sliding doors (schubtüren ?). The supply scuttles from the magazines are fitted with hinged flaps which open upwards on each side (Fig.3, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
(b) The 15 cm. (5.9") Ammunition hoists at the supply position in the casemates are fitted with a "closing flap" which shuts automatically, but its own weight assisted by a spring, immediately after the ammunition has rolled out on to the Ammunition Tray (which is placed in a horizontal position by a Paternoster apparatus (endless chain) (Fig.4, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
2. Apparently Gas Masks are employed in all ships. The method of use is the same as in the German Army. <u>Every</u> man was supplied with a mask (as it happened 2 days before action). These masks were to be brought into use immediately there was any evidence of suffocating gases, and they were so far successful that, according to the opinions of officers, at least one ship, if not two, was saved by their use.<br />
<br />
3. Enemy "shorts" usually exploded on hitting the water, with the result that, (as in the cases of shells exploding on board), splinters of various sizes struck guns among other things, and caused damage, but in practically every case no stoppage of firing from the gun resulted. Shell splinters also entered Conning Towers and Turrets through the sighting slits. But they caused no internal damage as their force was broken by their passage through the deeps [sic] slits. (Fig.5, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
4. In Turret firing. Salvoes were gradually used, and always with <u>only one</u> gun of each turret.<br />
<br />
5. For transmission of orders to the guns (also to 15 cm. (5.9" guns) from the Gunnery Officers position (in the Conning Tower) Elevation pointers are used which are mounted (<u>separately</u>) on brackets away from the Turret armour.<br />
<br />
6. Ranges of the individual rangefinders are shown on a circular scale (range receiver) by means of electrically worked pointers. All these dials are mounter [sic] in a circular box (Fig.6, Enc.3) so that the ranges of the same object shown by several rangefinders (Pointers in similar direction)[.] Further, it is possible to cut out one or other of the dials if the Rangetaker concerned is ranging badly.<br />
<br />
7. Repulse of Destroyers is carried out invariably by means of broadside salvoes of 15 cm. (5.9) guns etc. and one target only is always used. But the Gunlayer is only to fire when sights are exactly on the target.<br />
<br />
8. The 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) guns were not used in the battle. It is understood that in the future guns of this calibre, will only be retained on board as anti-aircraft guns, as was laid down for all ships.<br />
<br />
9. (a) The empty 26 cm. (11") cartridge cases are thrown out of the turrets on to the deck through openings in rear of the Gun platforms (2 per turret). A covering flap, opening downwards when the cases are thrown out, automatically closes the hole by means of a spring (Fig.7, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
(b) The fired 15 cm. (5.9") cartridge are placed in a large hanging net in the casemate, and are only removed from the casemate during a lull in the firing. It was stated that a very large number of fired cases (including Large Calibre ones) were collected and brought back.<br />
<br />
10. The voice pipes are made of 60,100 and 150 mm. diameter (2.4 in., 3.8 in.,and 6 in.). (The last named are called Schallrohre and are intended for short distances). Voice pipes are not lagged.<br />
<br />
11. The ventilation of the Turrets is similar to the method employed in our newer ships. A Fan placed between the two guns, sucks, on the one hand the powder gases from the breeches by means of a ventilation pipe from each gun when the breech is opened and on the other hand draws them away from the roof of the turret on the gun platform another fan, portable, and continually running, was installed when sucked in fresh air through a hose and passed it into the interior of the turret bymeans [sic] of a second hose. If any man had any difficulty in breathing he inhaled fresh air through the second hose. But even this method only afforded partial relief.<br />
<br />
12. All Gunnery machinery (hydraulic and electric) appears to have function correctly.<br />
<br />
13. From the Gunnery point of view there were no serious fires (magazines of any description), for which the "Flash door" protection described in Section II Miscellaneous, Pars. I (a) and (b) is principally responsible. All cartridges actually in a turret or casemate,when [sic] an enemy shell burst in the turret or casemate, were exploded in every case. Therefore the rule was most strictly enforced that only the absolute minimum of ammunition was kept ready at the guns.<br />
<br />
14. "SEYDLITZ" had 1150 28 cm. (11" shell) on board, of which 450 were expended. (No ship expended all her ammunition).<br />
<br />
15. The torpedo nets were not actually a hindrance in the action but they sustained heavy damage fromenemy [sic] hits and splinters so that parts of them hung down over the ships side.<br />
<br />
In future these nets being useless ballast will no longer be carried. This is already the case in the new battleship "BAYERN".<br />
<br />
<center>B. "OSTRFRIESLAND".</center><br />
<br />
<center>I. Hits. (Enclosure 1).</center><br />
<br />
This Battleship received no shell hits, but was struck by a mine onthe [sic] starboard side forward. The detailed description is contained in the report on Ship Construction.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
At the time of the inspection of this ship the 30.5 cm. (12") Ammunition was being embarked. The shells were being slung from the Quay on to the Deck by means of a powerful floating crane in bundles (of about 5 projectiles). All cartridges are enclosed in long water-tight zinc containers, fitted with stiffening bands. They were being rolled on board carefully across broad planks and stowed in the Magazines. If several rounds of ready ammunition have to be stowed in the Turret, the charges are always kept in the zinc cylinders.<br />
<br />
The 30.5 cm. (12") and also 28 cm. (11") projectiles are (according to the statement of the Gunnery Officer of this ship, Lt.Comdr.Lauenstein) of one description throughout, capped and fitted with base fuse. Total weight 405 kg. (about 890 lbs.) Bursting charge 12 to 13 kg. (26½ to 29 lbs.) of Trotyl. In the latest ships, however, "Armour piercing" and "high explosive" shell (but with a new explosive for bursting charge) are again to be used, as is already the case with the 28 cm. (15") shell in the Battleship "BAYERN".<br />
<br />
For the 15 cm.(5.9") guns it is reported that there are two types of shell in use.<br />
<br />
:(a) Fused shell with base fuses.<br />
<br />
:(b) High explosive shell,with a very sensitive nose fuse and a base fuse.<br />
<br />
<center>C. "VON DER TANN". (Enclosure 1.)</center><br />
<br />
This Battle Cruiser received 4 hits from large calibre shells (all on the starboard side).<br />
<br />
<center>I.Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
<br />
(1). The foremost 28 cm. (11") Turret was hit in the Barbette on the starboard side. The shell exploded and the armour was just penetrated (Hit No.1). Three men in the turret sustained burns (not very severe) from the "Flash". But the Turret was placed out of action as the armour at the point of impact was bulged inwards and jammed the Turret.<br />
<br />
(2). The after Conning Tower was similarly hit (Hit No.2)[.] But the shell only caused a shaking of the Tower and all apparatus inside remained intact.<br />
<br />
(3.) A shell exploded in the neighbourhood of the after Turret No.4 (Hit No.3). The effect on the Turret was only evident in a shaking, and the armour in the vicinity of the explosion was very slightly indented but without doing any damage so that the Turret continued in action.<br />
<br />
(4). No.4 hit is only of slight constructional interest.<br />
<br />
<center>II. Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
(1). In this ship, as in "OSTFRIESLAND", the question as to whether the collection of scraps of metal (coming from driving bands or Cartridge cases) in the Breech made any difference to the condition of the breech was answered in the negative.<br />
<br />
(2). The maximum rate of fire of the 28 cm. (11") guns of this Cruiser, as well as of the 30.5 cm. (12") guns of the "OSTFRIESLAND" is stated to have reached 3 - 4 rounds per minute in peace time.<br />
<br />
(3). The arrangement in the 28 cm. (11") turrets is in principle the same as in "SEYDLITZ" or as in the 30.5 cm. (12") guns of the large Battle Cruiser "HINDENBURG" (now building), with the exception of a few improvements in the last named ship. But while in the later ships (30.5 cm. 12") hydraulic rammers with reserve Hand ramming are installed "VON DER TANN" has only double Hand rammers, which are hung under the Turret roof.</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Attach%C3%A9_Report_on_the_Battle_of_Jutland&diff=334757Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland2024-03-22T13:40:58Z<p>Simon Harley: /* Report */</p>
<hr />
<div>Soon after the [[Battle of Jutland]] on 31 May &ndash; 1 June 1916 the Naval Attaché of the [[Austro-Hungarian Navy|Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Navy]] at the embassy in Berlin, ''Fregattenkapitäne'' Hieronymus Graf von Colloredo-Mannsfeld,<ref>''Schematismus für das K.u.K. Heer und für die Kriegsmarine für 1914''. p. 1270. ''Almanach für die k. und k. Kriegsmarine 1917''. p. 668.</ref> visited the [[High Sea Fleet]]. He composed a report on the battle for his superiors using first-hand accounts, interspersed here and there with his own observations. Being written so soon after the battle it provides an interesting, raw insight into the state of the [[Imperial German Navy]], even if some of the details turned out to be inaccurate.<br />
<br />
The version reproduced here is a translation in English apparently made by the [[Naval Intelligence Division (Royal Navy)|Naval Intelligence Division]] in 1919 from a copy which was subsequently returned to "F.N.A.", presumably the French Naval Attaché. A copy of the translation then made its way into the papers of the British Cabinet, from where historian Arthur J. Marder obtained a copy which is in his papers.<ref>Folder bearing number N.I.D. 087/19. Marder papers, Special Collections and Archives, Langson Library, University of California, Irvine, MS-F002, Box 27.</ref> He does not appear to have used it for the 1966 edition of ''From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow'', Volume III, but certainly used it for the revised edition in 1978.<ref>A quote on p. 189 of the 1966 edition reads, "The Fleet is filled with enthusiasm and elated with victory.... All, down to the last seaman, believe in the strength of the Fleet and look forward to further encounters with confidence." This differs to the quote used on p. 234 of the 1978 edition, which is identical to that used here.</ref> Three weeks after transcribing Marder's copy, editor [[User:Simon Harley|Simon Harley]] found another copy in the papers of {{ViceRN}} [[John Ernest Troyte Harper|John E. T. Harper]].<ref>Harper papers, Churchill Archives Centre, JEHR 1/4.</ref><br />
<br />
It is perhaps worth comparing this translation with that made by Hungarian historian Mihály Krámli of a post-war copy of a slightly shorter version of the report in a Hungarian archive which has been published on the ''NavWeaps'' online resource.<ref>Krámli, Mihály. [http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-124.pdf "The Report on the Battle of Jutland by the Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché in Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Colloredo-Mannsfeld."] ''NavWeaps''.</ref><br />
<br />
The original grammar and punctuation of the typescript has been reproduced here wherever possible.<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
From:- Austrian Naval Attache in Berlin.<br />
<br />
To:- Commander-in-Chief, Pola.<br />
<div style="float:right;">Berlin,<br>17 June, 1916.</div><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<center><u>NAVAL ENGAGEMENT OF 31 MAY 1916.</u></center><br />
<br />
The following is a report of the naval proceedings of 31 May - 1 June, 1916, and also of the damage sustained by the German Fleet.<br />
<br />
During my 3-days' visit to Wilhelmshaven, followed by a cursory examination of the "MARKGRAF" and "KURFURST" at Hamburg, I endeavoured to gain merely a general idea of the results of gunfire and concentrated my attention on the course of the action itself.<br />
Admiral Scheer, whom I only saw for a short time as he left for Kiel to attend the funeral of his borther-in-law [sic], Lieut.-Commander Mohr,<ref>Carl Mohr of the ''Hamburg''.[http://www.denkmalprojekt.org/2023/vl_marineoffiz_zahlmstr_feuerwerks_torpedooffiz_beamte_wk1.html "Halbstocks die Flagge!"] ''Onlineprojekt Gefallenendenkmäler''. Our thanks to Ruiz Mateo Lutzow for finding this excellent source.</ref> who was killed in the action, very kindly arranged that his Chief of Staff, Captain Trotha, should give me an account of the whole proceedings, illustrated by plans, and that I should be furnished with all information. I have tried to fill in the gaps by conversations with officers whom I know; this has resulted in some contradictory statements, and several points remain obscure, the accounts from the various ships not having all come in.<br />
<br />
Many episodes will therefore be explained later and may appear in a different light, but, as regards the broad outlines which are of chief importance, the picture of this interesting engagement is fairly clear. The accompanying plan of the action was made in haste for the Kaiser and will therefore need much correction.<br />
<br />
The spirit pervading the Fleet can only be described as one of enthusiasm; they are intoxicated with victory. The heavy load weighing on them all, the dear that this war might end without an encounter of the Fleets, have vanished. They have learnt what fighting really means, they know themselves to be superior to the enemy as regards tactics, and that they were following the right lines and have nothing to unlearn; they know that their gunfire was more effective than that of the enemy, and that they can rely implicitly on their flotillas which have always been looked upon in the German Navy as one of the chief factors in an action. Finally they know that their largest ships can stand heavy fire and serious damage, that they leave nothing to be desired as regards construction and cannot be sunk easily. In short, they feel that the British, in spite of all their boasting, cannot overcome the German Fleet and have a considerable respect for it.<br />
<br />
This conviction imbues the whole Fleet, down to the last man, with confidence in their strength and a calm assurance regarding future encounters. At the same time they are free from over-confidence and from under-estimation of the enemy. On the contrary, the British fire-control and the enormous piercing power of their heavy shell at great distances have roused their admiration, so that a careless conception of the situation is not to be feared, the less so, as well-balanced minds such as those of Admiral Scheer and his Staff are unlikely to be led away by former successes to undertake rash enterprises in the future.<br />
<br />
They do not deny that they were extraordinarily fortunate, and that if the action had been prosecuted with energy on the British side, and if the "Nelson touch" had been in evidence, things might have gone very badly for Germany, especially as the British still had an intact Battle Squadron of 12 units at their disposal which had not yet taken part in the action. But they console themselves with the knowledge that no naval action was ever won without some stroke of luck.<br />
<br />
The Kaiser's visit, the day before my arrival, and his address to the Fleet gave great satisfaction, and subsequently many important personages arrive to inspect the ships, such as Prince Henry and the Grand Dukes of Mecklenburg and Oldenburg, and numbers of decorations were distributed. Vice-Admiral Scheer was promoted to Admiral, and he and Vice-Admiral Hipper received the Pour le Merite.<br />
<br />
I also visited Rear-Admiral Behncke, who was wounded and in hospital; his wounds are slight, a few small splinters in his head, elbow and knee, and he will probably soon be well again.<br />
<br />
<center><u>COURSE OF THE ACTION.</u></center><br />
<br />
The Commander-in-Chief intended to advance with the whole Fleet to the waters of the Skagerrak, in order to make his presence felt unpleasantly by disturbing the shipping, hoping thereby to lure on the British forces and in this manner to be in a position to attack a part of the British Fleet with superior or at least with equal forces. He reckoned that any movements of the British Fleet would be reported to him in good time by the submarines which had been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and he hoped that the airships would prove a better means of reconnoitring than any possessed by the enemy.<br />
<br />
Unfavourable weather prevented him for a considerable period from undertaking any operations, and, as the submarines were to return home on 1 June and be relieved by a new group, the 31 May was the last date for carrying out the planned advance.<br />
<br />
The cruisers left the Jade at 3 a.m., the Main Fleet at 4 a.m., steering an easterly course, and then, after passing Heligoland, a N.N.W'ly course. No reports were received from submarines. These were stationed chiefly off the Orkneys and the Firth of Forth, and the large group of Flanders boats were off the Thames and at the entrance to the Channel. <br />
<br />
While proceeding northwards, a few W/T messages were received, but they were corrupt, appeared to refer only to small formations and gave no clue to the movements of the Grand Fleet. The airships were unable to start in the morning, on account of the wind, and, as it blew hard throughout the day in the Heligoland Bight, they could not start until the early hours of 1 June. In this respect things did not go well, but Admiral Scheer decided nevertheless to continue on his course to the Skagerrak. <br />
<br />
This the account given by Captain von Trotha, who affirms that nothing was known of the presence of the British Fleet in the waters of the Skagerrak, and that there seemed no probability of encountering this Fleet before 1 June.<br />
<br />
There are some points here which I am unable to understand. The submarines are said to have been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and were to return home on 1 June to be relieved probably by a weaker group. For, If the same number of boats were to to keep watch off the English coast, why should 31 May have been the last day for the German Fleet to sail. The day of departure was, therefore, too late in any case, for, if no encounter was to be expected before 1 June, the boats stationed off the coast could not possibly encounter the damaged British ships, as was intended, for probably no damaged ships would be there before 2 June.<br />
<br />
The battleship "KONIG ALBERT" had to carry out repairs to her condensers and did not proceed with the Fleet. Von Trotha told me that there was no alternative and that a ship must carry out small overhauls regularly in a dockyard according to programme. But could it not be arranged, when one is taking the initiative, to choose one's moment for an advance and to have all the ships together for this short time? And why should just that moment be chosen when one of the most powerful ships of the "Kaiser" class is in the dockyard, instead, for instance, of one of the "Nassau" class with 11-in. guns.<br />
<br />
In addition, the "BAYERN" was to have joined up a few days later. After having waited so long, why should not the plan have been postponed for 2 or 3 weeks, instead of dispensing with the only ship carrying 15-in. guns.<br />
<br />
In the same manner they dispensed with air reconnaissance, from which they had expected so much.<br />
<br />
These considerations make me doubt whether the account given me is quite correct, and whether, on the contrary, they knew of certain movements of the British Fleet and considered the moment extremely favourable for an attack. Perhaps they only knew of Beatty's battle squadron, and thinking the Main Fleet was far away, hoped to entrap this squadron. In Berlin, they have much to say, even in military circles, about the British Fleet's intention to push through into the Baltic, and of Kitchener's mission having some connection with this. I consider this senseless, for it cannot be presemed [sic] that the British Fleet would leave their shores unprotected and do the Germans the favour of operating in the Baltic, which would certainly be a most advantageous area for the German Fleet. In any case, there appear to be discrepancies which will probably be explained at some later date.<br />
<br />
Scouting groups, battle cruisers and light cruisers, together with flotillas, preceded the Main Fleet by 50 - 60 miles. At 4 p.m. the light cruisers encountered some British battle cruisers. These at once opened fire on the light cruisers, at an estimated distance of 26,247 yds.; the range could be taken accurately. Though they did not obtain a hit, the salvoes fell so well that the German cruisers thought it advisable to turn away and fall back on their battle cruisers.<br />
<br />
As the British approached, these battle cruisers turned on to a southerly course, in order to lure the enemy on to the German Main Fleet. A running action, on a southerly course, ensued. The British were to starboard and to the west of the Germans, who had therefore the following advantage: in the North Sea, in summer, the western horizon is quite light and visibility towards the west is good, while towards the east, and in a still greater degree off the Jutland Coast, it is misty and visibility is bad and no silhouettes stand out against the eastern horizon. This phenomenon also played great part in the subsequent course of the action. The sun was still high and was not troublesome, and the British ships offered admirable targets. The sea was calm, the wind N.W. 1-2, altering subsequently through W. to S.W.<br />
<br />
The following British ships were recognised:-<br />
3 "Lion" class, 1 "Tiger" and 2 "Indefatigable" class; they were soon reinforced by 5 "Queen Elizabeth" class following astern.<br />
<br />
It is asserted that, judging from shell splinters, the ship of the "Tiger" class carried 15-in. guns, and that she was therefore the mysterious vessel which replaced the "TIGER" sunk on 24.1.15; as the last-named "TIGER" carried only 13.5-in.guns, this was taken as a further proof of her loss. The silhouette of the new "TIGER", however, is said to have resembled that of the old "TIGER" exactly. As the "Queen Elizabeths" soon opened fire also with 15-in. guns, I rather doubt this assertion regarding the "TIGER", and the various ships on this early part of the engagement are altogether somewhat at variance.<br />
<br />
On the German side the ships proceeded in the following sequence:- "LÜTZOW", Flagship of Vice-Admiral Hipper, "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN".<br />
<br />
As Hipper edged towards the enemy, the distance decreased to about 7655 yds. The German fire was unquestionably superior, but the speed of the British vessels was greater. After a short time the "INDEFATIGABLE" and "QUEEN MARY" blew up, and 2 battle-cruisers and two attacking destroyers were also accounted for. The "QUEEN MARY" must have been destroyed by the explosion of a magazine; she was torn in two halves, and a water-colour painted by an officer represents her enveloped in an enormous column of black smoke; she disappeared in a few seconds. Only one cadet was subsequently picked.<br />
<br />
The second battle cruiser disappeared under similar circumstances. The "VON DER TANN" claims to have accounted for one of these battle-cruisers by a broadside. But the "MOLTKE" fired 4 torpedoes and also claims this achievement.<br />
<br />
The Germans suffered very little during this phase of the action, the "MOLTKE" alone receiving hits on the starboard side. The fire of the British battle-cruisers is said not to have been nearly as good as that of the "QUEEN ELIZABETH" class later on.<br />
<br />
When they had approached the German Main Fleet, the British turned on to a contrary course and the German cruisers did the same. The German Main Fleet proceeded in divisions in starboard quarter-line, the 3rd Battle Squadron: 4 "König" class and 3 "Kaiser" class, Fleet Flagship, 1st Battle Squadron: 4 "Ostfriesland" class and 4 "Westfalen" class, and the 2nd Battle Squadron: 5 "Deutschland" class and the "Hessen". They endeavoured to effect a junction with the cruisers, but were unable to take part very effectually.<br />
<br />
The course of the action was now in a northerly direction, over the area which had just been traversed, and the British ships now drew ahead considerably and turned more and more towards the East; the Germans followed this movement, and in consequence the conditions of visibility became less and less favourable for them.<br />
<br />
The "Queen Elizabeths" now made their presence more greatly felt; one of them had dropped out, but I was unable to ascertain when this occurred.<br />
<br />
The course of the German Main Fleet at first led past the 2 disabled British destroyers, which were lying stopped. The crews had already taken to the boats and were picked up later on by German destroyers. As the Main Fleet was doubtful about the advisability of passing the destroyers while they were still afloat, they were sunk by a few broadsides. One of the officers who was picked up was in pyjamas and is said to have stayed in his cabin during the action. He declared "We did not expect so much resistance," while another said - "The battle is rather disappointing." It has been ascertained that these destroyers were greatly under-manned; their crews seemed very exhausted, which points to their having been in the water for a long time.<br />
<br />
While on this easterly course, the light cruisers of the fast 2nd Scouting Group: "FRANKFURT", "PILLAU", "ELBING" and "WIESBADEN", were heavily fired on from the N.E. and E. without their being able to see more than the gun flashes. In addition, they were under continual fire from the N., and while turning away to S.E. and S., they ascertained that they were opposed by an interminable line of British ships, which appeared at first to be on a N.W.'ly course, and had then evidently turned together on to a S.'ly course.<br />
<br />
It may be noted here that the battleships, and, generally speaking, the battle-cruisers also, never sighted the British Main Fleet, and saw nothing but the flashes of the guns and the effects of the fire. These British ships, about 25 in number, were only sighted by a few light cruisers and by the flotillas, and were counted by them as accurately as possible.<br />
<br />
Surrounded thus from the N. and the E. and under fire, the "WIESBADEN" was disabled, apparently by a hit in the engine-room. The Admiral noticed, it is true, that his leading ships must have encountered new and powerful forces and that they were turning away; but he thought it his duty to go to the assistance of the "WIESBADEN" and therefore continued on an easterly course.<br />
<br />
The van of the Main Fleet, led by the "KÖNIG" (Rear-Admiral Behncke) now came under heavy fire from right ahead; the "KÖNIG" turned away under this fire towards the S.E., whereupon the Commander-in-Chief ordered the whole line to "turn together" to starboard and gave up the idea of helping the "WIESBADEN". About this time Vice-Admiral Hipper transferred his flag from the "LÜTZOW" to the "MOLTKE" with the help of a destroyer, his W/T station being damaged.<br />
<br />
Hardly had the Main Fleet drawn away on a westerly course, before it was ascertained that the pressure was relaxing and the fire decreasing, and that the British were no longer pursuing so hotly. Scheer therefore ordered the ships to "turn together" back on to their former course, and made the signal 'R' = 'Engage the enemy'. This second advance may be termed the zenith of the action. Admiral Scheer gave his views on it approximately as follows:- "Those who make a study of this engagement will be very puzzled as to my object in advancing thus against the wall of British ships. The fact is that I had no particular object. I made the first advance because I had a feeling that I ought to endeavour to assist the "WIESBADEN" and because the situation ahead was quite obscure to me, for I saw nothing of the "LÜTZOW" and received no W/T reports. I soon saw, however, that the leading ships were coming under an overwhelming fire, and that I could not risk the Fleet on the "WIESBADEN'S" account. When I noticed that the British pressure had quite ceased and that the Fleet remained intact in my hands, I turned back, under the impression that the action could not end in this way and that I ought to seek contact with the enemy again."<br />
<br />
The situation during the first and second advances may serve as an example of what should not take place according to all the laws of tactics, for it could not have been worse; von Trotha said jokingly that, if an Admiral brought about such a situation at a war game or in manoeuvres, he would never be entrusted without another command. In the North, the "Queen Elizabeths", then the battle-cruisers, and from N.E. through E. to S.E., an endless line of battleships formed an arc round the German van and kept it under fire. Evidently it had fallen into the most perfect trap. In addition to this unfavourable tactical position, there was a further difficulty, namely that the German ships could be clearly distinguished while they themselves only saw the gun flashes, 4 or 5 to each salvo, but could find no target.<br />
<br />
The Gunnery Officer of the "MARKGRAF" told me that he could not fire at all during half-an-hour, and that they were at the mercy of the British broadsides. Critical though the position was, in theory, they think that experience justifies the conclusion that this 'crossing the T' is in reality not so disastrous at longer ranges; for, in spite of the enormous superiority of their fire, the British made comparatively few hits, the simple reason being that, when fire is thus concentrated on a few leading ships, there can be no question of improving the shooting by spotting.<br />
<br />
Given good tactical training and squadrons which work well together, it is always easy to retire rapidly from an unfavourable position and even possibly to reach an advantageous one.<br />
<br />
The small amount of damage sustained by the Main Fleet may be owing partly to the fact that the leading battle-cruisers drew the enemy's fire, thus relieving the battleships. Only the three leading ships, "KÖNIG", "GROSSER KURFÜRST" and "MARKGRAF" received several hits; while among all the other ships, the "KAISER", "HELGOLAND" and the "SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN" received one hit each, and the rest were not hit at all.<br />
<br />
Simultaneously with the battle-cruisers, which were ahead and pressing forward in quarter-line formation, the 6th and 9th Flotillas, left by the "REGENSBURG", also proceeded to a torpedo attack. Regarding this cruiser advance, the Commanding Officer of the "SEYDLITZ" told me that he was in such a position that he was able to avoid the British salvoes, for he altered course towards the point where each salvo fell and thus evaded the spotting correction.<br />
<br />
This torpedo attack was carried out with great determination and seems to have been completely successful, although nobody is able to state how many hits were obtained. The British ships overlapped somewhat and their line was almost unbroken, and, as about 100 torpedoes were fired, it is estimates that there must have been a considerable number of hits, some people affirm that there were 20, but I do not place much confidence in these figures and it is useless to trouble about them as nobody is certain.<br />
<br />
The boats were fired on by guns of all calibres, even the heaviest, but with little effect, only one boat being destroyed; two other boats had been sunk in an earlier attack during the cruiser action.<br />
<br />
The battle-cruisers were also attacked by British torpedoes, the "SEYDLITZ" being hit once. The "MOLTKE" was lucky, for, when close to the ship, one torpedo apparently had a gyro failure and ran parallel with her. The "LÜTZOW" was probably hit also.<br />
<br />
After the attack, the destroyers laid fog and a heavy smoke screen, which interposed between the Fleet; this benefitted not only the heavily-damaged "LÜTZOW" and "DERFFLINGER", whose nets had been shot away and were hanging down, but also the whole Fleet. It may also have made an impression on the British.<br />
<br />
The German Main Fleet and cruisers turned on a westerly course, fire having again entirely ceased; and the ships of the Main Fleet then turned gradually in succession and in inverse sequence from W. to S.W., subsequently steering towards Horns Reef.<br />
<br />
It is not known what the British did; all that is certain, is that they did not follow in pursuit and that nothing further was seen of their Main Fleet. It remained light until 11 p.m. (summer time), and it would not have been impossible, considering their superior speed, for them to have come within firing range. The Germans expected it too, and now have to content themselves with surmises about the British Commander-in-Chief's reasons for not doing so. It is probably that the unfavourable issue of the fleet part of the battle and the demoralising losses in ships took away any desire on Jellicoe's part for further fighting. His Fleet may have lost heavily and been severely shaken by the torpedo attack; and, as the Germans still had some intact flotillas at their disposal, he may have feared further strong torpedo attacks in the critical hours of twilight, for in the German Navy they say that Jellicoe fears their destroyers in particular.<br />
<br />
Nevertheless, the Germans were not under the impression of having shaken the British Fleet to the extent of obliging them to give up the struggle, and when the evening passed without further incident, they reckoned with certainty on encountering Jellicoe off Horns Reef at daybreak. They were the more astonished at his non-appearance when their air reconnaissance reported that on the morning of 1 June a squadron of 12 battle-ships was proceeding North from the southern part of North Sea and that it suddenly turned on to an opposite course and proceeded South.<br />
<br />
As it could not possibly have been the intention of the British Commander-in-Chief to let the German Fleet escape after having encountered it at last far from its base, and as he still had an intact battle-squadron at his disposal, one is compelled to take the view that he no longer felt strong enough for a second encounter; the achievement of the German Fleet must therefore be very highly thought of.<br />
<br />
During the night cruising following the action, numerous small episodes and minor engagements took place, of which no clear idea can be formed. <br />
<br />
In view of a possible fresh attack or of a possible pursuit on the part of the enemy, it was thought undesirable to leave the 2nd Battle Squadron either in the van or in the rear, it therefore took station to starboard and at first proceeded on an opening course from the other squadrons, and continued fairly independently during the night.<br />
<br />
The 1st Battle Squadron therefore led, with the "WESTFALEN" as guide, and it was followed by the 3rd Battle Squadron.<br />
<br />
After the action had been broken off, the 4 remaining battle cruisers were ahead to port, where they were suddenly again brought under heavy fire from the port side and from ahead, apparently by 3 or 4 battle cruisers. It is presumed that these were the remaining 3 or 4 older cruisers of the "Invincible" class, which Jellicoe probably always stationed ahead of the Main Fleet, for it would hardly have been possible for the "Lions", which were following in the rear in the British line, to have taken station ahead so quickly. The German battle cruisers, all severely damaged, did not feel able to withstand this fire and turned away to starboard, passing ahead of the Main Fleet and between it and the 2nd Battle Squadron, which proceeded quietly on their course and before which the mysterious ships retired, not to be sighted again.<br />
<br />
The battle-cruisers then gradually fell astern, and as they were making much water, and also owing to their differing speeds, they lost contact with the Main Fleet and with each other.<br />
<br />
The "LÜTZOW" had dropped out during the engagement and proceeded independently, accompanied by 4 destroyers. At first she was able to steam 14 knots, but her speed decreased rapidly and dropped finally to 4 knots. Her bows sank slowly, and when the whole forecastle was under water the Commanding Officer decided to leave the ship. The badly wounded were transferred carefully to the boats and the disembarkation was conducted in good order. A torpedo was then fired at the ship and this coup de grace sank her in deep water at about 1 o'clock, I believe.<br />
<br />
The "SEYDLITZ" was hardly in a better condition than the "LÜTZOW"; she also sank gradually by the bows till the water was almost level with the deck, and she had a heavy list to port, but she continued on her course. In the darkest hours of the night she suddenly sighted 3 large ships to port, quite close to. She turned away, made a British recognition signal and was not pursued. As bad luck would have it, the steaming light had short-circuited, could not be switched off and showed intermittently.<br />
<br />
The "DERFFLINGER", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN" followed the Main Fleet more or less and met with no particular experiences.<br />
<br />
The Main Fleet had to repulse a series of destroyer attacks and was also engaged by cruisers. The movements of these British cruisers, which came up singly, are incomprehensible and give the impression of having lost their heads. They appear to have received the order, judging by an intercepted W/T message, to proceed on a northerly and north-westerly course, and thereby they ran into the extended German line which they probably imagined they had passed to the South.<br />
<br />
One large cruiser (?"WARRIOR") proceeded unsuspectingly within 875 yds. of the line of battleships and came under concentrated fire from several ships before she could reply, so that she blew up enveloped in flames and disappeared in 47 seconds. The "BIRMINGHAM" seems to have been accounted for in a similar manner. The destroyers all approached in a really insane manner; frequently not from ahead but from a direction astern, scattered, singly or in pairs, or at most 3 together, never in large numbers. Most of them were disabled forthwith by a few salvoes and set on fire. The "WESTFALEN" distinguished herself particularly at this time.<br />
<br />
These burning destroyers strewn along the course, lit it up as if for a festival. Evidently the fires were largely due to the light American and Mexican oils; at any rate German firing trials on oil bunkers never caused any such conflagrations.<br />
<br />
The attacking boats directed shrapnel fire on the searchlights with fairly good results, the searchlights of two battleships and one light cruiser being hit.<br />
<br />
One large destroyer, which only recognised the danger at the last moment and endeavoured to avoid it by altering course was rammed by the "NASSAU", which put her helm over for this purpose. The boat exploded internally and sank.<br />
<br />
The only ships hit were the "POMMERN" in the 2ns Battle Squadron, and the "ROSTOCK". The "POMMERN" blew up at once and nobody was saved. The "ROSTOCK" was just passing between ships of the Main Fleet when she was hit; the loss of life on board was small.<br />
<br />
The Germans believe they destroyed 11 British destroyers in all. The manner in which these destroyers were handled has not left a good impression on the whole, and one has certainly lost respect for this weapon. The view is also taken that the boats are too large and offer too wide a target.<br />
<br />
The light cruiser "ELBING", like the "ROSTOCK", apparently wanted to break through the line from port to starboard under pressure from the British cruisers; she was, however, rammed by the "POSEN" and had to be abandoned in a sinking condition. The Germans also fired a torpedo into her.<br />
<br />
The "FRAUENLOB" and 2 destroyers were lost during the night; no details of their loss are known.<br />
<br />
Not far from Heligoland, the "OSTFRIESLAND", 7th of the line, struck a mine. This brings the account of the chief events of this exciting cruiser to an end.<br />
<br />
The German flotillas were detached from the Fleet to clear the area off the Jutland Coast, which was divided up into sectors. The flotillas stationed furthest to the North proceeded to the Skagerrak and through these straits into the Baltic and to Kiel.<br />
<br />
None of the flotillas sighted the British Main Fleet again, which proves that it must have turned away to the N. or N.W. immediately after the action. According to confidential reports the Fleet entered British ports as early as 1 June.<br />
<br />
Two British battleships, in a severely damaged condition and accompanied by destroyers, were sighted proceeding back to England. One was attacked by a submarine, but without success.<br />
<br />
On the morning of 1 June, in fairly misty weather, a Zeppelin sighted groups of British ships leaving the Channel on a N.E.'ly course. The reports were rather vague, as sometimes 6 and sometimes 12 ships were mentioned; but it seems most likely that 12 battleships and 3 cruisers were in question, and that they soon retired. The airship, which flew low at one time to get a clearer view, was also fired on.<br />
<br />
Some of the ships are said to have had tripod masts.<br />
<br />
The German Fleet, with the exception of "SEYDLITZ", reached the Jade in the afternoon. The "SEYDLITZ" could not cross the bar on account of being so much down by the bows, and it was not till the next day at high water that she was towed in, stern first.<br />
<br />
<center><u>MISCELLANEOUS.<br>TACTICS.</u></center><br />
<br />
The Germans ascribe their success to various causes, and in the first place to their own superiority as regards tactics. This is a point which every officer discusses, and it is constantly repeated that it all happened just as in tactical manoeuvres and in "battle exercises", and that things could not have gone better.<br />
<br />
Movements of squadrons, divisions and individual ships, "turns together" and alterations of course and speed, all went like clockwork and demonstrated the very great mobility of all formations.<br />
<br />
The W/T signalling system of the Main Fleet never failed, and its failure would have been immaterial, as the primary and secondary flag action signals, showing from several positions in the ship, were made simultaneously.<br />
<br />
All this was due to the peace training and the practical experience of the Flag Officers and Captains. Though in peace time the Commander-in-Chief had never commanded a Fleet, nor the Admirals a squadron, still the training carried out on the same lines for a number of years resulted in everything proceeding with the expected precision.<br />
<br />
The British, on the contrary, are said to have displayed a certain clumsiness as regards tactics and to have preferred turning together when "turning on to an opposite course" (Wendungen im Gegenmarsch), though this conclusion does not seem altogether justified from the description of the action.<br />
<br />
The ships kept station 547 yds. apart, and Vice-Admiral Schmidt told me that, in his opinion, this distance is too small for large ships and that he prefers 656 yds., as the shorter distances result in the ships getting bunched and overlapping during alterations of course. In order to relieve this during the first turn to starboard, the Fleet Flagship herself turned to port and then closed gradually into line. At night the distance was 656 yds.<br />
<br />
No interruption of W/T communication was occasioned by the enemy.<br />
<br />
<center><u>GUNNERY</u></center><br />
<br />
It is admitted that the British are superior as regards their gunnery technique. Their salvoes fall most astoundingly close together and aroused admiration on all sides. Some people affirm that they fell too close together, and that it was consequently difficult to cover a sufficiently large danger space.<br />
<br />
This is particularly the case with the heaviest calibres: 13.5-in. and 15-in. and the battle-cruisers' fire was noticeably inferior to that of the "Queen Elizabeth" class, for example.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> Literal translation; the meaning is not clear. - Tr.] The spread of the salvoes frequently only covered a few square yards. In the "KÖNIG" 3 rounds, out of a salvo of 4 rounds, hit between the capstan and the bridge.<br />
<br />
This is attributed to careful calibration, which the British have studied for a long time and which, as is well known, was abandoned by the German Navy after a few trials. The gunnery officers declare unanimously that it must unquestionably be re-introduced.<br />
<br />
The British range-finders are superior to the German, and the construction of their turrets enables them to shoot at ranges impossible for German guns. The question of range appears to be immaterial to the British, who fire at any range so long as visibility permits.<br />
<br />
The Germans are fully convinced of the great superiority of 15-in. guns over all others, and deplore the fact that, owing to the predominant conservative tendencies in the German Navy, this calibre was not introduced until so lately. Vice-Admiral Gerdes, the Head of the Armament Department, is responsible for this, for he always opposed it on the ground that the poor visibility in German waters and the consequent short ranges rendered an increase of calibre useless; he considered the German 12-in. gun to be an altogether superior weapon, capable of competing with every other.<br />
<br />
In one respect the British seem behindhand as compared with the Germans: namely that they cannot alter range quickly enough and they are too dependent on the range clock. The British rely on steady fire at long range, and they adapt their tactics to this and avoid alterations of course and range most assiduously.<br />
<br />
The Germans, on the contrary, in their firing practices always work with big and rapid alterations of range and exercise firing while turning, so that the gunnery officers consider they have an advantage in this respect.<br />
<br />
The Turn on to an opposite course was certainly not advantageous for the German Fleet, but in this particular instance it made little difference, as the German ships were already unable to find a target; besides which, it must have disconcerted the British and it prevented them from obtaining good results with their fire. The salvoes fell very close together round the ships, but few hits were obtained. The rate of fire in the British ships is said to have been fair, but not excessive. Some people affirm that it was very modest.<br />
<br />
The British shell had great penetrating power, and from all reasonable distances the main armour was generally pierced clean through. The shell splinters picked up prove conclusively that at least 2 kinds of shell were used, differing considerably in material and quality. One kind of shell had a very thick wall and an extremely small explosive charge, it might almost be called a solid shot. It seems to have broken up frequently without exploding and the fuse did not function. Its explosive power, if it possessed any at all, was quite inconsiderable, and it is presumed that the explosives used was not high explosive.<br />
<br />
It appears from the splinters of these 15-in. shell that the wall was 6.3 - 6.7 ins. (16 - 17 cm.), so that the hollow space cannot measure more than 2.4 ins. - 1.8 ins. (4 - 6 cm.). It is true that the large pieces into which these shell broke pierced everything in their course and often went right through the whole ship, unless they struck an armoured part. Several intact heads were found, with and without caps, and also entire bases.<br />
<br />
The second kind of shell had considerably thinner walls, only about half as thick, but it also often broke up into quite large pieces and displayed no great explosive power, and little or no incendiary power.<br />
<br />
It appears therefore that the British aimed only at attaining penetrating power, and the Germans are of opinion that they do not possess (rohrsicheren)* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D.Note.- This appears to be a special fuse which is very delicate, but safe until it has left the gun.] fuses for high explosive shell; this was their opinion before the war also.<br />
<br />
They believe that the high explosive power of the German ammunition gives them a great advantage which may partly counterbalance the smaller calibre of their guns and perhaps also their inferior gunnery. In any case, the effect of the German shell at the point of impact was very considerable.<br />
<br />
The fact that the ships blew up must be attributed to explosions in their magazines. (In this connection one may recall a turret of the "SEYDLITZ" being hit in the action of 24 January, 1915; see my report No.47 ex 15). The turret armour must have been pierced and the shells in the turret must have been exploded. The British have no metal cartridge-cases and also no cartridge-holders such as the Germans have, but they keep their cartridges in locked boxes which are perhaps not flash-proof enough. It seems therefore, from the incident experienced by the "SEYDLITZ", that this must constitute a particular danger to British ships. In this last action also turrets in German ships were frequently hit; further details are given in the account of damage sustained.<br />
<br />
After having compared the hits received in the German ships with the observations of results on enemy targets, it may be safely affirmed that the explosive power of the German shells exceeds that of the British; this was already known after the action of 24 January 1915. The Germans are therefore very much annoyed that they had no 15-in. guns to fire, as they are persuaded that ships so knocked about (eingedeckte) as, for example, the "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" would have been completely destroyed by German shell.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. Note.- The writer appears to mean that if German 15-in. shell had been used against "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" these ships would have been sunk.]<br />
<br />
It may be noted here that the "BAYERN", the first of their ships to carry 15-in. guns, will not join the Fleet for another few days, and the "BADEN" not until the autumn.<br />
<br />
Medium armament played no part, only a few hits were obtained and they did little damage.<br />
<br />
The British fired part-salvoes, like the Germans; full salvoes may have been fired now and again.<br />
<br />
The method of repulsing destroyer attacks, which has previously been reported, namely the 'turning away' and firing on one, or at most two boats, proved to be sound, and the repulsing of attacks both by day and night offered no difficulties.<br />
<br />
As regards gunnery, it may also be mentioned that the fire-control apparatus worked without a hitch and withstood the heaviest shocks. The elevation pointers worked admirably. A few ships were not yet fitted with them.<br />
<br />
<center><u>Torpedo.</u></center><br />
<br />
As regards torpedo work the Germans consider themselves very much superior. There were prolonged discussions about depriving Flotilla Leaders of their independence and putting them under the orders of a Leader Ship, but they are now convinced that this is necessary to ensure the flotillas attacking at the right moment and all together.<br />
<br />
The flotillas were led by the 2 leader Ships "ROSTOCK" and "REGENSBURG", the first having 2 flotillas and the second 3 flotillas allocated to them. The remaining 2 flotillas accompanied the Main Fleet or the battle-cruisers. The leaders carried out their duties with great daring and circumspection. The attacks of the British were weak and scattered, and could therefore have little or only occasional success.<br />
<br />
The German 2nd Flotilla, composed of the larger 1500 ton boats were held back instead of being sent to attack. Although these boats are spoken of very highly and are indispensable for certain enterprises, the view is now taken that they are too large and too valuable to be used for attacking during an action. This Flotilla proceeded to Zeebrugge immediately after the action and arrived there safely. It is to be employed in preventing the British from blockading the harbour with nets, and thus make it impossible for the German submarines to proceed out.<br />
<br />
As far as I have heard, the "MOLTKE" alone of the larger ships fired 4 torpedoes.<br />
<br />
Submarines were not in evidence. No German submarines were present; on the other hand a German destroyer claims to have rammed a British submarine. This claim appears to be erroneous, at least it was declared to be nonsense by the Chief of Staff. The submarines failed as regards scouting and also doing the pursuit.<br />
<br />
Some people state that a British aeroplane was sighted to the northward, and that it had apparently risen from a cruiser. It played no part in the action.<br />
<br />
The use of "Höschter"* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. note:- Probably the name of the inventor.] fog seems to have been of good service, it and the smoke made by the destroyers having completely masked the Main Fleet and its movements at critical moments.<br />
<br />
<center><u>SPEED</u></center><br />
<br />
The advantage of speed lay entirely with the British, not only as regards the Main Fleet on account of the "Deutschland" class, but also as regards the battle-cruisers. The latter are said to have proved considerably faster than the German battle cruisers, an unpleasant experience which had already been made on 25 January 1915. This alone proves that the British are talking nonsense when they assert that the German Fleet sought safety in flight; on the contrary, it was far from its bases and entirely in the power of the British, who either did not wish to take advantage of their superior speed, or were unable to do so on account of the damage sustained. The visibility was no worse than it had been during the day and Jellicoe may have even welcomed the "Höschter" fog which would enable him to plead bad visibility as a reason for abandoning the pursuit. On the German side in the light of experience the factor of speed in the battleships is considered very important. But the moderate depths of the German harbours limits the draught of the ships, and make it particularly difficult for German builders to do much in this respect. In spite of greater length and higher horse power the most modern cruisers "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ" and "LÜTZOW" attained only a quite inconsiderable increase of speed in comparison with the older "GOEBEN" class, and proved a disappointment in this particular.<br />
<br />
The question whether the older battleships should take part in an important engagement was not easy to decide. The 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons composed of the "WITTLESBACH" and "BARBAROSSA" class, re-commissioned at the beginning of the war, were intended to be used in such actions, but have long since been paid off; some have been disarmed and employed as guardships and instructional ships, etc. It was considered however, that the 2nd Battle Squadron, composed of the most modern of the older ships, would be of some service in the action; but this squadron was in a privileged position, inasmuch as it was merely attached to the 1st and 3rd Battle Squadrons and its Admiral was allowed to operate independently and select the position he thought best. On this occasion it kept station quite well and did not prove a hindrance, but, on the other hand, it did not come under any heavy fire. This must be considered very fortunate, for, in view of the damage sustained by other ships and in view of the fact that the British shell pierced all armour above or below water even at the longest range, it is certain that every ship of this class would have been sunk by a few hits, as their internal sub-division is not proof against large inrushes of water.<br />
<br />
The loss of the "Pommern", which gives the British an opportunity for a hollow triumph, also teaches a clear lesson. The Chief of Staff told me that they will probably consider carefully before again exposing this Squadron to danger; therefore this action will have further confirmed the complete worthlessness of all Dreadnought types [sic] and will condemn them as old iron.<br />
<br />
<center><u>TORPEDO NETS.</u></center><br />
<br />
The torpedo nets of the battle cruisers are all badly damaged and the gear so knocked about by gunfire that they were almost useless. This was particularly the case with the "Derfflinger", where the after port nets were hanging in the water, and would have fallen across the propeller had they not chanced to remain held up by a temporary lashing. The ship was obliged to stop during the action to secure the nets, and they might easily have occasioned the loss of the ship.<br />
<br />
For this reason all the nets, together with the booms, were unshipped immediately after the ships' return, to everybody's satisfaction. They will not be carried any more, except perhaps for operations in the Baltic, where the ships may be obliged to anchor at sea.<br />
<br />
<center><u>LEAK-STOPPING SERVICE.</u></center><br />
<br />
The leak-stopping service which had been systematically developed, worked admirably and the Germans are convinced that they owe much to it. They believed that the "Seydlitz" could not have been brought in if the strengthening of the bulkheads, etc., had not been so thoroughly exercised and if the personnel had not been so well trained.<br />
<br />
It is also said, that in the "Lutzow", which had only been in commission for 2 months, was naturally not up to the mark in this respect, and that it is not impossible that small shortcomings, for which of course nobody can be blamed, were responsible for the ship sinking. The "Lutzow" was an unfortunate ship altogether. First her turbines collapsed, thus delaying her commissioning for 6 months, then she immediately struck a mine, and she was hardly out of dockyard hands before she was sunk.<br />
<br />
<center><u>DANGER FROM GAS FUMES.</u></center><br />
<br />
Only 2 days before sailing, a large number of the ships, and fortunately exactly those that came most under fire, namely battle-cruisers and the 3rd Squadron, were supplied with gas masks fitted with alkali cartridges for the whole crew and a plentiful reserve (in the "Seydlitz" 1500 masks for about 1200 men). The masks are similar to those used in the army for poisonous gases. Each man carries a mask slung round him, if he is not actually wearing it.<br />
<br />
I was told emphatically by all the officers, that, in their experience, these masks are absolutely necessary and not only saved many lives but enabled the men to carry on in parts of the ship which they would otherwise have been compelled to leave.<br />
<br />
The gases from shells, mines and torpedoes penetrate in an incredible manner through ventilators, telephone leads, etc. to compartments far away from the point of impact. In many cases the masks enabled large numbers of the guns' crews to escape from turrets that were hit, and to help out others who were badly wounded. In one case the men in one of the main engine rooms were able to remain at their posts after gas had penetrated, until the engine-room was ventilated.<br />
<br />
The Fleet breathing apparatus (Flottenathmer) is preferable to masks in some cases, but it cannot be supplied to everyone and it hampers one's movements, which the masks do not.<br />
<br />
On account of the great danger from gases, it is also advisable to fit hinged flaps in all shafts, and to have wooden bungs to fit the voice-pipes, keeping a hammer at hand to hammer them into the mouth-pieces.<br />
<br />
They tell me that it proved very useful to keep all the personnel employed below, such as in central control rooms, engine-rooms, torpedo flats, etc. continually informed of what was going on. The men get nervous, particularly at first, with the tremendous shocks caused by shell falling close to the ship, though the shocks are felt less on deck, and such information gives them confidence and they like knowing what is going on above them.<br />
<br />
<center><u>DAMAGE</u></center><br />
<br />
The distribution of ships needing repair in the various dockyards is as follows:-<br />
<br />
The "König" proceeded at once to Kiel and is under repair at Howaldt's yard. I did not see her.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" and "Moltke" in Blohm and Voss yard, Hamburg, the first in the Imperial Dock.<br />
<br />
The "Kurfürst["] in Vulkan Yard, Hamburg.<br />
<br />
The "Derfflinger" was first docked in Wilhelmshaven and the leaks temporarily stopped, she then proceeded to the Imperial dockyard, Kiel. The "Seydlitz" will now be docked in the large dock at Wilhelmshaven; during my stay the "Seydlitz" was still in the lock.<br />
<br />
The "Von der Tann", "Ostfriesland" and "Helgoland" will be repaired in dry docks in Wilhelmshaven. No other large ships require to be docked.<br />
<br />
"<u>Seydlitz</u>" The number of hits was still uncertain, as the whole forepart of the ship up to the upper deck was still under water, and it is not known what she looks like below water. The ship was brought into the lock with difficulty, and as she is 43 ft. down by the bows, she cannot be taken into harbour. They will not venture to dock the ship inside the lock, and intend first to raise her bows slightly.<br />
<br />
The roof and guns of the fore turret and anchors, cables etc., have already been unshipped, and they now intend to bring caissons alongside and pump out the fore part sufficiently to enable her to enter the harbour.<br />
<br />
The great inrush of water, that flooded more or less the whole fore part of the ship as far as the first boiler-room bulkhead, was caused by a number of hits. Firstly, one of the belt armour plates forward on the port side is missing, having fallen off. Secondly, there are believed to be at least 2 or 3 more hits below water, forward on the port side; for the list and the settling down had already become ominous when the ship was hit at the edge of the upper deck, port side, abreast the bridge; this was followed by an inrush of water in the battery deck, which did a great amount of damage.<br />
<br />
In addition, during the day action, she was hit by a torpedo on the starboard side under the forward 5.9 in. gun, which caused her to settle down still more by the bows. This gun was so much damaged by the shock from underneath as to be disabled.<br />
<br />
Further, there are 4 severe hits in the ship's side (mess deck, port side, forward of the turret), which also demolished the port capstan.<br />
<br />
These shell, or shell splinters, naturally penetrated to the armoured deck, so that the entire fore part of the ship above and below the armoured deck is holed in many places, allowing free passage for the water. The fore part of the ship was struck therefore by at least 8 or 9 shells and one torpedo.<br />
<br />
Apparently the only compartments which are not flooded, are the bow torpedo flats and the central control room. The former is being pumped out continuously, as a great deal of water is flowing in from above. The torpedo control room had to be abandoned, as the forward partition was not watertight. The central control room abaft this was not abandoned, but of its 2 entrances from the starboard and port passages, only the port one can be used, as the starboard one is flooded.<br />
<br />
The gunnery control room is far further aft and was not affected.<br />
<br />
The ship has a list of 7° to port, and as she has now been slightly raised, about 1¾ ft. of her bows are above water; at one time it was up to the level of the deck.<br />
<br />
While under way the forward boiler room bulkhead had to withstand most of the pressure; supports have been built up everywhere, but it leaks in places.<br />
<br />
The other hits of consequences were those in the turrets. The fore starboard turret No.2 received a direct hit on the fore face of the revolving structure. One curved plate was forced out, but fortunately the main effect of the explosion was outward. The right hand gun was disabled by slight damage to the mounting; with this exception the turret remained in action and kept up fire.<br />
<br />
The right hand gun of turret No.3 received a direct hit, which cut out a wide groove along the tube of the gun. The left hand gun continued to fire.<br />
<br />
The barbette of turret No.4 was hit on a level with the rammer, and the armour was pierced clean through. This hit is of special interest, as the "Seydlitz" received a similar hit and at the same level in turret No.5 on 24th January 1915, which caused a fire, disabled both the after turrets and killed all the guns' crews. This last time, however, the damage was slight. There was no ready ammunition in the turret, and only one cartridge was exploded, in contrast to the (6200 Kg.) 13,670 lbs. of powder on Jan.1915. The turret officer and a large number of the gun's crews were saved by their gas masks. The destruction caused by splinters was, however, considerable and the turret was abandoned, as it was not possible to continue fire from it. This was a 13.5 in. shell, at 15,310 yds. range, strength of armour pierced 8.6 inches.<br />
<br />
After the turret had been abandoned, it was hit a second time in the after side of the revolving part, which was pierced; this of course increased the havoc in the interior.<br />
<br />
Turret No.5 was hit in the roof. The shell richochetted, and the roof is slightly dented. Nobody was hurt and the turret continued to fire.<br />
<br />
In the "Seydlitz" therefore, all the turrets were hit, with the exception of the foremost turret, and one was hit twice.<br />
<br />
A further hit pierced the 5.9 in. (150mm.) casemate armour of the aftermost 5.9 in. starboard gun, No.2. The deck was pierced from beneath, and splinters also pierced the splinter bulkhead. The gun was disabled and all the crew were killed, with the exception of the ship's chaplain who happened to be in the casemate and must be watched over by a special guardian angel.<br />
<br />
A similar hit, with a 15 in. shell, struck the casemate armour of the 6-in. gun No.7 and exploded in the casemate. Men were killed, the gun was disabled and the splinter bulkhead pierced by large splinters. This time again, surprise was aroused by the comparatively small damage caused by a large calibre shell.<br />
<br />
"<u>Derfflinger</u>". One shell hit the armour belt forward of the hawse pipe, probably at the junction of 2 plates, as 2 plates broke away. The plates underneath were consequently strained apart and a great deal of water flowed in.<br />
<br />
The armour belt on the port side also received 2 further hits in the centre and was pierced clean through. The splinters penetrated more than half way through the ship, and in one case a piece of plating was driven half way though the ship. These hits, combined perhaps with others, destroyed the nets and their supports in several places.<br />
<br />
The two after turrets received direct hits, in one case on the roof, in the other case in the barbette above the deck; the armour was pierced and the upper portions of the turrets burnt out and severely damaged, but the flames did not penetrate to the magazines. The crew in the upper part of the turret were killed, and both turrets were disabled. This occurred at an early stage of the action.<br />
<br />
The guns at high elevation cannot yet be dismounted, as everything is wedged in, but they do not appear to be damaged.<br />
<br />
The muzzles were carried away off the 4 foremost 6 in. (15 cm.) guns on the port side; two of them probably having been accounted for by one and the same shell which hit the armour. One gun, the muzzle of which was perhaps damaged by a splinter, afterwards burst, the tube splitting open in the shape of a tulip.<br />
<br />
The "Derfflinger" received a few other hits of no particular interest. She appears the next most severely damaged ship after the "Lützow".<br />
<br />
The "<u>Moltke</u>" only received 5 hits, all of them during that part of the action which took place on a southerly course; while the cruisers mentioned above received most of the hits on the port side, consequently during the later stages of the action.<br />
<br />
One shell pieced the bulwarks in the after part of the ship above the armour, passed through the ship and struck the armour on the port side from inside, about 3.3 ft. below the water-line. One plate was forced out and is missing. The inrush of water was considerable. The after compartments, above the armoured deck which remained intact, were all more or less flooded.<br />
<br />
The second hit was further forward, below the armour belt. The shell exploded in a bunker, but the armoured deck held and no water penetrated it from below. The neighbouring bunkers made little water and could be pumped out.<br />
<br />
Another shell struck the 5.9 in. armour in the upper bunker, above the water-line. The armoured deck again held, but the inner wall of the bunker parted, and the battery deck was pierced from below, a 6 in. gun being damaged and disabled.<br />
<br />
In the fore part of the ship a shell struck the armour belt below the water-line. The plate remained intact and was driven in about 8 inches. The compartment was flooded, but the torpedo bulkhead remained watertight. A neighbouring compartment leaked slightly, the rivets having parted.<br />
<br />
The fifth case of damage, namely a plate beneath the armour belt being driven and pressed in, was probably not due to a direct hit, but to splinters of a shell which fell short.<br />
<br />
"<u>Von der Tann</u>". A shell hit and pierced the lower part of the 3.9 in. armour belt in the after part of the ship to starboard. The compartments above the armoured deck, and some of those on the deck above, were flooded. The chief effect of the shell was outside the ship, but it bent the plates below the otherwise undamaged armoured deck, so that a considerable amount of water flowed into the compartments below the armoured deck. The after torpedo flat was flooded half way up, and the men in the starboard steering engine room were shut in for a long time owing to the exits being blocked.<br />
<br />
The fore turret was hit on the starboard side on the upper edge of the barbette and a semi-circular armour plate was forced out. The machinery of the turret was so badly knocked about that the turret was disabled.<br />
<br />
The hydraulic piping was damaged, so that all the heavy armament was put out of action temporarily. Strangely enough, though men were wounded none were killed.<br />
<br />
The aftermost turret was hit in the barbette. The armour was pierced, but the effect of the shell was exterior, the turret sustained little internal damage, so that the handgear of the turret remained in action. The turret was wedged in one place and could not revolve; they succeeded, however, in cutting off with oxy-acetylene the piece of revolving part which was jammed against the inner side of the barbette thus getting rid of the obstruction.<br />
<br />
Outside the turret, the shell did considerable damage; some splinters striking downwards, bent the armoured deck and pierced it in places. As far as I know, the armoured deck sustained no further damage, and this was of little importance.<br />
<br />
The after conning-tower was hit and a piece of the armour torn away; the occupants, including the 3rd gunnery officer, were killed. Splinters struck downwards to the engine-room ventilation hatches, but were stopped by the armoured gratings.<br />
<br />
"<u>Ostfriesland"</u> was struck by a mine below the foremost port turret. The whole measures 197 ft.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. note:- Literal translation is 12 times 5 metres large.] The torpedo bulkhead is only slightly torn, and the inrush of water was only local.<br />
<br />
"<u>Helgoland</u>". A 13.5 in. shell hit the 7.9 in. armour belt forward on the port side and pierced it. The shell appears to have broken only as no explosive action can be traced. The range was about 14,217 yds.<br />
<br />
"<u>Nassau</u>" rammed a British destroyer, or rather, the destroyer ran into her forward on the port side. Her bows must have lifted right up, for her hawse-pipe remained on board the "Nassau", so firmly wedged into the side of the upper deck that it will have to be cut out. The "Nassau's" side below the deck is torn away for 33 ft. The destroyer then glanced off the "Nassau's" side and exploded internally. One of the crew remained behind in one of the nets, but fell into the water when the "Nassau" fired a salvo.<br />
<br />
The "Nassau" was hit by shrapnel from attacking destroyers in the foremost searchlight group, both port searchlights were put out of action. The searchlight control and electric cables were destroyed and many of the searchlight crews were killed. The after searchlight group was hit in a similar manner, and one of the searchlights was disabled.<br />
<br />
The "Rhineland" and a light cruiser were also hit in a similar manner.<br />
<br />
I have seen all the above mentioned ships in Wilhelmshaven.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" and "Kurfürst" were at Hamburg, but unfortunately I am unable to report much about them. They had already been under repair for several days, and the damage was to some extent made good. Besides this, the conditions were not favourable for undisturbed examination: commissioners from the Imperial Navy Office were on board, besides crowds of workmen, the noise was deafening and it was pouring with rain. Consequently I took no notes on the spot and relied on my memory, which however fails me now among the very many received of similar cases. I am therefore unable to report each hit with accuracy.<br />
<br />
This is immaterial, however, as there were no particularly interesting hits, and none of the ships had been hit in the turrets. The armour had been pierced in several places, the effect and character of the hits being similar in all cases; the hits on unarmoured parts were of little consequence.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" was hit aft on the port side of the water line just on a junction of two plates, a piece of equal size being torn away from each plate. The shell then struck the sloping part of the armoured deck and the splinters ricochetted and passed right through the ship. These plates have already been removed.<br />
<br />
A casemate was pierced and the gun disabled.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" is the only ship whose mast was hit, the mast remained standing and has now been removed.<br />
<br />
The spotting platform had to be abandoned, as communications with the conning tower was cut off. This was the only hit received in a conning tower; it only grazed the upper edge and glanced off, and the men inside hardly noticed it.<br />
<br />
The port engine was disabled, not in consequence of damage to the turbine which is in good condition, but owing to one of the main propeller bearings becoming overheated. The cause of this is not clear, but it is believed to be due to concussions. The ship was well able to keep station with her two remaining engines.<br />
<br />
The "<u>Kurfürst</u>" suffered especially from a great inrush of water forward on the port side, above the armoured deck; it was caused by a hit in the armour belt. No further damage of importance was sustained.<br />
<br />
With regard to time necessary for repair to these ships, it is not yet possible to say anything definite, as it is still undecided whether they shall undergo thorough repair or not. The chief difficulty is the manufacture of new armour plates; but some of the holed plates can, no doubt, be left in position for the present.<br />
<br />
A considerable time will be needed to repair some of the turrets of the battle-cruisers, but here too, they will contrive to get things done. For instance, the "Von der Tann" is to have an entire turret out of a ship of the "Nassau" class, probably the foremost turret, and this ship will be left without a turret for some time. They talk a great deal also of transferring guns, and they will perhaps make use of those intended for the "Hindenburg", which will not be completed will the late autumn.<br />
<br />
It may be presumed that the battleships will be ready for sea in 4-6 weeks, and the battle-cruisers, particularly the "Seydlitz", in not less than 4 months. Naturally work is going on day and night, and repairs are given priority over all new construction.<br />
<br />
The damage sustained by light cruisers and destroyers is inconsiderable. The "Hamburg" had a funnel shot away. As these ships seem to be of minor importance, I did not trouble further about them.<br />
<br />
As our Allies appear not to have the intention of communicating to us what effect the examination of damages sustained will have on their construction in the future, we must endeavour to ascertain this as time goes on by means of cross questioning and by studying their new constructions in detail. I do not feel called upon to draw premature and rash conclusions to-day, on the strength of impressions received, but this will not prevent me from giving a summary of my opinion and of the opinions expresses in my hearing.<br />
<br />
Firstly, it is a remarkable fact that in all the ships that have returned home, all the engine and boiler-rooms are undamaged; the "Lützow" is no exception to this, as she proceeded under her own steam until late in the night after the action. I have also been assured by the Imperial Navy Office, after an inspection carried out by the Chief Engineer, that not a single auxiliary engine was defective. The only boiler-room put out of action was the foremost one in the "Seydlitz" where the bulkhead gave a little, allowing water to penetrate through rivet holes and cracks when the ship was under way. The conclusion may therefore be drawn that these vital parts of the ship are sufficiently protected and that the armour belt of the usual German thicknesses, though it cannot stop the shells, at least fulfils its purpose by breaking them up. Consequently it has become almost impossible even for the largest splinters of 15 in. shell to penetrate through armoured deck or torpedo bulkhead in engine and boiler rooms.<br />
<br />
Even at these long ranges and steep angles there was no question of the armoured decks being pierced; but the fitting of strong gratings over the hatches, which prevented the engines of the "Von der Tann" from sustaining severe damage, appears very necessary.<br />
<br />
The torpedo bulkheads also resisted shells, mines and torpedoes effectually; and in cases where slight damage was sustained, it had no further consequences than the flooding of the compartment affected.<br />
<br />
Perhaps it would be advisable to construct a specially strong boiler-room bulkhead, similar to a torpedo bulkhead, so that it could not be damaged by splinters or water-pressure.<br />
<br />
The inspection of the "Seydlitz" has left me with the impression that the commanding officer of the "Seydlitz" expected rather too much of his ship, and that nothing short of extraordinary good luck enabled her to be brought back. At one time when the whole forepart of the ship was flooded and the bows were under water, he proceeded occasionally with revolutions for 22 knots, just in order to show how seaworthy his ship was, so he told me. This may have been very sporting, or perhaps it may have been necessary under the circumstances in order not to drop too far behind and be overtaken by the enemy, but it certainly was not good seamanship, and if his stokehold bulkhead had burst, the "Seydlitz" would have gone down like the "Lutzow", where the circumstances appear to have been very similar. Later on he decreased speed and finally proceeded stern first.<br />
<br />
I therefore think it not impossible that the loss of the "Lützow", which is said to have been proceeded at 14 knots for a time, was also due only to recklessly high speed, and that the ship might have been saved if she had proceeded stern first or been taken in tow.<br />
<br />
As the danger from water-pressure must always be greatest from ahead, it would certainly be advisable to take special preventative measures against it.<br />
<br />
Vice-Admiral Schmidt told me that, in his opinion, the armoured belt ought to be strongest in the centre, and possible in the afterpart to protect the steering engines, and possibly in the bows, but that it ought not to taper off gradually from the centre to the extremities. He was also entirely in favour of a protected upper deck forming a second armoured deck.<br />
<br />
The admirably thorough system of internal division in the German ships and the floating capability thus attained is the finest proof of the merit of German construction which pursued this aim, and it shows that Admiral von Tirpitz, the creator of the Battle Fleet of to-day, was right when he upheld the principle that, above all things, the ships must be capable of remaining afloat and must not sink or heel over, and that everything else is of secondary consideration.<br />
<br />
The large number of hits in the turrets is remarkable, and it is generally considered that the turret armour should be appreciably stronger, especially in the lower part of the barbettes; for it is not only the disablement of the guns that comes into question, serious though this might be, but also the blowing up of magazines and the total destruction of the ship, as the wide shaft down to the magazines cannot possibly be made completely flash-proof. This is the most vital part of the ship. It is only owing to the small explosive charges in British shells, that there were no explosions of magazines in the German ships.<br />
<br />
Everything possible had been done after the action of 24.1.15 to ensure protection against this danger; the ready ammunition was removed from the top of the hoists and wherever possible all the openings in shafts leading down below were fitted with flaps, covers and heavy asbestos mats, while German ammunition is particularly carefully stowed and packed in cases with screwed-on covers.<br />
<br />
The disasters on the British side are a proof that this is a question of the greatest importance. It must also be taken into consideration that while any other damage turret may take months.<br />
<br />
The numerous hits in turrets would appear to justify the opinion of those who decided against triple turrets, on the ground [sic] that if one was disabled it would put too many heavy guns out of action.<br />
<br />
A hit in a casemate will of course destroy it and disable the gun, but this is of little consequence. Care must be taken here also not to have any ready ammunition, and to close the ammunition hand-up hermetically with heavy asbestos mats at the magazine end also. With the German "Paternoster" (dredger hoist) the ammunition lifts this mat as it comes up and the mat then falls to and closes the opening, which is a practical arrangement.<br />
<br />
Other hits through unarmoured parts, which destroyed more or less small gear and at the first glance give an impression of terrible havoc, are really of no consequence.<br />
<br />
In the "Von der Tann" they wanted to flood a turret magazine. This was impossible, as the flooding valve in the battery, or between deck was piled up with debris, cabin fittings, etc., and was inaccessible. Fortunately the flooding of the magazine turned out to be unnecessary. The Executive Officer remarked to me how critical such a trivial matter might become, and that one could not be careful enough about choosing the positions for the flooding valves, which must be kept clear of easily destructible objects.<br />
<br />
The man-hole covers in the decks, coal shoots [chutes], etc., were pointed out to me as dangerous, as they may be burst open by pressure of gas from below, thus causing damage and giving passage to the gases. These covers should be secured in a different manner and much more firmly.<br />
<br />
The flooding and draining system worked admirably, and is hardly capable of improvement. The only disadvantage is that the compartments above the armoured deck have no draining arrangements. This should be provided. A list, consequent on an inrush of water, could always be corrected by flooding an opposite compartment. This is an important matter both as affecting gunnery and personnel.<br />
<br />
The searchlights, which were not taken down in the German ships, all came out of the action undamaged; anxiety on their account was therefore unfounded. It was very unpleasant when attacking boats fired on the searchlights, and it is therefore considered necessary to fit light armour protection on the masts for the crews of the searchlight control and electric cables.<br />
<br />
Damage from flames is nowhere visible. The Germans are now rather amused at the care with which interior partitions were scraped.<br />
<br />
I could not help comparing the German ships with the Russian battleship "Orel", which I saw in Madzurn after the battle of Tsushima. If I remember rightly, the "Orel" had 5 severe hits and 40 hits with medium-calibre shell.<br />
<br />
The enormous explosive power of the Shimosa shell, which breaks up into minute splinters, did not do the slightest damage to the vital parts of the ship, but the upper deck was transformed into a confused heap of ruins. Superstructure, bridges, masts, funnels, etc., were destroyed, guns dismounted and fires started.<br />
<br />
Nothing of the kind is to be seen in the German ships, outwardly only a few more or less clean shell holes are visible, and they look so orderly and so little damaged that they do not appear to have gone through an action.<br />
<br />
It is true that the upper decks are said to have been littered with countless splinters, but they flew on to the decks from shells which struck the water, the ship receiving violent shocks.<br />
<br />
The holes in the armour show the characteristic concentric cracks round the hole and the radial splashes, the latter proving that the shells exploded on impact or at the latest, as they passed through. In many cases, as already noted, the force of the explosion was external and only pieces of plate, and possibly the head of the shell were driven in.<br />
<br />
<center><u>FLAG OFFICERS OF THE FLEET AND LEADERS</u></center><br />
<br />
{|<br />
| Commander-in-Chief:<br />
| Vice Admiral Scheer<br />
|-<br />
| <u>I Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Vice Admiral Schmidt<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Engelhard<br />
|-<br />
| <u>II Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Mauve<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Baron von Dalwigh<br />
|-<br />
| <u>III Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Behncke<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Nordmann<br />
|-<br />
| Officer commanding the Scouting Forces and<br>Commanding 1st Scouting Group<br />
| Vice Admiral Hipper<br />
|-<br />
| " 2nd " "<br />
| Rear Admiral Bodicker<br />
|-<br />
| " 4th " "<br />
| Commodore "Captain" v. Reuter<br />
|-<br />
| Leaders of Destroyers<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| in "Rostock"<br />
| Commodore "Captain" Michelsen<br />
|-<br />
| in Regensburg<br />
| Commodore "Captain" Heinrich<br />
|-<br />
| Leader of submarines<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| In Hamburg<br />
| Captain Bauer<br />
|}<br />
<br />
<center><u>REMARKS</u></center><br />
<br />
The lecture on the action, upon which this report is based, was illustrated by a plan prepared in haste for H.M. the Kaiser, and a copy was promised to me. But the Admiral Staff does not wish to part with this first incomplete draft, and the preparation of an accurate plan has not yet been completed, as the Admiral Staff is not yet in possession of all the details.<br />
<br />
In time to be included in this report I have only received the sketch of the first stage of the battle, namely the cruiser action on a southerly course, together with a small sketch of the situation when the action was broken off; both are enclosed.<br />
<br />
I conclude from the sketch of the cruiser action, that the accounts given to me were not quite accurate; for instance, the assertion of the commanding officer of the "Moltke" that the shortest range at that stage was 7,650 yds. and that he had accounted for one of the armoured cruisers with a torpedo.<br />
<br />
The sketch shows that the "Indefatigable" was probably first destroyed by gun fire from the "Von der Tann", and later the "Queen Mary" by gunfire from the "Derfflinger", and that the range was never less than 14,220 yds.<br />
<br />
The loss of "V. 27" and "V. 29" and of 4 British destroyers is also apparent, while I was only told of two.<br />
<br />
In the original sketch, 2 British armoured cruisers are also shown as having fallen out during this stage, but this is not shown on the accompanying sketch and probably took place later.<br />
<br />
I was told by the Admiral Staff that the accompanying sketches are not to be taken as strictly accurate.<br />
<br />
It is requested that the sketches and course of the action and the account of damages may be treated as strictly confidential.<br />
<br />
==Footnotes==<br />
{{reflist}}<br />
<br />
==Bibliography==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
*''Schematismus für das K.u.K. Heer und für die Kriegsmarine für 1914. Separatausgabe''. Wien: 1914.<br />
*''Almanach für die k. und k. Kriegsmarine 1917. Kriegsausgabe''. '''XXXVII'''. Pola: 1917.<br />
*[[Arthur Marder (Naval Historian)|Marder, Arthur J.]] (1966). ''From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919: Jutland and After, May 1916–December 1916''. '''Volume III'''. London: Oxford University Press.<br />
*{{MarderFDSFIII}}<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
==External Links==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
*[http://www.denkmalprojekt.org/2023/vl_marineoffiz_zahlmstr_feuerwerks_torpedooffiz_beamte_wk1.html "Halbstocks die Flagge!"] ''Onlineprojekt Gefallenendenkmäler''.<br />
*Krámli, Mihály. [http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-124.pdf "The Report on the Battle of Jutland by the Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché in Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Colloredo-Mannsfeld."] ''NavWeaps''.<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
[[Category:Battle of Jutland]]</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Report_on_German_Warships_after_Jutland&diff=334756Austro-Hungarian Naval Report on German Warships after Jutland2024-03-22T13:34:38Z<p>Simon Harley: /* Report */</p>
<hr />
<div>This report is mentioned in the [[Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland]]. It was prepared by ''Marineartillerie-Oberingenieure 2. Klasse'' Georg Schindler.<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
REPORT by a Mission undertaken in accordance with Order. Section 4 M.S. No.1746 of 1916.<br />
----<br />
<br />
On the inspection of German Warships which took part in the Battle of the Skaggerak (Jutland), 31st.May - 1st.June 1916; on Wilhelmshaven, Hamburg and Kiel, and on other inspections of ships and bases.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}By Georg Schindler,<br />
<br />
{{pad|580px}}Gunnery Engineer, 2nd Class.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}AUSTRIAN NAVY.<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
The only details which have been dealt with are those which were of Gunnery interest.<br />
<br />
{|<br />
| A.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "SEYDLITZ"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| B.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "OSTFRIESLAND"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| C.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "VON DER TANN"<br />
| were<br />
|-<br />
| D.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "GROSSER KÜRFURST"<br />
| in<br />
|-<br />
| E.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"&nbsp;<br />
| "MARKGRAF"<br />
| engagement.<br />
|-<br />
| F.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "MOLTKE"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| G.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"<br />
| "DERFFLINGER"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| H.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "KÖNIG"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| J.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "HINDENBURG" (building)<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| K.<br />
| Large Battleship<br />
| "BAYERN"<br />
| rowspan=2 | Newly commissioned<br />
|-<br />
| L.<br />
| T.B.D.<br />
| "G.90"<br />
|-<br />
| M.<br />
| colspan=3 | Fishing vessels Anti-Submarine armament, etc.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| N.<br />
| colspan=3 | Short inspection of the Ordnance Workshops in the Arsenal in Wilhelmshaven. <br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| O.<br />
| Ditto in Kiel.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|}<br />
<br />
Ships under A.B.C.J. and M. were in Wilhelmshaven. D.E.F. in Hamburg and G.H.K.L. in Kiel.<br />
<br />
In the following reports on each ship, Section 1 deals with the effect of enemy hits on ships A. to H. above, in conjunction with the two attached ship sketches (Enclosures 1 and 2). [Not attached.]<br />
<br />
Of the hits marked in the sketches those of a gunnery interest are distinguished by red ink. Section II gives general remarks concerning the ships in question.<br />
<br />
Further a report is submitted on installations in newly commissioned ships (K. and L.) also on a ship still under construction (J.), as well as means of combating submarines installed in Fishing vessels (M.) and finally, briefly on the Ordnance workshops in the Naval Arsenals (N. and O.).<br />
<br />
A. "SEYDLITZ" (Enclosure 1).<br />
<br />
This Cruiser received 24 shell hits (38 cm. 34.3 cm. and 30.5 cm.)(15", 13.5" and 12") and one Torpedo hit.<br />
<br />
Except for 1 shell hit (apparently 34.3 cm.) (13.5") on the starboard side forward (Hits nos.2-4) and one hit no.16 (38 cm.?) in the starboard after 15 cm. (6") casemate all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all Gun tubes, Guns and many fittings had been dismantled and landed.<br />
<br />
<center>I. Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
<br />
1. A large calibre shell (hit no.8) struck the 2nd. 15 cm. port casemate (from forward), put the gun out of action and killed or seriously wounded the majority of the gun's crew.<br />
<br />
2. A 38 cm. shell exploded in the 4th 15 cm. casemate (hit No.13) the gun was similarly damaged, and 2 men (wounded) remained alive of the crew.<br />
<br />
3. In the port after 15 cm. casemate, No.6 gun, (hit No.15) had the same effect as the two described above.<br />
<br />
4. A 38 cm. shell (hit No.16) penetrated the armoured bulkhead on starboard side aft, near the last 15 cm. casemate, close to the curve of the armour (Fig.1, Enc.3) destroyed the 15 cm. gun and killed most of the gun crew.<br />
<br />
Of the twelve 15 cm. guns it appears that 2 port and 4 starboard fired unceasingly until the end.<br />
<br />
5. No.2 Turret (starboard) received a hit from port on the vertical turret armour (hit No.21) to the right of the right gun. Part of the nose of the shell pierced the armour anddestroyed [sic] the cradle and training gear of the right gun. The left was undamaged. The turret remained in action with this gun.<br />
<br />
6. An interesting hit is to be seen on the right 28 cm. gun of No.3 Turret port. The gun was on one of the jetties of the arsenal and could be examined. A large calibre shell hit the aforesaid gun a glancing blow just outside the turret, producing at the point of impact, a considerable elliptical scoop on the outside, causing a fracture of the inner tube and in addition bent the gun so that the axis of the tube at the muzzle was (as far as could be estimated) 200 mm. (about 8 in.) out of line.<br />
<br />
The cradle of this gun was split, the trunnions somewhat bent and the caps thereof partially opened out.<br />
<br />
The left gun of this turret, however, remained serviceable and the Turret could continue firing without interruption.<br />
<br />
7. A 34.3 cm. (13.5") shell (hit No.18) pierced the vertical armour of the revolving structure of No.4 Turret superimposed to the left of the left gun exploded inside the turret, ignited the cartridges which were ready for loading, put the turret out of action and killed all the crew (about 70 men) except 6.<br />
<br />
T [sic] This turret, already out of action, received another hit later from a 38 cm. (15") shell (hit No.17) this projectile struck the revolving Turret armour close to the lower edge at the right rear of the turret, and partially penetrated the turret.<br />
<br />
8. A Large calibre shell tore off the roof of the after (No.5) turret. (Geschossgeller ? ricochet). The turret suffered no appreciable damage inside.<br />
<br />
The remaining hits are being dealt with in the report on ship construction.≠ [I.D. Note: The original of this report can, unfortunately, not be obtained.]<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
<center>II Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
1. Extensive "flash" protection was already installed in "SEYDLITZ".<br />
<br />
(a) The openings for bringing 28 cm. cartridges into the lower loading chamber of the Ammunition Hoist can be shut off with sliding doors (schubtüren ?). The supply scuttles from the magazines are fitted with hinged flaps which open upwards on each side (Fig.3, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
(b) The 15 cm. (5.9") Ammunition hoists at the supply position in the casemates are fitted with a "closing flap" which shuts automatically, but its own weight assisted by a spring, immediately after the ammunition has rolled out on to the Ammunition Tray (which is placed in a horizontal position by a Paternoster apparatus (endless chain) (Fig.4, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
2. Apparently Gas Masks are employed in all ships. The method of use is the same as in the German Army. <u>Every</u> man was supplied with a mask (as it happened 2 days before action). These masks were to be brought into use immediately there was any evidence of suffocating gases, and they were so far successful that, according to the opinions of officers, at least one ship, if not two, was saved by their use.<br />
<br />
3. Enemy "shorts" usually exploded on hitting the water, with the result that, (as in the cases of shells exploding on board), splinters of various sizes struck guns among other things, and caused damage, but in practically every case no stoppage of firing from the gun resulted. Shell splinters also entered Conning Towers and Turrets through the sighting slits. But they caused no internal damage as their force was broken by their passage through the deeps [sic] slits. (Fig.5, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
4. In Turret firing. Salvoes were gradually used, and always with <u>only one</u> gun of each turret.<br />
<br />
5. For transmission of orders to the guns (also to 15 cm. (5.9" guns) from the Gunnery Officers position (in the Conning Tower) Elevation pointers are used which are mounted (<u>separately</u>) on brackets away from the Turret armour.<br />
<br />
6. Ranges of the individual rangefinders are shown on a circular scale (range receiver) by means of electrically worked pointers. All these dials are mounter [sic] in a circular box (Fig.6, Enc.3) so that the ranges of the same object shown by several rangefinders (Pointers in similar direction)[.] Further, it is possible to cut out one or other of the dials if the Rangetaker concerned is ranging badly.<br />
<br />
7. Repulse of Destroyers is carried out invariably by means of broadside salvoes of 15 cm. (5.9) guns etc. and one target only is always used. But the Gunlayer is only to fire when sights are exactly on the target.<br />
<br />
8. The 8.8 cm. (22 pr.) guns were not used in the battle. It is understood that in the future guns of this calibre, will only be retained on board as anti-aircraft guns, as was laid down for all ships.<br />
<br />
9. (a) The empty 26 cm. (11") cartridge cases are thrown out of the turrets on to the deck through openings in rear of the Gun platforms (2 per turret). A covering flap, opening downwards when the cases are thrown out, automatically closes the hole by means of a spring (Fig.7, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
(b) The fired 15 cm. (5.9") cartridge are placed in a large hanging net in the casemate, and are only removed from the casemate during a lull in the firing. It was stated that a very large number of fired cases (including Large Calibre ones) were collected and brought back.<br />
<br />
10. The voice pipes are made of 60,100 and 150 mm. diameter (2.4 in., 3.8 in.,and 6 in.). (The last named are called Schallrohre and are intended for short distances). Voice pipes are not lagged.<br />
<br />
11. The ventilation of the Turrets is similar to the method employed in our newer ships. A Fan placed between the two guns, sucks, on the one hand the powder gases from the breeches by means of a ventilation pipe from each gun when the breech is opened and on the other hand draws them away from the roof of the turret on the gun platform another fan, portable, and continually running, was installed when sucked in fresh air through a hose and passed it into the interior of the turret bymeans [sic] of a second hose. If any man had any difficulty in breathing he inhaled fresh air through the second hose. But even this method only afforded partial relief.<br />
<br />
12. All Gunnery machinery (hydraulic and electric) appears to have function correctly.<br />
<br />
13. From the Gunnery point of view there were no serious fires (magazines of any description), for which the "Flash door" protection described in Section II Miscellaneous, Pars. I (a) and (b) is principally responsible. All cartridges actually in a turret or casemate,when an enemy shell burst in the turret or casemate, were exploded in every case. Therefore the rule was most strictly enforced that only the absolute minimum of ammunition was kept ready at the guns.<br />
<br />
14. "SEYDLITZ" had 1150 28 cm. (11" shell) on board, of which 450 were expended. (No ship expended all her ammunition).<br />
<br />
15. The torpedo nets were not actually a hindrance in the action but they sustained heavy damage fromenemy [sic] hits and splinters so that parts of them hung down over the ships side.<br />
<br />
In future these nets being useless ballast will no longer be carried. This is already the case in the new battleship "BAYERN".</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Report_on_German_Warships_after_Jutland&diff=334755Austro-Hungarian Naval Report on German Warships after Jutland2024-03-22T13:03:11Z<p>Simon Harley: /* Report */</p>
<hr />
<div>This report is mentioned in the [[Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland]]. It was prepared by ''Marineartillerie-Oberingenieure 2. Klasse'' Georg Schindler.<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
REPORT by a Mission undertaken in accordance with Order. Section 4 M.S. No.1746 of 1916.<br />
----<br />
<br />
On the inspection of German Warships which took part in the Battle of the Skaggerak (Jutland), 31st.May - 1st.June 1916; on Wilhelmshaven, Hamburg and Kiel, and on other inspections of ships and bases.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}By Georg Schindler,<br />
<br />
{{pad|580px}}Gunnery Engineer, 2nd Class.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}AUSTRIAN NAVY.<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
The only details which have been dealt with are those which were of Gunnery interest.<br />
<br />
{|<br />
| A.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "SEYDLITZ"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| B.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "OSTFRIESLAND"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| C.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "VON DER TANN"<br />
| were<br />
|-<br />
| D.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "GROSSER KÜRFURST"<br />
| in<br />
|-<br />
| E.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"&nbsp;<br />
| "MARKGRAF"<br />
| engagement.<br />
|-<br />
| F.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "MOLTKE"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| G.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"<br />
| "DERFFLINGER"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| H.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "KÖNIG"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| J.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "HINDENBURG" (building)<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| K.<br />
| Large Battleship<br />
| "BAYERN"<br />
| rowspan=2 | Newly commissioned<br />
|-<br />
| L.<br />
| T.B.D.<br />
| "G.90"<br />
|-<br />
| M.<br />
| colspan=3 | Fishing vessels Anti-Submarine armament, etc.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| N.<br />
| colspan=3 | Short inspection of the Ordnance Workshops in the Arsenal in Wilhelmshaven. <br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| O.<br />
| Ditto in Kiel.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|}<br />
<br />
Ships under A.B.C.J. and M. were in Wilhelmshaven. D.E.F. in Hamburg and G.H.K.L. in Kiel.<br />
<br />
In the following reports on each ship, Section 1 deals with the effect of enemy hits on ships A. to H. above, in conjunction with the two attached ship sketches (Enclosures 1 and 2). [Not attached.]<br />
<br />
Of the hits marked in the sketches those of a gunnery interest are distinguished by red ink. Section II gives general remarks concerning the ships in question.<br />
<br />
Further a report is submitted on installations in newly commissioned ships (K. and L.) also on a ship still under construction (J.), as well as means of combating submarines installed in Fishing vessels (M.) and finally, briefly on the Ordnance workshops in the Naval Arsenals (N. and O.).<br />
<br />
A. "SEYDLITZ" (Enclosure 1).<br />
<br />
This Cruiser received 24 shell hits (38 cm. 34.3 cm. and 30.5 cm.)(15", 13.5" and 12") and one Torpedo hit.<br />
<br />
Except for 1 shell hit (apparently 34.3 cm.) (13.5") on the starboard side forward (Hits nos.2-4) and one hit no.16 (38 cm.?) in the starboard after 15 cm. (6") casemate all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all Gun tubes, Guns and many fittings had been dismantled and landed.<br />
<br />
<center>I. Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
<br />
1. A large calibre shell (hit no.8) struck the 2nd. 15 cm. port casemate (from forward), put the gun out of action and killed or seriously wounded the majority of the gun's crew.<br />
<br />
2. A 38 cm. shell exploded in the 4th 15 cm. casemate (hit No.13) the gun was similarly damaged, and 2 men (wounded) remained alive of the crew.<br />
<br />
3. In the port after 15 cm. casemate, No.6 gun, (hit No.15) had the same effect as the two described above.<br />
<br />
4. A 38 cm. shell (hit No.16) penetrated the armoured bulkhead on starboard side aft, near the last 15 cm. casemate, close to the curve of the armour (Fig.1, Enc.3) destroyed the 15 cm. gun and killed most of the gun crew.<br />
<br />
Of the twelve 15 cm. guns it appears that 2 port and 4 starboard fired unceasingly until the end.<br />
<br />
5. No.2 Turret (starboard) received a hit from port on the vertical turret armour (hit No.21) to the right of the right gun. Part of the nose of the shell pierced the armour anddestroyed [sic] the cradle and training gear of the right gun. The left was undamaged. The turret remained in action with this gun.<br />
<br />
6. An interesting hit is to be seen on the right 28 cm. gun of No.3 Turret port. The gun was on one of the jetties of the arsenal and could be examined. A large calibre shell hit the aforesaid gun a glancing blow just outside the turret, producing at the point of impact, a considerable elliptical scoop on the outside, causing a fracture of the inner tube and in addition bent the gun so that the axis of the tube at the muzzle was (as far as could be estimated) 200 mm. (about 8 in.) out of line.<br />
<br />
The cradle of this gun was split, the trunnions somewhat bent and the caps thereof partially opened out.<br />
<br />
The left gun of this turret, however, remained serviceable and the Turret could continue firing without interruption.<br />
<br />
7. A 34.3 cm. (13.5") shell (hit No.18) pierced the vertical armour of the revolving structure of No.4 Turret superimposed to the left of the left gun exploded inside the turret, ignited the cartridges which were ready for loading, put the turret out of action and killed all the crew (about 70 men) except 6.<br />
<br />
T [sic] This turret, already out of action, received another hit later from a 38 cm. (15") shell (hit No.17) this projectile struck the revolving Turret armour close to the lower edge at the right rear of the turret, and partially penetrated the turret.<br />
<br />
8. A Large calibre shell tore off the roof of the after (No.5) turret. (Geschossgeller ? ricochet). The turret suffered no appreciable damage inside.<br />
<br />
The remaining hits are being dealt with in the report on ship construction.≠ [I.D. Note: The original of this report can, unfortunately, not be obtained.]<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
<center>II Miscellaneous.</center><br />
<br />
1. Extensive "flash" protection was already installed in "SEYDLITZ".<br />
<br />
(a) The openings for bringing 28 cm. cartridges into the lower loading chamber of the Ammunition Hoist can be shut off with sliding doors (schubtüren ?). The supply scuttles from the magazines are fitted with hinged flaps which open upwards on each side (Fig.3, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
(b) The 15 cm. (5.9") Ammunition hoists at the supply position in the casemates are fitted with a "closing flap" which shuts automatically, but its own weight assisted by a spring, immediately after the ammunition has rolled out on to the Ammunition Tray (which is placed in a horizontal position by a Paternoster apparatus (endless chain) (Fig.4, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
2. Apparently Gas Masks are employed in all ships. The method of use is the same as in the German Army. <u>Every</u> man was supplied with a mask (as it happened 2 days before action). These masks were to be brought into use immediately there was any evidence of suffocating gases, and they were so far successful that, according to the opinions of officers, at least one ship, if not two, was saved by their use.<br />
<br />
3. Enemy "shorts" usually exploded on hitting the water, with the result that, (as in the cases of shells exploding on board), splinters of various sizes struck guns among other things, and caused damage, but in practically every case no stoppage of firing from the gun resulted. Shell splinters also entered Conning Towers and Turrets through the sighting slits. But they caused no internal damage as their force was broken by their passage through the deeps [sic] slits. (Fig.5, Enc.3).<br />
<br />
4. In Turret firing. Salvoes were gradually used, and always with <u>only one</u> gun of each turret.</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Report_on_German_Warships_after_Jutland&diff=334754Austro-Hungarian Naval Report on German Warships after Jutland2024-03-22T09:20:37Z<p>Simon Harley: Created page.</p>
<hr />
<div>This report is mentioned in the [[Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland]]. It was prepared by ''Marineartillerie-Oberingenieure 2. Klasse'' Georg Schindler.<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
REPORT by a Mission undertaken in accordance with Order. Section 4 M.S. No.1746 of 1916.<br />
----<br />
<br />
On the inspection of German Warships which took part in the Battle of the Skaggerak (Jutland), 31st.May - 1st.June 1916; on Wilhelmshaven, Hamburg and Kiel, and on other inspections of ships and bases.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}By Georg Schindler,<br />
<br />
{{pad|580px}}Gunnery Engineer, 2nd Class.<br />
<br />
{{pad|600px}}AUSTRIAN NAVY.<br />
<br />
----<br />
<br />
The only details which have been dealt with are those which were of Gunnery interest.<br />
<br />
{|<br />
| A.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "SEYDLITZ"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| B.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "OSTFRIESLAND"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| C.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "VON DER TANN"<br />
| were<br />
|-<br />
| D.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "GROSSER KÜRFURST"<br />
| in<br />
|-<br />
| E.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"&nbsp;<br />
| "MARKGRAF"<br />
| engagement.<br />
|-<br />
| F.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "MOLTKE"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| G.<br />
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;"<br />
| "DERFFLINGER"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| H.<br />
| Battleship<br />
| "KÖNIG"<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| J.<br />
| Battle Cruiser<br />
| "HINDENBURG" (building)<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| K.<br />
| Large Battleship<br />
| "BAYERN"<br />
| rowspan=2 | Newly commissioned<br />
|-<br />
| L.<br />
| T.B.D.<br />
| "G.90"<br />
|-<br />
| M.<br />
| colspan=3 | Fishing vessels Anti-Submarine armament, etc.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| N.<br />
| colspan=3 | Short inspection of the Ordnance Workshops in the Arsenal in Wilhelmshaven. <br />
| <br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| O.<br />
| Ditto in Kiel.<br />
| <br />
| <br />
|}<br />
<br />
Ships under A.B.C.J. and M. were in Wilhelmshaven. D.E.F. in Hamburg and G.H.K.L. in Kiel.<br />
<br />
In the following reports on each ship, Section 1 deals with the effect of enemy hits on ships A. to H. above, in conjunction with the two attached ship sketches (Enclosures 1 and 2). [Not attached.]<br />
<br />
Of the hits marked in the sketches those of a gunnery interest are distinguished by red ink. Section II gives general remarks concerning the ships in question.<br />
<br />
Further a report is submitted on installations in newly commissioned ships (K. and L.) also on a ship still under construction (J.), as well as means of combating submarines installed in Fishing vessels (M.) and finally, briefly on the Ordnance workshops in the Naval Arsenals (N. and O.).<br />
<br />
A. "SEYDLITZ" (Enclosure 1).<br />
<br />
This Cruiser received 24 shell hits (38 cm. 34.3 cm. and 30.5 cm.)(15", 13.5" and 12") and one Torpedo hit.<br />
<br />
Except for 1 shell hit (apparently 34.3 cm.) (13.5") on the starboard side forward (Hits nos.2-4) and one hit no.16 (38 cm.?) in the starboard after 15 cm. (6") casemate all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all hits came from the port side. At the time of the inspection all Gun tubes, Guns and many fittings had been dismantled and landed.<br />
<br />
<center>I. Effects of shell hits.</center><br />
<br />
1. A large calibre shell (hit no.8) struck the 2nd. 15 cm. port casemate (from forward), put the gun out of action and killed or seriously wounded the majority of the gun's crew.<br />
<br />
2. A 38 cm. shell exploded in the 4th 15 cm. casemate (hit No.13) the gun was similarly damaged, and 2 men (wounded) remained alive of the crew.<br />
<br />
3. In the port after 15 cm. casemate, No.6 gun, (hit No.15) had the same effect as the two described above.<br />
<br />
4. A 38 cm. shell (hit No.16) penetrated the armoured bulkhead on starboard side aft, near the last 15 cm. casemate, close to the curve of the armour (Fig.1, Enc.3) destroyed the 15 cm. gun and killed most of the gun crew.<br />
<br />
Of the twelve 15 cm. guns it appears that 2 port and 4 starboard fired unceasingly until the end.<br />
<br />
5. No.2 Turret (starboard) received a hit from port on the vertical turret armour (hit No.21) to the right of the right gun. Part of the nose of the shell pierced the armour anddestroyed [sic] the cradle and training gear of the right gun. The left was undamaged. The turret remained in action with this gun.<br />
<br />
6. An interesting hit is to be seen on the right 28 cm. gun of No.3 Turret port. The gun was on one of the jetties of the arsenal and could be examined. A large calibre shell hit the aforesaid gun a glancing blow just outside the turret, producing at the point of impact, a considerable elliptical scoop on the outside, causing a fracture of the inner tube and in addition bent the gun so that the axis of the tube at the muzzle was (as far as could be estimated) 200 mm. (about 8 in.) out of line.<br />
<br />
The cradle of this gun was split, the trunnions somewhat bent and the caps thereof partially opened out.<br />
<br />
The left gun of this turret, however, remained serviceable and the Turret could continue firing without interruption.<br />
<br />
7. A 34.3 cm. (13.5") shell (hit No.18) pierced the vertical armour of the revolving structure of No.4 Turret superimposed to the left of the left gun exploded inside the turret, ignited the cartridges which were ready for loading, put the turret out of action and killed all the crew (about 70 men) except 6.<br />
<br />
T [sic] This turret, already out of action, received another hit later from a 38 cm. (15") shell (hit No.17) this projectile struck the revolving Turret armour close to the lower edge at the right rear of the turret, and partially penetrated the turret.<br />
<br />
8. A Large calibre shell tore off the roof of the after (No.5) turret. (Geschossgeller ? ricochet). The turret suffered no appreciable damage inside.<br />
<br />
The remaining hits are being dealt with in the report on ship construction.≠ [I.D. Note: The original of this report can, unfortunately, not be obtained.]</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Attach%C3%A9_Report_on_the_Battle_of_Jutland&diff=334753Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland2024-03-19T19:55:11Z<p>Simon Harley: Made Changes.</p>
<hr />
<div>Soon after the [[Battle of Jutland]] on 31 May &ndash; 1 June 1916 the Naval Attaché of the [[Austro-Hungarian Navy|Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Navy]] at the embassy in Berlin, ''Fregattenkapitäne'' Hieronymus Graf von Colloredo-Mannsfeld,<ref>''Schematismus für das K.u.K. Heer und für die Kriegsmarine für 1914''. p. 1270. ''Almanach für die k. und k. Kriegsmarine 1917''. p. 668.</ref> visited the [[High Sea Fleet]]. He composed a report on the battle for his superiors using first-hand accounts, interspersed here and there with his own observations. Being written so soon after the battle it provides an interesting, raw insight into the state of the [[Imperial German Navy]], even if some of the details turned out to be inaccurate.<br />
<br />
The version reproduced here is a translation in English apparently made by the [[Naval Intelligence Division (Royal Navy)|Naval Intelligence Division]] in 1919 from a copy which was subsequently returned to "F.N.A.", presumably the French Naval Attaché. A copy of the translation then made its way into the papers of the British Cabinet, from where historian Arthur J. Marder obtained a copy which is in his papers.<ref>Folder bearing number N.I.D. 087/19. Marder papers, Special Collections and Archives, Langson Library, University of California, Irvine, MS-F002, Box 27.</ref> He does not appear to have used it for the 1966 edition of ''From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow'', Volume III, but certainly used it for the revised edition in 1978.<ref>A quote on p. 189 of the 1966 edition reads, "The Fleet is filled with enthusiasm and elated with victory.... All, down to the last seaman, believe in the strength of the Fleet and look forward to further encounters with confidence." This differs to the quote used on p. 234 of the 1978 edition, which is identical to that used here.</ref> Three weeks after transcribing Marder's copy, editor [[User:Simon Harley|Simon Harley]] found another copy in the papers of {{ViceRN}} [[John Ernest Troyte Harper|John E. T. Harper]].<ref>Harper papers, Churchill Archives Centre, JEHR 1/4.</ref><br />
<br />
It is perhaps worth comparing this translation with that made by Hungarian historian Mihály Krámli of a post-war copy of a slightly shorter version of the report in a Hungarian archive which has been published on the ''NavWeaps'' online resource.<ref>Krámli, Mihály. [http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-124.pdf "The Report on the Battle of Jutland by the Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché in Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Colloredo-Mannsfeld."] ''NavWeaps''.</ref><br />
<br />
The original grammar and punctuation of the typescript has been reproduced here wherever possible.<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
From:- Austrian Naval Attache in Berlin.<br />
<br />
To:- Commander-in-Chief, Pola.<br />
<div style="float:right;">Berlin,<br>17 June, 1916.</div><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<center><u>NAVAL ENGAGEMENT OF 31 MAY 1916.</u></center><br />
<br />
The following is a report of the naval proceedings of 31 May - 1 June, 1916, and also of the damage sustained by the German Fleet.<br />
<br />
During my 3-days' visit to Wilhelmshaven, followed by a cursory examination of the "MARKGRAF" and "KURFURST" at Hamburg, I endeavoured to gain merely a general idea of the results of gunfire and concentrated my attention on the course of the action itself.<br />
Admiral Scheer, whom I only saw for a short time as he left for Kiel to attend the funeral of his borther-in-law [sic], Lieut.-Commander Mohr,<ref>Carl Mohr of the ''Hamburg''.[http://www.denkmalprojekt.org/2023/vl_marineoffiz_zahlmstr_feuerwerks_torpedooffiz_beamte_wk1.html "Halbstocks die Flagge!"] ''Onlineprojekt Gefallenendenkmäler''. Our thanks to Ruiz Mateo Lutzow for finding this excellent source.</ref> who was killed in the action, very kindly arranged that his Chief of Staff, Captain Trotha, should give me an account of the whole proceedings, illustrated by plans, and that I should be furnished with all information. I have tried to fill in the gaps by conversations with officers whom I know; this has resulted in some contradictory statements, and several points remain obscure, the accounts from the various ships not having all come in.<br />
<br />
Many episodes will therefore be explained later and may appear in a different light, but, as regards the broad outlines which are of chief importance, the picture of this interesting engagement is fairly clear. The accompanying plan of the action was made in haste for the Kaiser and will therefore need much correction.<br />
<br />
The spirit pervading the Fleet can only be described as one of enthusiasm; they are intoxicated with victory. The heavy load weighing on them all, the dear that this war might end without an encounter of the Fleets, have vanished. They have learnt what fighting really means, they know themselves to be superior to the enemy as regards tactics, and that they were following the right lines and have nothing to unlearn; they know that their gunfire was more effective than that of the enemy, and that they can rely implicitly on their flotillas which have always been looked upon in the German Navy as one of the chief factors in an action. Finally they know that their largest ships can stand heavy fire and serious damage, that they leave nothing to be desired as regards construction and cannot be sunk easily. In short, they feel that the British, in spite of all their boasting, cannot overcome the German Fleet and have a considerable respect for it.<br />
<br />
This conviction imbues the whole Fleet, down to the last man, with confidence in their strength and a calm assurance regarding future encounters. At the same time they are free from over-confidence and from under-estimation of the enemy. On the contrary, the British fire-control and the enormous piercing power of their heavy shell at great distances have roused their admiration, so that a careless conception of the situation is not to be feared, the less so, as well-balanced minds such as those of Admiral Scheer and his Staff are unlikely to be led away by former successes to undertake rash enterprises in the future.<br />
<br />
They do not deny that they were extraordinarily fortunate, and that if the action had been prosecuted with energy on the British side, and if the "Nelson touch" had been in evidence, things might have gone very badly for Germany, especially as the British still had an intact Battle Squadron of 12 units at their disposal which had not yet taken part in the action. But they console themselves with the knowledge that no naval action was ever won without some stroke of luck.<br />
<br />
The Kaiser's visit, the day before my arrival, and his address to the Fleet gave great satisfaction, and subsequently many important personages arrive to inspect the ships, such as Prince Henry and the Grand Dukes of Mecklenburg and Oldenburg, and numbers of decorations were distributed. Vice-Admiral Scheer was promoted to Admiral, and he and Vice-Admiral Hipper received the Pour le Merite.<br />
<br />
I also visited Rear-Admiral Behncke, who was wounded and in hospital; his wounds are slight, a few small splinters in his head, elbow and knee, and he will probably soon be well again.<br />
<br />
<center><u>COURSE OF THE ACTION.</u></center><br />
<br />
The Commander-in-Chief intended to advance with the whole Fleet to the waters of the Skagerrak, in order to make his presence felt unpleasantly by disturbing the shipping, hoping thereby to lure on the British forces and in this manner to be in a position to attack a part of the British Fleet with superior or at least with equal forces. He reckoned that any movements of the British Fleet would be reported to him in good time by the submarines which had been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and he hoped that the airships would prove a better means of reconnoitring than any possessed by the enemy.<br />
<br />
Unfavourable weather prevented him for a considerable period from undertaking any operations, and, as the submarines were to return home on 1 June and be relieved by a new group, the 31 May was the last date for carrying out the planned advance.<br />
<br />
The cruisers left the Jade at 3 a.m., the Main Fleet at 4 a.m., steering an easterly course, and then, after passing Heligoland, a N.N.W'ly course. No reports were received from submarines. These were stationed chiefly off the Orkneys and the Firth of Forth, and the large group of Flanders boats were off the Thames and at the entrance to the Channel. <br />
<br />
While proceeding northwards, a few W/T messages were received, but they were corrupt, appeared to refer only to small formations and gave no clue to the movements of the Grand Fleet. The airships were unable to start in the morning, on account of the wind, and, as it blew hard throughout the day in the Heligoland Bight, they could not start until the early hours of 1 June. In this respect things did not go well, but Admiral Scheer decided nevertheless to continue on his course to the Skagerrak. <br />
<br />
This the account given by Captain von Trotha, who affirms that nothing was known of the presence of the British Fleet in the waters of the Skagerrak, and that there seemed no probability of encountering this Fleet before 1 June.<br />
<br />
There are some points here which I am unable to understand. The submarines are said to have been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and were to return home on 1 June to be relieved probably by a weaker group. For, If the same number of boats were to to keep watch off the English coast, why should 31 May have been the last day for the German Fleet to sail. The day of departure was, therefore, too late in any case, for, if no encounter was to be expected before 1 June, the boats stationed off the coast could not possibly encounter the damaged British ships, as was intended, for probably no damaged ships would be there before 2 June.<br />
<br />
The battleship "KONIG ALBERT" had to carry out repairs to her condensers and did not proceed with the Fleet. Von Trotha told me that there was no alternative and that a ship must carry out small overhauls regularly in a dockyard according to programme. But could it not be arranged, when one is taking the initiative, to choose one's moment for an advance and to have all the ships together for this short time? And why should just that moment be chosen when one of the most powerful ships of the "Kaiser" class is in the dockyard, instead, for instance, of one of the "Nassau" class with 11-in. guns.<br />
<br />
In addition, the "BAYERN" was to have joined up a few days later. After having waited so long, why should not the plan have been postponed for 2 or 3 weeks, instead of dispensing with the only ship carrying 15-in. guns.<br />
<br />
In the same manner they dispensed with air reconnaissance, from which they had expected so much.<br />
<br />
These considerations make me doubt whether the account given me is quite correct, and whether, on the contrary, they knew of certain movements of the British Fleet and considered the moment extremely favourable for an attack. Perhaps they only knew of Beatty's battle squadron, and thinking the Main Fleet was far away, hoped to entrap this squadron. In Berlin, they have much to say, even in military circles, about the British Fleet's intention to push through into the Baltic, and of Kitchener's mission having some connection with this. I consider this senseless, for it cannot be presemed [sic] that the British Fleet would leave their shores unprotected and do the Germans the favour of operating in the Baltic, which would certainly be a most advantageous area for the German Fleet. In any case, there appear to be discrepancies which will probably be explained at some later date.<br />
<br />
Scouting groups, battle cruisers and light cruisers, together with flotillas, preceded the Main Fleet by 50 - 60 miles. At 4 p.m. the light cruisers encountered some British battle cruisers. These at once opened fire on the light cruisers, at an estimated distance of 26,247 yds.; the range could be taken accurately. Though they did not obtain a hit, the salvoes fell so well that the German cruisers thought it advisable to turn away and fall back on their battle cruisers.<br />
<br />
As the British approached, these battle cruisers turned on to a southerly course, in order to lure the enemy on to the German Main Fleet. A running action, on a southerly course, ensued. The British were to starboard and to the west of the Germans, who had therefore the following advantage: in the North Sea, in summer, the western horizon is quite light and visibility towards the west is good, while towards the east, and in a still greater degree off the Jutland Coast, it is misty and visibility is bad and no silhouettes stand out against the eastern horizon. This phenomenon also played great part in the subsequent course of the action. The sun was still high and was not troublesome, and the British ships offered admirable targets. The sea was calm, the wind N.W. 1-2, altering subsequently through W. to S.W.<br />
<br />
The following British ships were recognised:-<br />
3 "Lion" class, 1 "Tiger" and 2 "Indefatigable" class; they were soon reinforced by 5 "Queen Elizabeth" class following astern.<br />
<br />
It is asserted that, judging from shell splinters, the ship of the "Tiger" class carried 15-in. guns, and that she was therefore the mysterious vessel which replaced the "TIGER" sunk on 24.1.15; as the last-named "TIGER" carried only 13.5-in.guns, this was taken as a further proof of her loss. The silhouette of the new "TIGER", however, is said to have resembled that of the old "TIGER" exactly. As the "Queen Elizabeths" soon opened fire also with 15-in. guns, I rather doubt this assertion regarding the "TIGER", and the various ships on this early part of the engagement are altogether somewhat at variance.<br />
<br />
On the German side the ships proceeded in the following sequence:- "LÜTZOW", Flagship of Vice-Admiral Hipper, "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN".<br />
<br />
As Hipper edged towards the enemy, the distance decreased to about 7655 yds. The German fire was unquestionably superior, but the speed of the British vessels was greater. After a short time the "INDEFATIGABLE" and "QUEEN MARY" blew up, and 2 battle-cruisers and two attacking destroyers were also accounted for. The "QUEEN MARY" must have been destroyed by the explosion of a magazine; she was torn in two halves, and a water-colour painted by an officer represents her enveloped in an enormous column of black smoke; she disappeared in a few seconds. Only one cadet was subsequently picked.<br />
<br />
The second battle cruiser disappeared under similar circumstances. The "VON DER TANN" claims to have accounted for one of these battle-cruisers by a broadside. But the "MOLTKE" fired 4 torpedoes and also claims this achievement.<br />
<br />
The Germans suffered very little during this phase of the action, the "MOLTKE" alone receiving hits on the starboard side. The fire of the British battle-cruisers is said not to have been nearly as good as that of the "QUEEN ELIZABETH" class later on.<br />
<br />
When they had approached the German Main Fleet, the British turned on to a contrary course and the German cruisers did the same. The German Main Fleet proceeded in divisions in starboard quarter-line, the 3rd Battle Squadron: 4 "König" class and 3 "Kaiser" class, Fleet Flagship, 1st Battle Squadron: 4 "Ostfriesland" class and 4 "Westfalen" class, and the 2nd Battle Squadron: 5 "Deutschland" class and the "Hessen". They endeavoured to effect a junction with the cruisers, but were unable to take part very effectually.<br />
<br />
The course of the action was now in a northerly direction, over the area which had just been traversed, and the British ships now drew ahead considerably and turned more and more towards the East; the Germans followed this movement, and in consequence the conditions of visibility became less and less favourable for them.<br />
<br />
The "Queen Elizabeths" now made their presence more greatly felt; one of them had dropped out, but I was unable to ascertain when this occurred.<br />
<br />
The course of the German Math Fleet at first led past the 2 disabled British destroyers, which were lying stopped. The crews had already taken to the boats and were picked up later on by German destroyers. As the Main Fleet was doubtful about the advisability of passing the destroyers while they were still afloat, they were sunk by a few broadsides. One of the officers who was picked up was in pyjamas and is said to have stayed in his cabin during the action. He declared "We did not expect so much resistance," while another said - "The battle is rather disappointing." It has been ascertained that these destroyers were greatly under-manned; their crews seemed very exhausted, which points to their having been in the water for a long time.<br />
<br />
While on this easterly course, the light cruisers of the fast 2nd Scouting Group: "FRANKFURT", "PILLAU", "ELBING" and "WIESBADEN", were heavily fired on from the N.E. and E. without their being able to see more than the gun flashes. In addition, they were under continual fire from the N., and while turning away to S.E. and S., they ascertained that they were opposed by an interminable line of British ships, which appeared at first to be on a N.W.'ly course, and had then evidently turned together on to a S.'ly course.<br />
<br />
It may be noted here that the battleships, and, generally speaking, the battle-cruisers also, never sighted the British Main Fleet, and saw nothing but the flashes of the guns and the effects of the fire. These British ships, about 25 in number, were only sighted by a few light cruisers and by the flotillas, and were counted by them as accurately as possible.<br />
<br />
Surrounded thus from the N. and the E. and under fire, the "WIESBADEN" was disabled, apparently by a hit in the engine-room. The Admiral noticed, it is true, that his leading ships must have encountered new and powerful forces and that they were turning away; but he thought it his duty to go to the assistance of the "WIESBADEN" and therefore continued on an easterly course.<br />
<br />
The van of the Main Fleet, led by the "KÖNIG" (Rear-Admiral Behncke) now came under heavy fire from right ahead; the "KÖNIG" turned away under this fire towards the S.E., whereupon the Commander-in-Chief ordered the whole line to "turn together" to starboard and gave up the idea of helping the "WIESBADEN". About this time Vice-Admiral Hipper transferred his flag from the "LÜTZOW" to the "MOLTKE" with the help of a destroyer, his W/T station being damaged.<br />
<br />
Hardly had the Main Fleet drawn away on a westerly course, before it was ascertained that the pressure was relaxing and the fire decreasing, and that the British were no longer pursuing so hotly. Scheer therefore ordered the ships to "turn together" back on to their former course, and made the signal 'R' = 'Engage the enemy'. This second advance may be termed the zenith of the action. Admiral Scheer gave his views on it approximately as follows:- "Those who make a study of this engagement will be very puzzled as to my object in advancing thus against the wall of British ships. The fact is that I had no particular object. I made the first advance because I had a feeling that I ought to endeavour to assist the "WIESBADEN" and because the situation ahead was quite obscure to me, for I saw nothing of the "LÜTZOW" and received no W/T reports. I soon saw, however, that the leading ships were coming under an overwhelming fire, and that I could not risk the Fleet on the "WIESBADEN'S" account. When I noticed that the British pressure had quite ceased and that the Fleet remained intact in my hands, I turned back, under the impression that the action could not end in this way and that I ought to seek contact with the enemy again."<br />
<br />
The situation during the first and second advances may serve as an example of what should not take place according to all the laws of tactics, for it could not have been worse; von Trotha said jokingly that, if an Admiral brought about such a situation at a war game or in manoeuvres, he would never be entrusted without another command. In the North, the "Queen Elizabeths", then the battle-cruisers, and from N.E. through E. to S.E., an endless line of battleships formed an arc round the German van and kept it under fire. Evidently it had fallen into the most perfect trap. In addition to this unfavourable tactical position, there was a further difficulty, namely that the German ships could be clearly distinguished while they themselves only saw the gun flashes, 4 or 5 to each salvo, but could find no target.<br />
<br />
The Gunnery Officer of the "MARKGRAF" told me that he could not fire at all during half-an-hour, and that they were at the mercy of the British broadsides. Critical though the position was, in theory, they think that experience justifies the conclusion that this 'crossing the T' is in reality not so disastrous at longer ranges; for, in spite of the enormous superiority of their fire, the British made comparatively few hits, the simple reason being that, when fire is thus concentrated on a few leading ships, there can be no question of improving the shooting by spotting.<br />
<br />
Given good tactical training and squadrons which work well together, it is always easy to retire rapidly from an unfavourable position and even possibly to reach an advantageous one.<br />
<br />
The small amount of damage sustained by the Main Fleet may be owing partly to the fact that the leading battle-cruisers drew the enemy's fire, thus relieving the battleships. Only the three leading ships, "KÖNIG", "GROSSER KURFÜRST" and "MARKGRAF" received several hits; while among all the other ships, the "KAISER", "HELGOLAND" and the "SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN" received one hit each, and the rest were not hit at all.<br />
<br />
Simultaneously with the battle-cruisers, which were ahead and pressing forward in quarter-line formation, the 6th and 9th Flotillas, left by the "REGENSBURG", also proceeded to a torpedo attack. Regarding this cruiser advance, the Commanding Officer of the "SEYDLITZ" told me that he was in such a position that he was able to avoid the British salvoes, for he altered course towards the point where each salvo fell and thus evaded the spotting correction.<br />
<br />
This torpedo attack was carried out with great determination and seems to have been completely successful, although nobody is able to state how many hits were obtained. The British ships overlapped somewhat and their line was almost unbroken, and, as about 100 torpedoes were fired, it is estimates that there must have been a considerable number of hits, some people affirm that there were 20, but I do not place much confidence in these figures and it is useless to trouble about them as nobody is certain.<br />
<br />
The boats were fired on by guns of all calibres, even the heaviest, but with little effect, only one boat being destroyed; two other boats had been sunk in an earlier attack during the cruiser action.<br />
<br />
The battle-cruisers were also attacked by British torpedoes, the "SEYDLITZ" being hit once. The "MOLTKE" was lucky, for, when close to the ship, one torpedo apparently had a gyro failure and ran parallel with her. The "LÜTZOW" was probably hit also.<br />
<br />
After the attack, the destroyers laid fog and a heavy smoke screen, which interposed between the Fleet; this benefitted not only the heavily-damaged "LÜTZOW" and "DERFFLINGER", whose nets had been shot away and were hanging down, but also the whole Fleet. It may also have made an impression on the British.<br />
<br />
The German Main Fleet and cruisers turned on a westerly course, fire having again entirely ceased; and the ships of the Main Fleet then turned gradually in succession and in inverse sequence from W. to S.W., subsequently steering towards Horns Reef.<br />
<br />
It is not known what the British did; all that is certain, is that they did not follow in pursuit and that nothing further was seen of their Main Fleet. It remained light until 11 p.m. (summer time), and it would not have been impossible, considering their superior speed, for them to have come within firing range. The Germans expected it too, and now have to content themselves with surmises about the British Commander-in-Chief's reasons for not doing so. It is probably that the unfavourable issue of the fleet part of the battle and the demoralising losses in ships took away any desire on Jellicoe's part for further fighting. His Fleet may have lost heavily and been severely shaken by the torpedo attack; and, as the Germans still had some intact flotillas at their disposal, he may have feared further strong torpedo attacks in the critical hours of twilight, for in the German Navy they say that Jellicoe fears their destroyers in particular.<br />
<br />
Nevertheless, the Germans were not under the impression of having shaken the British Fleet to the extent of obliging them to give up the struggle, and when the evening passed without further incident, they reckoned with certainty on encountering Jellicoe off Horns Reef at daybreak. They were the more astonished at his non-appearance when their air reconnaissance reported that on the morning of 1 June a squadron of 12 battle-ships was proceeding North from the southern part of North Sea and that it suddenly turned on to an opposite course and proceeded South.<br />
<br />
As it could not possibly have been the intention of the British Commander-in-Chief to let the German Fleet escape after having encountered it at last far from its base, and as he still had an intact battle-squadron at his disposal, one is compelled to take the view that he no longer felt strong enough for a second encounter; the achievement of the German Fleet must therefore be very highly thought of.<br />
<br />
During the night cruising following the action, numerous small episodes and minor engagements took place, of which no clear idea can be formed. <br />
<br />
In view of a possible fresh attack or of a possible pursuit on the part of the enemy, it was thought undesirable to leave the 2nd Battle Squadron either in the van or in the rear, it therefore took station to starboard and at first proceeded on an opening course from the other squadrons, and continued fairly independently during the night.<br />
<br />
The 1st Battle Squadron therefore led, with the "WESTFALEN" as guide, and it was followed by the 3rd Battle Squadron.<br />
<br />
After the action had been broken off, the 4 remaining battle cruisers were ahead to port, where they were suddenly again brought under heavy fire from the port side and from ahead, apparently by 3 or 4 battle cruisers. It is presumed that these were the remaining 3 or 4 older cruisers of the "Invincible" class, which Jellicoe probably always stationed ahead of the Main Fleet, for it would hardly have been possible for the "Lions", which were following in the rear in the British line, to have taken station ahead so quickly. The German battle cruisers, all severely damaged, did not feel able to withstand this fire and turned away to starboard, passing ahead of the Main Fleet and between it and the 2nd Battle Squadron, which proceeded quietly on their course and before which the mysterious ships retired, not to be sighted again.<br />
<br />
The battle-cruisers then gradually fell astern, and as they were making much water, and also owing to their differing speeds, they lost contact with the Main Fleet and with each other.<br />
<br />
The "LÜTZOW" had dropped out during the engagement and proceeded independently, accompanied by 4 destroyers. At first she was able to steam 14 knots, but her speed decreased rapidly and dropped finally to 4 knots. Her bows sank slowly, and when the whole forecastle was under water the Commanding Officer decided to leave the ship. The badly wounded were transferred carefully to the boats and the disembarkation was conducted in good order. A torpedo was then fired at the ship and this coup de grace sank her in deep water at about 1 o'clock, I believe.<br />
<br />
The "SEYDLITZ" was hardly in a better condition than the "LÜTZOW"; she also sank gradually by the bows till the water was almost level with the deck, and she had a heavy list to port, but she continued on her course. In the darkest hours of the night she suddenly sighted 3 large ships to port, quite close to. She turned away, made a British recognition signal and was not pursued. As bad luck would have it, the steaming light had short-circuited, could not be switched off and showed intermittently.<br />
<br />
The "DERFFLINGER", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN" followed the Main Fleet more or less and met with no particular experiences.<br />
<br />
The Main Fleet had to repulse a series of destroyer attacks and was also engaged by cruisers. The movements of these British cruisers, which came up singly, are incomprehensible and give the impression of having lost their heads. They appear to have received the order, judging by an intercepted W/T message, to proceed on a northerly and north-westerly course, and thereby they ran into the extended German line which they probably imagined they had passed to the South.<br />
<br />
One large cruiser (?"WARRIOR") proceeded unsuspectingly within 875 yds. of the line of battleships and came under concentrated fire from several ships before she could reply, so that she blew up enveloped in flames and disappeared in 47 seconds. The "BIRMINGHAM" seems to have been accounted for in a similar manner. The destroyers all approached in a really insane manner; frequently not from ahead but from a direction astern, scattered, singly or in pairs, or at most 3 together, never in large numbers. Most of them were disabled forthwith by a few salvoes and set on fire. The "WESTFALEN" distinguished herself particularly at this time.<br />
<br />
These burning destroyers strewn along the course, lit it up as if for a festival. Evidently the fires were largely due to the light American and Mexican oils; at any rate German firing trials on oil bunkers never caused any such conflagrations.<br />
<br />
The attacking boats directed shrapnel fire on the searchlights with fairly good results, the searchlights of two battleships and one light cruiser being hit.<br />
<br />
One large destroyer, which only recognised the danger at the last moment and endeavoured to avoid it by altering course was rammed by the "NASSAU", which put her helm over for this purpose. The boat exploded internally and sank.<br />
<br />
The only ships hit were the "POMMERN" in the 2ns Battle Squadron, and the "ROSTOCK". The "POMMERN" blew up at once and nobody was saved. The "ROSTOCK" was just passing between ships of the Main Fleet when she was hit; the loss of life on board was small.<br />
<br />
The Germans believe they destroyed 11 British destroyers in all. The manner in which these destroyers were handled has not left a good impression on the whole, and one has certainly lost respect for this weapon. The view is also taken that the boats are too large and offer too wide a target.<br />
<br />
The light cruiser "ELBING", like the "ROSTOCK", apparently wanted to break through the line from port to starboard under pressure from the British cruisers; she was, however, rammed by the "POSEN" and had to be abandoned in a sinking condition. The Germans also fired a torpedo into her.<br />
<br />
The "FRAUENLOB" and 2 destroyers were lost during the night; no details of their loss are known.<br />
<br />
Not far from Heligoland, the "OSTFRIESLAND", 7th of the line, struck a mine. This brings the account of the chief events of this exciting cruiser to an end.<br />
<br />
The German flotillas were detached from the Fleet to clear the area off the Jutland Coast, which was divided up into sectors. The flotillas stationed furthest to the North proceeded to the Skagerrak and through these straits into the Baltic and to Kiel.<br />
<br />
None of the flotillas sighted the British Main Fleet again, which proves that it must have turned away to the N. or N.W. immediately after the action. According to confidential reports the Fleet entered British ports as early as 1 June.<br />
<br />
Two British battleships, in a severely damaged condition and accompanied by destroyers, were sighted proceeding back to England. One was attacked by a submarine, but without success.<br />
<br />
On the morning of 1 June, in fairly misty weather, a Zeppelin sighted groups of British ships leaving the Channel on a N.E.'ly course. The reports were rather vague, as sometimes 6 and sometimes 12 ships were mentioned; but it seems most likely that 12 battleships and 3 cruisers were in question, and that they soon retired. The airship, which flew low at one time to get a clearer view, was also fired on.<br />
<br />
Some of the ships are said to have had tripod masts.<br />
<br />
The German Fleet, with the exception of "SEYDLITZ", reached the Jade in the afternoon. The "SEYDLITZ" could not cross the bar on account of being so much down by the bows, and it was not till the next day at high water that she was towed in, stern first.<br />
<br />
<center><u>MISCELLANEOUS.<br>TACTICS.</u></center><br />
<br />
The Germans ascribe their success to various causes, and in the first place to their own superiority as regards tactics. This is a point which every officer discusses, and it is constantly repeated that it all happened just as in tactical manoeuvres and in "battle exercises", and that things could not have gone better.<br />
<br />
Movements of squadrons, divisions and individual ships, "turns together" and alterations of course and speed, all went like clockwork and demonstrated the very great mobility of all formations.<br />
<br />
The W/T signalling system of the Main Fleet never failed, and its failure would have been immaterial, as the primary and secondary flag action signals, showing from several positions in the ship, were made simultaneously.<br />
<br />
All this was due to the peace training and the practical experience of the Flag Officers and Captains. Though in peace time the Commander-in-Chief had never commanded a Fleet, nor the Admirals a squadron, still the training carried out on the same lines for a number of years resulted in everything proceeding with the expected precision.<br />
<br />
The British, on the contrary, are said to have displayed a certain clumsiness as regards tactics and to have preferred turning together when "turning on to an opposite course" (Wendungen im Gegenmarsch), though this conclusion does not seem altogether justified from the description of the action.<br />
<br />
The ships kept station 547 yds. apart, and Vice-Admiral Schmidt told me that, in his opinion, this distance is too small for large ships and that he prefers 656 yds., as the shorter distances result in the ships getting bunched and overlapping during alterations of course. In order to relieve this during the first turn to starboard, the Fleet Flagship herself turned to port and then closed gradually into line. At night the distance was 656 yds.<br />
<br />
No interruption of W/T communication was occasioned by the enemy.<br />
<br />
<center><u>GUNNERY</u></center><br />
<br />
It is admitted that the British are superior as regards their gunnery technique. Their salvoes fall most astoundingly close together and aroused admiration on all sides. Some people affirm that they fell too close together, and that it was consequently difficult to cover a sufficiently large danger space.<br />
<br />
This is particularly the case with the heaviest calibres: 13.5-in. and 15-in. and the battle-cruisers' fire was noticeably inferior to that of the "Queen Elizabeth" class, for example.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> Literal translation; the meaning is not clear. - Tr.] The spread of the salvoes frequently only covered a few square yards. In the "KÖNIG" 3 rounds, out of a salvo of 4 rounds, hit between the capstan and the bridge.<br />
<br />
This is attributed to careful calibration, which the British have studied for a long time and which, as is well known, was abandoned by the German Navy after a few trials. The gunnery officers declare unanimously that it must unquestionably be re-introduced.<br />
<br />
The British range-finders are superior to the German, and the construction of their turrets enables them to shoot at ranges impossible for German guns. The question of range appears to be immaterial to the British, who fire at any range so long as visibility permits.<br />
<br />
The Germans are fully convinced of the great superiority of 15-in. guns over all others, and deplore the fact that, owing to the predominant conservative tendencies in the German Navy, this calibre was not introduced until so lately. Vice-Admiral Gerdes, the Head of the Armament Department, is responsible for this, for he always opposed it on the ground that the poor visibility in German waters and the consequent short ranges rendered an increase of calibre useless; he considered the German 12-in. gun to be an altogether superior weapon, capable of competing with every other.<br />
<br />
In one respect the British seem behindhand as compared with the Germans: namely that they cannot alter range quickly enough and they are too dependent on the range clock. The British rely on steady fire at long range, and they adapt their tactics to this and avoid alterations of course and range most assiduously.<br />
<br />
The Germans, on the contrary, in their firing practices always work with big and rapid alterations of range and exercise firing while turning, so that the gunnery officers consider they have an advantage in this respect.<br />
<br />
The Turn on to an opposite course was certainly not advantageous for the German Fleet, but in this particular instance it made little difference, as the German ships were already unable to find a target; besides which, it must have disconcerted the British and it prevented them from obtaining good results with their fire. The salvoes fell very close together round the ships, but few hits were obtained. The rate of fire in the British ships is said to have been fair, but not excessive. Some people affirm that it was very modest.<br />
<br />
The British shell had great penetrating power, and from all reasonable distances the main armour was generally pierced clean through. The shell splinters picked up prove conclusively that at least 2 kinds of shell were used, differing considerably in material and quality. One kind of shell had a very thick wall and an extremely small explosive charge, it might almost be called a solid shot. It seems to have broken up frequently without exploding and the fuse did not function. Its explosive power, if it possessed any at all, was quite inconsiderable, and it is presumed that the explosives used was not high explosive.<br />
<br />
It appears from the splinters of these 15-in. shell that the wall was 6.3 - 6.7 ins. (16 - 17 cm.), so that the hollow space cannot measure more than 2.4 ins. - 1.8 ins. (4 - 6 cm.). It is true that the large pieces into which these shell broke pierced everything in their course and often went right through the whole ship, unless they struck an armoured part. Several intact heads were found, with and without caps, and also entire bases.<br />
<br />
The second kind of shell had considerably thinner walls, only about half as thick, but it also often broke up into quite large pieces and displayed no great explosive power, and little or no incendiary power.<br />
<br />
It appears therefore that the British aimed only at attaining penetrating power, and the Germans are of opinion that they do not possess (rohrsicheren)* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D.Note.- This appears to be a special fuse which is very delicate, but safe until it has left the gun.] fuses for high explosive shell; this was their opinion before the war also.<br />
<br />
They believe that the high explosive power of the German ammunition gives them a great advantage which may partly counterbalance the smaller calibre of their guns and perhaps also their inferior gunnery. In any case, the effect of the German shell at the point of impact was very considerable.<br />
<br />
The fact that the ships blew up must be attributed to explosions in their magazines. (In this connection one may recall a turret of the "SEYDLITZ" being hit in the action of 24 January, 1915; see my report No.47 ex 15). The turret armour must have been pierced and the shells in the turret must have been exploded. The British have no metal cartridge-cases and also no cartridge-holders such as the Germans have, but they keep their cartridges in locked boxes which are perhaps not flash-proof enough. It seems therefore, from the incident experienced by the "SEYDLITZ", that this must constitute a particular danger to British ships. In this last action also turrets in German ships were frequently hit; further details are given in the account of damage sustained.<br />
<br />
After having compared the hits received in the German ships with the observations of results on enemy targets, it may be safely affirmed that the explosive power of the German shells exceeds that of the British; this was already known after the action of 24 January 1915. The Germans are therefore very much annoyed that they had no 15-in. guns to fire, as they are persuaded that ships so knocked about (eingedeckte) as, for example, the "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" would have been completely destroyed by German shell.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. Note.- The writer appears to mean that if German 15-in. shell had been used against "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" these ships would have been sunk.]<br />
<br />
It may be noted here that the "BAYERN", the first of their ships to carry 15-in. guns, will not join the Fleet for another few days, and the "BADEN" not until the autumn.<br />
<br />
Medium armament played no part, only a few hits were obtained and they did little damage.<br />
<br />
The British fired part-salvoes, like the Germans; full salvoes may have been fired now and again.<br />
<br />
The method of repulsing destroyer attacks, which has previously been reported, namely the 'turning away' and firing on one, or at most two boats, proved to be sound, and the repulsing of attacks both by day and night offered no difficulties.<br />
<br />
As regards gunnery, it may also be mentioned that the fire-control apparatus worked without a hitch and withstood the heaviest shocks. The elevation pointers worked admirably. A few ships were not yet fitted with them.<br />
<br />
<center><u>Torpedo.</u></center><br />
<br />
As regards torpedo work the Germans consider themselves very much superior. There were prolonged discussions about depriving Flotilla Leaders of their independence and putting them under the orders of a Leader Ship, but they are now convinced that this is necessary to ensure the flotillas attacking at the right moment and all together.<br />
<br />
The flotillas were led by the 2 leader Ships "ROSTOCK" and "REGENSBURG", the first having 2 flotillas and the second 3 flotillas allocated to them. The remaining 2 flotillas accompanied the Main Fleet or the battle-cruisers. The leaders carried out their duties with great daring and circumspection. The attacks of the British were weak and scattered, and could therefore have little or only occasional success.<br />
<br />
The German 2nd Flotilla, composed of the larger 1500 ton boats were held back instead of being sent to attack. Although these boats are spoken of very highly and are indispensable for certain enterprises, the view is now taken that they are too large and too valuable to be used for attacking during an action. This Flotilla proceeded to Zeebrugge immediately after the action and arrived there safely. It is to be employed in preventing the British from blockading the harbour with nets, and thus make it impossible for the German submarines to proceed out.<br />
<br />
As far as I have heard, the "MOLTKE" alone of the larger ships fired 4 torpedoes.<br />
<br />
Submarines were not in evidence. No German submarines were present; on the other hand a German destroyer claims to have rammed a British submarine. This claim appears to be erroneous, at least it was declared to be nonsense by the Chief of Staff. The submarines failed as regards scouting and also doing the pursuit.<br />
<br />
Some people state that a British aeroplane was sighted to the northward, and that it had apparently risen from a cruiser. It played no part in the action.<br />
<br />
The use of "Höschter"* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. note:- Probably the name of the inventor.] fog seems to have been of good service, it and the smoke made by the destroyers having completely masked the Main Fleet and its movements at critical moments.<br />
<br />
<center><u>SPEED</u></center><br />
<br />
The advantage of speed lay entirely with the British, not only as regards the Main Fleet on account of the "Deutschland" class, but also as regards the battle-cruisers. The latter are said to have proved considerably faster than the German battle cruisers, an unpleasant experience which had already been made on 25 January 1915. This alone proves that the British are talking nonsense when they assert that the German Fleet sought safety in flight; on the contrary, it was far from its bases and entirely in the power of the British, who either did not wish to take advantage of their superior speed, or were unable to do so on account of the damage sustained. The visibility was no worse than it had been during the day and Jellicoe may have even welcomed the "Höschter" fog which would enable him to plead bad visibility as a reason for abandoning the pursuit. On the German side in the light of experience the factor of speed in the battleships is considered very important. But the moderate depths of the German harbours limits the draught of the ships, and make it particularly difficult for German builders to do much in this respect. In spite of greater length and higher horse power the most modern cruisers "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ" and "LÜTZOW" attained only a quite inconsiderable increase of speed in comparison with the older "GOEBEN" class, and proved a disappointment in this particular.<br />
<br />
The question whether the older battleships should take part in an important engagement was not easy to decide. The 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons composed of the "WITTLESBACH" and "BARBAROSSA" class, re-commissioned at the beginning of the war, were intended to be used in such actions, but have long since been paid off; some have been disarmed and employed as guardships and instructional ships, etc. It was considered however, that the 2nd Battle Squadron, composed of the most modern of the older ships, would be of some service in the action; but this squadron was in a privileged position, inasmuch as it was merely attached to the 1st and 3rd Battle Squadrons and its Admiral was allowed to operate independently and select the position he thought best. On this occasion it kept station quite well and did not prove a hindrance, but, on the other hand, it did not come under any heavy fire. This must be considered very fortunate, for, in view of the damage sustained by other ships and in view of the fact that the British shell pierced all armour above or below water even at the longest range, it is certain that every ship of this class would have been sunk by a few hits, as their internal sub-division is not proof against large inrushes of water.<br />
<br />
The loss of the "Pommern", which gives the British an opportunity for a hollow triumph, also teaches a clear lesson. The Chief of Staff told me that they will probably consider carefully before again exposing this Squadron to danger; therefore this action will have further confirmed the complete worthlessness of all Dreadnought types [sic] and will condemn them as old iron.<br />
<br />
<center><u>TORPEDO NETS.</u></center><br />
<br />
The torpedo nets of the battle cruisers are all badly damaged and the gear so knocked about by gunfire that they were almost useless. This was particularly the case with the "Derfflinger", where the after port nets were hanging in the water, and would have fallen across the propeller had they not chanced to remain held up by a temporary lashing. The ship was obliged to stop during the action to secure the nets, and they might easily have occasioned the loss of the ship.<br />
<br />
For this reason all the nets, together with the booms, were unshipped immediately after the ships' return, to everybody's satisfaction. They will not be carried any more, except perhaps for operations in the Baltic, where the ships may be obliged to anchor at sea.<br />
<br />
<center><u>LEAK-STOPPING SERVICE.</u></center><br />
<br />
The leak-stopping service which had been systematically developed, worked admirably and the Germans are convinced that they owe much to it. They believed that the "Seydlitz" could not have been brought in if the strengthening of the bulkheads, etc., had not been so thoroughly exercised and if the personnel had not been so well trained.<br />
<br />
It is also said, that in the "Lutzow", which had only been in commission for 2 months, was naturally not up to the mark in this respect, and that it is not impossible that small shortcomings, for which of course nobody can be blamed, were responsible for the ship sinking. The "Lutzow" was an unfortunate ship altogether. First her turbines collapsed, thus delaying her commissioning for 6 months, then she immediately struck a mine, and she was hardly out of dockyard hands before she was sunk.<br />
<br />
<center><u>DANGER FROM GAS FUMES.</u></center><br />
<br />
Only 2 days before sailing, a large number of the ships, and fortunately exactly those that came most under fire, namely battle-cruisers and the 3rd Squadron, were supplied with gas masks fitted with alkali cartridges for the whole crew and a plentiful reserve (in the "Seydlitz" 1500 masks for about 1200 men). The masks are similar to those used in the army for poisonous gases. Each man carries a mask slung round him, if he is not actually wearing it.<br />
<br />
I was told emphatically by all the officers, that, in their experience, these masks are absolutely necessary and not only saved many lives but enabled the men to carry on in parts of the ship which they would otherwise have been compelled to leave.<br />
<br />
The gases from shells, mines and torpedoes penetrate in an incredible manner through ventilators, telephone leads, etc. to compartments far away from the point of impact. In many cases the masks enabled large numbers of the guns' crews to escape from turrets that were hit, and to help out others who were badly wounded. In one case the men in one of the main engine rooms were able to remain at their posts after gas had penetrated, until the engine-room was ventilated.<br />
<br />
The Fleet breathing apparatus (Flottenathmer) is preferable to masks in some cases, but it cannot be supplied to everyone and it hampers one's movements, which the masks do not.<br />
<br />
On account of the great danger from gases, it is also advisable to fit hinged flaps in all shafts, and to have wooden bungs to fit the voice-pipes, keeping a hammer at hand to hammer them into the mouth-pieces.<br />
<br />
They tell me that it proved very useful to keep all the personnel employed below, such as in central control rooms, engine-rooms, torpedo flats, etc. continually informed of what was going on. The men get nervous, particularly at first, with the tremendous shocks caused by shell falling close to the ship, though the shocks are felt less on deck, and such information gives them confidence and they like knowing what is going on above them.<br />
<br />
<center><u>DAMAGE</u></center><br />
<br />
The distribution of ships needing repair in the various dockyards is as follows:-<br />
<br />
The "König" proceeded at once to Kiel and is under repair at Howaldt's yard. I did not see her.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" and "Moltke" in Blohm and Voss yard, Hamburg, the first in the Imperial Dock.<br />
<br />
The "Kurfürst["] in Vulkan Yard, Hamburg.<br />
<br />
The "Derfflinger" was first docked in Wilhelmshaven and the leaks temporarily stopped, she then proceeded to the Imperial dockyard, Kiel. The "Seydlitz" will now be docked in the large dock at Wilhelmshaven; during my stay the "Seydlitz" was still in the lock.<br />
<br />
The "Von der Tann", "Ostfriesland" and "Helgoland" will be repaired in dry docks in Wilhelmshaven. No other large ships require to be docked.<br />
<br />
"<u>Seydlitz</u>" The number of hits was still uncertain, as the whole forepart of the ship up to the upper deck was still under water, and it is not known what she looks like below water. The ship was brought into the lock with difficulty, and as she is 43 ft. down by the bows, she cannot be taken into harbour. They will not venture to dock the ship inside the lock, and intend first to raise her bows slightly.<br />
<br />
The roof and guns of the fore turret and anchors, cables etc., have already been unshipped, and they now intend to bring caissons alongside and pump out the fore part sufficiently to enable her to enter the harbour.<br />
<br />
The great inrush of water, that flooded more or less the whole fore part of the ship as far as the first boiler-room bulkhead, was caused by a number of hits. Firstly, one of the belt armour plates forward on the port side is missing, having fallen off. Secondly, there are believed to be at least 2 or 3 more hits below water, forward on the port side; for the list and the settling down had already become ominous when the ship was hit at the edge of the upper deck, port side, abreast the bridge; this was followed by an inrush of water in the battery deck, which did a great amount of damage.<br />
<br />
In addition, during the day action, she was hit by a torpedo on the starboard side under the forward 5.9 in. gun, which caused her to settle down still more by the bows. This gun was so much damaged by the shock from underneath as to be disabled.<br />
<br />
Further, there are 4 severe hits in the ship's side (mess deck, port side, forward of the turret), which also demolished the port capstan.<br />
<br />
These shell, or shell splinters, naturally penetrated to the armoured deck, so that the entire fore part of the ship above and below the armoured deck is holed in many places, allowing free passage for the water. The fore part of the ship was struck therefore by at least 8 or 9 shells and one torpedo.<br />
<br />
Apparently the only compartments which are not flooded, are the bow torpedo flats and the central control room. The former is being pumped out continuously, as a great deal of water is flowing in from above. The torpedo control room had to be abandoned, as the forward partition was not watertight. The central control room abaft this was not abandoned, but of its 2 entrances from the starboard and port passages, only the port one can be used, as the starboard one is flooded.<br />
<br />
The gunnery control room is far further aft and was not affected.<br />
<br />
The ship has a list of 7° to port, and as she has now been slightly raised, about 1¾ ft. of her bows are above water; at one time it was up to the level of the deck.<br />
<br />
While under way the forward boiler room bulkhead had to withstand most of the pressure; supports have been built up everywhere, but it leaks in places.<br />
<br />
The other hits of consequences were those in the turrets. The fore starboard turret No.2 received a direct hit on the fore face of the revolving structure. One curved plate was forced out, but fortunately the main effect of the explosion was outward. The right hand gun was disabled by slight damage to the mounting; with this exception the turret remained in action and kept up fire.<br />
<br />
The right hand gun of turret No.3 received a direct hit, which cut out a wide groove along the tube of the gun. The left hand gun continued to fire.<br />
<br />
The barbette of turret No.4 was hit on a level with the rammer, and the armour was pierced clean through. This hit is of special interest, as the "Seydlitz" received a similar hit and at the same level in turret No.5 on 24th January 1915, which caused a fire, disabled both the after turrets and killed all the guns' crews. This last time, however, the damage was slight. There was no ready ammunition in the turret, and only one cartridge was exploded, in contrast to the (6200 Kg.) 13,670 lbs. of powder on Jan.1915. The turret officer and a large number of the gun's crews were saved by their gas masks. The destruction caused by splinters was, however, considerable and the turret was abandoned, as it was not possible to continue fire from it. This was a 13.5 in. shell, at 15,310 yds. range, strength of armour pierced 8.6 inches.<br />
<br />
After the turret had been abandoned, it was hit a second time in the after side of the revolving part, which was pierced; this of course increased the havoc in the interior.<br />
<br />
Turret No.5 was hit in the roof. The shell richochetted, and the roof is slightly dented. Nobody was hurt and the turret continued to fire.<br />
<br />
In the "Seydlitz" therefore, all the turrets were hit, with the exception of the foremost turret, and one was hit twice.<br />
<br />
A further hit pierced the 5.9 in. (150mm.) casemate armour of the aftermost 5.9 in. starboard gun, No.2. The deck was pierced from beneath, and splinters also pierced the splinter bulkhead. The gun was disabled and all the crew were killed, with the exception of the ship's chaplain who happened to be in the casemate and must be watched over by a special guardian angel.<br />
<br />
A similar hit, with a 15 in. shell, struck the casemate armour of the 6-in. gun No.7 and exploded in the casemate. Men were killed, the gun was disabled and the splinter bulkhead pierced by large splinters. This time again, surprise was aroused by the comparatively small damage caused by a large calibre shell.<br />
<br />
"<u>Derfflinger</u>". One shell hit the armour belt forward of the hawse pipe, probably at the junction of 2 plates, as 2 plates broke away. The plates underneath were consequently strained apart and a great deal of water flowed in.<br />
<br />
The armour belt on the port side also received 2 further hits in the centre and was pierced clean through. The splinters penetrated more than half way through the ship, and in one case a piece of plating was driven half way though the ship. These hits, combined perhaps with others, destroyed the nets and their supports in several places.<br />
<br />
The two after turrets received direct hits, in one case on the roof, in the other case in the barbette above the deck; the armour was pierced and the upper portions of the turrets burnt out and severely damaged, but the flames did not penetrate to the magazines. The crew in the upper part of the turret were killed, and both turrets were disabled. This occurred at an early stage of the action.<br />
<br />
The guns at high elevation cannot yet be dismounted, as everything is wedged in, but they do not appear to be damaged.<br />
<br />
The muzzles were carried away off the 4 foremost 6 in. (15 cm.) guns on the port side; two of them probably having been accounted for by one and the same shell which hit the armour. One gun, the muzzle of which was perhaps damaged by a splinter, afterwards burst, the tube splitting open in the shape of a tulip.<br />
<br />
The "Derfflinger" received a few other hits of no particular interest. She appears the next most severely damaged ship after the "Lützow".<br />
<br />
The "<u>Moltke</u>" only received 5 hits, all of them during that part of the action which took place on a southerly course; while the cruisers mentioned above received most of the hits on the port side, consequently during the later stages of the action.<br />
<br />
One shell pieced the bulwarks in the after part of the ship above the armour, passed through the ship and struck the armour on the port side from inside, about 3.3 ft. below the water-line. One plate was forced out and is missing. The inrush of water was considerable. The after compartments, above the armoured deck which remained intact, were all more or less flooded.<br />
<br />
The second hit was further forward, below the armour belt. The shell exploded in a bunker, but the armoured deck held and no water penetrated it from below. The neighbouring bunkers made little water and could be pumped out.<br />
<br />
Another shell struck the 5.9 in. armour in the upper bunker, above the water-line. The armoured deck again held, but the inner wall of the bunker parted, and the battery deck was pierced from below, a 6 in. gun being damaged and disabled.<br />
<br />
In the fore part of the ship a shell struck the armour belt below the water-line. The plate remained intact and was driven in about 8 inches. The compartment was flooded, but the torpedo bulkhead remained watertight. A neighbouring compartment leaked slightly, the rivets having parted.<br />
<br />
The fifth case of damage, namely a plate beneath the armour belt being driven and pressed in, was probably not due to a direct hit, but to splinters of a shell which fell short.<br />
<br />
"<u>Von der Tann</u>". A shell hit and pierced the lower part of the 3.9 in. armour belt in the after part of the ship to starboard. The compartments above the armoured deck, and some of those on the deck above, were flooded. The chief effect of the shell was outside the ship, but it bent the plates below the otherwise undamaged armoured deck, so that a considerable amount of water flowed into the compartments below the armoured deck. The after torpedo flat was flooded half way up, and the men in the starboard steering engine room were shut in for a long time owing to the exits being blocked.<br />
<br />
The fore turret was hit on the starboard side on the upper edge of the barbette and a semi-circular armour plate was forced out. The machinery of the turret was so badly knocked about that the turret was disabled.<br />
<br />
The hydraulic piping was damaged, so that all the heavy armament was put out of action temporarily. Strangely enough, though men were wounded none were killed.<br />
<br />
The aftermost turret was hit in the barbette. The armour was pierced, but the effect of the shell was exterior, the turret sustained little internal damage, so that the handgear of the turret remained in action. The turret was wedged in one place and could not revolve; they succeeded, however, in cutting off with oxy-acetylene the piece of revolving part which was jammed against the inner side of the barbette thus getting rid of the obstruction.<br />
<br />
Outside the turret, the shell did considerable damage; some splinters striking downwards, bent the armoured deck and pierced it in places. As far as I know, the armoured deck sustained no further damage, and this was of little importance.<br />
<br />
The after conning-tower was hit and a piece of the armour torn away; the occupants, including the 3rd gunnery officer, were killed. Splinters struck downwards to the engine-room ventilation hatches, but were stopped by the armoured gratings.<br />
<br />
"<u>Ostfriesland"</u> was struck by a mine below the foremost port turret. The whole measures 197 ft.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. note:- Literal translation is 12 times 5 metres large.] The torpedo bulkhead is only slightly torn, and the inrush of water was only local.<br />
<br />
"<u>Helgoland</u>". A 13.5 in. shell hit the 7.9 in. armour belt forward on the port side and pierced it. The shell appears to have broken only as no explosive action can be traced. The range was about 14,217 yds.<br />
<br />
"<u>Nassau</u>" rammed a British destroyer, or rather, the destroyer ran into her forward on the port side. Her bows must have lifted right up, for her hawse-pipe remained on board the "Nassau", so firmly wedged into the side of the upper deck that it will have to be cut out. The "Nassau's" side below the deck is torn away for 33 ft. The destroyer then glanced off the "Nassau's" side and exploded internally. One of the crew remained behind in one of the nets, but fell into the water when the "Nassau" fired a salvo.<br />
<br />
The "Nassau" was hit by shrapnel from attacking destroyers in the foremost searchlight group, both port searchlights were put out of action. The searchlight control and electric cables were destroyed and many of the searchlight crews were killed. The after searchlight group was hit in a similar manner, and one of the searchlights was disabled.<br />
<br />
The "Rhineland" and a light cruiser were also hit in a similar manner.<br />
<br />
I have seen all the above mentioned ships in Wilhelmshaven.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" and "Kurfürst" were at Hamburg, but unfortunately I am unable to report much about them. They had already been under repair for several days, and the damage was to some extent made good. Besides this, the conditions were not favourable for undisturbed examination: commissioners from the Imperial Navy Office were on board, besides crowds of workmen, the noise was deafening and it was pouring with rain. Consequently I took no notes on the spot and relied on my memory, which however fails me now among the very many received of similar cases. I am therefore unable to report each hit with accuracy.<br />
<br />
This is immaterial, however, as there were no particularly interesting hits, and none of the ships had been hit in the turrets. The armour had been pierced in several places, the effect and character of the hits being similar in all cases; the hits on unarmoured parts were of little consequence.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" was hit aft on the port side of the water line just on a junction of two plates, a piece of equal size being torn away from each plate. The shell then struck the sloping part of the armoured deck and the splinters ricochetted and passed right through the ship. These plates have already been removed.<br />
<br />
A casemate was pierced and the gun disabled.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" is the only ship whose mast was hit, the mast remained standing and has now been removed.<br />
<br />
The spotting platform had to be abandoned, as communications with the conning tower was cut off. This was the only hit received in a conning tower; it only grazed the upper edge and glanced off, and the men inside hardly noticed it.<br />
<br />
The port engine was disabled, not in consequence of damage to the turbine which is in good condition, but owing to one of the main propeller bearings becoming overheated. The cause of this is not clear, but it is believed to be due to concussions. The ship was well able to keep station with her two remaining engines.<br />
<br />
The "<u>Kurfürst</u>" suffered especially from a great inrush of water forward on the port side, above the armoured deck; it was caused by a hit in the armour belt. No further damage of importance was sustained.<br />
<br />
With regard to time necessary for repair to these ships, it is not yet possible to say anything definite, as it is still undecided whether they shall undergo thorough repair or not. The chief difficulty is the manufacture of new armour plates; but some of the holed plates can, no doubt, be left in position for the present.<br />
<br />
A considerable time will be needed to repair some of the turrets of the battle-cruisers, but here too, they will contrive to get things done. For instance, the "Von der Tann" is to have an entire turret out of a ship of the "Nassau" class, probably the foremost turret, and this ship will be left without a turret for some time. They talk a great deal also of transferring guns, and they will perhaps make use of those intended for the "Hindenburg", which will not be completed will the late autumn.<br />
<br />
It may be presumed that the battleships will be ready for sea in 4-6 weeks, and the battle-cruisers, particularly the "Seydlitz", in not less than 4 months. Naturally work is going on day and night, and repairs are given priority over all new construction.<br />
<br />
The damage sustained by light cruisers and destroyers is inconsiderable. The "Hamburg" had a funnel shot away. As these ships seem to be of minor importance, I did not trouble further about them.<br />
<br />
As our Allies appear not to have the intention of communicating to us what effect the examination of damages sustained will have on their construction in the future, we must endeavour to ascertain this as time goes on by means of cross questioning and by studying their new constructions in detail. I do not feel called upon to draw premature and rash conclusions to-day, on the strength of impressions received, but this will not prevent me from giving a summary of my opinion and of the opinions expresses in my hearing.<br />
<br />
Firstly, it is a remarkable fact that in all the ships that have returned home, all the engine and boiler-rooms are undamaged; the "Lützow" is no exception to this, as she proceeded under her own steam until late in the night after the action. I have also been assured by the Imperial Navy Office, after an inspection carried out by the Chief Engineer, that not a single auxiliary engine was defective. The only boiler-room put out of action was the foremost one in the "Seydlitz" where the bulkhead gave a little, allowing water to penetrate through rivet holes and cracks when the ship was under way. The conclusion may therefore be drawn that these vital parts of the ship are sufficiently protected and that the armour belt of the usual German thicknesses, though it cannot stop the shells, at least fulfils its purpose by breaking them up. Consequently it has become almost impossible even for the largest splinters of 15 in. shell to penetrate through armoured deck or torpedo bulkhead in engine and boiler rooms.<br />
<br />
Even at these long ranges and steep angles there was no question of the armoured decks being pierced; but the fitting of strong gratings over the hatches, which prevented the engines of the "Von der Tann" from sustaining severe damage, appears very necessary.<br />
<br />
The torpedo bulkheads also resisted shells, mines and torpedoes effectually; and in cases where slight damage was sustained, it had no further consequences than the flooding of the compartment affected.<br />
<br />
Perhaps it would be advisable to construct a specially strong boiler-room bulkhead, similar to a torpedo bulkhead, so that it could not be damaged by splinters or water-pressure.<br />
<br />
The inspection of the "Seydlitz" has left me with the impression that the commanding officer of the "Seydlitz" expected rather too much of his ship, and that nothing short of extraordinary good luck enabled her to be brought back. At one time when the whole forepart of the ship was flooded and the bows were under water, he proceeded occasionally with revolutions for 22 knots, just in order to show how seaworthy his ship was, so he told me. This may have been very sporting, or perhaps it may have been necessary under the circumstances in order not to drop too far behind and be overtaken by the enemy, but it certainly was not good seamanship, and if his stokehold bulkhead had burst, the "Seydlitz" would have gone down like the "Lutzow", where the circumstances appear to have been very similar. Later on he decreased speed and finally proceeded stern first.<br />
<br />
I therefore think it not impossible that the loss of the "Lützow", which is said to have been proceeded at 14 knots for a time, was also due only to recklessly high speed, and that the ship might have been saved if she had proceeded stern first or been taken in tow.<br />
<br />
As the danger from water-pressure must always be greatest from ahead, it would certainly be advisable to take special preventative measures against it.<br />
<br />
Vice-Admiral Schmidt told me that, in his opinion, the armoured belt ought to be strongest in the centre, and possible in the afterpart to protect the steering engines, and possibly in the bows, but that it ought not to taper off gradually from the centre to the extremities. He was also entirely in favour of a protected upper deck forming a second armoured deck.<br />
<br />
The admirably thorough system of internal division in the German ships and the floating capability thus attained is the finest proof of the merit of German construction which pursued this aim, and it shows that Admiral von Tirpitz, the creator of the Battle Fleet of to-day, was right when he upheld the principle that, above all things, the ships must be capable of remaining afloat and must not sink or heel over, and that everything else is of secondary consideration.<br />
<br />
The large number of hits in the turrets is remarkable, and it is generally considered that the turret armour should be appreciably stronger, especially in the lower part of the barbettes; for it is not only the disablement of the guns that comes into question, serious though this might be, but also the blowing up of magazines and the total destruction of the ship, as the wide shaft down to the magazines cannot possibly be made completely flash-proof. This is the most vital part of the ship. It is only owing to the small explosive charges in British shells, that there were no explosions of magazines in the German ships.<br />
<br />
Everything possible had been done after the action of 24.1.15 to ensure protection against this danger; the ready ammunition was removed from the top of the hoists and wherever possible all the openings in shafts leading down below were fitted with flaps, covers and heavy asbestos mats, while German ammunition is particularly carefully stowed and packed in cases with screwed-on covers.<br />
<br />
The disasters on the British side are a proof that this is a question of the greatest importance. It must also be taken into consideration that while any other damage turret may take months.<br />
<br />
The numerous hits in turrets would appear to justify the opinion of those who decided against triple turrets, on the ground [sic] that if one was disabled it would put too many heavy guns out of action.<br />
<br />
A hit in a casemate will of course destroy it and disable the gun, but this is of little consequence. Care must be taken here also not to have any ready ammunition, and to close the ammunition hand-up hermetically with heavy asbestos mats at the magazine end also. With the German "Paternoster" (dredger hoist) the ammunition lifts this mat as it comes up and the mat then falls to and closes the opening, which is a practical arrangement.<br />
<br />
Other hits through unarmoured parts, which destroyed more or less small gear and at the first glance give an impression of terrible havoc, are really of no consequence.<br />
<br />
In the "Von der Tann" they wanted to flood a turret magazine. This was impossible, as the flooding valve in the battery, or between deck was piled up with debris, cabin fittings, etc., and was inaccessible. Fortunately the flooding of the magazine turned out to be unnecessary. The Executive Officer remarked to me how critical such a trivial matter might become, and that one could not be careful enough about choosing the positions for the flooding valves, which must be kept clear of easily destructible objects.<br />
<br />
The man-hole covers in the decks, coal shoots [chutes], etc., were pointed out to me as dangerous, as they may be burst open by pressure of gas from below, thus causing damage and giving passage to the gases. These covers should be secured in a different manner and much more firmly.<br />
<br />
The flooding and draining system worked admirably, and is hardly capable of improvement. The only disadvantage is that the compartments above the armoured deck have no draining arrangements. This should be provided. A list, consequent on an inrush of water, could always be corrected by flooding an opposite compartment. This is an important matter both as affecting gunnery and personnel.<br />
<br />
The searchlights, which were not taken down in the German ships, all came out of the action undamaged; anxiety on their account was therefore unfounded. It was very unpleasant when attacking boats fired on the searchlights, and it is therefore considered necessary to fit light armour protection on the masts for the crews of the searchlight control and electric cables.<br />
<br />
Damage from flames is nowhere visible. The Germans are now rather amused at the care with which interior partitions were scraped.<br />
<br />
I could not help comparing the German ships with the Russian battleship "Orel", which I saw in Madzurn after the battle of Tsushima. If I remember rightly, the "Orel" had 5 severe hits and 40 hits with medium-calibre shell.<br />
<br />
The enormous explosive power of the Shimosa shell, which breaks up into minute splinters, did not do the slightest damage to the vital parts of the ship, but the upper deck was transformed into a confused heap of ruins. Superstructure, bridges, masts, funnels, etc., were destroyed, guns dismounted and fires started.<br />
<br />
Nothing of the kind is to be seen in the German ships, outwardly only a few more or less clean shell holes are visible, and they look so orderly and so little damaged that they do not appear to have gone through an action.<br />
<br />
It is true that the upper decks are said to have been littered with countless splinters, but they flew on to the decks from shells which struck the water, the ship receiving violent shocks.<br />
<br />
The holes in the armour show the characteristic concentric cracks round the hole and the radial splashes, the latter proving that the shells exploded on impact or at the latest, as they passed through. In many cases, as already noted, the force of the explosion was external and only pieces of plate, and possibly the head of the shell were driven in.<br />
<br />
<center><u>FLAG OFFICERS OF THE FLEET AND LEADERS</u></center><br />
<br />
{|<br />
| Commander-in-Chief:<br />
| Vice Admiral Scheer<br />
|-<br />
| <u>I Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Vice Admiral Schmidt<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Engelhard<br />
|-<br />
| <u>II Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Mauve<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Baron von Dalwigh<br />
|-<br />
| <u>III Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Behncke<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Nordmann<br />
|-<br />
| Officer commanding the Scouting Forces and<br>Commanding 1st Scouting Group<br />
| Vice Admiral Hipper<br />
|-<br />
| " 2nd " "<br />
| Rear Admiral Bodicker<br />
|-<br />
| " 4th " "<br />
| Commodore "Captain" v. Reuter<br />
|-<br />
| Leaders of Destroyers<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| in "Rostock"<br />
| Commodore "Captain" Michelsen<br />
|-<br />
| in Regensburg<br />
| Commodore "Captain" Heinrich<br />
|-<br />
| Leader of submarines<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| In Hamburg<br />
| Captain Bauer<br />
|}<br />
<br />
<center><u>REMARKS</u></center><br />
<br />
The lecture on the action, upon which this report is based, was illustrated by a plan prepared in haste for H.M. the Kaiser, and a copy was promised to me. But the Admiral Staff does not wish to part with this first incomplete draft, and the preparation of an accurate plan has not yet been completed, as the Admiral Staff is not yet in possession of all the details.<br />
<br />
In time to be included in this report I have only received the sketch of the first stage of the battle, namely the cruiser action on a southerly course, together with a small sketch of the situation when the action was broken off; both are enclosed.<br />
<br />
I conclude from the sketch of the cruiser action, that the accounts given to me were not quite accurate; for instance, the assertion of the commanding officer of the "Moltke" that the shortest range at that stage was 7,650 yds. and that he had accounted for one of the armoured cruisers with a torpedo.<br />
<br />
The sketch shows that the "Indefatigable" was probably first destroyed by gun fire from the "Von der Tann", and later the "Queen Mary" by gunfire from the "Derfflinger", and that the range was never less than 14,220 yds.<br />
<br />
The loss of "V. 27" and "V. 29" and of 4 British destroyers is also apparent, while I was only told of two.<br />
<br />
In the original sketch, 2 British armoured cruisers are also shown as having fallen out during this stage, but this is not shown on the accompanying sketch and probably took place later.<br />
<br />
I was told by the Admiral Staff that the accompanying sketches are not to be taken as strictly accurate.<br />
<br />
It is requested that the sketches and course of the action and the account of damages may be treated as strictly confidential.<br />
<br />
==Footnotes==<br />
{{reflist}}<br />
<br />
==Bibliography==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
*''Schematismus für das K.u.K. Heer und für die Kriegsmarine für 1914. Separatausgabe''. Wien: 1914.<br />
*''Almanach für die k. und k. Kriegsmarine 1917. Kriegsausgabe''. '''XXXVII'''. Pola: 1917.<br />
*[[Arthur Marder (Naval Historian)|Marder, Arthur J.]] (1966). ''From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919: Jutland and After, May 1916–December 1916''. '''Volume III'''. London: Oxford University Press.<br />
*{{MarderFDSFIII}}<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
==External Links==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
*[http://www.denkmalprojekt.org/2023/vl_marineoffiz_zahlmstr_feuerwerks_torpedooffiz_beamte_wk1.html "Halbstocks die Flagge!"] ''Onlineprojekt Gefallenendenkmäler''.<br />
*Krámli, Mihály. [http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-124.pdf "The Report on the Battle of Jutland by the Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché in Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Colloredo-Mannsfeld."] ''NavWeaps''.<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
[[Category:Battle of Jutland]]</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Attach%C3%A9_Report_on_the_Battle_of_Jutland&diff=334751Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland2024-03-13T10:11:41Z<p>Simon Harley: Made Changes.</p>
<hr />
<div>Soon after the [[Battle of Jutland]] on 31 May &ndash; 1 June 1916 the Naval Attaché of the [[Austro-Hungarian Navy|Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Navy]] at the embassy in Berlin, ''Fregattenkapitäne'' Hieronymus Graf von Colloredo-Mannsfeld,<ref>''Schematismus für das K.u.K. Heer und für die Kriegsmarine für 1914''. p. 1270. ''Almanach für die k. und k. Kriegsmarine 1917''. p. 668.</ref> visited the [[High Sea Fleet]]. He composed a report on the battle for his superiors using first-hand accounts, interspersed here and there with his own observations. Being written so soon after the battle, it provides an interesting, raw insight into the state of the [[Imperial German Navy]], even if some of the details turned out to be inaccurate.<br />
<br />
The version reproduced here is a translation in English apparently made by the [[Naval Intelligence Division (Royal Navy)|Naval Intelligence Division]] in 1919 from a copy which was subsequently returned to "F.N.A.", presumably the French Naval Attaché. A copy of the translation then made its way into the papers of the British Cabinet, from where historian Arthur J. Marder obtained a copy which is in his papers.<ref>Original number N.I.D. 087/19. Marder papers, Special Collections and Archives, Langson Library, University of California, Irvine, MS-F002, Box 27.</ref> He does not appear to have used it for the 1966 edition of ''From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow'', Volume III, but certainly used it for the revised edition in 1978.<ref>A quote on p. 189 of the 1966 edition reads, "The Fleet is filled with enthusiasm and elated<br />
with victory.... All, down to the last seaman, believe in the strength of the Fleet and look forward to further encounters with<br />
confidence." This differs to the quote used on p. 234 of the 1978 edition, which is identical to that used here.</ref> <br />
<br />
It is perhaps worth comparing this translation with that made by Hungarian historian Mihály Krámli of a post-war copy of a slightly shorter version of the report in a Hungarian archive which has been published on the ''NavWeaps'' online resource.<ref>Krámli, Mihály. [http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-124.pdf "The Report on the Battle of Jutland by the Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché in Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Colloredo-Mannsfeld."] ''NavWeaps''.</ref><br />
<br />
The original grammar and punctuation of the typescript has been reproduced here wherever possible.<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
From:- Austrian Naval Attache in Berlin.<br />
<br />
To:- Commander-in-Chief, Pola.<br />
<div style="float:right;">Berlin,<br>17 June, 1916.</div><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<center><u>NAVAL ENGAGEMENT OF 31 MAY 1916.</u></center><br />
<br />
The following is a report of the naval proceedings of 31 May - 1 June, 1916, and also of the damage sustained by the German Fleet.<br />
<br />
During my 3-days' visit to Wilhelmshaven, followed by a cursory examination of the "MARKGRAF" and "KURFURST" at Hamburg, I endeavoured to gain merely a general idea of the results of gunfire and concentrated my attention on the course of the action itself.<br />
Admiral Scheer, whom I only saw for a short time as he left for Kiel to attend the funeral of his borther-in-law [sic], Lieut.-Commander Mohr,<ref>Carl Mohr of the ''Hamburg''.[http://www.denkmalprojekt.org/2023/vl_marineoffiz_zahlmstr_feuerwerks_torpedooffiz_beamte_wk1.html "Halbstocks die Flagge!"] ''Onlineprojekt Gefallenendenkmäler''. Our thanks to Ruiz Mateo Lutzow for finding this excellent source.</ref> who was killed in the action, very kindly arranged that his Chief of Staff, Captain Trotha, should give me an account of the whole proceedings, illustrated by plans, and that I should be furnished with all information. I have tried to fill in the gaps by conversations with officers whom I know; this has resulted in some contradictory statements, and several points remain obscure, the accounts from the various ships not having all come in.<br />
<br />
Many episodes will therefore be explained later and may appear in a different light, but, as regards the broad outlines which are of chief importance, the picture of this interesting engagement is fairly clear. The accompanying plan of the action was made in haste for the Kaiser and will therefore need much correction.<br />
<br />
The spirit pervading the Fleet can only be described as one of enthusiasm; they are intoxicated with victory. The heavy load weighing on them all, the dear that this war might end without an encounter of the Fleets, have vanished. They have learnt what fighting really means, they know themselves to be superior to the enemy as regards tactics, and that they were following the right lines and have nothing to unlearn; they know that their gunfire was more effective than that of the enemy, and that they can rely implicitly on their flotillas which have always been looked upon in the German Navy as one of the chief factors in an action. Finally they know that their largest ships can stand heavy fire and serious damage, that they leave nothing to be desired as regards construction and cannot be sunk easily. In short, they feel that the British, in spite of all their boasting, cannot overcome the German Fleet and have a considerable respect for it.<br />
<br />
This conviction imbues the whole Fleet, down to the last man, with confidence in their strength and a calm assurance regarding future encounters. At the same time they are free from over-confidence and from under-estimation of the enemy. On the contrary, the British fire-control and the enormous piercing power of their heavy shell at great distances have roused their admiration, so that a careless conception of the situation is not to be feared, the less so, as well-balanced minds such as those of Admiral Scheer and his Staff are unlikely to be led away by former successes to undertake rash enterprises in the future.<br />
<br />
They do not deny that they were extraordinarily fortunate, and that if the action had been prosecuted with energy on the British side, and if the "Nelson touch" had been in evidence, things might have gone very badly for Germany, especially as the British still had an intact Battle Squadron of 12 units at their disposal which had not yet taken part in the action. But they console themselves with the knowledge that no naval action was ever won without some stroke of luck.<br />
<br />
The Kaiser's visit, the day before my arrival, and his address to the Fleet gave great satisfaction, and subsequently many important personages arrive to inspect the ships, such as Prince Henry and the Grand Dukes of Mecklenburg and Oldenburg, and numbers of decorations were distributed. Vice-Admiral Scheer was promoted to Admiral, and he and Vice-Admiral Hipper received the Pour le Merite.<br />
<br />
I also visited Rear-Admiral Behncke, who was wounded and in hospital; his wounds are slight, a few small splinters in his head, elbow and knee, and he will probably soon be well again.<br />
<br />
<center><u>COURSE OF THE ACTION.</u></center><br />
<br />
The Commander-in-Chief intended to advance with the whole Fleet to the waters of the Skagerrak, in order to make his presence felt unpleasantly by disturbing the shipping, hoping thereby to lure on the British forces and in this manner to be in a position to attack a part of the British Fleet with superior or at least with equal forces. He reckoned that any movements of the British Fleet would be reported to him in good time by the submarines which had been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and he hoped that the airships would prove a better means of reconnoitring than any possessed by the enemy.<br />
<br />
Unfavourable weather prevented him for a considerable period from undertaking any operations, and, as the submarines were to return home on 1 June and be relieved by a new group, the 31 May was the last date for carrying out the planned advance.<br />
<br />
The cruisers left the Jade at 3 a.m., the Main Fleet at 4 a.m., steering an easterly course, and then, after passing Heligoland, a N.N.W'ly course. No reports were received from submarines. These were stationed chiefly off the Orkneys and the Firth of Forth, and the large group of Flanders boats were off the Thames and at the entrance to the Channel. <br />
<br />
While proceeding northwards, a few W/T messages were received, but they were corrupt, appeared to refer only to small formations and gave no clue to the movements of the Grand Fleet. The airships were unable to start in the morning, on account of the wind, and, as it blew hard throughout the day in the Heligoland Bight, they could not start until the early hours of 1 June. In this respect things did not go well, but Admiral Scheer decided nevertheless to continue on his course to the Skagerrak. <br />
<br />
This the account given by Captain von Trotha, who affirms that nothing was known of the presence of the British Fleet in the waters of the Skagerrak, and that there seemed no probability of encountering this Fleet before 1 June.<br />
<br />
There are some points here which I am unable to understand. The submarines are said to have been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and were to return home on 1 June to be relieved probably by a weaker group. For, If the same number of boats were to to keep watch off the English coast, why should 31 May have been the last day for the German Fleet to sail. The day of departure was, therefore, too late in any case, for, if no encounter was to be expected before 1 June, the boats stationed off the coast could not possibly encounter the damaged British ships, as was intended, for probably no damaged ships would be there before 2 June.<br />
<br />
The battleship "KONIG ALBERT" had to carry out repairs to her condensers and did not proceed with the Fleet. Von Trotha told me that there was no alternative and that a ship must carry out small overhauls regularly in a dockyard according to programme. But could it not be arranged, when one is taking the initiative, to choose one's moment for an advance and to have all the ships together for this short time? And why should just that moment be chosen when one of the most powerful ships of the "Kaiser" class is in the dockyard, instead, for instance, of one of the "Nassau" class with 11-in. guns.<br />
<br />
In addition, the "BAYERN" was to have joined up a few days later. After having waited so long, why should not the plan have been postponed for 2 or 3 weeks, instead of dispensing with the only ship carrying 15-in. guns.<br />
<br />
In the same manner they dispensed with air reconnaissance, from which they had expected so much.<br />
<br />
These considerations make me doubt whether the account given me is quite correct, and whether, on the contrary, they knew of certain movements of the British Fleet and considered the moment extremely favourable for an attack. Perhaps they only knew of Beatty's battle squadron, and thinking the Main Fleet was far away, hoped to entrap this squadron. In Berlin, they have much to say, even in military circles, about the British Fleet's intention to push through into the Baltic, and of Kitchener's mission having some connection with this. I consider this senseless, for it cannot be presemed [sic] that the British Fleet would leave their shores unprotected and do the Germans the favour of operating in the Baltic, which would certainly be a most advantageous area for the German Fleet. In any case, there appear to be discrepancies which will probably be explained at some later date.<br />
<br />
Scouting groups, battle cruisers and light cruisers, together with flotillas, preceded the Main Fleet by 50 - 60 miles. At 4 p.m. the light cruisers encountered some British battle cruisers. These at once opened fire on the light cruisers, at an estimated distance of 26,247 yds.; the range could be taken accurately. Though they did not obtain a hit, the salvoes fell so well that the German cruisers thought it advisable to turn away and fall back on their battle cruisers.<br />
<br />
As the British approached, these battle cruisers turned on to a southerly course, in order to lure the enemy on to the German Main Fleet. A running action, on a southerly course, ensued. The British were to starboard and to the west of the Germans, who had therefore the following advantage: in the North Sea, in summer, the western horizon is quite light and visibility towards the west is good, while towards the east, and in a still greater degree off the Jutland Coast, it is misty and visibility is bad and no silhouettes stand out against the eastern horizon. This phenomenon also played great part in the subsequent course of the action. The sun was still high and was not troublesome, and the British ships offered admirable targets. The sea was calm, the wind N.W. 1-2, altering subsequently through W. to S.W.<br />
<br />
The following British ships were recognised:-<br />
3 "Lion" class, 1 "Tiger" and 2 "Indefatigable" class; they were soon reinforced by 5 "Queen Elizabeth" class following astern.<br />
<br />
It is asserted that, judging from shell splinters, the ship of the "Tiger" class carried 15-in. guns, and that she was therefore the mysterious vessel which replaced the "TIGER" sunk on 24.1.15; as the last-named "TIGER" carried only 13.5-in.guns, this was taken as a further proof of her loss. The silhouette of the new "TIGER", however, is said to have resembled that of the old "TIGER" exactly. As the "Queen Elizabeths" soon opened fire also with 15-in. guns, I rather doubt this assertion regarding the "TIGER", and the various ships on this early part of the engagement are altogether somewhat at variance.<br />
<br />
On the German side the ships proceeded in the following sequence:- "LÜTZOW", Flagship of Vice-Admiral Hipper, "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN".<br />
<br />
As Hipper edged towards the enemy, the distance decreased to about 7655 yds. The German fire was unquestionably superior, but the speed of the British vessels was greater. After a short time the "INDEFATIGABLE" and "QUEEN MARY" blew up, and 2 battle-cruisers and two attacking destroyers were also accounted for. The "QUEEN MARY" must have been destroyed by the explosion of a magazine; she was torn in two halves, and a water-colour painted by an officer represents her enveloped in an enormous column of black smoke; she disappeared in a few seconds. Only one cadet was subsequently picked.<br />
<br />
The second battle cruiser disappeared under similar circumstances. The "VON DER TANN" claims to have accounted for one of these battle-cruisers by a broadside. But the "MOLTKE" fired 4 torpedoes and also claims this achievement.<br />
<br />
The Germans suffered very little during this phase of the action, the "MOLTKE" alone receiving hits on the starboard side. The fire of the British battle-cruisers is said not to have been nearly as good as that of the "QUEEN ELIZABETH" class later on.<br />
<br />
When they had approached the German Main Fleet, the British turned on to a contrary course and the German cruisers did the same. The German Main Fleet proceeded in divisions in starboard quarter-line, the 3rd Battle Squadron: 4 "König" class and 3 "Kaiser" class, Fleet Flagship, 1st Battle Squadron: 4 "Ostfriesland" class and 4 "Westfalen" class, and the 2nd Battle Squadron: 5 "Deutschland" class and the "Hessen". They endeavoured to effect a junction with the cruisers, but were unable to take part very effectually.<br />
<br />
The course of the action was now in a northerly direction, over the area which had just been traversed, and the British ships now drew ahead considerably and turned more and more towards the East; the Germans followed this movement, and in consequence the conditions of visibility became less and less favourable for them.<br />
<br />
The "Queen Elizabeths" now made their presence more greatly felt; one of them had dropped out, but I was unable to ascertain when this occurred.<br />
<br />
The course of the German Math Fleet at first led past the 2 disabled British destroyers, which were lying stopped. The crews had already taken to the boats and were picked up later on by German destroyers. As the Main Fleet was doubtful about the advisability of passing the destroyers while they were still afloat, they were sunk by a few broadsides. One of the officers who was picked up was in pyjamas and is said to have stayed in his cabin during the action. He declared "We did not expect so much resistance," while another said - "The battle is rather disappointing." It has been ascertained that these destroyers were greatly under-manned; their crews seemed very exhausted, which points to their having been in the water for a long time.<br />
<br />
While on this easterly course, the light cruisers of the fast 2nd Scouting Group: "FRANKFURT", "PILLAU", "ELBING" and "WIESBADEN", were heavily fired on from the N.E. and E. without their being able to see more than the gun flashes. In addition, they were under continual fire from the N., and while turning away to S.E. and S., they ascertained that they were opposed by an interminable line of British ships, which appeared at first to be on a N.W.'ly course, and had then evidently turned together on to a S.'ly course.<br />
<br />
It may be noted here that the battleships, and, generally speaking, the battle-cruisers also, never sighted the British Main Fleet, and saw nothing but the flashes of the guns and the effects of the fire. These British ships, about 25 in number, were only sighted by a few light cruisers and by the flotillas, and were counted by them as accurately as possible.<br />
<br />
Surrounded thus from the N. and the E. and under fire, the "WIESBADEN" was disabled, apparently by a hit in the engine-room. The Admiral noticed, it is true, that his leading ships must have encountered new and powerful forces and that they were turning away; but he thought it his duty to go to the assistance of the "WIESBADEN" and therefore continued on an easterly course.<br />
<br />
The van of the Main Fleet, led by the "KÖNIG" (Rear-Admiral Behncke) now came under heavy fire from right ahead; the "KÖNIG" turned away under this fire towards the S.E., whereupon the Commander-in-Chief ordered the whole line to "turn together" to starboard and gave up the idea of helping the "WIESBADEN". About this time Vice-Admiral Hipper transferred his flag from the "LÜTZOW" to the "MOLTKE" with the help of a destroyer, his W/T station being damaged.<br />
<br />
Hardly had the Main Fleet drawn away on a westerly course, before it was ascertained that the pressure was relaxing and the fire decreasing, and that the British were no longer pursuing so hotly. Scheer therefore ordered the ships to "turn together" back on to their former course, and made the signal 'R' = 'Engage the enemy'. This second advance may be termed the zenith of the action. Admiral Scheer gave his views on it approximately as follows:- "Those who make a study of this engagement will be very puzzled as to my object in advancing thus against the wall of British ships. The fact is that I had no particular object. I made the first advance because I had a feeling that I ought to endeavour to assist the "WIESBADEN" and because the situation ahead was quite obscure to me, for I saw nothing of the "LÜTZOW" and received no W/T reports. I soon saw, however, that the leading ships were coming under an overwhelming fire, and that I could not risk the Fleet on the "WIESBADEN'S" account. When I noticed that the British pressure had quite ceased and that the Fleet remained intact in my hands, I turned back, under the impression that the action could not end in this way and that I ought to seek contact with the enemy again."<br />
<br />
The situation during the first and second advances may serve as an example of what should not take place according to all the laws of tactics, for it could not have been worse; von Trotha said jokingly that, if an Admiral brought about such a situation at a war game or in manoeuvres, he would never be entrusted without another command. In the North, the "Queen Elizabeths", then the battle-cruisers, and from N.E. through E. to S.E., an endless line of battleships formed an arc round the German van and kept it under fire. Evidently it had fallen into the most perfect trap. In addition to this unfavourable tactical position, there was a further difficulty, namely that the German ships could be clearly distinguished while they themselves only saw the gun flashes, 4 or 5 to each salvo, but could find no target.<br />
<br />
The Gunnery Officer of the "MARKGRAF" told me that he could not fire at all during half-an-hour, and that they were at the mercy of the British broadsides. Critical though the position was, in theory, they think that experience justifies the conclusion that this 'crossing the T' is in reality not so disastrous at longer ranges; for, in spite of the enormous superiority of their fire, the British made comparatively few hits, the simple reason being that, when fire is thus concentrated on a few leading ships, there can be no question of improving the shooting by spotting.<br />
<br />
Given good tactical training and squadrons which work well together, it is always easy to retire rapidly from an unfavourable position and even possibly to reach an advantageous one.<br />
<br />
The small amount of damage sustained by the Main Fleet may be owing partly to the fact that the leading battle-cruisers drew the enemy's fire, thus relieving the battleships. Only the three leading ships, "KÖNIG", "GROSSER KURFÜRST" and "MARKGRAF" received several hits; while among all the other ships, the "KAISER", "HELGOLAND" and the "SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN" received one hit each, and the rest were not hit at all.<br />
<br />
Simultaneously with the battle-cruisers, which were ahead and pressing forward in quarter-line formation, the 6th and 9th Flotillas, left by the "REGENSBURG", also proceeded to a torpedo attack. Regarding this cruiser advance, the Commanding Officer of the "SEYDLITZ" told me that he was in such a position that he was able to avoid the British salvoes, for he altered course towards the point where each salvo fell and thus evaded the spotting correction.<br />
<br />
This torpedo attack was carried out with great determination and seems to have been completely successful, although nobody is able to state how many hits were obtained. The British ships overlapped somewhat and their line was almost unbroken, and, as about 100 torpedoes were fired, it is estimates that there must have been a considerable number of hits, some people affirm that there were 20, but I do not place much confidence in these figures and it is useless to trouble about them as nobody is certain.<br />
<br />
The boats were fired on by guns of all calibres, even the heaviest, but with little effect, only one boat being destroyed; two other boats had been sunk in an earlier attack during the cruiser action.<br />
<br />
The battle-cruisers were also attacked by British torpedoes, the "SEYDLITZ" being hit once. The "MOLTKE" was lucky, for, when close to the ship, one torpedo apparently had a gyro failure and ran parallel with her. The "LÜTZOW" was probably hit also.<br />
<br />
After the attack, the destroyers laid fog and a heavy smoke screen, which interposed between the Fleet; this benefitted not only the heavily-damaged "LÜTZOW" and "DERFFLINGER", whose nets had been shot away and were hanging down, but also the whole Fleet. It may also have made an impression on the British.<br />
<br />
The German Main Fleet and cruisers turned on a westerly course, fire having again entirely ceased; and the ships of the Main Fleet then turned gradually in succession and in inverse sequence from W. to S.W., subsequently steering towards Horns Reef.<br />
<br />
It is not known what the British did; all that is certain, is that they did not follow in pursuit and that nothing further was seen of their Main Fleet. It remained light until 11 p.m. (summer time), and it would not have been impossible, considering their superior speed, for them to have come within firing range. The Germans expected it too, and now have to content themselves with surmises about the British Commander-in-Chief's reasons for not doing so. It is probably that the unfavourable issue of the fleet part of the battle and the demoralising losses in ships took away any desire on Jellicoe's part for further fighting. His Fleet may have lost heavily and been severely shaken by the torpedo attack; and, as the Germans still had some intact flotillas at their disposal, he may have feared further strong torpedo attacks in the critical hours of twilight, for in the German Navy they say that Jellicoe fears their destroyers in particular.<br />
<br />
Nevertheless, the Germans were not under the impression of having shaken the British Fleet to the extent of obliging them to give up the struggle, and when the evening passed without further incident, they reckoned with certainty on encountering Jellicoe off Horns Reef at daybreak. They were the more astonished at his non-appearance when their air reconnaissance reported that on the morning of 1 June a squadron of 12 battle-ships was proceeding North from the southern part of North Sea and that it suddenly turned on to an opposite course and proceeded South.<br />
<br />
As it could not possibly have been the intention of the British Commander-in-Chief to let the German Fleet escape after having encountered it at last far from its base, and as he still had an intact battle-squadron at his disposal, one is compelled to take the view that he no longer felt strong enough for a second encounter; the achievement of the German Fleet must therefore be very highly thought of.<br />
<br />
During the night cruising following the action, numerous small episodes and minor engagements took place, of which no clear idea can be formed. <br />
<br />
In view of a possible fresh attack or of a possible pursuit on the part of the enemy, it was thought undesirable to leave the 2nd Battle Squadron either in the van or in the rear, it therefore took station to starboard and at first proceeded on an opening course from the other squadrons, and continued fairly independently during the night.<br />
<br />
The 1st Battle Squadron therefore led, with the "WESTFALEN" as guide, and it was followed by the 3rd Battle Squadron.<br />
<br />
After the action had been broken off, the 4 remaining battle cruisers were ahead to port, where they were suddenly again brought under heavy fire from the port side and from ahead, apparently by 3 or 4 battle cruisers. It is presumed that these were the remaining 3 or 4 older cruisers of the "Invincible" class, which Jellicoe probably always stationed ahead of the Main Fleet, for it would hardly have been possible for the "Lions", which were following in the rear in the British line, to have taken station ahead so quickly. The German battle cruisers, all severely damaged, did not feel able to withstand this fire and turned away to starboard, passing ahead of the Main Fleet and between it and the 2nd Battle Squadron, which proceeded quietly on their course and before which the mysterious ships retired, not to be sighted again.<br />
<br />
The battle-cruisers then gradually fell astern, and as they were making much water, and also owing to their differing speeds, they lost contact with the Main Fleet and with each other.<br />
<br />
The "LÜTZOW" had dropped out during the engagement and proceeded independently, accompanied by 4 destroyers. At first she was able to steam 14 knots, but her speed decreased rapidly and dropped finally to 4 knots. Her bows sank slowly, and when the whole forecastle was under water the Commanding Officer decided to leave the ship. The badly wounded were transferred carefully to the boats and the disembarkation was conducted in good order. A torpedo was then fired at the ship and this coup de grace sank her in deep water at about 1 o'clock, I believe.<br />
<br />
The "SEYDLITZ" was hardly in a better condition than the "LÜTZOW"; she also sank gradually by the bows till the water was almost level with the deck, and she had a heavy list to port, but she continued on her course. In the darkest hours of the night she suddenly sighted 3 large ships to port, quite close to. She turned away, made a British recognition signal and was not pursued. As bad luck would have it, the steaming light had short-circuited, could not be switched off and showed intermittently.<br />
<br />
The "DERFFLINGER", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN" followed the Main Fleet more or less and met with no particular experiences.<br />
<br />
The Main Fleet had to repulse a series of destroyer attacks and was also engaged by cruisers. The movements of these British cruisers, which came up singly, are incomprehensible and give the impression of having lost their heads. They appear to have received the order, judging by an intercepted W/T message, to proceed on a northerly and north-westerly course, and thereby they ran into the extended German line which they probably imagined they had passed to the South.<br />
<br />
One large cruiser (?"WARRIOR") proceeded unsuspectingly within 875 yds. of the line of battleships and came under concentrated fire from several ships before she could reply, so that she blew up enveloped in flames and disappeared in 47 seconds. The "BIRMINGHAM" seems to have been accounted for in a similar manner. The destroyers all approached in a really insane manner; frequently not from ahead but from a direction astern, scattered, singly or in pairs, or at most 3 together, never in large numbers. Most of them were disabled forthwith by a few salvoes and set on fire. The "WESTFALEN" distinguished herself particularly at this time.<br />
<br />
These burning destroyers strewn along the course, lit it up as if for a festival. Evidently the fires were largely due to the light American and Mexican oils; at any rate German firing trials on oil bunkers never caused any such conflagrations.<br />
<br />
The attacking boats directed shrapnel fire on the searchlights with fairly good results, the searchlights of two battleships and one light cruiser being hit.<br />
<br />
One large destroyer, which only recognised the danger at the last moment and endeavoured to avoid it by altering course was rammed by the "NASSAU", which put her helm over for this purpose. The boat exploded internally and sank.<br />
<br />
The only ships hit were the "POMMERN" in the 2ns Battle Squadron, and the "ROSTOCK". The "POMMERN" blew up at once and nobody was saved. The "ROSTOCK" was just passing between ships of the Main Fleet when she was hit; the loss of life on board was small.<br />
<br />
The Germans believe they destroyed 11 British destroyers in all. The manner in which these destroyers were handled has not left a good impression on the whole, and one has certainly lost respect for this weapon. The view is also taken that the boats are too large and offer too wide a target.<br />
<br />
The light cruiser "ELBING", like the "ROSTOCK", apparently wanted to break through the line from port to starboard under pressure from the British cruisers; she was, however, rammed by the "POSEN" and had to be abandoned in a sinking condition. The Germans also fired a torpedo into her.<br />
<br />
The "FRAUENLOB" and 2 destroyers were lost during the night; no details of their loss are known.<br />
<br />
Not far from Heligoland, the "OSTFRIESLAND", 7th of the line, struck a mine. This brings the account of the chief events of this exciting cruiser to an end.<br />
<br />
The German flotillas were detached from the Fleet to clear the area off the Jutland Coast, which was divided up into sectors. The flotillas stationed furthest to the North proceeded to the Skagerrak and through these straits into the Baltic and to Kiel.<br />
<br />
None of the flotillas sighted the British Main Fleet again, which proves that it must have turned away to the N. or N.W. immediately after the action. According to confidential reports the Fleet entered British ports as early as 1 June.<br />
<br />
Two British battleships, in a severely damaged condition and accompanied by destroyers, were sighted proceeding back to England. One was attacked by a submarine, but without success.<br />
<br />
On the morning of 1 June, in fairly misty weather, a Zeppelin sighted groups of British ships leaving the Channel on a N.E.'ly course. The reports were rather vague, as sometimes 6 and sometimes 12 ships were mentioned; but it seems most likely that 12 battleships and 3 cruisers were in question, and that they soon retired. The airship, which flew low at one time to get a clearer view, was also fired on.<br />
<br />
Some of the ships are said to have had tripod masts.<br />
<br />
The German Fleet, with the exception of "SEYDLITZ", reached the Jade in the afternoon. The "SEYDLITZ" could not cross the bar on account of being so much down by the bows, and it was not till the next day at high water that she was towed in, stern first.<br />
<br />
<center><u>MISCELLANEOUS.<br>TACTICS.</u></center><br />
<br />
The Germans ascribe their success to various causes, and in the first place to their own superiority as regards tactics. This is a point which every officer discusses, and it is constantly repeated that it all happened just as in tactical manoeuvres and in "battle exercises", and that things could not have gone better.<br />
<br />
Movements of squadrons, divisions and individual ships, "turns together" and alterations of course and speed, all went like clockwork and demonstrated the very great mobility of all formations.<br />
<br />
The W/T signalling system of the Main Fleet never failed, and its failure would have been immaterial, as the primary and secondary flag action signals, showing from several positions in the ship, were made simultaneously.<br />
<br />
All this was due to the peace training and the practical experience of the Flag Officers and Captains. Though in peace time the Commander-in-Chief had never commanded a Fleet, nor the Admirals a squadron, still the training carried out on the same lines for a number of years resulted in everything proceeding with the expected precision.<br />
<br />
The British, on the contrary, are said to have displayed a certain clumsiness as regards tactics and to have preferred turning together when "turning on to an opposite course" (Wendungen im Gegenmarsch), though this conclusion does not seem altogether justified from the description of the action.<br />
<br />
The ships kept station 547 yds. apart, and Vice-Admiral Schmidt told me that, in his opinion, this distance is too small for large ships and that he prefers 656 yds., as the shorter distances result in the ships getting bunched and overlapping during alterations of course. In order to relieve this during the first turn to starboard, the Fleet Flagship herself turned to port and then closed gradually into line. At night the distance was 656 yds.<br />
<br />
No interruption of W/T communication was occasioned by the enemy.<br />
<br />
<center><u>GUNNERY</u></center><br />
<br />
It is admitted that the British are superior as regards their gunnery technique. Their salvoes fall most astoundingly close together and aroused admiration on all sides. Some people affirm that they fell too close together, and that it was consequently difficult to cover a sufficiently large danger space.<br />
<br />
This is particularly the case with the heaviest calibres: 13.5-in. and 15-in. and the battle-cruisers' fire was noticeably inferior to that of the "Queen Elizabeth" class, for example.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> Literal translation; the meaning is not clear. - Tr.] The spread of the salvoes frequently only covered a few square yards. In the "KÖNIG" 3 rounds, out of a salvo of 4 rounds, hit between the capstan and the bridge.<br />
<br />
This is attributed to careful calibration, which the British have studied for a long time and which, as is well known, was abandoned by the German Navy after a few trials. The gunnery officers declare unanimously that it must unquestionably be re-introduced.<br />
<br />
The British range-finders are superior to the German, and the construction of their turrets enables them to shoot at ranges impossible for German guns. The question of range appears to be immaterial to the British, who fire at any range so long as visibility permits.<br />
<br />
The Germans are fully convinced of the great superiority of 15-in. guns over all others, and deplore the fact that, owing to the predominant conservative tendencies in the German Navy, this calibre was not introduced until so lately. Vice-Admiral Gerdes, the Head of the Armament Department, is responsible for this, for he always opposed it on the ground that the poor visibility in German waters and the consequent short ranges rendered an increase of calibre useless; he considered the German 12-in. gun to be an altogether superior weapon, capable of competing with every other.<br />
<br />
In one respect the British seem behindhand as compared with the Germans: namely that they cannot alter range quickly enough and they are too dependent on the range clock. The British rely on steady fire at long range, and they adapt their tactics to this and avoid alterations of course and range most assiduously.<br />
<br />
The Germans, on the contrary, in their firing practices always work with big and rapid alterations of range and exercise firing while turning, so that the gunnery officers consider they have an advantage in this respect.<br />
<br />
The Turn on to an opposite course was certainly not advantageous for the German Fleet, but in this particular instance it made little difference, as the German ships were already unable to find a target; besides which, it must have disconcerted the British and it prevented them from obtaining good results with their fire. The salvoes fell very close together round the ships, but few hits were obtained. The rate of fire in the British ships is said to have been fair, but not excessive. Some people affirm that it was very modest.<br />
<br />
The British shell had great penetrating power, and from all reasonable distances the main armour was generally pierced clean through. The shell splinters picked up prove conclusively that at least 2 kinds of shell were used, differing considerably in material and quality. One kind of shell had a very thick wall and an extremely small explosive charge, it might almost be called a solid shot. It seems to have broken up frequently without exploding and the fuse did not function. Its explosive power, if it possessed any at all, was quite inconsiderable, and it is presumed that the explosives used was not high explosive.<br />
<br />
It appears from the splinters of these 15-in. shell that the wall was 6.3 - 6.7 ins. (16 - 17 cm.), so that the hollow space cannot measure more than 2.4 ins. - 1.8 ins. (4 - 6 cm.). It is true that the large pieces into which these shell broke pierced everything in their course and often went right through the whole ship, unless they struck an armoured part. Several intact heads were found, with and without caps, and also entire bases.<br />
<br />
The second kind of shell had considerably thinner walls, only about half as thick, but it also often broke up into quite large pieces and displayed no great explosive power, and little or no incendiary power.<br />
<br />
It appears therefore that the British aimed only at attaining penetrating power, and the Germans are of opinion that they do not possess (rohrsicheren)* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D.Note.- This appears to be a special fuse which is very delicate, but safe until it has left the gun.] fuses for high explosive shell; this was their opinion before the war also.<br />
<br />
They believe that the high explosive power of the German ammunition gives them a great advantage which may partly counterbalance the smaller calibre of their guns and perhaps also their inferior gunnery. In any case, the effect of the German shell at the point of impact was very considerable.<br />
<br />
The fact that the ships blew up must be attributed to explosions in their magazines. (In this connection one may recall a turret of the "SEYDLITZ" being hit in the action of 24 January, 1915; see my report No.47 ex 15). The turret armour must have been pierced and the shells in the turret must have been exploded. The British have no metal cartridge-cases and also no cartridge-holders such as the Germans have, but they keep their cartridges in locked boxes which are perhaps not flash-proof enough. It seems therefore, from the incident experienced by the "SEYDLITZ", that this must constitute a particular danger to British ships. In this last action also turrets in German ships were frequently hit; further details are given in the account of damage sustained.<br />
<br />
After having compared the hits received in the German ships with the observations of results on enemy targets, it may be safely affirmed that the explosive power of the German shells exceeds that of the British; this was already known after the action of 24 January 1915. The Germans are therefore very much annoyed that they had no 15-in. guns to fire, as they are persuaded that ships so knocked about (eingedeckte) as, for example, the "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" would have been completely destroyed by German shell.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. Note.- The writer appears to mean that if German 15-in. shell had been used against "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" these ships would have been sunk.]<br />
<br />
It may be noted here that the "BAYERN", the first of their ships to carry 15-in. guns, will not join the Fleet for another few days, and the "BADEN" not until the autumn.<br />
<br />
Medium armament played no part, only a few hits were obtained and they did little damage.<br />
<br />
The British fired part-salvoes, like the Germans; full salvoes may have been fired now and again.<br />
<br />
The method of repulsing destroyer attacks, which has previously been reported, namely the 'turning away' and firing on one, or at most two boats, proved to be sound, and the repulsing of attacks both by day and night offered no difficulties.<br />
<br />
As regards gunnery, it may also be mentioned that the fire-control apparatus worked without a hitch and withstood the heaviest shocks. The elevation pointers worked admirably. A few ships were not yet fitted with them.<br />
<br />
<center><u>Torpedo.</u></center><br />
<br />
As regards torpedo work the Germans consider themselves very much superior. There were prolonged discussions about depriving Flotilla Leaders of their independence and putting them under the orders of a Leader Ship, but they are now convinced that this is necessary to ensure the flotillas attacking at the right moment and all together.<br />
<br />
The flotillas were led by the 2 leader Ships "ROSTOCK" and "REGENSBURG", the first having 2 flotillas and the second 3 flotillas allocated to them. The remaining 2 flotillas accompanied the Main Fleet or the battle-cruisers. The leaders carried out their duties with great daring and circumspection. The attacks of the British were weak and scattered, and could therefore have little or only occasional success.<br />
<br />
The German 2nd Flotilla, composed of the larger 1500 ton boats were held back instead of being sent to attack. Although these boats are spoken of very highly and are indispensable for certain enterprises, the view is now taken that they are too large and too valuable to be used for attacking during an action. This Flotilla proceeded to Zeebrugge immediately after the action and arrived there safely. It is to be employed in preventing the British from blockading the harbour with nets, and thus make it impossible for the German submarines to proceed out.<br />
<br />
As far as I have heard, the "MOLTKE" alone of the larger ships fired 4 torpedoes.<br />
<br />
Submarines were not in evidence. No German submarines were present; on the other hand a German destroyer claims to have rammed a British submarine. This claim appears to be erroneous, at least it was declared to be nonsense by the Chief of Staff. The submarines failed as regards scouting and also doing the pursuit.<br />
<br />
Some people state that a British aeroplane was sighted to the northward, and that it had apparently risen from a cruiser. It played no part in the action.<br />
<br />
The use of "Höschter"* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. note:- Probably the name of the inventor.] fog seems to have been of good service, it and the smoke made by the destroyers having completely masked the Main Fleet and its movements at critical moments.<br />
<br />
<center><u>SPEED</u></center><br />
<br />
The advantage of speed lay entirely with the British, not only as regards the Main Fleet on account of the "Deutschland" class, but also as regards the battle-cruisers. The latter are said to have proved considerably faster than the German battle cruisers, an unpleasant experience which had already been made on 25 January 1915. This alone proves that the British are talking nonsense when they assert that the German Fleet sought safety in flight; on the contrary, it was far from its bases and entirely in the power of the British, who either did not wish to take advantage of their superior speed, or were unable to do so on account of the damage sustained. The visibility was no worse than it had been during the day and Jellicoe may have even welcomed the "Höschter" fog which would enable him to plead bad visibility as a reason for abandoning the pursuit. On the German side in the light of experience the factor of speed in the battleships is considered very important. But the moderate depths of the German harbours limits the draught of the ships, and make it particularly difficult for German builders to do much in this respect. In spite of greater length and higher horse power the most modern cruisers "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ" and "LÜTZOW" attained only a quite inconsiderable increase of speed in comparison with the older "GOEBEN" class, and proved a disappointment in this particular.<br />
<br />
The question whether the older battleships should take part in an important engagement was not easy to decide. The 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons composed of the "WITTLESBACH" and "BARBAROSSA" class, re-commissioned at the beginning of the war, were intended to be used in such actions, but have long since been paid off; some have been disarmed and employed as guardships and instructional ships, etc. It was considered however, that the 2nd Battle Squadron, composed of the most modern of the older ships, would be of some service in the action; but this squadron was in a privileged position, inasmuch as it was merely attached to the 1st and 3rd Battle Squadrons and its Admiral was allowed to operate independently and select the position he thought best. On this occasion it kept station quite well and did not prove a hindrance, but, on the other hand, it did not come under any heavy fire. This must be considered very fortunate, for, in view of the damage sustained by other ships and in view of the fact that the British shell pierced all armour above or below water even at the longest range, it is certain that every ship of this class would have been sunk by a few hits, as their internal sub-division is not proof against large inrushes of water.<br />
<br />
The loss of the "Pommern", which gives the British an opportunity for a hollow triumph, also teaches a clear lesson. The Chief of Staff told me that they will probably consider carefully before again exposing this Squadron to danger; therefore this action will have further confirmed the complete worthlessness of all Dreadnought types [sic] and will condemn them as old iron.<br />
<br />
<center><u>TORPEDO NETS.</u></center><br />
<br />
The torpedo nets of the battle cruisers are all badly damaged and the gear so knocked about by gunfire that they were almost useless. This was particularly the case with the "Derfflinger", where the after port nets were hanging in the water, and would have fallen across the propeller had they not chanced to remain held up by a temporary lashing. The ship was obliged to stop during the action to secure the nets, and they might easily have occasioned the loss of the ship.<br />
<br />
For this reason all the nets, together with the booms, were unshipped immediately after the ships' return, to everybody's satisfaction. They will not be carried any more, except perhaps for operations in the Baltic, where the ships may be obliged to anchor at sea.<br />
<br />
<center><u>LEAK-STOPPING SERVICE.</u></center><br />
<br />
The leak-stopping service which had been systematically developed, worked admirably and the Germans are convinced that they owe much to it. They believed that the "Seydlitz" could not have been brought in if the strengthening of the bulkheads, etc., had not been so thoroughly exercised and if the personnel had not been so well trained.<br />
<br />
It is also said, that in the "Lutzow", which had only been in commission for 2 months, was naturally not up to the mark in this respect, and that it is not impossible that small shortcomings, for which of course nobody can be blamed, were responsible for the ship sinking. The "Lutzow" was an unfortunate ship altogether. First her turbines collapsed, thus delaying her commissioning for 6 months, then she immediately struck a mine, and she was hardly out of dockyard hands before she was sunk.<br />
<br />
<center><u>DANGER FROM GAS FUMES.</u></center><br />
<br />
Only 2 days before sailing, a large number of the ships, and fortunately exactly those that came most under fire, namely battle-cruisers and the 3rd Squadron, were supplied with gas masks fitted with alkali cartridges for the whole crew and a plentiful reserve (in the "Seydlitz" 1500 masks for about 1200 men). The masks are similar to those used in the army for poisonous gases. Each man carries a mask slung round him, if he is not actually wearing it.<br />
<br />
I was told emphatically by all the officers, that, in their experience, these masks are absolutely necessary and not only saved many lives but enabled the men to carry on in parts of the ship which they would otherwise have been compelled to leave.<br />
<br />
The gases from shells, mines and torpedoes penetrate in an incredible manner through ventilators, telephone leads, etc. to compartments far away from the point of impact. In many cases the masks enabled large numbers of the guns' crews to escape from turrets that were hit, and to help out others who were badly wounded. In one case the men in one of the main engine rooms were able to remain at their posts after gas had penetrated, until the engine-room was ventilated.<br />
<br />
The Fleet breathing apparatus (Flottenathmer) is preferable to masks in some cases, but it cannot be supplied to everyone and it hampers one's movements, which the masks do not.<br />
<br />
On account of the great danger from gases, it is also advisable to fit hinged flaps in all shafts, and to have wooden bungs to fit the voice-pipes, keeping a hammer at hand to hammer them into the mouth-pieces.<br />
<br />
They tell me that it proved very useful to keep all the personnel employed below, such as in central control rooms, engine-rooms, torpedo flats, etc. continually informed of what was going on. The men get nervous, particularly at first, with the tremendous shocks caused by shell falling close to the ship, though the shocks are felt less on deck, and such information gives them confidence and they like knowing what is going on above them.<br />
<br />
<center><u>DAMAGE</u></center><br />
<br />
The distribution of ships needing repair in the various dockyards is as follows:-<br />
<br />
The "König" proceeded at once to Kiel and is under repair at Howaldt's yard. I did not see her.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" and "Moltke" in Blohm and Voss yard, Hamburg, the first in the Imperial Dock.<br />
<br />
The "Kurfürst["] in Vulkan Yard, Hamburg.<br />
<br />
The "Derfflinger" was first docked in Wilhelmshaven and the leaks temporarily stopped, she then proceeded to the Imperial dockyard, Kiel. The "Seydlitz" will now be docked in the large dock at Wilhelmshaven; during my stay the "Seydlitz" was still in the lock.<br />
<br />
The "Von der Tann", "Ostfriesland" and "Helgoland" will be repaired in dry docks in Wilhelmshaven. No other large ships require to be docked.<br />
<br />
"<u>Seydlitz</u>" The number of hits was still uncertain, as the whole forepart of the ship up to the upper deck was still under water, and it is not known what she looks like below water. The ship was brought into the lock with difficulty, and as she is 43 ft. down by the bows, she cannot be taken into harbour. They will not venture to dock the ship inside the lock, and intend first to raise her bows slightly.<br />
<br />
The roof and guns of the fore turret and anchors, cables etc., have already been unshipped, and they now intend to bring caissons alongside and pump out the fore part sufficiently to enable her to enter the harbour.<br />
<br />
The great inrush of water, that flooded more or less the whole fore part of the ship as far as the first boiler-room bulkhead, was caused by a number of hits. Firstly, one of the belt armour plates forward on the port side is missing, having fallen off. Secondly, there are believed to be at least 2 or 3 more hits below water, forward on the port side; for the list and the settling down had already become ominous when the ship was hit at the edge of the upper deck, port side, abreast the bridge; this was followed by an inrush of water in the battery deck, which did a great amount of damage.<br />
<br />
In addition, during the day action, she was hit by a torpedo on the starboard side under the forward 5.9 in. gun, which caused her to settle down still more by the bows. This gun was so much damaged by the shock from underneath as to be disabled.<br />
<br />
Further, there are 4 severe hits in the ship's side (mess deck, port side, forward of the turret), which also demolished the port capstan.<br />
<br />
These shell, or shell splinters, naturally penetrated to the armoured deck, so that the entire fore part of the ship above and below the armoured deck is holed in many places, allowing free passage for the water. The fore part of the ship was struck therefore by at least 8 or 9 shells and one torpedo.<br />
<br />
Apparently the only compartments which are not flooded, are the bow torpedo flats and the central control room. The former is being pumped out continuously, as a great deal of water is flowing in from above. The torpedo control room had to be abandoned, as the forward partition was not watertight. The central control room abaft this was not abandoned, but of its 2 entrances from the starboard and port passages, only the port one can be used, as the starboard one is flooded.<br />
<br />
The gunnery control room is far further aft and was not affected.<br />
<br />
The ship has a list of 7° to port, and as she has now been slightly raised, about 1¾ ft. of her bows are above water; at one time it was up to the level of the deck.<br />
<br />
While under way the forward boiler room bulkhead had to withstand most of the pressure; supports have been built up everywhere, but it leaks in places.<br />
<br />
The other hits of consequences were those in the turrets. The fore starboard turret No.2 received a direct hit on the fore face of the revolving structure. One curved plate was forced out, but fortunately the main effect of the explosion was outward. The right hand gun was disabled by slight damage to the mounting; with this exception the turret remained in action and kept up fire.<br />
<br />
The right hand gun of turret No.3 received a direct hit, which cut out a wide groove along the tube of the gun. The left hand gun continued to fire.<br />
<br />
The barbette of turret No.4 was hit on a level with the rammer, and the armour was pierced clean through. This hit is of special interest, as the "Seydlitz" received a similar hit and at the same level in turret No.5 on 24th January 1915, which caused a fire, disabled both the after turrets and killed all the guns' crews. This last time, however, the damage was slight. There was no ready ammunition in the turret, and only one cartridge was exploded, in contrast to the (6200 Kg.) 13,670 lbs. of powder on Jan.1915. The turret officer and a large number of the gun's crews were saved by their gas masks. The destruction caused by splinters was, however, considerable and the turret was abandoned, as it was not possible to continue fire from it. This was a 13.5 in. shell, at 15,310 yds. range, strength of armour pierced 8.6 inches.<br />
<br />
After the turret had been abandoned, it was hit a second time in the after side of the revolving part, which was pierced; this of course increased the havoc in the interior.<br />
<br />
Turret No.5 was hit in the roof. The shell richochetted, and the roof is slightly dented. Nobody was hurt and the turret continued to fire.<br />
<br />
In the "Seydlitz" therefore, all the turrets were hit, with the exception of the foremost turret, and one was hit twice.<br />
<br />
A further hit pierced the 5.9 in. (150mm.) casemate armour of the aftermost 5.9 in. starboard gun, No.2. The deck was pierced from beneath, and splinters also pierced the splinter bulkhead. The gun was disabled and all the crew were killed, with the exception of the ship's chaplain who happened to be in the casemate and must be watched over by a special guardian angel.<br />
<br />
A similar hit, with a 15 in. shell, struck the casemate armour of the 6-in. gun No.7 and exploded in the casemate. Men were killed, the gun was disabled and the splinter bulkhead pierced by large splinters. This time again, surprise was aroused by the comparatively small damage caused by a large calibre shell.<br />
<br />
"<u>Derfflinger</u>". One shell hit the armour belt forward of the hawse pipe, probably at the junction of 2 plates, as 2 plates broke away. The plates underneath were consequently strained apart and a great deal of water flowed in.<br />
<br />
The armour belt on the port side also received 2 further hits in the centre and was pierced clean through. The splinters penetrated more than half way through the ship, and in one case a piece of plating was driven half way though the ship. These hits, combined perhaps with others, destroyed the nets and their supports in several places.<br />
<br />
The two after turrets received direct hits, in one case on the roof, in the other case in the barbette above the deck; the armour was pierced and the upper portions of the turrets burnt out and severely damaged, but the flames did not penetrate to the magazines. The crew in the upper part of the turret were killed, and both turrets were disabled. This occurred at an early stage of the action.<br />
<br />
The guns at high elevation cannot yet be dismounted, as everything is wedged in, but they do not appear to be damaged.<br />
<br />
The muzzles were carried away off the 4 foremost 6 in. (15 cm.) guns on the port side; two of them probably having been accounted for by one and the same shell which hit the armour. One gun, the muzzle of which was perhaps damaged by a splinter, afterwards burst, the tube splitting open in the shape of a tulip.<br />
<br />
The "Derfflinger" received a few other hits of no particular interest. She appears the next most severely damaged ship after the "Lützow".<br />
<br />
The "<u>Moltke</u>" only received 5 hits, all of them during that part of the action which took place on a southerly course; while the cruisers mentioned above received most of the hits on the port side, consequently during the later stages of the action.<br />
<br />
One shell pieced the bulwarks in the after part of the ship above the armour, passed through the ship and struck the armour on the port side from inside, about 3.3 ft. below the water-line. One plate was forced out and is missing. The inrush of water was considerable. The after compartments, above the armoured deck which remained intact, were all more or less flooded.<br />
<br />
The second hit was further forward, below the armour belt. The shell exploded in a bunker, but the armoured deck held and no water penetrated it from below. The neighbouring bunkers made little water and could be pumped out.<br />
<br />
Another shell struck the 5.9 in. armour in the upper bunker, above the water-line. The armoured deck again held, but the inner wall of the bunker parted, and the battery deck was pierced from below, a 6 in. gun being damaged and disabled.<br />
<br />
In the fore part of the ship a shell struck the armour belt below the water-line. The plate remained intact and was driven in about 8 inches. The compartment was flooded, but the torpedo bulkhead remained watertight. A neighbouring compartment leaked slightly, the rivets having parted.<br />
<br />
The fifth case of damage, namely a plate beneath the armour belt being driven and pressed in, was probably not due to a direct hit, but to splinters of a shell which fell short.<br />
<br />
"<u>Von der Tann</u>". A shell hit and pierced the lower part of the 3.9 in. armour belt in the after part of the ship to starboard. The compartments above the armoured deck, and some of those on the deck above, were flooded. The chief effect of the shell was outside the ship, but it bent the plates below the otherwise undamaged armoured deck, so that a considerable amount of water flowed into the compartments below the armoured deck. The after torpedo flat was flooded half way up, and the men in the starboard steering engine room were shut in for a long time owing to the exits being blocked.<br />
<br />
The fore turret was hit on the starboard side on the upper edge of the barbette and a semi-circular armour plate was forced out. The machinery of the turret was so badly knocked about that the turret was disabled.<br />
<br />
The hydraulic piping was damaged, so that all the heavy armament was put out of action temporarily. Strangely enough, though men were wounded none were killed.<br />
<br />
The aftermost turret was hit in the barbette. The armour was pierced, but the effect of the shell was exterior, the turret sustained little internal damage, so that the handgear of the turret remained in action. The turret was wedged in one place and could not revolve; they succeeded, however, in cutting off with oxy-acetylene the piece of revolving part which was jammed against the inner side of the barbette thus getting rid of the obstruction.<br />
<br />
Outside the turret, the shell did considerable damage; some splinters striking downwards, bent the armoured deck and pierced it in places. As far as I know, the armoured deck sustained no further damage, and this was of little importance.<br />
<br />
The after conning-tower was hit and a piece of the armour torn away; the occupants, including the 3rd gunnery officer, were killed. Splinters struck downwards to the engine-room ventilation hatches, but were stopped by the armoured gratings.<br />
<br />
"<u>Ostfriesland"</u> was struck by a mine below the foremost port turret. The whole measures 197 ft.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. note:- Literal translation is 12 times 5 metres large.] The torpedo bulkhead is only slightly torn, and the inrush of water was only local.<br />
<br />
"<u>Helgoland</u>". A 13.5 in. shell hit the 7.9 in. armour belt forward on the port side and pierced it. The shell appears to have broken only as no explosive action can be traced. The range was about 14,217 yds.<br />
<br />
"<u>Nassau</u>" rammed a British destroyer, or rather, the destroyer ran into her forward on the port side. Her bows must have lifted right up, for her hawse-pipe remained on board the "Nassau", so firmly wedged into the side of the upper deck that it will have to be cut out. The "Nassau's" side below the deck is torn away for 33 ft. The destroyer then glanced off the "Nassau's" side and exploded internally. One of the crew remained behind in one of the nets, but fell into the water when the "Nassau" fired a salvo.<br />
<br />
The "Nassau" was hit by shrapnel from attacking destroyers in the foremost searchlight group, both port searchlights were put out of action. The searchlight control and electric cables were destroyed and many of the searchlight crews were killed. The after searchlight group was hit in a similar manner, and one of the searchlights was disabled.<br />
<br />
The "Rhineland" and a light cruiser were also hit in a similar manner.<br />
<br />
I have seen all the above mentioned ships in Wilhelmshaven.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" and "Kurfürst" were at Hamburg, but unfortunately I am unable to report much about them. They had already been under repair for several days, and the damage was to some extent made good. Besides this, the conditions were not favourable for undisturbed examination: commissioners from the Imperial Navy Office were on board, besides crowds of workmen, the noise was deafening and it was pouring with rain. Consequently I took no notes on the spot and relied on my memory, which however fails me now among the very many received of similar cases. I am therefore unable to report each hit with accuracy.<br />
<br />
This is immaterial, however, as there were no particularly interesting hits, and none of the ships had been hit in the turrets. The armour had been pierced in several places, the effect and character of the hits being similar in all cases; the hits on unarmoured parts were of little consequence.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" was hit aft on the port side of the water line just on a junction of two plates, a piece of equal size being torn away from each plate. The shell then struck the sloping part of the armoured deck and the splinters ricochetted and passed right through the ship. These plates have already been removed.<br />
<br />
A casemate was pierced and the gun disabled.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" is the only ship whose mast was hit, the mast remained standing and has now been removed.<br />
<br />
The spotting platform had to be abandoned, as communications with the conning tower was cut off. This was the only hit received in a conning tower; it only grazed the upper edge and glanced off, and the men inside hardly noticed it.<br />
<br />
The port engine was disabled, not in consequence of damage to the turbine which is in good condition, but owing to one of the main propeller bearings becoming overheated. The cause of this is not clear, but it is believed to be due to concussions. The ship was well able to keep station with her two remaining engines.<br />
<br />
The "<u>Kurfürst</u>" suffered especially from a great inrush of water forward on the port side, above the armoured deck; it was caused by a hit in the armour belt. No further damage of importance was sustained.<br />
<br />
With regard to time necessary for repair to these ships, it is not yet possible to say anything definite, as it is still undecided whether they shall undergo thorough repair or not. The chief difficulty is the manufacture of new armour plates; but some of the holed plates can, no doubt, be left in position for the present.<br />
<br />
A considerable time will be needed to repair some of the turrets of the battle-cruisers, but here too, they will contrive to get things done. For instance, the "Von der Tann" is to have an entire turret out of a ship of the "Nassau" class, probably the foremost turret, and this ship will be left without a turret for some time. They talk a great deal also of transferring guns, and they will perhaps make use of those intended for the "Hindenburg", which will not be completed will the late autumn.<br />
<br />
It may be presumed that the battleships will be ready for sea in 4-6 weeks, and the battle-cruisers, particularly the "Seydlitz", in not less than 4 months. Naturally work is going on day and night, and repairs are given priority over all new construction.<br />
<br />
The damage sustained by light cruisers and destroyers is inconsiderable. The "Hamburg" had a funnel shot away. As these ships seem to be of minor importance, I did not trouble further about them.<br />
<br />
As our Allies appear not to have the intention of communicating to us what effect the examination of damages sustained will have on their construction in the future, we must endeavour to ascertain this as time goes on by means of cross questioning and by studying their new constructions in detail. I do not feel called upon to draw premature and rash conclusions to-day, on the strength of impressions received, but this will not prevent me from giving a summary of my opinion and of the opinions expresses in my hearing.<br />
<br />
Firstly, it is a remarkable fact that in all the ships that have returned home, all the engine and boiler-rooms are undamaged; the "Lützow" is no exception to this, as she proceeded under her own steam until late in the night after the action. I have also been assured by the Imperial Navy Office, after an inspection carried out by the Chief Engineer, that not a single auxiliary engine was defective. The only boiler-room put out of action was the foremost one in the "Seydlitz" where the bulkhead gave a little, allowing water to penetrate through rivet holes and cracks when the ship was under way. The conclusion may therefore be drawn that these vital parts of the ship are sufficiently protected and that the armour belt of the usual German thicknesses, though it cannot stop the shells, at least fulfils its purpose by breaking them up. Consequently it has become almost impossible even for the largest splinters of 15 in. shell to penetrate through armoured deck or torpedo bulkhead in engine and boiler rooms.<br />
<br />
Even at these long ranges and steep angles there was no question of the armoured decks being pierced; but the fitting of strong gratings over the hatches, which prevented the engines of the "Von der Tann" from sustaining severe damage, appears very necessary.<br />
<br />
The torpedo bulkheads also resisted shells, mines and torpedoes effectually; and in cases where slight damage was sustained, it had no further consequences than the flooding of the compartment affected.<br />
<br />
Perhaps it would be advisable to construct a specially strong boiler-room bulkhead, similar to a torpedo bulkhead, so that it could not be damaged by splinters or water-pressure.<br />
<br />
The inspection of the "Seydlitz" has left me with the impression that the commanding officer of the "Seydlitz" expected rather too much of his ship, and that nothing short of extraordinary good luck enabled her to be brought back. At one time when the whole forepart of the ship was flooded and the bows were under water, he proceeded occasionally with revolutions for 22 knots, just in order to show how seaworthy his ship was, so he told me. This may have been very sporting, or perhaps it may have been necessary under the circumstances in order not to drop too far behind and be overtaken by the enemy, but it certainly was not good seamanship, and if his stokehold bulkhead had burst, the "Seydlitz" would have gone down like the "Lutzow", where the circumstances appear to have been very similar. Later on he decreased speed and finally proceeded stern first.<br />
<br />
I therefore think it not impossible that the loss of the "Lützow", which is said to have been proceeded at 14 knots for a time, was also due only to recklessly high speed, and that the ship might have been saved if she had proceeded stern first or been taken in tow.<br />
<br />
As the danger from water-pressure must always be greatest from ahead, it would certainly be advisable to take special preventative measures against it.<br />
<br />
Vice-Admiral Schmidt told me that, in his opinion, the armoured belt ought to be strongest in the centre, and possible in the afterpart to protect the steering engines, and possibly in the bows, but that it ought not to taper off gradually from the centre to the extremities. He was also entirely in favour of a protected upper deck forming a second armoured deck.<br />
<br />
The admirably thorough system of internal division in the German ships and the floating capability thus attained is the finest proof of the merit of German construction which pursued this aim, and it shows that Admiral von Tirpitz, the creator of the Battle Fleet of to-day, was right when he upheld the principle that, above all things, the ships must be capable of remaining afloat and must not sink or heel over, and that everything else is of secondary consideration.<br />
<br />
The large number of hits in the turrets is remarkable, and it is generally considered that the turret armour should be appreciably stronger, especially in the lower part of the barbettes; for it is not only the disablement of the guns that comes into question, serious though this might be, but also the blowing up of magazines and the total destruction of the ship, as the wide shaft down to the magazines cannot possibly be made completely flash-proof. This is the most vital part of the ship. It is only owing to the small explosive charges in British shells, that there were no explosions of magazines in the German ships.<br />
<br />
Everything possible had been done after the action of 24.1.15 to ensure protection against this danger; the ready ammunition was removed from the top of the hoists and wherever possible all the openings in shafts leading down below were fitted with flaps, covers and heavy asbestos mats, while German ammunition is particularly carefully stowed and packed in cases with screwed-on covers.<br />
<br />
The disasters on the British side are a proof that this is a question of the greatest importance. It must also be taken into consideration that while any other damage turret may take months.<br />
<br />
The numerous hits in turrets would appear to justify the opinion of those who decided against triple turrets, on the ground [sic] that if one was disabled it would put too many heavy guns out of action.<br />
<br />
A hit in a casemate will of course destroy it and disable the gun, but this is of little consequence. Care must be taken here also not to have any ready ammunition, and to close the ammunition hand-up hermetically with heavy asbestos mats at the magazine end also. With the German "Paternoster" (dredger hoist) the ammunition lifts this mat as it comes up and the mat then falls to and closes the opening, which is a practical arrangement.<br />
<br />
Other hits through unarmoured parts, which destroyed more or less small gear and at the first glance give an impression of terrible havoc, are really of no consequence.<br />
<br />
In the "Von der Tann" they wanted to flood a turret magazine. This was impossible, as the flooding valve in the battery, or between deck was piled up with debris, cabin fittings, etc., and was inaccessible. Fortunately the flooding of the magazine turned out to be unnecessary. The Executive Officer remarked to me how critical such a trivial matter might become, and that one could not be careful enough about choosing the positions for the flooding valves, which must be kept clear of easily destructible objects.<br />
<br />
The man-hole covers in the decks, coal shoots [chutes], etc., were pointed out to me as dangerous, as they may be burst open by pressure of gas from below, thus causing damage and giving passage to the gases. These covers should be secured in a different manner and much more firmly.<br />
<br />
The flooding and draining system worked admirably, and is hardly capable of improvement. The only disadvantage is that the compartments above the armoured deck have no draining arrangements. This should be provided. A list, consequent on an inrush of water, could always be corrected by flooding an opposite compartment. This is an important matter both as affecting gunnery and personnel.<br />
<br />
The searchlights, which were not taken down in the German ships, all came out of the action undamaged; anxiety on their account was therefore unfounded. It was very unpleasant when attacking boats fired on the searchlights, and it is therefore considered necessary to fit light armour protection on the masts for the crews of the searchlight control and electric cables.<br />
<br />
Damage from flames is nowhere visible. The Germans are now rather amused at the care with which interior partitions were scraped.<br />
<br />
I could not help comparing the German ships with the Russian battleship "Orel", which I saw in Madzurn after the battle of Tsushima. If I remember rightly, the "Orel" had 5 severe hits and 40 hits with medium-calibre shell.<br />
<br />
The enormous explosive power of the Shimosa shell, which breaks up into minute splinters, did not do the slightest damage to the vital parts of the ship, but the upper deck was transformed into a confused heap of ruins. Superstructure, bridges, masts, funnels, etc., were destroyed, guns dismounted and fires started.<br />
<br />
Nothing of the kind is to be seen in the German ships, outwardly only a few more or less clean shell holes are visible, and they look so orderly and so little damaged that they do not appear to have gone through an action.<br />
<br />
It is true that the upper decks are said to have been littered with countless splinters, but they flew on to the decks from shells which struck the water, the ship receiving violent shocks.<br />
<br />
The holes in the armour show the characteristic concentric cracks round the hole and the radial splashes, the latter proving that the shells exploded on impact or at the latest, as they passed through. In many cases, as already noted, the force of the explosion was external and only pieces of plate, and possibly the head of the shell were driven in.<br />
<br />
<center><u>FLAG OFFICERS OF THE FLEET AND LEADERS</u></center><br />
<br />
{|<br />
| Commander-in-Chief:<br />
| Vice Admiral Scheer<br />
|-<br />
| <u>I Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Vice Admiral Schmidt<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Engelhard<br />
|-<br />
| <u>II Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Mauve<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Baron von Dalwigh<br />
|-<br />
| <u>III Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Behncke<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Nordmann<br />
|-<br />
| Officer commanding the Scouting Forces and<br>Commanding 1st Scouting Group<br />
| Vice Admiral Hipper<br />
|-<br />
| " 2nd " "<br />
| Rear Admiral Bodicker<br />
|-<br />
| " 4th " "<br />
| Commodore "Captain" v. Reuter<br />
|-<br />
| Leaders of Destroyers<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| in "Rostock"<br />
| Commodore "Captain" Michelsen<br />
|-<br />
| in Regensburg<br />
| Commodore "Captain" Heinrich<br />
|-<br />
| Leader of submarines<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| In Hamburg<br />
| Captain Bauer<br />
|}<br />
<br />
<center><u>REMARKS</u></center><br />
<br />
The lecture on the action, upon which this report is based, was illustrated by a plan prepared in haste for H.M. the Kaiser, and a copy was promised to me. But the Admiral Staff does not wish to part with this first incomplete draft, and the preparation of an accurate plan has not yet been completed, as the Admiral Staff is not yet in possession of all the details.<br />
<br />
In time to be included in this report I have only received the sketch of the first stage of the battle, namely the cruiser action on a southerly course, together with a small sketch of the situation when the action was broken off; both are enclosed.<br />
<br />
I conclude from the sketch of the cruiser action, that the accounts given to me were not quite accurate; for instance, the assertion of the commanding officer of the "Moltke" that the shortest range at that stage was 7,650 yds. and that he had accounted for one of the armoured cruisers with a torpedo.<br />
<br />
The sketch shows that the "Indefatigable" was probably first destroyed by gun fire from the "Von der Tann", and later the "Queen Mary" by gunfire from the "Derfflinger", and that the range was never less than 14,220 yds.<br />
<br />
The loss of "V. 27" and "V. 29" and of 4 British destroyers is also apparent, while I was only told of two.<br />
<br />
In the original sketch, 2 British armoured cruisers are also shown as having fallen out during this stage, but this is not shown on the accompanying sketch and probably took place later.<br />
<br />
I was told by the Admiral Staff that the accompanying sketches are not to be taken as strictly accurate.<br />
<br />
It is requested that the sketches and course of the action and the account of damages may be treated as strictly confidential.<br />
<br />
==Footnotes==<br />
{{reflist}}<br />
<br />
==Bibliography==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
*''Schematismus für das K.u.K. Heer und für die Kriegsmarine für 1914. Separatausgabe''. Wien: 1914.<br />
*''Almanach für die k. und k. Kriegsmarine 1917. Kriegsausgabe''. '''XXXVII'''. Pola: 1917.<br />
*[[Arthur Marder (Naval Historian)|Marder, Arthur J.]] (1966). ''From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919: Jutland and After, May 1916–December 1916''. '''Volume III'''. London: Oxford University Press.<br />
*{{MarderFDSFIII}}<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
==External Links==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
*[http://www.denkmalprojekt.org/2023/vl_marineoffiz_zahlmstr_feuerwerks_torpedooffiz_beamte_wk1.html "Halbstocks die Flagge!"] ''Onlineprojekt Gefallenendenkmäler''.<br />
*Krámli, Mihály. [http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-124.pdf "The Report on the Battle of Jutland by the Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché in Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Colloredo-Mannsfeld."] ''NavWeaps''.<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
[[Category:Battle of Jutland]]</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Attach%C3%A9_Report_on_the_Battle_of_Jutland&diff=334750Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland2024-03-13T09:50:01Z<p>Simon Harley: Oops.</p>
<hr />
<div>Soon after the [[Battle of Jutland]] on 31 May &ndash; 1 June 1916 the Naval Attaché of the [[Austro-Hungarian Navy|Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Navy]] at the embassy in Berlin, ''Fregattenkapitäne'' Hieronymus Graf von Colloredo-Mannsfeld,<ref>''Schematismus für das K.u.K. Heer und für die Kriegsmarine für 1914''. p. 1270. ''Almanach für die k. und k. Kriegsmarine 1917''. p. 668.</ref> visited the High Sea Fleet. He composed a report on the battle for his superiors using first-hand accounts, interspersed here and there with his own observations. The version reproduced here is a translation in English apparently made by the [[Naval Intelligence Division (Royal Navy)|Naval Intelligence Division]] in 1919 from a copy which was subsequently returned to "F.N.A.", presumably the French Naval Attaché. A copy of the translation then made its way into the papers of the British Cabinet, from where historian Arthur J. Marder obtained a copy which is in his papers.<ref>Original number N.I.D. 087/19. Marder papers, Special Collections and Archives, Langson Library, University of California, Irvine, MS-F002, Box 27.</ref> He does not appear to have used it for the 1966 edition of ''From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow'', Volume III, but certainly used it for the revised edition in 1978.<ref>A quote on p. 189 of the 1966 edition reads, "The Fleet is filled with enthusiasm and elated<br />
with victory.... All, down to the last seaman, believe in the strength of the Fleet and look forward to further encounters with<br />
confidence." This differs to the quote used on p. 234 of the 1978 edition, which is identical to that used here.</ref> <br />
<br />
It is perhaps worth comparing this translation with that made by Hungarian historian Mihály Krámli of a post-war copy of a slightly shorter version of the report in a Hungarian archive which has been published on the ''NavWeaps'' online resource.<ref>Krámli, Mihály. [http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-124.pdf "The Report on the Battle of Jutland by the Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché in Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Colloredo-Mannsfeld."] ''NavWeaps''.</ref><br />
<br />
The original grammar and punctuation of the typescript has been reproduced here wherever possible.<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
From:- Austrian Naval Attache in Berlin.<br />
<br />
To:- Commander-in-Chief, Pola.<br />
<div style="float:right;">Berlin,<br>17 June, 1916.</div><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<center><u>NAVAL ENGAGEMENT OF 31 MAY 1916.</u></center><br />
<br />
The following is a report of the naval proceedings of 31 May - 1 June, 1916, and also of the damage sustained by the German Fleet.<br />
<br />
During my 3-days' visit to Wilhelmshaven, followed by a cursory examination of the "MARKGRAF" and "KURFURST" at Hamburg, I endeavoured to gain merely a general idea of the results of gunfire and concentrated my attention on the course of the action itself.<br />
Admiral Scheer, whom I only saw for a short time as he left for Kiel to attend the funeral of his borther-in-law [sic], Lieut.-Commander Mohr,<ref>Carl Mohr of the ''Hamburg''.[http://www.denkmalprojekt.org/2023/vl_marineoffiz_zahlmstr_feuerwerks_torpedooffiz_beamte_wk1.html "Halbstocks die Flagge!"] ''Onlineprojekt Gefallenendenkmäler''. Our thanks to Ruiz Mateo Lutzow for finding this excellent source.</ref> who was killed in the action, very kindly arranged that his Chief of Staff, Captain Trotha, should give me an account of the whole proceedings, illustrated by plans, and that I should be furnished with all information. I have tried to fill in the gaps by conversations with officers whom I know; this has resulted in some contradictory statements, and several points remain obscure, the accounts from the various ships not having all come in.<br />
<br />
Many episodes will therefore be explained later and may appear in a different light, but, as regards the broad outlines which are of chief importance, the picture of this interesting engagement is fairly clear. The accompanying plan of the action was made in haste for the Kaiser and will therefore need much correction.<br />
<br />
The spirit pervading the Fleet can only be described as one of enthusiasm; they are intoxicated with victory. The heavy load weighing on them all, the dear that this war might end without an encounter of the Fleets, have vanished. They have learnt what fighting really means, they know themselves to be superior to the enemy as regards tactics, and that they were following the right lines and have nothing to unlearn; they know that their gunfire was more effective than that of the enemy, and that they can rely implicitly on their flotillas which have always been looked upon in the German Navy as one of the chief factors in an action. Finally they know that their largest ships can stand heavy fire and serious damage, that they leave nothing to be desired as regards construction and cannot be sunk easily. In short, they feel that the British, in spite of all their boasting, cannot overcome the German Fleet and have a considerable respect for it.<br />
<br />
This conviction imbues the whole Fleet, down to the last man, with confidence in their strength and a calm assurance regarding future encounters. At the same time they are free from over-confidence and from under-estimation of the enemy. On the contrary, the British fire-control and the enormous piercing power of their heavy shell at great distances have roused their admiration, so that a careless conception of the situation is not to be feared, the less so, as well-balanced minds such as those of Admiral Scheer and his Staff are unlikely to be led away by former successes to undertake rash enterprises in the future.<br />
<br />
They do not deny that they were extraordinarily fortunate, and that if the action had been prosecuted with energy on the British side, and if the "Nelson touch" had been in evidence, things might have gone very badly for Germany, especially as the British still had an intact Battle Squadron of 12 units at their disposal which had not yet taken part in the action. But they console themselves with the knowledge that no naval action was ever won without some stroke of luck.<br />
<br />
The Kaiser's visit, the day before my arrival, and his address to the Fleet gave great satisfaction, and subsequently many important personages arrive to inspect the ships, such as Prince Henry and the Grand Dukes of Mecklenburg and Oldenburg, and numbers of decorations were distributed. Vice-Admiral Scheer was promoted to Admiral, and he and Vice-Admiral Hipper received the Pour le Merite.<br />
<br />
I also visited Rear-Admiral Behncke, who was wounded and in hospital; his wounds are slight, a few small splinters in his head, elbow and knee, and he will probably soon be well again.<br />
<br />
<center><u>COURSE OF THE ACTION.</u></center><br />
<br />
The Commander-in-Chief intended to advance with the whole Fleet to the waters of the Skagerrak, in order to make his presence felt unpleasantly by disturbing the shipping, hoping thereby to lure on the British forces and in this manner to be in a position to attack a part of the British Fleet with superior or at least with equal forces. He reckoned that any movements of the British Fleet would be reported to him in good time by the submarines which had been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and he hoped that the airships would prove a better means of reconnoitring than any possessed by the enemy.<br />
<br />
Unfavourable weather prevented him for a considerable period from undertaking any operations, and, as the submarines were to return home on 1 June and be relieved by a new group, the 31 May was the last date for carrying out the planned advance.<br />
<br />
The cruisers left the Jade at 3 a.m., the Main Fleet at 4 a.m., steering an easterly course, and then, after passing Heligoland, a N.N.W'ly course. No reports were received from submarines. These were stationed chiefly off the Orkneys and the Firth of Forth, and the large group of Flanders boats were off the Thames and at the entrance to the Channel. <br />
<br />
While proceeding northwards, a few W/T messages were received, but they were corrupt, appeared to refer only to small formations and gave no clue to the movements of the Grand Fleet. The airships were unable to start in the morning, on account of the wind, and, as it blew hard throughout the day in the Heligoland Bight, they could not start until the early hours of 1 June. In this respect things did not go well, but Admiral Scheer decided nevertheless to continue on his course to the Skagerrak. <br />
<br />
This the account given by Captain von Trotha, who affirms that nothing was known of the presence of the British Fleet in the waters of the Skagerrak, and that there seemed no probability of encountering this Fleet before 1 June.<br />
<br />
There are some points here which I am unable to understand. The submarines are said to have been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and were to return home on 1 June to be relieved probably by a weaker group. For, If the same number of boats were to to keep watch off the English coast, why should 31 May have been the last day for the German Fleet to sail. The day of departure was, therefore, too late in any case, for, if no encounter was to be expected before 1 June, the boats stationed off the coast could not possibly encounter the damaged British ships, as was intended, for probably no damaged ships would be there before 2 June.<br />
<br />
The battleship "KONIG ALBERT" had to carry out repairs to her condensers and did not proceed with the Fleet. Von Trotha told me that there was no alternative and that a ship must carry out small overhauls regularly in a dockyard according to programme. But could it not be arranged, when one is taking the initiative, to choose one's moment for an advance and to have all the ships together for this short time? And why should just that moment be chosen when one of the most powerful ships of the "Kaiser" class is in the dockyard, instead, for instance, of one of the "Nassau" class with 11-in. guns.<br />
<br />
In addition, the "BAYERN" was to have joined up a few days later. After having waited so long, why should not the plan have been postponed for 2 or 3 weeks, instead of dispensing with the only ship carrying 15-in. guns.<br />
<br />
In the same manner they dispensed with air reconnaissance, from which they had expected so much.<br />
<br />
These considerations make me doubt whether the account given me is quite correct, and whether, on the contrary, they knew of certain movements of the British Fleet and considered the moment extremely favourable for an attack. Perhaps they only knew of Beatty's battle squadron, and thinking the Main Fleet was far away, hoped to entrap this squadron. In Berlin, they have much to say, even in military circles, about the British Fleet's intention to push through into the Baltic, and of Kitchener's mission having some connection with this. I consider this senseless, for it cannot be presemed [sic] that the British Fleet would leave their shores unprotected and do the Germans the favour of operating in the Baltic, which would certainly be a most advantageous area for the German Fleet. In any case, there appear to be discrepancies which will probably be explained at some later date.<br />
<br />
Scouting groups, battle cruisers and light cruisers, together with flotillas, preceded the Main Fleet by 50 - 60 miles. At 4 p.m. the light cruisers encountered some British battle cruisers. These at once opened fire on the light cruisers, at an estimated distance of 26,247 yds.; the range could be taken accurately. Though they did not obtain a hit, the salvoes fell so well that the German cruisers thought it advisable to turn away and fall back on their battle cruisers.<br />
<br />
As the British approached, these battle cruisers turned on to a southerly course, in order to lure the enemy on to the German Main Fleet. A running action, on a southerly course, ensued. The British were to starboard and to the west of the Germans, who had therefore the following advantage: in the North Sea, in summer, the western horizon is quite light and visibility towards the west is good, while towards the east, and in a still greater degree off the Jutland Coast, it is misty and visibility is bad and no silhouettes stand out against the eastern horizon. This phenomenon also played great part in the subsequent course of the action. The sun was still high and was not troublesome, and the British ships offered admirable targets. The sea was calm, the wind N.W. 1-2, altering subsequently through W. to S.W.<br />
<br />
The following British ships were recognised:-<br />
3 "Lion" class, 1 "Tiger" and 2 "Indefatigable" class; they were soon reinforced by 5 "Queen Elizabeth" class following astern.<br />
<br />
It is asserted that, judging from shell splinters, the ship of the "Tiger" class carried 15-in. guns, and that she was therefore the mysterious vessel which replaced the "TIGER" sunk on 24.1.15; as the last-named "TIGER" carried only 13.5-in.guns, this was taken as a further proof of her loss. The silhouette of the new "TIGER", however, is said to have resembled that of the old "TIGER" exactly. As the "Queen Elizabeths" soon opened fire also with 15-in. guns, I rather doubt this assertion regarding the "TIGER", and the various ships on this early part of the engagement are altogether somewhat at variance.<br />
<br />
On the German side the ships proceeded in the following sequence:- "LÜTZOW", Flagship of Vice-Admiral Hipper, "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN".<br />
<br />
As Hipper edged towards the enemy, the distance decreased to about 7655 yds. The German fire was unquestionably superior, but the speed of the British vessels was greater. After a short time the "INDEFATIGABLE" and "QUEEN MARY" blew up, and 2 battle-cruisers and two attacking destroyers were also accounted for. The "QUEEN MARY" must have been destroyed by the explosion of a magazine; she was torn in two halves, and a water-colour painted by an officer represents her enveloped in an enormous column of black smoke; she disappeared in a few seconds. Only one cadet was subsequently picked.<br />
<br />
The second battle cruiser disappeared under similar circumstances. The "VON DER TANN" claims to have accounted for one of these battle-cruisers by a broadside. But the "MOLTKE" fired 4 torpedoes and also claims this achievement.<br />
<br />
The Germans suffered very little during this phase of the action, the "MOLTKE" alone receiving hits on the starboard side. The fire of the British battle-cruisers is said not to have been nearly as good as that of the "QUEEN ELIZABETH" class later on.<br />
<br />
When they had approached the German Main Fleet, the British turned on to a contrary course and the German cruisers did the same. The German Main Fleet proceeded in divisions in starboard quarter-line, the 3rd Battle Squadron: 4 "König" class and 3 "Kaiser" class, Fleet Flagship, 1st Battle Squadron: 4 "Ostfriesland" class and 4 "Westfalen" class, and the 2nd Battle Squadron: 5 "Deutschland" class and the "Hessen". They endeavoured to effect a junction with the cruisers, but were unable to take part very effectually.<br />
<br />
The course of the action was now in a northerly direction, over the area which had just been traversed, and the British ships now drew ahead considerably and turned more and more towards the East; the Germans followed this movement, and in consequence the conditions of visibility became less and less favourable for them.<br />
<br />
The "Queen Elizabeths" now made their presence more greatly felt; one of them had dropped out, but I was unable to ascertain when this occurred.<br />
<br />
The course of the German Math Fleet at first led past the 2 disabled British destroyers, which were lying stopped. The crews had already taken to the boats and were picked up later on by German destroyers. As the Main Fleet was doubtful about the advisability of passing the destroyers while they were still afloat, they were sunk by a few broadsides. One of the officers who was picked up was in pyjamas and is said to have stayed in his cabin during the action. He declared "We did not expect so much resistance," while another said - "The battle is rather disappointing." It has been ascertained that these destroyers were greatly under-manned; their crews seemed very exhausted, which points to their having been in the water for a long time.<br />
<br />
While on this easterly course, the light cruisers of the fast 2nd Scouting Group: "FRANKFURT", "PILLAU", "ELBING" and "WIESBADEN", were heavily fired on from the N.E. and E. without their being able to see more than the gun flashes. In addition, they were under continual fire from the N., and while turning away to S.E. and S., they ascertained that they were opposed by an interminable line of British ships, which appeared at first to be on a N.W.'ly course, and had then evidently turned together on to a S.'ly course.<br />
<br />
It may be noted here that the battleships, and, generally speaking, the battle-cruisers also, never sighted the British Main Fleet, and saw nothing but the flashes of the guns and the effects of the fire. These British ships, about 25 in number, were only sighted by a few light cruisers and by the flotillas, and were counted by them as accurately as possible.<br />
<br />
Surrounded thus from the N. and the E. and under fire, the "WIESBADEN" was disabled, apparently by a hit in the engine-room. The Admiral noticed, it is true, that his leading ships must have encountered new and powerful forces and that they were turning away; but he thought it his duty to go to the assistance of the "WIESBADEN" and therefore continued on an easterly course.<br />
<br />
The van of the Main Fleet, led by the "KÖNIG" (Rear-Admiral Behncke) now came under heavy fire from right ahead; the "KÖNIG" turned away under this fire towards the S.E., whereupon the Commander-in-Chief ordered the whole line to "turn together" to starboard and gave up the idea of helping the "WIESBADEN". About this time Vice-Admiral Hipper transferred his flag from the "LÜTZOW" to the "MOLTKE" with the help of a destroyer, his W/T station being damaged.<br />
<br />
Hardly had the Main Fleet drawn away on a westerly course, before it was ascertained that the pressure was relaxing and the fire decreasing, and that the British were no longer pursuing so hotly. Scheer therefore ordered the ships to "turn together" back on to their former course, and made the signal 'R' = 'Engage the enemy'. This second advance may be termed the zenith of the action. Admiral Scheer gave his views on it approximately as follows:- "Those who make a study of this engagement will be very puzzled as to my object in advancing thus against the wall of British ships. The fact is that I had no particular object. I made the first advance because I had a feeling that I ought to endeavour to assist the "WIESBADEN" and because the situation ahead was quite obscure to me, for I saw nothing of the "LÜTZOW" and received no W/T reports. I soon saw, however, that the leading ships were coming under an overwhelming fire, and that I could not risk the Fleet on the "WIESBADEN'S" account. When I noticed that the British pressure had quite ceased and that the Fleet remained intact in my hands, I turned back, under the impression that the action could not end in this way and that I ought to seek contact with the enemy again."<br />
<br />
The situation during the first and second advances may serve as an example of what should not take place according to all the laws of tactics, for it could not have been worse; von Trotha said jokingly that, if an Admiral brought about such a situation at a war game or in manoeuvres, he would never be entrusted without another command. In the North, the "Queen Elizabeths", then the battle-cruisers, and from N.E. through E. to S.E., an endless line of battleships formed an arc round the German van and kept it under fire. Evidently it had fallen into the most perfect trap. In addition to this unfavourable tactical position, there was a further difficulty, namely that the German ships could be clearly distinguished while they themselves only saw the gun flashes, 4 or 5 to each salvo, but could find no target.<br />
<br />
The Gunnery Officer of the "MARKGRAF" told me that he could not fire at all during half-an-hour, and that they were at the mercy of the British broadsides. Critical though the position was, in theory, they think that experience justifies the conclusion that this 'crossing the T' is in reality not so disastrous at longer ranges; for, in spite of the enormous superiority of their fire, the British made comparatively few hits, the simple reason being that, when fire is thus concentrated on a few leading ships, there can be no question of improving the shooting by spotting.<br />
<br />
Given good tactical training and squadrons which work well together, it is always easy to retire rapidly from an unfavourable position and even possibly to reach an advantageous one.<br />
<br />
The small amount of damage sustained by the Main Fleet may be owing partly to the fact that the leading battle-cruisers drew the enemy's fire, thus relieving the battleships. Only the three leading ships, "KÖNIG", "GROSSER KURFÜRST" and "MARKGRAF" received several hits; while among all the other ships, the "KAISER", "HELGOLAND" and the "SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN" received one hit each, and the rest were not hit at all.<br />
<br />
Simultaneously with the battle-cruisers, which were ahead and pressing forward in quarter-line formation, the 6th and 9th Flotillas, left by the "REGENSBURG", also proceeded to a torpedo attack. Regarding this cruiser advance, the Commanding Officer of the "SEYDLITZ" told me that he was in such a position that he was able to avoid the British salvoes, for he altered course towards the point where each salvo fell and thus evaded the spotting correction.<br />
<br />
This torpedo attack was carried out with great determination and seems to have been completely successful, although nobody is able to state how many hits were obtained. The British ships overlapped somewhat and their line was almost unbroken, and, as about 100 torpedoes were fired, it is estimates that there must have been a considerable number of hits, some people affirm that there were 20, but I do not place much confidence in these figures and it is useless to trouble about them as nobody is certain.<br />
<br />
The boats were fired on by guns of all calibres, even the heaviest, but with little effect, only one boat being destroyed; two other boats had been sunk in an earlier attack during the cruiser action.<br />
<br />
The battle-cruisers were also attacked by British torpedoes, the "SEYDLITZ" being hit once. The "MOLTKE" was lucky, for, when close to the ship, one torpedo apparently had a gyro failure and ran parallel with her. The "LÜTZOW" was probably hit also.<br />
<br />
After the attack, the destroyers laid fog and a heavy smoke screen, which interposed between the Fleet; this benefitted not only the heavily-damaged "LÜTZOW" and "DERFFLINGER", whose nets had been shot away and were hanging down, but also the whole Fleet. It may also have made an impression on the British.<br />
<br />
The German Main Fleet and cruisers turned on a westerly course, fire having again entirely ceased; and the ships of the Main Fleet then turned gradually in succession and in inverse sequence from W. to S.W., subsequently steering towards Horns Reef.<br />
<br />
It is not known what the British did; all that is certain, is that they did not follow in pursuit and that nothing further was seen of their Main Fleet. It remained light until 11 p.m. (summer time), and it would not have been impossible, considering their superior speed, for them to have come within firing range. The Germans expected it too, and now have to content themselves with surmises about the British Commander-in-Chief's reasons for not doing so. It is probably that the unfavourable issue of the fleet part of the battle and the demoralising losses in ships took away any desire on Jellicoe's part for further fighting. His Fleet may have lost heavily and been severely shaken by the torpedo attack; and, as the Germans still had some intact flotillas at their disposal, he may have feared further strong torpedo attacks in the critical hours of twilight, for in the German Navy they say that Jellicoe fears their destroyers in particular.<br />
<br />
Nevertheless, the Germans were not under the impression of having shaken the British Fleet to the extent of obliging them to give up the struggle, and when the evening passed without further incident, they reckoned with certainty on encountering Jellicoe off Horns Reef at daybreak. They were the more astonished at his non-appearance when their air reconnaissance reported that on the morning of 1 June a squadron of 12 battle-ships was proceeding North from the southern part of North Sea and that it suddenly turned on to an opposite course and proceeded South.<br />
<br />
As it could not possibly have been the intention of the British Commander-in-Chief to let the German Fleet escape after having encountered it at last far from its base, and as he still had an intact battle-squadron at his disposal, one is compelled to take the view that he no longer felt strong enough for a second encounter; the achievement of the German Fleet must therefore be very highly thought of.<br />
<br />
During the night cruising following the action, numerous small episodes and minor engagements took place, of which no clear idea can be formed. <br />
<br />
In view of a possible fresh attack or of a possible pursuit on the part of the enemy, it was thought undesirable to leave the 2nd Battle Squadron either in the van or in the rear, it therefore took station to starboard and at first proceeded on an opening course from the other squadrons, and continued fairly independently during the night.<br />
<br />
The 1st Battle Squadron therefore led, with the "WESTFALEN" as guide, and it was followed by the 3rd Battle Squadron.<br />
<br />
After the action had been broken off, the 4 remaining battle cruisers were ahead to port, where they were suddenly again brought under heavy fire from the port side and from ahead, apparently by 3 or 4 battle cruisers. It is presumed that these were the remaining 3 or 4 older cruisers of the "Invincible" class, which Jellicoe probably always stationed ahead of the Main Fleet, for it would hardly have been possible for the "Lions", which were following in the rear in the British line, to have taken station ahead so quickly. The German battle cruisers, all severely damaged, did not feel able to withstand this fire and turned away to starboard, passing ahead of the Main Fleet and between it and the 2nd Battle Squadron, which proceeded quietly on their course and before which the mysterious ships retired, not to be sighted again.<br />
<br />
The battle-cruisers then gradually fell astern, and as they were making much water, and also owing to their differing speeds, they lost contact with the Main Fleet and with each other.<br />
<br />
The "LÜTZOW" had dropped out during the engagement and proceeded independently, accompanied by 4 destroyers. At first she was able to steam 14 knots, but her speed decreased rapidly and dropped finally to 4 knots. Her bows sank slowly, and when the whole forecastle was under water the Commanding Officer decided to leave the ship. The badly wounded were transferred carefully to the boats and the disembarkation was conducted in good order. A torpedo was then fired at the ship and this coup de grace sank her in deep water at about 1 o'clock, I believe.<br />
<br />
The "SEYDLITZ" was hardly in a better condition than the "LÜTZOW"; she also sank gradually by the bows till the water was almost level with the deck, and she had a heavy list to port, but she continued on her course. In the darkest hours of the night she suddenly sighted 3 large ships to port, quite close to. She turned away, made a British recognition signal and was not pursued. As bad luck would have it, the steaming light had short-circuited, could not be switched off and showed intermittently.<br />
<br />
The "DERFFLINGER", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN" followed the Main Fleet more or less and met with no particular experiences.<br />
<br />
The Main Fleet had to repulse a series of destroyer attacks and was also engaged by cruisers. The movements of these British cruisers, which came up singly, are incomprehensible and give the impression of having lost their heads. They appear to have received the order, judging by an intercepted W/T message, to proceed on a northerly and north-westerly course, and thereby they ran into the extended German line which they probably imagined they had passed to the South.<br />
<br />
One large cruiser (?"WARRIOR") proceeded unsuspectingly within 875 yds. of the line of battleships and came under concentrated fire from several ships before she could reply, so that she blew up enveloped in flames and disappeared in 47 seconds. The "BIRMINGHAM" seems to have been accounted for in a similar manner. The destroyers all approached in a really insane manner; frequently not from ahead but from a direction astern, scattered, singly or in pairs, or at most 3 together, never in large numbers. Most of them were disabled forthwith by a few salvoes and set on fire. The "WESTFALEN" distinguished herself particularly at this time.<br />
<br />
These burning destroyers strewn along the course, lit it up as if for a festival. Evidently the fires were largely due to the light American and Mexican oils; at any rate German firing trials on oil bunkers never caused any such conflagrations.<br />
<br />
The attacking boats directed shrapnel fire on the searchlights with fairly good results, the searchlights of two battleships and one light cruiser being hit.<br />
<br />
One large destroyer, which only recognised the danger at the last moment and endeavoured to avoid it by altering course was rammed by the "NASSAU", which put her helm over for this purpose. The boat exploded internally and sank.<br />
<br />
The only ships hit were the "POMMERN" in the 2ns Battle Squadron, and the "ROSTOCK". The "POMMERN" blew up at once and nobody was saved. The "ROSTOCK" was just passing between ships of the Main Fleet when she was hit; the loss of life on board was small.<br />
<br />
The Germans believe they destroyed 11 British destroyers in all. The manner in which these destroyers were handled has not left a good impression on the whole, and one has certainly lost respect for this weapon. The view is also taken that the boats are too large and offer too wide a target.<br />
<br />
The light cruiser "ELBING", like the "ROSTOCK", apparently wanted to break through the line from port to starboard under pressure from the British cruisers; she was, however, rammed by the "POSEN" and had to be abandoned in a sinking condition. The Germans also fired a torpedo into her.<br />
<br />
The "FRAUENLOB" and 2 destroyers were lost during the night; no details of their loss are known.<br />
<br />
Not far from Heligoland, the "OSTFRIESLAND", 7th of the line, struck a mine. This brings the account of the chief events of this exciting cruiser to an end.<br />
<br />
The German flotillas were detached from the Fleet to clear the area off the Jutland Coast, which was divided up into sectors. The flotillas stationed furthest to the North proceeded to the Skagerrak and through these straits into the Baltic and to Kiel.<br />
<br />
None of the flotillas sighted the British Main Fleet again, which proves that it must have turned away to the N. or N.W. immediately after the action. According to confidential reports the Fleet entered British ports as early as 1 June.<br />
<br />
Two British battleships, in a severely damaged condition and accompanied by destroyers, were sighted proceeding back to England. One was attacked by a submarine, but without success.<br />
<br />
On the morning of 1 June, in fairly misty weather, a Zeppelin sighted groups of British ships leaving the Channel on a N.E.'ly course. The reports were rather vague, as sometimes 6 and sometimes 12 ships were mentioned; but it seems most likely that 12 battleships and 3 cruisers were in question, and that they soon retired. The airship, which flew low at one time to get a clearer view, was also fired on.<br />
<br />
Some of the ships are said to have had tripod masts.<br />
<br />
The German Fleet, with the exception of "SEYDLITZ", reached the Jade in the afternoon. The "SEYDLITZ" could not cross the bar on account of being so much down by the bows, and it was not till the next day at high water that she was towed in, stern first.<br />
<br />
<center><u>MISCELLANEOUS.<br>TACTICS.</u></center><br />
<br />
The Germans ascribe their success to various causes, and in the first place to their own superiority as regards tactics. This is a point which every officer discusses, and it is constantly repeated that it all happened just as in tactical manoeuvres and in "battle exercises", and that things could not have gone better.<br />
<br />
Movements of squadrons, divisions and individual ships, "turns together" and alterations of course and speed, all went like clockwork and demonstrated the very great mobility of all formations.<br />
<br />
The W/T signalling system of the Main Fleet never failed, and its failure would have been immaterial, as the primary and secondary flag action signals, showing from several positions in the ship, were made simultaneously.<br />
<br />
All this was due to the peace training and the practical experience of the Flag Officers and Captains. Though in peace time the Commander-in-Chief had never commanded a Fleet, nor the Admirals a squadron, still the training carried out on the same lines for a number of years resulted in everything proceeding with the expected precision.<br />
<br />
The British, on the contrary, are said to have displayed a certain clumsiness as regards tactics and to have preferred turning together when "turning on to an opposite course" (Wendungen im Gegenmarsch), though this conclusion does not seem altogether justified from the description of the action.<br />
<br />
The ships kept station 547 yds. apart, and Vice-Admiral Schmidt told me that, in his opinion, this distance is too small for large ships and that he prefers 656 yds., as the shorter distances result in the ships getting bunched and overlapping during alterations of course. In order to relieve this during the first turn to starboard, the Fleet Flagship herself turned to port and then closed gradually into line. At night the distance was 656 yds.<br />
<br />
No interruption of W/T communication was occasioned by the enemy.<br />
<br />
<center><u>GUNNERY</u></center><br />
<br />
It is admitted that the British are superior as regards their gunnery technique. Their salvoes fall most astoundingly close together and aroused admiration on all sides. Some people affirm that they fell too close together, and that it was consequently difficult to cover a sufficiently large danger space.<br />
<br />
This is particularly the case with the heaviest calibres: 13.5-in. and 15-in. and the battle-cruisers' fire was noticeably inferior to that of the "Queen Elizabeth" class, for example.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> Literal translation; the meaning is not clear. - Tr.] The spread of the salvoes frequently only covered a few square yards. In the "KÖNIG" 3 rounds, out of a salvo of 4 rounds, hit between the capstan and the bridge.<br />
<br />
This is attributed to careful calibration, which the British have studied for a long time and which, as is well known, was abandoned by the German Navy after a few trials. The gunnery officers declare unanimously that it must unquestionably be re-introduced.<br />
<br />
The British range-finders are superior to the German, and the construction of their turrets enables them to shoot at ranges impossible for German guns. The question of range appears to be immaterial to the British, who fire at any range so long as visibility permits.<br />
<br />
The Germans are fully convinced of the great superiority of 15-in. guns over all others, and deplore the fact that, owing to the predominant conservative tendencies in the German Navy, this calibre was not introduced until so lately. Vice-Admiral Gerdes, the Head of the Armament Department, is responsible for this, for he always opposed it on the ground that the poor visibility in German waters and the consequent short ranges rendered an increase of calibre useless; he considered the German 12-in. gun to be an altogether superior weapon, capable of competing with every other.<br />
<br />
In one respect the British seem behindhand as compared with the Germans: namely that they cannot alter range quickly enough and they are too dependent on the range clock. The British rely on steady fire at long range, and they adapt their tactics to this and avoid alterations of course and range most assiduously.<br />
<br />
The Germans, on the contrary, in their firing practices always work with big and rapid alterations of range and exercise firing while turning, so that the gunnery officers consider they have an advantage in this respect.<br />
<br />
The Turn on to an opposite course was certainly not advantageous for the German Fleet, but in this particular instance it made little difference, as the German ships were already unable to find a target; besides which, it must have disconcerted the British and it prevented them from obtaining good results with their fire. The salvoes fell very close together round the ships, but few hits were obtained. The rate of fire in the British ships is said to have been fair, but not excessive. Some people affirm that it was very modest.<br />
<br />
The British shell had great penetrating power, and from all reasonable distances the main armour was generally pierced clean through. The shell splinters picked up prove conclusively that at least 2 kinds of shell were used, differing considerably in material and quality. One kind of shell had a very thick wall and an extremely small explosive charge, it might almost be called a solid shot. It seems to have broken up frequently without exploding and the fuse did not function. Its explosive power, if it possessed any at all, was quite inconsiderable, and it is presumed that the explosives used was not high explosive.<br />
<br />
It appears from the splinters of these 15-in. shell that the wall was 6.3 - 6.7 ins. (16 - 17 cm.), so that the hollow space cannot measure more than 2.4 ins. - 1.8 ins. (4 - 6 cm.). It is true that the large pieces into which these shell broke pierced everything in their course and often went right through the whole ship, unless they struck an armoured part. Several intact heads were found, with and without caps, and also entire bases.<br />
<br />
The second kind of shell had considerably thinner walls, only about half as thick, but it also often broke up into quite large pieces and displayed no great explosive power, and little or no incendiary power.<br />
<br />
It appears therefore that the British aimed only at attaining penetrating power, and the Germans are of opinion that they do not possess (rohrsicheren)* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D.Note.- This appears to be a special fuse which is very delicate, but safe until it has left the gun.] fuses for high explosive shell; this was their opinion before the war also.<br />
<br />
They believe that the high explosive power of the German ammunition gives them a great advantage which may partly counterbalance the smaller calibre of their guns and perhaps also their inferior gunnery. In any case, the effect of the German shell at the point of impact was very considerable.<br />
<br />
The fact that the ships blew up must be attributed to explosions in their magazines. (In this connection one may recall a turret of the "SEYDLITZ" being hit in the action of 24 January, 1915; see my report No.47 ex 15). The turret armour must have been pierced and the shells in the turret must have been exploded. The British have no metal cartridge-cases and also no cartridge-holders such as the Germans have, but they keep their cartridges in locked boxes which are perhaps not flash-proof enough. It seems therefore, from the incident experienced by the "SEYDLITZ", that this must constitute a particular danger to British ships. In this last action also turrets in German ships were frequently hit; further details are given in the account of damage sustained.<br />
<br />
After having compared the hits received in the German ships with the observations of results on enemy targets, it may be safely affirmed that the explosive power of the German shells exceeds that of the British; this was already known after the action of 24 January 1915. The Germans are therefore very much annoyed that they had no 15-in. guns to fire, as they are persuaded that ships so knocked about (eingedeckte) as, for example, the "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" would have been completely destroyed by German shell.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. Note.- The writer appears to mean that if German 15-in. shell had been used against "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" these ships would have been sunk.]<br />
<br />
It may be noted here that the "BAYERN", the first of their ships to carry 15-in. guns, will not join the Fleet for another few days, and the "BADEN" not until the autumn.<br />
<br />
Medium armament played no part, only a few hits were obtained and they did little damage.<br />
<br />
The British fired part-salvoes, like the Germans; full salvoes may have been fired now and again.<br />
<br />
The method of repulsing destroyer attacks, which has previously been reported, namely the 'turning away' and firing on one, or at most two boats, proved to be sound, and the repulsing of attacks both by day and night offered no difficulties.<br />
<br />
As regards gunnery, it may also be mentioned that the fire-control apparatus worked without a hitch and withstood the heaviest shocks. The elevation pointers worked admirably. A few ships were not yet fitted with them.<br />
<br />
<center><u>Torpedo.</u></center><br />
<br />
As regards torpedo work the Germans consider themselves very much superior. There were prolonged discussions about depriving Flotilla Leaders of their independence and putting them under the orders of a Leader Ship, but they are now convinced that this is necessary to ensure the flotillas attacking at the right moment and all together.<br />
<br />
The flotillas were led by the 2 leader Ships "ROSTOCK" and "REGENSBURG", the first having 2 flotillas and the second 3 flotillas allocated to them. The remaining 2 flotillas accompanied the Main Fleet or the battle-cruisers. The leaders carried out their duties with great daring and circumspection. The attacks of the British were weak and scattered, and could therefore have little or only occasional success.<br />
<br />
The German 2nd Flotilla, composed of the larger 1500 ton boats were held back instead of being sent to attack. Although these boats are spoken of very highly and are indispensable for certain enterprises, the view is now taken that they are too large and too valuable to be used for attacking during an action. This Flotilla proceeded to Zeebrugge immediately after the action and arrived there safely. It is to be employed in preventing the British from blockading the harbour with nets, and thus make it impossible for the German submarines to proceed out.<br />
<br />
As far as I have heard, the "MOLTKE" alone of the larger ships fired 4 torpedoes.<br />
<br />
Submarines were not in evidence. No German submarines were present; on the other hand a German destroyer claims to have rammed a British submarine. This claim appears to be erroneous, at least it was declared to be nonsense by the Chief of Staff. The submarines failed as regards scouting and also doing the pursuit.<br />
<br />
Some people state that a British aeroplane was sighted to the northward, and that it had apparently risen from a cruiser. It played no part in the action.<br />
<br />
The use of "Höschter"* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. note:- Probably the name of the inventor.] fog seems to have been of good service, it and the smoke made by the destroyers having completely masked the Main Fleet and its movements at critical moments.<br />
<br />
<center><u>SPEED</u></center><br />
<br />
The advantage of speed lay entirely with the British, not only as regards the Main Fleet on account of the "Deutschland" class, but also as regards the battle-cruisers. The latter are said to have proved considerably faster than the German battle cruisers, an unpleasant experience which had already been made on 25 January 1915. This alone proves that the British are talking nonsense when they assert that the German Fleet sought safety in flight; on the contrary, it was far from its bases and entirely in the power of the British, who either did not wish to take advantage of their superior speed, or were unable to do so on account of the damage sustained. The visibility was no worse than it had been during the day and Jellicoe may have even welcomed the "Höschter" fog which would enable him to plead bad visibility as a reason for abandoning the pursuit. On the German side in the light of experience the factor of speed in the battleships is considered very important. But the moderate depths of the German harbours limits the draught of the ships, and make it particularly difficult for German builders to do much in this respect. In spite of greater length and higher horse power the most modern cruisers "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ" and "LÜTZOW" attained only a quite inconsiderable increase of speed in comparison with the older "GOEBEN" class, and proved a disappointment in this particular.<br />
<br />
The question whether the older battleships should take part in an important engagement was not easy to decide. The 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons composed of the "WITTLESBACH" and "BARBAROSSA" class, re-commissioned at the beginning of the war, were intended to be used in such actions, but have long since been paid off; some have been disarmed and employed as guardships and instructional ships, etc. It was considered however, that the 2nd Battle Squadron, composed of the most modern of the older ships, would be of some service in the action; but this squadron was in a privileged position, inasmuch as it was merely attached to the 1st and 3rd Battle Squadrons and its Admiral was allowed to operate independently and select the position he thought best. On this occasion it kept station quite well and did not prove a hindrance, but, on the other hand, it did not come under any heavy fire. This must be considered very fortunate, for, in view of the damage sustained by other ships and in view of the fact that the British shell pierced all armour above or below water even at the longest range, it is certain that every ship of this class would have been sunk by a few hits, as their internal sub-division is not proof against large inrushes of water.<br />
<br />
The loss of the "Pommern", which gives the British an opportunity for a hollow triumph, also teaches a clear lesson. The Chief of Staff told me that they will probably consider carefully before again exposing this Squadron to danger; therefore this action will have further confirmed the complete worthlessness of all Dreadnought types [sic] and will condemn them as old iron.<br />
<br />
<center><u>TORPEDO NETS.</u></center><br />
<br />
The torpedo nets of the battle cruisers are all badly damaged and the gear so knocked about by gunfire that they were almost useless. This was particularly the case with the "Derfflinger", where the after port nets were hanging in the water, and would have fallen across the propeller had they not chanced to remain held up by a temporary lashing. The ship was obliged to stop during the action to secure the nets, and they might easily have occasioned the loss of the ship.<br />
<br />
For this reason all the nets, together with the booms, were unshipped immediately after the ships' return, to everybody's satisfaction. They will not be carried any more, except perhaps for operations in the Baltic, where the ships may be obliged to anchor at sea.<br />
<br />
<center><u>LEAK-STOPPING SERVICE.</u></center><br />
<br />
The leak-stopping service which had been systematically developed, worked admirably and the Germans are convinced that they owe much to it. They believed that the "Seydlitz" could not have been brought in if the strengthening of the bulkheads, etc., had not been so thoroughly exercised and if the personnel had not been so well trained.<br />
<br />
It is also said, that in the "Lutzow", which had only been in commission for 2 months, was naturally not up to the mark in this respect, and that it is not impossible that small shortcomings, for which of course nobody can be blamed, were responsible for the ship sinking. The "Lutzow" was an unfortunate ship altogether. First her turbines collapsed, thus delaying her commissioning for 6 months, then she immediately struck a mine, and she was hardly out of dockyard hands before she was sunk.<br />
<br />
<center><u>DANGER FROM GAS FUMES.</u></center><br />
<br />
Only 2 days before sailing, a large number of the ships, and fortunately exactly those that came most under fire, namely battle-cruisers and the 3rd Squadron, were supplied with gas masks fitted with alkali cartridges for the whole crew and a plentiful reserve (in the "Seydlitz" 1500 masks for about 1200 men). The masks are similar to those used in the army for poisonous gases. Each man carries a mask slung round him, if he is not actually wearing it.<br />
<br />
I was told emphatically by all the officers, that, in their experience, these masks are absolutely necessary and not only saved many lives but enabled the men to carry on in parts of the ship which they would otherwise have been compelled to leave.<br />
<br />
The gases from shells, mines and torpedoes penetrate in an incredible manner through ventilators, telephone leads, etc. to compartments far away from the point of impact. In many cases the masks enabled large numbers of the guns' crews to escape from turrets that were hit, and to help out others who were badly wounded. In one case the men in one of the main engine rooms were able to remain at their posts after gas had penetrated, until the engine-room was ventilated.<br />
<br />
The Fleet breathing apparatus (Flottenathmer) is preferable to masks in some cases, but it cannot be supplied to everyone and it hampers one's movements, which the masks do not.<br />
<br />
On account of the great danger from gases, it is also advisable to fit hinged flaps in all shafts, and to have wooden bungs to fit the voice-pipes, keeping a hammer at hand to hammer them into the mouth-pieces.<br />
<br />
They tell me that it proved very useful to keep all the personnel employed below, such as in central control rooms, engine-rooms, torpedo flats, etc. continually informed of what was going on. The men get nervous, particularly at first, with the tremendous shocks caused by shell falling close to the ship, though the shocks are felt less on deck, and such information gives them confidence and they like knowing what is going on above them.<br />
<br />
<center><u>DAMAGE</u></center><br />
<br />
The distribution of ships needing repair in the various dockyards is as follows:-<br />
<br />
The "König" proceeded at once to Kiel and is under repair at Howaldt's yard. I did not see her.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" and "Moltke" in Blohm and Voss yard, Hamburg, the first in the Imperial Dock.<br />
<br />
The "Kurfürst["] in Vulkan Yard, Hamburg.<br />
<br />
The "Derfflinger" was first docked in Wilhelmshaven and the leaks temporarily stopped, she then proceeded to the Imperial dockyard, Kiel. The "Seydlitz" will now be docked in the large dock at Wilhelmshaven; during my stay the "Seydlitz" was still in the lock.<br />
<br />
The "Von der Tann", "Ostfriesland" and "Helgoland" will be repaired in dry docks in Wilhelmshaven. No other large ships require to be docked.<br />
<br />
"<u>Seydlitz</u>" The number of hits was still uncertain, as the whole forepart of the ship up to the upper deck was still under water, and it is not known what she looks like below water. The ship was brought into the lock with difficulty, and as she is 43 ft. down by the bows, she cannot be taken into harbour. They will not venture to dock the ship inside the lock, and intend first to raise her bows slightly.<br />
<br />
The roof and guns of the fore turret and anchors, cables etc., have already been unshipped, and they now intend to bring caissons alongside and pump out the fore part sufficiently to enable her to enter the harbour.<br />
<br />
The great inrush of water, that flooded more or less the whole fore part of the ship as far as the first boiler-room bulkhead, was caused by a number of hits. Firstly, one of the belt armour plates forward on the port side is missing, having fallen off. Secondly, there are believed to be at least 2 or 3 more hits below water, forward on the port side; for the list and the settling down had already become ominous when the ship was hit at the edge of the upper deck, port side, abreast the bridge; this was followed by an inrush of water in the battery deck, which did a great amount of damage.<br />
<br />
In addition, during the day action, she was hit by a torpedo on the starboard side under the forward 5.9 in. gun, which caused her to settle down still more by the bows. This gun was so much damaged by the shock from underneath as to be disabled.<br />
<br />
Further, there are 4 severe hits in the ship's side (mess deck, port side, forward of the turret), which also demolished the port capstan.<br />
<br />
These shell, or shell splinters, naturally penetrated to the armoured deck, so that the entire fore part of the ship above and below the armoured deck is holed in many places, allowing free passage for the water. The fore part of the ship was struck therefore by at least 8 or 9 shells and one torpedo.<br />
<br />
Apparently the only compartments which are not flooded, are the bow torpedo flats and the central control room. The former is being pumped out continuously, as a great deal of water is flowing in from above. The torpedo control room had to be abandoned, as the forward partition was not watertight. The central control room abaft this was not abandoned, but of its 2 entrances from the starboard and port passages, only the port one can be used, as the starboard one is flooded.<br />
<br />
The gunnery control room is far further aft and was not affected.<br />
<br />
The ship has a list of 7° to port, and as she has now been slightly raised, about 1¾ ft. of her bows are above water; at one time it was up to the level of the deck.<br />
<br />
While under way the forward boiler room bulkhead had to withstand most of the pressure; supports have been built up everywhere, but it leaks in places.<br />
<br />
The other hits of consequences were those in the turrets. The fore starboard turret No.2 received a direct hit on the fore face of the revolving structure. One curved plate was forced out, but fortunately the main effect of the explosion was outward. The right hand gun was disabled by slight damage to the mounting; with this exception the turret remained in action and kept up fire.<br />
<br />
The right hand gun of turret No.3 received a direct hit, which cut out a wide groove along the tube of the gun. The left hand gun continued to fire.<br />
<br />
The barbette of turret No.4 was hit on a level with the rammer, and the armour was pierced clean through. This hit is of special interest, as the "Seydlitz" received a similar hit and at the same level in turret No.5 on 24th January 1915, which caused a fire, disabled both the after turrets and killed all the guns' crews. This last time, however, the damage was slight. There was no ready ammunition in the turret, and only one cartridge was exploded, in contrast to the (6200 Kg.) 13,670 lbs. of powder on Jan.1915. The turret officer and a large number of the gun's crews were saved by their gas masks. The destruction caused by splinters was, however, considerable and the turret was abandoned, as it was not possible to continue fire from it. This was a 13.5 in. shell, at 15,310 yds. range, strength of armour pierced 8.6 inches.<br />
<br />
After the turret had been abandoned, it was hit a second time in the after side of the revolving part, which was pierced; this of course increased the havoc in the interior.<br />
<br />
Turret No.5 was hit in the roof. The shell richochetted, and the roof is slightly dented. Nobody was hurt and the turret continued to fire.<br />
<br />
In the "Seydlitz" therefore, all the turrets were hit, with the exception of the foremost turret, and one was hit twice.<br />
<br />
A further hit pierced the 5.9 in. (150mm.) casemate armour of the aftermost 5.9 in. starboard gun, No.2. The deck was pierced from beneath, and splinters also pierced the splinter bulkhead. The gun was disabled and all the crew were killed, with the exception of the ship's chaplain who happened to be in the casemate and must be watched over by a special guardian angel.<br />
<br />
A similar hit, with a 15 in. shell, struck the casemate armour of the 6-in. gun No.7 and exploded in the casemate. Men were killed, the gun was disabled and the splinter bulkhead pierced by large splinters. This time again, surprise was aroused by the comparatively small damage caused by a large calibre shell.<br />
<br />
"<u>Derfflinger</u>". One shell hit the armour belt forward of the hawse pipe, probably at the junction of 2 plates, as 2 plates broke away. The plates underneath were consequently strained apart and a great deal of water flowed in.<br />
<br />
The armour belt on the port side also received 2 further hits in the centre and was pierced clean through. The splinters penetrated more than half way through the ship, and in one case a piece of plating was driven half way though the ship. These hits, combined perhaps with others, destroyed the nets and their supports in several places.<br />
<br />
The two after turrets received direct hits, in one case on the roof, in the other case in the barbette above the deck; the armour was pierced and the upper portions of the turrets burnt out and severely damaged, but the flames did not penetrate to the magazines. The crew in the upper part of the turret were killed, and both turrets were disabled. This occurred at an early stage of the action.<br />
<br />
The guns at high elevation cannot yet be dismounted, as everything is wedged in, but they do not appear to be damaged.<br />
<br />
The muzzles were carried away off the 4 foremost 6 in. (15 cm.) guns on the port side; two of them probably having been accounted for by one and the same shell which hit the armour. One gun, the muzzle of which was perhaps damaged by a splinter, afterwards burst, the tube splitting open in the shape of a tulip.<br />
<br />
The "Derfflinger" received a few other hits of no particular interest. She appears the next most severely damaged ship after the "Lützow".<br />
<br />
The "<u>Moltke</u>" only received 5 hits, all of them during that part of the action which took place on a southerly course; while the cruisers mentioned above received most of the hits on the port side, consequently during the later stages of the action.<br />
<br />
One shell pieced the bulwarks in the after part of the ship above the armour, passed through the ship and struck the armour on the port side from inside, about 3.3 ft. below the water-line. One plate was forced out and is missing. The inrush of water was considerable. The after compartments, above the armoured deck which remained intact, were all more or less flooded.<br />
<br />
The second hit was further forward, below the armour belt. The shell exploded in a bunker, but the armoured deck held and no water penetrated it from below. The neighbouring bunkers made little water and could be pumped out.<br />
<br />
Another shell struck the 5.9 in. armour in the upper bunker, above the water-line. The armoured deck again held, but the inner wall of the bunker parted, and the battery deck was pierced from below, a 6 in. gun being damaged and disabled.<br />
<br />
In the fore part of the ship a shell struck the armour belt below the water-line. The plate remained intact and was driven in about 8 inches. The compartment was flooded, but the torpedo bulkhead remained watertight. A neighbouring compartment leaked slightly, the rivets having parted.<br />
<br />
The fifth case of damage, namely a plate beneath the armour belt being driven and pressed in, was probably not due to a direct hit, but to splinters of a shell which fell short.<br />
<br />
"<u>Von der Tann</u>". A shell hit and pierced the lower part of the 3.9 in. armour belt in the after part of the ship to starboard. The compartments above the armoured deck, and some of those on the deck above, were flooded. The chief effect of the shell was outside the ship, but it bent the plates below the otherwise undamaged armoured deck, so that a considerable amount of water flowed into the compartments below the armoured deck. The after torpedo flat was flooded half way up, and the men in the starboard steering engine room were shut in for a long time owing to the exits being blocked.<br />
<br />
The fore turret was hit on the starboard side on the upper edge of the barbette and a semi-circular armour plate was forced out. The machinery of the turret was so badly knocked about that the turret was disabled.<br />
<br />
The hydraulic piping was damaged, so that all the heavy armament was put out of action temporarily. Strangely enough, though men were wounded none were killed.<br />
<br />
The aftermost turret was hit in the barbette. The armour was pierced, but the effect of the shell was exterior, the turret sustained little internal damage, so that the handgear of the turret remained in action. The turret was wedged in one place and could not revolve; they succeeded, however, in cutting off with oxy-acetylene the piece of revolving part which was jammed against the inner side of the barbette thus getting rid of the obstruction.<br />
<br />
Outside the turret, the shell did considerable damage; some splinters striking downwards, bent the armoured deck and pierced it in places. As far as I know, the armoured deck sustained no further damage, and this was of little importance.<br />
<br />
The after conning-tower was hit and a piece of the armour torn away; the occupants, including the 3rd gunnery officer, were killed. Splinters struck downwards to the engine-room ventilation hatches, but were stopped by the armoured gratings.<br />
<br />
"<u>Ostfriesland"</u> was struck by a mine below the foremost port turret. The whole measures 197 ft.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. note:- Literal translation is 12 times 5 metres large.] The torpedo bulkhead is only slightly torn, and the inrush of water was only local.<br />
<br />
"<u>Helgoland</u>". A 13.5 in. shell hit the 7.9 in. armour belt forward on the port side and pierced it. The shell appears to have broken only as no explosive action can be traced. The range was about 14,217 yds.<br />
<br />
"<u>Nassau</u>" rammed a British destroyer, or rather, the destroyer ran into her forward on the port side. Her bows must have lifted right up, for her hawse-pipe remained on board the "Nassau", so firmly wedged into the side of the upper deck that it will have to be cut out. The "Nassau's" side below the deck is torn away for 33 ft. The destroyer then glanced off the "Nassau's" side and exploded internally. One of the crew remained behind in one of the nets, but fell into the water when the "Nassau" fired a salvo.<br />
<br />
The "Nassau" was hit by shrapnel from attacking destroyers in the foremost searchlight group, both port searchlights were put out of action. The searchlight control and electric cables were destroyed and many of the searchlight crews were killed. The after searchlight group was hit in a similar manner, and one of the searchlights was disabled.<br />
<br />
The "Rhineland" and a light cruiser were also hit in a similar manner.<br />
<br />
I have seen all the above mentioned ships in Wilhelmshaven.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" and "Kurfürst" were at Hamburg, but unfortunately I am unable to report much about them. They had already been under repair for several days, and the damage was to some extent made good. Besides this, the conditions were not favourable for undisturbed examination: commissioners from the Imperial Navy Office were on board, besides crowds of workmen, the noise was deafening and it was pouring with rain. Consequently I took no notes on the spot and relied on my memory, which however fails me now among the very many received of similar cases. I am therefore unable to report each hit with accuracy.<br />
<br />
This is immaterial, however, as there were no particularly interesting hits, and none of the ships had been hit in the turrets. The armour had been pierced in several places, the effect and character of the hits being similar in all cases; the hits on unarmoured parts were of little consequence.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" was hit aft on the port side of the water line just on a junction of two plates, a piece of equal size being torn away from each plate. The shell then struck the sloping part of the armoured deck and the splinters ricochetted and passed right through the ship. These plates have already been removed.<br />
<br />
A casemate was pierced and the gun disabled.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" is the only ship whose mast was hit, the mast remained standing and has now been removed.<br />
<br />
The spotting platform had to be abandoned, as communications with the conning tower was cut off. This was the only hit received in a conning tower; it only grazed the upper edge and glanced off, and the men inside hardly noticed it.<br />
<br />
The port engine was disabled, not in consequence of damage to the turbine which is in good condition, but owing to one of the main propeller bearings becoming overheated. The cause of this is not clear, but it is believed to be due to concussions. The ship was well able to keep station with her two remaining engines.<br />
<br />
The "<u>Kurfürst</u>" suffered especially from a great inrush of water forward on the port side, above the armoured deck; it was caused by a hit in the armour belt. No further damage of importance was sustained.<br />
<br />
With regard to time necessary for repair to these ships, it is not yet possible to say anything definite, as it is still undecided whether they shall undergo thorough repair or not. The chief difficulty is the manufacture of new armour plates; but some of the holed plates can, no doubt, be left in position for the present.<br />
<br />
A considerable time will be needed to repair some of the turrets of the battle-cruisers, but here too, they will contrive to get things done. For instance, the "Von der Tann" is to have an entire turret out of a ship of the "Nassau" class, probably the foremost turret, and this ship will be left without a turret for some time. They talk a great deal also of transferring guns, and they will perhaps make use of those intended for the "Hindenburg", which will not be completed will the late autumn.<br />
<br />
It may be presumed that the battleships will be ready for sea in 4-6 weeks, and the battle-cruisers, particularly the "Seydlitz", in not less than 4 months. Naturally work is going on day and night, and repairs are given priority over all new construction.<br />
<br />
The damage sustained by light cruisers and destroyers is inconsiderable. The "Hamburg" had a funnel shot away. As these ships seem to be of minor importance, I did not trouble further about them.<br />
<br />
As our Allies appear not to have the intention of communicating to us what effect the examination of damages sustained will have on their construction in the future, we must endeavour to ascertain this as time goes on by means of cross questioning and by studying their new constructions in detail. I do not feel called upon to draw premature and rash conclusions to-day, on the strength of impressions received, but this will not prevent me from giving a summary of my opinion and of the opinions expresses in my hearing.<br />
<br />
Firstly, it is a remarkable fact that in all the ships that have returned home, all the engine and boiler-rooms are undamaged; the "Lützow" is no exception to this, as she proceeded under her own steam until late in the night after the action. I have also been assured by the Imperial Navy Office, after an inspection carried out by the Chief Engineer, that not a single auxiliary engine was defective. The only boiler-room put out of action was the foremost one in the "Seydlitz" where the bulkhead gave a little, allowing water to penetrate through rivet holes and cracks when the ship was under way. The conclusion may therefore be drawn that these vital parts of the ship are sufficiently protected and that the armour belt of the usual German thicknesses, though it cannot stop the shells, at least fulfils its purpose by breaking them up. Consequently it has become almost impossible even for the largest splinters of 15 in. shell to penetrate through armoured deck or torpedo bulkhead in engine and boiler rooms.<br />
<br />
Even at these long ranges and steep angles there was no question of the armoured decks being pierced; but the fitting of strong gratings over the hatches, which prevented the engines of the "Von der Tann" from sustaining severe damage, appears very necessary.<br />
<br />
The torpedo bulkheads also resisted shells, mines and torpedoes effectually; and in cases where slight damage was sustained, it had no further consequences than the flooding of the compartment affected.<br />
<br />
Perhaps it would be advisable to construct a specially strong boiler-room bulkhead, similar to a torpedo bulkhead, so that it could not be damaged by splinters or water-pressure.<br />
<br />
The inspection of the "Seydlitz" has left me with the impression that the commanding officer of the "Seydlitz" expected rather too much of his ship, and that nothing short of extraordinary good luck enabled her to be brought back. At one time when the whole forepart of the ship was flooded and the bows were under water, he proceeded occasionally with revolutions for 22 knots, just in order to show how seaworthy his ship was, so he told me. This may have been very sporting, or perhaps it may have been necessary under the circumstances in order not to drop too far behind and be overtaken by the enemy, but it certainly was not good seamanship, and if his stokehold bulkhead had burst, the "Seydlitz" would have gone down like the "Lutzow", where the circumstances appear to have been very similar. Later on he decreased speed and finally proceeded stern first.<br />
<br />
I therefore think it not impossible that the loss of the "Lützow", which is said to have been proceeded at 14 knots for a time, was also due only to recklessly high speed, and that the ship might have been saved if she had proceeded stern first or been taken in tow.<br />
<br />
As the danger from water-pressure must always be greatest from ahead, it would certainly be advisable to take special preventative measures against it.<br />
<br />
Vice-Admiral Schmidt told me that, in his opinion, the armoured belt ought to be strongest in the centre, and possible in the afterpart to protect the steering engines, and possibly in the bows, but that it ought not to taper off gradually from the centre to the extremities. He was also entirely in favour of a protected upper deck forming a second armoured deck.<br />
<br />
The admirably thorough system of internal division in the German ships and the floating capability thus attained is the finest proof of the merit of German construction which pursued this aim, and it shows that Admiral von Tirpitz, the creator of the Battle Fleet of to-day, was right when he upheld the principle that, above all things, the ships must be capable of remaining afloat and must not sink or heel over, and that everything else is of secondary consideration.<br />
<br />
The large number of hits in the turrets is remarkable, and it is generally considered that the turret armour should be appreciably stronger, especially in the lower part of the barbettes; for it is not only the disablement of the guns that comes into question, serious though this might be, but also the blowing up of magazines and the total destruction of the ship, as the wide shaft down to the magazines cannot possibly be made completely flash-proof. This is the most vital part of the ship. It is only owing to the small explosive charges in British shells, that there were no explosions of magazines in the German ships.<br />
<br />
Everything possible had been done after the action of 24.1.15 to ensure protection against this danger; the ready ammunition was removed from the top of the hoists and wherever possible all the openings in shafts leading down below were fitted with flaps, covers and heavy asbestos mats, while German ammunition is particularly carefully stowed and packed in cases with screwed-on covers.<br />
<br />
The disasters on the British side are a proof that this is a question of the greatest importance. It must also be taken into consideration that while any other damage turret may take months.<br />
<br />
The numerous hits in turrets would appear to justify the opinion of those who decided against triple turrets, on the ground [sic] that if one was disabled it would put too many heavy guns out of action.<br />
<br />
A hit in a casemate will of course destroy it and disable the gun, but this is of little consequence. Care must be taken here also not to have any ready ammunition, and to close the ammunition hand-up hermetically with heavy asbestos mats at the magazine end also. With the German "Paternoster" (dredger hoist) the ammunition lifts this mat as it comes up and the mat then falls to and closes the opening, which is a practical arrangement.<br />
<br />
Other hits through unarmoured parts, which destroyed more or less small gear and at the first glance give an impression of terrible havoc, are really of no consequence.<br />
<br />
In the "Von der Tann" they wanted to flood a turret magazine. This was impossible, as the flooding valve in the battery, or between deck was piled up with debris, cabin fittings, etc., and was inaccessible. Fortunately the flooding of the magazine turned out to be unnecessary. The Executive Officer remarked to me how critical such a trivial matter might become, and that one could not be careful enough about choosing the positions for the flooding valves, which must be kept clear of easily destructible objects.<br />
<br />
The man-hole covers in the decks, coal shoots [chutes], etc., were pointed out to me as dangerous, as they may be burst open by pressure of gas from below, thus causing damage and giving passage to the gases. These covers should be secured in a different manner and much more firmly.<br />
<br />
The flooding and draining system worked admirably, and is hardly capable of improvement. The only disadvantage is that the compartments above the armoured deck have no draining arrangements. This should be provided. A list, consequent on an inrush of water, could always be corrected by flooding an opposite compartment. This is an important matter both as affecting gunnery and personnel.<br />
<br />
The searchlights, which were not taken down in the German ships, all came out of the action undamaged; anxiety on their account was therefore unfounded. It was very unpleasant when attacking boats fired on the searchlights, and it is therefore considered necessary to fit light armour protection on the masts for the crews of the searchlight control and electric cables.<br />
<br />
Damage from flames is nowhere visible. The Germans are now rather amused at the care with which interior partitions were scraped.<br />
<br />
I could not help comparing the German ships with the Russian battleship "Orel", which I saw in Madzurn after the battle of Tsushima. If I remember rightly, the "Orel" had 5 severe hits and 40 hits with medium-calibre shell.<br />
<br />
The enormous explosive power of the Shimosa shell, which breaks up into minute splinters, did not do the slightest damage to the vital parts of the ship, but the upper deck was transformed into a confused heap of ruins. Superstructure, bridges, masts, funnels, etc., were destroyed, guns dismounted and fires started.<br />
<br />
Nothing of the kind is to be seen in the German ships, outwardly only a few more or less clean shell holes are visible, and they look so orderly and so little damaged that they do not appear to have gone through an action.<br />
<br />
It is true that the upper decks are said to have been littered with countless splinters, but they flew on to the decks from shells which struck the water, the ship receiving violent shocks.<br />
<br />
The holes in the armour show the characteristic concentric cracks round the hole and the radial splashes, the latter proving that the shells exploded on impact or at the latest, as they passed through. In many cases, as already noted, the force of the explosion was external and only pieces of plate, and possibly the head of the shell were driven in.<br />
<br />
<center><u>FLAG OFFICERS OF THE FLEET AND LEADERS</u></center><br />
<br />
{|<br />
| Commander-in-Chief:<br />
| Vice Admiral Scheer<br />
|-<br />
| <u>I Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Vice Admiral Schmidt<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Engelhard<br />
|-<br />
| <u>II Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Mauve<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Baron von Dalwigh<br />
|-<br />
| <u>III Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Behncke<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Nordmann<br />
|-<br />
| Officer commanding the Scouting Forces and<br>Commanding 1st Scouting Group<br />
| Vice Admiral Hipper<br />
|-<br />
| " 2nd " "<br />
| Rear Admiral Bodicker<br />
|-<br />
| " 4th " "<br />
| Commodore "Captain" v. Reuter<br />
|-<br />
| Leaders of Destroyers<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| in "Rostock"<br />
| Commodore "Captain" Michelsen<br />
|-<br />
| in Regensburg<br />
| Commodore "Captain" Heinrich<br />
|-<br />
| Leader of submarines<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| In Hamburg<br />
| Captain Bauer<br />
|}<br />
<br />
<center><u>REMARKS</u></center><br />
<br />
The lecture on the action, upon which this report is based, was illustrated by a plan prepared in haste for H.M. the Kaiser, and a copy was promised to me. But the Admiral Staff does not wish to part with this first incomplete draft, and the preparation of an accurate plan has not yet been completed, as the Admiral Staff is not yet in possession of all the details.<br />
<br />
In time to be included in this report I have only received the sketch of the first stage of the battle, namely the cruiser action on a southerly course, together with a small sketch of the situation when the action was broken off; both are enclosed.<br />
<br />
I conclude from the sketch of the cruiser action, that the accounts given to me were not quite accurate; for instance, the assertion of the commanding officer of the "Moltke" that the shortest range at that stage was 7,650 yds. and that he had accounted for one of the armoured cruisers with a torpedo.<br />
<br />
The sketch shows that the "Indefatigable" was probably first destroyed by gun fire from the "Von der Tann", and later the "Queen Mary" by gunfire from the "Derfflinger", and that the range was never less than 14,220 yds.<br />
<br />
The loss of "V. 27" and "V. 29" and of 4 British destroyers is also apparent, while I was only told of two.<br />
<br />
In the original sketch, 2 British armoured cruisers are also shown as having fallen out during this stage, but this is not shown on the accompanying sketch and probably took place later.<br />
<br />
I was told by the Admiral Staff that the accompanying sketches are not to be taken as strictly accurate.<br />
<br />
It is requested that the sketches and course of the action and the account of damages may be treated as strictly confidential.<br />
<br />
==Footnotes==<br />
{{reflist}}<br />
<br />
==Bibliography==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
*''Schematismus für das K.u.K. Heer und für die Kriegsmarine für 1914. Separatausgabe''. Wien: 1914.<br />
*''Almanach für die k. und k. Kriegsmarine 1917. Kriegsausgabe''. '''XXXVII'''. Pola: 1917.<br />
*[[Arthur Marder (Naval Historian)|Marder, Arthur J.]] (1966). ''From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919: Jutland and After, May 1916–December 1916''. '''Volume III'''. London: Oxford University Press.<br />
*{{MarderFDSFIII}}<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
==External Links==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
*[http://www.denkmalprojekt.org/2023/vl_marineoffiz_zahlmstr_feuerwerks_torpedooffiz_beamte_wk1.html "Halbstocks die Flagge!"] ''Onlineprojekt Gefallenendenkmäler''.<br />
*Krámli, Mihály. [http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-124.pdf "The Report on the Battle of Jutland by the Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché in Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Colloredo-Mannsfeld."] ''NavWeaps''.<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
[[Category:Battle of Jutland]]</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Attach%C3%A9_Report_on_the_Battle_of_Jutland&diff=334747Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland2024-03-13T08:43:15Z<p>Simon Harley: Made Changes.</p>
<hr />
<div>Soon after the [[Battle of Jutland]] on 31 May &ndash; 1 June 1916 the Naval Attaché of the [[Austro-Hungarian Navy|Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Navy]] at the embassy in Berlin, ''Fregattenkapitäne'' Hieronymus Graf von Colloredo-Mannsfeld,<ref>''Schematismus für das K.u.K. Heer und für die Kriegsmarine für 1914''. p. 1270. ''Almanach für die k. und k. Kriegsmarine 1917''. p. 668.</ref> visited the High Sea Fleet. He composed a report on the battle for his superiors using first-hand accounts, interspersed here and there with his own observations. The version reproduced here is a translation in English apparently made by the [[Naval Intelligence Division (Royal Navy)|Naval Intelligence Division]] in 1919 from a copy which was subsequently returned to "F.N.A.", presumably the French Naval Attaché. A copy of the translation then made its way into the papers of the British Cabinet, from where historian Arthur J. Marder obtained a copy which is in his papers.<ref>Original number N.I.D. 087/19. Marder papers, Special Collections and Archives, Langson Library, University of California, Irvine, MS-F002, Box 27.</ref> He does not appear to have used it for the 1966 edition of ''From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow'', Volume III, but certainly used it for the revised edition in 1978.<ref>A quote on p. 189 of the 1966 edition reads, "The Fleet is filled with enthusiasm and elated<br />
with victory.... All, down to the last seaman, believe in the strength of the Fleet and look forward to further encounters with<br />
confidence." This differs to the quote used on p. 234 of the 1978 edition, which is identical to that used here.</ref> <br />
<br />
It is worth comparing this translation with that made by Hungarian historian Mihály Krámli of a post-war copy of a slightly different version of the report in a Hungarian archive which has been published on the ''NavWeaps'' online resource.<ref>Krámli, Mihály. [http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-124.pdf "The Report on the Battle of Jutland by the Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché in Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Colloredo-Mannsfeld."] ''NavWeaps''.</ref><br />
<br />
The original grammar and punctuation of the typescript has been reproduced here wherever possible.<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
From:- Austrian Naval Attache in Berlin.<br />
<br />
To:- Commander-in-Chief, Pola.<br />
<div style="float:right;">Berlin,<br>17 June, 1916.</div><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<center><u>NAVAL ENGAGEMENT OF 31 MAY 1916.</u></center><br />
<br />
The following is a report of the naval proceedings of 31 May - 1 June, 1916, and also of the damage sustained by the German Fleet.<br />
<br />
During my 3-days' visit to Wilhelmshaven, followed by a cursory examination of the "MARKGRAF" and "KURFURST" at Hamburg, I endeavoured to gain merely a general idea of the results of gunfire and concentrated my attention on the course of the action itself.<br />
Admiral Scheer, whom I only saw for a short time as he left for Kiel to attend the funeral of his borther-in-law [sic], Lieut.-Commander Mohr,<ref>Carl Mohr of the ''Hamburg''.[http://www.denkmalprojekt.org/2023/vl_marineoffiz_zahlmstr_feuerwerks_torpedooffiz_beamte_wk1.html "Halbstocks die Flagge!"] ''Onlineprojekt Gefallenendenkmäler''. Our thanks to Ruiz Mateo Lutzow for finding this excellent source.</ref> who was killed in the action, very kindly arranged that his Chief of Staff, Captain Trotha, should give me an account of the whole proceedings, illustrated by plans, and that I should be furnished with all information. I have tried to fill in the gaps by conversations with officers whom I know; this has resulted in some contradictory statements, and several points remain obscure, the accounts from the various ships not having all come in.<br />
<br />
Many episodes will therefore be explained later and may appear in a different light, but, as regards the broad outlines which are of chief importance, the picture of this interesting engagement is fairly clear. The accompanying plan of the action was made in haste for the Kaiser and will therefore need much correction.<br />
<br />
The spirit pervading the Fleet can only be described as one of enthusiasm; they are intoxicated with victory. The heavy load weighing on them all, the dear that this war might end without an encounter of the Fleets, have vanished. They have learnt what fighting really means, they know themselves to be superior to the enemy as regards tactics, and that they were following the right lines and have nothing to unlearn; they know that their gunfire was more effective than that of the enemy, and that they can rely implicitly on their flotillas which have always been looked upon in the German Navy as one of the chief factors in an action. Finally they know that their largest ships can stand heavy fire and serious damage, that they leave nothing to be desired as regards construction and cannot be sunk easily. In short, they feel that the British, in spite of all their boasting, cannot overcome the German Fleet and have a considerable respect for it.<br />
<br />
This conviction imbues the whole Fleet, down to the last man, with confidence in their strength and a calm assurance regarding future encounters. At the same time they are free from over-confidence and from under-estimation of the enemy. On the contrary, the British fire-control and the enormous piercing power of their heavy shell at great distances have roused their admiration, so that a careless conception of the situation is not to be feared, the less so, as well-balanced minds such as those of Admiral Scheer and his Staff are unlikely to be led away by former successes to undertake rash enterprises in the future.<br />
<br />
They do not deny that they were extraordinarily fortunate, and that if the action had been prosecuted with energy on the British side, and if the "Nelson touch" had been in evidence, things might have gone very badly for Germany, especially as the British still had an intact Battle Squadron of 12 units at their disposal which had not yet taken part in the action. But they console themselves with the knowledge that no naval action was ever won without some stroke of luck.<br />
<br />
The Kaiser's visit, the day before my arrival, and his address to the Fleet gave great satisfaction, and subsequently many important personages arrive to inspect the ships, such as Prince Henry and the Grand Dukes of Mecklenburg and Oldenburg, and numbers of decorations were distributed. Vice-Admiral Scheer was promoted to Admiral, and he and Vice-Admiral Hipper received the Pour le Merite.<br />
<br />
I also visited Rear-Admiral Behncke, who was wounded and in hospital; his wounds are slight, a few small splinters in his head, elbow and knee, and he will probably soon be well again.<br />
<br />
<center><u>COURSE OF THE ACTION.</u></center><br />
<br />
The Commander-in-Chief intended to advance with the whole Fleet to the waters of the Skagerrak, in order to make his presence felt unpleasantly by disturbing the shipping, hoping thereby to lure on the British forces and in this manner to be in a position to attack a part of the British Fleet with superior or at least with equal forces. He reckoned that any movements of the British Fleet would be reported to him in good time by the submarines which had been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and he hoped that the airships would prove a better means of reconnoitring than any possessed by the enemy.<br />
<br />
Unfavourable weather prevented him for a considerable period from undertaking any operations, and, as the submarines were to return home on 1 June and be relieved by a new group, the 31 May was the last date for carrying out the planned advance.<br />
<br />
The cruisers left the Jade at 3 a.m., the Main Fleet at 4 a.m., steering an easterly course, and then, after passing Heligoland, a N.N.W'ly course. No reports were received from submarines. These were stationed chiefly off the Orkneys and the Firth of Forth, and the large group of Flanders boats were off the Thames and at the entrance to the Channel. <br />
<br />
While proceeding northwards, a few W/T messages were received, but they were corrupt, appeared to refer only to small formations and gave no clue to the movements of the Grand Fleet. The airships were unable to start in the morning, on account of the wind, and, as it blew hard throughout the day in the Heligoland Bight, they could not start until the early hours of 1 June. In this respect things did not go well, but Admiral Scheer decided nevertheless to continue on his course to the Skagerrak. <br />
<br />
This the account given by Captain von Trotha, who affirms that nothing was known of the presence of the British Fleet in the waters of the Skagerrak, and that there seemed no probability of encountering this Fleet before 1 June.<br />
<br />
There are some points here which I am unable to understand. The submarines are said to have been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and were to return home on 1 June to be relieved probably by a weaker group. For, If the same number of boats were to to keep watch off the English coast, why should 31 May have been the last day for the German Fleet to sail. The day of departure was, therefore, too late in any case, for, if no encounter was to be expected before 1 June, the boats stationed off the coast could not possibly encounter the damaged British ships, as was intended, for probably no damaged ships would be there before 2 June.<br />
<br />
The battleship "KONIG ALBERT" had to carry out repairs to her condensers and did not proceed with the Fleet. Von Trotha told me that there was no alternative and that a ship must carry out small overhauls regularly in a dockyard according to programme. But could it not be arranged, when one is taking the initiative, to choose one's moment for an advance and to have all the ships together for this short time? And why should just that moment be chosen when one of the most powerful ships of the "Kaiser" class is in the dockyard, instead, for instance, of one of the "Nassau" class with 11-in. guns.<br />
<br />
In addition, the "BAYERN" was to have joined up a few days later. After having waited so long, why should not the plan have been postponed for 2 or 3 weeks, instead of dispensing with the only ship carrying 15-in. guns.<br />
<br />
In the same manner they dispensed with air reconnaissance, from which they had expected so much.<br />
<br />
These considerations make me doubt whether the account given me is quite correct, and whether, on the contrary, they knew of certain movements of the British Fleet and considered the moment extremely favourable for an attack. Perhaps they only knew of Beatty's battle squadron, and thinking the Main Fleet was far away, hoped to entrap this squadron. In Berlin, they have much to say, even in military circles, about the British Fleet's intention to push through into the Baltic, and of Kitchener's mission having some connection with this. I consider this senseless, for it cannot be presemed [sic] that the British Fleet would leave their shores unprotected and do the Germans the favour of operating in the Baltic, which would certainly be a most advantageous area for the German Fleet. In any case, there appear to be discrepancies which will probably be explained at some later date.<br />
<br />
Scouting groups, battle cruisers and light cruisers, together with flotillas, preceded the Main Fleet by 50 - 60 miles. At 4 p.m. the light cruisers encountered some British battle cruisers. These at once opened fire on the light cruisers, at an estimated distance of 26,247 yds.; the range could be taken accurately. Though they did not obtain a hit, the salvoes fell so well that the German cruisers thought it advisable to turn away and fall back on their battle cruisers.<br />
<br />
As the British approached, these battle cruisers turned on to a southerly course, in order to lure the enemy on to the German Main Fleet. A running action, on a southerly course, ensued. The British were to starboard and to the west of the Germans, who had therefore the following advantage: in the North Sea, in summer, the western horizon is quite light and visibility towards the west is good, while towards the east, and in a still greater degree off the Jutland Coast, it is misty and visibility is bad and no silhouettes stand out against the eastern horizon. This phenomenon also played great part in the subsequent course of the action. The sun was still high and was not troublesome, and the British ships offered admirable targets. The sea was calm, the wind N.W. 1-2, altering subsequently through W. to S.W.<br />
<br />
The following British ships were recognised:-<br />
3 "Lion" class, 1 "Tiger" and 2 "Indefatigable" class; they were soon reinforced by 5 "Queen Elizabeth" class following astern.<br />
<br />
It is asserted that, judging from shell splinters, the ship of the "Tiger" class carried 15-in. guns, and that she was therefore the mysterious vessel which replaced the "TIGER" sunk on 24.1.15; as the last-named "TIGER" carried only 13.5-in.guns, this was taken as a further proof of her loss. The silhouette of the new "TIGER", however, is said to have resembled that of the old "TIGER" exactly. As the "Queen Elizabeths" soon opened fire also with 15-in. guns, I rather doubt this assertion regarding the "TIGER", and the various ships on this early part of the engagement are altogether somewhat at variance.<br />
<br />
On the German side the ships proceeded in the following sequence:- "LÜTZOW", Flagship of Vice-Admiral Hipper, "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN".<br />
<br />
As Hipper edged towards the enemy, the distance decreased to about 7655 yds. The German fire was unquestionably superior, but the speed of the British vessels was greater. After a short time the "INDEFATIGABLE" and "QUEEN MARY" blew up, and 2 battle-cruisers and two attacking destroyers were also accounted for. The "QUEEN MARY" must have been destroyed by the explosion of a magazine; she was torn in two halves, and a water-colour painted by an officer represents her enveloped in an enormous column of black smoke; she disappeared in a few seconds. Only one cadet was subsequently picked.<br />
<br />
The second battle cruiser disappeared under similar circumstances. The "VON DER TANN" claims to have accounted for one of these battle-cruisers by a broadside. But the "MOLTKE" fired 4 torpedoes and also claims this achievement.<br />
<br />
The Germans suffered very little during this phase of the action, the "MOLTKE" alone receiving hits on the starboard side. The fire of the British battle-cruisers is said not to have been nearly as good as that of the "QUEEN ELIZABETH" class later on.<br />
<br />
When they had approached the German Main Fleet, the British turned on to a contrary course and the German cruisers did the same. The German Main Fleet proceeded in divisions in starboard quarter-line, the 3rd Battle Squadron: 4 "König" class and 3 "Kaiser" class, Fleet Flagship, 1st Battle Squadron: 4 "Ostfriesland" class and 4 "Westfalen" class, and the 2nd Battle Squadron: 5 "Deutschland" class and the "Hessen". They endeavoured to effect a junction with the cruisers, but were unable to take part very effectually.<br />
<br />
The course of the action was now in a northerly direction, over the area which had just been traversed, and the British ships now drew ahead considerably and turned more and more towards the East; the Germans followed this movement, and in consequence the conditions of visibility became less and less favourable for them.<br />
<br />
The "Queen Elizabeths" now made their presence more greatly felt; one of them had dropped out, but I was unable to ascertain when this occurred.<br />
<br />
The course of the German Math Fleet at first led past the 2 disabled British destroyers, which were lying stopped. The crews had already taken to the boats and were picked up later on by German destroyers. As the Main Fleet was doubtful about the advisability of passing the destroyers while they were still afloat, they were sunk by a few broadsides. One of the officers who was picked up was in pyjamas and is said to have stayed in his cabin during the action. He declared "We did not expect so much resistance," while another said - "The battle is rather disappointing." It has been ascertained that these destroyers were greatly under-manned; their crews seemed very exhausted, which points to their having been in the water for a long time.<br />
<br />
While on this easterly course, the light cruisers of the fast 2nd Scouting Group: "FRANKFURT", "PILLAU", "ELBING" and "WIESBADEN", were heavily fired on from the N.E. and E. without their being able to see more than the gun flashes. In addition, they were under continual fire from the N., and while turning away to S.E. and S., they ascertained that they were opposed by an interminable line of British ships, which appeared at first to be on a N.W.'ly course, and had then evidently turned together on to a S.'ly course.<br />
<br />
It may be noted here that the battleships, and, generally speaking, the battle-cruisers also, never sighted the British Main Fleet, and saw nothing but the flashes of the guns and the effects of the fire. These British ships, about 25 in number, were only sighted by a few light cruisers and by the flotillas, and were counted by them as accurately as possible.<br />
<br />
Surrounded thus from the N. and the E. and under fire, the "WIESBADEN" was disabled, apparently by a hit in the engine-room. The Admiral noticed, it is true, that his leading ships must have encountered new and powerful forces and that they were turning away; but he thought it his duty to go to the assistance of the "WIESBADEN" and therefore continued on an easterly course.<br />
<br />
The van of the Main Fleet, led by the "KÖNIG" (Rear-Admiral Behncke) now came under heavy fire from right ahead; the "KÖNIG" turned away under this fire towards the S.E., whereupon the Commander-in-Chief ordered the whole line to "turn together" to starboard and gave up the idea of helping the "WIESBADEN". About this time Vice-Admiral Hipper transferred his flag from the "LÜTZOW" to the "MOLTKE" with the help of a destroyer, his W/T station being damaged.<br />
<br />
Hardly had the Main Fleet drawn away on a westerly course, before it was ascertained that the pressure was relaxing and the fire decreasing, and that the British were no longer pursuing so hotly. Scheer therefore ordered the ships to "turn together" back on to their former course, and made the signal 'R' = 'Engage the enemy'. This second advance may be termed the zenith of the action. Admiral Scheer gave his views on it approximately as follows:- "Those who make a study of this engagement will be very puzzled as to my object in advancing thus against the wall of British ships. The fact is that I had no particular object. I made the first advance because I had a feeling that I ought to endeavour to assist the "WIESBADEN" and because the situation ahead was quite obscure to me, for I saw nothing of the "LÜTZOW" and received no W/T reports. I soon saw, however, that the leading ships were coming under an overwhelming fire, and that I could not risk the Fleet on the "WIESBADEN'S" account. When I noticed that the British pressure had quite ceased and that the Fleet remained intact in my hands, I turned back, under the impression that the action could not end in this way and that I ought to seek contact with the enemy again."<br />
<br />
The situation during the first and second advances may serve as an example of what should not take place according to all the laws of tactics, for it could not have been worse; von Trotha said jokingly that, if an Admiral brought about such a situation at a war game or in manoeuvres, he would never be entrusted without another command. In the North, the "Queen Elizabeths", then the battle-cruisers, and from N.E. through E. to S.E., an endless line of battleships formed an arc round the German van and kept it under fire. Evidently it had fallen into the most perfect trap. In addition to this unfavourable tactical position, there was a further difficulty, namely that the German ships could be clearly distinguished while they themselves only saw the gun flashes, 4 or 5 to each salvo, but could find no target.<br />
<br />
The Gunnery Officer of the "MARKGRAF" told me that he could not fire at all during half-an-hour, and that they were at the mercy of the British broadsides. Critical though the position was, in theory, they think that experience justifies the conclusion that this 'crossing the T' is in reality not so disastrous at longer ranges; for, in spite of the enormous superiority of their fire, the British made comparatively few hits, the simple reason being that, when fire is thus concentrated on a few leading ships, there can be no question of improving the shooting by spotting.<br />
<br />
Given good tactical training and squadrons which work well together, it is always easy to retire rapidly from an unfavourable position and even possibly to reach an advantageous one.<br />
<br />
The small amount of damage sustained by the Main Fleet may be owing partly to the fact that the leading battle-cruisers drew the enemy's fire, thus relieving the battleships. Only the three leading ships, "KÖNIG", "GROSSER KURFÜRST" and "MARKGRAF" received several hits; while among all the other ships, the "KAISER", "HELGOLAND" and the "SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN" received one hit each, and the rest were not hit at all.<br />
<br />
Simultaneously with the battle-cruisers, which were ahead and pressing forward in quarter-line formation, the 6th and 9th Flotillas, left by the "REGENSBURG", also proceeded to a torpedo attack. Regarding this cruiser advance, the Commanding Officer of the "SEYDLITZ" told me that he was in such a position that he was able to avoid the British salvoes, for he altered course towards the point where each salvo fell and thus evaded the spotting correction.<br />
<br />
This torpedo attack was carried out with great determination and seems to have been completely successful, although nobody is able to state how many hits were obtained. The British ships overlapped somewhat and their line was almost unbroken, and, as about 100 torpedoes were fired, it is estimates that there must have been a considerable number of hits, some people affirm that there were 20, but I do not place much confidence in these figures and it is useless to trouble about them as nobody is certain.<br />
<br />
The boats were fired on by guns of all calibres, even the heaviest, but with little effect, only one boat being destroyed; two other boats had been sunk in an earlier attack during the cruiser action.<br />
<br />
The battle-cruisers were also attacked by British torpedoes, the "SEYDLITZ" being hit once. The "MOLTKE" was lucky, for, when close to the ship, one torpedo apparently had a gyro failure and ran parallel with her. The "LÜTZOW" was probably hit also.<br />
<br />
After the attack, the destroyers laid fog and a heavy smoke screen, which interposed between the Fleet; this benefitted not only the heavily-damaged "LÜTZOW" and "DERFFLINGER", whose nets had been shot away and were hanging down, but also the whole Fleet. It may also have made an impression on the British.<br />
<br />
The German Main Fleet and cruisers turned on a westerly course, fire having again entirely ceased; and the ships of the Main Fleet then turned gradually in succession and in inverse sequence from W. to S.W., subsequently steering towards Horns Reef.<br />
<br />
It is not known what the British did; all that is certain, is that they did not follow in pursuit and that nothing further was seen of their Main Fleet. It remained light until 11 p.m. (summer time), and it would not have been impossible, considering their superior speed, for them to have come within firing range. The Germans expected it too, and now have to content themselves with surmises about the British Commander-in-Chief's reasons for not doing so. It is probably that the unfavourable issue of the fleet part of the battle and the demoralising losses in ships took away any desire on Jellicoe's part for further fighting. His Fleet may have lost heavily and been severely shaken by the torpedo attack; and, as the Germans still had some intact flotillas at their disposal, he may have feared further strong torpedo attacks in the critical hours of twilight, for in the German Navy they say that Jellicoe fears their destroyers in particular.<br />
<br />
Nevertheless, the Germans were not under the impression of having shaken the British Fleet to the extent of obliging them to give up the struggle, and when the evening passed without further incident, they reckoned with certainty on encountering Jellicoe off Horns Reef at daybreak. They were the more astonished at his non-appearance when their air reconnaissance reported that on the morning of 1 June a squadron of 12 battle-ships was proceeding North from the southern part of North Sea and that it suddenly turned on to an opposite course and proceeded South.<br />
<br />
As it could not possibly have been the intention of the British Commander-in-Chief to let the German Fleet escape after having encountered it at last far from its base, and as he still had an intact battle-squadron at his disposal, one is compelled to take the view that he no longer felt strong enough for a second encounter; the achievement of the German Fleet must therefore be very highly thought of.<br />
<br />
During the night cruising following the action, numerous small episodes and minor engagements took place, of which no clear idea can be formed. <br />
<br />
In view of a possible fresh attack or of a possible pursuit on the part of the enemy, it was thought undesirable to leave the 2nd Battle Squadron either in the van or in the rear, it therefore took station to starboard and at first proceeded on an opening course from the other squadrons, and continued fairly independently during the night.<br />
<br />
The 1st Battle Squadron therefore led, with the "WESTFALEN" as guide, and it was followed by the 3rd Battle Squadron.<br />
<br />
After the action had been broken off, the 4 remaining battle cruisers were ahead to port, where they were suddenly again brought under heavy fire from the port side and from ahead, apparently by 3 or 4 battle cruisers. It is presumed that these were the remaining 3 or 4 older cruisers of the "Invincible" class, which Jellicoe probably always stationed ahead of the Main Fleet, for it would hardly have been possible for the "Lions", which were following in the rear in the British line, to have taken station ahead so quickly. The German battle cruisers, all severely damaged, did not feel able to withstand this fire and turned away to starboard, passing ahead of the Main Fleet and between it and the 2nd Battle Squadron, which proceeded quietly on their course and before which the mysterious ships retired, not to be sighted again.<br />
<br />
The battle-cruisers then gradually fell astern, and as they were making much water, and also owing to their differing speeds, they lost contact with the Main Fleet and with each other.<br />
<br />
The "LÜTZOW" had dropped out during the engagement and proceeded independently, accompanied by 4 destroyers. At first she was able to steam 14 knots, but her speed decreased rapidly and dropped finally to 4 knots. Her bows sank slowly, and when the whole forecastle was under water the Commanding Officer decided to leave the ship. The badly wounded were transferred carefully to the boats and the disembarkation was conducted in good order. A torpedo was then fired at the ship and this coup de grace sank her in deep water at about 1 o'clock, I believe.<br />
<br />
The "SEYDLITZ" was hardly in a better condition than the "LÜTZOW"; she also sank gradually by the bows till the water was almost level with the deck, and she had a heavy list to port, but she continued on her course. In the darkest hours of the night she suddenly sighted 3 large ships to port, quite close to. She turned away, made a British recognition signal and was not pursued. As bad luck would have it, the steaming light had short-circuited, could not be switched off and showed intermittently.<br />
<br />
The "DERFFLINGER", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN" followed the Main Fleet more or less and met with no particular experiences.<br />
<br />
The Main Fleet had to repulse a series of destroyer attacks and was also engaged by cruisers. The movements of these British cruisers, which came up singly, are incomprehensible and give the impression of having lost their heads. They appear to have received the order, judging by an intercepted W/T message, to proceed on a northerly and north-westerly course, and thereby they ran into the extended German line which they probably imagined they had passed to the South.<br />
<br />
One large cruiser (?"WARRIOR") proceeded unsuspectingly within 875 yds. of the line of battleships and came under concentrated fire from several ships before she could reply, so that she blew up enveloped in flames and disappeared in 47 seconds. The "BIRMINGHAM" seems to have been accounted for in a similar manner. The destroyers all approached in a really insane manner; frequently not from ahead but from a direction astern, scattered, singly or in pairs, or at most 3 together, never in large numbers. Most of them were disabled forthwith by a few salvoes and set on fire. The "WESTFALEN" distinguished herself particularly at this time.<br />
<br />
These burning destroyers strewn along the course, lit it up as if for a festival. Evidently the fires were largely due to the light American and Mexican oils; at any rate German firing trials on oil bunkers never caused any such conflagrations.<br />
<br />
The attacking boats directed shrapnel fire on the searchlights with fairly good results, the searchlights of two battleships and one light cruiser being hit.<br />
<br />
One large destroyer, which only recognised the danger at the last moment and endeavoured to avoid it by altering course was rammed by the "NASSAU", which put her helm over for this purpose. The boat exploded internally and sank.<br />
<br />
The only ships hit were the "POMMERN" in the 2ns Battle Squadron, and the "ROSTOCK". The "POMMERN" blew up at once and nobody was saved. The "ROSTOCK" was just passing between ships of the Main Fleet when she was hit; the loss of life on board was small.<br />
<br />
The Germans believe they destroyed 11 British destroyers in all. The manner in which these destroyers were handled has not left a good impression on the whole, and one has certainly lost respect for this weapon. The view is also taken that the boats are too large and offer too wide a target.<br />
<br />
The light cruiser "ELBING", like the "ROSTOCK", apparently wanted to break through the line from port to starboard under pressure from the British cruisers; she was, however, rammed by the "POSEN" and had to be abandoned in a sinking condition. The Germans also fired a torpedo into her.<br />
<br />
The "FRAUENLOB" and 2 destroyers were lost during the night; no details of their loss are known.<br />
<br />
Not far from Heligoland, the "OSTFRIESLAND", 7th of the line, struck a mine. This brings the account of the chief events of this exciting cruiser to an end.<br />
<br />
The German flotillas were detached from the Fleet to clear the area off the Jutland Coast, which was divided up into sectors. The flotillas stationed furthest to the North proceeded to the Skagerrak and through these straits into the Baltic and to Kiel.<br />
<br />
None of the flotillas sighted the British Main Fleet again, which proves that it must have turned away to the N. or N.W. immediately after the action. According to confidential reports the Fleet entered British ports as early as 1 June.<br />
<br />
Two British battleships, in a severely damaged condition and accompanied by destroyers, were sighted proceeding back to England. One was attacked by a submarine, but without success.<br />
<br />
On the morning of 1 June, in fairly misty weather, a Zeppelin sighted groups of British ships leaving the Channel on a N.E.'ly course. The reports were rather vague, as sometimes 6 and sometimes 12 ships were mentioned; but it seems most likely that 12 battleships and 3 cruisers were in question, and that they soon retired. The airship, which flew low at one time to get a clearer view, was also fired on.<br />
<br />
Some of the ships are said to have had tripod masts.<br />
<br />
The German Fleet, with the exception of "SEYDLITZ", reached the Jade in the afternoon. The "SEYDLITZ" could not cross the bar on account of being so much down by the bows, and it was not till the next day at high water that she was towed in, stern first.<br />
<br />
<center><u>MISCELLANEOUS.<br>TACTICS.</u></center><br />
<br />
The Germans ascribe their success to various causes, and in the first place to their own superiority as regards tactics. This is a point which every officer discusses, and it is constantly repeated that it all happened just as in tactical manoeuvres and in "battle exercises", and that things could not have gone better.<br />
<br />
Movements of squadrons, divisions and individual ships, "turns together" and alterations of course and speed, all went like clockwork and demonstrated the very great mobility of all formations.<br />
<br />
The W/T signalling system of the Main Fleet never failed, and its failure would have been immaterial, as the primary and secondary flag action signals, showing from several positions in the ship, were made simultaneously.<br />
<br />
All this was due to the peace training and the practical experience of the Flag Officers and Captains. Though in peace time the Commander-in-Chief had never commanded a Fleet, nor the Admirals a squadron, still the training carried out on the same lines for a number of years resulted in everything proceeding with the expected precision.<br />
<br />
The British, on the contrary, are said to have displayed a certain clumsiness as regards tactics and to have preferred turning together when "turning on to an opposite course" (Wendungen im Gegenmarsch), though this conclusion does not seem altogether justified from the description of the action.<br />
<br />
The ships kept station 547 yds. apart, and Vice-Admiral Schmidt told me that, in his opinion, this distance is too small for large ships and that he prefers 656 yds., as the shorter distances result in the ships getting bunched and overlapping during alterations of course. In order to relieve this during the first turn to starboard, the Fleet Flagship herself turned to port and then closed gradually into line. At night the distance was 656 yds.<br />
<br />
No interruption of W/T communication was occasioned by the enemy.<br />
<br />
<center><u>GUNNERY</u></center><br />
<br />
It is admitted that the British are superior as regards their gunnery technique. Their salvoes fall most astoundingly close together and aroused admiration on all sides. Some people affirm that they fell too close together, and that it was consequently difficult to cover a sufficiently large danger space.<br />
<br />
This is particularly the case with the heaviest calibres: 13.5-in. and 15-in. and the battle-cruisers' fire was noticeably inferior to that of the "Queen Elizabeth" class, for example.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> Literal translation; the meaning is not clear. - Tr.] The spread of the salvoes frequently only covered a few square yards. In the "KÖNIG" 3 rounds, out of a salvo of 4 rounds, hit between the capstan and the bridge.<br />
<br />
This is attributed to careful calibration, which the British have studied for a long time and which, as is well known, was abandoned by the German Navy after a few trials. The gunnery officers declare unanimously that it must unquestionably be re-introduced.<br />
<br />
The British range-finders are superior to the German, and the construction of their turrets enables them to shoot at ranges impossible for German guns. The question of range appears to be immaterial to the British, who fire at any range so long as visibility permits.<br />
<br />
The Germans are fully convinced of the great superiority of 15-in. guns over all others, and deplore the fact that, owing to the predominant conservative tendencies in the German Navy, this calibre was not introduced until so lately. Vice-Admiral Gerdes, the Head of the Armament Department, is responsible for this, for he always opposed it on the ground that the poor visibility in German waters and the consequent short ranges rendered an increase of calibre useless; he considered the German 12-in. gun to be an altogether superior weapon, capable of competing with every other.<br />
<br />
In one respect the British seem behindhand as compared with the Germans: namely that they cannot alter range quickly enough and they are too dependent on the range clock. The British rely on steady fire at long range, and they adapt their tactics to this and avoid alterations of course and range most assiduously.<br />
<br />
The Germans, on the contrary, in their firing practices always work with big and rapid alterations of range and exercise firing while turning, so that the gunnery officers consider they have an advantage in this respect.<br />
<br />
The Turn on to an opposite course was certainly not advantageous for the German Fleet, but in this particular instance it made little difference, as the German ships were already unable to find a target; besides which, it must have disconcerted the British and it prevented them from obtaining good results with their fire. The salvoes fell very close together round the ships, but few hits were obtained. The rate of fire in the British ships is said to have been fair, but not excessive. Some people affirm that it was very modest.<br />
<br />
The British shell had great penetrating power, and from all reasonable distances the main armour was generally pierced clean through. The shell splinters picked up prove conclusively that at least 2 kinds of shell were used, differing considerably in material and quality. One kind of shell had a very thick wall and an extremely small explosive charge, it might almost be called a solid shot. It seems to have broken up frequently without exploding and the fuse did not function. Its explosive power, if it possessed any at all, was quite inconsiderable, and it is presumed that the explosives used was not high explosive.<br />
<br />
It appears from the splinters of these 15-in. shell that the wall was 6.3 - 6.7 ins. (16 - 17 cm.), so that the hollow space cannot measure more than 2.4 ins. - 1.8 ins. (4 - 6 cm.). It is true that the large pieces into which these shell broke pierced everything in their course and often went right through the whole ship, unless they struck an armoured part. Several intact heads were found, with and without caps, and also entire bases.<br />
<br />
The second kind of shell had considerably thinner walls, only about half as thick, but it also often broke up into quite large pieces and displayed no great explosive power, and little or no incendiary power.<br />
<br />
It appears therefore that the British aimed only at attaining penetrating power, and the Germans are of opinion that they do not possess (rohrsicheren)* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D.Note.- This appears to be a special fuse which is very delicate, but safe until it has left the gun.] fuses for high explosive shell; this was their opinion before the war also.<br />
<br />
They believe that the high explosive power of the German ammunition gives them a great advantage which may partly counterbalance the smaller calibre of their guns and perhaps also their inferior gunnery. In any case, the effect of the German shell at the point of impact was very considerable.<br />
<br />
The fact that the ships blew up must be attributed to explosions in their magazines. (In this connection one may recall a turret of the "SEYDLITZ" being hit in the action of 24 January, 1915; see my report No.47 ex 15). The turret armour must have been pierced and the shells in the turret must have been exploded. The British have no metal cartridge-cases and also no cartridge-holders such as the Germans have, but they keep their cartridges in locked boxes which are perhaps not flash-proof enough. It seems therefore, from the incident experienced by the "SEYDLITZ", that this must constitute a particular danger to British ships. In this last action also turrets in German ships were frequently hit; further details are given in the account of damage sustained.<br />
<br />
After having compared the hits received in the German ships with the observations of results on enemy targets, it may be safely affirmed that the explosive power of the German shells exceeds that of the British; this was already known after the action of 24 January 1915. The Germans are therefore very much annoyed that they had no 15-in. guns to fire, as they are persuaded that ships so knocked about (eingedeckte) as, for example, the "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" would have been completely destroyed by German shell.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. Note.- The writer appears to mean that if German 15-in. shell had been used against "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" these ships would have been sunk.]<br />
<br />
It may be noted here that the "BAYERN", the first of their ships to carry 15-in. guns, will not join the Fleet for another few days, and the "BADEN" not until the autumn.<br />
<br />
Medium armament played no part, only a few hits were obtained and they did little damage.<br />
<br />
The British fired part-salvoes, like the Germans; full salvoes may have been fired now and again.<br />
<br />
The method of repulsing destroyer attacks, which has previously been reported, namely the 'turning away' and firing on one, or at most two boats, proved to be sound, and the repulsing of attacks both by day and night offered no difficulties.<br />
<br />
As regards gunnery, it may also be mentioned that the fire-control apparatus worked without a hitch and withstood the heaviest shocks. The elevation pointers worked admirably. A few ships were not yet fitted with them.<br />
<br />
<center><u>Torpedo.</u></center><br />
<br />
As regards torpedo work the Germans consider themselves very much superior. There were prolonged discussions about depriving Flotilla Leaders of their independence and putting them under the orders of a Leader Ship, but they are now convinced that this is necessary to ensure the flotillas attacking at the right moment and all together.<br />
<br />
The flotillas were led by the 2 leader Ships "ROSTOCK" and "REGENSBURG", the first having 2 flotillas and the second 3 flotillas allocated to them. The remaining 2 flotillas accompanied the Main Fleet or the battle-cruisers. The leaders carried out their duties with great daring and circumspection. The attacks of the British were weak and scattered, and could therefore have little or only occasional success.<br />
<br />
The German 2nd Flotilla, composed of the larger 1500 ton boats were held back instead of being sent to attack. Although these boats are spoken of very highly and are indispensable for certain enterprises, the view is now taken that they are too large and too valuable to be used for attacking during an action. This Flotilla proceeded to Zeebrugge immediately after the action and arrived there safely. It is to be employed in preventing the British from blockading the harbour with nets, and thus make it impossible for the German submarines to proceed out.<br />
<br />
As far as I have heard, the "MOLTKE" alone of the larger ships fired 4 torpedoes.<br />
<br />
Submarines were not in evidence. No German submarines were present; on the other hand a German destroyer claims to have rammed a British submarine. This claim appears to be erroneous, at least it was declared to be nonsense by the Chief of Staff. The submarines failed as regards scouting and also doing the pursuit.<br />
<br />
Some people state that a British aeroplane was sighted to the northward, and that it had apparently risen from a cruiser. It played no part in the action.<br />
<br />
The use of "Höschter"* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. note:- Probably the name of the inventor.] fog seems to have been of good service, it and the smoke made by the destroyers having completely masked the Main Fleet and its movements at critical moments.<br />
<br />
<center><u>SPEED</u></center><br />
<br />
The advantage of speed lay entirely with the British, not only as regards the Main Fleet on account of the "Deutschland" class, but also as regards the battle-cruisers. The latter are said to have proved considerably faster than the German battle cruisers, an unpleasant experience which had already been made on 25 January 1915. This alone proves that the British are talking nonsense when they assert that the German Fleet sought safety in flight; on the contrary, it was far from its bases and entirely in the power of the British, who either did not wish to take advantage of their superior speed, or were unable to do so on account of the damage sustained. The visibility was no worse than it had been during the day and Jellicoe may have even welcomed the "Höschter" fog which would enable him to plead bad visibility as a reason for abandoning the pursuit. On the German side in the light of experience the factor of speed in the battleships is considered very important. But the moderate depths of the German harbours limits the draught of the ships, and make it particularly difficult for German builders to do much in this respect. In spite of greater length and higher horse power the most modern cruisers "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ" and "LÜTZOW" attained only a quite inconsiderable increase of speed in comparison with the older "GOEBEN" class, and proved a disappointment in this particular.<br />
<br />
The question whether the older battleships should take part in an important engagement was not easy to decide. The 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons composed of the "WITTLESBACH" and "BARBAROSSA" class, re-commissioned at the beginning of the war, were intended to be used in such actions, but have long since been paid off; some have been disarmed and employed as guardships and instructional ships, etc. It was considered however, that the 2nd Battle Squadron, composed of the most modern of the older ships, would be of some service in the action; but this squadron was in a privileged position, inasmuch as it was merely attached to the 1st and 3rd Battle Squadrons and its Admiral was allowed to operate independently and select the position he thought best. On this occasion it kept station quite well and did not prove a hindrance, but, on the other hand, it did not come under any heavy fire. This must be considered very fortunate, for, in view of the damage sustained by other ships and in view of the fact that the British shell pierced all armour above or below water even at the longest range, it is certain that every ship of this class would have been sunk by a few hits, as their internal sub-division is not proof against large inrushes of water.<br />
<br />
The loss of the "Pommern", which gives the British an opportunity for a hollow triumph, also teaches a clear lesson. The Chief of Staff told me that they will probably consider carefully before again exposing this Squadron to danger; therefore this action will have further confirmed the complete worthlessness of all Dreadnought types [sic] and will condemn them as old iron.<br />
<br />
<center><u>TORPEDO NETS.</u></center><br />
<br />
The torpedo nets of the battle cruisers are all badly damaged and the gear so knocked about by gunfire that they were almost useless. This was particularly the case with the "Derfflinger", where the after port nets were hanging in the water, and would have fallen across the propeller had they not chanced to remain held up by a temporary lashing. The ship was obliged to stop during the action to secure the nets, and they might easily have occasioned the loss of the ship.<br />
<br />
For this reason all the nets, together with the booms, were unshipped immediately after the ships' return, to everybody's satisfaction. They will not be carried any more, except perhaps for operations in the Baltic, where the ships may be obliged to anchor at sea.<br />
<br />
<center><u>LEAK-STOPPING SERVICE.</u></center><br />
<br />
The leak-stopping service which had been systematically developed, worked admirably and the Germans are convinced that they owe much to it. They believed that the "Seydlitz" could not have been brought in if the strengthening of the bulkheads, etc., had not been so thoroughly exercised and if the personnel had not been so well trained.<br />
<br />
It is also said, that in the "Lutzow", which had only been in commission for 2 months, was naturally not up to the mark in this respect, and that it is not impossible that small shortcomings, for which of course nobody can be blamed, were responsible for the ship sinking. The "Lutzow" was an unfortunate ship altogether. First her turbines collapsed, thus delaying her commissioning for 6 months, then she immediately struck a mine, and she was hardly out of dockyard hands before she was sunk.<br />
<br />
<center><u>DANGER FROM GAS FUMES.</u></center><br />
<br />
Only 2 days before sailing, a large number of the ships, and fortunately exactly those that came most under fire, namely battle-cruisers and the 3rd Squadron, were supplied with gas masks fitted with alkali cartridges for the whole crew and a plentiful reserve (in the "Seydlitz" 1500 masks for about 1200 men). The masks are similar to those used in the army for poisonous gases. Each man carries a mask slung round him, if he is not actually wearing it.<br />
<br />
I was told emphatically by all the officers, that, in their experience, these masks are absolutely necessary and not only saved many lives but enabled the men to carry on in parts of the ship which they would otherwise have been compelled to leave.<br />
<br />
The gases from shells, mines and torpedoes penetrate in an incredible manner through ventilators, telephone leads, etc. to compartments far away from the point of impact. In many cases the masks enabled large numbers of the guns' crews to escape from turrets that were hit, and to help out others who were badly wounded. In one case the men in one of the main engine rooms were able to remain at their posts after gas had penetrated, until the engine-room was ventilated.<br />
<br />
The Fleet breathing apparatus (Flottenathmer) is preferable to masks in some cases, but it cannot be supplied to everyone and it hampers one's movements, which the masks do not.<br />
<br />
On account of the great danger from gases, it is also advisable to fit hinged flaps in all shafts, and to have wooden bungs to fit the voice-pipes, keeping a hammer at hand to hammer them into the mouth-pieces.<br />
<br />
They tell me that it proved very useful to keep all the personnel employed below, such as in central control rooms, engine-rooms, torpedo flats, etc. continually informed of what was going on. The men get nervous, particularly at first, with the tremendous shocks caused by shell falling close to the ship, though the shocks are felt less on deck, and such information gives them confidence and they like knowing what is going on above them.<br />
<br />
<center><u>DAMAGE</u></center><br />
<br />
The distribution of ships needing repair in the various dockyards is as follows:-<br />
<br />
The "König" proceeded at once to Kiel and is under repair at Howaldt's yard. I did not see her.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" and "Moltke" in Blohm and Voss yard, Hamburg, the first in the Imperial Dock.<br />
<br />
The "Kurfürst["] in Vulkan Yard, Hamburg.<br />
<br />
The "Derfflinger" was first docked in Wilhelmshaven and the leaks temporarily stopped, she then proceeded to the Imperial dockyard, Kiel. The "Seydlitz" will now be docked in the large dock at Wilhelmshaven; during my stay the "Seydlitz" was still in the lock.<br />
<br />
The "Von der Tann", "Ostfriesland" and "Helgoland" will be repaired in dry docks in Wilhelmshaven. No other large ships require to be docked.<br />
<br />
"<u>Seydlitz</u>" The number of hits was still uncertain, as the whole forepart of the ship up to the upper deck was still under water, and it is not known what she looks like below water. The ship was brought into the lock with difficulty, and as she is 43 ft. down by the bows, she cannot be taken into harbour. They will not venture to dock the ship inside the lock, and intend first to raise her bows slightly.<br />
<br />
The roof and guns of the fore turret and anchors, cables etc., have already been unshipped, and they now intend to bring caissons alongside and pump out the fore part sufficiently to enable her to enter the harbour.<br />
<br />
The great inrush of water, that flooded more or less the whole fore part of the ship as far as the first boiler-room bulkhead, was caused by a number of hits. Firstly, one of the belt armour plates forward on the port side is missing, having fallen off. Secondly, there are believed to be at least 2 or 3 more hits below water, forward on the port side; for the list and the settling down had already become ominous when the ship was hit at the edge of the upper deck, port side, abreast the bridge; this was followed by an inrush of water in the battery deck, which did a great amount of damage.<br />
<br />
In addition, during the day action, she was hit by a torpedo on the starboard side under the forward 5.9 in. gun, which caused her to settle down still more by the bows. This gun was so much damaged by the shock from underneath as to be disabled.<br />
<br />
Further, there are 4 severe hits in the ship's side (mess deck, port side, forward of the turret), which also demolished the port capstan.<br />
<br />
These shell, or shell splinters, naturally penetrated to the armoured deck, so that the entire fore part of the ship above and below the armoured deck is holed in many places, allowing free passage for the water. The fore part of the ship was struck therefore by at least 8 or 9 shells and one torpedo.<br />
<br />
Apparently the only compartments which are not flooded, are the bow torpedo flats and the central control room. The former is being pumped out continuously, as a great deal of water is flowing in from above. The torpedo control room had to be abandoned, as the forward partition was not watertight. The central control room abaft this was not abandoned, but of its 2 entrances from the starboard and port passages, only the port one can be used, as the starboard one is flooded.<br />
<br />
The gunnery control room is far further aft and was not affected.<br />
<br />
The ship has a list of 7° to port, and as she has now been slightly raised, about 1¾ ft. of her bows are above water; at one time it was up to the level of the deck.<br />
<br />
While under way the forward boiler room bulkhead had to withstand most of the pressure; supports have been built up everywhere, but it leaks in places.<br />
<br />
The other hits of consequences were those in the turrets. The fore starboard turret No.2 received a direct hit on the fore face of the revolving structure. One curved plate was forced out, but fortunately the main effect of the explosion was outward. The right hand gun was disabled by slight damage to the mounting; with this exception the turret remained in action and kept up fire.<br />
<br />
The right hand gun of turret No.3 received a direct hit, which cut out a wide groove along the tube of the gun. The left hand gun continued to fire.<br />
<br />
The barbette of turret No.4 was hit on a level with the rammer, and the armour was pierced clean through. This hit is of special interest, as the "Seydlitz" received a similar hit and at the same level in turret No.5 on 24th January 1915, which caused a fire, disabled both the after turrets and killed all the guns' crews. This last time, however, the damage was slight. There was no ready ammunition in the turret, and only one cartridge was exploded, in contrast to the (6200 Kg.) 13,670 lbs. of powder on Jan.1915. The turret officer and a large number of the gun's crews were saved by their gas masks. The destruction caused by splinters was, however, considerable and the turret was abandoned, as it was not possible to continue fire from it. This was a 13.5 in. shell, at 15,310 yds. range, strength of armour pierced 8.6 inches.<br />
<br />
After the turret had been abandoned, it was hit a second time in the after side of the revolving part, which was pierced; this of course increased the havoc in the interior.<br />
<br />
Turret No.5 was hit in the roof. The shell richochetted, and the roof is slightly dented. Nobody was hurt and the turret continued to fire.<br />
<br />
In the "Seydlitz" therefore, all the turrets were hit, with the exception of the foremost turret, and one was hit twice.<br />
<br />
A further hit pierced the 5.9 in. (150mm.) casemate armour of the aftermost 5.9 in. starboard gun, No.2. The deck was pierced from beneath, and splinters also pierced the splinter bulkhead. The gun was disabled and all the crew were killed, with the exception of the ship's chaplain who happened to be in the casemate and must be watched over by a special guardian angel.<br />
<br />
A similar hit, with a 15 in. shell, struck the casemate armour of the 6-in. gun No.7 and exploded in the casemate. Men were killed, the gun was disabled and the splinter bulkhead pierced by large splinters. This time again, surprise was aroused by the comparatively small damage caused by a large calibre shell.<br />
<br />
"<u>Derfflinger</u>". One shell hit the armour belt forward of the hawse pipe, probably at the junction of 2 plates, as 2 plates broke away. The plates underneath were consequently strained apart and a great deal of water flowed in.<br />
<br />
The armour belt on the port side also received 2 further hits in the centre and was pierced clean through. The splinters penetrated more than half way through the ship, and in one case a piece of plating was driven half way though the ship. These hits, combined perhaps with others, destroyed the nets and their supports in several places.<br />
<br />
The two after turrets received direct hits, in one case on the roof, in the other case in the barbette above the deck; the armour was pierced and the upper portions of the turrets burnt out and severely damaged, but the flames did not penetrate to the magazines. The crew in the upper part of the turret were killed, and both turrets were disabled. This occurred at an early stage of the action.<br />
<br />
The guns at high elevation cannot yet be dismounted, as everything is wedged in, but they do not appear to be damaged.<br />
<br />
The muzzles were carried away off the 4 foremost 6 in. (15 cm.) guns on the port side; two of them probably having been accounted for by one and the same shell which hit the armour. One gun, the muzzle of which was perhaps damaged by a splinter, afterwards burst, the tube splitting open in the shape of a tulip.<br />
<br />
The "Derfflinger" received a few other hits of no particular interest. She appears the next most severely damaged ship after the "Lützow".<br />
<br />
The "<u>Moltke</u>" only received 5 hits, all of them during that part of the action which took place on a southerly course; while the cruisers mentioned above received most of the hits on the port side, consequently during the later stages of the action.<br />
<br />
One shell pieced the bulwarks in the after part of the ship above the armour, passed through the ship and struck the armour on the port side from inside, about 3.3 ft. below the water-line. One plate was forced out and is missing. The inrush of water was considerable. The after compartments, above the armoured deck which remained intact, were all more or less flooded.<br />
<br />
The second hit was further forward, below the armour belt. The shell exploded in a bunker, but the armoured deck held and no water penetrated it from below. The neighbouring bunkers made little water and could be pumped out.<br />
<br />
Another shell struck the 5.9 in. armour in the upper bunker, above the water-line. The armoured deck again held, but the inner wall of the bunker parted, and the battery deck was pierced from below, a 6 in. gun being damaged and disabled.<br />
<br />
In the fore part of the ship a shell struck the armour belt below the water-line. The plate remained intact and was driven in about 8 inches. The compartment was flooded, but the torpedo bulkhead remained watertight. A neighbouring compartment leaked slightly, the rivets having parted.<br />
<br />
The fifth case of damage, namely a plate beneath the armour belt being driven and pressed in, was probably not due to a direct hit, but to splinters of a shell which fell short.<br />
<br />
"<u>Von der Tann</u>". A shell hit and pierced the lower part of the 3.9 in. armour belt in the after part of the ship to starboard. The compartments above the armoured deck, and some of those on the deck above, were flooded. The chief effect of the shell was outside the ship, but it bent the plates below the otherwise undamaged armoured deck, so that a considerable amount of water flowed into the compartments below the armoured deck. The after torpedo flat was flooded half way up, and the men in the starboard steering engine room were shut in for a long time owing to the exits being blocked.<br />
<br />
The fore turret was hit on the starboard side on the upper edge of the barbette and a semi-circular armour plate was forced out. The machinery of the turret was so badly knocked about that the turret was disabled.<br />
<br />
The hydraulic piping was damaged, so that all the heavy armament was put out of action temporarily. Strangely enough, though men were wounded none were killed.<br />
<br />
The aftermost turret was hit in the barbette. The armour was pierced, but the effect of the shell was exterior, the turret sustained little internal damage, so that the handgear of the turret remained in action. The turret was wedged in one place and could not revolve; they succeeded, however, in cutting off with oxy-acetylene the piece of revolving part which was jammed against the inner side of the barbette thus getting rid of the obstruction.<br />
<br />
Outside the turret, the shell did considerable damage; some splinters striking downwards, bent the armoured deck and pierced it in places. As far as I know, the armoured deck sustained no further damage, and this was of little importance.<br />
<br />
The after conning-tower was hit and a piece of the armour torn away; the occupants, including the 3rd gunnery officer, were killed. Splinters struck downwards to the engine-room ventilation hatches, but were stopped by the armoured gratings.<br />
<br />
"<u>Ostfriesland"</u> was struck by a mine below the foremost port turret. The whole measures 197 ft.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. note:- Literal translation is 12 times 5 metres large.] The torpedo bulkhead is only slightly torn, and the inrush of water was only local.<br />
<br />
"<u>Helgoland</u>". A 13.5 in. shell hit the 7.9 in. armour belt forward on the port side and pierced it. The shell appears to have broken only as no explosive action can be traced. The range was about 14,217 yds.<br />
<br />
"<u>Nassau</u>" rammed a British destroyer, or rather, the destroyer ran into her forward on the port side. Her bows must have lifted right up, for her hawse-pipe remained on board the "Nassau", so firmly wedged into the side of the upper deck that it will have to be cut out. The "Nassau's" side below the deck is torn away for 33 ft. The destroyer then glanced off the "Nassau's" side and exploded internally. One of the crew remained behind in one of the nets, but fell into the water when the "Nassau" fired a salvo.<br />
<br />
The "Nassau" was hit by shrapnel from attacking destroyers in the foremost searchlight group, both port searchlights were put out of action. The searchlight control and electric cables were destroyed and many of the searchlight crews were killed. The after searchlight group was hit in a similar manner, and one of the searchlights was disabled.<br />
<br />
The "Rhineland" and a light cruiser were also hit in a similar manner.<br />
<br />
I have seen all the above mentioned ships in Wilhelmshaven.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" and "Kurfürst" were at Hamburg, but unfortunately I am unable to report much about them. They had already been under repair for several days, and the damage was to some extent made good. Besides this, the conditions were not favourable for undisturbed examination: commissioners from the Imperial Navy Office were on board, besides crowds of workmen, the noise was deafening and it was pouring with rain. Consequently I took no notes on the spot and relied on my memory, which however fails me now among the very many received of similar cases. I am therefore unable to report each hit with accuracy.<br />
<br />
This is immaterial, however, as there were no particularly interesting hits, and none of the ships had been hit in the turrets. The armour had been pierced in several places, the effect and character of the hits being similar in all cases; the hits on unarmoured parts were of little consequence.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" was hit aft on the port side of the water line just on a junction of two plates, a piece of equal size being torn away from each plate. The shell then struck the sloping part of the armoured deck and the splinters ricochetted and passed right through the ship. These plates have already been removed.<br />
<br />
A casemate was pierced and the gun disabled.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" is the only ship whose mast was hit, the mast remained standing and has now been removed.<br />
<br />
The spotting platform had to be abandoned, as communications with the conning tower was cut off. This was the only hit received in a conning tower; it only grazed the upper edge and glanced off, and the men inside hardly noticed it.<br />
<br />
The port engine was disabled, not in consequence of damage to the turbine which is in good condition, but owing to one of the main propeller bearings becoming overheated. The cause of this is not clear, but it is believed to be due to concussions. The ship was well able to keep station with her two remaining engines.<br />
<br />
The "<u>Kurfürst</u>" suffered especially from a great inrush of water forward on the port side, above the armoured deck; it was caused by a hit in the armour belt. No further damage of importance was sustained.<br />
<br />
With regard to time necessary for repair to these ships, it is not yet possible to say anything definite, as it is still undecided whether they shall undergo thorough repair or not. The chief difficulty is the manufacture of new armour plates; but some of the holed plates can, no doubt, be left in position for the present.<br />
<br />
A considerable time will be needed to repair some of the turrets of the battle-cruisers, but here too, they will contrive to get things done. For instance, the "Von der Tann" is to have an entire turret out of a ship of the "Nassau" class, probably the foremost turret, and this ship will be left without a turret for some time. They talk a great deal also of transferring guns, and they will perhaps make use of those intended for the "Hindenburg", which will not be completed will the late autumn.<br />
<br />
It may be presumed that the battleships will be ready for sea in 4-6 weeks, and the battle-cruisers, particularly the "Seydlitz", in not less than 4 months. Naturally work is going on day and night, and repairs are given priority over all new construction.<br />
<br />
The damage sustained by light cruisers and destroyers is inconsiderable. The "Hamburg" had a funnel shot away. As these ships seem to be of minor importance, I did not trouble further about them.<br />
<br />
As our Allies appear not to have the intention of communicating to us what effect the examination of damages sustained will have on their construction in the future, we must endeavour to ascertain this as time goes on by means of cross questioning and by studying their new constructions in detail. I do not feel called upon to draw premature and rash conclusions to-day, on the strength of impressions received, but this will not prevent me from giving a summary of my opinion and of the opinions expresses in my hearing.<br />
<br />
Firstly, it is a remarkable fact that in all the ships that have returned home, all the engine and boiler-rooms are undamaged; the "Lützow" is no exception to this, as she proceeded under her own steam until late in the night after the action. I have also been assured by the Imperial Navy Office, after an inspection carried out by the Chief Engineer, that not a single auxiliary engine was defective. The only boiler-room put out of action was the foremost one in the "Seydlitz" where the bulkhead gave a little, allowing water to penetrate through rivet holes and cracks when the ship was under way. The conclusion may therefore be drawn that these vital parts of the ship are sufficiently protected and that the armour belt of the usual German thicknesses, though it cannot stop the shells, at least fulfils its purpose by breaking them up. Consequently it has become almost impossible even for the largest splinters of 15 in. shell to penetrate through armoured deck or torpedo bulkhead in engine and boiler rooms.<br />
<br />
Even at these long ranges and steep angles there was no question of the armoured decks being pierced; but the fitting of strong gratings over the hatches, which prevented the engines of the "Von der Tann" from sustaining severe damage, appears very necessary.<br />
<br />
The torpedo bulkheads also resisted shells, mines and torpedoes effectually; and in cases where slight damage was sustained, it had no further consequences than the flooding of the compartment affected.<br />
<br />
Perhaps it would be advisable to construct a specially strong boiler-room bulkhead, similar to a torpedo bulkhead, so that it could not be damaged by splinters or water-pressure.<br />
<br />
The inspection of the "Seydlitz" has left me with the impression that the commanding officer of the "Seydlitz" expected rather too much of his ship, and that nothing short of extraordinary good luck enabled her to be brought back. At one time when the whole forepart of the ship was flooded and the bows were under water, he proceeded occasionally with revolutions for 22 knots, just in order to show how seaworthy his ship was, so he told me. This may have been very sporting, or perhaps it may have been necessary under the circumstances in order not to drop too far behind and be overtaken by the enemy, but it certainly was not good seamanship, and if his stokehold bulkhead had burst, the "Seydlitz" would have gone down like the "Lutzow", where the circumstances appear to have been very similar. Later on he decreased speed and finally proceeded stern first.<br />
<br />
I therefore think it not impossible that the loss of the "Lützow", which is said to have been proceeded at 14 knots for a time, was also due only to recklessly high speed, and that the ship might have been saved if she had proceeded stern first or been taken in tow.<br />
<br />
As the danger from water-pressure must always be greatest from ahead, it would certainly be advisable to take special preventative measures against it.<br />
<br />
Vice-Admiral Schmidt told me that, in his opinion, the armoured belt ought to be strongest in the centre, and possible in the afterpart to protect the steering engines, and possibly in the bows, but that it ought not to taper off gradually from the centre to the extremities. He was also entirely in favour of a protected upper deck forming a second armoured deck.<br />
<br />
The admirably thorough system of internal division in the German ships and the floating capability thus attained is the finest proof of the merit of German construction which pursued this aim, and it shows that Admiral von Tirpitz, the creator of the Battle Fleet of to-day, was right when he upheld the principle that, above all things, the ships must be capable of remaining afloat and must not sink or heel over, and that everything else is of secondary consideration.<br />
<br />
The large number of hits in the turrets is remarkable, and it is generally considered that the turret armour should be appreciably stronger, especially in the lower part of the barbettes; for it is not only the disablement of the guns that comes into question, serious though this might be, but also the blowing up of magazines and the total destruction of the ship, as the wide shaft down to the magazines cannot possibly be made completely flash-proof. This is the most vital part of the ship. It is only owing to the small explosive charges in British shells, that there were no explosions of magazines in the German ships.<br />
<br />
Everything possible had been done after the action of 24.1.15 to ensure protection against this danger; the ready ammunition was removed from the top of the hoists and wherever possible all the openings in shafts leading down below were fitted with flaps, covers and heavy asbestos mats, while German ammunition is particularly carefully stowed and packed in cases with screwed-on covers.<br />
<br />
The disasters on the British side are a proof that this is a question of the greatest importance. It must also be taken into consideration that while any other damage turret may take months.<br />
<br />
The numerous hits in turrets would appear to justify the opinion of those who decided against triple turrets, on the ground [sic] that if one was disabled it would put too many heavy guns out of action.<br />
<br />
A hit in a casemate will of course destroy it and disable the gun, but this is of little consequence. Care must be taken here also not to have any ready ammunition, and to close the ammunition hand-up hermetically with heavy asbestos mats at the magazine end also. With the German "Paternoster" (dredger hoist) the ammunition lifts this mat as it comes up and the mat then falls to and closes the opening, which is a practical arrangement.<br />
<br />
Other hits through unarmoured parts, which destroyed more or less small gear and at the first glance give an impression of terrible havoc, are really of no consequence.<br />
<br />
In the "Von der Tann" they wanted to flood a turret magazine. This was impossible, as the flooding valve in the battery, or between deck was piled up with debris, cabin fittings, etc., and was inaccessible. Fortunately the flooding of the magazine turned out to be unnecessary. The Executive Officer remarked to me how critical such a trivial matter might become, and that one could not be careful enough about choosing the positions for the flooding valves, which must be kept clear of easily destructible objects.<br />
<br />
The man-hole covers in the decks, coal shoots [chutes], etc., were pointed out to me as dangerous, as they may be burst open by pressure of gas from below, thus causing damage and giving passage to the gases. These covers should be secured in a different manner and much more firmly.<br />
<br />
The flooding and draining system worked admirably, and is hardly capable of improvement. The only disadvantage is that the compartments above the armoured deck have no draining arrangements. This should be provided. A list, consequent on an inrush of water, could always be corrected by flooding an opposite compartment. This is an important matter both as affecting gunnery and personnel.<br />
<br />
The searchlights, which were not taken down in the German ships, all came out of the action undamaged; anxiety on their account was therefore unfounded. It was very unpleasant when attacking boats fired on the searchlights, and it is therefore considered necessary to fit light armour protection on the masts for the crews of the searchlight control and electric cables.<br />
<br />
Damage from flames is nowhere visible. The Germans are now rather amused at the care with which interior partitions were scraped.<br />
<br />
I could not help comparing the German ships with the Russian battleship "Orel", which I saw in Madzurn after the battle of Tsushima. If I remember rightly, the "Orel" had 5 severe hits and 40 hits with medium-calibre shell.<br />
<br />
The enormous explosive power of the Shimosa shell, which breaks up into minute splinters, did not do the slightest damage to the vital parts of the ship, but the upper deck was transformed into a confused heap of ruins. Superstructure, bridges, masts, funnels, etc., were destroyed, guns dismounted and fires started.<br />
<br />
Nothing of the kind is to be seen in the German ships, outwardly only a few more or less clean shell holes are visible, and they look so orderly and so little damaged that they do not appear to have gone through an action.<br />
<br />
It is true that the upper decks are said to have been littered with countless splinters, but they flew on to the decks from shells which struck the water, the ship receiving violent shocks.<br />
<br />
The holes in the armour show the characteristic concentric cracks round the hole and the radial splashes, the latter proving that the shells exploded on impact or at the latest, as they passed through. In many cases, as already noted, the force of the explosion was external and only pieces of plate, and possibly the head of the shell were driven in.<br />
<br />
<center><u>FLAG OFFICERS OF THE FLEET AND LEADERS</u></center><br />
<br />
{|<br />
| Commander-in-Chief:<br />
| Vice Admiral Scheer<br />
|-<br />
| <u>I Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Vice Admiral Schmidt<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Engelhard<br />
|-<br />
| <u>II Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Mauve<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Baron von Dalwigh<br />
|-<br />
| <u>III Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Behncke<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Nordmann<br />
|-<br />
| Officer commanding the Scouting Forces and<br>Commanding 1st Scouting Group<br />
| Vice Admiral Hipper<br />
|-<br />
| " 2nd " "<br />
| Rear Admiral Bodicker<br />
|-<br />
| " 4th " "<br />
| Commodore "Captain" v. Reuter<br />
|-<br />
| Leaders of Destroyers<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| in "Rostock"<br />
| Commodore "Captain" Michelsen<br />
|-<br />
| in Regensburg<br />
| Commodore "Captain" Heinrich<br />
|-<br />
| Leader of submarines<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| In Hamburg<br />
| Captain Bauer<br />
|}<br />
<br />
<center><u>REMARKS</u></center><br />
<br />
The lecture on the action, upon which this report is based, was illustrated by a plan prepared in haste for H.M. the Kaiser, and a copy was promised to me. But the Admiral Staff does not wish to part with this first incomplete draft, and the preparation of an accurate plan has not yet been completed, as the Admiral Staff is not yet in possession of all the details.<br />
<br />
In time to be included in this report I have only received the sketch of the first stage of the battle, namely the cruiser action on a southerly course, together with a small sketch of the situation when the action was broken off; both are enclosed.<br />
<br />
I conclude from the sketch of the cruiser action, that the accounts given to me were not quite accurate; for instance, the assertion of the commanding officer of the "Moltke" that the shortest range at that stage was 7,650 yds. and that he had accounted for one of the armoured cruisers with a torpedo.<br />
<br />
The sketch shows that the "Indefatigable" was probably first destroyed by gun fire from the "Von der Tann", and later the "Queen Mary" by gunfire from the "Derfflinger", and that the range was never less than 14,220 yds.<br />
<br />
The loss of "V. 27" and "V. 29" and of 4 British destroyers is also apparent, while I was only told of two.<br />
<br />
In the original sketch, 2 British armoured cruisers are also shown as having fallen out during this stage, but this is not shown on the accompanying sketch and probably took place later.<br />
<br />
I was told by the Admiral Staff that the accompanying sketches are not to be taken as strictly accurate.<br />
<br />
It is requested that the sketches and course of the action and the account of damages may be treated as strictly confidential.<br />
<br />
==Footnotes==<br />
{{reflist}}<br />
<br />
==Bibliography==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
*''Schematismus für das K.u.K. Heer und für die Kriegsmarine für 1914. Separatausgabe''. Wien: 1914.<br />
*''Almanach für die k. und k. Kriegsmarine 1917. Kriegsausgabe''. '''XXXVII'''. Pola: 1917.<br />
*[[Arthur Marder (Naval Historian)|Marder, Arthur J.]] (1966). ''From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919: Jutland and After, May 1916–December 1916''. '''Volume III'''. London: Oxford University Press.<br />
*{{MarderFDSFIII}}<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
==External Links==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
*[http://www.denkmalprojekt.org/2023/vl_marineoffiz_zahlmstr_feuerwerks_torpedooffiz_beamte_wk1.html "Halbstocks die Flagge!"] ''Onlineprojekt Gefallenendenkmäler''.<br />
*Krámli, Mihály. [http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-124.pdf "The Report on the Battle of Jutland by the Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché in Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Colloredo-Mannsfeld."] ''NavWeaps''.<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
[[Category:Battle of Jutland]]</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Attach%C3%A9_Report_on_the_Battle_of_Jutland&diff=334746Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland2024-03-12T08:27:54Z<p>Simon Harley: Made Changes.</p>
<hr />
<div>Soon after the [[Battle of Jutland]] on 31 May &ndash; 1 June 1916 the Naval Attaché of the [[Austro-Hungarian Navy|Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Navy]] at the embassy in Berlin, ''Fregattenkapitäne'' Hieronymus Graf von Colloredo-Mannsfeld,<ref>''Schematismus für das K.u.K. Heer und für die Kriegsmarine für 1914''. p. 1270. ''Almanach für die k. und k. Kriegsmarine 1917''. p. 668.</ref> visited the High Sea Fleet. He composed a report on the battle for his superiors using first-hand accounts, interspersed here and there with his own observations. The version reproduced here is a translation in English apparently made by the [[Naval Intelligence Division (Royal Navy)|Naval Intelligence Division]] in 1919 from a copy which was subsequently returned to "F.N.A.", presumably the French Naval Attaché. A copy of the translation then made its way into the papers of the British Cabinet, from where historian Arthur J. Marder obtained a copy which is in his papers.<ref>Original number N.I.D. 087/19. Marder papers, Special Collections and Archives, Langson Library, University of California, Irvine, MS-F002, Box 27.</ref> He does not appear to have used it for the 1966 edition of ''From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow'', Volume III, but certainly used it for the revised edition in 1978.<ref>The quote on p. 189 of the 1966 edition differs from that on p. 234 of the 1978 edition, which is identical to that used here.</ref> <br />
<br />
It is worth comparing this translation with that made by Hungarian historian Mihály Krámli of a post-war copy of a slightly different version of the report in a Hungarian archive which has been published on the ''NavWeaps'' online resource.<ref>Krámli, Mihály. [http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-124.pdf "The Report on the Battle of Jutland by the Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché in Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Colloredo-Mannsfeld."] ''NavWeaps''.</ref><br />
<br />
The original grammar and punctuation of the typescript has been reproduced here wherever possible.<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
From:- Austrian Naval Attache in Berlin.<br />
<br />
To:- Commander-in-Chief, Pola.<br />
<div style="float:right;">Berlin,<br>17 June, 1916.</div><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<center><u>NAVAL ENGAGEMENT OF 31 MAY 1916.</u></center><br />
<br />
The following is a report of the naval proceedings of 31 May - 1 June, 1916, and also of the damage sustained by the German Fleet.<br />
<br />
During my 3-days' visit to Wilhelmshaven, followed by a cursory examination of the "MARKGRAF" and "KURFURST" at Hamburg, I endeavoured to gain merely a general idea of the results of gunfire and concentrated my attention on the course of the action itself.<br />
Admiral Scheer, whom I only saw for a short time as he left for Kiel to attend the funeral of his borther-in-law [sic], Lieut.-Commander Mohr,<ref>Carl Mohr of the ''Hamburg''.[http://www.denkmalprojekt.org/2023/vl_marineoffiz_zahlmstr_feuerwerks_torpedooffiz_beamte_wk1.html "Halbstocks die Flagge!"] ''Onlineprojekt Gefallenendenkmäler''. Our thanks to Ruiz Mateo Lutzow for finding this excellent source.</ref> who was killed in the action, very kindly arranged that his Chief of Staff, Captain Trotha, should give me an account of the whole proceedings, illustrated by plans, and that I should be furnished with all information. I have tried to fill in the gaps by conversations with officers whom I know; this has resulted in some contradictory statements, and several points remain obscure, the accounts from the various ships not having all come in.<br />
<br />
Many episodes will therefore be explained later and may appear in a different light, but, as regards the broad outlines which are of chief importance, the picture of this interesting engagement is fairly clear. The accompanying plan of the action was made in haste for the Kaiser and will therefore need much correction.<br />
<br />
The spirit pervading the Fleet can only be described as one of enthusiasm; they are intoxicated with victory. The heavy load weighing on them all, the dear that this war might end without an encounter of the Fleets, have vanished. They have learnt what fighting really means, they know themselves to be superior to the enemy as regards tactics, and that they were following the right lines and have nothing to unlearn; they know that their gunfire was more effective than that of the enemy, and that they can rely implicitly on their flotillas which have always been looked upon in the German Navy as one of the chief factors in an action. Finally they know that their largest ships can stand heavy fire and serious damage, that they leave nothing to be desired as regards construction and cannot be sunk easily. In short, they feel that the British, in spite of all their boasting, cannot overcome the German Fleet and have a considerable respect for it.<br />
<br />
This conviction imbues the whole Fleet, down to the last man, with confidence in their strength and a calm assurance regarding future encounters. At the same time they are free from over-confidence and from under-estimation of the enemy. On the contrary, the British fire-control and the enormous piercing power of their heavy shell at great distances have roused their admiration, so that a careless conception of the situation is not to be feared, the less so, as well-balanced minds such as those of Admiral Scheer and his Staff are unlikely to be led away by former successes to undertake rash enterprises in the future.<br />
<br />
They do not deny that they were extraordinarily fortunate, and that if the action had been prosecuted with energy on the British side, and if the "Nelson touch" had been in evidence, things might have gone very badly for Germany, especially as the British still had an intact Battle Squadron of 12 units at their disposal which had not yet taken part in the action. But they console themselves with the knowledge that no naval action was ever won without some stroke of luck.<br />
<br />
The Kaiser's visit, the day before my arrival, and his address to the Fleet gave great satisfaction, and subsequently many important personages arrive to inspect the ships, such as Prince Henry and the Grand Dukes of Mecklenburg and Oldenburg, and numbers of decorations were distributed. Vice-Admiral Scheer was promoted to Admiral, and he and Vice-Admiral Hipper received the Pour le Merite.<br />
<br />
I also visited Rear-Admiral Behncke, who was wounded and in hospital; his wounds are slight, a few small splinters in his head, elbow and knee, and he will probably soon be well again.<br />
<br />
<center><u>COURSE OF THE ACTION.</u></center><br />
<br />
The Commander-in-Chief intended to advance with the whole Fleet to the waters of the Skagerrak, in order to make his presence felt unpleasantly by disturbing the shipping, hoping thereby to lure on the British forces and in this manner to be in a position to attack a part of the British Fleet with superior or at least with equal forces. He reckoned that any movements of the British Fleet would be reported to him in good time by the submarines which had been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and he hoped that the airships would prove a better means of reconnoitring than any possessed by the enemy.<br />
<br />
Unfavourable weather prevented him for a considerable period from undertaking any operations, and, as the submarines were to return home on 1 June and be relieved by a new group, the 31 May was the last date for carrying out the planned advance.<br />
<br />
The cruisers left the Jade at 3 a.m., the Main Fleet at 4 a.m., steering an easterly course, and then, after passing Heligoland, a N.N.W'ly course. No reports were received from submarines. These were stationed chiefly off the Orkneys and the Firth of Forth, and the large group of Flanders boats were off the Thames and at the entrance to the Channel. <br />
<br />
While proceeding northwards, a few W/T messages were received, but they were corrupt, appeared to refer only to small formations and gave no clue to the movements of the Grand Fleet. The airships were unable to start in the morning, on account of the wind, and, as it blew hard throughout the day in the Heligoland Bight, they could not start until the early hours of 1 June. In this respect things did not go well, but Admiral Scheer decided nevertheless to continue on his course to the Skagerrak. <br />
<br />
This the account given by Captain von Trotha, who affirms that nothing was known of the presence of the British Fleet in the waters of the Skagerrak, and that there seemed no probability of encountering this Fleet before 1 June.<br />
<br />
There are some points here which I am unable to understand. The submarines are said to have been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and were to return home on 1 June to be relieved probably by a weaker group. For, If the same number of boats were to to keep watch off the English coast, why should 31 May have been the last day for the German Fleet to sail. The day of departure was, therefore, too late in any case, for, if no encounter was to be expected before 1 June, the boats stationed off the coast could not possibly encounter the damaged British ships, as was intended, for probably no damaged ships would be there before 2 June.<br />
<br />
The battleship "KONIG ALBERT" had to carry out repairs to her condensers and did not proceed with the Fleet. Von Trotha told me that there was no alternative and that a ship must carry out small overhauls regularly in a dockyard according to programme. But could it not be arranged, when one is taking the initiative, to choose one's moment for an advance and to have all the ships together for this short time? And why should just that moment be chosen when one of the most powerful ships of the "Kaiser" class is in the dockyard, instead, for instance, of one of the "Nassau" class with 11-in. guns.<br />
<br />
In addition, the "BAYERN" was to have joined up a few days later. After having waited so long, why should not the plan have been postponed for 2 or 3 weeks, instead of dispensing with the only ship carrying 15-in. guns.<br />
<br />
In the same manner they dispensed with air reconnaissance, from which they had expected so much.<br />
<br />
These considerations make me doubt whether the account given me is quite correct, and whether, on the contrary, they knew of certain movements of the British Fleet and considered the moment extremely favourable for an attack. Perhaps they only knew of Beatty's battle squadron, and thinking the Main Fleet was far away, hoped to entrap this squadron. In Berlin, they have much to say, even in military circles, about the British Fleet's intention to push through into the Baltic, and of Kitchener's mission having some connection with this. I consider this senseless, for it cannot be presemed [sic] that the British Fleet would leave their shores unprotected and do the Germans the favour of operating in the Baltic, which would certainly be a most advantageous area for the German Fleet. In any case, there appear to be discrepancies which will probably be explained at some later date.<br />
<br />
Scouting groups, battle cruisers and light cruisers, together with flotillas, preceded the Main Fleet by 50 - 60 miles. At 4 p.m. the light cruisers encountered some British battle cruisers. These at once opened fire on the light cruisers, at an estimated distance of 26,247 yds.; the range could be taken accurately. Though they did not obtain a hit, the salvoes fell so well that the German cruisers thought it advisable to turn away and fall back on their battle cruisers.<br />
<br />
As the British approached, these battle cruisers turned on to a southerly course, in order to lure the enemy on to the German Main Fleet. A running action, on a southerly course, ensued. The British were to starboard and to the west of the Germans, who had therefore the following advantage: in the North Sea, in summer, the western horizon is quite light and visibility towards the west is good, while towards the east, and in a still greater degree off the Jutland Coast, it is misty and visibility is bad and no silhouettes stand out against the eastern horizon. This phenomenon also played great part in the subsequent course of the action. The sun was still high and was not troublesome, and the British ships offered admirable targets. The sea was calm, the wind N.W. 1-2, altering subsequently through W. to S.W.<br />
<br />
The following British ships were recognised:-<br />
3 "Lion" class, 1 "Tiger" and 2 "Indefatigable" class; they were soon reinforced by 5 "Queen Elizabeth" class following astern.<br />
<br />
It is asserted that, judging from shell splinters, the ship of the "Tiger" class carried 15-in. guns, and that she was therefore the mysterious vessel which replaced the "TIGER" sunk on 24.1.15; as the last-named "TIGER" carried only 13.5-in.guns, this was taken as a further proof of her loss. The silhouette of the new "TIGER", however, is said to have resembled that of the old "TIGER" exactly. As the "Queen Elizabeths" soon opened fire also with 15-in. guns, I rather doubt this assertion regarding the "TIGER", and the various ships on this early part of the engagement are altogether somewhat at variance.<br />
<br />
On the German side the ships proceeded in the following sequence:- "LÜTZOW", Flagship of Vice-Admiral Hipper, "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN".<br />
<br />
As Hipper edged towards the enemy, the distance decreased to about 7655 yds. The German fire was unquestionably superior, but the speed of the British vessels was greater. After a short time the "INDEFATIGABLE" and "QUEEN MARY" blew up, and 2 battle-cruisers and two attacking destroyers were also accounted for. The "QUEEN MARY" must have been destroyed by the explosion of a magazine; she was torn in two halves, and a water-colour painted by an officer represents her enveloped in an enormous column of black smoke; she disappeared in a few seconds. Only one cadet was subsequently picked.<br />
<br />
The second battle cruiser disappeared under similar circumstances. The "VON DER TANN" claims to have accounted for one of these battle-cruisers by a broadside. But the "MOLTKE" fired 4 torpedoes and also claims this achievement.<br />
<br />
The Germans suffered very little during this phase of the action, the "MOLTKE" alone receiving hits on the starboard side. The fire of the British battle-cruisers is said not to have been nearly as good as that of the "QUEEN ELIZABETH" class later on.<br />
<br />
When they had approached the German Main Fleet, the British turned on to a contrary course and the German cruisers did the same. The German Main Fleet proceeded in divisions in starboard quarter-line, the 3rd Battle Squadron: 4 "König" class and 3 "Kaiser" class, Fleet Flagship, 1st Battle Squadron: 4 "Ostfriesland" class and 4 "Westfalen" class, and the 2nd Battle Squadron: 5 "Deutschland" class and the "Hessen". They endeavoured to effect a junction with the cruisers, but were unable to take part very effectually.<br />
<br />
The course of the action was now in a northerly direction, over the area which had just been traversed, and the British ships now drew ahead considerably and turned more and more towards the East; the Germans followed this movement, and in consequence the conditions of visibility became less and less favourable for them.<br />
<br />
The "Queen Elizabeths" now made their presence more greatly felt; one of them had dropped out, but I was unable to ascertain when this occurred.<br />
<br />
The course of the German Math Fleet at first led past the 2 disabled British destroyers, which were lying stopped. The crews had already taken to the boats and were picked up later on by German destroyers. As the Main Fleet was doubtful about the advisability of passing the destroyers while they were still afloat, they were sunk by a few broadsides. One of the officers who was picked up was in pyjamas and is said to have stayed in his cabin during the action. He declared "We did not expect so much resistance," while another said - "The battle is rather disappointing." It has been ascertained that these destroyers were greatly under-manned; their crews seemed very exhausted, which points to their having been in the water for a long time.<br />
<br />
While on this easterly course, the light cruisers of the fast 2nd Scouting Group: "FRANKFURT", "PILLAU", "ELBING" and "WIESBADEN", were heavily fired on from the N.E. and E. without their being able to see more than the gun flashes. In addition, they were under continual fire from the N., and while turning away to S.E. and S., they ascertained that they were opposed by an interminable line of British ships, which appeared at first to be on a N.W.'ly course, and had then evidently turned together on to a S.'ly course.<br />
<br />
It may be noted here that the battleships, and, generally speaking, the battle-cruisers also, never sighted the British Main Fleet, and saw nothing but the flashes of the guns and the effects of the fire. These British ships, about 25 in number, were only sighted by a few light cruisers and by the flotillas, and were counted by them as accurately as possible.<br />
<br />
Surrounded thus from the N. and the E. and under fire, the "WIESBADEN" was disabled, apparently by a hit in the engine-room. The Admiral noticed, it is true, that his leading ships must have encountered new and powerful forces and that they were turning away; but he thought it his duty to go to the assistance of the "WIESBADEN" and therefore continued on an easterly course.<br />
<br />
The van of the Main Fleet, led by the "KÖNIG" (Rear-Admiral Behncke) now came under heavy fire from right ahead; the "KÖNIG" turned away under this fire towards the S.E., whereupon the Commander-in-Chief ordered the whole line to "turn together" to starboard and gave up the idea of helping the "WIESBADEN". About this time Vice-Admiral Hipper transferred his flag from the "LÜTZOW" to the "MOLTKE" with the help of a destroyer, his W/T station being damaged.<br />
<br />
Hardly had the Main Fleet drawn away on a westerly course, before it was ascertained that the pressure was relaxing and the fire decreasing, and that the British were no longer pursuing so hotly. Scheer therefore ordered the ships to "turn together" back on to their former course, and made the signal 'R' = 'Engage the enemy'. This second advance may be termed the zenith of the action. Admiral Scheer gave his views on it approximately as follows:- "Those who make a study of this engagement will be very puzzled as to my object in advancing thus against the wall of British ships. The fact is that I had no particular object. I made the first advance because I had a feeling that I ought to endeavour to assist the "WIESBADEN" and because the situation ahead was quite obscure to me, for I saw nothing of the "LÜTZOW" and received no W/T reports. I soon saw, however, that the leading ships were coming under an overwhelming fire, and that I could not risk the Fleet on the "WIESBADEN'S" account. When I noticed that the British pressure had quite ceased and that the Fleet remained intact in my hands, I turned back, under the impression that the action could not end in this way and that I ought to seek contact with the enemy again."<br />
<br />
The situation during the first and second advances may serve as an example of what should not take place according to all the laws of tactics, for it could not have been worse; von Trotha said jokingly that, if an Admiral brought about such a situation at a war game or in manoeuvres, he would never be entrusted without another command. In the North, the "Queen Elizabeths", then the battle-cruisers, and from N.E. through E. to S.E., an endless line of battleships formed an arc round the German van and kept it under fire. Evidently it had fallen into the most perfect trap. In addition to this unfavourable tactical position, there was a further difficulty, namely that the German ships could be clearly distinguished while they themselves only saw the gun flashes, 4 or 5 to each salvo, but could find no target.<br />
<br />
The Gunnery Officer of the "MARKGRAF" told me that he could not fire at all during half-an-hour, and that they were at the mercy of the British broadsides. Critical though the position was, in theory, they think that experience justifies the conclusion that this 'crossing the T' is in reality not so disastrous at longer ranges; for, in spite of the enormous superiority of their fire, the British made comparatively few hits, the simple reason being that, when fire is thus concentrated on a few leading ships, there can be no question of improving the shooting by spotting.<br />
<br />
Given good tactical training and squadrons which work well together, it is always easy to retire rapidly from an unfavourable position and even possibly to reach an advantageous one.<br />
<br />
The small amount of damage sustained by the Main Fleet may be owing partly to the fact that the leading battle-cruisers drew the enemy's fire, thus relieving the battleships. Only the three leading ships, "KÖNIG", "GROSSER KURFÜRST" and "MARKGRAF" received several hits; while among all the other ships, the "KAISER", "HELGOLAND" and the "SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN" received one hit each, and the rest were not hit at all.<br />
<br />
Simultaneously with the battle-cruisers, which were ahead and pressing forward in quarter-line formation, the 6th and 9th Flotillas, left by the "REGENSBURG", also proceeded to a torpedo attack. Regarding this cruiser advance, the Commanding Officer of the "SEYDLITZ" told me that he was in such a position that he was able to avoid the British salvoes, for he altered course towards the point where each salvo fell and thus evaded the spotting correction.<br />
<br />
This torpedo attack was carried out with great determination and seems to have been completely successful, although nobody is able to state how many hits were obtained. The British ships overlapped somewhat and their line was almost unbroken, and, as about 100 torpedoes were fired, it is estimates that there must have been a considerable number of hits, some people affirm that there were 20, but I do not place much confidence in these figures and it is useless to trouble about them as nobody is certain.<br />
<br />
The boats were fired on by guns of all calibres, even the heaviest, but with little effect, only one boat being destroyed; two other boats had been sunk in an earlier attack during the cruiser action.<br />
<br />
The battle-cruisers were also attacked by British torpedoes, the "SEYDLITZ" being hit once. The "MOLTKE" was lucky, for, when close to the ship, one torpedo apparently had a gyro failure and ran parallel with her. The "LÜTZOW" was probably hit also.<br />
<br />
After the attack, the destroyers laid fog and a heavy smoke screen, which interposed between the Fleet; this benefitted not only the heavily-damaged "LÜTZOW" and "DERFFLINGER", whose nets had been shot away and were hanging down, but also the whole Fleet. It may also have made an impression on the British.<br />
<br />
The German Main Fleet and cruisers turned on a westerly course, fire having again entirely ceased; and the ships of the Main Fleet then turned gradually in succession and in inverse sequence from W. to S.W., subsequently steering towards Horns Reef.<br />
<br />
It is not known what the British did; all that is certain, is that they did not follow in pursuit and that nothing further was seen of their Main Fleet. It remained light until 11 p.m. (summer time), and it would not have been impossible, considering their superior speed, for them to have come within firing range. The Germans expected it too, and now have to content themselves with surmises about the British Commander-in-Chief's reasons for not doing so. It is probably that the unfavourable issue of the fleet part of the battle and the demoralising losses in ships took away any desire on Jellicoe's part for further fighting. His Fleet may have lost heavily and been severely shaken by the torpedo attack; and, as the Germans still had some intact flotillas at their disposal, he may have feared further strong torpedo attacks in the critical hours of twilight, for in the German Navy they say that Jellicoe fears their destroyers in particular.<br />
<br />
Nevertheless, the Germans were not under the impression of having shaken the British Fleet to the extent of obliging them to give up the struggle, and when the evening passed without further incident, they reckoned with certainty on encountering Jellicoe off Horns Reef at daybreak. They were the more astonished at his non-appearance when their air reconnaissance reported that on the morning of 1 June a squadron of 12 battle-ships was proceeding North from the southern part of North Sea and that it suddenly turned on to an opposite course and proceeded South.<br />
<br />
As it could not possibly have been the intention of the British Commander-in-Chief to let the German Fleet escape after having encountered it at last far from its base, and as he still had an intact battle-squadron at his disposal, one is compelled to take the view that he no longer felt strong enough for a second encounter; the achievement of the German Fleet must therefore be very highly thought of.<br />
<br />
During the night cruising following the action, numerous small episodes and minor engagements took place, of which no clear idea can be formed. <br />
<br />
In view of a possible fresh attack or of a possible pursuit on the part of the enemy, it was thought undesirable to leave the 2nd Battle Squadron either in the van or in the rear, it therefore took station to starboard and at first proceeded on an opening course from the other squadrons, and continued fairly independently during the night.<br />
<br />
The 1st Battle Squadron therefore led, with the "WESTFALEN" as guide, and it was followed by the 3rd Battle Squadron.<br />
<br />
After the action had been broken off, the 4 remaining battle cruisers were ahead to port, where they were suddenly again brought under heavy fire from the port side and from ahead, apparently by 3 or 4 battle cruisers. It is presumed that these were the remaining 3 or 4 older cruisers of the "Invincible" class, which Jellicoe probably always stationed ahead of the Main Fleet, for it would hardly have been possible for the "Lions", which were following in the rear in the British line, to have taken station ahead so quickly. The German battle cruisers, all severely damaged, did not feel able to withstand this fire and turned away to starboard, passing ahead of the Main Fleet and between it and the 2nd Battle Squadron, which proceeded quietly on their course and before which the mysterious ships retired, not to be sighted again.<br />
<br />
The battle-cruisers then gradually fell astern, and as they were making much water, and also owing to their differing speeds, they lost contact with the Main Fleet and with each other.<br />
<br />
The "LÜTZOW" had dropped out during the engagement and proceeded independently, accompanied by 4 destroyers. At first she was able to steam 14 knots, but her speed decreased rapidly and dropped finally to 4 knots. Her bows sank slowly, and when the whole forecastle was under water the Commanding Officer decided to leave the ship. The badly wounded were transferred carefully to the boats and the disembarkation was conducted in good order. A torpedo was then fired at the ship and this coup de grace sank her in deep water at about 1 o'clock, I believe.<br />
<br />
The "SEYDLITZ" was hardly in a better condition than the "LÜTZOW"; she also sank gradually by the bows till the water was almost level with the deck, and she had a heavy list to port, but she continued on her course. In the darkest hours of the night she suddenly sighted 3 large ships to port, quite close to. She turned away, made a British recognition signal and was not pursued. As bad luck would have it, the steaming light had short-circuited, could not be switched off and showed intermittently.<br />
<br />
The "DERFFLINGER", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN" followed the Main Fleet more or less and met with no particular experiences.<br />
<br />
The Main Fleet had to repulse a series of destroyer attacks and was also engaged by cruisers. The movements of these British cruisers, which came up singly, are incomprehensible and give the impression of having lost their heads. They appear to have received the order, judging by an intercepted W/T message, to proceed on a northerly and north-westerly course, and thereby they ran into the extended German line which they probably imagined they had passed to the South.<br />
<br />
One large cruiser (?"WARRIOR") proceeded unsuspectingly within 875 yds. of the line of battleships and came under concentrated fire from several ships before she could reply, so that she blew up enveloped in flames and disappeared in 47 seconds. The "BIRMINGHAM" seems to have been accounted for in a similar manner. The destroyers all approached in a really insane manner; frequently not from ahead but from a direction astern, scattered, singly or in pairs, or at most 3 together, never in large numbers. Most of them were disabled forthwith by a few salvoes and set on fire. The "WESTFALEN" distinguished herself particularly at this time.<br />
<br />
These burning destroyers strewn along the course, lit it up as if for a festival. Evidently the fires were largely due to the light American and Mexican oils; at any rate German firing trials on oil bunkers never caused any such conflagrations.<br />
<br />
The attacking boats directed shrapnel fire on the searchlights with fairly good results, the searchlights of two battleships and one light cruiser being hit.<br />
<br />
One large destroyer, which only recognised the danger at the last moment and endeavoured to avoid it by altering course was rammed by the "NASSAU", which put her helm over for this purpose. The boat exploded internally and sank.<br />
<br />
The only ships hit were the "POMMERN" in the 2ns Battle Squadron, and the "ROSTOCK". The "POMMERN" blew up at once and nobody was saved. The "ROSTOCK" was just passing between ships of the Main Fleet when she was hit; the loss of life on board was small.<br />
<br />
The Germans believe they destroyed 11 British destroyers in all. The manner in which these destroyers were handled has not left a good impression on the whole, and one has certainly lost respect for this weapon. The view is also taken that the boats are too large and offer too wide a target.<br />
<br />
The light cruiser "ELBING", like the "ROSTOCK", apparently wanted to break through the line from port to starboard under pressure from the British cruisers; she was, however, rammed by the "POSEN" and had to be abandoned in a sinking condition. The Germans also fired a torpedo into her.<br />
<br />
The "FRAUENLOB" and 2 destroyers were lost during the night; no details of their loss are known.<br />
<br />
Not far from Heligoland, the "OSTFRIESLAND", 7th of the line, struck a mine. This brings the account of the chief events of this exciting cruiser to an end.<br />
<br />
The German flotillas were detached from the Fleet to clear the area off the Jutland Coast, which was divided up into sectors. The flotillas stationed furthest to the North proceeded to the Skagerrak and through these straits into the Baltic and to Kiel.<br />
<br />
None of the flotillas sighted the British Main Fleet again, which proves that it must have turned away to the N. or N.W. immediately after the action. According to confidential reports the Fleet entered British ports as early as 1 June.<br />
<br />
Two British battleships, in a severely damaged condition and accompanied by destroyers, were sighted proceeding back to England. One was attacked by a submarine, but without success.<br />
<br />
On the morning of 1 June, in fairly misty weather, a Zeppelin sighted groups of British ships leaving the Channel on a N.E.'ly course. The reports were rather vague, as sometimes 6 and sometimes 12 ships were mentioned; but it seems most likely that 12 battleships and 3 cruisers were in question, and that they soon retired. The airship, which flew low at one time to get a clearer view, was also fired on.<br />
<br />
Some of the ships are said to have had tripod masts.<br />
<br />
The German Fleet, with the exception of "SEYDLITZ", reached the Jade in the afternoon. The "SEYDLITZ" could not cross the bar on account of being so much down by the bows, and it was not till the next day at high water that she was towed in, stern first.<br />
<br />
<center><u>MISCELLANEOUS.<br>TACTICS.</u></center><br />
<br />
The Germans ascribe their success to various causes, and in the first place to their own superiority as regards tactics. This is a point which every officer discusses, and it is constantly repeated that it all happened just as in tactical manoeuvres and in "battle exercises", and that things could not have gone better.<br />
<br />
Movements of squadrons, divisions and individual ships, "turns together" and alterations of course and speed, all went like clockwork and demonstrated the very great mobility of all formations.<br />
<br />
The W/T signalling system of the Main Fleet never failed, and its failure would have been immaterial, as the primary and secondary flag action signals, showing from several positions in the ship, were made simultaneously.<br />
<br />
All this was due to the peace training and the practical experience of the Flag Officers and Captains. Though in peace time the Commander-in-Chief had never commanded a Fleet, nor the Admirals a squadron, still the training carried out on the same lines for a number of years resulted in everything proceeding with the expected precision.<br />
<br />
The British, on the contrary, are said to have displayed a certain clumsiness as regards tactics and to have preferred turning together when "turning on to an opposite course" (Wendungen im Gegenmarsch), though this conclusion does not seem altogether justified from the description of the action.<br />
<br />
The ships kept station 547 yds. apart, and Vice-Admiral Schmidt told me that, in his opinion, this distance is too small for large ships and that he prefers 656 yds., as the shorter distances result in the ships getting bunched and overlapping during alterations of course. In order to relieve this during the first turn to starboard, the Fleet Flagship herself turned to port and then closed gradually into line. At night the distance was 656 yds.<br />
<br />
No interruption of W/T communication was occasioned by the enemy.<br />
<br />
<center><u>GUNNERY</u></center><br />
<br />
It is admitted that the British are superior as regards their gunnery technique. Their salvoes fall most astoundingly close together and aroused admiration on all sides. Some people affirm that they fell too close together, and that it was consequently difficult to cover a sufficiently large danger space.<br />
<br />
This is particularly the case with the heaviest calibres: 13.5-in. and 15-in. and the battle-cruisers' fire was noticeably inferior to that of the "Queen Elizabeth" class, for example.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> Literal translation; the meaning is not clear. - Tr.] The spread of the salvoes frequently only covered a few square yards. In the "KÖNIG" 3 rounds, out of a salvo of 4 rounds, hit between the capstan and the bridge.<br />
<br />
This is attributed to careful calibration, which the British have studied for a long time and which, as is well known, was abandoned by the German Navy after a few trials. The gunnery officers declare unanimously that it must unquestionably be re-introduced.<br />
<br />
The British range-finders are superior to the German, and the construction of their turrets enables them to shoot at ranges impossible for German guns. The question of range appears to be immaterial to the British, who fire at any range so long as visibility permits.<br />
<br />
The Germans are fully convinced of the great superiority of 15-in. guns over all others, and deplore the fact that, owing to the predominant conservative tendencies in the German Navy, this calibre was not introduced until so lately. Vice-Admiral Gerdes, the Head of the Armament Department, is responsible for this, for he always opposed it on the ground that the poor visibility in German waters and the consequent short ranges rendered an increase of calibre useless; he considered the German 12-in. gun to be an altogether superior weapon, capable of competing with every other.<br />
<br />
In one respect the British seem behindhand as compared with the Germans: namely that they cannot alter range quickly enough and they are too dependent on the range clock. The British rely on steady fire at long range, and they adapt their tactics to this and avoid alterations of course and range most assiduously.<br />
<br />
The Germans, on the contrary, in their firing practices always work with big and rapid alterations of range and exercise firing while turning, so that the gunnery officers consider they have an advantage in this respect.<br />
<br />
The Turn on to an opposite course was certainly not advantageous for the German Fleet, but in this particular instance it made little difference, as the German ships were already unable to find a target; besides which, it must have disconcerted the British and it prevented them from obtaining good results with their fire. The salvoes fell very close together round the ships, but few hits were obtained. The rate of fire in the British ships is said to have been fair, but not excessive. Some people affirm that it was very modest.<br />
<br />
The British shell had great penetrating power, and from all reasonable distances the main armour was generally pierced clean through. The shell splinters picked up prove conclusively that at least 2 kinds of shell were used, differing considerably in material and quality. One kind of shell had a very thick wall and an extremely small explosive charge, it might almost be called a solid shot. It seems to have broken up frequently without exploding and the fuse did not function. Its explosive power, if it possessed any at all, was quite inconsiderable, and it is presumed that the explosives used was not high explosive.<br />
<br />
It appears from the splinters of these 15-in. shell that the wall was 6.3 - 6.7 ins. (16 - 17 cm.), so that the hollow space cannot measure more than 2.4 ins. - 1.8 ins. (4 - 6 cm.). It is true that the large pieces into which these shell broke pierced everything in their course and often went right through the whole ship, unless they struck an armoured part. Several intact heads were found, with and without caps, and also entire bases.<br />
<br />
The second kind of shell had considerably thinner walls, only about half as thick, but it also often broke up into quite large pieces and displayed no great explosive power, and little or no incendiary power.<br />
<br />
It appears therefore that the British aimed only at attaining penetrating power, and the Germans are of opinion that they do not possess (rohrsicheren)* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D.Note.- This appears to be a special fuse which is very delicate, but safe until it has left the gun.] fuses for high explosive shell; this was their opinion before the war also.<br />
<br />
They believe that the high explosive power of the German ammunition gives them a great advantage which may partly counterbalance the smaller calibre of their guns and perhaps also their inferior gunnery. In any case, the effect of the German shell at the point of impact was very considerable.<br />
<br />
The fact that the ships blew up must be attributed to explosions in their magazines. (In this connection one may recall a turret of the "SEYDLITZ" being hit in the action of 24 January, 1915; see my report No.47 ex 15). The turret armour must have been pierced and the shells in the turret must have been exploded. The British have no metal cartridge-cases and also no cartridge-holders such as the Germans have, but they keep their cartridges in locked boxes which are perhaps not flash-proof enough. It seems therefore, from the incident experienced by the "SEYDLITZ", that this must constitute a particular danger to British ships. In this last action also turrets in German ships were frequently hit; further details are given in the account of damage sustained.<br />
<br />
After having compared the hits received in the German ships with the observations of results on enemy targets, it may be safely affirmed that the explosive power of the German shells exceeds that of the British; this was already known after the action of 24 January 1915. The Germans are therefore very much annoyed that they had no 15-in. guns to fire, as they are persuaded that ships so knocked about (eingedeckte) as, for example, the "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" would have been completely destroyed by German shell.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. Note.- The writer appears to mean that if German 15-in. shell had been used against "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" these ships would have been sunk.]<br />
<br />
It may be noted here that the "BAYERN", the first of their ships to carry 15-in. guns, will not join the Fleet for another few days, and the "BADEN" not until the autumn.<br />
<br />
Medium armament played no part, only a few hits were obtained and they did little damage.<br />
<br />
The British fired part-salvoes, like the Germans; full salvoes may have been fired now and again.<br />
<br />
The method of repulsing destroyer attacks, which has previously been reported, namely the 'turning away' and firing on one, or at most two boats, proved to be sound, and the repulsing of attacks both by day and night offered no difficulties.<br />
<br />
As regards gunnery, it may also be mentioned that the fire-control apparatus worked without a hitch and withstood the heaviest shocks. The elevation pointers worked admirably. A few ships were not yet fitted with them.<br />
<br />
<center><u>Torpedo.</u></center><br />
<br />
As regards torpedo work the Germans consider themselves very much superior. There were prolonged discussions about depriving Flotilla Leaders of their independence and putting them under the orders of a Leader Ship, but they are now convinced that this is necessary to ensure the flotillas attacking at the right moment and all together.<br />
<br />
The flotillas were led by the 2 leader Ships "ROSTOCK" and "REGENSBURG", the first having 2 flotillas and the second 3 flotillas allocated to them. The remaining 2 flotillas accompanied the Main Fleet or the battle-cruisers. The leaders carried out their duties with great daring and circumspection. The attacks of the British were weak and scattered, and could therefore have little or only occasional success.<br />
<br />
The German 2nd Flotilla, composed of the larger 1500 ton boats were held back instead of being sent to attack. Although these boats are spoken of very highly and are indispensable for certain enterprises, the view is now taken that they are too large and too valuable to be used for attacking during an action. This Flotilla proceeded to Zeebrugge immediately after the action and arrived there safely. It is to be employed in preventing the British from blockading the harbour with nets, and thus make it impossible for the German submarines to proceed out.<br />
<br />
As far as I have heard, the "MOLTKE" alone of the larger ships fired 4 torpedoes.<br />
<br />
Submarines were not in evidence. No German submarines were present; on the other hand a German destroyer claims to have rammed a British submarine. This claim appears to be erroneous, at least it was declared to be nonsense by the Chief of Staff. The submarines failed as regards scouting and also doing the pursuit.<br />
<br />
Some people state that a British aeroplane was sighted to the northward, and that it had apparently risen from a cruiser. It played no part in the action.<br />
<br />
The use of "Höschter"* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. note:- Probably the name of the inventor.] fog seems to have been of good service, it and the smoke made by the destroyers having completely masked the Main Fleet and its movements at critical moments.<br />
<br />
<center><u>SPEED</u></center><br />
<br />
The advantage of speed lay entirely with the British, not only as regards the Main Fleet on account of the "Deutschland" class, but also as regards the battle-cruisers. The latter are said to have proved considerably faster than the German battle cruisers, an unpleasant experience which had already been made on 25 January 1915. This alone proves that the British are talking nonsense when they assert that the German Fleet sought safety in flight; on the contrary, it was far from its bases and entirely in the power of the British, who either did not wish to take advantage of their superior speed, or were unable to do so on account of the damage sustained. The visibility was no worse than it had been during the day and Jellicoe may have even welcomed the "Höschter" fog which would enable him to plead bad visibility as a reason for abandoning the pursuit. On the German side in the light of experience the factor of speed in the battleships is considered very important. But the moderate depths of the German harbours limits the draught of the ships, and make it particularly difficult for German builders to do much in this respect. In spite of greater length and higher horse power the most modern cruisers "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ" and "LÜTZOW" attained only a quite inconsiderable increase of speed in comparison with the older "GOEBEN" class, and proved a disappointment in this particular.<br />
<br />
The question whether the older battleships should take part in an important engagement was not easy to decide. The 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons composed of the "WITTLESBACH" and "BARBAROSSA" class, re-commissioned at the beginning of the war, were intended to be used in such actions, but have long since been paid off; some have been disarmed and employed as guardships and instructional ships, etc. It was considered however, that the 2nd Battle Squadron, composed of the most modern of the older ships, would be of some service in the action; but this squadron was in a privileged position, inasmuch as it was merely attached to the 1st and 3rd Battle Squadrons and its Admiral was allowed to operate independently and select the position he thought best. On this occasion it kept station quite well and did not prove a hindrance, but, on the other hand, it did not come under any heavy fire. This must be considered very fortunate, for, in view of the damage sustained by other ships and in view of the fact that the British shell pierced all armour above or below water even at the longest range, it is certain that every ship of this class would have been sunk by a few hits, as their internal sub-division is not proof against large inrushes of water.<br />
<br />
The loss of the "Pommern", which gives the British an opportunity for a hollow triumph, also teaches a clear lesson. The Chief of Staff told me that they will probably consider carefully before again exposing this Squadron to danger; therefore this action will have further confirmed the complete worthlessness of all Dreadnought types [sic] and will condemn them as old iron.<br />
<br />
<center><u>TORPEDO NETS.</u></center><br />
<br />
The torpedo nets of the battle cruisers are all badly damaged and the gear so knocked about by gunfire that they were almost useless. This was particularly the case with the "Derfflinger", where the after port nets were hanging in the water, and would have fallen across the propeller had they not chanced to remain held up by a temporary lashing. The ship was obliged to stop during the action to secure the nets, and they might easily have occasioned the loss of the ship.<br />
<br />
For this reason all the nets, together with the booms, were unshipped immediately after the ships' return, to everybody's satisfaction. They will not be carried any more, except perhaps for operations in the Baltic, where the ships may be obliged to anchor at sea.<br />
<br />
<center><u>LEAK-STOPPING SERVICE.</u></center><br />
<br />
The leak-stopping service which had been systematically developed, worked admirably and the Germans are convinced that they owe much to it. They believed that the "Seydlitz" could not have been brought in if the strengthening of the bulkheads, etc., had not been so thoroughly exercised and if the personnel had not been so well trained.<br />
<br />
It is also said, that in the "Lutzow", which had only been in commission for 2 months, was naturally not up to the mark in this respect, and that it is not impossible that small shortcomings, for which of course nobody can be blamed, were responsible for the ship sinking. The "Lutzow" was an unfortunate ship altogether. First her turbines collapsed, thus delaying her commissioning for 6 months, then she immediately struck a mine, and she was hardly out of dockyard hands before she was sunk.<br />
<br />
<center><u>DANGER FROM GAS FUMES.</u></center><br />
<br />
Only 2 days before sailing, a large number of the ships, and fortunately exactly those that came most under fire, namely battle-cruisers and the 3rd Squadron, were supplied with gas masks fitted with alkali cartridges for the whole crew and a plentiful reserve (in the "Seydlitz" 1500 masks for about 1200 men). The masks are similar to those used in the army for poisonous gases. Each man carries a mask slung round him, if he is not actually wearing it.<br />
<br />
I was told emphatically by all the officers, that, in their experience, these masks are absolutely necessary and not only saved many lives but enabled the men to carry on in parts of the ship which they would otherwise have been compelled to leave.<br />
<br />
The gases from shells, mines and torpedoes penetrate in an incredible manner through ventilators, telephone leads, etc. to compartments far away from the point of impact. In many cases the masks enabled large numbers of the guns' crews to escape from turrets that were hit, and to help out others who were badly wounded. In one case the men in one of the main engine rooms were able to remain at their posts after gas had penetrated, until the engine-room was ventilated.<br />
<br />
The Fleet breathing apparatus (Flottenathmer) is preferable to masks in some cases, but it cannot be supplied to everyone and it hampers one's movements, which the masks do not.<br />
<br />
On account of the great danger from gases, it is also advisable to fit hinged flaps in all shafts, and to have wooden bungs to fit the voice-pipes, keeping a hammer at hand to hammer them into the mouth-pieces.<br />
<br />
They tell me that it proved very useful to keep all the personnel employed below, such as in central control rooms, engine-rooms, torpedo flats, etc. continually informed of what was going on. The men get nervous, particularly at first, with the tremendous shocks caused by shell falling close to the ship, though the shocks are felt less on deck, and such information gives them confidence and they like knowing what is going on above them.<br />
<br />
<center><u>DAMAGE</u></center><br />
<br />
The distribution of ships needing repair in the various dockyards is as follows:-<br />
<br />
The "König" proceeded at once to Kiel and is under repair at Howaldt's yard. I did not see her.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" and "Moltke" in Blohm and Voss yard, Hamburg, the first in the Imperial Dock.<br />
<br />
The "Kurfürst["] in Vulkan Yard, Hamburg.<br />
<br />
The "Derfflinger" was first docked in Wilhelmshaven and the leaks temporarily stopped, she then proceeded to the Imperial dockyard, Kiel. The "Seydlitz" will now be docked in the large dock at Wilhelmshaven; during my stay the "Seydlitz" was still in the lock.<br />
<br />
The "Von der Tann", "Ostfriesland" and "Helgoland" will be repaired in dry docks in Wilhelmshaven. No other large ships require to be docked.<br />
<br />
"<u>Seydlitz</u>" The number of hits was still uncertain, as the whole forepart of the ship up to the upper deck was still under water, and it is not known what she looks like below water. The ship was brought into the lock with difficulty, and as she is 43 ft. down by the bows, she cannot be taken into harbour. They will not venture to dock the ship inside the lock, and intend first to raise her bows slightly.<br />
<br />
The roof and guns of the fore turret and anchors, cables etc., have already been unshipped, and they now intend to bring caissons alongside and pump out the fore part sufficiently to enable her to enter the harbour.<br />
<br />
The great inrush of water, that flooded more or less the whole fore part of the ship as far as the first boiler-room bulkhead, was caused by a number of hits. Firstly, one of the belt armour plates forward on the port side is missing, having fallen off. Secondly, there are believed to be at least 2 or 3 more hits below water, forward on the port side; for the list and the settling down had already become ominous when the ship was hit at the edge of the upper deck, port side, abreast the bridge; this was followed by an inrush of water in the battery deck, which did a great amount of damage.<br />
<br />
In addition, during the day action, she was hit by a torpedo on the starboard side under the forward 5.9 in. gun, which caused her to settle down still more by the bows. This gun was so much damaged by the shock from underneath as to be disabled.<br />
<br />
Further, there are 4 severe hits in the ship's side (mess deck, port side, forward of the turret), which also demolished the port capstan.<br />
<br />
These shell, or shell splinters, naturally penetrated to the armoured deck, so that the entire fore part of the ship above and below the armoured deck is holed in many places, allowing free passage for the water. The fore part of the ship was struck therefore by at least 8 or 9 shells and one torpedo.<br />
<br />
Apparently the only compartments which are not flooded, are the bow torpedo flats and the central control room. The former is being pumped out continuously, as a great deal of water is flowing in from above. The torpedo control room had to be abandoned, as the forward partition was not watertight. The central control room abaft this was not abandoned, but of its 2 entrances from the starboard and port passages, only the port one can be used, as the starboard one is flooded.<br />
<br />
The gunnery control room is far further aft and was not affected.<br />
<br />
The ship has a list of 7° to port, and as she has now been slightly raised, about 1¾ ft. of her bows are above water; at one time it was up to the level of the deck.<br />
<br />
While under way the forward boiler room bulkhead had to withstand most of the pressure; supports have been built up everywhere, but it leaks in places.<br />
<br />
The other hits of consequences were those in the turrets. The fore starboard turret No.2 received a direct hit on the fore face of the revolving structure. One curved plate was forced out, but fortunately the main effect of the explosion was outward. The right hand gun was disabled by slight damage to the mounting; with this exception the turret remained in action and kept up fire.<br />
<br />
The right hand gun of turret No.3 received a direct hit, which cut out a wide groove along the tube of the gun. The left hand gun continued to fire.<br />
<br />
The barbette of turret No.4 was hit on a level with the rammer, and the armour was pierced clean through. This hit is of special interest, as the "Seydlitz" received a similar hit and at the same level in turret No.5 on 24th January 1915, which caused a fire, disabled both the after turrets and killed all the guns' crews. This last time, however, the damage was slight. There was no ready ammunition in the turret, and only one cartridge was exploded, in contrast to the (6200 Kg.) 13,670 lbs. of powder on Jan.1915. The turret officer and a large number of the gun's crews were saved by their gas masks. The destruction caused by splinters was, however, considerable and the turret was abandoned, as it was not possible to continue fire from it. This was a 13.5 in. shell, at 15,310 yds. range, strength of armour pierced 8.6 inches.<br />
<br />
After the turret had been abandoned, it was hit a second time in the after side of the revolving part, which was pierced; this of course increased the havoc in the interior.<br />
<br />
Turret No.5 was hit in the roof. The shell richochetted, and the roof is slightly dented. Nobody was hurt and the turret continued to fire.<br />
<br />
In the "Seydlitz" therefore, all the turrets were hit, with the exception of the foremost turret, and one was hit twice.<br />
<br />
A further hit pierced the 5.9 in. (150mm.) casemate armour of the aftermost 5.9 in. starboard gun, No.2. The deck was pierced from beneath, and splinters also pierced the splinter bulkhead. The gun was disabled and all the crew were killed, with the exception of the ship's chaplain who happened to be in the casemate and must be watched over by a special guardian angel.<br />
<br />
A similar hit, with a 15 in. shell, struck the casemate armour of the 6-in. gun No.7 and exploded in the casemate. Men were killed, the gun was disabled and the splinter bulkhead pierced by large splinters. This time again, surprise was aroused by the comparatively small damage caused by a large calibre shell.<br />
<br />
"<u>Derfflinger</u>". One shell hit the armour belt forward of the hawse pipe, probably at the junction of 2 plates, as 2 plates broke away. The plates underneath were consequently strained apart and a great deal of water flowed in.<br />
<br />
The armour belt on the port side also received 2 further hits in the centre and was pierced clean through. The splinters penetrated more than half way through the ship, and in one case a piece of plating was driven half way though the ship. These hits, combined perhaps with others, destroyed the nets and their supports in several places.<br />
<br />
The two after turrets received direct hits, in one case on the roof, in the other case in the barbette above the deck; the armour was pierced and the upper portions of the turrets burnt out and severely damaged, but the flames did not penetrate to the magazines. The crew in the upper part of the turret were killed, and both turrets were disabled. This occurred at an early stage of the action.<br />
<br />
The guns at high elevation cannot yet be dismounted, as everything is wedged in, but they do not appear to be damaged.<br />
<br />
The muzzles were carried away off the 4 foremost 6 in. (15 cm.) guns on the port side; two of them probably having been accounted for by one and the same shell which hit the armour. One gun, the muzzle of which was perhaps damaged by a splinter, afterwards burst, the tube splitting open in the shape of a tulip.<br />
<br />
The "Derfflinger" received a few other hits of no particular interest. She appears the next most severely damaged ship after the "Lützow".<br />
<br />
The "<u>Moltke</u>" only received 5 hits, all of them during that part of the action which took place on a southerly course; while the cruisers mentioned above received most of the hits on the port side, consequently during the later stages of the action.<br />
<br />
One shell pieced the bulwarks in the after part of the ship above the armour, passed through the ship and struck the armour on the port side from inside, about 3.3 ft. below the water-line. One plate was forced out and is missing. The inrush of water was considerable. The after compartments, above the armoured deck which remained intact, were all more or less flooded.<br />
<br />
The second hit was further forward, below the armour belt. The shell exploded in a bunker, but the armoured deck held and no water penetrated it from below. The neighbouring bunkers made little water and could be pumped out.<br />
<br />
Another shell struck the 5.9 in. armour in the upper bunker, above the water-line. The armoured deck again held, but the inner wall of the bunker parted, and the battery deck was pierced from below, a 6 in. gun being damaged and disabled.<br />
<br />
In the fore part of the ship a shell struck the armour belt below the water-line. The plate remained intact and was driven in about 8 inches. The compartment was flooded, but the torpedo bulkhead remained watertight. A neighbouring compartment leaked slightly, the rivets having parted.<br />
<br />
The fifth case of damage, namely a plate beneath the armour belt being driven and pressed in, was probably not due to a direct hit, but to splinters of a shell which fell short.<br />
<br />
"<u>Von der Tann</u>". A shell hit and pierced the lower part of the 3.9 in. armour belt in the after part of the ship to starboard. The compartments above the armoured deck, and some of those on the deck above, were flooded. The chief effect of the shell was outside the ship, but it bent the plates below the otherwise undamaged armoured deck, so that a considerable amount of water flowed into the compartments below the armoured deck. The after torpedo flat was flooded half way up, and the men in the starboard steering engine room were shut in for a long time owing to the exits being blocked.<br />
<br />
The fore turret was hit on the starboard side on the upper edge of the barbette and a semi-circular armour plate was forced out. The machinery of the turret was so badly knocked about that the turret was disabled.<br />
<br />
The hydraulic piping was damaged, so that all the heavy armament was put out of action temporarily. Strangely enough, though men were wounded none were killed.<br />
<br />
The aftermost turret was hit in the barbette. The armour was pierced, but the effect of the shell was exterior, the turret sustained little internal damage, so that the handgear of the turret remained in action. The turret was wedged in one place and could not revolve; they succeeded, however, in cutting off with oxy-acetylene the piece of revolving part which was jammed against the inner side of the barbette thus getting rid of the obstruction.<br />
<br />
Outside the turret, the shell did considerable damage; some splinters striking downwards, bent the armoured deck and pierced it in places. As far as I know, the armoured deck sustained no further damage, and this was of little importance.<br />
<br />
The after conning-tower was hit and a piece of the armour torn away; the occupants, including the 3rd gunnery officer, were killed. Splinters struck downwards to the engine-room ventilation hatches, but were stopped by the armoured gratings.<br />
<br />
"<u>Ostfriesland"</u> was struck by a mine below the foremost port turret. The whole measures 197 ft.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. note:- Literal translation is 12 times 5 metres large.] The torpedo bulkhead is only slightly torn, and the inrush of water was only local.<br />
<br />
"<u>Helgoland</u>". A 13.5 in. shell hit the 7.9 in. armour belt forward on the port side and pierced it. The shell appears to have broken only as no explosive action can be traced. The range was about 14,217 yds.<br />
<br />
"<u>Nassau</u>" rammed a British destroyer, or rather, the destroyer ran into her forward on the port side. Her bows must have lifted right up, for her hawse-pipe remained on board the "Nassau", so firmly wedged into the side of the upper deck that it will have to be cut out. The "Nassau's" side below the deck is torn away for 33 ft. The destroyer then glanced off the "Nassau's" side and exploded internally. One of the crew remained behind in one of the nets, but fell into the water when the "Nassau" fired a salvo.<br />
<br />
The "Nassau" was hit by shrapnel from attacking destroyers in the foremost searchlight group, both port searchlights were put out of action. The searchlight control and electric cables were destroyed and many of the searchlight crews were killed. The after searchlight group was hit in a similar manner, and one of the searchlights was disabled.<br />
<br />
The "Rhineland" and a light cruiser were also hit in a similar manner.<br />
<br />
I have seen all the above mentioned ships in Wilhelmshaven.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" and "Kurfürst" were at Hamburg, but unfortunately I am unable to report much about them. They had already been under repair for several days, and the damage was to some extent made good. Besides this, the conditions were not favourable for undisturbed examination: commissioners from the Imperial Navy Office were on board, besides crowds of workmen, the noise was deafening and it was pouring with rain. Consequently I took no notes on the spot and relied on my memory, which however fails me now among the very many received of similar cases. I am therefore unable to report each hit with accuracy.<br />
<br />
This is immaterial, however, as there were no particularly interesting hits, and none of the ships had been hit in the turrets. The armour had been pierced in several places, the effect and character of the hits being similar in all cases; the hits on unarmoured parts were of little consequence.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" was hit aft on the port side of the water line just on a junction of two plates, a piece of equal size being torn away from each plate. The shell then struck the sloping part of the armoured deck and the splinters ricochetted and passed right through the ship. These plates have already been removed.<br />
<br />
A casemate was pierced and the gun disabled.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" is the only ship whose mast was hit, the mast remained standing and has now been removed.<br />
<br />
The spotting platform had to be abandoned, as communications with the conning tower was cut off. This was the only hit received in a conning tower; it only grazed the upper edge and glanced off, and the men inside hardly noticed it.<br />
<br />
The port engine was disabled, not in consequence of damage to the turbine which is in good condition, but owing to one of the main propeller bearings becoming overheated. The cause of this is not clear, but it is believed to be due to concussions. The ship was well able to keep station with her two remaining engines.<br />
<br />
The "<u>Kurfürst</u>" suffered especially from a great inrush of water forward on the port side, above the armoured deck; it was caused by a hit in the armour belt. No further damage of importance was sustained.<br />
<br />
With regard to time necessary for repair to these ships, it is not yet possible to say anything definite, as it is still undecided whether they shall undergo thorough repair or not. The chief difficulty is the manufacture of new armour plates; but some of the holed plates can, no doubt, be left in position for the present.<br />
<br />
A considerable time will be needed to repair some of the turrets of the battle-cruisers, but here too, they will contrive to get things done. For instance, the "Von der Tann" is to have an entire turret out of a ship of the "Nassau" class, probably the foremost turret, and this ship will be left without a turret for some time. They talk a great deal also of transferring guns, and they will perhaps make use of those intended for the "Hindenburg", which will not be completed will the late autumn.<br />
<br />
It may be presumed that the battleships will be ready for sea in 4-6 weeks, and the battle-cruisers, particularly the "Seydlitz", in not less than 4 months. Naturally work is going on day and night, and repairs are given priority over all new construction.<br />
<br />
The damage sustained by light cruisers and destroyers is inconsiderable. The "Hamburg" had a funnel shot away. As these ships seem to be of minor importance, I did not trouble further about them.<br />
<br />
As our Allies appear not to have the intention of communicating to us what effect the examination of damages sustained will have on their construction in the future, we must endeavour to ascertain this as time goes on by means of cross questioning and by studying their new constructions in detail. I do not feel called upon to draw premature and rash conclusions to-day, on the strength of impressions received, but this will not prevent me from giving a summary of my opinion and of the opinions expresses in my hearing.<br />
<br />
Firstly, it is a remarkable fact that in all the ships that have returned home, all the engine and boiler-rooms are undamaged; the "Lützow" is no exception to this, as she proceeded under her own steam until late in the night after the action. I have also been assured by the Imperial Navy Office, after an inspection carried out by the Chief Engineer, that not a single auxiliary engine was defective. The only boiler-room put out of action was the foremost one in the "Seydlitz" where the bulkhead gave a little, allowing water to penetrate through rivet holes and cracks when the ship was under way. The conclusion may therefore be drawn that these vital parts of the ship are sufficiently protected and that the armour belt of the usual German thicknesses, though it cannot stop the shells, at least fulfils its purpose by breaking them up. Consequently it has become almost impossible even for the largest splinters of 15 in. shell to penetrate through armoured deck or torpedo bulkhead in engine and boiler rooms.<br />
<br />
Even at these long ranges and steep angles there was no question of the armoured decks being pierced; but the fitting of strong gratings over the hatches, which prevented the engines of the "Von der Tann" from sustaining severe damage, appears very necessary.<br />
<br />
The torpedo bulkheads also resisted shells, mines and torpedoes effectually; and in cases where slight damage was sustained, it had no further consequences than the flooding of the compartment affected.<br />
<br />
Perhaps it would be advisable to construct a specially strong boiler-room bulkhead, similar to a torpedo bulkhead, so that it could not be damaged by splinters or water-pressure.<br />
<br />
The inspection of the "Seydlitz" has left me with the impression that the commanding officer of the "Seydlitz" expected rather too much of his ship, and that nothing short of extraordinary good luck enabled her to be brought back. At one time when the whole forepart of the ship was flooded and the bows were under water, he proceeded occasionally with revolutions for 22 knots, just in order to show how seaworthy his ship was, so he told me. This may have been very sporting, or perhaps it may have been necessary under the circumstances in order not to drop too far behind and be overtaken by the enemy, but it certainly was not good seamanship, and if his stokehold bulkhead had burst, the "Seydlitz" would have gone down like the "Lutzow", where the circumstances appear to have been very similar. Later on he decreased speed and finally proceeded stern first.<br />
<br />
I therefore think it not impossible that the loss of the "Lützow", which is said to have been proceeded at 14 knots for a time, was also due only to recklessly high speed, and that the ship might have been saved if she had proceeded stern first or been taken in tow.<br />
<br />
As the danger from water-pressure must always be greatest from ahead, it would certainly be advisable to take special preventative measures against it.<br />
<br />
Vice-Admiral Schmidt told me that, in his opinion, the armoured belt ought to be strongest in the centre, and possible in the afterpart to protect the steering engines, and possibly in the bows, but that it ought not to taper off gradually from the centre to the extremities. He was also entirely in favour of a protected upper deck forming a second armoured deck.<br />
<br />
The admirably thorough system of internal division in the German ships and the floating capability thus attained is the finest proof of the merit of German construction which pursued this aim, and it shows that Admiral von Tirpitz, the creator of the Battle Fleet of to-day, was right when he upheld the principle that, above all things, the ships must be capable of remaining afloat and must not sink or heel over, and that everything else is of secondary consideration.<br />
<br />
The large number of hits in the turrets is remarkable, and it is generally considered that the turret armour should be appreciably stronger, especially in the lower part of the barbettes; for it is not only the disablement of the guns that comes into question, serious though this might be, but also the blowing up of magazines and the total destruction of the ship, as the wide shaft down to the magazines cannot possibly be made completely flash-proof. This is the most vital part of the ship. It is only owing to the small explosive charges in British shells, that there were no explosions of magazines in the German ships.<br />
<br />
Everything possible had been done after the action of 24.1.15 to ensure protection against this danger; the ready ammunition was removed from the top of the hoists and wherever possible all the openings in shafts leading down below were fitted with flaps, covers and heavy asbestos mats, while German ammunition is particularly carefully stowed and packed in cases with screwed-on covers.<br />
<br />
The disasters on the British side are a proof that this is a question of the greatest importance. It must also be taken into consideration that while any other damage turret may take months.<br />
<br />
The numerous hits in turrets would appear to justify the opinion of those who decided against triple turrets, on the ground [sic] that if one was disabled it would put too many heavy guns out of action.<br />
<br />
A hit in a casemate will of course destroy it and disable the gun, but this is of little consequence. Care must be taken here also not to have any ready ammunition, and to close the ammunition hand-up hermetically with heavy asbestos mats at the magazine end also. With the German "Paternoster" (dredger hoist) the ammunition lifts this mat as it comes up and the mat then falls to and closes the opening, which is a practical arrangement.<br />
<br />
Other hits through unarmoured parts, which destroyed more or less small gear and at the first glance give an impression of terrible havoc, are really of no consequence.<br />
<br />
In the "Von der Tann" they wanted to flood a turret magazine. This was impossible, as the flooding valve in the battery, or between deck was piled up with debris, cabin fittings, etc., and was inaccessible. Fortunately the flooding of the magazine turned out to be unnecessary. The Executive Officer remarked to me how critical such a trivial matter might become, and that one could not be careful enough about choosing the positions for the flooding valves, which must be kept clear of easily destructible objects.<br />
<br />
The man-hole covers in the decks, coal shoots [chutes], etc., were pointed out to me as dangerous, as they may be burst open by pressure of gas from below, thus causing damage and giving passage to the gases. These covers should be secured in a different manner and much more firmly.<br />
<br />
The flooding and draining system worked admirably, and is hardly capable of improvement. The only disadvantage is that the compartments above the armoured deck have no draining arrangements. This should be provided. A list, consequent on an inrush of water, could always be corrected by flooding an opposite compartment. This is an important matter both as affecting gunnery and personnel.<br />
<br />
The searchlights, which were not taken down in the German ships, all came out of the action undamaged; anxiety on their account was therefore unfounded. It was very unpleasant when attacking boats fired on the searchlights, and it is therefore considered necessary to fit light armour protection on the masts for the crews of the searchlight control and electric cables.<br />
<br />
Damage from flames is nowhere visible. The Germans are now rather amused at the care with which interior partitions were scraped.<br />
<br />
I could not help comparing the German ships with the Russian battleship "Orel", which I saw in Madzurn after the battle of Tsushima. If I remember rightly, the "Orel" had 5 severe hits and 40 hits with medium-calibre shell.<br />
<br />
The enormous explosive power of the Shimosa shell, which breaks up into minute splinters, did not do the slightest damage to the vital parts of the ship, but the upper deck was transformed into a confused heap of ruins. Superstructure, bridges, masts, funnels, etc., were destroyed, guns dismounted and fires started.<br />
<br />
Nothing of the kind is to be seen in the German ships, outwardly only a few more or less clean shell holes are visible, and they look so orderly and so little damaged that they do not appear to have gone through an action.<br />
<br />
It is true that the upper decks are said to have been littered with countless splinters, but they flew on to the decks from shells which struck the water, the ship receiving violent shocks.<br />
<br />
The holes in the armour show the characteristic concentric cracks round the hole and the radial splashes, the latter proving that the shells exploded on impact or at the latest, as they passed through. In many cases, as already noted, the force of the explosion was external and only pieces of plate, and possibly the head of the shell were driven in.<br />
<br />
<center><u>FLAG OFFICERS OF THE FLEET AND LEADERS</u></center><br />
<br />
{|<br />
| Commander-in-Chief:<br />
| Vice Admiral Scheer<br />
|-<br />
| <u>I Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Vice Admiral Schmidt<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Engelhard<br />
|-<br />
| <u>II Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Mauve<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Baron von Dalwigh<br />
|-<br />
| <u>III Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Behncke<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Nordmann<br />
|-<br />
| Officer commanding the Scouting Forces and<br>Commanding 1st Scouting Group<br />
| Vice Admiral Hipper<br />
|-<br />
| " 2nd " "<br />
| Rear Admiral Bodicker<br />
|-<br />
| " 4th " "<br />
| Commodore "Captain" v. Reuter<br />
|-<br />
| Leaders of Destroyers<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| in "Rostock"<br />
| Commodore "Captain" Michelsen<br />
|-<br />
| in Regensburg<br />
| Commodore "Captain" Heinrich<br />
|-<br />
| Leader of submarines<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| In Hamburg<br />
| Captain Bauer<br />
|}<br />
<br />
<center><u>REMARKS</u></center><br />
<br />
The lecture on the action, upon which this report is based, was illustrated by a plan prepared in haste for H.M. the Kaiser, and a copy was promised to me. But the Admiral Staff does not wish to part with this first incomplete draft, and the preparation of an accurate plan has not yet been completed, as the Admiral Staff is not yet in possession of all the details.<br />
<br />
In time to be included in this report I have only received the sketch of the first stage of the battle, namely the cruiser action on a southerly course, together with a small sketch of the situation when the action was broken off; both are enclosed.<br />
<br />
I conclude from the sketch of the cruiser action, that the accounts given to me were not quite accurate; for instance, the assertion of the commanding officer of the "Moltke" that the shortest range at that stage was 7,650 yds. and that he had accounted for one of the armoured cruisers with a torpedo.<br />
<br />
The sketch shows that the "Indefatigable" was probably first destroyed by gun fire from the "Von der Tann", and later the "Queen Mary" by gunfire from the "Derfflinger", and that the range was never less than 14,220 yds.<br />
<br />
The loss of "V. 27" and "V. 29" and of 4 British destroyers is also apparent, while I was only told of two.<br />
<br />
In the original sketch, 2 British armoured cruisers are also shown as having fallen out during this stage, but this is not shown on the accompanying sketch and probably took place later.<br />
<br />
I was told by the Admiral Staff that the accompanying sketches are not to be taken as strictly accurate.<br />
<br />
It is requested that the sketches and course of the action and the account of damages may be treated as strictly confidential.<br />
<br />
==Footnotes==<br />
{{reflist}}<br />
<br />
==Bibliography==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
*''Schematismus für das K.u.K. Heer und für die Kriegsmarine für 1914. Separatausgabe''. Wien: 1914.<br />
*''Almanach für die k. und k. Kriegsmarine 1917. Kriegsausgabe''. '''XXXVII'''. Pola: 1917.<br />
*[[Arthur Marder (Naval Historian)|Marder, Arthur J.]] (1966). ''From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919: Jutland and After, May 1916–December 1916''. '''Volume III'''. London: Oxford University Press.<br />
*{{MarderFDSFIII}}<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
==External Links==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
*[http://www.denkmalprojekt.org/2023/vl_marineoffiz_zahlmstr_feuerwerks_torpedooffiz_beamte_wk1.html "Halbstocks die Flagge!"] ''Onlineprojekt Gefallenendenkmäler''.<br />
*Krámli, Mihály. [http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-124.pdf "The Report on the Battle of Jutland by the Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché in Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Colloredo-Mannsfeld."] ''NavWeaps''.<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
[[Category:Battle of Jutland]]</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Attach%C3%A9_Report_on_the_Battle_of_Jutland&diff=334745Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland2024-03-12T08:26:20Z<p>Simon Harley: Oops.</p>
<hr />
<div>Soon after the [[Battle of Jutland]] on 31 May &ndash; 1 June 1916 the Naval Attaché of the [[Austro-Hungarian Navy|Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Navy]] at the embassy in Berlin, ''Fregattenkapitäne'' Hieronymus Graf von Colloredo-Mannsfeld,<ref>''Schematismus für das K.u.K. Heer und für die Kriegsmarine für 1914''. p. 1270. ''Almanach für die k. und k. Kriegsmarine 1917''. p. 668.</ref> visited the High Sea Fleet. He composed a report on the battle for his superiors using first-hand accounts, interspersed here and there with his own observations. The version reproduced here is a translation in English apparently made by the [[Naval Intelligence Division (Royal Navy)|Naval Intelligence Division]] in 1919 from a copy which was subsequently returned to "F.N.A.", presumably the French Naval Attaché. A copy of the translation then made its way into the papers of the British Cabinet, from where historian Arthur J. Marder obtained a copy which is in his papers.<ref>Original number N.I.D. 087/19. Marder papers, Special Collections and Archives, Langson Library, University of California, Irvine, MS-F002, Box 27.</ref> He does not appear to have used it for the 1966 edition of ''From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow'', Volume III, but certainly used it for the revised edition in 1978.<ref>The quote on p. 189 of the 1966 edition differs from that on p. 234 of the 1978 edition, which is identical to that used here.</ref> <br />
<br />
It is worth comparing this translation with that made by Hungarian historian Mihály Krámli of a post-war copy of a slightly different version of the report in a Hungarian archive which has been published on the ''NavWeaps'' online resource.<ref>Krámli, Mihály. [http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-124.pdf "The Report on the Battle of Jutland by the Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché in Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Colloredo-Mannsfeld."] ''NavWeaps''.</ref><br />
<br />
The original grammar and punctuation of the typescript has been reproduced here wherever possible.<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
From:- Austrian Naval Attache in Berlin.<br />
<br />
To:- Commander-in-Chief, Pola.<br />
<div style="float:right;">Berlin,<br>17 June, 1916.</div><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<center><u>NAVAL ENGAGEMENT OF 31 MAY 1916.</u></center><br />
<br />
The following is a report of the naval proceedings of 31 May - 1 June, 1916, and also of the damage sustained by the German Fleet.<br />
<br />
During my 3-days' visit to Wilhelmshaven, followed by a cursory examination of the "MARKGRAF" and "KURFURST" at Hamburg, I endeavoured to gain merely a general idea of the results of gunfire and concentrated my attention on the course of the action itself.<br />
Admiral Scheer, whom I only saw for a short time as he left for Kiel to attend the funeral of his borther-in-law [sic], Lieut.-Commander Mohr,<ref>Carl Mohr of the ''Hamburg''. Our thanks to Ruiz Mateo Lutzow for pointing this out on Facebook.[http://www.denkmalprojekt.org/2023/vl_marineoffiz_zahlmstr_feuerwerks_torpedooffiz_beamte_wk1.html "Halbstocks die Flagge!"] ''Onlineprojekt Gefallendenkmäler''.</ref> who was killed in the action, very kindly arranged that his Chief of Staff, Captain Trotha, should give me an account of the whole proceedings, illustrated by plans, and that I should be furnished with all information. I have tried to fill in the gaps by conversations with officers whom I know; this has resulted in some contradictory statements, and several points remain obscure, the accounts from the various ships not having all come in.<br />
<br />
Many episodes will therefore be explained later and may appear in a different light, but, as regards the broad outlines which are of chief importance, the picture of this interesting engagement is fairly clear. The accompanying plan of the action was made in haste for the Kaiser and will therefore need much correction.<br />
<br />
The spirit pervading the Fleet can only be described as one of enthusiasm; they are intoxicated with victory. The heavy load weighing on them all, the dear that this war might end without an encounter of the Fleets, have vanished. They have learnt what fighting really means, they know themselves to be superior to the enemy as regards tactics, and that they were following the right lines and have nothing to unlearn; they know that their gunfire was more effective than that of the enemy, and that they can rely implicitly on their flotillas which have always been looked upon in the German Navy as one of the chief factors in an action. Finally they know that their largest ships can stand heavy fire and serious damage, that they leave nothing to be desired as regards construction and cannot be sunk easily. In short, they feel that the British, in spite of all their boasting, cannot overcome the German Fleet and have a considerable respect for it.<br />
<br />
This conviction imbues the whole Fleet, down to the last man, with confidence in their strength and a calm assurance regarding future encounters. At the same time they are free from over-confidence and from under-estimation of the enemy. On the contrary, the British fire-control and the enormous piercing power of their heavy shell at great distances have roused their admiration, so that a careless conception of the situation is not to be feared, the less so, as well-balanced minds such as those of Admiral Scheer and his Staff are unlikely to be led away by former successes to undertake rash enterprises in the future.<br />
<br />
They do not deny that they were extraordinarily fortunate, and that if the action had been prosecuted with energy on the British side, and if the "Nelson touch" had been in evidence, things might have gone very badly for Germany, especially as the British still had an intact Battle Squadron of 12 units at their disposal which had not yet taken part in the action. But they console themselves with the knowledge that no naval action was ever won without some stroke of luck.<br />
<br />
The Kaiser's visit, the day before my arrival, and his address to the Fleet gave great satisfaction, and subsequently many important personages arrive to inspect the ships, such as Prince Henry and the Grand Dukes of Mecklenburg and Oldenburg, and numbers of decorations were distributed. Vice-Admiral Scheer was promoted to Admiral, and he and Vice-Admiral Hipper received the Pour le Merite.<br />
<br />
I also visited Rear-Admiral Behncke, who was wounded and in hospital; his wounds are slight, a few small splinters in his head, elbow and knee, and he will probably soon be well again.<br />
<br />
<center><u>COURSE OF THE ACTION.</u></center><br />
<br />
The Commander-in-Chief intended to advance with the whole Fleet to the waters of the Skagerrak, in order to make his presence felt unpleasantly by disturbing the shipping, hoping thereby to lure on the British forces and in this manner to be in a position to attack a part of the British Fleet with superior or at least with equal forces. He reckoned that any movements of the British Fleet would be reported to him in good time by the submarines which had been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and he hoped that the airships would prove a better means of reconnoitring than any possessed by the enemy.<br />
<br />
Unfavourable weather prevented him for a considerable period from undertaking any operations, and, as the submarines were to return home on 1 June and be relieved by a new group, the 31 May was the last date for carrying out the planned advance.<br />
<br />
The cruisers left the Jade at 3 a.m., the Main Fleet at 4 a.m., steering an easterly course, and then, after passing Heligoland, a N.N.W'ly course. No reports were received from submarines. These were stationed chiefly off the Orkneys and the Firth of Forth, and the large group of Flanders boats were off the Thames and at the entrance to the Channel. <br />
<br />
While proceeding northwards, a few W/T messages were received, but they were corrupt, appeared to refer only to small formations and gave no clue to the movements of the Grand Fleet. The airships were unable to start in the morning, on account of the wind, and, as it blew hard throughout the day in the Heligoland Bight, they could not start until the early hours of 1 June. In this respect things did not go well, but Admiral Scheer decided nevertheless to continue on his course to the Skagerrak. <br />
<br />
This the account given by Captain von Trotha, who affirms that nothing was known of the presence of the British Fleet in the waters of the Skagerrak, and that there seemed no probability of encountering this Fleet before 1 June.<br />
<br />
There are some points here which I am unable to understand. The submarines are said to have been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and were to return home on 1 June to be relieved probably by a weaker group. For, If the same number of boats were to to keep watch off the English coast, why should 31 May have been the last day for the German Fleet to sail. The day of departure was, therefore, too late in any case, for, if no encounter was to be expected before 1 June, the boats stationed off the coast could not possibly encounter the damaged British ships, as was intended, for probably no damaged ships would be there before 2 June.<br />
<br />
The battleship "KONIG ALBERT" had to carry out repairs to her condensers and did not proceed with the Fleet. Von Trotha told me that there was no alternative and that a ship must carry out small overhauls regularly in a dockyard according to programme. But could it not be arranged, when one is taking the initiative, to choose one's moment for an advance and to have all the ships together for this short time? And why should just that moment be chosen when one of the most powerful ships of the "Kaiser" class is in the dockyard, instead, for instance, of one of the "Nassau" class with 11-in. guns.<br />
<br />
In addition, the "BAYERN" was to have joined up a few days later. After having waited so long, why should not the plan have been postponed for 2 or 3 weeks, instead of dispensing with the only ship carrying 15-in. guns.<br />
<br />
In the same manner they dispensed with air reconnaissance, from which they had expected so much.<br />
<br />
These considerations make me doubt whether the account given me is quite correct, and whether, on the contrary, they knew of certain movements of the British Fleet and considered the moment extremely favourable for an attack. Perhaps they only knew of Beatty's battle squadron, and thinking the Main Fleet was far away, hoped to entrap this squadron. In Berlin, they have much to say, even in military circles, about the British Fleet's intention to push through into the Baltic, and of Kitchener's mission having some connection with this. I consider this senseless, for it cannot be presemed [sic] that the British Fleet would leave their shores unprotected and do the Germans the favour of operating in the Baltic, which would certainly be a most advantageous area for the German Fleet. In any case, there appear to be discrepancies which will probably be explained at some later date.<br />
<br />
Scouting groups, battle cruisers and light cruisers, together with flotillas, preceded the Main Fleet by 50 - 60 miles. At 4 p.m. the light cruisers encountered some British battle cruisers. These at once opened fire on the light cruisers, at an estimated distance of 26,247 yds.; the range could be taken accurately. Though they did not obtain a hit, the salvoes fell so well that the German cruisers thought it advisable to turn away and fall back on their battle cruisers.<br />
<br />
As the British approached, these battle cruisers turned on to a southerly course, in order to lure the enemy on to the German Main Fleet. A running action, on a southerly course, ensued. The British were to starboard and to the west of the Germans, who had therefore the following advantage: in the North Sea, in summer, the western horizon is quite light and visibility towards the west is good, while towards the east, and in a still greater degree off the Jutland Coast, it is misty and visibility is bad and no silhouettes stand out against the eastern horizon. This phenomenon also played great part in the subsequent course of the action. The sun was still high and was not troublesome, and the British ships offered admirable targets. The sea was calm, the wind N.W. 1-2, altering subsequently through W. to S.W.<br />
<br />
The following British ships were recognised:-<br />
3 "Lion" class, 1 "Tiger" and 2 "Indefatigable" class; they were soon reinforced by 5 "Queen Elizabeth" class following astern.<br />
<br />
It is asserted that, judging from shell splinters, the ship of the "Tiger" class carried 15-in. guns, and that she was therefore the mysterious vessel which replaced the "TIGER" sunk on 24.1.15; as the last-named "TIGER" carried only 13.5-in.guns, this was taken as a further proof of her loss. The silhouette of the new "TIGER", however, is said to have resembled that of the old "TIGER" exactly. As the "Queen Elizabeths" soon opened fire also with 15-in. guns, I rather doubt this assertion regarding the "TIGER", and the various ships on this early part of the engagement are altogether somewhat at variance.<br />
<br />
On the German side the ships proceeded in the following sequence:- "LÜTZOW", Flagship of Vice-Admiral Hipper, "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN".<br />
<br />
As Hipper edged towards the enemy, the distance decreased to about 7655 yds. The German fire was unquestionably superior, but the speed of the British vessels was greater. After a short time the "INDEFATIGABLE" and "QUEEN MARY" blew up, and 2 battle-cruisers and two attacking destroyers were also accounted for. The "QUEEN MARY" must have been destroyed by the explosion of a magazine; she was torn in two halves, and a water-colour painted by an officer represents her enveloped in an enormous column of black smoke; she disappeared in a few seconds. Only one cadet was subsequently picked.<br />
<br />
The second battle cruiser disappeared under similar circumstances. The "VON DER TANN" claims to have accounted for one of these battle-cruisers by a broadside. But the "MOLTKE" fired 4 torpedoes and also claims this achievement.<br />
<br />
The Germans suffered very little during this phase of the action, the "MOLTKE" alone receiving hits on the starboard side. The fire of the British battle-cruisers is said not to have been nearly as good as that of the "QUEEN ELIZABETH" class later on.<br />
<br />
When they had approached the German Main Fleet, the British turned on to a contrary course and the German cruisers did the same. The German Main Fleet proceeded in divisions in starboard quarter-line, the 3rd Battle Squadron: 4 "König" class and 3 "Kaiser" class, Fleet Flagship, 1st Battle Squadron: 4 "Ostfriesland" class and 4 "Westfalen" class, and the 2nd Battle Squadron: 5 "Deutschland" class and the "Hessen". They endeavoured to effect a junction with the cruisers, but were unable to take part very effectually.<br />
<br />
The course of the action was now in a northerly direction, over the area which had just been traversed, and the British ships now drew ahead considerably and turned more and more towards the East; the Germans followed this movement, and in consequence the conditions of visibility became less and less favourable for them.<br />
<br />
The "Queen Elizabeths" now made their presence more greatly felt; one of them had dropped out, but I was unable to ascertain when this occurred.<br />
<br />
The course of the German Math Fleet at first led past the 2 disabled British destroyers, which were lying stopped. The crews had already taken to the boats and were picked up later on by German destroyers. As the Main Fleet was doubtful about the advisability of passing the destroyers while they were still afloat, they were sunk by a few broadsides. One of the officers who was picked up was in pyjamas and is said to have stayed in his cabin during the action. He declared "We did not expect so much resistance," while another said - "The battle is rather disappointing." It has been ascertained that these destroyers were greatly under-manned; their crews seemed very exhausted, which points to their having been in the water for a long time.<br />
<br />
While on this easterly course, the light cruisers of the fast 2nd Scouting Group: "FRANKFURT", "PILLAU", "ELBING" and "WIESBADEN", were heavily fired on from the N.E. and E. without their being able to see more than the gun flashes. In addition, they were under continual fire from the N., and while turning away to S.E. and S., they ascertained that they were opposed by an interminable line of British ships, which appeared at first to be on a N.W.'ly course, and had then evidently turned together on to a S.'ly course.<br />
<br />
It may be noted here that the battleships, and, generally speaking, the battle-cruisers also, never sighted the British Main Fleet, and saw nothing but the flashes of the guns and the effects of the fire. These British ships, about 25 in number, were only sighted by a few light cruisers and by the flotillas, and were counted by them as accurately as possible.<br />
<br />
Surrounded thus from the N. and the E. and under fire, the "WIESBADEN" was disabled, apparently by a hit in the engine-room. The Admiral noticed, it is true, that his leading ships must have encountered new and powerful forces and that they were turning away; but he thought it his duty to go to the assistance of the "WIESBADEN" and therefore continued on an easterly course.<br />
<br />
The van of the Main Fleet, led by the "KÖNIG" (Rear-Admiral Behncke) now came under heavy fire from right ahead; the "KÖNIG" turned away under this fire towards the S.E., whereupon the Commander-in-Chief ordered the whole line to "turn together" to starboard and gave up the idea of helping the "WIESBADEN". About this time Vice-Admiral Hipper transferred his flag from the "LÜTZOW" to the "MOLTKE" with the help of a destroyer, his W/T station being damaged.<br />
<br />
Hardly had the Main Fleet drawn away on a westerly course, before it was ascertained that the pressure was relaxing and the fire decreasing, and that the British were no longer pursuing so hotly. Scheer therefore ordered the ships to "turn together" back on to their former course, and made the signal 'R' = 'Engage the enemy'. This second advance may be termed the zenith of the action. Admiral Scheer gave his views on it approximately as follows:- "Those who make a study of this engagement will be very puzzled as to my object in advancing thus against the wall of British ships. The fact is that I had no particular object. I made the first advance because I had a feeling that I ought to endeavour to assist the "WIESBADEN" and because the situation ahead was quite obscure to me, for I saw nothing of the "LÜTZOW" and received no W/T reports. I soon saw, however, that the leading ships were coming under an overwhelming fire, and that I could not risk the Fleet on the "WIESBADEN'S" account. When I noticed that the British pressure had quite ceased and that the Fleet remained intact in my hands, I turned back, under the impression that the action could not end in this way and that I ought to seek contact with the enemy again."<br />
<br />
The situation during the first and second advances may serve as an example of what should not take place according to all the laws of tactics, for it could not have been worse; von Trotha said jokingly that, if an Admiral brought about such a situation at a war game or in manoeuvres, he would never be entrusted without another command. In the North, the "Queen Elizabeths", then the battle-cruisers, and from N.E. through E. to S.E., an endless line of battleships formed an arc round the German van and kept it under fire. Evidently it had fallen into the most perfect trap. In addition to this unfavourable tactical position, there was a further difficulty, namely that the German ships could be clearly distinguished while they themselves only saw the gun flashes, 4 or 5 to each salvo, but could find no target.<br />
<br />
The Gunnery Officer of the "MARKGRAF" told me that he could not fire at all during half-an-hour, and that they were at the mercy of the British broadsides. Critical though the position was, in theory, they think that experience justifies the conclusion that this 'crossing the T' is in reality not so disastrous at longer ranges; for, in spite of the enormous superiority of their fire, the British made comparatively few hits, the simple reason being that, when fire is thus concentrated on a few leading ships, there can be no question of improving the shooting by spotting.<br />
<br />
Given good tactical training and squadrons which work well together, it is always easy to retire rapidly from an unfavourable position and even possibly to reach an advantageous one.<br />
<br />
The small amount of damage sustained by the Main Fleet may be owing partly to the fact that the leading battle-cruisers drew the enemy's fire, thus relieving the battleships. Only the three leading ships, "KÖNIG", "GROSSER KURFÜRST" and "MARKGRAF" received several hits; while among all the other ships, the "KAISER", "HELGOLAND" and the "SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN" received one hit each, and the rest were not hit at all.<br />
<br />
Simultaneously with the battle-cruisers, which were ahead and pressing forward in quarter-line formation, the 6th and 9th Flotillas, left by the "REGENSBURG", also proceeded to a torpedo attack. Regarding this cruiser advance, the Commanding Officer of the "SEYDLITZ" told me that he was in such a position that he was able to avoid the British salvoes, for he altered course towards the point where each salvo fell and thus evaded the spotting correction.<br />
<br />
This torpedo attack was carried out with great determination and seems to have been completely successful, although nobody is able to state how many hits were obtained. The British ships overlapped somewhat and their line was almost unbroken, and, as about 100 torpedoes were fired, it is estimates that there must have been a considerable number of hits, some people affirm that there were 20, but I do not place much confidence in these figures and it is useless to trouble about them as nobody is certain.<br />
<br />
The boats were fired on by guns of all calibres, even the heaviest, but with little effect, only one boat being destroyed; two other boats had been sunk in an earlier attack during the cruiser action.<br />
<br />
The battle-cruisers were also attacked by British torpedoes, the "SEYDLITZ" being hit once. The "MOLTKE" was lucky, for, when close to the ship, one torpedo apparently had a gyro failure and ran parallel with her. The "LÜTZOW" was probably hit also.<br />
<br />
After the attack, the destroyers laid fog and a heavy smoke screen, which interposed between the Fleet; this benefitted not only the heavily-damaged "LÜTZOW" and "DERFFLINGER", whose nets had been shot away and were hanging down, but also the whole Fleet. It may also have made an impression on the British.<br />
<br />
The German Main Fleet and cruisers turned on a westerly course, fire having again entirely ceased; and the ships of the Main Fleet then turned gradually in succession and in inverse sequence from W. to S.W., subsequently steering towards Horns Reef.<br />
<br />
It is not known what the British did; all that is certain, is that they did not follow in pursuit and that nothing further was seen of their Main Fleet. It remained light until 11 p.m. (summer time), and it would not have been impossible, considering their superior speed, for them to have come within firing range. The Germans expected it too, and now have to content themselves with surmises about the British Commander-in-Chief's reasons for not doing so. It is probably that the unfavourable issue of the fleet part of the battle and the demoralising losses in ships took away any desire on Jellicoe's part for further fighting. His Fleet may have lost heavily and been severely shaken by the torpedo attack; and, as the Germans still had some intact flotillas at their disposal, he may have feared further strong torpedo attacks in the critical hours of twilight, for in the German Navy they say that Jellicoe fears their destroyers in particular.<br />
<br />
Nevertheless, the Germans were not under the impression of having shaken the British Fleet to the extent of obliging them to give up the struggle, and when the evening passed without further incident, they reckoned with certainty on encountering Jellicoe off Horns Reef at daybreak. They were the more astonished at his non-appearance when their air reconnaissance reported that on the morning of 1 June a squadron of 12 battle-ships was proceeding North from the southern part of North Sea and that it suddenly turned on to an opposite course and proceeded South.<br />
<br />
As it could not possibly have been the intention of the British Commander-in-Chief to let the German Fleet escape after having encountered it at last far from its base, and as he still had an intact battle-squadron at his disposal, one is compelled to take the view that he no longer felt strong enough for a second encounter; the achievement of the German Fleet must therefore be very highly thought of.<br />
<br />
During the night cruising following the action, numerous small episodes and minor engagements took place, of which no clear idea can be formed. <br />
<br />
In view of a possible fresh attack or of a possible pursuit on the part of the enemy, it was thought undesirable to leave the 2nd Battle Squadron either in the van or in the rear, it therefore took station to starboard and at first proceeded on an opening course from the other squadrons, and continued fairly independently during the night.<br />
<br />
The 1st Battle Squadron therefore led, with the "WESTFALEN" as guide, and it was followed by the 3rd Battle Squadron.<br />
<br />
After the action had been broken off, the 4 remaining battle cruisers were ahead to port, where they were suddenly again brought under heavy fire from the port side and from ahead, apparently by 3 or 4 battle cruisers. It is presumed that these were the remaining 3 or 4 older cruisers of the "Invincible" class, which Jellicoe probably always stationed ahead of the Main Fleet, for it would hardly have been possible for the "Lions", which were following in the rear in the British line, to have taken station ahead so quickly. The German battle cruisers, all severely damaged, did not feel able to withstand this fire and turned away to starboard, passing ahead of the Main Fleet and between it and the 2nd Battle Squadron, which proceeded quietly on their course and before which the mysterious ships retired, not to be sighted again.<br />
<br />
The battle-cruisers then gradually fell astern, and as they were making much water, and also owing to their differing speeds, they lost contact with the Main Fleet and with each other.<br />
<br />
The "LÜTZOW" had dropped out during the engagement and proceeded independently, accompanied by 4 destroyers. At first she was able to steam 14 knots, but her speed decreased rapidly and dropped finally to 4 knots. Her bows sank slowly, and when the whole forecastle was under water the Commanding Officer decided to leave the ship. The badly wounded were transferred carefully to the boats and the disembarkation was conducted in good order. A torpedo was then fired at the ship and this coup de grace sank her in deep water at about 1 o'clock, I believe.<br />
<br />
The "SEYDLITZ" was hardly in a better condition than the "LÜTZOW"; she also sank gradually by the bows till the water was almost level with the deck, and she had a heavy list to port, but she continued on her course. In the darkest hours of the night she suddenly sighted 3 large ships to port, quite close to. She turned away, made a British recognition signal and was not pursued. As bad luck would have it, the steaming light had short-circuited, could not be switched off and showed intermittently.<br />
<br />
The "DERFFLINGER", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN" followed the Main Fleet more or less and met with no particular experiences.<br />
<br />
The Main Fleet had to repulse a series of destroyer attacks and was also engaged by cruisers. The movements of these British cruisers, which came up singly, are incomprehensible and give the impression of having lost their heads. They appear to have received the order, judging by an intercepted W/T message, to proceed on a northerly and north-westerly course, and thereby they ran into the extended German line which they probably imagined they had passed to the South.<br />
<br />
One large cruiser (?"WARRIOR") proceeded unsuspectingly within 875 yds. of the line of battleships and came under concentrated fire from several ships before she could reply, so that she blew up enveloped in flames and disappeared in 47 seconds. The "BIRMINGHAM" seems to have been accounted for in a similar manner. The destroyers all approached in a really insane manner; frequently not from ahead but from a direction astern, scattered, singly or in pairs, or at most 3 together, never in large numbers. Most of them were disabled forthwith by a few salvoes and set on fire. The "WESTFALEN" distinguished herself particularly at this time.<br />
<br />
These burning destroyers strewn along the course, lit it up as if for a festival. Evidently the fires were largely due to the light American and Mexican oils; at any rate German firing trials on oil bunkers never caused any such conflagrations.<br />
<br />
The attacking boats directed shrapnel fire on the searchlights with fairly good results, the searchlights of two battleships and one light cruiser being hit.<br />
<br />
One large destroyer, which only recognised the danger at the last moment and endeavoured to avoid it by altering course was rammed by the "NASSAU", which put her helm over for this purpose. The boat exploded internally and sank.<br />
<br />
The only ships hit were the "POMMERN" in the 2ns Battle Squadron, and the "ROSTOCK". The "POMMERN" blew up at once and nobody was saved. The "ROSTOCK" was just passing between ships of the Main Fleet when she was hit; the loss of life on board was small.<br />
<br />
The Germans believe they destroyed 11 British destroyers in all. The manner in which these destroyers were handled has not left a good impression on the whole, and one has certainly lost respect for this weapon. The view is also taken that the boats are too large and offer too wide a target.<br />
<br />
The light cruiser "ELBING", like the "ROSTOCK", apparently wanted to break through the line from port to starboard under pressure from the British cruisers; she was, however, rammed by the "POSEN" and had to be abandoned in a sinking condition. The Germans also fired a torpedo into her.<br />
<br />
The "FRAUENLOB" and 2 destroyers were lost during the night; no details of their loss are known.<br />
<br />
Not far from Heligoland, the "OSTFRIESLAND", 7th of the line, struck a mine. This brings the account of the chief events of this exciting cruiser to an end.<br />
<br />
The German flotillas were detached from the Fleet to clear the area off the Jutland Coast, which was divided up into sectors. The flotillas stationed furthest to the North proceeded to the Skagerrak and through these straits into the Baltic and to Kiel.<br />
<br />
None of the flotillas sighted the British Main Fleet again, which proves that it must have turned away to the N. or N.W. immediately after the action. According to confidential reports the Fleet entered British ports as early as 1 June.<br />
<br />
Two British battleships, in a severely damaged condition and accompanied by destroyers, were sighted proceeding back to England. One was attacked by a submarine, but without success.<br />
<br />
On the morning of 1 June, in fairly misty weather, a Zeppelin sighted groups of British ships leaving the Channel on a N.E.'ly course. The reports were rather vague, as sometimes 6 and sometimes 12 ships were mentioned; but it seems most likely that 12 battleships and 3 cruisers were in question, and that they soon retired. The airship, which flew low at one time to get a clearer view, was also fired on.<br />
<br />
Some of the ships are said to have had tripod masts.<br />
<br />
The German Fleet, with the exception of "SEYDLITZ", reached the Jade in the afternoon. The "SEYDLITZ" could not cross the bar on account of being so much down by the bows, and it was not till the next day at high water that she was towed in, stern first.<br />
<br />
<center><u>MISCELLANEOUS.<br>TACTICS.</u></center><br />
<br />
The Germans ascribe their success to various causes, and in the first place to their own superiority as regards tactics. This is a point which every officer discusses, and it is constantly repeated that it all happened just as in tactical manoeuvres and in "battle exercises", and that things could not have gone better.<br />
<br />
Movements of squadrons, divisions and individual ships, "turns together" and alterations of course and speed, all went like clockwork and demonstrated the very great mobility of all formations.<br />
<br />
The W/T signalling system of the Main Fleet never failed, and its failure would have been immaterial, as the primary and secondary flag action signals, showing from several positions in the ship, were made simultaneously.<br />
<br />
All this was due to the peace training and the practical experience of the Flag Officers and Captains. Though in peace time the Commander-in-Chief had never commanded a Fleet, nor the Admirals a squadron, still the training carried out on the same lines for a number of years resulted in everything proceeding with the expected precision.<br />
<br />
The British, on the contrary, are said to have displayed a certain clumsiness as regards tactics and to have preferred turning together when "turning on to an opposite course" (Wendungen im Gegenmarsch), though this conclusion does not seem altogether justified from the description of the action.<br />
<br />
The ships kept station 547 yds. apart, and Vice-Admiral Schmidt told me that, in his opinion, this distance is too small for large ships and that he prefers 656 yds., as the shorter distances result in the ships getting bunched and overlapping during alterations of course. In order to relieve this during the first turn to starboard, the Fleet Flagship herself turned to port and then closed gradually into line. At night the distance was 656 yds.<br />
<br />
No interruption of W/T communication was occasioned by the enemy.<br />
<br />
<center><u>GUNNERY</u></center><br />
<br />
It is admitted that the British are superior as regards their gunnery technique. Their salvoes fall most astoundingly close together and aroused admiration on all sides. Some people affirm that they fell too close together, and that it was consequently difficult to cover a sufficiently large danger space.<br />
<br />
This is particularly the case with the heaviest calibres: 13.5-in. and 15-in. and the battle-cruisers' fire was noticeably inferior to that of the "Queen Elizabeth" class, for example.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> Literal translation; the meaning is not clear. - Tr.] The spread of the salvoes frequently only covered a few square yards. In the "KÖNIG" 3 rounds, out of a salvo of 4 rounds, hit between the capstan and the bridge.<br />
<br />
This is attributed to careful calibration, which the British have studied for a long time and which, as is well known, was abandoned by the German Navy after a few trials. The gunnery officers declare unanimously that it must unquestionably be re-introduced.<br />
<br />
The British range-finders are superior to the German, and the construction of their turrets enables them to shoot at ranges impossible for German guns. The question of range appears to be immaterial to the British, who fire at any range so long as visibility permits.<br />
<br />
The Germans are fully convinced of the great superiority of 15-in. guns over all others, and deplore the fact that, owing to the predominant conservative tendencies in the German Navy, this calibre was not introduced until so lately. Vice-Admiral Gerdes, the Head of the Armament Department, is responsible for this, for he always opposed it on the ground that the poor visibility in German waters and the consequent short ranges rendered an increase of calibre useless; he considered the German 12-in. gun to be an altogether superior weapon, capable of competing with every other.<br />
<br />
In one respect the British seem behindhand as compared with the Germans: namely that they cannot alter range quickly enough and they are too dependent on the range clock. The British rely on steady fire at long range, and they adapt their tactics to this and avoid alterations of course and range most assiduously.<br />
<br />
The Germans, on the contrary, in their firing practices always work with big and rapid alterations of range and exercise firing while turning, so that the gunnery officers consider they have an advantage in this respect.<br />
<br />
The Turn on to an opposite course was certainly not advantageous for the German Fleet, but in this particular instance it made little difference, as the German ships were already unable to find a target; besides which, it must have disconcerted the British and it prevented them from obtaining good results with their fire. The salvoes fell very close together round the ships, but few hits were obtained. The rate of fire in the British ships is said to have been fair, but not excessive. Some people affirm that it was very modest.<br />
<br />
The British shell had great penetrating power, and from all reasonable distances the main armour was generally pierced clean through. The shell splinters picked up prove conclusively that at least 2 kinds of shell were used, differing considerably in material and quality. One kind of shell had a very thick wall and an extremely small explosive charge, it might almost be called a solid shot. It seems to have broken up frequently without exploding and the fuse did not function. Its explosive power, if it possessed any at all, was quite inconsiderable, and it is presumed that the explosives used was not high explosive.<br />
<br />
It appears from the splinters of these 15-in. shell that the wall was 6.3 - 6.7 ins. (16 - 17 cm.), so that the hollow space cannot measure more than 2.4 ins. - 1.8 ins. (4 - 6 cm.). It is true that the large pieces into which these shell broke pierced everything in their course and often went right through the whole ship, unless they struck an armoured part. Several intact heads were found, with and without caps, and also entire bases.<br />
<br />
The second kind of shell had considerably thinner walls, only about half as thick, but it also often broke up into quite large pieces and displayed no great explosive power, and little or no incendiary power.<br />
<br />
It appears therefore that the British aimed only at attaining penetrating power, and the Germans are of opinion that they do not possess (rohrsicheren)* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D.Note.- This appears to be a special fuse which is very delicate, but safe until it has left the gun.] fuses for high explosive shell; this was their opinion before the war also.<br />
<br />
They believe that the high explosive power of the German ammunition gives them a great advantage which may partly counterbalance the smaller calibre of their guns and perhaps also their inferior gunnery. In any case, the effect of the German shell at the point of impact was very considerable.<br />
<br />
The fact that the ships blew up must be attributed to explosions in their magazines. (In this connection one may recall a turret of the "SEYDLITZ" being hit in the action of 24 January, 1915; see my report No.47 ex 15). The turret armour must have been pierced and the shells in the turret must have been exploded. The British have no metal cartridge-cases and also no cartridge-holders such as the Germans have, but they keep their cartridges in locked boxes which are perhaps not flash-proof enough. It seems therefore, from the incident experienced by the "SEYDLITZ", that this must constitute a particular danger to British ships. In this last action also turrets in German ships were frequently hit; further details are given in the account of damage sustained.<br />
<br />
After having compared the hits received in the German ships with the observations of results on enemy targets, it may be safely affirmed that the explosive power of the German shells exceeds that of the British; this was already known after the action of 24 January 1915. The Germans are therefore very much annoyed that they had no 15-in. guns to fire, as they are persuaded that ships so knocked about (eingedeckte) as, for example, the "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" would have been completely destroyed by German shell.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. Note.- The writer appears to mean that if German 15-in. shell had been used against "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" these ships would have been sunk.]<br />
<br />
It may be noted here that the "BAYERN", the first of their ships to carry 15-in. guns, will not join the Fleet for another few days, and the "BADEN" not until the autumn.<br />
<br />
Medium armament played no part, only a few hits were obtained and they did little damage.<br />
<br />
The British fired part-salvoes, like the Germans; full salvoes may have been fired now and again.<br />
<br />
The method of repulsing destroyer attacks, which has previously been reported, namely the 'turning away' and firing on one, or at most two boats, proved to be sound, and the repulsing of attacks both by day and night offered no difficulties.<br />
<br />
As regards gunnery, it may also be mentioned that the fire-control apparatus worked without a hitch and withstood the heaviest shocks. The elevation pointers worked admirably. A few ships were not yet fitted with them.<br />
<br />
<center><u>Torpedo.</u></center><br />
<br />
As regards torpedo work the Germans consider themselves very much superior. There were prolonged discussions about depriving Flotilla Leaders of their independence and putting them under the orders of a Leader Ship, but they are now convinced that this is necessary to ensure the flotillas attacking at the right moment and all together.<br />
<br />
The flotillas were led by the 2 leader Ships "ROSTOCK" and "REGENSBURG", the first having 2 flotillas and the second 3 flotillas allocated to them. The remaining 2 flotillas accompanied the Main Fleet or the battle-cruisers. The leaders carried out their duties with great daring and circumspection. The attacks of the British were weak and scattered, and could therefore have little or only occasional success.<br />
<br />
The German 2nd Flotilla, composed of the larger 1500 ton boats were held back instead of being sent to attack. Although these boats are spoken of very highly and are indispensable for certain enterprises, the view is now taken that they are too large and too valuable to be used for attacking during an action. This Flotilla proceeded to Zeebrugge immediately after the action and arrived there safely. It is to be employed in preventing the British from blockading the harbour with nets, and thus make it impossible for the German submarines to proceed out.<br />
<br />
As far as I have heard, the "MOLTKE" alone of the larger ships fired 4 torpedoes.<br />
<br />
Submarines were not in evidence. No German submarines were present; on the other hand a German destroyer claims to have rammed a British submarine. This claim appears to be erroneous, at least it was declared to be nonsense by the Chief of Staff. The submarines failed as regards scouting and also doing the pursuit.<br />
<br />
Some people state that a British aeroplane was sighted to the northward, and that it had apparently risen from a cruiser. It played no part in the action.<br />
<br />
The use of "Höschter"* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. note:- Probably the name of the inventor.] fog seems to have been of good service, it and the smoke made by the destroyers having completely masked the Main Fleet and its movements at critical moments.<br />
<br />
<center><u>SPEED</u></center><br />
<br />
The advantage of speed lay entirely with the British, not only as regards the Main Fleet on account of the "Deutschland" class, but also as regards the battle-cruisers. The latter are said to have proved considerably faster than the German battle cruisers, an unpleasant experience which had already been made on 25 January 1915. This alone proves that the British are talking nonsense when they assert that the German Fleet sought safety in flight; on the contrary, it was far from its bases and entirely in the power of the British, who either did not wish to take advantage of their superior speed, or were unable to do so on account of the damage sustained. The visibility was no worse than it had been during the day and Jellicoe may have even welcomed the "Höschter" fog which would enable him to plead bad visibility as a reason for abandoning the pursuit. On the German side in the light of experience the factor of speed in the battleships is considered very important. But the moderate depths of the German harbours limits the draught of the ships, and make it particularly difficult for German builders to do much in this respect. In spite of greater length and higher horse power the most modern cruisers "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ" and "LÜTZOW" attained only a quite inconsiderable increase of speed in comparison with the older "GOEBEN" class, and proved a disappointment in this particular.<br />
<br />
The question whether the older battleships should take part in an important engagement was not easy to decide. The 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons composed of the "WITTLESBACH" and "BARBAROSSA" class, re-commissioned at the beginning of the war, were intended to be used in such actions, but have long since been paid off; some have been disarmed and employed as guardships and instructional ships, etc. It was considered however, that the 2nd Battle Squadron, composed of the most modern of the older ships, would be of some service in the action; but this squadron was in a privileged position, inasmuch as it was merely attached to the 1st and 3rd Battle Squadrons and its Admiral was allowed to operate independently and select the position he thought best. On this occasion it kept station quite well and did not prove a hindrance, but, on the other hand, it did not come under any heavy fire. This must be considered very fortunate, for, in view of the damage sustained by other ships and in view of the fact that the British shell pierced all armour above or below water even at the longest range, it is certain that every ship of this class would have been sunk by a few hits, as their internal sub-division is not proof against large inrushes of water.<br />
<br />
The loss of the "Pommern", which gives the British an opportunity for a hollow triumph, also teaches a clear lesson. The Chief of Staff told me that they will probably consider carefully before again exposing this Squadron to danger; therefore this action will have further confirmed the complete worthlessness of all Dreadnought types [sic] and will condemn them as old iron.<br />
<br />
<center><u>TORPEDO NETS.</u></center><br />
<br />
The torpedo nets of the battle cruisers are all badly damaged and the gear so knocked about by gunfire that they were almost useless. This was particularly the case with the "Derfflinger", where the after port nets were hanging in the water, and would have fallen across the propeller had they not chanced to remain held up by a temporary lashing. The ship was obliged to stop during the action to secure the nets, and they might easily have occasioned the loss of the ship.<br />
<br />
For this reason all the nets, together with the booms, were unshipped immediately after the ships' return, to everybody's satisfaction. They will not be carried any more, except perhaps for operations in the Baltic, where the ships may be obliged to anchor at sea.<br />
<br />
<center><u>LEAK-STOPPING SERVICE.</u></center><br />
<br />
The leak-stopping service which had been systematically developed, worked admirably and the Germans are convinced that they owe much to it. They believed that the "Seydlitz" could not have been brought in if the strengthening of the bulkheads, etc., had not been so thoroughly exercised and if the personnel had not been so well trained.<br />
<br />
It is also said, that in the "Lutzow", which had only been in commission for 2 months, was naturally not up to the mark in this respect, and that it is not impossible that small shortcomings, for which of course nobody can be blamed, were responsible for the ship sinking. The "Lutzow" was an unfortunate ship altogether. First her turbines collapsed, thus delaying her commissioning for 6 months, then she immediately struck a mine, and she was hardly out of dockyard hands before she was sunk.<br />
<br />
<center><u>DANGER FROM GAS FUMES.</u></center><br />
<br />
Only 2 days before sailing, a large number of the ships, and fortunately exactly those that came most under fire, namely battle-cruisers and the 3rd Squadron, were supplied with gas masks fitted with alkali cartridges for the whole crew and a plentiful reserve (in the "Seydlitz" 1500 masks for about 1200 men). The masks are similar to those used in the army for poisonous gases. Each man carries a mask slung round him, if he is not actually wearing it.<br />
<br />
I was told emphatically by all the officers, that, in their experience, these masks are absolutely necessary and not only saved many lives but enabled the men to carry on in parts of the ship which they would otherwise have been compelled to leave.<br />
<br />
The gases from shells, mines and torpedoes penetrate in an incredible manner through ventilators, telephone leads, etc. to compartments far away from the point of impact. In many cases the masks enabled large numbers of the guns' crews to escape from turrets that were hit, and to help out others who were badly wounded. In one case the men in one of the main engine rooms were able to remain at their posts after gas had penetrated, until the engine-room was ventilated.<br />
<br />
The Fleet breathing apparatus (Flottenathmer) is preferable to masks in some cases, but it cannot be supplied to everyone and it hampers one's movements, which the masks do not.<br />
<br />
On account of the great danger from gases, it is also advisable to fit hinged flaps in all shafts, and to have wooden bungs to fit the voice-pipes, keeping a hammer at hand to hammer them into the mouth-pieces.<br />
<br />
They tell me that it proved very useful to keep all the personnel employed below, such as in central control rooms, engine-rooms, torpedo flats, etc. continually informed of what was going on. The men get nervous, particularly at first, with the tremendous shocks caused by shell falling close to the ship, though the shocks are felt less on deck, and such information gives them confidence and they like knowing what is going on above them.<br />
<br />
<center><u>DAMAGE</u></center><br />
<br />
The distribution of ships needing repair in the various dockyards is as follows:-<br />
<br />
The "König" proceeded at once to Kiel and is under repair at Howaldt's yard. I did not see her.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" and "Moltke" in Blohm and Voss yard, Hamburg, the first in the Imperial Dock.<br />
<br />
The "Kurfürst["] in Vulkan Yard, Hamburg.<br />
<br />
The "Derfflinger" was first docked in Wilhelmshaven and the leaks temporarily stopped, she then proceeded to the Imperial dockyard, Kiel. The "Seydlitz" will now be docked in the large dock at Wilhelmshaven; during my stay the "Seydlitz" was still in the lock.<br />
<br />
The "Von der Tann", "Ostfriesland" and "Helgoland" will be repaired in dry docks in Wilhelmshaven. No other large ships require to be docked.<br />
<br />
"<u>Seydlitz</u>" The number of hits was still uncertain, as the whole forepart of the ship up to the upper deck was still under water, and it is not known what she looks like below water. The ship was brought into the lock with difficulty, and as she is 43 ft. down by the bows, she cannot be taken into harbour. They will not venture to dock the ship inside the lock, and intend first to raise her bows slightly.<br />
<br />
The roof and guns of the fore turret and anchors, cables etc., have already been unshipped, and they now intend to bring caissons alongside and pump out the fore part sufficiently to enable her to enter the harbour.<br />
<br />
The great inrush of water, that flooded more or less the whole fore part of the ship as far as the first boiler-room bulkhead, was caused by a number of hits. Firstly, one of the belt armour plates forward on the port side is missing, having fallen off. Secondly, there are believed to be at least 2 or 3 more hits below water, forward on the port side; for the list and the settling down had already become ominous when the ship was hit at the edge of the upper deck, port side, abreast the bridge; this was followed by an inrush of water in the battery deck, which did a great amount of damage.<br />
<br />
In addition, during the day action, she was hit by a torpedo on the starboard side under the forward 5.9 in. gun, which caused her to settle down still more by the bows. This gun was so much damaged by the shock from underneath as to be disabled.<br />
<br />
Further, there are 4 severe hits in the ship's side (mess deck, port side, forward of the turret), which also demolished the port capstan.<br />
<br />
These shell, or shell splinters, naturally penetrated to the armoured deck, so that the entire fore part of the ship above and below the armoured deck is holed in many places, allowing free passage for the water. The fore part of the ship was struck therefore by at least 8 or 9 shells and one torpedo.<br />
<br />
Apparently the only compartments which are not flooded, are the bow torpedo flats and the central control room. The former is being pumped out continuously, as a great deal of water is flowing in from above. The torpedo control room had to be abandoned, as the forward partition was not watertight. The central control room abaft this was not abandoned, but of its 2 entrances from the starboard and port passages, only the port one can be used, as the starboard one is flooded.<br />
<br />
The gunnery control room is far further aft and was not affected.<br />
<br />
The ship has a list of 7° to port, and as she has now been slightly raised, about 1¾ ft. of her bows are above water; at one time it was up to the level of the deck.<br />
<br />
While under way the forward boiler room bulkhead had to withstand most of the pressure; supports have been built up everywhere, but it leaks in places.<br />
<br />
The other hits of consequences were those in the turrets. The fore starboard turret No.2 received a direct hit on the fore face of the revolving structure. One curved plate was forced out, but fortunately the main effect of the explosion was outward. The right hand gun was disabled by slight damage to the mounting; with this exception the turret remained in action and kept up fire.<br />
<br />
The right hand gun of turret No.3 received a direct hit, which cut out a wide groove along the tube of the gun. The left hand gun continued to fire.<br />
<br />
The barbette of turret No.4 was hit on a level with the rammer, and the armour was pierced clean through. This hit is of special interest, as the "Seydlitz" received a similar hit and at the same level in turret No.5 on 24th January 1915, which caused a fire, disabled both the after turrets and killed all the guns' crews. This last time, however, the damage was slight. There was no ready ammunition in the turret, and only one cartridge was exploded, in contrast to the (6200 Kg.) 13,670 lbs. of powder on Jan.1915. The turret officer and a large number of the gun's crews were saved by their gas masks. The destruction caused by splinters was, however, considerable and the turret was abandoned, as it was not possible to continue fire from it. This was a 13.5 in. shell, at 15,310 yds. range, strength of armour pierced 8.6 inches.<br />
<br />
After the turret had been abandoned, it was hit a second time in the after side of the revolving part, which was pierced; this of course increased the havoc in the interior.<br />
<br />
Turret No.5 was hit in the roof. The shell richochetted, and the roof is slightly dented. Nobody was hurt and the turret continued to fire.<br />
<br />
In the "Seydlitz" therefore, all the turrets were hit, with the exception of the foremost turret, and one was hit twice.<br />
<br />
A further hit pierced the 5.9 in. (150mm.) casemate armour of the aftermost 5.9 in. starboard gun, No.2. The deck was pierced from beneath, and splinters also pierced the splinter bulkhead. The gun was disabled and all the crew were killed, with the exception of the ship's chaplain who happened to be in the casemate and must be watched over by a special guardian angel.<br />
<br />
A similar hit, with a 15 in. shell, struck the casemate armour of the 6-in. gun No.7 and exploded in the casemate. Men were killed, the gun was disabled and the splinter bulkhead pierced by large splinters. This time again, surprise was aroused by the comparatively small damage caused by a large calibre shell.<br />
<br />
"<u>Derfflinger</u>". One shell hit the armour belt forward of the hawse pipe, probably at the junction of 2 plates, as 2 plates broke away. The plates underneath were consequently strained apart and a great deal of water flowed in.<br />
<br />
The armour belt on the port side also received 2 further hits in the centre and was pierced clean through. The splinters penetrated more than half way through the ship, and in one case a piece of plating was driven half way though the ship. These hits, combined perhaps with others, destroyed the nets and their supports in several places.<br />
<br />
The two after turrets received direct hits, in one case on the roof, in the other case in the barbette above the deck; the armour was pierced and the upper portions of the turrets burnt out and severely damaged, but the flames did not penetrate to the magazines. The crew in the upper part of the turret were killed, and both turrets were disabled. This occurred at an early stage of the action.<br />
<br />
The guns at high elevation cannot yet be dismounted, as everything is wedged in, but they do not appear to be damaged.<br />
<br />
The muzzles were carried away off the 4 foremost 6 in. (15 cm.) guns on the port side; two of them probably having been accounted for by one and the same shell which hit the armour. One gun, the muzzle of which was perhaps damaged by a splinter, afterwards burst, the tube splitting open in the shape of a tulip.<br />
<br />
The "Derfflinger" received a few other hits of no particular interest. She appears the next most severely damaged ship after the "Lützow".<br />
<br />
The "<u>Moltke</u>" only received 5 hits, all of them during that part of the action which took place on a southerly course; while the cruisers mentioned above received most of the hits on the port side, consequently during the later stages of the action.<br />
<br />
One shell pieced the bulwarks in the after part of the ship above the armour, passed through the ship and struck the armour on the port side from inside, about 3.3 ft. below the water-line. One plate was forced out and is missing. The inrush of water was considerable. The after compartments, above the armoured deck which remained intact, were all more or less flooded.<br />
<br />
The second hit was further forward, below the armour belt. The shell exploded in a bunker, but the armoured deck held and no water penetrated it from below. The neighbouring bunkers made little water and could be pumped out.<br />
<br />
Another shell struck the 5.9 in. armour in the upper bunker, above the water-line. The armoured deck again held, but the inner wall of the bunker parted, and the battery deck was pierced from below, a 6 in. gun being damaged and disabled.<br />
<br />
In the fore part of the ship a shell struck the armour belt below the water-line. The plate remained intact and was driven in about 8 inches. The compartment was flooded, but the torpedo bulkhead remained watertight. A neighbouring compartment leaked slightly, the rivets having parted.<br />
<br />
The fifth case of damage, namely a plate beneath the armour belt being driven and pressed in, was probably not due to a direct hit, but to splinters of a shell which fell short.<br />
<br />
"<u>Von der Tann</u>". A shell hit and pierced the lower part of the 3.9 in. armour belt in the after part of the ship to starboard. The compartments above the armoured deck, and some of those on the deck above, were flooded. The chief effect of the shell was outside the ship, but it bent the plates below the otherwise undamaged armoured deck, so that a considerable amount of water flowed into the compartments below the armoured deck. The after torpedo flat was flooded half way up, and the men in the starboard steering engine room were shut in for a long time owing to the exits being blocked.<br />
<br />
The fore turret was hit on the starboard side on the upper edge of the barbette and a semi-circular armour plate was forced out. The machinery of the turret was so badly knocked about that the turret was disabled.<br />
<br />
The hydraulic piping was damaged, so that all the heavy armament was put out of action temporarily. Strangely enough, though men were wounded none were killed.<br />
<br />
The aftermost turret was hit in the barbette. The armour was pierced, but the effect of the shell was exterior, the turret sustained little internal damage, so that the handgear of the turret remained in action. The turret was wedged in one place and could not revolve; they succeeded, however, in cutting off with oxy-acetylene the piece of revolving part which was jammed against the inner side of the barbette thus getting rid of the obstruction.<br />
<br />
Outside the turret, the shell did considerable damage; some splinters striking downwards, bent the armoured deck and pierced it in places. As far as I know, the armoured deck sustained no further damage, and this was of little importance.<br />
<br />
The after conning-tower was hit and a piece of the armour torn away; the occupants, including the 3rd gunnery officer, were killed. Splinters struck downwards to the engine-room ventilation hatches, but were stopped by the armoured gratings.<br />
<br />
"<u>Ostfriesland"</u> was struck by a mine below the foremost port turret. The whole measures 197 ft.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. note:- Literal translation is 12 times 5 metres large.] The torpedo bulkhead is only slightly torn, and the inrush of water was only local.<br />
<br />
"<u>Helgoland</u>". A 13.5 in. shell hit the 7.9 in. armour belt forward on the port side and pierced it. The shell appears to have broken only as no explosive action can be traced. The range was about 14,217 yds.<br />
<br />
"<u>Nassau</u>" rammed a British destroyer, or rather, the destroyer ran into her forward on the port side. Her bows must have lifted right up, for her hawse-pipe remained on board the "Nassau", so firmly wedged into the side of the upper deck that it will have to be cut out. The "Nassau's" side below the deck is torn away for 33 ft. The destroyer then glanced off the "Nassau's" side and exploded internally. One of the crew remained behind in one of the nets, but fell into the water when the "Nassau" fired a salvo.<br />
<br />
The "Nassau" was hit by shrapnel from attacking destroyers in the foremost searchlight group, both port searchlights were put out of action. The searchlight control and electric cables were destroyed and many of the searchlight crews were killed. The after searchlight group was hit in a similar manner, and one of the searchlights was disabled.<br />
<br />
The "Rhineland" and a light cruiser were also hit in a similar manner.<br />
<br />
I have seen all the above mentioned ships in Wilhelmshaven.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" and "Kurfürst" were at Hamburg, but unfortunately I am unable to report much about them. They had already been under repair for several days, and the damage was to some extent made good. Besides this, the conditions were not favourable for undisturbed examination: commissioners from the Imperial Navy Office were on board, besides crowds of workmen, the noise was deafening and it was pouring with rain. Consequently I took no notes on the spot and relied on my memory, which however fails me now among the very many received of similar cases. I am therefore unable to report each hit with accuracy.<br />
<br />
This is immaterial, however, as there were no particularly interesting hits, and none of the ships had been hit in the turrets. The armour had been pierced in several places, the effect and character of the hits being similar in all cases; the hits on unarmoured parts were of little consequence.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" was hit aft on the port side of the water line just on a junction of two plates, a piece of equal size being torn away from each plate. The shell then struck the sloping part of the armoured deck and the splinters ricochetted and passed right through the ship. These plates have already been removed.<br />
<br />
A casemate was pierced and the gun disabled.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" is the only ship whose mast was hit, the mast remained standing and has now been removed.<br />
<br />
The spotting platform had to be abandoned, as communications with the conning tower was cut off. This was the only hit received in a conning tower; it only grazed the upper edge and glanced off, and the men inside hardly noticed it.<br />
<br />
The port engine was disabled, not in consequence of damage to the turbine which is in good condition, but owing to one of the main propeller bearings becoming overheated. The cause of this is not clear, but it is believed to be due to concussions. The ship was well able to keep station with her two remaining engines.<br />
<br />
The "<u>Kurfürst</u>" suffered especially from a great inrush of water forward on the port side, above the armoured deck; it was caused by a hit in the armour belt. No further damage of importance was sustained.<br />
<br />
With regard to time necessary for repair to these ships, it is not yet possible to say anything definite, as it is still undecided whether they shall undergo thorough repair or not. The chief difficulty is the manufacture of new armour plates; but some of the holed plates can, no doubt, be left in position for the present.<br />
<br />
A considerable time will be needed to repair some of the turrets of the battle-cruisers, but here too, they will contrive to get things done. For instance, the "Von der Tann" is to have an entire turret out of a ship of the "Nassau" class, probably the foremost turret, and this ship will be left without a turret for some time. They talk a great deal also of transferring guns, and they will perhaps make use of those intended for the "Hindenburg", which will not be completed will the late autumn.<br />
<br />
It may be presumed that the battleships will be ready for sea in 4-6 weeks, and the battle-cruisers, particularly the "Seydlitz", in not less than 4 months. Naturally work is going on day and night, and repairs are given priority over all new construction.<br />
<br />
The damage sustained by light cruisers and destroyers is inconsiderable. The "Hamburg" had a funnel shot away. As these ships seem to be of minor importance, I did not trouble further about them.<br />
<br />
As our Allies appear not to have the intention of communicating to us what effect the examination of damages sustained will have on their construction in the future, we must endeavour to ascertain this as time goes on by means of cross questioning and by studying their new constructions in detail. I do not feel called upon to draw premature and rash conclusions to-day, on the strength of impressions received, but this will not prevent me from giving a summary of my opinion and of the opinions expresses in my hearing.<br />
<br />
Firstly, it is a remarkable fact that in all the ships that have returned home, all the engine and boiler-rooms are undamaged; the "Lützow" is no exception to this, as she proceeded under her own steam until late in the night after the action. I have also been assured by the Imperial Navy Office, after an inspection carried out by the Chief Engineer, that not a single auxiliary engine was defective. The only boiler-room put out of action was the foremost one in the "Seydlitz" where the bulkhead gave a little, allowing water to penetrate through rivet holes and cracks when the ship was under way. The conclusion may therefore be drawn that these vital parts of the ship are sufficiently protected and that the armour belt of the usual German thicknesses, though it cannot stop the shells, at least fulfils its purpose by breaking them up. Consequently it has become almost impossible even for the largest splinters of 15 in. shell to penetrate through armoured deck or torpedo bulkhead in engine and boiler rooms.<br />
<br />
Even at these long ranges and steep angles there was no question of the armoured decks being pierced; but the fitting of strong gratings over the hatches, which prevented the engines of the "Von der Tann" from sustaining severe damage, appears very necessary.<br />
<br />
The torpedo bulkheads also resisted shells, mines and torpedoes effectually; and in cases where slight damage was sustained, it had no further consequences than the flooding of the compartment affected.<br />
<br />
Perhaps it would be advisable to construct a specially strong boiler-room bulkhead, similar to a torpedo bulkhead, so that it could not be damaged by splinters or water-pressure.<br />
<br />
The inspection of the "Seydlitz" has left me with the impression that the commanding officer of the "Seydlitz" expected rather too much of his ship, and that nothing short of extraordinary good luck enabled her to be brought back. At one time when the whole forepart of the ship was flooded and the bows were under water, he proceeded occasionally with revolutions for 22 knots, just in order to show how seaworthy his ship was, so he told me. This may have been very sporting, or perhaps it may have been necessary under the circumstances in order not to drop too far behind and be overtaken by the enemy, but it certainly was not good seamanship, and if his stokehold bulkhead had burst, the "Seydlitz" would have gone down like the "Lutzow", where the circumstances appear to have been very similar. Later on he decreased speed and finally proceeded stern first.<br />
<br />
I therefore think it not impossible that the loss of the "Lützow", which is said to have been proceeded at 14 knots for a time, was also due only to recklessly high speed, and that the ship might have been saved if she had proceeded stern first or been taken in tow.<br />
<br />
As the danger from water-pressure must always be greatest from ahead, it would certainly be advisable to take special preventative measures against it.<br />
<br />
Vice-Admiral Schmidt told me that, in his opinion, the armoured belt ought to be strongest in the centre, and possible in the afterpart to protect the steering engines, and possibly in the bows, but that it ought not to taper off gradually from the centre to the extremities. He was also entirely in favour of a protected upper deck forming a second armoured deck.<br />
<br />
The admirably thorough system of internal division in the German ships and the floating capability thus attained is the finest proof of the merit of German construction which pursued this aim, and it shows that Admiral von Tirpitz, the creator of the Battle Fleet of to-day, was right when he upheld the principle that, above all things, the ships must be capable of remaining afloat and must not sink or heel over, and that everything else is of secondary consideration.<br />
<br />
The large number of hits in the turrets is remarkable, and it is generally considered that the turret armour should be appreciably stronger, especially in the lower part of the barbettes; for it is not only the disablement of the guns that comes into question, serious though this might be, but also the blowing up of magazines and the total destruction of the ship, as the wide shaft down to the magazines cannot possibly be made completely flash-proof. This is the most vital part of the ship. It is only owing to the small explosive charges in British shells, that there were no explosions of magazines in the German ships.<br />
<br />
Everything possible had been done after the action of 24.1.15 to ensure protection against this danger; the ready ammunition was removed from the top of the hoists and wherever possible all the openings in shafts leading down below were fitted with flaps, covers and heavy asbestos mats, while German ammunition is particularly carefully stowed and packed in cases with screwed-on covers.<br />
<br />
The disasters on the British side are a proof that this is a question of the greatest importance. It must also be taken into consideration that while any other damage turret may take months.<br />
<br />
The numerous hits in turrets would appear to justify the opinion of those who decided against triple turrets, on the ground [sic] that if one was disabled it would put too many heavy guns out of action.<br />
<br />
A hit in a casemate will of course destroy it and disable the gun, but this is of little consequence. Care must be taken here also not to have any ready ammunition, and to close the ammunition hand-up hermetically with heavy asbestos mats at the magazine end also. With the German "Paternoster" (dredger hoist) the ammunition lifts this mat as it comes up and the mat then falls to and closes the opening, which is a practical arrangement.<br />
<br />
Other hits through unarmoured parts, which destroyed more or less small gear and at the first glance give an impression of terrible havoc, are really of no consequence.<br />
<br />
In the "Von der Tann" they wanted to flood a turret magazine. This was impossible, as the flooding valve in the battery, or between deck was piled up with debris, cabin fittings, etc., and was inaccessible. Fortunately the flooding of the magazine turned out to be unnecessary. The Executive Officer remarked to me how critical such a trivial matter might become, and that one could not be careful enough about choosing the positions for the flooding valves, which must be kept clear of easily destructible objects.<br />
<br />
The man-hole covers in the decks, coal shoots [chutes], etc., were pointed out to me as dangerous, as they may be burst open by pressure of gas from below, thus causing damage and giving passage to the gases. These covers should be secured in a different manner and much more firmly.<br />
<br />
The flooding and draining system worked admirably, and is hardly capable of improvement. The only disadvantage is that the compartments above the armoured deck have no draining arrangements. This should be provided. A list, consequent on an inrush of water, could always be corrected by flooding an opposite compartment. This is an important matter both as affecting gunnery and personnel.<br />
<br />
The searchlights, which were not taken down in the German ships, all came out of the action undamaged; anxiety on their account was therefore unfounded. It was very unpleasant when attacking boats fired on the searchlights, and it is therefore considered necessary to fit light armour protection on the masts for the crews of the searchlight control and electric cables.<br />
<br />
Damage from flames is nowhere visible. The Germans are now rather amused at the care with which interior partitions were scraped.<br />
<br />
I could not help comparing the German ships with the Russian battleship "Orel", which I saw in Madzurn after the battle of Tsushima. If I remember rightly, the "Orel" had 5 severe hits and 40 hits with medium-calibre shell.<br />
<br />
The enormous explosive power of the Shimosa shell, which breaks up into minute splinters, did not do the slightest damage to the vital parts of the ship, but the upper deck was transformed into a confused heap of ruins. Superstructure, bridges, masts, funnels, etc., were destroyed, guns dismounted and fires started.<br />
<br />
Nothing of the kind is to be seen in the German ships, outwardly only a few more or less clean shell holes are visible, and they look so orderly and so little damaged that they do not appear to have gone through an action.<br />
<br />
It is true that the upper decks are said to have been littered with countless splinters, but they flew on to the decks from shells which struck the water, the ship receiving violent shocks.<br />
<br />
The holes in the armour show the characteristic concentric cracks round the hole and the radial splashes, the latter proving that the shells exploded on impact or at the latest, as they passed through. In many cases, as already noted, the force of the explosion was external and only pieces of plate, and possibly the head of the shell were driven in.<br />
<br />
<center><u>FLAG OFFICERS OF THE FLEET AND LEADERS</u></center><br />
<br />
{|<br />
| Commander-in-Chief:<br />
| Vice Admiral Scheer<br />
|-<br />
| <u>I Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Vice Admiral Schmidt<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Engelhard<br />
|-<br />
| <u>II Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Mauve<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Baron von Dalwigh<br />
|-<br />
| <u>III Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Behncke<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Nordmann<br />
|-<br />
| Officer commanding the Scouting Forces and<br>Commanding 1st Scouting Group<br />
| Vice Admiral Hipper<br />
|-<br />
| " 2nd " "<br />
| Rear Admiral Bodicker<br />
|-<br />
| " 4th " "<br />
| Commodore "Captain" v. Reuter<br />
|-<br />
| Leaders of Destroyers<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| in "Rostock"<br />
| Commodore "Captain" Michelsen<br />
|-<br />
| in Regensburg<br />
| Commodore "Captain" Heinrich<br />
|-<br />
| Leader of submarines<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| In Hamburg<br />
| Captain Bauer<br />
|}<br />
<br />
<center><u>REMARKS</u></center><br />
<br />
The lecture on the action, upon which this report is based, was illustrated by a plan prepared in haste for H.M. the Kaiser, and a copy was promised to me. But the Admiral Staff does not wish to part with this first incomplete draft, and the preparation of an accurate plan has not yet been completed, as the Admiral Staff is not yet in possession of all the details.<br />
<br />
In time to be included in this report I have only received the sketch of the first stage of the battle, namely the cruiser action on a southerly course, together with a small sketch of the situation when the action was broken off; both are enclosed.<br />
<br />
I conclude from the sketch of the cruiser action, that the accounts given to me were not quite accurate; for instance, the assertion of the commanding officer of the "Moltke" that the shortest range at that stage was 7,650 yds. and that he had accounted for one of the armoured cruisers with a torpedo.<br />
<br />
The sketch shows that the "Indefatigable" was probably first destroyed by gun fire from the "Von der Tann", and later the "Queen Mary" by gunfire from the "Derfflinger", and that the range was never less than 14,220 yds.<br />
<br />
The loss of "V. 27" and "V. 29" and of 4 British destroyers is also apparent, while I was only told of two.<br />
<br />
In the original sketch, 2 British armoured cruisers are also shown as having fallen out during this stage, but this is not shown on the accompanying sketch and probably took place later.<br />
<br />
I was told by the Admiral Staff that the accompanying sketches are not to be taken as strictly accurate.<br />
<br />
It is requested that the sketches and course of the action and the account of damages may be treated as strictly confidential.<br />
<br />
==Footnotes==<br />
{{reflist}}<br />
<br />
==Bibliography==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
*''Schematismus für das K.u.K. Heer und für die Kriegsmarine für 1914. Separatausgabe''. Wien: 1914.<br />
*''Almanach für die k. und k. Kriegsmarine 1917. Kriegsausgabe''. '''XXXVII'''. Pola: 1917.<br />
*[[Arthur Marder (Naval Historian)|Marder, Arthur J.]] (1966). ''From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919: Jutland and After, May 1916–December 1916''. '''Volume III'''. London: Oxford University Press.<br />
*{{MarderFDSFIII}}<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
==External Links==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
*[http://www.denkmalprojekt.org/2023/vl_marineoffiz_zahlmstr_feuerwerks_torpedooffiz_beamte_wk1.html "Halbstocks die Flagge!"] ''Onlineprojekt Gefallendenkmäler''.<br />
*Krámli, Mihály. [http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-124.pdf "The Report on the Battle of Jutland by the Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché in Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Colloredo-Mannsfeld."] ''NavWeaps''.<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
[[Category:Battle of Jutland]]</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Attach%C3%A9_Report_on_the_Battle_of_Jutland&diff=334744Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland2024-03-11T22:36:07Z<p>Simon Harley: Oops.</p>
<hr />
<div>Soon after the [[Battle of Jutland]] on 31 May &ndash; 1 June 1916 the Naval Attaché of the [[Austro-Hungarian Navy|Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Navy]] at the embassy in Berlin, ''Fregattenkapitäne'' Hieronymus Graf von Colloredo-Mannsfeld,<ref>''Schematismus für das K.u.K. Heer und für die Kriegsmarine für 1914''. p. 1270. ''Almanach für die k. und k. Kriegsmarine 1917''. p. 668.</ref> visited the High Sea Fleet. He composed a report on the battle for his superiors using first-hand accounts, interspersed here and there with his own observations. The version reproduced here is a translation in English apparently made by the [[Naval Intelligence Division (Royal Navy)|Naval Intelligence Division]] in 1919 from a copy which was subsequently returned to "F.N.A.", presumably the French Naval Attaché. A copy of the translation then made its way into the papers of the British Cabinet, from where historian Arthur J. Marder obtained a copy which is in his papers.<ref>Original number N.I.D. 087/19. Marder papers, Special Collections and Archives, Langson Library, University of California, Irvine, MS-F002, Box 27.</ref> He does not appear to have used it for the 1966 edition of ''From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow'', Volume III, but certainly used it for the revised edition in 1978.<ref>The quote on p. 189 of the 1966 edition differs from that on p. 234 of the 1978 edition, which is identical to that used here.</ref> <br />
<br />
It is worth comparing this translation with that made by Hungarian historian Mihály Krámli of a post-war copy of a slightly different version of the report in a Hungarian archive which has been published on the ''NavWeaps'' online resource.<ref>Krámli, Mihály. [http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-124.pdf "The Report on the Battle of Jutland by the Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché in Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Colloredo-Mannsfeld."] ''NavWeaps''.</ref><br />
<br />
The original grammar and punctuation of the typescript has been reproduced here wherever possible.<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
From:- Austrian Naval Attache in Berlin.<br />
<br />
To:- Commander-in-Chief, Pola.<br />
<div style="float:right;">Berlin,<br>17 June, 1916.</div><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<center><u>NAVAL ENGAGEMENT OF 31 MAY 1916.</u></center><br />
<br />
The following is a report of the naval proceedings of 31 May - 1 June, 1916, and also of the damage sustained by the German Fleet.<br />
<br />
During my 3-days' visit to Wilhelmshaven, followed by a cursory examination of the "MARKGRAF" and "KURFURST" at Hamburg, I endeavoured to gain merely a general idea of the results of gunfire and concentrated my attention on the course of the action itself.<br />
Admiral Scheer, whom I only saw for a short time as he left for Kiel to attend the funeral of his borther-in-law [sic], Lieut.-Commander Mohr,<ref>Carl Mohr of the ''Hamburg''. Our thanks to Ruiz Mateo Lutzow for pointing this out on Facebook.[http://www.denkmalprojekt.org/2023/vl_marineoffiz_zahlmstr_feuerwerks_torpedooffiz_beamte_wk1.html "Raise the flag!"]</ref> who was killed in the action, very kindly arranged that his Chief of Staff, Captain Trotha, should give me an account of the whole proceedings, illustrated by plans, and that I should be furnished with all information. I have tried to fill in the gaps by conversations with officers whom I know; this has resulted in some contradictory statements, and several points remain obscure, the accounts from the various ships not having all come in.<br />
<br />
Many episodes will therefore be explained later and may appear in a different light, but, as regards the broad outlines which are of chief importance, the picture of this interesting engagement is fairly clear. The accompanying plan of the action was made in haste for the Kaiser and will therefore need much correction.<br />
<br />
The spirit pervading the Fleet can only be described as one of enthusiasm; they are intoxicated with victory. The heavy load weighing on them all, the dear that this war might end without an encounter of the Fleets, have vanished. They have learnt what fighting really means, they know themselves to be superior to the enemy as regards tactics, and that they were following the right lines and have nothing to unlearn; they know that their gunfire was more effective than that of the enemy, and that they can rely implicitly on their flotillas which have always been looked upon in the German Navy as one of the chief factors in an action. Finally they know that their largest ships can stand heavy fire and serious damage, that they leave nothing to be desired as regards construction and cannot be sunk easily. In short, they feel that the British, in spite of all their boasting, cannot overcome the German Fleet and have a considerable respect for it.<br />
<br />
This conviction imbues the whole Fleet, down to the last man, with confidence in their strength and a calm assurance regarding future encounters. At the same time they are free from over-confidence and from under-estimation of the enemy. On the contrary, the British fire-control and the enormous piercing power of their heavy shell at great distances have roused their admiration, so that a careless conception of the situation is not to be feared, the less so, as well-balanced minds such as those of Admiral Scheer and his Staff are unlikely to be led away by former successes to undertake rash enterprises in the future.<br />
<br />
They do not deny that they were extraordinarily fortunate, and that if the action had been prosecuted with energy on the British side, and if the "Nelson touch" had been in evidence, things might have gone very badly for Germany, especially as the British still had an intact Battle Squadron of 12 units at their disposal which had not yet taken part in the action. But they console themselves with the knowledge that no naval action was ever won without some stroke of luck.<br />
<br />
The Kaiser's visit, the day before my arrival, and his address to the Fleet gave great satisfaction, and subsequently many important personages arrive to inspect the ships, such as Prince Henry and the Grand Dukes of Mecklenburg and Oldenburg, and numbers of decorations were distributed. Vice-Admiral Scheer was promoted to Admiral, and he and Vice-Admiral Hipper received the Pour le Merite.<br />
<br />
I also visited Rear-Admiral Behncke, who was wounded and in hospital; his wounds are slight, a few small splinters in his head, elbow and knee, and he will probably soon be well again.<br />
<br />
<center><u>COURSE OF THE ACTION.</u></center><br />
<br />
The Commander-in-Chief intended to advance with the whole Fleet to the waters of the Skagerrak, in order to make his presence felt unpleasantly by disturbing the shipping, hoping thereby to lure on the British forces and in this manner to be in a position to attack a part of the British Fleet with superior or at least with equal forces. He reckoned that any movements of the British Fleet would be reported to him in good time by the submarines which had been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and he hoped that the airships would prove a better means of reconnoitring than any possessed by the enemy.<br />
<br />
Unfavourable weather prevented him for a considerable period from undertaking any operations, and, as the submarines were to return home on 1 June and be relieved by a new group, the 31 May was the last date for carrying out the planned advance.<br />
<br />
The cruisers left the Jade at 3 a.m., the Main Fleet at 4 a.m., steering an easterly course, and then, after passing Heligoland, a N.N.W'ly course. No reports were received from submarines. These were stationed chiefly off the Orkneys and the Firth of Forth, and the large group of Flanders boats were off the Thames and at the entrance to the Channel. <br />
<br />
While proceeding northwards, a few W/T messages were received, but they were corrupt, appeared to refer only to small formations and gave no clue to the movements of the Grand Fleet. The airships were unable to start in the morning, on account of the wind, and, as it blew hard throughout the day in the Heligoland Bight, they could not start until the early hours of 1 June. In this respect things did not go well, but Admiral Scheer decided nevertheless to continue on his course to the Skagerrak. <br />
<br />
This the account given by Captain von Trotha, who affirms that nothing was known of the presence of the British Fleet in the waters of the Skagerrak, and that there seemed no probability of encountering this Fleet before 1 June.<br />
<br />
There are some points here which I am unable to understand. The submarines are said to have been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and were to return home on 1 June to be relieved probably by a weaker group. For, If the same number of boats were to to keep watch off the English coast, why should 31 May have been the last day for the German Fleet to sail. The day of departure was, therefore, too late in any case, for, if no encounter was to be expected before 1 June, the boats stationed off the coast could not possibly encounter the damaged British ships, as was intended, for probably no damaged ships would be there before 2 June.<br />
<br />
The battleship "KONIG ALBERT" had to carry out repairs to her condensers and did not proceed with the Fleet. Von Trotha told me that there was no alternative and that a ship must carry out small overhauls regularly in a dockyard according to programme. But could it not be arranged, when one is taking the initiative, to choose one's moment for an advance and to have all the ships together for this short time? And why should just that moment be chosen when one of the most powerful ships of the "Kaiser" class is in the dockyard, instead, for instance, of one of the "Nassau" class with 11-in. guns.<br />
<br />
In addition, the "BAYERN" was to have joined up a few days later. After having waited so long, why should not the plan have been postponed for 2 or 3 weeks, instead of dispensing with the only ship carrying 15-in. guns.<br />
<br />
In the same manner they dispensed with air reconnaissance, from which they had expected so much.<br />
<br />
These considerations make me doubt whether the account given me is quite correct, and whether, on the contrary, they knew of certain movements of the British Fleet and considered the moment extremely favourable for an attack. Perhaps they only knew of Beatty's battle squadron, and thinking the Main Fleet was far away, hoped to entrap this squadron. In Berlin, they have much to say, even in military circles, about the British Fleet's intention to push through into the Baltic, and of Kitchener's mission having some connection with this. I consider this senseless, for it cannot be presemed [sic] that the British Fleet would leave their shores unprotected and do the Germans the favour of operating in the Baltic, which would certainly be a most advantageous area for the German Fleet. In any case, there appear to be discrepancies which will probably be explained at some later date.<br />
<br />
Scouting groups, battle cruisers and light cruisers, together with flotillas, preceded the Main Fleet by 50 - 60 miles. At 4 p.m. the light cruisers encountered some British battle cruisers. These at once opened fire on the light cruisers, at an estimated distance of 26,247 yds.; the range could be taken accurately. Though they did not obtain a hit, the salvoes fell so well that the German cruisers thought it advisable to turn away and fall back on their battle cruisers.<br />
<br />
As the British approached, these battle cruisers turned on to a southerly course, in order to lure the enemy on to the German Main Fleet. A running action, on a southerly course, ensued. The British were to starboard and to the west of the Germans, who had therefore the following advantage: in the North Sea, in summer, the western horizon is quite light and visibility towards the west is good, while towards the east, and in a still greater degree off the Jutland Coast, it is misty and visibility is bad and no silhouettes stand out against the eastern horizon. This phenomenon also played great part in the subsequent course of the action. The sun was still high and was not troublesome, and the British ships offered admirable targets. The sea was calm, the wind N.W. 1-2, altering subsequently through W. to S.W.<br />
<br />
The following British ships were recognised:-<br />
3 "Lion" class, 1 "Tiger" and 2 "Indefatigable" class; they were soon reinforced by 5 "Queen Elizabeth" class following astern.<br />
<br />
It is asserted that, judging from shell splinters, the ship of the "Tiger" class carried 15-in. guns, and that she was therefore the mysterious vessel which replaced the "TIGER" sunk on 24.1.15; as the last-named "TIGER" carried only 13.5-in.guns, this was taken as a further proof of her loss. The silhouette of the new "TIGER", however, is said to have resembled that of the old "TIGER" exactly. As the "Queen Elizabeths" soon opened fire also with 15-in. guns, I rather doubt this assertion regarding the "TIGER", and the various ships on this early part of the engagement are altogether somewhat at variance.<br />
<br />
On the German side the ships proceeded in the following sequence:- "LÜTZOW", Flagship of Vice-Admiral Hipper, "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN".<br />
<br />
As Hipper edged towards the enemy, the distance decreased to about 7655 yds. The German fire was unquestionably superior, but the speed of the British vessels was greater. After a short time the "INDEFATIGABLE" and "QUEEN MARY" blew up, and 2 battle-cruisers and two attacking destroyers were also accounted for. The "QUEEN MARY" must have been destroyed by the explosion of a magazine; she was torn in two halves, and a water-colour painted by an officer represents her enveloped in an enormous column of black smoke; she disappeared in a few seconds. Only one cadet was subsequently picked.<br />
<br />
The second battle cruiser disappeared under similar circumstances. The "VON DER TANN" claims to have accounted for one of these battle-cruisers by a broadside. But the "MOLTKE" fired 4 torpedoes and also claims this achievement.<br />
<br />
The Germans suffered very little during this phase of the action, the "MOLTKE" alone receiving hits on the starboard side. The fire of the British battle-cruisers is said not to have been nearly as good as that of the "QUEEN ELIZABETH" class later on.<br />
<br />
When they had approached the German Main Fleet, the British turned on to a contrary course and the German cruisers did the same. The German Main Fleet proceeded in divisions in starboard quarter-line, the 3rd Battle Squadron: 4 "König" class and 3 "Kaiser" class, Fleet Flagship, 1st Battle Squadron: 4 "Ostfriesland" class and 4 "Westfalen" class, and the 2nd Battle Squadron: 5 "Deutschland" class and the "Hessen". They endeavoured to effect a junction with the cruisers, but were unable to take part very effectually.<br />
<br />
The course of the action was now in a northerly direction, over the area which had just been traversed, and the British ships now drew ahead considerably and turned more and more towards the East; the Germans followed this movement, and in consequence the conditions of visibility became less and less favourable for them.<br />
<br />
The "Queen Elizabeths" now made their presence more greatly felt; one of them had dropped out, but I was unable to ascertain when this occurred.<br />
<br />
The course of the German Math Fleet at first led past the 2 disabled British destroyers, which were lying stopped. The crews had already taken to the boats and were picked up later on by German destroyers. As the Main Fleet was doubtful about the advisability of passing the destroyers while they were still afloat, they were sunk by a few broadsides. One of the officers who was picked up was in pyjamas and is said to have stayed in his cabin during the action. He declared "We did not expect so much resistance," while another said - "The battle is rather disappointing." It has been ascertained that these destroyers were greatly under-manned; their crews seemed very exhausted, which points to their having been in the water for a long time.<br />
<br />
While on this easterly course, the light cruisers of the fast 2nd Scouting Group: "FRANKFURT", "PILLAU", "ELBING" and "WIESBADEN", were heavily fired on from the N.E. and E. without their being able to see more than the gun flashes. In addition, they were under continual fire from the N., and while turning away to S.E. and S., they ascertained that they were opposed by an interminable line of British ships, which appeared at first to be on a N.W.'ly course, and had then evidently turned together on to a S.'ly course.<br />
<br />
It may be noted here that the battleships, and, generally speaking, the battle-cruisers also, never sighted the British Main Fleet, and saw nothing but the flashes of the guns and the effects of the fire. These British ships, about 25 in number, were only sighted by a few light cruisers and by the flotillas, and were counted by them as accurately as possible.<br />
<br />
Surrounded thus from the N. and the E. and under fire, the "WIESBADEN" was disabled, apparently by a hit in the engine-room. The Admiral noticed, it is true, that his leading ships must have encountered new and powerful forces and that they were turning away; but he thought it his duty to go to the assistance of the "WIESBADEN" and therefore continued on an easterly course.<br />
<br />
The van of the Main Fleet, led by the "KÖNIG" (Rear-Admiral Behncke) now came under heavy fire from right ahead; the "KÖNIG" turned away under this fire towards the S.E., whereupon the Commander-in-Chief ordered the whole line to "turn together" to starboard and gave up the idea of helping the "WIESBADEN". About this time Vice-Admiral Hipper transferred his flag from the "LÜTZOW" to the "MOLTKE" with the help of a destroyer, his W/T station being damaged.<br />
<br />
Hardly had the Main Fleet drawn away on a westerly course, before it was ascertained that the pressure was relaxing and the fire decreasing, and that the British were no longer pursuing so hotly. Scheer therefore ordered the ships to "turn together" back on to their former course, and made the signal 'R' = 'Engage the enemy'. This second advance may be termed the zenith of the action. Admiral Scheer gave his views on it approximately as follows:- "Those who make a study of this engagement will be very puzzled as to my object in advancing thus against the wall of British ships. The fact is that I had no particular object. I made the first advance because I had a feeling that I ought to endeavour to assist the "WIESBADEN" and because the situation ahead was quite obscure to me, for I saw nothing of the "LÜTZOW" and received no W/T reports. I soon saw, however, that the leading ships were coming under an overwhelming fire, and that I could not risk the Fleet on the "WIESBADEN'S" account. When I noticed that the British pressure had quite ceased and that the Fleet remained intact in my hands, I turned back, under the impression that the action could not end in this way and that I ought to seek contact with the enemy again."<br />
<br />
The situation during the first and second advances may serve as an example of what should not take place according to all the laws of tactics, for it could not have been worse; von Trotha said jokingly that, if an Admiral brought about such a situation at a war game or in manoeuvres, he would never be entrusted without another command. In the North, the "Queen Elizabeths", then the battle-cruisers, and from N.E. through E. to S.E., an endless line of battleships formed an arc round the German van and kept it under fire. Evidently it had fallen into the most perfect trap. In addition to this unfavourable tactical position, there was a further difficulty, namely that the German ships could be clearly distinguished while they themselves only saw the gun flashes, 4 or 5 to each salvo, but could find no target.<br />
<br />
The Gunnery Officer of the "MARKGRAF" told me that he could not fire at all during half-an-hour, and that they were at the mercy of the British broadsides. Critical though the position was, in theory, they think that experience justifies the conclusion that this 'crossing the T' is in reality not so disastrous at longer ranges; for, in spite of the enormous superiority of their fire, the British made comparatively few hits, the simple reason being that, when fire is thus concentrated on a few leading ships, there can be no question of improving the shooting by spotting.<br />
<br />
Given good tactical training and squadrons which work well together, it is always easy to retire rapidly from an unfavourable position and even possibly to reach an advantageous one.<br />
<br />
The small amount of damage sustained by the Main Fleet may be owing partly to the fact that the leading battle-cruisers drew the enemy's fire, thus relieving the battleships. Only the three leading ships, "KÖNIG", "GROSSER KURFÜRST" and "MARKGRAF" received several hits; while among all the other ships, the "KAISER", "HELGOLAND" and the "SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN" received one hit each, and the rest were not hit at all.<br />
<br />
Simultaneously with the battle-cruisers, which were ahead and pressing forward in quarter-line formation, the 6th and 9th Flotillas, left by the "REGENSBURG", also proceeded to a torpedo attack. Regarding this cruiser advance, the Commanding Officer of the "SEYDLITZ" told me that he was in such a position that he was able to avoid the British salvoes, for he altered course towards the point where each salvo fell and thus evaded the spotting correction.<br />
<br />
This torpedo attack was carried out with great determination and seems to have been completely successful, although nobody is able to state how many hits were obtained. The British ships overlapped somewhat and their line was almost unbroken, and, as about 100 torpedoes were fired, it is estimates that there must have been a considerable number of hits, some people affirm that there were 20, but I do not place much confidence in these figures and it is useless to trouble about them as nobody is certain.<br />
<br />
The boats were fired on by guns of all calibres, even the heaviest, but with little effect, only one boat being destroyed; two other boats had been sunk in an earlier attack during the cruiser action.<br />
<br />
The battle-cruisers were also attacked by British torpedoes, the "SEYDLITZ" being hit once. The "MOLTKE" was lucky, for, when close to the ship, one torpedo apparently had a gyro failure and ran parallel with her. The "LÜTZOW" was probably hit also.<br />
<br />
After the attack, the destroyers laid fog and a heavy smoke screen, which interposed between the Fleet; this benefitted not only the heavily-damaged "LÜTZOW" and "DERFFLINGER", whose nets had been shot away and were hanging down, but also the whole Fleet. It may also have made an impression on the British.<br />
<br />
The German Main Fleet and cruisers turned on a westerly course, fire having again entirely ceased; and the ships of the Main Fleet then turned gradually in succession and in inverse sequence from W. to S.W., subsequently steering towards Horns Reef.<br />
<br />
It is not known what the British did; all that is certain, is that they did not follow in pursuit and that nothing further was seen of their Main Fleet. It remained light until 11 p.m. (summer time), and it would not have been impossible, considering their superior speed, for them to have come within firing range. The Germans expected it too, and now have to content themselves with surmises about the British Commander-in-Chief's reasons for not doing so. It is probably that the unfavourable issue of the fleet part of the battle and the demoralising losses in ships took away any desire on Jellicoe's part for further fighting. His Fleet may have lost heavily and been severely shaken by the torpedo attack; and, as the Germans still had some intact flotillas at their disposal, he may have feared further strong torpedo attacks in the critical hours of twilight, for in the German Navy they say that Jellicoe fears their destroyers in particular.<br />
<br />
Nevertheless, the Germans were not under the impression of having shaken the British Fleet to the extent of obliging them to give up the struggle, and when the evening passed without further incident, they reckoned with certainty on encountering Jellicoe off Horns Reef at daybreak. They were the more astonished at his non-appearance when their air reconnaissance reported that on the morning of 1 June a squadron of 12 battle-ships was proceeding North from the southern part of North Sea and that it suddenly turned on to an opposite course and proceeded South.<br />
<br />
As it could not possibly have been the intention of the British Commander-in-Chief to let the German Fleet escape after having encountered it at last far from its base, and as he still had an intact battle-squadron at his disposal, one is compelled to take the view that he no longer felt strong enough for a second encounter; the achievement of the German Fleet must therefore be very highly thought of.<br />
<br />
During the night cruising following the action, numerous small episodes and minor engagements took place, of which no clear idea can be formed. <br />
<br />
In view of a possible fresh attack or of a possible pursuit on the part of the enemy, it was thought undesirable to leave the 2nd Battle Squadron either in the van or in the rear, it therefore took station to starboard and at first proceeded on an opening course from the other squadrons, and continued fairly independently during the night.<br />
<br />
The 1st Battle Squadron therefore led, with the "WESTFALEN" as guide, and it was followed by the 3rd Battle Squadron.<br />
<br />
After the action had been broken off, the 4 remaining battle cruisers were ahead to port, where they were suddenly again brought under heavy fire from the port side and from ahead, apparently by 3 or 4 battle cruisers. It is presumed that these were the remaining 3 or 4 older cruisers of the "Invincible" class, which Jellicoe probably always stationed ahead of the Main Fleet, for it would hardly have been possible for the "Lions", which were following in the rear in the British line, to have taken station ahead so quickly. The German battle cruisers, all severely damaged, did not feel able to withstand this fire and turned away to starboard, passing ahead of the Main Fleet and between it and the 2nd Battle Squadron, which proceeded quietly on their course and before which the mysterious ships retired, not to be sighted again.<br />
<br />
The battle-cruisers then gradually fell astern, and as they were making much water, and also owing to their differing speeds, they lost contact with the Main Fleet and with each other.<br />
<br />
The "LÜTZOW" had dropped out during the engagement and proceeded independently, accompanied by 4 destroyers. At first she was able to steam 14 knots, but her speed decreased rapidly and dropped finally to 4 knots. Her bows sank slowly, and when the whole forecastle was under water the Commanding Officer decided to leave the ship. The badly wounded were transferred carefully to the boats and the disembarkation was conducted in good order. A torpedo was then fired at the ship and this coup de grace sank her in deep water at about 1 o'clock, I believe.<br />
<br />
The "SEYDLITZ" was hardly in a better condition than the "LÜTZOW"; she also sank gradually by the bows till the water was almost level with the deck, and she had a heavy list to port, but she continued on her course. In the darkest hours of the night she suddenly sighted 3 large ships to port, quite close to. She turned away, made a British recognition signal and was not pursued. As bad luck would have it, the steaming light had short-circuited, could not be switched off and showed intermittently.<br />
<br />
The "DERFFLINGER", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN" followed the Main Fleet more or less and met with no particular experiences.<br />
<br />
The Main Fleet had to repulse a series of destroyer attacks and was also engaged by cruisers. The movements of these British cruisers, which came up singly, are incomprehensible and give the impression of having lost their heads. They appear to have received the order, judging by an intercepted W/T message, to proceed on a northerly and north-westerly course, and thereby they ran into the extended German line which they probably imagined they had passed to the South.<br />
<br />
One large cruiser (?"WARRIOR") proceeded unsuspectingly within 875 yds. of the line of battleships and came under concentrated fire from several ships before she could reply, so that she blew up enveloped in flames and disappeared in 47 seconds. The "BIRMINGHAM" seems to have been accounted for in a similar manner. The destroyers all approached in a really insane manner; frequently not from ahead but from a direction astern, scattered, singly or in pairs, or at most 3 together, never in large numbers. Most of them were disabled forthwith by a few salvoes and set on fire. The "WESTFALEN" distinguished herself particularly at this time.<br />
<br />
These burning destroyers strewn along the course, lit it up as if for a festival. Evidently the fires were largely due to the light American and Mexican oils; at any rate German firing trials on oil bunkers never caused any such conflagrations.<br />
<br />
The attacking boats directed shrapnel fire on the searchlights with fairly good results, the searchlights of two battleships and one light cruiser being hit.<br />
<br />
One large destroyer, which only recognised the danger at the last moment and endeavoured to avoid it by altering course was rammed by the "NASSAU", which put her helm over for this purpose. The boat exploded internally and sank.<br />
<br />
The only ships hit were the "POMMERN" in the 2ns Battle Squadron, and the "ROSTOCK". The "POMMERN" blew up at once and nobody was saved. The "ROSTOCK" was just passing between ships of the Main Fleet when she was hit; the loss of life on board was small.<br />
<br />
The Germans believe they destroyed 11 British destroyers in all. The manner in which these destroyers were handled has not left a good impression on the whole, and one has certainly lost respect for this weapon. The view is also taken that the boats are too large and offer too wide a target.<br />
<br />
The light cruiser "ELBING", like the "ROSTOCK", apparently wanted to break through the line from port to starboard under pressure from the British cruisers; she was, however, rammed by the "POSEN" and had to be abandoned in a sinking condition. The Germans also fired a torpedo into her.<br />
<br />
The "FRAUENLOB" and 2 destroyers were lost during the night; no details of their loss are known.<br />
<br />
Not far from Heligoland, the "OSTFRIESLAND", 7th of the line, struck a mine. This brings the account of the chief events of this exciting cruiser to an end.<br />
<br />
The German flotillas were detached from the Fleet to clear the area off the Jutland Coast, which was divided up into sectors. The flotillas stationed furthest to the North proceeded to the Skagerrak and through these straits into the Baltic and to Kiel.<br />
<br />
None of the flotillas sighted the British Main Fleet again, which proves that it must have turned away to the N. or N.W. immediately after the action. According to confidential reports the Fleet entered British ports as early as 1 June.<br />
<br />
Two British battleships, in a severely damaged condition and accompanied by destroyers, were sighted proceeding back to England. One was attacked by a submarine, but without success.<br />
<br />
On the morning of 1 June, in fairly misty weather, a Zeppelin sighted groups of British ships leaving the Channel on a N.E.'ly course. The reports were rather vague, as sometimes 6 and sometimes 12 ships were mentioned; but it seems most likely that 12 battleships and 3 cruisers were in question, and that they soon retired. The airship, which flew low at one time to get a clearer view, was also fired on.<br />
<br />
Some of the ships are said to have had tripod masts.<br />
<br />
The German Fleet, with the exception of "SEYDLITZ", reached the Jade in the afternoon. The "SEYDLITZ" could not cross the bar on account of being so much down by the bows, and it was not till the next day at high water that she was towed in, stern first.<br />
<br />
<center><u>MISCELLANEOUS.<br>TACTICS.</u></center><br />
<br />
The Germans ascribe their success to various causes, and in the first place to their own superiority as regards tactics. This is a point which every officer discusses, and it is constantly repeated that it all happened just as in tactical manoeuvres and in "battle exercises", and that things could not have gone better.<br />
<br />
Movements of squadrons, divisions and individual ships, "turns together" and alterations of course and speed, all went like clockwork and demonstrated the very great mobility of all formations.<br />
<br />
The W/T signalling system of the Main Fleet never failed, and its failure would have been immaterial, as the primary and secondary flag action signals, showing from several positions in the ship, were made simultaneously.<br />
<br />
All this was due to the peace training and the practical experience of the Flag Officers and Captains. Though in peace time the Commander-in-Chief had never commanded a Fleet, nor the Admirals a squadron, still the training carried out on the same lines for a number of years resulted in everything proceeding with the expected precision.<br />
<br />
The British, on the contrary, are said to have displayed a certain clumsiness as regards tactics and to have preferred turning together when "turning on to an opposite course" (Wendungen im Gegenmarsch), though this conclusion does not seem altogether justified from the description of the action.<br />
<br />
The ships kept station 547 yds. apart, and Vice-Admiral Schmidt told me that, in his opinion, this distance is too small for large ships and that he prefers 656 yds., as the shorter distances result in the ships getting bunched and overlapping during alterations of course. In order to relieve this during the first turn to starboard, the Fleet Flagship herself turned to port and then closed gradually into line. At night the distance was 656 yds.<br />
<br />
No interruption of W/T communication was occasioned by the enemy.<br />
<br />
<center><u>GUNNERY</u></center><br />
<br />
It is admitted that the British are superior as regards their gunnery technique. Their salvoes fall most astoundingly close together and aroused admiration on all sides. Some people affirm that they fell too close together, and that it was consequently difficult to cover a sufficiently large danger space.<br />
<br />
This is particularly the case with the heaviest calibres: 13.5-in. and 15-in. and the battle-cruisers' fire was noticeably inferior to that of the "Queen Elizabeth" class, for example.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> Literal translation; the meaning is not clear. - Tr.] The spread of the salvoes frequently only covered a few square yards. In the "KÖNIG" 3 rounds, out of a salvo of 4 rounds, hit between the capstan and the bridge.<br />
<br />
This is attributed to careful calibration, which the British have studied for a long time and which, as is well known, was abandoned by the German Navy after a few trials. The gunnery officers declare unanimously that it must unquestionably be re-introduced.<br />
<br />
The British range-finders are superior to the German, and the construction of their turrets enables them to shoot at ranges impossible for German guns. The question of range appears to be immaterial to the British, who fire at any range so long as visibility permits.<br />
<br />
The Germans are fully convinced of the great superiority of 15-in. guns over all others, and deplore the fact that, owing to the predominant conservative tendencies in the German Navy, this calibre was not introduced until so lately. Vice-Admiral Gerdes, the Head of the Armament Department, is responsible for this, for he always opposed it on the ground that the poor visibility in German waters and the consequent short ranges rendered an increase of calibre useless; he considered the German 12-in. gun to be an altogether superior weapon, capable of competing with every other.<br />
<br />
In one respect the British seem behindhand as compared with the Germans: namely that they cannot alter range quickly enough and they are too dependent on the range clock. The British rely on steady fire at long range, and they adapt their tactics to this and avoid alterations of course and range most assiduously.<br />
<br />
The Germans, on the contrary, in their firing practices always work with big and rapid alterations of range and exercise firing while turning, so that the gunnery officers consider they have an advantage in this respect.<br />
<br />
The Turn on to an opposite course was certainly not advantageous for the German Fleet, but in this particular instance it made little difference, as the German ships were already unable to find a target; besides which, it must have disconcerted the British and it prevented them from obtaining good results with their fire. The salvoes fell very close together round the ships, but few hits were obtained. The rate of fire in the British ships is said to have been fair, but not excessive. Some people affirm that it was very modest.<br />
<br />
The British shell had great penetrating power, and from all reasonable distances the main armour was generally pierced clean through. The shell splinters picked up prove conclusively that at least 2 kinds of shell were used, differing considerably in material and quality. One kind of shell had a very thick wall and an extremely small explosive charge, it might almost be called a solid shot. It seems to have broken up frequently without exploding and the fuse did not function. Its explosive power, if it possessed any at all, was quite inconsiderable, and it is presumed that the explosives used was not high explosive.<br />
<br />
It appears from the splinters of these 15-in. shell that the wall was 6.3 - 6.7 ins. (16 - 17 cm.), so that the hollow space cannot measure more than 2.4 ins. - 1.8 ins. (4 - 6 cm.). It is true that the large pieces into which these shell broke pierced everything in their course and often went right through the whole ship, unless they struck an armoured part. Several intact heads were found, with and without caps, and also entire bases.<br />
<br />
The second kind of shell had considerably thinner walls, only about half as thick, but it also often broke up into quite large pieces and displayed no great explosive power, and little or no incendiary power.<br />
<br />
It appears therefore that the British aimed only at attaining penetrating power, and the Germans are of opinion that they do not possess (rohrsicheren)* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D.Note.- This appears to be a special fuse which is very delicate, but safe until it has left the gun.] fuses for high explosive shell; this was their opinion before the war also.<br />
<br />
They believe that the high explosive power of the German ammunition gives them a great advantage which may partly counterbalance the smaller calibre of their guns and perhaps also their inferior gunnery. In any case, the effect of the German shell at the point of impact was very considerable.<br />
<br />
The fact that the ships blew up must be attributed to explosions in their magazines. (In this connection one may recall a turret of the "SEYDLITZ" being hit in the action of 24 January, 1915; see my report No.47 ex 15). The turret armour must have been pierced and the shells in the turret must have been exploded. The British have no metal cartridge-cases and also no cartridge-holders such as the Germans have, but they keep their cartridges in locked boxes which are perhaps not flash-proof enough. It seems therefore, from the incident experienced by the "SEYDLITZ", that this must constitute a particular danger to British ships. In this last action also turrets in German ships were frequently hit; further details are given in the account of damage sustained.<br />
<br />
After having compared the hits received in the German ships with the observations of results on enemy targets, it may be safely affirmed that the explosive power of the German shells exceeds that of the British; this was already known after the action of 24 January 1915. The Germans are therefore very much annoyed that they had no 15-in. guns to fire, as they are persuaded that ships so knocked about (eingedeckte) as, for example, the "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" would have been completely destroyed by German shell.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. Note.- The writer appears to mean that if German 15-in. shell had been used against "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" these ships would have been sunk.]<br />
<br />
It may be noted here that the "BAYERN", the first of their ships to carry 15-in. guns, will not join the Fleet for another few days, and the "BADEN" not until the autumn.<br />
<br />
Medium armament played no part, only a few hits were obtained and they did little damage.<br />
<br />
The British fired part-salvoes, like the Germans; full salvoes may have been fired now and again.<br />
<br />
The method of repulsing destroyer attacks, which has previously been reported, namely the 'turning away' and firing on one, or at most two boats, proved to be sound, and the repulsing of attacks both by day and night offered no difficulties.<br />
<br />
As regards gunnery, it may also be mentioned that the fire-control apparatus worked without a hitch and withstood the heaviest shocks. The elevation pointers worked admirably. A few ships were not yet fitted with them.<br />
<br />
<center><u>Torpedo.</u></center><br />
<br />
As regards torpedo work the Germans consider themselves very much superior. There were prolonged discussions about depriving Flotilla Leaders of their independence and putting them under the orders of a Leader Ship, but they are now convinced that this is necessary to ensure the flotillas attacking at the right moment and all together.<br />
<br />
The flotillas were led by the 2 leader Ships "ROSTOCK" and "REGENSBURG", the first having 2 flotillas and the second 3 flotillas allocated to them. The remaining 2 flotillas accompanied the Main Fleet or the battle-cruisers. The leaders carried out their duties with great daring and circumspection. The attacks of the British were weak and scattered, and could therefore have little or only occasional success.<br />
<br />
The German 2nd Flotilla, composed of the larger 1500 ton boats were held back instead of being sent to attack. Although these boats are spoken of very highly and are indispensable for certain enterprises, the view is now taken that they are too large and too valuable to be used for attacking during an action. This Flotilla proceeded to Zeebrugge immediately after the action and arrived there safely. It is to be employed in preventing the British from blockading the harbour with nets, and thus make it impossible for the German submarines to proceed out.<br />
<br />
As far as I have heard, the "MOLTKE" alone of the larger ships fired 4 torpedoes.<br />
<br />
Submarines were not in evidence. No German submarines were present; on the other hand a German destroyer claims to have rammed a British submarine. This claim appears to be erroneous, at least it was declared to be nonsense by the Chief of Staff. The submarines failed as regards scouting and also doing the pursuit.<br />
<br />
Some people state that a British aeroplane was sighted to the northward, and that it had apparently risen from a cruiser. It played no part in the action.<br />
<br />
The use of "Höschter"* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. note:- Probably the name of the inventor.] fog seems to have been of good service, it and the smoke made by the destroyers having completely masked the Main Fleet and its movements at critical moments.<br />
<br />
<center><u>SPEED</u></center><br />
<br />
The advantage of speed lay entirely with the British, not only as regards the Main Fleet on account of the "Deutschland" class, but also as regards the battle-cruisers. The latter are said to have proved considerably faster than the German battle cruisers, an unpleasant experience which had already been made on 25 January 1915. This alone proves that the British are talking nonsense when they assert that the German Fleet sought safety in flight; on the contrary, it was far from its bases and entirely in the power of the British, who either did not wish to take advantage of their superior speed, or were unable to do so on account of the damage sustained. The visibility was no worse than it had been during the day and Jellicoe may have even welcomed the "Höschter" fog which would enable him to plead bad visibility as a reason for abandoning the pursuit. On the German side in the light of experience the factor of speed in the battleships is considered very important. But the moderate depths of the German harbours limits the draught of the ships, and make it particularly difficult for German builders to do much in this respect. In spite of greater length and higher horse power the most modern cruisers "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ" and "LÜTZOW" attained only a quite inconsiderable increase of speed in comparison with the older "GOEBEN" class, and proved a disappointment in this particular.<br />
<br />
The question whether the older battleships should take part in an important engagement was not easy to decide. The 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons composed of the "WITTLESBACH" and "BARBAROSSA" class, re-commissioned at the beginning of the war, were intended to be used in such actions, but have long since been paid off; some have been disarmed and employed as guardships and instructional ships, etc. It was considered however, that the 2nd Battle Squadron, composed of the most modern of the older ships, would be of some service in the action; but this squadron was in a privileged position, inasmuch as it was merely attached to the 1st and 3rd Battle Squadrons and its Admiral was allowed to operate independently and select the position he thought best. On this occasion it kept station quite well and did not prove a hindrance, but, on the other hand, it did not come under any heavy fire. This must be considered very fortunate, for, in view of the damage sustained by other ships and in view of the fact that the British shell pierced all armour above or below water even at the longest range, it is certain that every ship of this class would have been sunk by a few hits, as their internal sub-division is not proof against large inrushes of water.<br />
<br />
The loss of the "Pommern", which gives the British an opportunity for a hollow triumph, also teaches a clear lesson. The Chief of Staff told me that they will probably consider carefully before again exposing this Squadron to danger; therefore this action will have further confirmed the complete worthlessness of all Dreadnought types [sic] and will condemn them as old iron.<br />
<br />
<center><u>TORPEDO NETS.</u></center><br />
<br />
The torpedo nets of the battle cruisers are all badly damaged and the gear so knocked about by gunfire that they were almost useless. This was particularly the case with the "Derfflinger", where the after port nets were hanging in the water, and would have fallen across the propeller had they not chanced to remain held up by a temporary lashing. The ship was obliged to stop during the action to secure the nets, and they might easily have occasioned the loss of the ship.<br />
<br />
For this reason all the nets, together with the booms, were unshipped immediately after the ships' return, to everybody's satisfaction. They will not be carried any more, except perhaps for operations in the Baltic, where the ships may be obliged to anchor at sea.<br />
<br />
<center><u>LEAK-STOPPING SERVICE.</u></center><br />
<br />
The leak-stopping service which had been systematically developed, worked admirably and the Germans are convinced that they owe much to it. They believed that the "Seydlitz" could not have been brought in if the strengthening of the bulkheads, etc., had not been so thoroughly exercised and if the personnel had not been so well trained.<br />
<br />
It is also said, that in the "Lutzow", which had only been in commission for 2 months, was naturally not up to the mark in this respect, and that it is not impossible that small shortcomings, for which of course nobody can be blamed, were responsible for the ship sinking. The "Lutzow" was an unfortunate ship altogether. First her turbines collapsed, thus delaying her commissioning for 6 months, then she immediately struck a mine, and she was hardly out of dockyard hands before she was sunk.<br />
<br />
<center><u>DANGER FROM GAS FUMES.</u></center><br />
<br />
Only 2 days before sailing, a large number of the ships, and fortunately exactly those that came most under fire, namely battle-cruisers and the 3rd Squadron, were supplied with gas masks fitted with alkali cartridges for the whole crew and a plentiful reserve (in the "Seydlitz" 1500 masks for about 1200 men). The masks are similar to those used in the army for poisonous gases. Each man carries a mask slung round him, if he is not actually wearing it.<br />
<br />
I was told emphatically by all the officers, that, in their experience, these masks are absolutely necessary and not only saved many lives but enabled the men to carry on in parts of the ship which they would otherwise have been compelled to leave.<br />
<br />
The gases from shells, mines and torpedoes penetrate in an incredible manner through ventilators, telephone leads, etc. to compartments far away from the point of impact. In many cases the masks enabled large numbers of the guns' crews to escape from turrets that were hit, and to help out others who were badly wounded. In one case the men in one of the main engine rooms were able to remain at their posts after gas had penetrated, until the engine-room was ventilated.<br />
<br />
The Fleet breathing apparatus (Flottenathmer) is preferable to masks in some cases, but it cannot be supplied to everyone and it hampers one's movements, which the masks do not.<br />
<br />
On account of the great danger from gases, it is also advisable to fit hinged flaps in all shafts, and to have wooden bungs to fit the voice-pipes, keeping a hammer at hand to hammer them into the mouth-pieces.<br />
<br />
They tell me that it proved very useful to keep all the personnel employed below, such as in central control rooms, engine-rooms, torpedo flats, etc. continually informed of what was going on. The men get nervous, particularly at first, with the tremendous shocks caused by shell falling close to the ship, though the shocks are felt less on deck, and such information gives them confidence and they like knowing what is going on above them.<br />
<br />
<center><u>DAMAGE</u></center><br />
<br />
The distribution of ships needing repair in the various dockyards is as follows:-<br />
<br />
The "König" proceeded at once to Kiel and is under repair at Howaldt's yard. I did not see her.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" and "Moltke" in Blohm and Voss yard, Hamburg, the first in the Imperial Dock.<br />
<br />
The "Kurfürst["] in Vulkan Yard, Hamburg.<br />
<br />
The "Derfflinger" was first docked in Wilhelmshaven and the leaks temporarily stopped, she then proceeded to the Imperial dockyard, Kiel. The "Seydlitz" will now be docked in the large dock at Wilhelmshaven; during my stay the "Seydlitz" was still in the lock.<br />
<br />
The "Von der Tann", "Ostfriesland" and "Helgoland" will be repaired in dry docks in Wilhelmshaven. No other large ships require to be docked.<br />
<br />
"<u>Seydlitz</u>" The number of hits was still uncertain, as the whole forepart of the ship up to the upper deck was still under water, and it is not known what she looks like below water. The ship was brought into the lock with difficulty, and as she is 43 ft. down by the bows, she cannot be taken into harbour. They will not venture to dock the ship inside the lock, and intend first to raise her bows slightly.<br />
<br />
The roof and guns of the fore turret and anchors, cables etc., have already been unshipped, and they now intend to bring caissons alongside and pump out the fore part sufficiently to enable her to enter the harbour.<br />
<br />
The great inrush of water, that flooded more or less the whole fore part of the ship as far as the first boiler-room bulkhead, was caused by a number of hits. Firstly, one of the belt armour plates forward on the port side is missing, having fallen off. Secondly, there are believed to be at least 2 or 3 more hits below water, forward on the port side; for the list and the settling down had already become ominous when the ship was hit at the edge of the upper deck, port side, abreast the bridge; this was followed by an inrush of water in the battery deck, which did a great amount of damage.<br />
<br />
In addition, during the day action, she was hit by a torpedo on the starboard side under the forward 5.9 in. gun, which caused her to settle down still more by the bows. This gun was so much damaged by the shock from underneath as to be disabled.<br />
<br />
Further, there are 4 severe hits in the ship's side (mess deck, port side, forward of the turret), which also demolished the port capstan.<br />
<br />
These shell, or shell splinters, naturally penetrated to the armoured deck, so that the entire fore part of the ship above and below the armoured deck is holed in many places, allowing free passage for the water. The fore part of the ship was struck therefore by at least 8 or 9 shells and one torpedo.<br />
<br />
Apparently the only compartments which are not flooded, are the bow torpedo flats and the central control room. The former is being pumped out continuously, as a great deal of water is flowing in from above. The torpedo control room had to be abandoned, as the forward partition was not watertight. The central control room abaft this was not abandoned, but of its 2 entrances from the starboard and port passages, only the port one can be used, as the starboard one is flooded.<br />
<br />
The gunnery control room is far further aft and was not affected.<br />
<br />
The ship has a list of 7° to port, and as she has now been slightly raised, about 1¾ ft. of her bows are above water; at one time it was up to the level of the deck.<br />
<br />
While under way the forward boiler room bulkhead had to withstand most of the pressure; supports have been built up everywhere, but it leaks in places.<br />
<br />
The other hits of consequences were those in the turrets. The fore starboard turret No.2 received a direct hit on the fore face of the revolving structure. One curved plate was forced out, but fortunately the main effect of the explosion was outward. The right hand gun was disabled by slight damage to the mounting; with this exception the turret remained in action and kept up fire.<br />
<br />
The right hand gun of turret No.3 received a direct hit, which cut out a wide groove along the tube of the gun. The left hand gun continued to fire.<br />
<br />
The barbette of turret No.4 was hit on a level with the rammer, and the armour was pierced clean through. This hit is of special interest, as the "Seydlitz" received a similar hit and at the same level in turret No.5 on 24th January 1915, which caused a fire, disabled both the after turrets and killed all the guns' crews. This last time, however, the damage was slight. There was no ready ammunition in the turret, and only one cartridge was exploded, in contrast to the (6200 Kg.) 13,670 lbs. of powder on Jan.1915. The turret officer and a large number of the gun's crews were saved by their gas masks. The destruction caused by splinters was, however, considerable and the turret was abandoned, as it was not possible to continue fire from it. This was a 13.5 in. shell, at 15,310 yds. range, strength of armour pierced 8.6 inches.<br />
<br />
After the turret had been abandoned, it was hit a second time in the after side of the revolving part, which was pierced; this of course increased the havoc in the interior.<br />
<br />
Turret No.5 was hit in the roof. The shell richochetted, and the roof is slightly dented. Nobody was hurt and the turret continued to fire.<br />
<br />
In the "Seydlitz" therefore, all the turrets were hit, with the exception of the foremost turret, and one was hit twice.<br />
<br />
A further hit pierced the 5.9 in. (150mm.) casemate armour of the aftermost 5.9 in. starboard gun, No.2. The deck was pierced from beneath, and splinters also pierced the splinter bulkhead. The gun was disabled and all the crew were killed, with the exception of the ship's chaplain who happened to be in the casemate and must be watched over by a special guardian angel.<br />
<br />
A similar hit, with a 15 in. shell, struck the casemate armour of the 6-in. gun No.7 and exploded in the casemate. Men were killed, the gun was disabled and the splinter bulkhead pierced by large splinters. This time again, surprise was aroused by the comparatively small damage caused by a large calibre shell.<br />
<br />
"<u>Derfflinger</u>". One shell hit the armour belt forward of the hawse pipe, probably at the junction of 2 plates, as 2 plates broke away. The plates underneath were consequently strained apart and a great deal of water flowed in.<br />
<br />
The armour belt on the port side also received 2 further hits in the centre and was pierced clean through. The splinters penetrated more than half way through the ship, and in one case a piece of plating was driven half way though the ship. These hits, combined perhaps with others, destroyed the nets and their supports in several places.<br />
<br />
The two after turrets received direct hits, in one case on the roof, in the other case in the barbette above the deck; the armour was pierced and the upper portions of the turrets burnt out and severely damaged, but the flames did not penetrate to the magazines. The crew in the upper part of the turret were killed, and both turrets were disabled. This occurred at an early stage of the action.<br />
<br />
The guns at high elevation cannot yet be dismounted, as everything is wedged in, but they do not appear to be damaged.<br />
<br />
The muzzles were carried away off the 4 foremost 6 in. (15 cm.) guns on the port side; two of them probably having been accounted for by one and the same shell which hit the armour. One gun, the muzzle of which was perhaps damaged by a splinter, afterwards burst, the tube splitting open in the shape of a tulip.<br />
<br />
The "Derfflinger" received a few other hits of no particular interest. She appears the next most severely damaged ship after the "Lützow".<br />
<br />
The "<u>Moltke</u>" only received 5 hits, all of them during that part of the action which took place on a southerly course; while the cruisers mentioned above received most of the hits on the port side, consequently during the later stages of the action.<br />
<br />
One shell pieced the bulwarks in the after part of the ship above the armour, passed through the ship and struck the armour on the port side from inside, about 3.3 ft. below the water-line. One plate was forced out and is missing. The inrush of water was considerable. The after compartments, above the armoured deck which remained intact, were all more or less flooded.<br />
<br />
The second hit was further forward, below the armour belt. The shell exploded in a bunker, but the armoured deck held and no water penetrated it from below. The neighbouring bunkers made little water and could be pumped out.<br />
<br />
Another shell struck the 5.9 in. armour in the upper bunker, above the water-line. The armoured deck again held, but the inner wall of the bunker parted, and the battery deck was pierced from below, a 6 in. gun being damaged and disabled.<br />
<br />
In the fore part of the ship a shell struck the armour belt below the water-line. The plate remained intact and was driven in about 8 inches. The compartment was flooded, but the torpedo bulkhead remained watertight. A neighbouring compartment leaked slightly, the rivets having parted.<br />
<br />
The fifth case of damage, namely a plate beneath the armour belt being driven and pressed in, was probably not due to a direct hit, but to splinters of a shell which fell short.<br />
<br />
"<u>Von der Tann</u>". A shell hit and pierced the lower part of the 3.9 in. armour belt in the after part of the ship to starboard. The compartments above the armoured deck, and some of those on the deck above, were flooded. The chief effect of the shell was outside the ship, but it bent the plates below the otherwise undamaged armoured deck, so that a considerable amount of water flowed into the compartments below the armoured deck. The after torpedo flat was flooded half way up, and the men in the starboard steering engine room were shut in for a long time owing to the exits being blocked.<br />
<br />
The fore turret was hit on the starboard side on the upper edge of the barbette and a semi-circular armour plate was forced out. The machinery of the turret was so badly knocked about that the turret was disabled.<br />
<br />
The hydraulic piping was damaged, so that all the heavy armament was put out of action temporarily. Strangely enough, though men were wounded none were killed.<br />
<br />
The aftermost turret was hit in the barbette. The armour was pierced, but the effect of the shell was exterior, the turret sustained little internal damage, so that the handgear of the turret remained in action. The turret was wedged in one place and could not revolve; they succeeded, however, in cutting off with oxy-acetylene the piece of revolving part which was jammed against the inner side of the barbette thus getting rid of the obstruction.<br />
<br />
Outside the turret, the shell did considerable damage; some splinters striking downwards, bent the armoured deck and pierced it in places. As far as I know, the armoured deck sustained no further damage, and this was of little importance.<br />
<br />
The after conning-tower was hit and a piece of the armour torn away; the occupants, including the 3rd gunnery officer, were killed. Splinters struck downwards to the engine-room ventilation hatches, but were stopped by the armoured gratings.<br />
<br />
"<u>Ostfriesland"</u> was struck by a mine below the foremost port turret. The whole measures 197 ft.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. note:- Literal translation is 12 times 5 metres large.] The torpedo bulkhead is only slightly torn, and the inrush of water was only local.<br />
<br />
"<u>Helgoland</u>". A 13.5 in. shell hit the 7.9 in. armour belt forward on the port side and pierced it. The shell appears to have broken only as no explosive action can be traced. The range was about 14,217 yds.<br />
<br />
"<u>Nassau</u>" rammed a British destroyer, or rather, the destroyer ran into her forward on the port side. Her bows must have lifted right up, for her hawse-pipe remained on board the "Nassau", so firmly wedged into the side of the upper deck that it will have to be cut out. The "Nassau's" side below the deck is torn away for 33 ft. The destroyer then glanced off the "Nassau's" side and exploded internally. One of the crew remained behind in one of the nets, but fell into the water when the "Nassau" fired a salvo.<br />
<br />
The "Nassau" was hit by shrapnel from attacking destroyers in the foremost searchlight group, both port searchlights were put out of action. The searchlight control and electric cables were destroyed and many of the searchlight crews were killed. The after searchlight group was hit in a similar manner, and one of the searchlights was disabled.<br />
<br />
The "Rhineland" and a light cruiser were also hit in a similar manner.<br />
<br />
I have seen all the above mentioned ships in Wilhelmshaven.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" and "Kurfürst" were at Hamburg, but unfortunately I am unable to report much about them. They had already been under repair for several days, and the damage was to some extent made good. Besides this, the conditions were not favourable for undisturbed examination: commissioners from the Imperial Navy Office were on board, besides crowds of workmen, the noise was deafening and it was pouring with rain. Consequently I took no notes on the spot and relied on my memory, which however fails me now among the very many received of similar cases. I am therefore unable to report each hit with accuracy.<br />
<br />
This is immaterial, however, as there were no particularly interesting hits, and none of the ships had been hit in the turrets. The armour had been pierced in several places, the effect and character of the hits being similar in all cases; the hits on unarmoured parts were of little consequence.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" was hit aft on the port side of the water line just on a junction of two plates, a piece of equal size being torn away from each plate. The shell then struck the sloping part of the armoured deck and the splinters ricochetted and passed right through the ship. These plates have already been removed.<br />
<br />
A casemate was pierced and the gun disabled.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" is the only ship whose mast was hit, the mast remained standing and has now been removed.<br />
<br />
The spotting platform had to be abandoned, as communications with the conning tower was cut off. This was the only hit received in a conning tower; it only grazed the upper edge and glanced off, and the men inside hardly noticed it.<br />
<br />
The port engine was disabled, not in consequence of damage to the turbine which is in good condition, but owing to one of the main propeller bearings becoming overheated. The cause of this is not clear, but it is believed to be due to concussions. The ship was well able to keep station with her two remaining engines.<br />
<br />
The "<u>Kurfürst</u>" suffered especially from a great inrush of water forward on the port side, above the armoured deck; it was caused by a hit in the armour belt. No further damage of importance was sustained.<br />
<br />
With regard to time necessary for repair to these ships, it is not yet possible to say anything definite, as it is still undecided whether they shall undergo thorough repair or not. The chief difficulty is the manufacture of new armour plates; but some of the holed plates can, no doubt, be left in position for the present.<br />
<br />
A considerable time will be needed to repair some of the turrets of the battle-cruisers, but here too, they will contrive to get things done. For instance, the "Von der Tann" is to have an entire turret out of a ship of the "Nassau" class, probably the foremost turret, and this ship will be left without a turret for some time. They talk a great deal also of transferring guns, and they will perhaps make use of those intended for the "Hindenburg", which will not be completed will the late autumn.<br />
<br />
It may be presumed that the battleships will be ready for sea in 4-6 weeks, and the battle-cruisers, particularly the "Seydlitz", in not less than 4 months. Naturally work is going on day and night, and repairs are given priority over all new construction.<br />
<br />
The damage sustained by light cruisers and destroyers is inconsiderable. The "Hamburg" had a funnel shot away. As these ships seem to be of minor importance, I did not trouble further about them.<br />
<br />
As our Allies appear not to have the intention of communicating to us what effect the examination of damages sustained will have on their construction in the future, we must endeavour to ascertain this as time goes on by means of cross questioning and by studying their new constructions in detail. I do not feel called upon to draw premature and rash conclusions to-day, on the strength of impressions received, but this will not prevent me from giving a summary of my opinion and of the opinions expresses in my hearing.<br />
<br />
Firstly, it is a remarkable fact that in all the ships that have returned home, all the engine and boiler-rooms are undamaged; the "Lützow" is no exception to this, as she proceeded under her own steam until late in the night after the action. I have also been assured by the Imperial Navy Office, after an inspection carried out by the Chief Engineer, that not a single auxiliary engine was defective. The only boiler-room put out of action was the foremost one in the "Seydlitz" where the bulkhead gave a little, allowing water to penetrate through rivet holes and cracks when the ship was under way. The conclusion may therefore be drawn that these vital parts of the ship are sufficiently protected and that the armour belt of the usual German thicknesses, though it cannot stop the shells, at least fulfils its purpose by breaking them up. Consequently it has become almost impossible even for the largest splinters of 15 in. shell to penetrate through armoured deck or torpedo bulkhead in engine and boiler rooms.<br />
<br />
Even at these long ranges and steep angles there was no question of the armoured decks being pierced; but the fitting of strong gratings over the hatches, which prevented the engines of the "Von der Tann" from sustaining severe damage, appears very necessary.<br />
<br />
The torpedo bulkheads also resisted shells, mines and torpedoes effectually; and in cases where slight damage was sustained, it had no further consequences than the flooding of the compartment affected.<br />
<br />
Perhaps it would be advisable to construct a specially strong boiler-room bulkhead, similar to a torpedo bulkhead, so that it could not be damaged by splinters or water-pressure.<br />
<br />
The inspection of the "Seydlitz" has left me with the impression that the commanding officer of the "Seydlitz" expected rather too much of his ship, and that nothing short of extraordinary good luck enabled her to be brought back. At one time when the whole forepart of the ship was flooded and the bows were under water, he proceeded occasionally with revolutions for 22 knots, just in order to show how seaworthy his ship was, so he told me. This may have been very sporting, or perhaps it may have been necessary under the circumstances in order not to drop too far behind and be overtaken by the enemy, but it certainly was not good seamanship, and if his stokehold bulkhead had burst, the "Seydlitz" would have gone down like the "Lutzow", where the circumstances appear to have been very similar. Later on he decreased speed and finally proceeded stern first.<br />
<br />
I therefore think it not impossible that the loss of the "Lützow", which is said to have been proceeded at 14 knots for a time, was also due only to recklessly high speed, and that the ship might have been saved if she had proceeded stern first or been taken in tow.<br />
<br />
As the danger from water-pressure must always be greatest from ahead, it would certainly be advisable to take special preventative measures against it.<br />
<br />
Vice-Admiral Schmidt told me that, in his opinion, the armoured belt ought to be strongest in the centre, and possible in the afterpart to protect the steering engines, and possibly in the bows, but that it ought not to taper off gradually from the centre to the extremities. He was also entirely in favour of a protected upper deck forming a second armoured deck.<br />
<br />
The admirably thorough system of internal division in the German ships and the floating capability thus attained is the finest proof of the merit of German construction which pursued this aim, and it shows that Admiral von Tirpitz, the creator of the Battle Fleet of to-day, was right when he upheld the principle that, above all things, the ships must be capable of remaining afloat and must not sink or heel over, and that everything else is of secondary consideration.<br />
<br />
The large number of hits in the turrets is remarkable, and it is generally considered that the turret armour should be appreciably stronger, especially in the lower part of the barbettes; for it is not only the disablement of the guns that comes into question, serious though this might be, but also the blowing up of magazines and the total destruction of the ship, as the wide shaft down to the magazines cannot possibly be made completely flash-proof. This is the most vital part of the ship. It is only owing to the small explosive charges in British shells, that there were no explosions of magazines in the German ships.<br />
<br />
Everything possible had been done after the action of 24.1.15 to ensure protection against this danger; the ready ammunition was removed from the top of the hoists and wherever possible all the openings in shafts leading down below were fitted with flaps, covers and heavy asbestos mats, while German ammunition is particularly carefully stowed and packed in cases with screwed-on covers.<br />
<br />
The disasters on the British side are a proof that this is a question of the greatest importance. It must also be taken into consideration that while any other damage turret may take months.<br />
<br />
The numerous hits in turrets would appear to justify the opinion of those who decided against triple turrets, on the ground [sic] that if one was disabled it would put too many heavy guns out of action.<br />
<br />
A hit in a casemate will of course destroy it and disable the gun, but this is of little consequence. Care must be taken here also not to have any ready ammunition, and to close the ammunition hand-up hermetically with heavy asbestos mats at the magazine end also. With the German "Paternoster" (dredger hoist) the ammunition lifts this mat as it comes up and the mat then falls to and closes the opening, which is a practical arrangement.<br />
<br />
Other hits through unarmoured parts, which destroyed more or less small gear and at the first glance give an impression of terrible havoc, are really of no consequence.<br />
<br />
In the "Von der Tann" they wanted to flood a turret magazine. This was impossible, as the flooding valve in the battery, or between deck was piled up with debris, cabin fittings, etc., and was inaccessible. Fortunately the flooding of the magazine turned out to be unnecessary. The Executive Officer remarked to me how critical such a trivial matter might become, and that one could not be careful enough about choosing the positions for the flooding valves, which must be kept clear of easily destructible objects.<br />
<br />
The man-hole covers in the decks, coal shoots [chutes], etc., were pointed out to me as dangerous, as they may be burst open by pressure of gas from below, thus causing damage and giving passage to the gases. These covers should be secured in a different manner and much more firmly.<br />
<br />
The flooding and draining system worked admirably, and is hardly capable of improvement. The only disadvantage is that the compartments above the armoured deck have no draining arrangements. This should be provided. A list, consequent on an inrush of water, could always be corrected by flooding an opposite compartment. This is an important matter both as affecting gunnery and personnel.<br />
<br />
The searchlights, which were not taken down in the German ships, all came out of the action undamaged; anxiety on their account was therefore unfounded. It was very unpleasant when attacking boats fired on the searchlights, and it is therefore considered necessary to fit light armour protection on the masts for the crews of the searchlight control and electric cables.<br />
<br />
Damage from flames is nowhere visible. The Germans are now rather amused at the care with which interior partitions were scraped.<br />
<br />
I could not help comparing the German ships with the Russian battleship "Orel", which I saw in Madzurn after the battle of Tsushima. If I remember rightly, the "Orel" had 5 severe hits and 40 hits with medium-calibre shell.<br />
<br />
The enormous explosive power of the Shimosa shell, which breaks up into minute splinters, did not do the slightest damage to the vital parts of the ship, but the upper deck was transformed into a confused heap of ruins. Superstructure, bridges, masts, funnels, etc., were destroyed, guns dismounted and fires started.<br />
<br />
Nothing of the kind is to be seen in the German ships, outwardly only a few more or less clean shell holes are visible, and they look so orderly and so little damaged that they do not appear to have gone through an action.<br />
<br />
It is true that the upper decks are said to have been littered with countless splinters, but they flew on to the decks from shells which struck the water, the ship receiving violent shocks.<br />
<br />
The holes in the armour show the characteristic concentric cracks round the hole and the radial splashes, the latter proving that the shells exploded on impact or at the latest, as they passed through. In many cases, as already noted, the force of the explosion was external and only pieces of plate, and possibly the head of the shell were driven in.<br />
<br />
<center><u>FLAG OFFICERS OF THE FLEET AND LEADERS</u></center><br />
<br />
{|<br />
| Commander-in-Chief:<br />
| Vice Admiral Scheer<br />
|-<br />
| <u>I Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Vice Admiral Schmidt<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Engelhard<br />
|-<br />
| <u>II Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Mauve<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Baron von Dalwigh<br />
|-<br />
| <u>III Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Behncke<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Nordmann<br />
|-<br />
| Officer commanding the Scouting Forces and<br>Commanding 1st Scouting Group<br />
| Vice Admiral Hipper<br />
|-<br />
| " 2nd " "<br />
| Rear Admiral Bodicker<br />
|-<br />
| " 4th " "<br />
| Commodore "Captain" v. Reuter<br />
|-<br />
| Leaders of Destroyers<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| in "Rostock"<br />
| Commodore "Captain" Michelsen<br />
|-<br />
| in Regensburg<br />
| Commodore "Captain" Heinrich<br />
|-<br />
| Leader of submarines<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| In Hamburg<br />
| Captain Bauer<br />
|}<br />
<br />
<center><u>REMARKS</u></center><br />
<br />
The lecture on the action, upon which this report is based, was illustrated by a plan prepared in haste for H.M. the Kaiser, and a copy was promised to me. But the Admiral Staff does not wish to part with this first incomplete draft, and the preparation of an accurate plan has not yet been completed, as the Admiral Staff is not yet in possession of all the details.<br />
<br />
In time to be included in this report I have only received the sketch of the first stage of the battle, namely the cruiser action on a southerly course, together with a small sketch of the situation when the action was broken off; both are enclosed.<br />
<br />
I conclude from the sketch of the cruiser action, that the accounts given to me were not quite accurate; for instance, the assertion of the commanding officer of the "Moltke" that the shortest range at that stage was 7,650 yds. and that he had accounted for one of the armoured cruisers with a torpedo.<br />
<br />
The sketch shows that the "Indefatigable" was probably first destroyed by gun fire from the "Von der Tann", and later the "Queen Mary" by gunfire from the "Derfflinger", and that the range was never less than 14,220 yds.<br />
<br />
The loss of "V. 27" and "V. 29" and of 4 British destroyers is also apparent, while I was only told of two.<br />
<br />
In the original sketch, 2 British armoured cruisers are also shown as having fallen out during this stage, but this is not shown on the accompanying sketch and probably took place later.<br />
<br />
I was told by the Admiral Staff that the accompanying sketches are not to be taken as strictly accurate.<br />
<br />
It is requested that the sketches and course of the action and the account of damages may be treated as strictly confidential.<br />
<br />
==Footnotes==<br />
{{reflist}}<br />
<br />
==Bibliography==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
*''Schematismus für das K.u.K. Heer und für die Kriegsmarine für 1914. Separatausgabe''. Wien: 1914.<br />
*''Almanach für die k. und k. Kriegsmarine 1917. Kriegsausgabe''. '''XXXVII'''. Pola: 1917.<br />
*[[Arthur Marder (Naval Historian)|Marder, Arthur J.]] (1966). ''From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919: Jutland and After, May 1916–December 1916''. '''Volume III'''. London: Oxford University Press.<br />
*{{MarderFDSFIII}}<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
==External Links==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
*Krámli, Mihály. [http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-124.pdf "The Report on the Battle of Jutland by the Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché in Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Colloredo-Mannsfeld."] ''NavWeaps''.<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
[[Category:Battle of Jutland]]</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Attach%C3%A9_Report_on_the_Battle_of_Jutland&diff=334743Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland2024-03-11T22:34:55Z<p>Simon Harley: /* Report */</p>
<hr />
<div>Soon after the [[Battle of Jutland]] on 31 May &ndash; 1 June 1916 the Naval Attaché of the [[Austro-Hungarian Navy|Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Navy]] at the embassy in Berlin, ''Fregattenkapitäne'' Hieronymus Graf von Colloredo-Mannsfeld,<ref>''Schematismus für das K.u.K. Heer und für die Kriegsmarine für 1914''. p. 1270. ''Almanach für die k. und k. Kriegsmarine 1917''. p. 668.</ref> visited the High Sea Fleet. He composed a report on the battle for his superiors using first-hand accounts, interspersed here and there with his own observations. The version reproduced here is a translation in English apparently made by the [[Naval Intelligence Division (Royal Navy)|Naval Intelligence Division]] in 1919 from a copy which was subsequently returned to "F.N.A.", presumably the French Naval Attaché. A copy of the translation then made its way into the papers of the British Cabinet, from where historian Arthur J. Marder obtained a copy which is in his papers.<ref>Original number N.I.D. 087/19. Marder papers, Special Collections and Archives, Langson Library, University of California, Irvine, MS-F002, Box 27.</ref> He does not appear to have used it for the 1966 edition of ''From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow'', Volume III, but certainly used it for the revised edition in 1978.<ref>The quote on p. 189 of the 1966 edition differs from that on p. 234 of the 1978 edition, which is identical to that used here.</ref> <br />
<br />
It is worth comparing this translation with that made by Hungarian historian Mihály Krámli of a post-war copy of a slightly different version of the report in a Hungarian archive which has been published on the ''NavWeaps'' online resource.<ref>Krámli, Mihály. [http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-124.pdf "The Report on the Battle of Jutland by the Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché in Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Colloredo-Mannsfeld."] ''NavWeaps''.</ref><br />
<br />
The original grammar and punctuation of the typescript has been reproduced here wherever possible.<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
From:- Austrian Naval Attache in Berlin.<br />
<br />
To:- Commander-in-Chief, Pola.<br />
<div style="float:right;">Berlin,<br>17 June, 1916.</div><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<center><u>NAVAL ENGAGEMENT OF 31 MAY 1916.</u></center><br />
<br />
The following is a report of the naval proceedings of 31 May - 1 June, 1916, and also of the damage sustained by the German Fleet.<br />
<br />
During my 3-days' visit to Wilhelmshaven, followed by a cursory examination of the "MARKGRAF" and "KURFURST" at Hamburg, I endeavoured to gain merely a general idea of the results of gunfire and concentrated my attention on the course of the action itself.<br />
Admiral Scheer, whom I only saw for a short time as he left for Kiel to attend the funeral of his borther-in-law [sic], Lieut.-Commander Mohr,<ref>Carl Mohr of the ''Hamburg''. Our thanks to Ruiz Mateo Lutzow for pointing this out on Facebook.[http://www.denkmalprojekt.org/2023/vl_marineoffiz_zahlmstr_feuerwerks_torpedooffiz_beamte_wk1.html Raise the flag!]</ref> who was killed in the action, very kindly arranged that his Chief of Staff, Captain Trotha, should give me an account of the whole proceedings, illustrated by plans, and that I should be furnished with all information. I have tried to fill in the gaps by conversations with officers whom I know; this has resulted in some contradictory statements, and several points remain obscure, the accounts from the various ships not having all come in.<br />
<br />
Many episodes will therefore be explained later and may appear in a different light, but, as regards the broad outlines which are of chief importance, the picture of this interesting engagement is fairly clear. The accompanying plan of the action was made in haste for the Kaiser and will therefore need much correction.<br />
<br />
The spirit pervading the Fleet can only be described as one of enthusiasm; they are intoxicated with victory. The heavy load weighing on them all, the dear that this war might end without an encounter of the Fleets, have vanished. They have learnt what fighting really means, they know themselves to be superior to the enemy as regards tactics, and that they were following the right lines and have nothing to unlearn; they know that their gunfire was more effective than that of the enemy, and that they can rely implicitly on their flotillas which have always been looked upon in the German Navy as one of the chief factors in an action. Finally they know that their largest ships can stand heavy fire and serious damage, that they leave nothing to be desired as regards construction and cannot be sunk easily. In short, they feel that the British, in spite of all their boasting, cannot overcome the German Fleet and have a considerable respect for it.<br />
<br />
This conviction imbues the whole Fleet, down to the last man, with confidence in their strength and a calm assurance regarding future encounters. At the same time they are free from over-confidence and from under-estimation of the enemy. On the contrary, the British fire-control and the enormous piercing power of their heavy shell at great distances have roused their admiration, so that a careless conception of the situation is not to be feared, the less so, as well-balanced minds such as those of Admiral Scheer and his Staff are unlikely to be led away by former successes to undertake rash enterprises in the future.<br />
<br />
They do not deny that they were extraordinarily fortunate, and that if the action had been prosecuted with energy on the British side, and if the "Nelson touch" had been in evidence, things might have gone very badly for Germany, especially as the British still had an intact Battle Squadron of 12 units at their disposal which had not yet taken part in the action. But they console themselves with the knowledge that no naval action was ever won without some stroke of luck.<br />
<br />
The Kaiser's visit, the day before my arrival, and his address to the Fleet gave great satisfaction, and subsequently many important personages arrive to inspect the ships, such as Prince Henry and the Grand Dukes of Mecklenburg and Oldenburg, and numbers of decorations were distributed. Vice-Admiral Scheer was promoted to Admiral, and he and Vice-Admiral Hipper received the Pour le Merite.<br />
<br />
I also visited Rear-Admiral Behncke, who was wounded and in hospital; his wounds are slight, a few small splinters in his head, elbow and knee, and he will probably soon be well again.<br />
<br />
<center><u>COURSE OF THE ACTION.</u></center><br />
<br />
The Commander-in-Chief intended to advance with the whole Fleet to the waters of the Skagerrak, in order to make his presence felt unpleasantly by disturbing the shipping, hoping thereby to lure on the British forces and in this manner to be in a position to attack a part of the British Fleet with superior or at least with equal forces. He reckoned that any movements of the British Fleet would be reported to him in good time by the submarines which had been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and he hoped that the airships would prove a better means of reconnoitring than any possessed by the enemy.<br />
<br />
Unfavourable weather prevented him for a considerable period from undertaking any operations, and, as the submarines were to return home on 1 June and be relieved by a new group, the 31 May was the last date for carrying out the planned advance.<br />
<br />
The cruisers left the Jade at 3 a.m., the Main Fleet at 4 a.m., steering an easterly course, and then, after passing Heligoland, a N.N.W'ly course. No reports were received from submarines. These were stationed chiefly off the Orkneys and the Firth of Forth, and the large group of Flanders boats were off the Thames and at the entrance to the Channel. <br />
<br />
While proceeding northwards, a few W/T messages were received, but they were corrupt, appeared to refer only to small formations and gave no clue to the movements of the Grand Fleet. The airships were unable to start in the morning, on account of the wind, and, as it blew hard throughout the day in the Heligoland Bight, they could not start until the early hours of 1 June. In this respect things did not go well, but Admiral Scheer decided nevertheless to continue on his course to the Skagerrak. <br />
<br />
This the account given by Captain von Trotha, who affirms that nothing was known of the presence of the British Fleet in the waters of the Skagerrak, and that there seemed no probability of encountering this Fleet before 1 June.<br />
<br />
There are some points here which I am unable to understand. The submarines are said to have been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and were to return home on 1 June to be relieved probably by a weaker group. For, If the same number of boats were to to keep watch off the English coast, why should 31 May have been the last day for the German Fleet to sail. The day of departure was, therefore, too late in any case, for, if no encounter was to be expected before 1 June, the boats stationed off the coast could not possibly encounter the damaged British ships, as was intended, for probably no damaged ships would be there before 2 June.<br />
<br />
The battleship "KONIG ALBERT" had to carry out repairs to her condensers and did not proceed with the Fleet. Von Trotha told me that there was no alternative and that a ship must carry out small overhauls regularly in a dockyard according to programme. But could it not be arranged, when one is taking the initiative, to choose one's moment for an advance and to have all the ships together for this short time? And why should just that moment be chosen when one of the most powerful ships of the "Kaiser" class is in the dockyard, instead, for instance, of one of the "Nassau" class with 11-in. guns.<br />
<br />
In addition, the "BAYERN" was to have joined up a few days later. After having waited so long, why should not the plan have been postponed for 2 or 3 weeks, instead of dispensing with the only ship carrying 15-in. guns.<br />
<br />
In the same manner they dispensed with air reconnaissance, from which they had expected so much.<br />
<br />
These considerations make me doubt whether the account given me is quite correct, and whether, on the contrary, they knew of certain movements of the British Fleet and considered the moment extremely favourable for an attack. Perhaps they only knew of Beatty's battle squadron, and thinking the Main Fleet was far away, hoped to entrap this squadron. In Berlin, they have much to say, even in military circles, about the British Fleet's intention to push through into the Baltic, and of Kitchener's mission having some connection with this. I consider this senseless, for it cannot be presemed [sic] that the British Fleet would leave their shores unprotected and do the Germans the favour of operating in the Baltic, which would certainly be a most advantageous area for the German Fleet. In any case, there appear to be discrepancies which will probably be explained at some later date.<br />
<br />
Scouting groups, battle cruisers and light cruisers, together with flotillas, preceded the Main Fleet by 50 - 60 miles. At 4 p.m. the light cruisers encountered some British battle cruisers. These at once opened fire on the light cruisers, at an estimated distance of 26,247 yds.; the range could be taken accurately. Though they did not obtain a hit, the salvoes fell so well that the German cruisers thought it advisable to turn away and fall back on their battle cruisers.<br />
<br />
As the British approached, these battle cruisers turned on to a southerly course, in order to lure the enemy on to the German Main Fleet. A running action, on a southerly course, ensued. The British were to starboard and to the west of the Germans, who had therefore the following advantage: in the North Sea, in summer, the western horizon is quite light and visibility towards the west is good, while towards the east, and in a still greater degree off the Jutland Coast, it is misty and visibility is bad and no silhouettes stand out against the eastern horizon. This phenomenon also played great part in the subsequent course of the action. The sun was still high and was not troublesome, and the British ships offered admirable targets. The sea was calm, the wind N.W. 1-2, altering subsequently through W. to S.W.<br />
<br />
The following British ships were recognised:-<br />
3 "Lion" class, 1 "Tiger" and 2 "Indefatigable" class; they were soon reinforced by 5 "Queen Elizabeth" class following astern.<br />
<br />
It is asserted that, judging from shell splinters, the ship of the "Tiger" class carried 15-in. guns, and that she was therefore the mysterious vessel which replaced the "TIGER" sunk on 24.1.15; as the last-named "TIGER" carried only 13.5-in.guns, this was taken as a further proof of her loss. The silhouette of the new "TIGER", however, is said to have resembled that of the old "TIGER" exactly. As the "Queen Elizabeths" soon opened fire also with 15-in. guns, I rather doubt this assertion regarding the "TIGER", and the various ships on this early part of the engagement are altogether somewhat at variance.<br />
<br />
On the German side the ships proceeded in the following sequence:- "LÜTZOW", Flagship of Vice-Admiral Hipper, "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN".<br />
<br />
As Hipper edged towards the enemy, the distance decreased to about 7655 yds. The German fire was unquestionably superior, but the speed of the British vessels was greater. After a short time the "INDEFATIGABLE" and "QUEEN MARY" blew up, and 2 battle-cruisers and two attacking destroyers were also accounted for. The "QUEEN MARY" must have been destroyed by the explosion of a magazine; she was torn in two halves, and a water-colour painted by an officer represents her enveloped in an enormous column of black smoke; she disappeared in a few seconds. Only one cadet was subsequently picked.<br />
<br />
The second battle cruiser disappeared under similar circumstances. The "VON DER TANN" claims to have accounted for one of these battle-cruisers by a broadside. But the "MOLTKE" fired 4 torpedoes and also claims this achievement.<br />
<br />
The Germans suffered very little during this phase of the action, the "MOLTKE" alone receiving hits on the starboard side. The fire of the British battle-cruisers is said not to have been nearly as good as that of the "QUEEN ELIZABETH" class later on.<br />
<br />
When they had approached the German Main Fleet, the British turned on to a contrary course and the German cruisers did the same. The German Main Fleet proceeded in divisions in starboard quarter-line, the 3rd Battle Squadron: 4 "König" class and 3 "Kaiser" class, Fleet Flagship, 1st Battle Squadron: 4 "Ostfriesland" class and 4 "Westfalen" class, and the 2nd Battle Squadron: 5 "Deutschland" class and the "Hessen". They endeavoured to effect a junction with the cruisers, but were unable to take part very effectually.<br />
<br />
The course of the action was now in a northerly direction, over the area which had just been traversed, and the British ships now drew ahead considerably and turned more and more towards the East; the Germans followed this movement, and in consequence the conditions of visibility became less and less favourable for them.<br />
<br />
The "Queen Elizabeths" now made their presence more greatly felt; one of them had dropped out, but I was unable to ascertain when this occurred.<br />
<br />
The course of the German Math Fleet at first led past the 2 disabled British destroyers, which were lying stopped. The crews had already taken to the boats and were picked up later on by German destroyers. As the Main Fleet was doubtful about the advisability of passing the destroyers while they were still afloat, they were sunk by a few broadsides. One of the officers who was picked up was in pyjamas and is said to have stayed in his cabin during the action. He declared "We did not expect so much resistance," while another said - "The battle is rather disappointing." It has been ascertained that these destroyers were greatly under-manned; their crews seemed very exhausted, which points to their having been in the water for a long time.<br />
<br />
While on this easterly course, the light cruisers of the fast 2nd Scouting Group: "FRANKFURT", "PILLAU", "ELBING" and "WIESBADEN", were heavily fired on from the N.E. and E. without their being able to see more than the gun flashes. In addition, they were under continual fire from the N., and while turning away to S.E. and S., they ascertained that they were opposed by an interminable line of British ships, which appeared at first to be on a N.W.'ly course, and had then evidently turned together on to a S.'ly course.<br />
<br />
It may be noted here that the battleships, and, generally speaking, the battle-cruisers also, never sighted the British Main Fleet, and saw nothing but the flashes of the guns and the effects of the fire. These British ships, about 25 in number, were only sighted by a few light cruisers and by the flotillas, and were counted by them as accurately as possible.<br />
<br />
Surrounded thus from the N. and the E. and under fire, the "WIESBADEN" was disabled, apparently by a hit in the engine-room. The Admiral noticed, it is true, that his leading ships must have encountered new and powerful forces and that they were turning away; but he thought it his duty to go to the assistance of the "WIESBADEN" and therefore continued on an easterly course.<br />
<br />
The van of the Main Fleet, led by the "KÖNIG" (Rear-Admiral Behncke) now came under heavy fire from right ahead; the "KÖNIG" turned away under this fire towards the S.E., whereupon the Commander-in-Chief ordered the whole line to "turn together" to starboard and gave up the idea of helping the "WIESBADEN". About this time Vice-Admiral Hipper transferred his flag from the "LÜTZOW" to the "MOLTKE" with the help of a destroyer, his W/T station being damaged.<br />
<br />
Hardly had the Main Fleet drawn away on a westerly course, before it was ascertained that the pressure was relaxing and the fire decreasing, and that the British were no longer pursuing so hotly. Scheer therefore ordered the ships to "turn together" back on to their former course, and made the signal 'R' = 'Engage the enemy'. This second advance may be termed the zenith of the action. Admiral Scheer gave his views on it approximately as follows:- "Those who make a study of this engagement will be very puzzled as to my object in advancing thus against the wall of British ships. The fact is that I had no particular object. I made the first advance because I had a feeling that I ought to endeavour to assist the "WIESBADEN" and because the situation ahead was quite obscure to me, for I saw nothing of the "LÜTZOW" and received no W/T reports. I soon saw, however, that the leading ships were coming under an overwhelming fire, and that I could not risk the Fleet on the "WIESBADEN'S" account. When I noticed that the British pressure had quite ceased and that the Fleet remained intact in my hands, I turned back, under the impression that the action could not end in this way and that I ought to seek contact with the enemy again."<br />
<br />
The situation during the first and second advances may serve as an example of what should not take place according to all the laws of tactics, for it could not have been worse; von Trotha said jokingly that, if an Admiral brought about such a situation at a war game or in manoeuvres, he would never be entrusted without another command. In the North, the "Queen Elizabeths", then the battle-cruisers, and from N.E. through E. to S.E., an endless line of battleships formed an arc round the German van and kept it under fire. Evidently it had fallen into the most perfect trap. In addition to this unfavourable tactical position, there was a further difficulty, namely that the German ships could be clearly distinguished while they themselves only saw the gun flashes, 4 or 5 to each salvo, but could find no target.<br />
<br />
The Gunnery Officer of the "MARKGRAF" told me that he could not fire at all during half-an-hour, and that they were at the mercy of the British broadsides. Critical though the position was, in theory, they think that experience justifies the conclusion that this 'crossing the T' is in reality not so disastrous at longer ranges; for, in spite of the enormous superiority of their fire, the British made comparatively few hits, the simple reason being that, when fire is thus concentrated on a few leading ships, there can be no question of improving the shooting by spotting.<br />
<br />
Given good tactical training and squadrons which work well together, it is always easy to retire rapidly from an unfavourable position and even possibly to reach an advantageous one.<br />
<br />
The small amount of damage sustained by the Main Fleet may be owing partly to the fact that the leading battle-cruisers drew the enemy's fire, thus relieving the battleships. Only the three leading ships, "KÖNIG", "GROSSER KURFÜRST" and "MARKGRAF" received several hits; while among all the other ships, the "KAISER", "HELGOLAND" and the "SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN" received one hit each, and the rest were not hit at all.<br />
<br />
Simultaneously with the battle-cruisers, which were ahead and pressing forward in quarter-line formation, the 6th and 9th Flotillas, left by the "REGENSBURG", also proceeded to a torpedo attack. Regarding this cruiser advance, the Commanding Officer of the "SEYDLITZ" told me that he was in such a position that he was able to avoid the British salvoes, for he altered course towards the point where each salvo fell and thus evaded the spotting correction.<br />
<br />
This torpedo attack was carried out with great determination and seems to have been completely successful, although nobody is able to state how many hits were obtained. The British ships overlapped somewhat and their line was almost unbroken, and, as about 100 torpedoes were fired, it is estimates that there must have been a considerable number of hits, some people affirm that there were 20, but I do not place much confidence in these figures and it is useless to trouble about them as nobody is certain.<br />
<br />
The boats were fired on by guns of all calibres, even the heaviest, but with little effect, only one boat being destroyed; two other boats had been sunk in an earlier attack during the cruiser action.<br />
<br />
The battle-cruisers were also attacked by British torpedoes, the "SEYDLITZ" being hit once. The "MOLTKE" was lucky, for, when close to the ship, one torpedo apparently had a gyro failure and ran parallel with her. The "LÜTZOW" was probably hit also.<br />
<br />
After the attack, the destroyers laid fog and a heavy smoke screen, which interposed between the Fleet; this benefitted not only the heavily-damaged "LÜTZOW" and "DERFFLINGER", whose nets had been shot away and were hanging down, but also the whole Fleet. It may also have made an impression on the British.<br />
<br />
The German Main Fleet and cruisers turned on a westerly course, fire having again entirely ceased; and the ships of the Main Fleet then turned gradually in succession and in inverse sequence from W. to S.W., subsequently steering towards Horns Reef.<br />
<br />
It is not known what the British did; all that is certain, is that they did not follow in pursuit and that nothing further was seen of their Main Fleet. It remained light until 11 p.m. (summer time), and it would not have been impossible, considering their superior speed, for them to have come within firing range. The Germans expected it too, and now have to content themselves with surmises about the British Commander-in-Chief's reasons for not doing so. It is probably that the unfavourable issue of the fleet part of the battle and the demoralising losses in ships took away any desire on Jellicoe's part for further fighting. His Fleet may have lost heavily and been severely shaken by the torpedo attack; and, as the Germans still had some intact flotillas at their disposal, he may have feared further strong torpedo attacks in the critical hours of twilight, for in the German Navy they say that Jellicoe fears their destroyers in particular.<br />
<br />
Nevertheless, the Germans were not under the impression of having shaken the British Fleet to the extent of obliging them to give up the struggle, and when the evening passed without further incident, they reckoned with certainty on encountering Jellicoe off Horns Reef at daybreak. They were the more astonished at his non-appearance when their air reconnaissance reported that on the morning of 1 June a squadron of 12 battle-ships was proceeding North from the southern part of North Sea and that it suddenly turned on to an opposite course and proceeded South.<br />
<br />
As it could not possibly have been the intention of the British Commander-in-Chief to let the German Fleet escape after having encountered it at last far from its base, and as he still had an intact battle-squadron at his disposal, one is compelled to take the view that he no longer felt strong enough for a second encounter; the achievement of the German Fleet must therefore be very highly thought of.<br />
<br />
During the night cruising following the action, numerous small episodes and minor engagements took place, of which no clear idea can be formed. <br />
<br />
In view of a possible fresh attack or of a possible pursuit on the part of the enemy, it was thought undesirable to leave the 2nd Battle Squadron either in the van or in the rear, it therefore took station to starboard and at first proceeded on an opening course from the other squadrons, and continued fairly independently during the night.<br />
<br />
The 1st Battle Squadron therefore led, with the "WESTFALEN" as guide, and it was followed by the 3rd Battle Squadron.<br />
<br />
After the action had been broken off, the 4 remaining battle cruisers were ahead to port, where they were suddenly again brought under heavy fire from the port side and from ahead, apparently by 3 or 4 battle cruisers. It is presumed that these were the remaining 3 or 4 older cruisers of the "Invincible" class, which Jellicoe probably always stationed ahead of the Main Fleet, for it would hardly have been possible for the "Lions", which were following in the rear in the British line, to have taken station ahead so quickly. The German battle cruisers, all severely damaged, did not feel able to withstand this fire and turned away to starboard, passing ahead of the Main Fleet and between it and the 2nd Battle Squadron, which proceeded quietly on their course and before which the mysterious ships retired, not to be sighted again.<br />
<br />
The battle-cruisers then gradually fell astern, and as they were making much water, and also owing to their differing speeds, they lost contact with the Main Fleet and with each other.<br />
<br />
The "LÜTZOW" had dropped out during the engagement and proceeded independently, accompanied by 4 destroyers. At first she was able to steam 14 knots, but her speed decreased rapidly and dropped finally to 4 knots. Her bows sank slowly, and when the whole forecastle was under water the Commanding Officer decided to leave the ship. The badly wounded were transferred carefully to the boats and the disembarkation was conducted in good order. A torpedo was then fired at the ship and this coup de grace sank her in deep water at about 1 o'clock, I believe.<br />
<br />
The "SEYDLITZ" was hardly in a better condition than the "LÜTZOW"; she also sank gradually by the bows till the water was almost level with the deck, and she had a heavy list to port, but she continued on her course. In the darkest hours of the night she suddenly sighted 3 large ships to port, quite close to. She turned away, made a British recognition signal and was not pursued. As bad luck would have it, the steaming light had short-circuited, could not be switched off and showed intermittently.<br />
<br />
The "DERFFLINGER", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN" followed the Main Fleet more or less and met with no particular experiences.<br />
<br />
The Main Fleet had to repulse a series of destroyer attacks and was also engaged by cruisers. The movements of these British cruisers, which came up singly, are incomprehensible and give the impression of having lost their heads. They appear to have received the order, judging by an intercepted W/T message, to proceed on a northerly and north-westerly course, and thereby they ran into the extended German line which they probably imagined they had passed to the South.<br />
<br />
One large cruiser (?"WARRIOR") proceeded unsuspectingly within 875 yds. of the line of battleships and came under concentrated fire from several ships before she could reply, so that she blew up enveloped in flames and disappeared in 47 seconds. The "BIRMINGHAM" seems to have been accounted for in a similar manner. The destroyers all approached in a really insane manner; frequently not from ahead but from a direction astern, scattered, singly or in pairs, or at most 3 together, never in large numbers. Most of them were disabled forthwith by a few salvoes and set on fire. The "WESTFALEN" distinguished herself particularly at this time.<br />
<br />
These burning destroyers strewn along the course, lit it up as if for a festival. Evidently the fires were largely due to the light American and Mexican oils; at any rate German firing trials on oil bunkers never caused any such conflagrations.<br />
<br />
The attacking boats directed shrapnel fire on the searchlights with fairly good results, the searchlights of two battleships and one light cruiser being hit.<br />
<br />
One large destroyer, which only recognised the danger at the last moment and endeavoured to avoid it by altering course was rammed by the "NASSAU", which put her helm over for this purpose. The boat exploded internally and sank.<br />
<br />
The only ships hit were the "POMMERN" in the 2ns Battle Squadron, and the "ROSTOCK". The "POMMERN" blew up at once and nobody was saved. The "ROSTOCK" was just passing between ships of the Main Fleet when she was hit; the loss of life on board was small.<br />
<br />
The Germans believe they destroyed 11 British destroyers in all. The manner in which these destroyers were handled has not left a good impression on the whole, and one has certainly lost respect for this weapon. The view is also taken that the boats are too large and offer too wide a target.<br />
<br />
The light cruiser "ELBING", like the "ROSTOCK", apparently wanted to break through the line from port to starboard under pressure from the British cruisers; she was, however, rammed by the "POSEN" and had to be abandoned in a sinking condition. The Germans also fired a torpedo into her.<br />
<br />
The "FRAUENLOB" and 2 destroyers were lost during the night; no details of their loss are known.<br />
<br />
Not far from Heligoland, the "OSTFRIESLAND", 7th of the line, struck a mine. This brings the account of the chief events of this exciting cruiser to an end.<br />
<br />
The German flotillas were detached from the Fleet to clear the area off the Jutland Coast, which was divided up into sectors. The flotillas stationed furthest to the North proceeded to the Skagerrak and through these straits into the Baltic and to Kiel.<br />
<br />
None of the flotillas sighted the British Main Fleet again, which proves that it must have turned away to the N. or N.W. immediately after the action. According to confidential reports the Fleet entered British ports as early as 1 June.<br />
<br />
Two British battleships, in a severely damaged condition and accompanied by destroyers, were sighted proceeding back to England. One was attacked by a submarine, but without success.<br />
<br />
On the morning of 1 June, in fairly misty weather, a Zeppelin sighted groups of British ships leaving the Channel on a N.E.'ly course. The reports were rather vague, as sometimes 6 and sometimes 12 ships were mentioned; but it seems most likely that 12 battleships and 3 cruisers were in question, and that they soon retired. The airship, which flew low at one time to get a clearer view, was also fired on.<br />
<br />
Some of the ships are said to have had tripod masts.<br />
<br />
The German Fleet, with the exception of "SEYDLITZ", reached the Jade in the afternoon. The "SEYDLITZ" could not cross the bar on account of being so much down by the bows, and it was not till the next day at high water that she was towed in, stern first.<br />
<br />
<center><u>MISCELLANEOUS.<br>TACTICS.</u></center><br />
<br />
The Germans ascribe their success to various causes, and in the first place to their own superiority as regards tactics. This is a point which every officer discusses, and it is constantly repeated that it all happened just as in tactical manoeuvres and in "battle exercises", and that things could not have gone better.<br />
<br />
Movements of squadrons, divisions and individual ships, "turns together" and alterations of course and speed, all went like clockwork and demonstrated the very great mobility of all formations.<br />
<br />
The W/T signalling system of the Main Fleet never failed, and its failure would have been immaterial, as the primary and secondary flag action signals, showing from several positions in the ship, were made simultaneously.<br />
<br />
All this was due to the peace training and the practical experience of the Flag Officers and Captains. Though in peace time the Commander-in-Chief had never commanded a Fleet, nor the Admirals a squadron, still the training carried out on the same lines for a number of years resulted in everything proceeding with the expected precision.<br />
<br />
The British, on the contrary, are said to have displayed a certain clumsiness as regards tactics and to have preferred turning together when "turning on to an opposite course" (Wendungen im Gegenmarsch), though this conclusion does not seem altogether justified from the description of the action.<br />
<br />
The ships kept station 547 yds. apart, and Vice-Admiral Schmidt told me that, in his opinion, this distance is too small for large ships and that he prefers 656 yds., as the shorter distances result in the ships getting bunched and overlapping during alterations of course. In order to relieve this during the first turn to starboard, the Fleet Flagship herself turned to port and then closed gradually into line. At night the distance was 656 yds.<br />
<br />
No interruption of W/T communication was occasioned by the enemy.<br />
<br />
<center><u>GUNNERY</u></center><br />
<br />
It is admitted that the British are superior as regards their gunnery technique. Their salvoes fall most astoundingly close together and aroused admiration on all sides. Some people affirm that they fell too close together, and that it was consequently difficult to cover a sufficiently large danger space.<br />
<br />
This is particularly the case with the heaviest calibres: 13.5-in. and 15-in. and the battle-cruisers' fire was noticeably inferior to that of the "Queen Elizabeth" class, for example.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> Literal translation; the meaning is not clear. - Tr.] The spread of the salvoes frequently only covered a few square yards. In the "KÖNIG" 3 rounds, out of a salvo of 4 rounds, hit between the capstan and the bridge.<br />
<br />
This is attributed to careful calibration, which the British have studied for a long time and which, as is well known, was abandoned by the German Navy after a few trials. The gunnery officers declare unanimously that it must unquestionably be re-introduced.<br />
<br />
The British range-finders are superior to the German, and the construction of their turrets enables them to shoot at ranges impossible for German guns. The question of range appears to be immaterial to the British, who fire at any range so long as visibility permits.<br />
<br />
The Germans are fully convinced of the great superiority of 15-in. guns over all others, and deplore the fact that, owing to the predominant conservative tendencies in the German Navy, this calibre was not introduced until so lately. Vice-Admiral Gerdes, the Head of the Armament Department, is responsible for this, for he always opposed it on the ground that the poor visibility in German waters and the consequent short ranges rendered an increase of calibre useless; he considered the German 12-in. gun to be an altogether superior weapon, capable of competing with every other.<br />
<br />
In one respect the British seem behindhand as compared with the Germans: namely that they cannot alter range quickly enough and they are too dependent on the range clock. The British rely on steady fire at long range, and they adapt their tactics to this and avoid alterations of course and range most assiduously.<br />
<br />
The Germans, on the contrary, in their firing practices always work with big and rapid alterations of range and exercise firing while turning, so that the gunnery officers consider they have an advantage in this respect.<br />
<br />
The Turn on to an opposite course was certainly not advantageous for the German Fleet, but in this particular instance it made little difference, as the German ships were already unable to find a target; besides which, it must have disconcerted the British and it prevented them from obtaining good results with their fire. The salvoes fell very close together round the ships, but few hits were obtained. The rate of fire in the British ships is said to have been fair, but not excessive. Some people affirm that it was very modest.<br />
<br />
The British shell had great penetrating power, and from all reasonable distances the main armour was generally pierced clean through. The shell splinters picked up prove conclusively that at least 2 kinds of shell were used, differing considerably in material and quality. One kind of shell had a very thick wall and an extremely small explosive charge, it might almost be called a solid shot. It seems to have broken up frequently without exploding and the fuse did not function. Its explosive power, if it possessed any at all, was quite inconsiderable, and it is presumed that the explosives used was not high explosive.<br />
<br />
It appears from the splinters of these 15-in. shell that the wall was 6.3 - 6.7 ins. (16 - 17 cm.), so that the hollow space cannot measure more than 2.4 ins. - 1.8 ins. (4 - 6 cm.). It is true that the large pieces into which these shell broke pierced everything in their course and often went right through the whole ship, unless they struck an armoured part. Several intact heads were found, with and without caps, and also entire bases.<br />
<br />
The second kind of shell had considerably thinner walls, only about half as thick, but it also often broke up into quite large pieces and displayed no great explosive power, and little or no incendiary power.<br />
<br />
It appears therefore that the British aimed only at attaining penetrating power, and the Germans are of opinion that they do not possess (rohrsicheren)* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D.Note.- This appears to be a special fuse which is very delicate, but safe until it has left the gun.] fuses for high explosive shell; this was their opinion before the war also.<br />
<br />
They believe that the high explosive power of the German ammunition gives them a great advantage which may partly counterbalance the smaller calibre of their guns and perhaps also their inferior gunnery. In any case, the effect of the German shell at the point of impact was very considerable.<br />
<br />
The fact that the ships blew up must be attributed to explosions in their magazines. (In this connection one may recall a turret of the "SEYDLITZ" being hit in the action of 24 January, 1915; see my report No.47 ex 15). The turret armour must have been pierced and the shells in the turret must have been exploded. The British have no metal cartridge-cases and also no cartridge-holders such as the Germans have, but they keep their cartridges in locked boxes which are perhaps not flash-proof enough. It seems therefore, from the incident experienced by the "SEYDLITZ", that this must constitute a particular danger to British ships. In this last action also turrets in German ships were frequently hit; further details are given in the account of damage sustained.<br />
<br />
After having compared the hits received in the German ships with the observations of results on enemy targets, it may be safely affirmed that the explosive power of the German shells exceeds that of the British; this was already known after the action of 24 January 1915. The Germans are therefore very much annoyed that they had no 15-in. guns to fire, as they are persuaded that ships so knocked about (eingedeckte) as, for example, the "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" would have been completely destroyed by German shell.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. Note.- The writer appears to mean that if German 15-in. shell had been used against "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" these ships would have been sunk.]<br />
<br />
It may be noted here that the "BAYERN", the first of their ships to carry 15-in. guns, will not join the Fleet for another few days, and the "BADEN" not until the autumn.<br />
<br />
Medium armament played no part, only a few hits were obtained and they did little damage.<br />
<br />
The British fired part-salvoes, like the Germans; full salvoes may have been fired now and again.<br />
<br />
The method of repulsing destroyer attacks, which has previously been reported, namely the 'turning away' and firing on one, or at most two boats, proved to be sound, and the repulsing of attacks both by day and night offered no difficulties.<br />
<br />
As regards gunnery, it may also be mentioned that the fire-control apparatus worked without a hitch and withstood the heaviest shocks. The elevation pointers worked admirably. A few ships were not yet fitted with them.<br />
<br />
<center><u>Torpedo.</u></center><br />
<br />
As regards torpedo work the Germans consider themselves very much superior. There were prolonged discussions about depriving Flotilla Leaders of their independence and putting them under the orders of a Leader Ship, but they are now convinced that this is necessary to ensure the flotillas attacking at the right moment and all together.<br />
<br />
The flotillas were led by the 2 leader Ships "ROSTOCK" and "REGENSBURG", the first having 2 flotillas and the second 3 flotillas allocated to them. The remaining 2 flotillas accompanied the Main Fleet or the battle-cruisers. The leaders carried out their duties with great daring and circumspection. The attacks of the British were weak and scattered, and could therefore have little or only occasional success.<br />
<br />
The German 2nd Flotilla, composed of the larger 1500 ton boats were held back instead of being sent to attack. Although these boats are spoken of very highly and are indispensable for certain enterprises, the view is now taken that they are too large and too valuable to be used for attacking during an action. This Flotilla proceeded to Zeebrugge immediately after the action and arrived there safely. It is to be employed in preventing the British from blockading the harbour with nets, and thus make it impossible for the German submarines to proceed out.<br />
<br />
As far as I have heard, the "MOLTKE" alone of the larger ships fired 4 torpedoes.<br />
<br />
Submarines were not in evidence. No German submarines were present; on the other hand a German destroyer claims to have rammed a British submarine. This claim appears to be erroneous, at least it was declared to be nonsense by the Chief of Staff. The submarines failed as regards scouting and also doing the pursuit.<br />
<br />
Some people state that a British aeroplane was sighted to the northward, and that it had apparently risen from a cruiser. It played no part in the action.<br />
<br />
The use of "Höschter"* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. note:- Probably the name of the inventor.] fog seems to have been of good service, it and the smoke made by the destroyers having completely masked the Main Fleet and its movements at critical moments.<br />
<br />
<center><u>SPEED</u></center><br />
<br />
The advantage of speed lay entirely with the British, not only as regards the Main Fleet on account of the "Deutschland" class, but also as regards the battle-cruisers. The latter are said to have proved considerably faster than the German battle cruisers, an unpleasant experience which had already been made on 25 January 1915. This alone proves that the British are talking nonsense when they assert that the German Fleet sought safety in flight; on the contrary, it was far from its bases and entirely in the power of the British, who either did not wish to take advantage of their superior speed, or were unable to do so on account of the damage sustained. The visibility was no worse than it had been during the day and Jellicoe may have even welcomed the "Höschter" fog which would enable him to plead bad visibility as a reason for abandoning the pursuit. On the German side in the light of experience the factor of speed in the battleships is considered very important. But the moderate depths of the German harbours limits the draught of the ships, and make it particularly difficult for German builders to do much in this respect. In spite of greater length and higher horse power the most modern cruisers "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ" and "LÜTZOW" attained only a quite inconsiderable increase of speed in comparison with the older "GOEBEN" class, and proved a disappointment in this particular.<br />
<br />
The question whether the older battleships should take part in an important engagement was not easy to decide. The 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons composed of the "WITTLESBACH" and "BARBAROSSA" class, re-commissioned at the beginning of the war, were intended to be used in such actions, but have long since been paid off; some have been disarmed and employed as guardships and instructional ships, etc. It was considered however, that the 2nd Battle Squadron, composed of the most modern of the older ships, would be of some service in the action; but this squadron was in a privileged position, inasmuch as it was merely attached to the 1st and 3rd Battle Squadrons and its Admiral was allowed to operate independently and select the position he thought best. On this occasion it kept station quite well and did not prove a hindrance, but, on the other hand, it did not come under any heavy fire. This must be considered very fortunate, for, in view of the damage sustained by other ships and in view of the fact that the British shell pierced all armour above or below water even at the longest range, it is certain that every ship of this class would have been sunk by a few hits, as their internal sub-division is not proof against large inrushes of water.<br />
<br />
The loss of the "Pommern", which gives the British an opportunity for a hollow triumph, also teaches a clear lesson. The Chief of Staff told me that they will probably consider carefully before again exposing this Squadron to danger; therefore this action will have further confirmed the complete worthlessness of all Dreadnought types [sic] and will condemn them as old iron.<br />
<br />
<center><u>TORPEDO NETS.</u></center><br />
<br />
The torpedo nets of the battle cruisers are all badly damaged and the gear so knocked about by gunfire that they were almost useless. This was particularly the case with the "Derfflinger", where the after port nets were hanging in the water, and would have fallen across the propeller had they not chanced to remain held up by a temporary lashing. The ship was obliged to stop during the action to secure the nets, and they might easily have occasioned the loss of the ship.<br />
<br />
For this reason all the nets, together with the booms, were unshipped immediately after the ships' return, to everybody's satisfaction. They will not be carried any more, except perhaps for operations in the Baltic, where the ships may be obliged to anchor at sea.<br />
<br />
<center><u>LEAK-STOPPING SERVICE.</u></center><br />
<br />
The leak-stopping service which had been systematically developed, worked admirably and the Germans are convinced that they owe much to it. They believed that the "Seydlitz" could not have been brought in if the strengthening of the bulkheads, etc., had not been so thoroughly exercised and if the personnel had not been so well trained.<br />
<br />
It is also said, that in the "Lutzow", which had only been in commission for 2 months, was naturally not up to the mark in this respect, and that it is not impossible that small shortcomings, for which of course nobody can be blamed, were responsible for the ship sinking. The "Lutzow" was an unfortunate ship altogether. First her turbines collapsed, thus delaying her commissioning for 6 months, then she immediately struck a mine, and she was hardly out of dockyard hands before she was sunk.<br />
<br />
<center><u>DANGER FROM GAS FUMES.</u></center><br />
<br />
Only 2 days before sailing, a large number of the ships, and fortunately exactly those that came most under fire, namely battle-cruisers and the 3rd Squadron, were supplied with gas masks fitted with alkali cartridges for the whole crew and a plentiful reserve (in the "Seydlitz" 1500 masks for about 1200 men). The masks are similar to those used in the army for poisonous gases. Each man carries a mask slung round him, if he is not actually wearing it.<br />
<br />
I was told emphatically by all the officers, that, in their experience, these masks are absolutely necessary and not only saved many lives but enabled the men to carry on in parts of the ship which they would otherwise have been compelled to leave.<br />
<br />
The gases from shells, mines and torpedoes penetrate in an incredible manner through ventilators, telephone leads, etc. to compartments far away from the point of impact. In many cases the masks enabled large numbers of the guns' crews to escape from turrets that were hit, and to help out others who were badly wounded. In one case the men in one of the main engine rooms were able to remain at their posts after gas had penetrated, until the engine-room was ventilated.<br />
<br />
The Fleet breathing apparatus (Flottenathmer) is preferable to masks in some cases, but it cannot be supplied to everyone and it hampers one's movements, which the masks do not.<br />
<br />
On account of the great danger from gases, it is also advisable to fit hinged flaps in all shafts, and to have wooden bungs to fit the voice-pipes, keeping a hammer at hand to hammer them into the mouth-pieces.<br />
<br />
They tell me that it proved very useful to keep all the personnel employed below, such as in central control rooms, engine-rooms, torpedo flats, etc. continually informed of what was going on. The men get nervous, particularly at first, with the tremendous shocks caused by shell falling close to the ship, though the shocks are felt less on deck, and such information gives them confidence and they like knowing what is going on above them.<br />
<br />
<center><u>DAMAGE</u></center><br />
<br />
The distribution of ships needing repair in the various dockyards is as follows:-<br />
<br />
The "König" proceeded at once to Kiel and is under repair at Howaldt's yard. I did not see her.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" and "Moltke" in Blohm and Voss yard, Hamburg, the first in the Imperial Dock.<br />
<br />
The "Kurfürst["] in Vulkan Yard, Hamburg.<br />
<br />
The "Derfflinger" was first docked in Wilhelmshaven and the leaks temporarily stopped, she then proceeded to the Imperial dockyard, Kiel. The "Seydlitz" will now be docked in the large dock at Wilhelmshaven; during my stay the "Seydlitz" was still in the lock.<br />
<br />
The "Von der Tann", "Ostfriesland" and "Helgoland" will be repaired in dry docks in Wilhelmshaven. No other large ships require to be docked.<br />
<br />
"<u>Seydlitz</u>" The number of hits was still uncertain, as the whole forepart of the ship up to the upper deck was still under water, and it is not known what she looks like below water. The ship was brought into the lock with difficulty, and as she is 43 ft. down by the bows, she cannot be taken into harbour. They will not venture to dock the ship inside the lock, and intend first to raise her bows slightly.<br />
<br />
The roof and guns of the fore turret and anchors, cables etc., have already been unshipped, and they now intend to bring caissons alongside and pump out the fore part sufficiently to enable her to enter the harbour.<br />
<br />
The great inrush of water, that flooded more or less the whole fore part of the ship as far as the first boiler-room bulkhead, was caused by a number of hits. Firstly, one of the belt armour plates forward on the port side is missing, having fallen off. Secondly, there are believed to be at least 2 or 3 more hits below water, forward on the port side; for the list and the settling down had already become ominous when the ship was hit at the edge of the upper deck, port side, abreast the bridge; this was followed by an inrush of water in the battery deck, which did a great amount of damage.<br />
<br />
In addition, during the day action, she was hit by a torpedo on the starboard side under the forward 5.9 in. gun, which caused her to settle down still more by the bows. This gun was so much damaged by the shock from underneath as to be disabled.<br />
<br />
Further, there are 4 severe hits in the ship's side (mess deck, port side, forward of the turret), which also demolished the port capstan.<br />
<br />
These shell, or shell splinters, naturally penetrated to the armoured deck, so that the entire fore part of the ship above and below the armoured deck is holed in many places, allowing free passage for the water. The fore part of the ship was struck therefore by at least 8 or 9 shells and one torpedo.<br />
<br />
Apparently the only compartments which are not flooded, are the bow torpedo flats and the central control room. The former is being pumped out continuously, as a great deal of water is flowing in from above. The torpedo control room had to be abandoned, as the forward partition was not watertight. The central control room abaft this was not abandoned, but of its 2 entrances from the starboard and port passages, only the port one can be used, as the starboard one is flooded.<br />
<br />
The gunnery control room is far further aft and was not affected.<br />
<br />
The ship has a list of 7° to port, and as she has now been slightly raised, about 1¾ ft. of her bows are above water; at one time it was up to the level of the deck.<br />
<br />
While under way the forward boiler room bulkhead had to withstand most of the pressure; supports have been built up everywhere, but it leaks in places.<br />
<br />
The other hits of consequences were those in the turrets. The fore starboard turret No.2 received a direct hit on the fore face of the revolving structure. One curved plate was forced out, but fortunately the main effect of the explosion was outward. The right hand gun was disabled by slight damage to the mounting; with this exception the turret remained in action and kept up fire.<br />
<br />
The right hand gun of turret No.3 received a direct hit, which cut out a wide groove along the tube of the gun. The left hand gun continued to fire.<br />
<br />
The barbette of turret No.4 was hit on a level with the rammer, and the armour was pierced clean through. This hit is of special interest, as the "Seydlitz" received a similar hit and at the same level in turret No.5 on 24th January 1915, which caused a fire, disabled both the after turrets and killed all the guns' crews. This last time, however, the damage was slight. There was no ready ammunition in the turret, and only one cartridge was exploded, in contrast to the (6200 Kg.) 13,670 lbs. of powder on Jan.1915. The turret officer and a large number of the gun's crews were saved by their gas masks. The destruction caused by splinters was, however, considerable and the turret was abandoned, as it was not possible to continue fire from it. This was a 13.5 in. shell, at 15,310 yds. range, strength of armour pierced 8.6 inches.<br />
<br />
After the turret had been abandoned, it was hit a second time in the after side of the revolving part, which was pierced; this of course increased the havoc in the interior.<br />
<br />
Turret No.5 was hit in the roof. The shell richochetted, and the roof is slightly dented. Nobody was hurt and the turret continued to fire.<br />
<br />
In the "Seydlitz" therefore, all the turrets were hit, with the exception of the foremost turret, and one was hit twice.<br />
<br />
A further hit pierced the 5.9 in. (150mm.) casemate armour of the aftermost 5.9 in. starboard gun, No.2. The deck was pierced from beneath, and splinters also pierced the splinter bulkhead. The gun was disabled and all the crew were killed, with the exception of the ship's chaplain who happened to be in the casemate and must be watched over by a special guardian angel.<br />
<br />
A similar hit, with a 15 in. shell, struck the casemate armour of the 6-in. gun No.7 and exploded in the casemate. Men were killed, the gun was disabled and the splinter bulkhead pierced by large splinters. This time again, surprise was aroused by the comparatively small damage caused by a large calibre shell.<br />
<br />
"<u>Derfflinger</u>". One shell hit the armour belt forward of the hawse pipe, probably at the junction of 2 plates, as 2 plates broke away. The plates underneath were consequently strained apart and a great deal of water flowed in.<br />
<br />
The armour belt on the port side also received 2 further hits in the centre and was pierced clean through. The splinters penetrated more than half way through the ship, and in one case a piece of plating was driven half way though the ship. These hits, combined perhaps with others, destroyed the nets and their supports in several places.<br />
<br />
The two after turrets received direct hits, in one case on the roof, in the other case in the barbette above the deck; the armour was pierced and the upper portions of the turrets burnt out and severely damaged, but the flames did not penetrate to the magazines. The crew in the upper part of the turret were killed, and both turrets were disabled. This occurred at an early stage of the action.<br />
<br />
The guns at high elevation cannot yet be dismounted, as everything is wedged in, but they do not appear to be damaged.<br />
<br />
The muzzles were carried away off the 4 foremost 6 in. (15 cm.) guns on the port side; two of them probably having been accounted for by one and the same shell which hit the armour. One gun, the muzzle of which was perhaps damaged by a splinter, afterwards burst, the tube splitting open in the shape of a tulip.<br />
<br />
The "Derfflinger" received a few other hits of no particular interest. She appears the next most severely damaged ship after the "Lützow".<br />
<br />
The "<u>Moltke</u>" only received 5 hits, all of them during that part of the action which took place on a southerly course; while the cruisers mentioned above received most of the hits on the port side, consequently during the later stages of the action.<br />
<br />
One shell pieced the bulwarks in the after part of the ship above the armour, passed through the ship and struck the armour on the port side from inside, about 3.3 ft. below the water-line. One plate was forced out and is missing. The inrush of water was considerable. The after compartments, above the armoured deck which remained intact, were all more or less flooded.<br />
<br />
The second hit was further forward, below the armour belt. The shell exploded in a bunker, but the armoured deck held and no water penetrated it from below. The neighbouring bunkers made little water and could be pumped out.<br />
<br />
Another shell struck the 5.9 in. armour in the upper bunker, above the water-line. The armoured deck again held, but the inner wall of the bunker parted, and the battery deck was pierced from below, a 6 in. gun being damaged and disabled.<br />
<br />
In the fore part of the ship a shell struck the armour belt below the water-line. The plate remained intact and was driven in about 8 inches. The compartment was flooded, but the torpedo bulkhead remained watertight. A neighbouring compartment leaked slightly, the rivets having parted.<br />
<br />
The fifth case of damage, namely a plate beneath the armour belt being driven and pressed in, was probably not due to a direct hit, but to splinters of a shell which fell short.<br />
<br />
"<u>Von der Tann</u>". A shell hit and pierced the lower part of the 3.9 in. armour belt in the after part of the ship to starboard. The compartments above the armoured deck, and some of those on the deck above, were flooded. The chief effect of the shell was outside the ship, but it bent the plates below the otherwise undamaged armoured deck, so that a considerable amount of water flowed into the compartments below the armoured deck. The after torpedo flat was flooded half way up, and the men in the starboard steering engine room were shut in for a long time owing to the exits being blocked.<br />
<br />
The fore turret was hit on the starboard side on the upper edge of the barbette and a semi-circular armour plate was forced out. The machinery of the turret was so badly knocked about that the turret was disabled.<br />
<br />
The hydraulic piping was damaged, so that all the heavy armament was put out of action temporarily. Strangely enough, though men were wounded none were killed.<br />
<br />
The aftermost turret was hit in the barbette. The armour was pierced, but the effect of the shell was exterior, the turret sustained little internal damage, so that the handgear of the turret remained in action. The turret was wedged in one place and could not revolve; they succeeded, however, in cutting off with oxy-acetylene the piece of revolving part which was jammed against the inner side of the barbette thus getting rid of the obstruction.<br />
<br />
Outside the turret, the shell did considerable damage; some splinters striking downwards, bent the armoured deck and pierced it in places. As far as I know, the armoured deck sustained no further damage, and this was of little importance.<br />
<br />
The after conning-tower was hit and a piece of the armour torn away; the occupants, including the 3rd gunnery officer, were killed. Splinters struck downwards to the engine-room ventilation hatches, but were stopped by the armoured gratings.<br />
<br />
"<u>Ostfriesland"</u> was struck by a mine below the foremost port turret. The whole measures 197 ft.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. note:- Literal translation is 12 times 5 metres large.] The torpedo bulkhead is only slightly torn, and the inrush of water was only local.<br />
<br />
"<u>Helgoland</u>". A 13.5 in. shell hit the 7.9 in. armour belt forward on the port side and pierced it. The shell appears to have broken only as no explosive action can be traced. The range was about 14,217 yds.<br />
<br />
"<u>Nassau</u>" rammed a British destroyer, or rather, the destroyer ran into her forward on the port side. Her bows must have lifted right up, for her hawse-pipe remained on board the "Nassau", so firmly wedged into the side of the upper deck that it will have to be cut out. The "Nassau's" side below the deck is torn away for 33 ft. The destroyer then glanced off the "Nassau's" side and exploded internally. One of the crew remained behind in one of the nets, but fell into the water when the "Nassau" fired a salvo.<br />
<br />
The "Nassau" was hit by shrapnel from attacking destroyers in the foremost searchlight group, both port searchlights were put out of action. The searchlight control and electric cables were destroyed and many of the searchlight crews were killed. The after searchlight group was hit in a similar manner, and one of the searchlights was disabled.<br />
<br />
The "Rhineland" and a light cruiser were also hit in a similar manner.<br />
<br />
I have seen all the above mentioned ships in Wilhelmshaven.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" and "Kurfürst" were at Hamburg, but unfortunately I am unable to report much about them. They had already been under repair for several days, and the damage was to some extent made good. Besides this, the conditions were not favourable for undisturbed examination: commissioners from the Imperial Navy Office were on board, besides crowds of workmen, the noise was deafening and it was pouring with rain. Consequently I took no notes on the spot and relied on my memory, which however fails me now among the very many received of similar cases. I am therefore unable to report each hit with accuracy.<br />
<br />
This is immaterial, however, as there were no particularly interesting hits, and none of the ships had been hit in the turrets. The armour had been pierced in several places, the effect and character of the hits being similar in all cases; the hits on unarmoured parts were of little consequence.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" was hit aft on the port side of the water line just on a junction of two plates, a piece of equal size being torn away from each plate. The shell then struck the sloping part of the armoured deck and the splinters ricochetted and passed right through the ship. These plates have already been removed.<br />
<br />
A casemate was pierced and the gun disabled.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" is the only ship whose mast was hit, the mast remained standing and has now been removed.<br />
<br />
The spotting platform had to be abandoned, as communications with the conning tower was cut off. This was the only hit received in a conning tower; it only grazed the upper edge and glanced off, and the men inside hardly noticed it.<br />
<br />
The port engine was disabled, not in consequence of damage to the turbine which is in good condition, but owing to one of the main propeller bearings becoming overheated. The cause of this is not clear, but it is believed to be due to concussions. The ship was well able to keep station with her two remaining engines.<br />
<br />
The "<u>Kurfürst</u>" suffered especially from a great inrush of water forward on the port side, above the armoured deck; it was caused by a hit in the armour belt. No further damage of importance was sustained.<br />
<br />
With regard to time necessary for repair to these ships, it is not yet possible to say anything definite, as it is still undecided whether they shall undergo thorough repair or not. The chief difficulty is the manufacture of new armour plates; but some of the holed plates can, no doubt, be left in position for the present.<br />
<br />
A considerable time will be needed to repair some of the turrets of the battle-cruisers, but here too, they will contrive to get things done. For instance, the "Von der Tann" is to have an entire turret out of a ship of the "Nassau" class, probably the foremost turret, and this ship will be left without a turret for some time. They talk a great deal also of transferring guns, and they will perhaps make use of those intended for the "Hindenburg", which will not be completed will the late autumn.<br />
<br />
It may be presumed that the battleships will be ready for sea in 4-6 weeks, and the battle-cruisers, particularly the "Seydlitz", in not less than 4 months. Naturally work is going on day and night, and repairs are given priority over all new construction.<br />
<br />
The damage sustained by light cruisers and destroyers is inconsiderable. The "Hamburg" had a funnel shot away. As these ships seem to be of minor importance, I did not trouble further about them.<br />
<br />
As our Allies appear not to have the intention of communicating to us what effect the examination of damages sustained will have on their construction in the future, we must endeavour to ascertain this as time goes on by means of cross questioning and by studying their new constructions in detail. I do not feel called upon to draw premature and rash conclusions to-day, on the strength of impressions received, but this will not prevent me from giving a summary of my opinion and of the opinions expresses in my hearing.<br />
<br />
Firstly, it is a remarkable fact that in all the ships that have returned home, all the engine and boiler-rooms are undamaged; the "Lützow" is no exception to this, as she proceeded under her own steam until late in the night after the action. I have also been assured by the Imperial Navy Office, after an inspection carried out by the Chief Engineer, that not a single auxiliary engine was defective. The only boiler-room put out of action was the foremost one in the "Seydlitz" where the bulkhead gave a little, allowing water to penetrate through rivet holes and cracks when the ship was under way. The conclusion may therefore be drawn that these vital parts of the ship are sufficiently protected and that the armour belt of the usual German thicknesses, though it cannot stop the shells, at least fulfils its purpose by breaking them up. Consequently it has become almost impossible even for the largest splinters of 15 in. shell to penetrate through armoured deck or torpedo bulkhead in engine and boiler rooms.<br />
<br />
Even at these long ranges and steep angles there was no question of the armoured decks being pierced; but the fitting of strong gratings over the hatches, which prevented the engines of the "Von der Tann" from sustaining severe damage, appears very necessary.<br />
<br />
The torpedo bulkheads also resisted shells, mines and torpedoes effectually; and in cases where slight damage was sustained, it had no further consequences than the flooding of the compartment affected.<br />
<br />
Perhaps it would be advisable to construct a specially strong boiler-room bulkhead, similar to a torpedo bulkhead, so that it could not be damaged by splinters or water-pressure.<br />
<br />
The inspection of the "Seydlitz" has left me with the impression that the commanding officer of the "Seydlitz" expected rather too much of his ship, and that nothing short of extraordinary good luck enabled her to be brought back. At one time when the whole forepart of the ship was flooded and the bows were under water, he proceeded occasionally with revolutions for 22 knots, just in order to show how seaworthy his ship was, so he told me. This may have been very sporting, or perhaps it may have been necessary under the circumstances in order not to drop too far behind and be overtaken by the enemy, but it certainly was not good seamanship, and if his stokehold bulkhead had burst, the "Seydlitz" would have gone down like the "Lutzow", where the circumstances appear to have been very similar. Later on he decreased speed and finally proceeded stern first.<br />
<br />
I therefore think it not impossible that the loss of the "Lützow", which is said to have been proceeded at 14 knots for a time, was also due only to recklessly high speed, and that the ship might have been saved if she had proceeded stern first or been taken in tow.<br />
<br />
As the danger from water-pressure must always be greatest from ahead, it would certainly be advisable to take special preventative measures against it.<br />
<br />
Vice-Admiral Schmidt told me that, in his opinion, the armoured belt ought to be strongest in the centre, and possible in the afterpart to protect the steering engines, and possibly in the bows, but that it ought not to taper off gradually from the centre to the extremities. He was also entirely in favour of a protected upper deck forming a second armoured deck.<br />
<br />
The admirably thorough system of internal division in the German ships and the floating capability thus attained is the finest proof of the merit of German construction which pursued this aim, and it shows that Admiral von Tirpitz, the creator of the Battle Fleet of to-day, was right when he upheld the principle that, above all things, the ships must be capable of remaining afloat and must not sink or heel over, and that everything else is of secondary consideration.<br />
<br />
The large number of hits in the turrets is remarkable, and it is generally considered that the turret armour should be appreciably stronger, especially in the lower part of the barbettes; for it is not only the disablement of the guns that comes into question, serious though this might be, but also the blowing up of magazines and the total destruction of the ship, as the wide shaft down to the magazines cannot possibly be made completely flash-proof. This is the most vital part of the ship. It is only owing to the small explosive charges in British shells, that there were no explosions of magazines in the German ships.<br />
<br />
Everything possible had been done after the action of 24.1.15 to ensure protection against this danger; the ready ammunition was removed from the top of the hoists and wherever possible all the openings in shafts leading down below were fitted with flaps, covers and heavy asbestos mats, while German ammunition is particularly carefully stowed and packed in cases with screwed-on covers.<br />
<br />
The disasters on the British side are a proof that this is a question of the greatest importance. It must also be taken into consideration that while any other damage turret may take months.<br />
<br />
The numerous hits in turrets would appear to justify the opinion of those who decided against triple turrets, on the ground [sic] that if one was disabled it would put too many heavy guns out of action.<br />
<br />
A hit in a casemate will of course destroy it and disable the gun, but this is of little consequence. Care must be taken here also not to have any ready ammunition, and to close the ammunition hand-up hermetically with heavy asbestos mats at the magazine end also. With the German "Paternoster" (dredger hoist) the ammunition lifts this mat as it comes up and the mat then falls to and closes the opening, which is a practical arrangement.<br />
<br />
Other hits through unarmoured parts, which destroyed more or less small gear and at the first glance give an impression of terrible havoc, are really of no consequence.<br />
<br />
In the "Von der Tann" they wanted to flood a turret magazine. This was impossible, as the flooding valve in the battery, or between deck was piled up with debris, cabin fittings, etc., and was inaccessible. Fortunately the flooding of the magazine turned out to be unnecessary. The Executive Officer remarked to me how critical such a trivial matter might become, and that one could not be careful enough about choosing the positions for the flooding valves, which must be kept clear of easily destructible objects.<br />
<br />
The man-hole covers in the decks, coal shoots [chutes], etc., were pointed out to me as dangerous, as they may be burst open by pressure of gas from below, thus causing damage and giving passage to the gases. These covers should be secured in a different manner and much more firmly.<br />
<br />
The flooding and draining system worked admirably, and is hardly capable of improvement. The only disadvantage is that the compartments above the armoured deck have no draining arrangements. This should be provided. A list, consequent on an inrush of water, could always be corrected by flooding an opposite compartment. This is an important matter both as affecting gunnery and personnel.<br />
<br />
The searchlights, which were not taken down in the German ships, all came out of the action undamaged; anxiety on their account was therefore unfounded. It was very unpleasant when attacking boats fired on the searchlights, and it is therefore considered necessary to fit light armour protection on the masts for the crews of the searchlight control and electric cables.<br />
<br />
Damage from flames is nowhere visible. The Germans are now rather amused at the care with which interior partitions were scraped.<br />
<br />
I could not help comparing the German ships with the Russian battleship "Orel", which I saw in Madzurn after the battle of Tsushima. If I remember rightly, the "Orel" had 5 severe hits and 40 hits with medium-calibre shell.<br />
<br />
The enormous explosive power of the Shimosa shell, which breaks up into minute splinters, did not do the slightest damage to the vital parts of the ship, but the upper deck was transformed into a confused heap of ruins. Superstructure, bridges, masts, funnels, etc., were destroyed, guns dismounted and fires started.<br />
<br />
Nothing of the kind is to be seen in the German ships, outwardly only a few more or less clean shell holes are visible, and they look so orderly and so little damaged that they do not appear to have gone through an action.<br />
<br />
It is true that the upper decks are said to have been littered with countless splinters, but they flew on to the decks from shells which struck the water, the ship receiving violent shocks.<br />
<br />
The holes in the armour show the characteristic concentric cracks round the hole and the radial splashes, the latter proving that the shells exploded on impact or at the latest, as they passed through. In many cases, as already noted, the force of the explosion was external and only pieces of plate, and possibly the head of the shell were driven in.<br />
<br />
<center><u>FLAG OFFICERS OF THE FLEET AND LEADERS</u></center><br />
<br />
{|<br />
| Commander-in-Chief:<br />
| Vice Admiral Scheer<br />
|-<br />
| <u>I Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Vice Admiral Schmidt<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Engelhard<br />
|-<br />
| <u>II Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Mauve<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Baron von Dalwigh<br />
|-<br />
| <u>III Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Behncke<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Nordmann<br />
|-<br />
| Officer commanding the Scouting Forces and<br>Commanding 1st Scouting Group<br />
| Vice Admiral Hipper<br />
|-<br />
| " 2nd " "<br />
| Rear Admiral Bodicker<br />
|-<br />
| " 4th " "<br />
| Commodore "Captain" v. Reuter<br />
|-<br />
| Leaders of Destroyers<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| in "Rostock"<br />
| Commodore "Captain" Michelsen<br />
|-<br />
| in Regensburg<br />
| Commodore "Captain" Heinrich<br />
|-<br />
| Leader of submarines<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| In Hamburg<br />
| Captain Bauer<br />
|}<br />
<br />
<center><u>REMARKS</u></center><br />
<br />
The lecture on the action, upon which this report is based, was illustrated by a plan prepared in haste for H.M. the Kaiser, and a copy was promised to me. But the Admiral Staff does not wish to part with this first incomplete draft, and the preparation of an accurate plan has not yet been completed, as the Admiral Staff is not yet in possession of all the details.<br />
<br />
In time to be included in this report I have only received the sketch of the first stage of the battle, namely the cruiser action on a southerly course, together with a small sketch of the situation when the action was broken off; both are enclosed.<br />
<br />
I conclude from the sketch of the cruiser action, that the accounts given to me were not quite accurate; for instance, the assertion of the commanding officer of the "Moltke" that the shortest range at that stage was 7,650 yds. and that he had accounted for one of the armoured cruisers with a torpedo.<br />
<br />
The sketch shows that the "Indefatigable" was probably first destroyed by gun fire from the "Von der Tann", and later the "Queen Mary" by gunfire from the "Derfflinger", and that the range was never less than 14,220 yds.<br />
<br />
The loss of "V. 27" and "V. 29" and of 4 British destroyers is also apparent, while I was only told of two.<br />
<br />
In the original sketch, 2 British armoured cruisers are also shown as having fallen out during this stage, but this is not shown on the accompanying sketch and probably took place later.<br />
<br />
I was told by the Admiral Staff that the accompanying sketches are not to be taken as strictly accurate.<br />
<br />
It is requested that the sketches and course of the action and the account of damages may be treated as strictly confidential.<br />
<br />
==Footnotes==<br />
{{reflist}}<br />
<br />
==Bibliography==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
*''Schematismus für das K.u.K. Heer und für die Kriegsmarine für 1914. Separatausgabe''. Wien: 1914.<br />
*''Almanach für die k. und k. Kriegsmarine 1917. Kriegsausgabe''. '''XXXVII'''. Pola: 1917.<br />
*[[Arthur Marder (Naval Historian)|Marder, Arthur J.]] (1966). ''From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919: Jutland and After, May 1916–December 1916''. '''Volume III'''. London: Oxford University Press.<br />
*{{MarderFDSFIII}}<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
==External Links==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
*Krámli, Mihály. [http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-124.pdf "The Report on the Battle of Jutland by the Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché in Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Colloredo-Mannsfeld."] ''NavWeaps''.<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
[[Category:Battle of Jutland]]</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Royal_Navy_Flag_Officers,_1889-1919&diff=334742Royal Navy Flag Officers, 1889-19192024-03-11T18:46:29Z<p>Simon Harley: Oops.</p>
<hr />
<div>This is a list of flag officers of the British [[Royal Navy]] arranged in order of promotion to the rank of {{RearRN}}, and lists every officer who served on the Active List as a flag officer from January, 1889 to December, 1919.<br />
<br />
{| border="2" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" style="margin: 0 0 1em 0.5em; background: #f9f9f9; border: 1px #aaa solid; border-collapse: collapse;" width=100% align=center<br />
|-valign="top"<br />
! colspan="11" align=center | Flag Officers of the Royal Navy, 1889 &ndash; 1919<br />
|- valign="top"|- valign="top" bgcolor=#CEDFF2<br />
! width=20%; align= center rowspan=2 | <small>Name</small><br />
! width=10%; align= center rowspan=2 | <small>Born</small><br />
! width=10%; align= center rowspan=2 | <small>Died</small><br />
! width=30%; align= center colspan=4 | <small>Date of Promotion</small><br />
! width=10%; align= center rowspan=2 | <small>Final Rank</small><br />
! width=10%; align= center rowspan=2 | <small>Retired</small><br />
|-valign="top"<br />
! width=10%; align= center | <small>Admiral of the Fleet</small><br />
! width=10%; align= center | <small>Admiral</small><br />
! width=10%; align= center | <small>Vice-Admiral</small><br />
! width=10%; align= center | <small>Rear-Admiral</small><br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{RIGHTHON}} [[John Hay|Lord John Hay]], G.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 23 August, 1827<br />
| align= center | 4 May, 1916<br />
| align= center | 15 December, 1888<br />
| align= center | 8 July, 1884<br />
| align= center | 31 December, 1877<br />
| align= center | 7 May, 1872<br />
| align= left | Admiral of the Fleet<br />
| align= center | 23 August, 1897<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Algernon Frederick Rous de Horsey]], K.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 25 July, 1827<br />
| align= center | 22 October, 1922<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 29 April, 1885<br />
| align= center | 27 November, 1879<br />
| align= center | 7 May, 1875<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 25 July, 1892<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[William Montagu Dowell]], G.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 2 August, 1825<br />
| align= center | 27 December, 1912<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 July, 1885<br />
| align= center | 20 January, 1880<br />
| align= center | 11 December, 1875<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 2 August, 1890<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{RIGHTHON}} [[Arthur William Acland Hood, First Baron Hood]], G.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 14 July, 1824<br />
| align= center | 15 November, 1901<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 18 January, 1886<br />
| align= center | 23 July, 1880<br />
| align= center | 22 March, 1876<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 14 July, 1889<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[John Edmund Commerell]], V.C., G.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 13 January, 1829<br />
| align= center | 21 May, 1901<br />
| align= center | 14 February, 1892<br />
| align= center | 12 April, 1886<br />
| align= center | 19 January, 1881<br />
| align= center | 12 November, 1876<br />
| align= left | Admiral of the Fleet<br />
| align= center | 13 January, 1899<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{RIGHTHON}} [[Richard James Meade, Fourth Earl of Clanwilliam]], G.C.B., K.C.M.G., F.R.G.S.<br />
| align= center | 3 October, 1832<br />
| align= center | 4 August, 1907<br />
| align= center | 20 February, 1895<br />
| align= center | 22 June, 1886<br />
| align= center | 26 July, 1881<br />
| align= center | 31 December, 1876<br />
| align= left | Admiral of the Fleet<br />
| align= center | 3 October, 1902<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | H.S.H. [[Ernest Leopold Victor Charles Auguste Joseph Emich, Prince of Leiningen|Prince Ernest of Leiningen]], G.C.B., G.C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 9 November, 1830<br />
| align= center | 5 April, 1904<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 7 June, 1887<br />
| align= center | 1 December, 1881<br />
| align= center | 31 December, 1876<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 9 November, 1895<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Richard Vesey Hamilton]], G.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 28 May, 1829<br />
| align= center | 18 September, 1912<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 18 October, 1887<br />
| align= center | 17 February, 1884<br />
| align= center | 27 September, 1877<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 28 May, 1894<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Charles Ludovic Darley Waddilove]]<br />
| align= center | 13 May, 1828<br />
| align= center | 17 October, 1896<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 May, 1888<br />
| align= center | 1 April, 1884<br />
| align= center | 31 December, 1877<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 13 May, 1893<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Leveson Eliot Henry Somerset]]<br />
| align= center | 29 August, 1829<br />
| align= center | 7 February, 1900<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 19 June, 1888<br />
| align= center | 7 July, 1884<br />
| align= center | 28 February, 1878<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 20 June, 1891<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Algernon McLennan Lyons]], G.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 26 August, 1833<br />
| align= center | 9 February, 1908<br />
| align= center | 23 August, 1897<br />
| align= center | 15 December, 1888<br />
| align= center | 27 October, 1884<br />
| align= center | 26 September, 1878<br />
| align= left | Admiral of the Fleet<br />
| align= center | 30 August, 1903<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | H.R.H. [[Alfred Ernest Albert, Third Duke of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha]], K.G., K.T., K.P. &c.<br />
| align= center | 6 August, 1844<br />
| align= center | 30 July, 1900<br />
| align= center | 3 June, 1893<br />
| align= center | 18 October, 1887<br />
| align= center | 30 November, 1882<br />
| align= center | 30 December, 1878<br />
| align= left | Admiral of the Fleet<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Thomas Brandreth]], K.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 6 August, 1825<br />
| align= center | 10 December, 1894<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 14 July, 1889<br />
| align= center | 30 October, 1884<br />
| align= center | 31 December, 1878<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 6 August, 1890<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Thomas Bridgeman Lethbridge]]<br />
| align= center | 28 October, 1828<br />
| align= center | 30 December, 1892<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 2 August, 1890<br />
| align= center | 27 March, 1885<br />
| align= center | 31 December, 1878<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 5 August, 1890<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Francis William Sullivan, Sixth Baronet]], K.C.B., C.M.G.<br />
| align= center | 31 May, 1834<br />
| align= center | 13 May, 1906<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 5 August, 1890<br />
| align= center | 31 March, 1885<br />
| align= center | 31 December, 1878<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 25 February, 1892<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[William Graham]], K.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 10 September, 1826<br />
| align= center | 31 May, 1907<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 6 August, 1890<br />
| align= center | 29 April, 1885<br />
| align= center | 1 February, 1879<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 10 September, 1891<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Anthony Hiley Hoskins]], G.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 1 September, 1828<br />
| align= center | 21 June, 1901<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 20 June, 1891<br />
| align= center | 1 June, 1885<br />
| align= center | 15 June, 1879<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 1 September, 1893<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Nowell Salmon]], V.C., G.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 20 February, 1835<br />
| align= center | 14 February, 1912<br />
| align= center | 13 January, 1899<br />
| align= center | 10 September, 1891<br />
| align= center | 1 July, 1885<br />
| align= center | 2 August, 1879<br />
| align= left | Admiral of the Fleet<br />
| align= center | 20 February, 1905<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[John Kennedy Erskine Baird]], K.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 16 September, 1832<br />
| align= center | 8 December, 1908<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 14 February, 1892<br />
| align= center | 18 January, 1886<br />
| align= center | 31 December, 1879<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 16 September, 1897<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Charles Thomas Curme]]<br />
| align= center | 2 August, 1827<br />
| align= center | 19 February, 1892<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 9 March, 1886<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1880<br />
| align= left | Vice-Admiral<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[George Willes Watson]], K.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 5 April, 1827<br />
| align= center | 26 April, 1897<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 25 February, 1892<br />
| align= center | 12 April, 1885<br />
| align= center | 9 January, 1880<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 5 April, 1892<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Henry Dennis Hickley]]<br />
| align= center | 11 December, 1826<br />
| align= center | 22 December, 1903<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 5 April, 1892 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 22 June, 1886<br />
| align= center | 20 January, 1880<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 4 January, 1891<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{HON}} [[William John Ward]]<br />
| align= center | 9 December, 1829<br />
| align= center | 20 November, 1900<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 5 April, 1892<br />
| align= center | 7 July, 1887<br />
| align= center | 23 July, 1880<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 9 December, 1894<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Henry Rushworth Wratislaw]]<br />
| align= center | 29 August, 1832<br />
| align= center | 26 July, 1913<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 25 July, 1892 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 15 July, 1887<br />
| align= center | 31 December, 1880<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 29 January, 1891<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[William Henry Whyte]]<br />
| align= center | 24 January, 1829<br />
| align= center | 9 September, 1912<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 25 July, 1892<br />
| align= center | 18 October, 1887<br />
| align= center | 3 January, 1881<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 9 August, 1892<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Henry Duncan Grant]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 12 October, 1834<br />
| align= center | 9 November, 1896<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 9 August, 1892<br />
| align= center | 6 January, 1888<br />
| align= center | 19 January, 1881<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[William Henry Edye]]<br />
| align= center | 30 August, 1830<br />
| align= center | 17 February, 1910<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 13 May, 1893 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 14 May, 1888<br />
| align= center | 31 December, 1881<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 30 August, 1890<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Michael Culme-Seymour, Third Baronet]], G.C.B., G.C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 13 March, 1836<br />
| align= center | 11 October, 1920<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 13 June, 1893<br />
| align= center | 19 June 1888<br />
| align= center | 6 June, 1882<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 13 March, 1901<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Frederick William Richards]], G.C.B., F.R.G.S. <br />
| align= center | 30 November, 1833<br />
| align= center | 28 September, 1912<br />
| align= center | 29 November, 1898<br />
| align= center | 1 September, 1893<br />
| align= center | 25 October, 1888<br />
| align= center | 9 June, 1882<br />
| align= left | Admiral of the Fleet<br />
| align= center | 30 November, 1903<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{HON}} [[Walter Cecil Carpenter]]<br />
| align= center | 27 March, 1834<br />
| align= center | 15 May, 1904<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 28 May, 1894<br />
| align= center | 8 November, 1888<br />
| align= center | 31 December, 1882<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 11 March, 1896<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Robert Gordon Douglas]]<br />
| align= center | 7 May, 1829<br />
| align= center | 12 January, 1910<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 9 December, 1894 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 15 December, 1888<br />
| align= center | 8 January, 1883<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 7 June, 1894<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[William Samuel Greive]]<br />
| align= center | 2 January, 1831<br />
| align= center | 29 October, 1891<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 14 July, 1889<br />
| align= center | 17 February, 1884<br />
| align= left | Vice-Admiral<br />
| align= center | 13 August, 1889<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[George Tryon]], K.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 4 January, 1832<br />
| align= center | 22 June, 1893<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 13 August, 1889<br />
| align= center | 1 April, 1884<br />
| align= left | Vice-Admiral<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Algernon Charles Fieschi Heneage]], G.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 19 March, 1834<br />
| align= center | 10 June, 1915<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 9 December, 1894<br />
| align= center | 29 November, 1889<br />
| align= center | 7 July, 1884<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 19 March, 1898<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Walter James Hunt-Grubbe]], G.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 23 February, 1832<br />
| align= center | 11 April, 1922<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 20 February, 1895<br />
| align= center | 2 August, 1890<br />
| align= center | 8 July, 1884<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 23 February, 1897<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Charles John Rowley]]<br />
| align= center | 24 December, 1832<br />
| align= center | 11 November, 1919<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 9 November, 1895<br />
| align= center | 5 August, 1890<br />
| align= center | 27 October, 1884<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 26 December, 1897<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Richard Wells]], K.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 3 February, 1833<br />
| align= center | 9 October, 1896<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 11 March, 1896<br />
| align= center | 6 August, 1890<br />
| align= center | 30 October, 1884<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Thomas le Hunte Ward]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 4 August, 1830<br />
| align= center | 23 September, 1907<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 9 November, 1896 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 30 August, 1890 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 27 March, 1885<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 4 August, 1890<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{HONSIR}} [[Edmund Robert Fremantle]], G.C.B., C.M.G.<br />
| align= center | 15 June, 1836<br />
| align= center | 10 February, 1929<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 10 October, 1896<br />
| align= center | 30 August, 1890<br />
| align= center | 7 April, 1885<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 15 June, 1901<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[John Ommanney Hopkins]], G.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 13 July, 1834<br />
| align= center | 30 July, 1916<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 9 November, 1896<br />
| align= center | 4 January, 1891<br />
| align= center | 29 April, 1885<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 13 July, 1899<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[St. George Caulfield D'Arcy-Irvine]], K.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 23 May, 1833<br />
| align= center | 2 July, 1916<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 23 February, 1897<br />
| align= center | 29 January, 1891<br />
| align= center | 1 June, 1885<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 10 May, 1897<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Henry Fairfax]], K.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 21 January, 1837<br />
| align= center | 20 March, 1900<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 10 May, 1897<br />
| align= center | 20 June, 1891<br />
| align= center | 1 July, 1885<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[William Elrington Gordon]]<br />
| align= center | 20 May, 1831<br />
| align= center | 7 July, 1897<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 10 September, 1891 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 5 July, 1885<br />
| align= left | Vice-Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 20 May, 1891<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Lindesay Brine]], F.R.G.S.<br />
| align= center | 5 November, 1834<br />
| align= center | 2 February, 1906<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 23 August, 1897 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 28 December, 1891<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1886<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 6 November, 1894<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Alfred John Chatfield]]<br />
| align= center | 27 August, 1832<br />
| align= center | 25 August, 1910<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 23 August, 1897 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 10 September, 1891 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1886<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 27 August, 1891<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[James Elphinstone Erskine]], K.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 2 December, 1838<br />
| align= center | 25 July, 1911<br />
| align= center | 3 October, 1902<br />
| align= center | 23 August, 1897<br />
| align= center | 14 February, 1892<br />
| align= center | 18 January, 1886<br />
| align= left | Admiral of the Fleet<br />
| align= center | 2 December, 1908<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Thomas Barnardiston]]<br />
| align= center | 4 December, 1833<br />
| align= center | 21 January, 1907<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 23 August, 1897 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 10 September, 1891<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1886<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 28 December, 1891<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[George Lydiard Sulivan]]<br />
| align= center | 26 March, 1832<br />
| align= center | 3 July, 1905<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 16 September, 1897 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 20 February, 1892<br />
| align= center | 9 March, 1886<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 26 March, 1892<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Henry Frederick Nicholson]], K.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 24 October, 1835<br />
| align= center | 17 October, 1914<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 16 September, 1897<br />
| align= center | 25 February, 1892<br />
| align= center | 22 June, 1886<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 11 December, 1897<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[George Stanley Bosanquet]]<br />
| align= center | 18 April, 1835<br />
| align= center | 12 January, 1914<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 19 March, 1898 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 25 July, 1892<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1887<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 10 March, 1894<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Alexander Buller]], G.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 30 June, 1835<br />
| align= center | 3 October, 1903<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 11 December, 1897<br />
| align= center | 26 March, 1892<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1887<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 30 June, 1899<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Loftus Francis Jones]]<br />
| align= center | 19 July, 1836<br />
| align= center | 22 June, 1912<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 26 December, 1897<br />
| align= center | 5 April, 1892<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1887<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 26 October, 1899<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Francis Mowbray Prattent]]<br />
| align= center | 19 May, 1833<br />
| align= center | 31 October, 1892<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 9 August, 1892<br />
| align= center | 24 May, 1887<br />
| align= left | Vice-Admiral<br />
| align= center | 6 September, 1892<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Edward Kelly]]<br />
| align= center | 26 April, 1836<br />
| align= center | 16 January, 1892<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 10 June, 1887<br />
| align= left | Rear-Admiral<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Frederick Charles Bryan Robinson]]<br />
| align= center | 3 April, 1836<br />
| align= center | 18 January, 1896<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 5 October, 1892<br />
| align= center | 7 July, 1887<br />
| align= left | Vice-Admiral<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Richard Edward Tracey]], K.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 24 January, 1837<br />
| align= center | 7 March, 1907<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 29 November, 1898<br />
| align= center | 23 June, 1893<br />
| align= center | 31 December, 1887<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 24 January, 1902<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Edward Stanley Adeane]], C.M.G.<br />
| align= center | 7 December, 1836<br />
| align= center | 18 October, 1902<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 19 March, 1898<br />
| align= center | 13 May, 1893<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1888<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 7 December, 1901<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Charles Frederick Hotham]], G.C.B., G.C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 20 March, 1843<br />
| align= center | 22 March, 1925<br />
| align= center | 30 August, 1903<br />
| align= center | 13 January, 1899<br />
| align= center | 1 September, 1893<br />
| align= center | 6 January, 1888<br />
| align= left | Admiral of the Fleet<br />
| align= center | 20 March, 1913<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{RIGHTHON}} [[Charles Thomas Montagu Douglas Scott|Lord Charles Scott]], G.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 20 October, 1839<br />
| align= center | 21 August, 1911<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 30 June, 1899<br />
| align= center | 10 March, 1894<br />
| align= center | 3 April, 1888<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 20 October, 1904<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Robert Henry More Molyneux]], G.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 6 August, 1838<br />
| align= center | 29 February, 1904<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 13 July, 1899<br />
| align= center | 23 May, 1894<br />
| align= center | 1 May, 1888<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 6 August, 1903<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Robert O'Brien FitzRoy]], K.C.B., F.R.G.S.<br />
| align= center | 2 April, 1839<br />
| align= center | 7 May, 1896<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 7 June, 1894<br />
| align= center | 14 May, 1888<br />
| align= left | Vice-Admiral<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Nathaniel Bowden-Smith]], K.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 21 January, 1838<br />
| align= center | 28 April, 1921<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 26 October, 1899<br />
| align= center | 5 November, 1894<br />
| align= center | 19 June, 1888<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 21 January, 1903<br />
|-valign="top"<br />
! colspan="11" align=left | Officers promoted to Flag Rank in 1889<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{RIGHTHON}} [[Walter Talbot Kerr|Lord Walter Kerr]], G.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 28 September, 1839<br />
| align= center | 12 May, 1927<br />
| align= center | 16 June, 1904<br />
| align= center | 21 March, 1900<br />
| align= center | 20 February, 1895<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1889<br />
| align= left | Admiral of the Fleet<br />
| align= center | 28 September, 1909<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[William Henry Maxwell]]<br />
| align= center | 13 June, 1840<br />
| align= center | 1 July, 1920<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 21 March, 1900 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 9 December, 1894<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1889<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 25 June, 1895<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[James George Mead]]<br />
| align= center | 4 March, 1834<br />
| align= center | 18 March, 1913<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 21 March, 1900 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 9 December, 1894 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1889<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 4 March, 1894<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[George Digby Morant]], K.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 8 August, 1837<br />
| align= center | 13 February, 1921<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 13 March, 1901<br />
| align= center | 20 June, 1895<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1889<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 24 May, 1901<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{RIGHTHONSIR}} [[Edward Hobart Seymour]], G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O., Hon. LL.D., P.C.<br />
| align= center | 30 April, 1840<br />
| align= center | 2 March, 1929<br />
| align= center | 20 February, 1905<br />
| align= center | 24 May, 1901<br />
| align= center | 9 September, 1895<br />
| align= center | 14 July, 1889<br />
| align= left | Admiral of the Fleet<br />
| align= center | 20 April, 1910<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Henry Craven St. John]]<br />
| align= center | 5 January, 1837<br />
| align= center | 21 May, 1909<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 15 June, 1901<br />
| align= center | 19 January, 1896<br />
| align= center | 13 August, 1889<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 16 June, 1901<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[William Robert Kennedy]], G.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 14 March, 1838<br />
| align= center | 9 October, 1916<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 16 June, 1901<br />
| align= center | 11 March, 1896<br />
| align= center | 29 November, 1889<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 2 November, 1901<br />
|-valign="top"<br />
! colspan="11" align=left | Officers promoted to Flag Rank in 1890<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{RIGHTHON}} [[John Arbuthnot Fisher, First Baron Fisher]], G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 25 January, 1841<br />
| align= center | 10 July, 1920<br />
| align= center | 4 December, 1905<br />
| align= center | 2 November, 1901<br />
| align= center | 8 May, 1896<br />
| align= center | 2 August, 1890<br />
| align= left | Admiral of the Fleet<br />
| align= center | 27 May, 1915<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Henry Frederick Stephenson]], G.C.V.O., K.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 7 June, 1842<br />
| align= center | 16 December, 1919<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 7 December, 1901<br />
| align= center | 10 October, 1896<br />
| align= center | 4 August, 1890<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 1 September, 1904<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Charles George Fane]], K.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 14 November, 1837<br />
| align= center | 22 February, 1909<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 24 January, 1902<br />
| align= center | 9 November, 1896<br />
| align= center | 5 August, 1890<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 25 January, 1902<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[John Frederick George Grant]]<br />
| align= center | 30 November, 1835<br />
| align= center | 4 February, 1916<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 25 January, 1902 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 23 February, 1897 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 6 August, 1890<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 29 September, 1894<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Henry Forster Cleveland]]<br />
| align= center | 28 April, 1837<br />
| align= center | 26 January, 1924<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 25 January, 1902 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 23 February, 1897 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 30 August, 1890<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 24 December, 1894<br />
|-valign="top"<br />
! colspan="11" align=left | Officers promoted to Flag Rank in 1891<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Compton Edward Domvile]], G.C.B., G.C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 10 October, 1842<br />
| align= center | 19 November, 1924<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 25 January, 1902<br />
| align= center | 23 February, 1897<br />
| align= center | 4 January, 1891<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 10 October, 1907<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Francis Durrant]], C.M.G.<br />
| align= center | 24 June, 1837<br />
| align= center | 6 December, 1896<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 29 January, 1891<br />
| align= left | Rear-Admiral<br />
| align= center | 7 August, 1893<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Frederick George Denham Bedford]], G.C.B., G.C.M.G.<br />
| align= center | 28 December, 1838<br />
| align= center | 30 January, 1913<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 3 October, 1902<br />
| align= center | 16 May, 1897<br />
| align= center | 20 June, 1891<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 30 May, 1903<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[John Fiot Lee Pearse Maclear]], F.R.G.S.<br />
| align= center | 27 June, 1838<br />
| align= center | 17 July, 1907<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 21 January, 1903 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 23 August, 1897 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 20 June, 1891<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 21 August, 1891<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Albert Hastings Markham]], K.C.B., F.R.G.S.<br />
| align= center | 1 November, 1841<br />
| align= center | 28 October, 1918<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 21 January, 1903<br />
| align= center | 23 August, 1897<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1891<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 11 November, 1906<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Samuel Long]]<br />
| align= center | 5 January, 1840<br />
| align= center | 25 April, 1893<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 7 September, 1891<br />
| align= left | Rear-Admiral<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Alfred Taylor Dale]]<br />
| align= center | 26 September, 1840<br />
| align= center | 14 November, 1925<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 30 May, 1903<br />
| align= center | 16 September, 1897<br />
| align= center | 10 September, 1891<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 24 May, 1905<br />
|-valign="top"<br />
! colspan="11" align=left | Officers promoted to Flag Rank in 1892<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Claude Edward Buckle]]<br />
| align= center | 7 February, 1839<br />
| align= center | 7 February, 1930<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 6 August, 1903<br />
| align= center | 11 December, 1897<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1892<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 12 August, 1903<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Richard Duckworth-King]]<br />
| align= center | 16 July, 1840<br />
| align= center | 4 January, 1900<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 26 December, 1897<br />
| align= center | 17 January, 1892<br />
| align= left | Vice-Admiral<br />
| align= center | 21 December, 1898<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Harry Holdsworth Rawson]], G.C.B., G.C.M.G.<br />
| align= center | 5 November, 1843<br />
| align= center | 3 November, 1910<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 12 August, 1903<br />
| align= center | 19 March, 1898<br />
| align= center | 14 February, 1892<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 5 November, 1908<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Robert Hornby Boyle]]<br />
| align= center | 11 October, 1840<br />
| align= center | 13 June, 1892<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 20 February, 1892<br />
| align= left | Rear-Admiral<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Cyprian Arthur George Bridge]], G.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 15 March, 1839<br />
| align= center | 16 August, 1924<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 30 August, 1903<br />
| align= center | 29 November, 1898<br />
| align= center | 25 February, 1892<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 15 March, 1904<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Edmund Charles Drummond]]<br />
| align= center | 4 August, 1841<br />
| align= center | 6 May, 1911<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 October, 1903<br />
| align= center | 21 December, 1898<br />
| align= center | 26 March, 1892<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 26 November, 1904<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Charles Searle Cardale]]<br />
| align= center | 21 April, 1841<br />
| align= center | 1 June, 1904<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 15 March, 1904 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 13 January, 1899<br />
| align= center | 5 April, 1892<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 3 March, 1900<br />
|-valign="top"<br />
! colspan="11" align=left | Officers promoted to Flag Rank in 1893<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Edmund John Church]]<br />
| align= center | 14 February, 1842<br />
| align= center | 18 April, 1904<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 15 March, 1904 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 30 June, 1899<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1893<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 11 July, 1899<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[John Reginald Thomas Fullerton]], G.C.V.O., C.B.<br />
| align= center | 10 August, 1840<br />
| align= center | 29 June, 1918<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 15 March, 1904 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 11 July, 1899<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1893<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 April, 1901<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Walter Stewart]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 13 July, 1841<br />
| align= center | 26 October, 1896<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1893<br />
| align= left | Rear-Admiral<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Charles Barstow Theobald]]<br />
| align= center | 5 August, 1843<br />
| align= center | 25 December, 1905<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 15 March, 1904 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 13 July, 1899 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1893<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'') <br />
| align= center | 5 August, 1893<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Henry St. Leger Bury Palliser]]<br />
| align= center | 22 June, 1839<br />
| align= center | 17 March, 1907<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 15 March, 1904 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 13 July, 1899 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 26 April, 1893<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 22 June, 1899<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Ernest Rice]], K.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 24 February, 1840<br />
| align= center | 15 April, 1927<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 15 March, 1904<br />
| align= center | 13 July, 1899<br />
| align= center | 13 May, 1893<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 24 February, 1905<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Frederick Samuel Vander-Meulen]]<br />
| align= center | 20 November, 1839<br />
| align= center | 13 February, 1913<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 16 June, 1904 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 26 October, 1899<br />
| align= center | 23 June, 1893<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 20 November, 1899<br />
|-valign="top"<br />
! colspan="11" align=left | Officers promoted to Flag Rank in 1894<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Hilary Gustavus Andoe]], K.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 19 February, 1841<br />
| align= center | 11 February, 1905<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 16 June, 1904 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 20 November, 1899<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1894<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 19 February, 1901<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Armand Temple Powlett]]<br />
| align= center | 17 May, 1841<br />
| align= center | 22 January, 1925<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 16 June, 1904 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 3 March, 1900<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1894<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 17 March, 1901<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Alexander Plantagenet Hastings]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 31 October, 1844<br />
| align= center | 7 December, 1925<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 16 June, 1904 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 21 March, 1900<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1894<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 28 March, 1901<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Francis Starkie Clayton]]<br />
| align= center | 19 July, 1839<br />
| align= center | 21 October, 1913<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 16 June, 1904 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1901 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 10 March, 1894<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 19 July, 1899<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Rodney Maclaine Lloyd]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 3 July, 1841<br />
| align= center | 16 May, 1911<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 16 June, 1904 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 10 August, 1900<br />
| align= center | 4 April, 1894<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 September, 1902<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Arthur Hildebrand Alington]]<br />
| align= center | 10 October, 1839<br />
| align= center | 7 December, 1925<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 16 June, 1904 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1901 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 28 May, 1894<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 13 January, 1899<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Henry John Carr]]<br />
| align= center | 6 July, 1839<br />
| align= center | 18 July, 1914<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 16 June, 1904 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1901 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 7 June, 1894<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 6 July, 1899<br />
|-valign="top"<br />
! colspan="11" align=left | Officers promoted to Flag Rank in 1895<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Charles Lister Oxley]]<br />
| align= center | 17 October, 1841<br />
| align= center | 21 July, 1920<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 16 June, 1904<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1901<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1895<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 17 October, 1906<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Robert Hastings Harris]]<br />
| align= center | 12 October, 1843<br />
| align= center | 25 August, 1926<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 September, 1904<br />
| align= center | 19 February, 1901<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1895<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 12 October, 1908<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Hugo Lewis Pearson]], K.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 30 June, 1843<br />
| align= center | 12 June, 1912<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 20 October, 1904<br />
| align= center | 13 March, 1901<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1895<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 30 June, 1908<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[John Fellowes]], K.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 1 April, 1843<br />
| align= center | 22 September, 1913<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 26 November, 1904<br />
| align= center | 17 March, 1901<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1895<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 8 June, 1905<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Charles Cooper Penrose FitzGerald]]<br />
| align= center | 30 April, 1841<br />
| align= center | 11 August, 1921<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 20 February, 1905<br />
| align= center | 28 March, 1901<br />
| align= center | 20 February, 1895<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 2 March, 1905<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Arthur Knyvet Wilson, Third Baronet]], V.C., G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 4 March, 1842<br />
| align= center | 25 May, 1921<br />
| align= center | 1 March, 1907<br />
| align= center | 24 February, 1905<br />
| align= center | 24 May, 1901<br />
| align= center | 20 June, 1895<br />
| align= left | Admiral of the Fleet<br />
| align= center | 4 March, 1912<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Archibald Lucius Douglas]], G.C.B., G.C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 3 February, 1842<br />
| align= center | 12 March, 1913<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 2 March, 1905<br />
| align= center | 15 June, 1901<br />
| align= center | 9 November, 1895<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 8 February, 1907<br />
|-valign="top"<br />
! colspan="11" align=left | Officers promoted to Flag Rank in 1896<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[William Home Chisholme St. Clair]]<br />
| align= center | 9 September, 1841<br />
| align= center | 16 November, 1905<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 24 May, 1905 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 16 June, 1901<br />
| align= center | 19 January, 1896<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 9 September, 1901<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Atwell Peregrine MacLeod Lake]]<br />
| align= center | 11 April, 1842<br />
| align= center | 27 August, 1915<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 24 May, 1905 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 9 September, 1901<br />
| align= center | 11 March, 1896<br />
| align= left | Admiral {''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 July, 1902<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Gerard Henry Uctred Noel]], G.C.B., K.C.M.G. <br />
| align= center | 5 March, 1845<br />
| align= center | 23 May, 1918<br />
| align= center | 2 December, 1908<br />
| align= center | 24 May, 1905<br />
| align= center | 2 November, 1901<br />
| align= center | 8 May, 1896<br />
| align= left | Admiral of the Fleet<br />
| align= center | 5 March, 1915<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[John William Brackenbury]], C.B., C.M.G.<br />
| align= center | 30 November, 1842<br />
| align= center | 15 March, 1918<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 8 June, 1905<br />
| align= center | 7 December, 1901<br />
| align= center | 10 October, 1896<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 5 July, 1905<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Thomas Sturges Jackson]], K.C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 6 March, 1842<br />
| align= center | 9 September, 1934<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 5 July, 1905<br />
| align= center | 24 January, 1902<br />
| align= center | 20 October, 1896<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 22 July, 1905<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Richard Horace Hamond]]<br />
| align= center | 17 January, 1843<br />
| align= center | 12 March, 1906<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 22 July, 1905 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 25 January, 1902 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 9 November, 1896<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 31 March, 1898<br />
|-valign="top"<br />
! colspan="11" align=left | Officers promoted to Flag Rank in 1897<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Arthur Dalrymple Fanshawe]], G.C.B., G.C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 2 April, 1847<br />
| align= center | 21 January, 1936<br />
| align= center | 30 April, 1910<br />
| align= center | 22 July, 1905<br />
| align= center | 25 January, 1902<br />
| align= center | 23 February, 1897<br />
| align= left | Admiral of the Fleet<br />
| align= center | 2 April, 1917<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Day Hort Bosanquet]], G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., K.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 22 March, 1843<br />
| align= center | 28 June, 1923<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 4 December, 1905<br />
| align= center | 1 July, 1902<br />
| align= center | 10 May, 1897<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 22 March, 1908<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Lewis Anthony Beaumont]], G.C.B., K.C.M.G., F.R.G.S.<br />
| align= center | 19 May, 1847<br />
| align= center | 19 June, 1922<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 17 October, 1906<br />
| align= center | 1 September, 1902<br />
| align= center | 23 August, 1897<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 19 May, 1912<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{RIGHTHON}} [[Charles William de la Poer Beresford, First Baron Beresford]], G.C.B., G.C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 10 February, 1846<br />
| align= center | 6 September, 1919<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 11 November, 1906<br />
| align= center | 3 October, 1902<br />
| align= center | 18 September, 1897<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 10 February, 1911<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Albert Baldwin Jenkings]]<br />
| align= center | 2 March, 1846<br />
| align= center | 5 October, 1942<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1907<br />
| align= center | 21 January, 1903<br />
| align= center | 11 December, 1897<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 1 June, 1907<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Henry Coey Kane]], K.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 15 December, 1843<br />
| align= center | 30 January, 1917<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 8 February, 1907 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 30 May, 1903 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 26 December, 1897<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 25 August, 1899<br />
|-valign="top"<br />
! colspan="11" align=left | Officers promoted to Flag Rank in 1898<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Frederick Ross Boardman]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 28 June, 1843<br />
| align= center | 24 September, 1927<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 8 February, 1907 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 30 May, 1903 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 19 March, 1898<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1899<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[James Andrew Thomas Bruce]], K.C.M.G.<br />
| align= center | 15 July, 1846<br />
| align= center | 25 May, 1921<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 8 February, 1907<br />
| align= center | 30 May, 1903<br />
| align= center | 31 March, 1898<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 2 January, 1909<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Henry Rose]]<br />
| align= center | 10 February, 1844<br />
| align= center | 21 October, 1928<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 March, 1907 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 6 August, 1903<br />
| align= center | 29 November, 1898<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 10 February, 1904<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Pelham Aldrich]], C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 8 December, 1844<br />
| align= center | 12 November, 1930<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 March, 1907<br />
| align= center | 12 August, 1903<br />
| align= center | 21 December, 1898<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 22 March, 1908<br />
|-valign="top"<br />
! colspan="11" align=left | Officers promoted to Flag Rank in 1899<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Swinton Colthurst Holland]], F.R.G.S.<br />
| align= center | 8 February, 1844<br />
| align= center | 8 June, 1922<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 June, 1907<br />
| align= center | 30 August, 1903<br />
| align= center | 13 January, 1899<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 11 April, 1908<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Arthur William Moore]], G.C.B., G.C.V.O., C.M.G.<br />
| align= center | 30 July, 1847<br />
| align= center | 3 April, 1934<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 10 October, 1907<br />
| align= center | 8 December, 1903<br />
| align= center | 13 January, 1899<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 30 July, 1912<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Ernest Neville Rolfe]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 11 August, 1847<br />
| align= center | 11 May, 1909<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 10 October, 1907 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 October, 1903<br />
| align= center | 13 January, 1899<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 8 December, 1903<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Andrew Kennedy Bickford]], C.M.G.<br />
| align= center | 16 July, 1844<br />
| align= center | 9 October, 1927<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 22 March, 1908<br />
| align= center | 10 February, 1904<br />
| align= center | 22 June, 1899<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 12 May, 1908<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[William Alison Dyke Acland, Second Baronet]], C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 18 December, 1847<br />
| align= center | 26 November, 1924<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 22 March, 1908<br />
| align= center | 15 March, 1904<br />
| align= center | 30 June, 1899<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 17 July, 1911<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[William Frederick Stanley Mann]]<br />
| align= center | 21 June, 1846<br />
| align= center | 23 April, 1924<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 11 April, 1908 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 16 June, 1904 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 6 July, 1899<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 23 July, 1901<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[John Hugh Bainbridge]]<br />
| align= center | 31 May, 1845<br />
| align= center | 10 August, 1901<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 11 July, 1899<br />
| align= left | Rear-Admiral<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Charles Carter Drury]], G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.S.I., F.R.G.S.<br />
| align= center | 27 August, 1846<br />
| align= center | 18 May, 1914<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 11 April, 1908<br />
| align= center | 16 June, 1904<br />
| align= center | 13 July, 1899<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 27 August, 1911<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Edmund Frederick Jeffreys]], C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 1 October, 1846<br />
| align= center | 19 March, 1925<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 12 May, 1908<br />
| align= center | 1 September, 1904<br />
| align= center | 19 July, 1899<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 18 May, 1908<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Reginald Neville Custance]], G.C.B., K.C.M.G., C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 20 September, 1847<br />
| align= center | 30 August, 1935<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 18 May, 1908<br />
| align= center | 20 October, 1904<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1899<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 20 September, 1912<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Burges Watson]], C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 24 September, 1846<br />
| align= center | 21 September, 1902<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 25 August, 1899<br />
| align= left | Rear-Admiral<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[John Robert Ebenezer Pattisson]]<br />
| align= center | 10 December, 1844<br />
| align= center | 13 February, 1928<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 30 June, 1908 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 26 November, 1904<br />
| align= center | 26 October, 1899<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 27 November, 1904<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[William Hannam Henderson]], K.B.E.<br />
| align= center | 20 June, 1845<br />
| align= center | 29 April, 1931<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 30 June, 1908<br />
| align= center | 27 November, 1904<br />
| align= center | 20 November, 1899<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 2 July, 1908<br />
|-valign="top"<br />
! colspan="11" align=left | Officers promoted to Flag Rank in 1900<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[James Lacon Hammet]], C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 15 May, 1848<br />
| align= center | 15 February, 1905<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1905<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1900<br />
| align= left | Vice-Admiral<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Harry Tremenheere Grenfell]], K.C.B., C.M.G.<br />
| align= center | 9 March, 1845<br />
| align= center | 19 February, 1906<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 16 February, 1905<br />
| align= center | 3 March, 1900<br />
| align= left | Vice-Admiral<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Baldwin Wake Walker, Second Baronet]] <br />
| align= center | 24 September, 1846<br />
| align= center | 28 June, 1905<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 20 February, 1905<br />
| align= center | 21 March, 1900<br />
| align= left | Vice-Admiral<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Robert William Craigie]]<br />
| align= center | 25 July, 1849<br />
| align= center | 21 August, 1911<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 2 July, 1908<br />
| align= center | 24 February, 1905<br />
| align= center | 10 August, 1900<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 5 November, 1908<br />
|-valign="top"<br />
! colspan="11" align=left | Officers promoted to Flag Rank in 1901<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Wilmot Hawkesworth Fawkes]], G.C.B., K.C.V.O., Hon. LL.D.<br />
| align= center | 22 December, 1846<br />
| align= center | 29 May, 1926<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 12 October, 1908<br />
| align= center | 2 March, 1905<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1901<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 12 April, 1911<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | H<small>IS</small> M<small>AJESTY</small> [[George V]], By the Grace of God, of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas King, Defender of the Faith, Emperor of India, K.G., K.T., K.P., G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., G.C.V.O., I.S.O., P.C., F.R.S.<br />
| align= center | 3 June, 1865<br />
| align= center | 20 January, 1936<br />
| align= center | 7 May, 1910<br />
| align= center | 1 March, 1910<br />
| align= center | 26 June, 1903<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1901<br />
| align= left | Admiral of the Fleet<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[George Lambart Atkinson-Willes]], K.C.B. <br />
| align= center | 13 July, 1847<br />
| align= center | 25 December, 1921<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 5 November, 1908<br />
| align= center | 24 May, 1905<br />
| align= center | 19 February, 1901<br />
| align= left | Vice-Admiral<br />
| align= center | 13 July, 1912<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Edward Henry Meggs Davis]], C.M.G., O.B.E.<br />
| align= center | 18 August, 1846<br />
| align= center | 6 October, 1929<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 5 November, 1908 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 8 June, 1905<br />
| align= center | 13 March, 1901<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 26 June, 1905<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[John Harvey Rainier]]<br />
| align= center | 29 April, 1847<br />
| align= center | 21 November, 1915<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 5 November, 1908 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 26 June, 1905<br />
| align= center | 17 March, 1901<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1905<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[William Henry May]]<br />
| align= center | 31 July, 1849<br />
| align= center | 7 October, 1930<br />
| align= center | 20 March, 1913<br />
| align= center | 5 November, 1908<br />
| align= center | 29 June, 1905<br />
| align= center | 28 March, 1901<br />
| align= left | Admiral of the Fleet<br />
| align= center | 31 July, 1919<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Alfred Arthur Chase Parr]], F.R.G.S.<br />
| align= center | 14 June, 1849<br />
| align= center | 20 February, 1914<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 2 December, 1908 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 5 July, 1905<br />
| align= center | 24 May, 1901<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 8 March, 1906<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Reginald Friend Hannam Henderson]], G.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 20 November, 1846<br />
| align= center | 12 July, 1932<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 2 December, 1908<br />
| align= center | 22 July, 1905<br />
| align= center | 15 June, 1901<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1910<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Count Frederick Cosmeto Metaxa]]<br />
| align= center | 7 March, 1847<br />
| align= center | 2 March, 1910<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 2 January, 1909 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1905<br />
| align= center | 16 June, 1901<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 12 September, 1905<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{HONSIR}} [[Assheton Gore Curzon-Howe]], G.C.V.O., K.C.B., C.M.G.<br />
| align= center | 10 August, 1850<br />
| align= center | 1 March, 1911<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 2 January, 1909<br />
| align= center | 12 September, 1905<br />
| align= center | 23 July, 1901<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Angus MacLeod]], C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 11 June, 1847<br />
| align= center | 29 April, 1920<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1910<br />
| align= center | 4 December, 1905<br />
| align= center | 11 August, 1901<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 22 July, 1910<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Edmund Samuel Poë]], G.C.V.O., K.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 11 September, 1849<br />
| align= center | 4 April, 1921<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 30 April, 1910<br />
| align= center | 20 February, 1906<br />
| align= center | 9 September, 1901<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 11 September, 1914<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Arthur Charles Burgoyne Bromley]]<br />
| align= center | 16 September, 1847<br />
| align= center | 25 October, 1909<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 8 March, 1906<br />
| align= center | 2 November, 1901<br />
| align= left | Vice-Admiral<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Charles Campbell]], K.C.M.G., D.S.O.<br />
| align= center | 26 March, 1847 <br />
| align= center | 8 February, 1911<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 22 July, 1910 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 17 October, 1906<br />
| align= center | 7 December, 1901<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 18 October, 1906<br />
|-valign="top"<br />
! colspan="11" align=left | Officers promoted to Flag Rank in 1902<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[John Durnford]], G.C.B., D.S.O.<br />
| align= center | 6 February, 1849<br />
| align= center | 13 June, 1914<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 21 July, 1910<br />
| align= center | 18 October, 1906<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1902<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 10 May, 1913<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[William Marrack]]<br />
| align= center | 18 February, 1847<br />
| align= center | 26 January, 1926<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 10 February, 1911 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 11 November, 1906<br />
| align= center | 24 January, 1902<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 17 November, 1906<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Edward Chichester, Ninth Baronet]], C.B., C.M.G.<br />
| align= center | 20 November, 1849<br />
| align= center | 17 September, 1906<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 25 January, 1902<br />
| align= left | Rear-Admiral<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Gerald Charles Langley]]<br />
| align= center | 13 October, 1848<br />
| align= center | 18 April, 1914<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 10 February, 1911 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 17 November, 1906<br />
| align= center | 1 July, 1902<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 23 November, 1906<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Charles James Barlow]], D.S.O.<br />
| align= center | 11 August, 1848<br />
| align= center | 25 August, 1921<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 10 February, 1911<br />
| align= center | 23 November, 1906<br />
| align= center | 1 September, 1902<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 19 July, 1911<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Henry John May]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 20 February, 1853<br />
| align= center | 24 April, 1904<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 22 September, 1902<br />
| align= left | Rear-Admiral<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{HONSIR}} [[Hedworth Meux]], G.C.B., K.C.V.O. (originally ''Lambton'')<br />
| align= center | 5 July, 1856<br />
| align= center | 20 September, 1929<br />
| align= center | 5 March, 1915<br />
| align= center | 2 March, 1911<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1907<br />
| align= center | 3 October, 1902<br />
| align= left | Admiral of the Fleet<br />
| align= center | 5 July, 1921<br />
|-valign="top"<br />
! colspan="11" align=left | Officers promoted to Flag Rank in 1903<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Francis Powell]], K.C.M.G., C.B.<br />
| align= center | 15 September, 1849<br />
| align= center | 5 October, 1927<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 12 April, 1911 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 8 February, 1907<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1903<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 13 February, 1907<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[William Des Vœux Hamilton]]<br />
| align= center | 17 September, 1852<br />
| align= center | 15 February, 1907<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 13 February, 1907<br />
| align= center | 21 January, 1903<br />
| align= left | Vice-Admiral<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[William Carnegie Codrington Forsyth]]<br />
| align= center | 11 December, 1849<br />
| align= center | 3 September, 1906<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 30 May, 1903<br />
| align= left | Rear-Admiral<br />
| align= center | 11 May, 1904<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Arthur Barrow]]<br />
| align= center | 25 March, 1853<br />
| align= center | 22 November, 1914<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 12 April, 1911 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 16 February, 1907 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 6 August, 1903<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 26 May, 1906<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Francis Charles Bridgeman Bridgeman]], G.C.B., G.C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 7 December, 1848<br />
| align= center | 17 February, 1929<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 12 April, 1911<br />
| align= center | 16 February, 1907<br />
| align= center | 12 August, 1903<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 7 December, 1913<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Richard Poore, Fourth Baronet]], K.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 7 July, 1853<br />
| align= center | 8 December, 1930<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 17 July, 1911<br />
| align= center | 1 March, 1907<br />
| align= center | 30 August, 1903<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 3 April, 1917<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Alvin Coote Corry]]<br />
| align= center | 23 October, 1849<br />
| align= center | 25 January, 1907<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 31 August, 1903<br />
| align= left | Rear-Admiral<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Robert Leonard Groome]], C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 10 September, 1848<br />
| align= center | 22 November, 1917<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 19 July, 1911 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 June, 1907<br />
| align= center | 31 August, 1903<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 September, 1907<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[George Augustus Giffard]], C.M.G.<br />
| align= center | 20 February, 1849<br />
| align= center | 23 September, 1925<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 19 July, 1911<br />
| align= center | 1 September, 1907<br />
| align= center | 1 October, 1903<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 16 May, 1913<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Charles Grey Robinson]], C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 12 November, 1850<br />
| align= center | 14 February, 1934<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 27 August, 1911<br />
| align= center | 10 October, 1907<br />
| align= center | 8 October, 1903<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 18 September, 1911<br />
|-valign="top"<br />
! colspan="11" align=left | Officers promoted to Flag Rank in 1904<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Charles Ramsay Arbuthnot]]<br />
| align= center | 5 February, 1850<br />
| align= center | 30 September, 1913<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 18 September, 1911 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 22 March, 1908 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1904<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 July, 1907<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Walter Hodgson Bevan Graham]]<br />
| align= center | 13 October, 1849<br />
| align= center | 28 August, 1931<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 18 September, 1911 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 22 March, 1908<br />
| align= center | 10 February, 1904<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 3 January, 1911<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Randolph Frank Ollive Foote]], K.C.B., C.M.G.<br />
| align= center | 14 May, 1853<br />
| align= center | 28 November, 1931<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 18 September, 1911 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 22 March, 1908<br />
| align= center | 15 March, 1904<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 15 March, 1911<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Edward Harpur Gamble]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 6 September, 1849<br />
| align= center | 18 November, 1925<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 18 September, 1911<br />
| align= center | 11 April, 1908<br />
| align= center | 1 April, 1904<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 19 September, 1911<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Archibald Berkeley Milne, Second Baronet]], G.C.V.O., K.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 2 June, 1855<br />
| align= center | 5 July, 1938<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 19 September, 1911<br />
| align= center | 12 May, 1908<br />
| align= center | 25 April, 1904<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 12 February, 1919<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[George Fowler King-Hall]], K.C.B., C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 14 August, 1850<br />
| align= center | 10 September, 1939<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 19 May, 1912<br />
| align= center | 18 May, 1908<br />
| align= center | 11 May, 1904<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 10 February, 1914<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Michael Pelham O'Callaghan]], C.B., C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 15 December, 1850<br />
| align= center | 9 June, 1937<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 13 July, 1912 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 30 June, 1908 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 16 June, 1904<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 16 December, 1907<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{MOSTHON}} [[Louis Alexander Mountbatten, First Marquess of Milford Haven]], G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G.<br />
| align= center | 24 May, 1854<br />
| align= center | 11 September, 1921<br />
| align= center | 4 August, 1921 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 13 July, 1912<br />
| align= center | 30 June, 1908<br />
| align= center | 1 July, 1904<br />
| align= left | Admiral of the Fleet (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1919<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Gerald Walter Russell]]<br />
| align= center | 17 January, 1850<br />
| align= center | 7 November, 1928<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 30 July, 1912 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 2 July, 1908 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 September, 1904<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 March, 1908<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Henry Deacon Barry]], K.C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 27 November, 1849<br />
| align= center | 14 November, 1908<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 2 July, 1908<br />
| align= center | 1 October, 1904<br />
| align= left | Vice-Admiral<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[George Neville]], K.C.B., C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 18 March, 1850<br />
| align= center | 5 February, 1923<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 30 July, 1912<br />
| align= center | 12 October, 1908<br />
| align= center | 20 October, 1904<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 3 June, 1913<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Alfred Leigh Winsloe]], K.C.B., C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 25 April, 1852<br />
| align= center | 16 February, 1931<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 20 September, 1912<br />
| align= center | 5 November, 1908<br />
| align= center | 26 November, 1904<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 13 December, 1913<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Thomas MacGill]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 16 August, 1850<br />
| align= center | 16 April, 1926<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 20 March, 1913 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 5 November, 1908 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 27 November, 1904<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 31 May, 1906<br />
|-valign="top"<br />
! colspan="11" align=left | Officers promoted to Flag Rank in 1905<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Harry Seawell Frank Niblett]], C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 31 October, 1852<br />
| align= center | 26 December, 1939<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 20 March, 1913 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 5 November, 1908<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1905<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 27 April, 1910<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Frank Finnis]], C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 8 November, 1851<br />
| align= center | 17 November, 1918<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 20 March, 1913 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 15 November, 1908<br />
| align= center | 16 February, 1905<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 9 February, 1909<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Arthur William Edward Prothero]]<br />
| align= center | 18 April, 1850<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1931<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 20 March, 1913 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 2 December, 1908 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 20 February, 1905<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 11 July, 1905<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Percy Moreton Scott, First Baronet]], K.C.B., K.C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 10 July, 1853<br />
| align= center | 18 October, 1924<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 20 March, 1913<br />
| align= center | 2 December, 1908<br />
| align= center | 24 February, 1905<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 21 March, 1913<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[George Le Clerc Egerton]], K.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 17 October, 1852<br />
| align= center | 30 March, 1940<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 21 March, 1913<br />
| align= center | 2 January, 1909<br />
| align= center | 2 March, 1905<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 9 June, 1916<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Charles Henry Adair]]<br />
| align= center | 2 July, 1851<br />
| align= center | 9 March, 1920<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 10 May, 1913<br />
| align= center | 9 February, 1909<br />
| align= center | 1 April, 1905<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 15 May, 1913<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Alexander William Chisholm-Batten]], D.S.O., M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 28 September, 1851<br />
| align= center | 2 November, 1925<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 15 May, 1913 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 26 October, 1909 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 24 May, 1905<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 May, 1907<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Frederic William Fisher]], K.C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 5 October, 1851<br />
| align= center | 23 December, 1943<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 15 May, 1913<br />
| align= center | 26 October, 1909<br />
| align= center | 8 June, 1905<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 24 October, 1914<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Charles Henry Cross]]<br />
| align= center | 18 May, 1852<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1915<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 16 May, 1913<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1910<br />
| align= center | 26 June, 1905<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 17 May, 1913<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Robert Archibald James Montgomerie]], C.B., C.M.G.<br />
| align= center | 11 September, 1855<br />
| align= center | 1 September, 1908<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 29 June, 1905<br />
| align= left | Rear-Admiral<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[George Astley Callaghan]], G.C.B., G.C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 21 December, 1852<br />
| align= center | 23 November, 1920<br />
| align= center | 2 April, 1917<br />
| align= center | 17 May, 1913<br />
| align= center | 27 April, 1910<br />
| align= center | 1 July, 1905<br />
| align= left | Admiral of the Fleet<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Charles Gauntlett Dicken]]<br />
| align= center | 26 April, 1854<br />
| align= center | 7 September, 1937<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 3 June, 1913 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 30 April, 1910 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 5 July, 1905<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 October, 1908<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Archibald James Pocklington]]<br />
| align= center | 9 June, 1851<br />
| align= center | 16 October, 1922<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 3 June, 1913 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 30 April, 1910 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 11 July, 1905<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 16 February, 1906<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[George Morris Henderson]], M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 12 August, 1851<br />
| align= center | 16 January, 1915<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 3 June, 1913 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 30 April, 1910 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 22 July, 1905<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 5 July, 1908<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Francis George Kirby]]<br />
| align= center | 18 August, 1854<br />
| align= center | 13 January, 1951<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 3 June, 1913 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 30 April, 1910 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1905<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 15 January, 1908<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Frederick Fogarty Fegen]], M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 28 April, 1855<br />
| align= center | 20 March, 1911<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 30 April, 1910 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 12 September, 1905<br />
| align= left | Vice-Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 12 March, 1909<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[James Edward Clifford Goodrich]], K.C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 23 July, 1851<br />
| align= center | 21 December, 1925<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 3 June, 1913<br />
| align= center | 30 April, 1910<br />
| align= center | 1 October, 1905<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 4 June, 1913<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Charles Windham]], C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 1 March, 1851<br />
| align= center | 20 May, 1916<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 4 June, 1913 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 22 July, 1910 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 4 December, 1905<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 4 June, 1909<br />
|-valign="top"<br />
! colspan="11" align=left | Officers promoted to Flag Rank in 1906<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Spencer Henry Metcalfe Login]], C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 24 September, 1851<br />
| align= center | 22 January, 1909<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1906<br />
| align= left | Rear-Admiral<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Philip Francis Tillard]]<br />
| align= center | 17 September, 1852<br />
| align= center | 23 February, 1933<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 4 June, 1913 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 22 July, 1910 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 16 February, 1906<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 22 June, 1909<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[John Locke Marx]], C.B., M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 23 April, 1852<br />
| align= center | 16 September, 1939<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 4 June, 1913 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 22 July, 1910 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 8 March, 1906<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 8 September, 1909<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[John Edward Bearcroft]], C.B., M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 18 August, 1851<br />
| align= center | 5 September, 1931<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 4 June, 1913 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 22 July, 1910 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 20 March, 1906<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 30 May, 1906<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Leslie Creery Stuart]], C.M.G., M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 18 October, 1851<br />
| align= center | 1 November, 1908<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 April, 1906<br />
| align= left | Rear-Admiral<br />
| align= center | 15 June, 1908<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Arthur Mostyn Field]], K.C.B., F.R.S., F.R.A.S., F.R.G.S.<br />
| align= center | 27 June, 1855<br />
| align= center | 3 July, 1950<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 4 June, 1913 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 22 July, 1910<br />
| align= center | 26 May, 1906<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 24 August, 1910<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Frederick Samuel Inglefield]], K.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 29 April, 1854<br />
| align= center | 8 August, 1921<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 4 June, 1913<br />
| align= center | 24 August, 1910<br />
| align= center | 30 May, 1906<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 9 June, 1916<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Henry Morton Tudor Tudor]]<br />
| align= center | 23 July, 1855<br />
| align= center | 3 January, 1926<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 7 December, 1913 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 3 January, 1911 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 31 May, 1906<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 30 November, 1909<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Francis John Foley]]<br />
| align= center | 2 December, 1855<br />
| align= center | 5 March, 1911<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 3 January, 1911<br />
| align= center | 1 July, 1906<br />
| align= left | Vice-Admiral<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[John Denison]], D.S.O.<br />
| align= center | 25 May, 1853<br />
| align= center | 9 March, 1939<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 7 December, 1913<br />
| align= center | 10 February, 1911<br />
| align= center | 18 September, 1906<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 8 December, 1913<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Alfred Wyndham Paget]], K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O.<br />
| align= center | 20 March, 1852<br />
| align= center | 17 June, 1918<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 8 December, 1913<br />
| align= center | 6 March, 1911<br />
| align= center | 1 October, 1906<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 14 September, 1914<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Robert Swinburne Lowry]], K.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 4 March, 1854<br />
| align= center | 29 May, 1920<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 13 December, 1913<br />
| align= center | 6 March, 1911<br />
| align= center | 17 October, 1906<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 19 August, 1917<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Henry Bradwardine Jackson]], G.C.B., K.C.V.O., F.R.S.<br />
| align= center | 21 January, 1855<br />
| align= center | 14 December, 1929<br />
| align= center | 31 July, 1919<br />
| align= center | 10 February, 1914<br />
| align= center | 15 March, 1911<br />
| align= center | 18 October, 1906<br />
| align= left | Admiral of the Fleet<br />
| align= center | 31 July, 1924<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{HONSIR}} [[Stanley Cecil James Colville]], G.C.B., G.C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 21 February, 1861<br />
| align= center | 9 April, 1939<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 11 September, 1914<br />
| align= center | 12 April, 1911<br />
| align= center | 11 November, 1906<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 4 April, 1922<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Arthur Murray Farquhar]], K.C.B., C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 19 January, 1855<br />
| align= center | 16 November, 1937<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 14 September, 1914<br />
| align= center | 17 July, 1911<br />
| align= center | 17 November, 1906<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 9 June, 1916<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[William Blake Fisher]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 19 February, 1853<br />
| align= center | 8 May, 1926<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 24 October, 1914 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 19 July, 1911<br />
| align= center | 23 November, 1906<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 27 August, 1914<br />
|-valign="top"<br />
! colspan="11" align=left | Officers promoted to Flag Rank in 1907<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Ernest Alfred Simons]]<br />
| align= center | 3 September, 1856<br />
| align= center | 30 August, 1928<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 24 October, 1914<br />
| align= center | 27 August, 1911<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1907<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 24 October, 1915<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Robert Stevenson Dalton Cuming]], C.B.E., D.S.O. (originally ''Cumming'')<br />
| align= center | 10 September, 1852<br />
| align= center | 22 February, 1940<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 5 March, 1915 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 18 September, 1911 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 26 January, 1907<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 10 April, 1907<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{RIGHTHON}} [[John Rushworth Jellicoe, First Earl Jellicoe]], G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 5 December, 1859<br />
| align= center | 20 November, 1935<br />
| align= center | 3 April, 1919<br />
| align= center | 5 March, 1915<br />
| align= center | 18 September, 1911<br />
| align= center | 8 February, 1907<br />
| align= left | Admiral of the Fleet<br />
| align= center | 5 December, 1924<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[James Startin]], K.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 20 May, 1855<br />
| align= center | 25 September, 1948<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 24 October, 1915 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 19 September, 1911<br />
| align= center | 13 February, 1907<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 14 September, 1914<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[William Stokes Rees]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 20 January, 1853<br />
| align= center | 20 July, 1929<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 24 October, 1915 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 19 May, 1912 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 16 February, 1907<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 22 June, 1909<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Harry Campbell Reynolds]]<br />
| align= center | 2 June, 1853<br />
| align= center | 7 February, 1949<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 24 October, 1915 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 19 May, 1912 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 March, 1907<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 2 December, 1908<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Francis Charles Methuen Noel]], F.R.G.S.<br />
| align= center | 5 June, 1852<br />
| align= center | 30 December, 1925<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 24 October, 1915 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 19 May, 1912 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 April, 1907<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 10 October, 1907<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Paul Warner Bush]], K.C.B., M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 21 September, 1855<br />
| align= center | 15 March, 1930<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 24 October, 1915<br />
| align= center | 19 May, 1912<br />
| align= center | 10 April, 1907<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 10 January, 1916<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Charles John Briggs]], K.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 15 July, 1858<br />
| align= center | 16 July, 1951<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 10 January, 1916<br />
| align= center | 13 July, 1912<br />
| align= center | 1 May, 1907<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 2 July, 1917<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Frederick St. George Rich]], F.R.G.S.<br />
| align= center | 14 November, 1852<br />
| align= center | 22 May, 1914<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 30 July, 1912 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 June, 1907<br />
| align= left | Vice-Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 20 September, 1910<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Thomas Young Greet]]<br />
| align= center | 20 February, 1854<br />
| align= center | 25 September, 1947<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 9 June, 1916 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 31 July, 1912 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 July, 1907<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1908<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Francis Alban Arthur Giffard Tate]]<br />
| align= center | 7 June, 1853<br />
| align= center | 4 January, 1930<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 9 June, 1916 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 30 July, 1912<br />
| align= center | 1 July, 1907<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 31 July, 1912<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Arthur John Horsley]]<br />
| align= center | 3 March, 1853<br />
| align= center | 7 April, 1937<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 9 June, 1916 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 31 July, 1912 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 September, 1907<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 20 September, 1907<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Herbert Augustus Warren]], M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 24 July, 1855<br />
| align= center | 30 October, 1926<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 9 June, 1916 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 31 July, 1912 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 20 September, 1907<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 20 March, 1911<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Frederick Tower Hamilton]], K.C.B., M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 8 March, 1856<br />
| align= center | 4 October, 1917<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 9 June, 1916<br />
| align= center | 31 July, 1912<br />
| align= center | 1 October, 1907<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Cecil Burney, First Baronet]], G.C.B., G.C.M.G.<br />
| align= center | 15 May, 1858<br />
| align= center | 5 June, 1929<br />
| align= center | 24 November, 1920<br />
| align= center | 9 June, 1916<br />
| align= center | 20 September, 1912<br />
| align= center | 10 October, 1907<br />
| align= left | Admiral of the Fleet<br />
| align= center | 24 November, 1925<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Frederick Sidney Pelham]], C.B.E.<br />
| align= center | 25 October, 1854<br />
| align= center | 19 October, 1931<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 9 June, 1916<br />
| align= center | 20 March, 1913<br />
| align= center | 10 October, 1907<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 10 June, 1916<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Arthur Archibald Campbell Galloway]]<br />
| align= center | 30 June, 1855<br />
| align= center | 12 February, 1918<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 10 June, 1916 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 21 March, 1913<br />
| align= center | 16 December, 1907<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 4 June, 1913<br />
|-valign="top"<br />
! colspan="11" align=left | Officers promoted to Flag Rank in 1908<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[John Casement]]<br />
| align= center | 22 July, 1854<br />
| align= center | 8 June, 1910<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 15 January, 1908<br />
| align= left | Rear-Admiral<br />
| align= center | 2 January, 1909<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{HONSIR}} [[Alexander Edward Bethell]], G.C.M.G., K.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 28 August, 1855<br />
| align= center | 13 June, 1932<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 10 June, 1916<br />
| align= center | 10 May, 1913<br />
| align= center | 1 March, 1908<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 1 September, 1918<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Frederic Edward Errington Brock]], G.B.E., K.C.M.G., C.B.<br />
| align= center | 15 October, 1854<br />
| align= center | 1 November, 1929<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 2 April, 1917<br />
| align= center | 15 May, 1913<br />
| align= center | 22 March, 1908<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 25 August, 1918<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Thomas Philip Walker]], D.S.O.<br />
| align= center | 16 September, 1858<br />
| align= center | 27 August, 1932<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 2 April, 1917 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 15 May, 1913 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 22 March, 1908<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 22 September, 1911<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Hugh Pigot Williams]]<br />
| align= center | 1 September, 1858<br />
| align= center | 28 June, 1934<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 3 April, 1917 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 16 May, 1913<br />
| align= center | 11 April, 1908<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 11 April, 1915<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Charles Edmund Kingsmill]], Kt.<br />
| align= center | 7 July, 1855<br />
| align= center | 15 July, 1935<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 3 April, 1917 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 17 May, 1913<br />
| align= center | 12 May, 1908<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 12 September, 1908<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Charles Henry Coke]], K.C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 2 October, 1854<br />
| align= center | 23 February, 1945<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 3 April, 1917<br />
| align= center | 17 May, 1913<br />
| align= center | 18 May, 1908<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 10 April, 1917<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Robert Henry Simpson Stokes]]<br />
| align= center | 5 August, 1855<br />
| align= center | 24 April, 1914<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 3 June, 1913<br />
| align= center | 15 June, 1908<br />
| align= left | Vice-Admiral<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Thomas Henry Martyn Jerram]], G.C.M.G., K.C.B.,<br />
| align= center | 6 September, 1858<br />
| align= center | 19 March, 1933<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 10 April, 1917<br />
| align= center | 4 June, 1913<br />
| align= center | 30 June, 1908<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 30 January, 1918<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[George John Scott Warrender, Seventh Baronet]], K.C.V.O., C.B.<br />
| align= center | 31 July, 1860<br />
| align= center | 8 January, 1917<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 4 June, 1913<br />
| align= center | 2 July, 1908<br />
| align= left | Vice-Admiral<br />
| align= center | 6 December, 1916<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Colin Richard Keppel]], G.C.V.O., K.C.I.E., C.B., D.S.O.<br />
| align= center | 3 December, 1862<br />
| align= center | 6 July, 1947<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 26 April, 1917 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 7 December, 1913<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1908<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 15 December, 1913<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Douglas Austin Gamble]], K.C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 8 November, 1856<br />
| align= center | 23 May, 1934<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 26 April, 1917<br />
| align= center | 8 December, 1913<br />
| align= center | 2 September, 1908<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 17 May, 1917<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Robert Nelson Ommanney]], K.B.E., C.B.<br />
| align= center | 31 January, 1854<br />
| align= center | 12 January, 1938<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 2 July, 1917 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 15 December, 1913<br />
| align= center | 1 October, 1908<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 9 August, 1915<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Charles Hope Robertson]], C.M.G., M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 19 May, 1856<br />
| align= center | 16 January, 1942<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 2 July, 1917 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 10 February, 1914 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 12 October, 1908<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 2 July, 1909<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Edward Eden Bradford]], G.B.E., K.C.B., C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 10 December, 1858<br />
| align= center | 25 November, 1935<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 2 July, 1917<br />
| align= center | 10 February, 1914<br />
| align= center | 5 November, 1908<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 11 March, 1918<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Henry Coare Kingsford]]<br />
| align= center | 7 January, 1858<br />
| align= center | 1 March, 1941<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 2 July, 1917 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 10 February, 1914 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 5 November, 1908<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 7 March, 1912<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Edmond John Warre Slade]], K.C.I.E., K.C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 20 March, 1859<br />
| align= center | 20 January, 1928<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 19 August, 1917<br />
| align= center | 25 April, 1914<br />
| align= center | 5 November, 1908<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 1 September, 1917<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Sackville Hamilton Carden]], K.C.M.G.<br />
| align= center | 3 May, 1857<br />
| align= center | 5 May, 1930<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 September, 1917<br />
| align= center | 27 August, 1914<br />
| align= center | 15 November, 1908<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 23 October, 1917<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Lewis Bayly]], K.C.B, K.C.M.G., C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 28 September, 1857<br />
| align= center | 16 May, 1938<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 23 October, 1917<br />
| align= center | 14 September, 1914<br />
| align= center | 2 December, 1908<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 1 April, 1919<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Richard Bowles Farquhar]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 12 January, 1859<br />
| align= center | 27 November, 1948<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 5 October, 1917<br />
| align= center | 11 September, 1914<br />
| align= center | 2 December, 1908<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1918<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Frederick Charles Doveton Sturdee, First Baronet]], G.C.B., K.C.M.G., C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 9 June, 1859<br />
| align= center | 7 May, 1925<br />
| align= center | 5 July, 1921<br />
| align= center | 17 May, 1917<br />
| align= center | 13 December, 1913<br />
| align= center | 12 December, 1908<br />
| align= left | Admiral of the Fleet<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
|-valign="top"<br />
! colspan="11" align=left | Officers promoted to Flag Rank in 1909<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[George Edwin Patey]], K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 24 February, 1859<br />
| align= center | 4 February, 1935<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1918<br />
| align= center | 14 September, 1914<br />
| align= center | 2 January, 1909<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1919<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Julian Charles Allix Wilkinson]]<br />
| align= center | 24 February, 1859<br />
| align= center | 13 November, 1917<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 14 September, 1914 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 2 January, 1909<br />
| align= left | Vice-Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 18 January, 1911<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Arthur Henry Limpus]], K.C.M.G., C.B.<br />
| align= center | 7 June, 1863<br />
| align= center | 3 November, 1931<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 30 January, 1918<br />
| align= center | 14 September, 1914<br />
| align= center | 23 January, 1909<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1919<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Richard Henry Peirse]], K.C.B., K.B.E., M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 4 September, 1860<br />
| align= center | 10 July, 1940<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 11 March, 1918<br />
| align= center | 24 October, 1914<br />
| align= center | 9 February, 1909<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 17 January, 1919<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Charles Holcombe Dare]], K.C.M.G., C.B., M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 9 November, 1854<br />
| align= center | 6 August, 1924<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 25 August, 1918 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 5 March, 1915 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 12 March, 1909<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 12 July, 1909<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Edward George Shortland]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 2 November, 1855<br />
| align= center | 7 April, 1929<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 25 August, 1918 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 5 March, 1915 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 4 June, 1909<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 11 April, 1912<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Herbert Goodenough King-Hall]], K.C.B., C.V.O., D.S.O.<br />
| align= center | 15 March, 1862<br />
| align= center | 20 October, 1936<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 25 August, 1918<br />
| align= center | 5 March, 1915<br />
| align= center | 22 June, 1909<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 1 May, 1922<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Frederick Robert William Morgan]], M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 17 November, 1861<br />
| align= center | 13 April, 1910<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 22 June, 1909<br />
| align= left | Rear-Admiral<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Arthur Yerbury Moggridge]] <br />
| align= center | 20 September, 1858<br />
| align= center | 13 November, 1946<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 September, 1918 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 11 April, 1915<br />
| align= center | 2 July, 1909<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 15 July, 1915<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Reginald Hugh Spencer Bacon]], K.C.B, K.C.V.O., D.S.O.<br />
| align= center | 6 September, 1863<br />
| align= center | 9 June, 1947<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 September, 1918 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 15 July, 1915<br />
| align= center | 12 July, 1909<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 31 March, 1919<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Robert Hathorn Johnston Stewart]], C.B., M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 20 May, 1858<br />
| align= center | 23 May, 1940<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 September, 1918 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 15 July, 1915 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 8 September, 1909<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 9 July, 1912<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[William Lowther Grant]], K.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 10 November, 1864<br />
| align= center | 30 January, 1929<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 September, 1918<br />
| align= center | 15 July, 1915<br />
| align= center | 26 October, 1909<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 24 March, 1920<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Spencer Victor Yorke de Horsey]]<br />
| align= center | 4 June, 1863<br />
| align= center | 19 March, 1937<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1919 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 9 August, 1915 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 25 November, 1909<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 21 August, 1911<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Robert Grant Fraser]]<br />
| align= center | 24 July, 1858<br />
| align= center | 18 October, 1920<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1919 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 9 August, 1915 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 30 November, 1909<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 21 February, 1910<br />
|-valign="top"<br />
! colspan="11" align=left | Officers promoted to Flag Rank in 1910<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{RIGHTHON}} [[David Richard Beatty, First Earl Beatty]], G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O., D.S.O., P.C.<br />
| align= center | 17 January, 1871<br />
| align= center | 10 March, 1936<br />
| align= center | 3 April, 1919<br />
| align= center | 27 November, 1916<br />
| align= center | 9 August, 1915<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1910<br />
| align= left | Admiral of the Fleet<br />
| align= center | 17 January, 1936<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Herbert Edward Purey-Cust]], K.B.E., C.B.<br />
| align= center | 26 February, 1857<br />
| align= center | 11 November, 1938<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1919 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 24 October, 1915 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 21 February, 1910<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 19 December, 1912<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Herbert Lyon]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 28 December, 1856<br />
| align= center | 6 March, 1919<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1919 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 24 October, 1915 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 14 April, 1910<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 25 January, 1913<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Charles Henry Hodgson Moore]]<br />
| align= center | 22 March, 1858<br />
| align= center | 17 March, 1920<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1919 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 24 October, 1915 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 27 April, 1910<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 10 May, 1913<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Henry Loftus Tottenham]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 7 August, 1860<br />
| align= center | 24 February, 1950<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1919 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 24 October, 1915<br />
| align= center | 30 April, 1910<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 26 October, 1918<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Charles Hope Dundas|Charles Hope Dundas of Dundas]], K.C.M.G.<br />
| align= center | 9 August, 1859<br />
| align= center | 1 July, 1924<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1919 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 10 January, 1916<br />
| align= center | 22 July, 1910<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 25 January, 1916<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Christopher George Francis Maurice Cradock]], K.C.V.O., C.B.<br />
| align= center | 2 July, 1862<br />
| align= center | 1 November, 1914<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 24 August, 1910<br />
| align= left | Rear-Admiral<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Reginald Godfrey Otway Tupper]], G.B.E., K.C.B., C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 16 October, 1859<br />
| align= center | 5 March, 1945<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1919<br />
| align= center | 25 January, 1916<br />
| align= center | 20 September, 1910<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 16 May, 1921<br />
|-valign="top"<br />
! colspan="11" align=left | Officers promoted to Flag Rank in 1911<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Lionel Grant Tufnell]], C.M.G.<br />
| align= center | 27 October, 1857<br />
| align= center | 11 August, 1930<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1919 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 9 June, 1916 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 3 January, 1911<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 19 April, 1911<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Herbert Whitmore Savory]], M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 15 July, 1857<br />
| align= center | 23 February, 1918<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 9 June, 1916 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 18 January, 1911<br />
| align= left | Vice-Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 December, 1911<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[William Fane De Salis]], K.B.E., M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 21 July, 1858<br />
| align= center | 23 January, 1939<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1919 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 9 June, 1916 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 10 February, 1911<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 2 March, 1913<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Bernard Currey]]<br />
| align= center | 11 May, 1862<br />
| align= center | 6 June, 1936<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1919<br />
| align= center | 9 June, 1916<br />
| align= center | 2 March, 1911<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 9 January, 1919<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Ernest Charles Thomas Troubridge]], K.C.M.G., C.B., M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 15 July, 1862<br />
| align= center | 28 January, 1926<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 9 January, 1919<br />
| align= center | 9 June, 1916<br />
| align= center | 6 March, 1911<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 1 July, 1921<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Arthur Wartensleben Ewart]]<br />
| align= center | 23 December, 1862<br />
| align= center | 18 November, 1922<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 17 January, 1919 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 9 June, 1916 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 15 March, 1911<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 15 May, 1911<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Archibald Gordon Henry Wilson Moore]], K.C.B., C.B.<br />
| align= center | 2 February, 1862<br />
| align= center | 2 April, 1934<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 17 January, 1919<br />
| align= center | 9 June, 1916<br />
| align= center | 20 March, 1911<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 21 February, 1919<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Charles Edward Madden, First Baronet|Charles Edward Madden]], G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 5 September, 1862<br />
| align= center | 5 June, 1935<br />
| align= center | 31 July, 1924<br />
| align= center | 12 February, 1919<br />
| align= center | 10 June, 1916<br />
| align= center | 12 April, 1911<br />
| align= left | Admiral of the Fleet<br />
| align= center | 30 July, 1930<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{RIGHTHON}} [[Rosslyn Erskine Wemyss, First Baron Wester Wemyss]], G.C.B., C.M.G., M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 12 April, 1864<br />
| align= center | 24 May, 1933<br />
| align= center | 1 November, 1919<br />
| align= center | 21 February, 1919<br />
| align= center | 6 December, 1916<br />
| align= center | 19 April, 1911<br />
| align= left | Admiral of the Fleet<br />
| align= center | 12 April, 1929<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Charles Eustace Anson]], C.B., M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 3 December, 1859<br />
| align= center | 28 April, 1940<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 3 April, 1919 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 3 April, 1917<br />
| align= center | 15 May, 1911<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 13 April, 1917<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Cecil Fiennes Thursby]], K.C.B., K.C.M.G.<br />
| align= center | 17 January, 1861<br />
| align= center | 28 May, 1936<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 3 April, 1919<br />
| align= center | 10 April, 1917<br />
| align= center | 17 July, 1911<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 7 October, 1920<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[John Arthur Tuke]]<br />
| align= center | 18 April, 1857<br />
| align= center | 5 January, 1916<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 19 July, 1911<br />
| align= left | Rear-Admiral<br />
| align= center | 24 October, 1913<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Arthur Henry Christian]], C.B., M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 31 August, 1863<br />
| align= center | 20 August, 1926<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 July, 1919<br />
| align= center | 13 April, 1917<br />
| align= center | 21 August, 1911<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 3 October, 1919<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{HONSIR}} [[Somerset Arthur Gough-Calthorpe]], G.C.B., G.C.M.G., C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 23 December, 1864<br />
| align= center | 27 July, 1937<br />
| align= center | 8 May, 1925<br />
| align= center | 31 July, 1919<br />
| align= center | 26 April, 1917<br />
| align= center | 27 August, 1911<br />
| align= left | Admiral of the Fleet<br />
| align= center | 8 May, 1930<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[William Oswald Story]], C.B.E.<br />
| align= center | 18 April, 1859<br />
| align= center | 14 January, 1938<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 3 October, 1919 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 26 April, 1917 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 18 September, 1911<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 30 January, 1912<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Herbert Leopold Heath]], K.C.B., M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 27 December, 1861<br />
| align= center | 22 October, 1954<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 3 October, 1919<br />
| align= center | 26 April, 1917<br />
| align= center | 19 September, 1911<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 1 June, 1922<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Montague Edward Browning]], G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 18 January, 1863<br />
| align= center | 4 November, 1947<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 November, 1919<br />
| align= center | 26 April, 1917<br />
| align= center | 22 September, 1911<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 4 October, 1926<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[John Michael de Robeck, First Baronet]], G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 10 June, 1862<br />
| align= center | 20 January, 1928<br />
| align= center | 24 November, 1925<br />
| align= center | 24 March, 1920<br />
| align= center | 17 May, 1917<br />
| align= center | 1 December, 1911<br />
| align= left | Admiral of the Fleet<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
|-valign="top"<br />
! colspan="11" align=left | Officers promoted to Flag Rank in 1912<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Richard Purefoy FitzGerald Purefoy]], C.B.E., M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 26 May, 1862<br />
| align= center | 19 December, 1943<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 7 October, 1920 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 2 July, 1917 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 30 January, 1912<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 15 February, 1916<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Arthur William Waymouth]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 16 November, 1863<br />
| align= center | 14 January, 1936<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 7 October, 1920 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 2 July, 1917<br />
| align= center | 7 March, 1912<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 27 September, 1917<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Godfrey Harry Brydges Mundy]], C.B., D.S.O., M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 11 August, 1860<br />
| align= center | 7 October, 1928<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 7 October, 1920 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 19 August, 1917<br />
| align= center | 11 April, 1912<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 19 September, 1917<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Archibald Peile Stoddart]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 5 September, 1860<br />
| align= center | 18 December, 1939<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 7 October, 1920 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 September, 1917<br />
| align= center | 19 May, 1912<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 15 January, 1918<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Hugh Evan-Thomas]], G.C.B., K.C.M.G., M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 27 October, 1862<br />
| align= center | 30 August, 1928<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 7 October, 1920<br />
| align= center | 19 September, 1917<br />
| align= center | 9 July, 1912<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 20 June, 1924<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Robert Keith Arbuthnot, Fourth Baronet]], K.C.B., M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 23 March, 1864<br />
| align= center | 31 May, 1916<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 13 July, 1912<br />
| align= left | Rear-Admiral<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Stuart Nicholson]], C.B., M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 11 October, 1865<br />
| align= center | 10 September, 1936<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 24 November, 1920<br />
| align= center | 27 September, 1917<br />
| align= center | 30 July, 1912<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 25 November, 1920<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Dudley Rawson Stratford de Chair]], K.C.B., K.C.M.G., M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 30 August, 1864<br />
| align= center | 17 August, 1958<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 25 November, 1920<br />
| align= center | 5 October, 1917<br />
| align= center | 31 July, 1912<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 1 November, 1923<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Henry Hervey Campbell]], K.C.V.O., C.B.<br />
| align= center | 27 February, 1865<br />
| align= center | 12 February, 1933<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 16 May, 1921 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 23 October, 1917 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 20 September, 1912<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 17 February, 1917<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Evelyn Robert Le Marchant]], D.S.O.<br />
| align= center | 25 January, 1858<br />
| align= center | 12 February, 1949<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 16 May, 1921 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 23 October, 1917 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 19 December, 1912<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 14 January, 1913<br />
|-valign="top"<br />
! colspan="11" align=left | Officers promoted to Flag Rank in 1913<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Frederick Charles Tudor Tudor]], K.C.B., K.C.M.G.<br />
| align= center | 29 March, 1863<br />
| align= center | 14 April, 1946<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 16 May, 1921<br />
| align= center | 23 October, 1917<br />
| align= center | 14 January, 1913<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 15 November, 1922<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Charles Lionel Napier]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 16 November, 1861<br />
| align= center | 9 March, 1934<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 July, 1921 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1918<br />
| align= center | 25 January, 1913<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 26 April, 1918<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Alexander Ludovic Duff]], G.C.B., G.B.E., K.C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 20 February, 1862<br />
| align= center | 22 November, 1933<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 July, 1921<br />
| align= center | 15 January, 1918<br />
| align= center | 2 March, 1913<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 1 July, 1925<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Reginald Arthur Allenby]], M.V.O., D.S.O.<br />
| align= center | 4 September, 1861<br />
| align= center | 18 March, 1936<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 5 July, 1921 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 30 January, 1918 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 20 March, 1913<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 18 February, 1915<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Seymour Elphinstone Erskine]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 23 June, 1863<br />
| align= center | 23 February, 1945<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 5 July, 1921 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 30 January, 1918 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 21 March, 1913<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 12 August, 1915<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Edward Francis Benedict Charlton]], K.C.B., K.C.M.G.<br />
| align= center | 21 March, 1865<br />
| align= center | 23 October, 1937<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 5 July, 1921<br />
| align= center | 30 January, 1918<br />
| align= center | 10 May, 1913<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 3 March, 1924<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[John de Mestre Hutchison]], C.M.G., C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 4 September, 1862<br />
| align= center | 9 October, 1932<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 5 July, 1921 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 30 January, 1918 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 10 May, 1913<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 9 May, 1916<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Robert Stewart Phipps Hornby]], C.M.G.<br />
| align= center | 9 July, 1866<br />
| align= center | 12 August, 1956<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 4 April, 1922<br />
| align= center | 11 March, 1918<br />
| align= center | 15 May, 1913<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 6 April, 1922<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Mark Edward Frederic Kerr]], C.B., M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 26 September, 1864<br />
| align= center | 20 January, 1944<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 6 April, 1922 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 26 April, 1918<br />
| align= center | 16 May, 1913<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 October, 1918<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{HON}} [[Horace Lambert Alexander Hood]], K.C.B, M.V.O., D.S.O.<br />
| align= center | 2 October, 1870<br />
| align= center | 31 May, 1916<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 17 May, 1913<br />
| align= left | Rear-Admiral<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[John Bridges Eustace]]<br />
| align= center | 20 January, 1861<br />
| align= center | 9 August, 1947<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 6 April, 1922 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 25 August, 1918<br />
| align= center | 3 June, 1913<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 September, 1918<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[William Henry Baker-Baker]], O.B.E.<br />
| align= center | 7 December, 1862<br />
| align= center | 7 August, 1932<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 June, 1922 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 September, 1918 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 4 June, 1913<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 December, 1913<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[William Christopher Pakenham]], G.C.B., K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 10 July, 1861<br />
| align= center | 28 July, 1933<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 6 April, 1922<br />
| align= center | 1 September, 1918<br />
| align= center | 4 June, 1913<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 1 March, 1926<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Cresswell John Eyres]], D.S.O., O.B.E.<br />
| align= center | 20 March, 1862<br />
| align= center | 12 October, 1949<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 June, 1922 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 September, 1918 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 23 June, 1913<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 18 December, 1914<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Francis George Eyre]]<br />
| align= center | 4 February, 1864<br />
| align= center | 22 January, 1941<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 June, 1922 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 October, 1918<br />
| align= center | 14 October, 1913<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 10 February, 1919<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Francis Spurstow Miller]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 25 November, 1863<br />
| align= center | 6 February, 1954<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 June, 1922 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 September, 1918<br />
| align= center | 14 October, 1913<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 29 January, 1920<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Trevylyan Dacres Willes Napier]], K.C.B., M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 19 April, 1867<br />
| align= center | 30 July, 1920<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 26 October, 1918<br />
| align= center | 24 October, 1913<br />
| align= left | Vice-Admiral<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Arthur Cavenagh Leveson]], G.C.B., F.R.G.S.<br />
| align= center | 27 January, 1868<br />
| align= center | 26 June, 1929<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 June, 1922<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1919<br />
| align= center | 1 December, 1913<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 22 February, 1928<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Sydney Robert Fremantle]], G.C.B., M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 16 November, 1867<br />
| align= center | 29 April, 1958<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 15 November, 1922<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1919<br />
| align= center | 7 December, 1913<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 5 April, 1928<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Henry Francis Oliver]], G.C.B., K.C.M.G., M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 22 January, 1865<br />
| align= center | 15 October, 1965<br />
| align= center | 21 January, 1928<br />
| align= center | 1 November, 1923<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1919<br />
| align= center | 8 December, 1913<br />
| align= left | Admiral of the Fleet<br />
| align= center | 31 January, 1933<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[John Philip Rolleston]], D.S.O.<br />
| align= center | 10 April, 1859<br />
| align= center | 12 December, 1936<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 3 March, 1924 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 9 January, 1919 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 13 December, 1913<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 7 March, 1914<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Gerald Charles Adolphe Marescaux]], C.B., C.M.G.<br />
| align= center | 10 February, 1860<br />
| align= center | 3 September, 1920<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 9 January, 1919 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 15 December, 1913<br />
| align= left | Vice-Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 4 November, 1915<br />
|-valign="top"<br />
! colspan="11" align=left | Officers promoted to Flag Rank in 1914<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Edmund Radcliffe Pears]], K.B.E., C.B.<br />
| align= center | 25 April, 1862<br />
| align= center | 21 June, 1941<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 3 March, 1924 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 9 January, 1919<br />
| align= center | 10 February, 1914<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 24 January, 1920<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Arthur David Ricardo]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 14 September, 1861<br />
| align= center | 12 February, 1931<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 3 March, 1924 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 17 January, 1919<br />
| align= center | 7 March, 1914<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 26 January, 1920<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{HON}} [[Robert Francis Boyle]], M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 12 December, 1863<br />
| align= center | 11 September, 1922<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 10 February, 1919<br />
| align= center | 25 April, 1914<br />
| align= left | Vice-Admiral<br />
| align= center | 11 February, 1919<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[George Alexander Ballard]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 7 March, 1862<br />
| align= center | 16 September, 1948<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 3 March, 1924 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 11 February, 1919<br />
| align= center | 27 August, 1914<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 15 June, 1921<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Owen Francis Gillett]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 8 February, 1863<br />
| align= center | 21 March, 1938<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 3 March, 1924 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 12 February, 1919 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 11 September, 1914<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 26 May, 1915<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Morgan Singer]], K.C.B., K.C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 13 December, 1864<br />
| align= center | 27 April, 1938<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 3 March, 1924<br />
| align= center | 12 February, 1919<br />
| align= center | 14 September, 1914<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1924<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Ernest Frederick Augustus Gaunt]], K.C.B., K.B.E., C.M.G.<br />
| align= center | 25 March, 1865<br />
| align= center | 20 April, 1940<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 30 June, 1924<br />
| align= center | 21 February, 1919<br />
| align= center | 24 October, 1914<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 10 March, 1925<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Robert John Prendergast]], K.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 9 July, 1864<br />
| align= center | 14 May, 1946<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 31 July, 1924 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 31 July, 1919<br />
| align= center | 2 November, 1914<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1919<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Norman Craig Palmer]], C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 20 August, 1866<br />
| align= center | 12 January, 1926<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 31 July, 1924 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1919<br />
| align= center | 18 December, 1914<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 2 August, 1919<br />
|-valign="top"<br />
! colspan="11" align=left | Officers promoted to Flag Rank in 1915<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Cecil Frederick Dampier]], C.M.G.<br />
| align= center | 11 May, 1868<br />
| align= center | 11 April, 1950<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 31 July, 1924 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 2 August, 1919<br />
| align= center | 18 February, 1915<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 July, 1922<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Osmond de Beauvoir Brock]], G.C.B., K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., D.C.L. (O<small>XON</small>)<br />
| align= center | 5 January, 1869<br />
| align= center | 14 October, 1947<br />
| align= center | 31 July, 1929<br />
| align= center | 31 July, 1924<br />
| align= center | 3 October, 1919<br />
| align= center | 5 March, 1915<br />
| align= left | Admiral of the Fleet<br />
| align= center | 31 July, 1934<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Hubert Grant-Dalton]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 21 July, 1862<br />
| align= center | 22 April, 1934<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1924 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 November, 1919 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 11 April, 1915<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 2 June, 1915<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Alfred Ernest Albert Grant]], J.P.<br />
| align= center | 10 April, 1861<br />
| align= center | 14 August, 1933<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1924 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 November, 1919<br />
| align= center | 26 May, 1915<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 2 November, 1919<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Cyril Everard Tower]], D.S.O.<br />
| align= center | 3 December, 1861<br />
| align= center | 20 January, 1929<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1924 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 2 November, 1919 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 2 June, 1915<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 19 June, 1915<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Joseph Ridgway Bridson]]<br />
| align= center | 13 August, 1861<br />
| align= center | 3 September, 1933<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1924 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 2 November, 1919 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 19 June, 1915<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 29 June, 1915<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Edmund Hyde Smith]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 21 June, 1865<br />
| align= center | 13 July, 1939<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1924 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 2 November, 1919<br />
| align= center | 29 June, 1915<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 3 November, 1919<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Ernest Gillbe Barton]]<br />
| align= center | 20 October, 1861<br />
| align= center | 29 January, 1938<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1924 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 3 November, 1919 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 15 July, 1915<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 16 July, 1915<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Robert Hamilton Anstruther]], C.M.G.<br />
| align= center | 10 June, 1862<br />
| align= center | 26 September, 1938<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1924 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 3 November, 1919 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 16 July, 1915<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 17 July, 1915<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Bentinck John Davies Yelverton]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 28 October, 1862<br />
| align= center | 7 January, 1959<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1924 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 3 November, 1919 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 17 July, 1915<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 18 July, 1915<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Henry James Langford Clarke]]<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1866<br />
| align= center | 28 March, 1944<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1924 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 3 November, 1919 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 18 July, 1915<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 19 July, 1915<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Arthur Hayes-Sadler]], C.S.I.<br />
| align= center | 9 October, 1863<br />
| align= center | 9 February, 1952<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1924 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 3 November, 1919<br />
| align= center | 19 July, 1915<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 17 February, 1920<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Richard Fortescue Phillimore]], G.C.B., K.C.M.G., M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 23 December, 1864<br />
| align= center | 8 November, 1940<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1924<br />
| align= center | 24 January, 1920<br />
| align= center | 9 August, 1915<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 6 October, 1929<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Charles Lionel Vaughan-Lee]], K.B.E., C.B.<br />
| align= center | 27 February, 1867<br />
| align= center | 16 March, 1928<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 10 March, 1925 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 26 January, 1920<br />
| align= center | 12 August, 1915<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 27 January, 1920<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{HON}} [[Edward Stafford Fitzherbert, Thirteenth Baron Stafford|Edward Stafford Fitzherbert]], K.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 17 April, 1865<br />
| align= center | 28 September, 1941<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 17 March, 1925 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 27 January, 1920<br />
| align= center | 24 October, 1915<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 24 March, 1923<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[George Walter Smith]]<br />
| align= center | 13 June, 1865<br />
| align= center | 22 February, 1919<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 4 November, 1915<br />
| align= left | Rear-Admiral<br />
| align= center | 11 January, 1916<br />
|-valign="top"<br />
! colspan="11" align=left | Officers promoted to Flag Rank in 1916<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Douglas Romilly Lothian Nicholson]], K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 4 March, 1867<br />
| align= center | 8 February, 1946<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 10 March, 1925<br />
| align= center | 29 January, 1920<br />
| align= center | 10 January, 1916<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 1 March, 1926<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Cecil Spencer Hickley]], C.B., M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 22 January, 1865<br />
| align= center | 1 May, 1941<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 8 May, 1925 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 17 February, 1920<br />
| align= center | 11 January, 1916<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 18 February, 1920<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Arthur John Henniker-Hughan, Sixth Baronet|Arthur John Henniker-Hughan]], Bart., C.B.<br />
| align= center | 24 January, 1866<br />
| align= center | 4 October, 1925<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 8 May, 1925 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 18 February, 1920<br />
| align= center | 25 January, 1916<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 19 February, 1920<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Thomas Dawson Lees Sheppard]], K.B.E., C.B., M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 7 April, 1866<br />
| align= center | 24 February, 1953<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 8 May, 1925 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 19 February, 1920<br />
| align= center | 15 February, 1916<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 May, 1922<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Francis William Kennedy]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 15 December, 1862<br />
| align= center | 11 July, 1939<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 8 May, 1925 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 24 March, 1920<br />
| align= center | 1 June, 1916<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 25 March, 1920<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Rowland Nugent]]<br />
| align= center | 22 December, 1861<br />
| align= center | 25 March, 1948<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 8 May, 1925 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 25 March, 1920 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 June, 1916<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 2 June, 1916<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Hugh Thomas Hibbert]], C.B.E., D.S.O.<br />
| align= center | 5 August, 1863<br />
| align= center | 30 April, 1951<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 8 May, 1925 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 25 March, 1920 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 2 June, 1916<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 3 June, 1916<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Herbert Arthur Stevenson Fyler]], C.B., D.S.O.<br />
| align= center | 7 January, 1864<br />
| align= center | 19 July, 1934<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 8 May, 1920 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 25 March, 1920 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 3 June, 1916<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 4 June, 1916<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Heathcoat Salusbury Grant]], K.C.M.G., C.B. (''Acting Vice-Admiral'' 27 September, 1918)<br />
| align= center | 13 February, 1864<br />
| align= center | 25 September, 1938<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 8 May, 1925 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 25 March, 1920<br />
| align= center | 4 June, 1916<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 26 March, 1920<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Thomas Jackson]], K.B.E., C.B., M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 20 February, 1868<br />
| align= center | 7 July, 1945<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 8 May, 1925 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 26 March, 1920<br />
| align= center | 9 June, 1916<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 7 October, 1923<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Philip Nelson-Ward]], C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 29 June, 1866<br />
| align= center | 27 June, 1937<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 8 May, 1925 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 31 July, 1920 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 9 June, 1916<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 10 June, 1916<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Frank Edward Cavendish Ryan]], C.B.E.<br />
| align= center | 6 August, 1865<br />
| align= center | 15 February, 1945<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 8 May, 1925 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 31 July, 1920 ('"Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 9 June, 1916<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 10 June, 1916<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Michael Culme-Seymour, Fourth Baronet|Michael Culme Seymour, Bart.]], K.C.B., M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 29 August, 1867<br />
| align= center | 2 April, 1925<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 7 October, 1920<br />
| align= center | 10 June, 1916<br />
| align= left | Vice-Admiral<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[William Edmund Goodenough]], G.C.B., M.V.O., F.R.S.<br />
| align= center | 2 June, 1867<br />
| align= center | 30 January, 1945<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 8 May, 1925<br />
| align= center | 31 July, 1920<br />
| align= center | 10 June, 1916<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 23 May, 1930<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[William Coldingham Masters Nicholson]], K.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 28 October, 1863<br />
| align= center | 9 January, 1932<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 July, 1925<br />
| align= center | 24 November, 1920<br />
| align= center | 10 June, 1916<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 14 October, 1925<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Herbert Charles Campbell Da Costa]]<br />
| align= center | 18 April, 1865<br />
| align= center | 29 December, 1940<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 24 November, 1925 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 25 November, 1920 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 14 June, 1916<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 15 June, 1916<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Ernest Humbert Grafton]]<br />
| align= center | 4 August, 1864<br />
| align= center | 18 August, 1924<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 25 November, 1920 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 15 June, 1916<br />
| align= left | Vice-Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 16 June, 1916<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[John Franklin Parry]], K.C.B., F.R.G.S.<br />
| align= center | 15 August, 1863<br />
| align= center | 21 April, 1926<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 24 November, 1925 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 25 November, 1920 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 16 June, 1916<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 September, 1919<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Laurence Eliot Power]], K.C.B., C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 7 May, 1867<br />
| align= center | 20 January, 1927<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 24 November, 1925 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 25 November, 1920<br />
| align= center | 6 December, 1916<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 26 November, 1920<br />
|-valign="top"<br />
! colspan="11" align=left | Officers promoted to Flag Rank in 1917<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[John Scott Luard]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 26 June, 1865<br />
| align= center | 5 March, 1936<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 24 November, 1925 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 26 November, 1920 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 2 April, 1917<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 3 April, 1917<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[George Price Webley Hope]], K.C.B., K.C.M.G.<br />
| align= center | 11 October, 1869<br />
| align= center | 11 July, 1959<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 24 November, 1925<br />
| align= center | 26 November, 1920<br />
| align= center | 3 April, 1917<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 1 March, 1926<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Cuthbert Edward Hunter]]<br />
| align= center | 10 March, 1866<br />
| align= center | 30 April, 1952<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 24 November, 1925 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 26 November, 1920 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 3 April, 1917<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 17 April, 1917<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{RIGHTHON}} [[Roger John Brownlow Keyes, First Baron Keyes]], G.C.B., K.C.V.O., C.M.G., D.S.O.<br />
| align= center | 4 October, 1872<br />
| align= center | 26 December, 1945<br />
| align= center | 8 May, 1930<br />
| align= center | 1 March, 1926<br />
| align= center | 16 May, 1921<br />
| align= center | 10 April, 1917<br />
| align= left | Admiral of the Fleet<br />
| align= center | 8 May, 1935<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Cecil Foley Lambert]], K.C.B.<br />
| align= center | 28 May, 1864<br />
| align= center | 29 February, 1928<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 March, 1926 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 15 June, 1921<br />
| align= center | 13 April, 1917<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 5 December, 1921<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Hugh Henry Darby Tothill]], K.C.B., K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 14 March, 1865<br />
| align= center | 25 September, 1927<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 March, 1926<br />
| align= center | 15 June, 1921<br />
| align= center | 17 April, 1917<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 25 October, 1926<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Edwyn Sinclair Alexander-Sinclair, Twelfth Laird of Freswick]], G.C.B., M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 12 December, 1865<br />
| align= center | 13 November, 1945<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 4 October, 1926<br />
| align= center | 4 April, 1922<br />
| align= center | 26 April, 1917<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 12 December, 1930<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Herbert Chatterton]]<br />
| align= center | 22 June, 1863<br />
| align= center | 19 November, 1932<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 25 October, 1926 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 6 April, 1922 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 26 April, 1917<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 27 April, 1917<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Stuart St. John Farquhar]]<br />
| align= center | 2 October, 1865<br />
| align= center | 8 February, 1941<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 25 October, 1926 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 6 April, 1922 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 26 April, 1917<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 27 April, 1917<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Lionel Halsey]], G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., K.C.I.E., C.B.<br />
| align= center | 26 February, 1872<br />
| align= center | 26 October, 1949<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 4 October, 1926 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 5 July, 1921<br />
| align= center | 26 April, 1917<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 November, 1922<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{HON}} [[Stanhope Hawke]]<br />
| align= center | 12 April or 16 April, 1863<br />
| align= center | 1 February, 1936<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 25 October, 1926 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 6 April, 1922 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 26 April, 1917<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 27 April, 1917<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Herbert James Ogilvy Millar]]<br />
| align= center | 3 February, 1866<br />
| align= center | 6 June, 1934<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 25 October, 1926 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 6 April, 1922 ('"Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 26 April, 1917<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 27 April, 1917<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Edward Herbert Moubray]]<br />
| align= center | 22 January, 1865<br />
| align= center | 9 March, 1929<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 25 October, 1926 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 6 April, 1922 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 26 April, 1917<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 27 April, 1917<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{HONSIR}} [[Victor Albert Stanley]], K.C.B., M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 17 January, 1867<br />
| align= center | 9 June, 1934<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 2 March, 1926<br />
| align= center | 1 July, 1921<br />
| align= center | 26 April, 1917<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 8 November, 1926<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Drury St. Aubyn Wake]], K.C.I.E., C.B.<br />
| align= center | 16 September, 1863<br />
| align= center | 23 September, 1935<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 25 October, 1926 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 6 April, 1922 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 26 April, 1917<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 27 April, 1917<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Henry Harvey Bruce]], K.C.B., M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 8 May, 1862<br />
| align= center | 14 September, 1948<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 8 November, 1926 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 May, 1922<br />
| align= center | 27 April, 1917<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 2 May, 1922<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Bertram Mordaunt Chambers]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 3 October, 1866<br />
| align= center | 27 April, 1945<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 8 November, 1926 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 May, 1922 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 27 April, 1917<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 28 April, 1917<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[James Andrew Fergusson]], K.C.B., K.C.M.G.<br />
| align= center | 16 April, 1871<br />
| align= center | 13 April, 1942<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 25 October, 1926<br />
| align= center | 6 April, 1922<br />
| align= center | 27 April, 1917<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 11 June, 1928<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Clement Greatorex]], C.B., M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 7 January, 1869<br />
| align= center | 20 March, 1937<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 8 November, 1926 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 2 May, 1922<br />
| align= center | 27 April, 1917<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 3 May, 1922<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[William Reginald Hall]], K.C.M.G., C.B.<br />
| align= center | 28 June, 1870<br />
| align= center | 22 October, 1943<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 8 November, 1926 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 May, 1922 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 27 April, 1917<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 3 February, 1919<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Thomas Webster Kemp]], C.B., C.M.G., C.I.E.<br />
| align= center | 27 September, 1866<br />
| align= center | 13 January, 1928<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 8 November, 1926 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 May, 1922 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 27 April, 1917<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 28 April, 1917<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[George Cuthbert Cayley]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 30 August, 1866<br />
| align= center | 21 December, 1944<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 8 November, 1926 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 3 May, 1922 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 28 April, 1917<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 18 July, 1919<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Allan Frederic Everett]], K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., C.B.<br />
| align= center | 22 February, 1868<br />
| align= center | 22 January, 1938<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 8 November, 1926 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 3 May, 1922<br />
| align= center | 28 April, 1917<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 12 August, 1925<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Henry Bertram Pelly]], K.C.V.O., C.B.<br />
| align= center | 9 September, 1867<br />
| align= center | 27 December, 1942<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 8 November, 1926 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 3 May, 1922<br />
| align= center | 17 May, 1917<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 18 January, 1925<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[John Nicholas]]<br />
| align= center | 17 March, 1865<br />
| align= center | 23 June, 1942<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 8 November, 1926 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 June, 1922 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 2 July, 1917<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 3 July, 1917<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Allen Thomas Hunt]], K.C.B., C.S.I.<br />
| align= center | 14 February, 1866<br />
| align= center | 24 February, 1943<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 8 November, 1926 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 June, 1922<br />
| align= center | 3 July, 1917<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 19 July, 1924<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Lewis Clinton-Baker]], K.C.B., K.C.V.O., C.B.E.<br />
| align= center | 16 March, 1866<br />
| align= center | 12 December, 1939<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 8 November, 1926<br />
| align= center | 1 July, 1922<br />
| align= center | 19 August, 1917<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1927<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[John Frederick Ernest Green]], K.C.M.G., C.B.<br />
| align= center | 8 August, 1866<br />
| align= center | 30 October, 1948<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1927 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 November, 1922<br />
| align= center | 1 September, 1917<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1925<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{RIGHTHON}} [[Richard Morden Harbord-Hamond, Tenth Baron Suffield]]<br />
| align= center | 24 August, 1865<br />
| align= center | 2 February, 1951<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1927 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 15 November, 1922 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 19 September, 1917<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 20 September, 1917<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Vivian Henry Gerald Bernard]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 30 August, 1868<br />
| align= center | 17 February, 1934<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1927 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 15 November, 1922<br />
| align= center | 20 September, 1917<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 16 November, 1922<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Charles Frederick Thorp]], C.B.E.<br />
| align= center | 3 June, 1869<br />
| align= center | 31 October, 1954<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1927 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 16 November, 1922 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 27 September, 1917<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 28 September, 1917<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Edward Francis Bruen]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 7 November, 1866<br />
| align= center | 22 November, 1952<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1927 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 16 November, 1922<br />
| align= center | 28 September, 1917<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 October, 1924<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[James Clement Ley]], C.B., C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 25 July, 1869<br />
| align= center | 15 July, 1946<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1927 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 24 March, 1923<br />
| align= center | 5 October, 1917<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 25 March, 1923<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Edmond Hyde Parker]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 30 January, 1868<br />
| align= center | 19 August, 1951<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1927 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 25 March, 1923<br />
| align= center | 23 October, 1917<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 26 March, 1923<br />
|-valign="top"<br />
! colspan="11" align=left | Officers promoted to Flag Rank in 1918<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[William George Elmhirst Ruck-Keene]], M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 30 January, 1867<br />
| align= center | 30 January, 1935<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1927 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 7 October, 1923 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1918<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 17 February, 1920<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Edward Montgomery Phillpotts]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1871<br />
| align= center | 9 April, 1952<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1927 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 7 October, 1923<br />
| align= center | 15 January, 1918<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 8 October, 1923<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Cunningham Robert de Clare Foot]], C.B.E.<br />
| align= center | 13 June, 1864<br />
| align= center | 17 May, 1940<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1927 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 8 October, 1923 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 30 January, 1918<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 31 January, 1918<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Algernon Walker-Heneage-Vivian|Algernon Walker Heneage]], C.B., M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 4 February, 1871<br />
| align= center | 26 February, 1952<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1927 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 8 October, 1923 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 31 January, 1918<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 29 July, 1920<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Frederick Charles Learmonth]], K.B.E., C.B.<br />
| align= center | 14 January, 1866<br />
| align= center | 3 June, 1941<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1927 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 8 October, 1923 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 11 March, 1918<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 8 March, 1921<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Robert Edmund Ross Benson]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 23 April or 25 April, 1864<br />
| align= center | 3 February, 1927<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 8 October, 1923 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 26 April, 1918<br />
| align= left | Vice-Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 27 April, 1918<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Philip Howard Colomb]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 13 December, 1867<br />
| align= center | 18 April, 1958<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1927 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 8 October, 1923<br />
| align= center | 27 April, 1918<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 14 October, 1923<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[George Holmes Borrett]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 10 March, 1868<br />
| align= center | 10 June, 1952<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1927 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 14 October, 1923<br />
| align= center | 16 August, 1918<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 17 February, 1925<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Charles Ferdinand Henderson]]<br />
| align= center | 7 March, 1866<br />
| align= center | 15 July, 1935<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1927 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 November, 1923 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 25 August, 1918<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 26 August, 1918<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Brian Herbert Fairbairn Barttelot]], K.B.E., C.B., C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 13 December, 1867<br />
| align= center | 4 February, 1942<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1927 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 November, 1923<br />
| align= center | 26 August, 1918<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 2 November, 1923<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Marcus Rowley Hill]], C.B.E.<br />
| align= center | 13 March, 1867<br />
| align= center | 8 February, 1825<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 2 November, 1923 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 September, 1918<br />
| align= left | Vice-Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 2 September, 1918<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Henry George Glas Sandeman]], C.M.G.<br />
| align= center | 18 June, 1868<br />
| align= center | 16 May, 1928<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 September, 1918<br />
| align= left | Rear-Admiral<br />
| align= center | 2 September, 1918<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Walter Henry Cowan, First Baronet]], K.C.B., D.S.O.*, M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 11 June, 1871<br />
| align= center | 14 February, 1956<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1927<br />
| align= center | 2 November, 1923<br />
| align= center | 2 September, 1918<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 6 October, 1931<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Philip Wylie Dumas]], C.B., C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 9 March, 1868<br />
| align= center | 11 December, 1948<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 21 January, 1928 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 30 June, 1924 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 2 September, 1918<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 3 September, 1918<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Richard Webb]], K.C.M.G., C.B.<br />
| align= center | 20 July, 1870<br />
| align= center | 20 January, 1950<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 21 January, 1928<br />
| align= center | 30 June, 1924<br />
| align= center | 3 September, 1918<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 27 February, 1929<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Charles William Keighly-Peach]], D.S.O.<br />
| align= center | 23 September, 1865<br />
| align= center | 27 November, 1943<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 22 February, 1928 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 19 July, 1924 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 October, 1918<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 2 October, 1918<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Maurice Woollcombe]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 18 April, 1868<br />
| align= center | 19 December, 1930<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 22 February, 1928 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 19 July, 1924 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 2 October, 1918<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 25 March, 1922<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Guy Reginald Archer Gaunt]], K.C.M.G., C.B.<br />
| align= center | 25 May, 1869<br />
| align= center | 19 May, 1953<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 22 February, 1928 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 19 July, 1924 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 26 October, 1918<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 27 October, 1918<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[George Bowes Hutton]]<br />
| align= center | 22 May, 1867<br />
| align= center | 15 January, 1947<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 22 February, 1928 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 19 July, 1924 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 27 October, 1918<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 28 October, 1918<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Edward Buxton Kiddle]], K.B.E., C.B.<br />
| align= center | 2 November, 1866<br />
| align= center | 29 April, 1933<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 22 February, 1928 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 19 July, 1924<br />
| align= center | 28 October, 1918<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1924<br />
|-valign="top"<br />
! colspan="11" align=left | Officers promoted to Flag Rank in 1919<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Cole Cortlandt Fowler]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 7 August, 1866<br />
| align= center | 24 May, 1936<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 22 February, 1928 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 31 July, 1924 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1919<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 9 April, 1922<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Charles Frederick Corbett]], C.B., M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 21 November, 1867<br />
| align= center | 29 January, 1955<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 22 February, 1928 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 31 July, 1924 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1919<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 14 October, 1922<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[William Firth Slayter]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 22 January, 1867<br />
| align= center | 15 May, 1936<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 22 February, 1928 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 31 July, 1924 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1919<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 April, 1921<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Frederick Dundas Gilpin-Brown]], C.B.E.<br />
| align= center | 12 April, 1866<br />
| align= center | 9 February, 1934<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 22 February, 1928 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 31 July, 1924 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 2 January, 1919<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 3 January, 1919<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Rudolf Walter Bentinck]], K.C.B., K.C.M.G.<br />
| align= center | 20 March, 1869<br />
| align= center | 31 March, 1947<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 22 February, 1928<br />
| align= center | 31 July, 1924<br />
| align= center | 3 January, 1919<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 9 October, 1929<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{HONSIR}} [[Algernon Douglas Edward Harry Boyle]], K.C.B., C.M.G., M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 21 October, 1871<br />
| align= center | 13 October, 1949<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 5 April, 1928 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1924<br />
| align= center | 9 January, 1919<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 September, 1924<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Edmund Percy Fenwick George Grant]], K.C.V.O., C.B.<br />
| align= center | 23 September, 1867<br />
| align= center | 8 September, 1952<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 5 April, 1928 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1924<br />
| align= center | 17 January, 1919<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 14 January, 1928<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Frederick Laurence Field]], G.C.B., K.C.M.G.<br />
| align= center | 19 April, 1871<br />
| align= center | 24 October, 1945<br />
| align= center | 21 January, 1933<br />
| align= center | 5 April, 1928<br />
| align= center | 26 September, 1924<br />
| align= center | 11 February, 1919<br />
| align= left | Admiral of the Fleet<br />
| align= center | 21 January, 1938<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{HONSIR}} [[Hubert George Brand]], G.C.B., K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 20 May, 1870<br />
| align= center | 14 December, 1955<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 11 June, 1928<br />
| align= center | 1 October, 1924<br />
| align= center | 12 February, 1919<br />
| align= left | Admiral<br />
| align= center | 12 October, 1932<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Henry Blackett]], C.B.E.<br />
| align= center | 28 November, 1867<br />
| align= center | 1 December, 1952<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 27 February, 1929 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1925 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 21 February, 1919<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 22 February, 1919<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Henry William Grant]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 24 January, 1870<br />
| align= center | 15 April, 1949<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 27 February, 1929 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1925 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 22 February, 1919<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 23 February, 1919<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Charles Martin-de-Bartolomé]], K.C.M.G., C.B.<br />
| align= center | 26 November, 1871<br />
| align= center | 27 May, 1941<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 27 February, 1929 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1925 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 23 February, 1919<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 15 August, 1919<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Sydney Stewart Hall]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 16 June, 1872<br />
| align= center | 10 January, 1955<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 27 February, 1929 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1925 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 18 July, 1919<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 16 September, 1919<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[John Edmund Drummond]]<br />
| align= center | 5 July, 1873<br />
| align= center | 15 November, 1926<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1925 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 31 July, 1919<br />
| align= left | Vice-Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1919<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Henry Boyle Townshend Somerville]], C.M.G.<br />
| align= center | 7 September, 1863<br />
| align= center | 24 March, 1936<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1925 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 August, 1919<br />
| align= left | Vice-Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 2 August, 1919<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[James Charles Tancred]]<br />
| align= center | 17 September, 1864<br />
| align= center | 9 December, 1943<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1925 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 2 August, 1919<br />
| align= left | Vice-Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 3 August, 1919<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Douglas Lionel Dent]], C.B., C.M.G.<br />
| align= center | 7 August, 1869<br />
| align= center | 11 July, 1959<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 27 February, 1929 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 1 January, 1925<br />
| align= center | 3 August, 1919<br />
| align= left | Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 6 August, 1926<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Warren Hastings D'Oyly]]<br />
| align= center | 3 August, 1867<br />
| align= center | 22 March, 1950<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 18 January, 1925<br />
| align= center | 1 September, 1919<br />
| align= left | Vice-Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 2 September, 1919<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[William John Standly Alderson]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 10 June, 1867<br />
| align= center | 30 May, 1946<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 18 January, 1925 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 16 September, 1919<br />
| align= left | Vice-Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 12 December, 1923<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Mortimer L'Estrange Silver]], C.B.E.<br />
| align= center | 7 August, 1869<br />
| align= center | 6 December, 1946<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 18 January, 1925 (''Retired'') <br />
| align= center | 3 October, 1919<br />
| align= left | Vice-Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 4 October, 1919<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Edward Henry Fitzhardinge Heaton-Ellis]], K.B.E., C.B., M.V.O.<br />
| align= center | 19 November, 1868<br />
| align= center | 23 February, 1943<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 18 January, 1925 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 4 October, 1919<br />
| align= left | Vice-Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 2 December, 1919<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Henry Montagu Doughty]], C.B., C.M.G.<br />
| align= center | 4 September, 1870<br />
| align= center | 1 May, 1921<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 1 November, 1919<br />
| align= left | Rear-Admiral<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | [[Arthur William Craig Waller]], C.B.<br />
| align= center | 18 June, 1872<br />
| align= center | 21 February, 1943<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | &mdash;<br />
| align= center | 18 January, 1925 (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 3 November, 1919<br />
| align= left | Vice-Admiral (''Retired'')<br />
| align= center | 15 March, 1922<br />
|- valign="top"<br />
| align= left | {{SIR}} [[Reginald Yorke Tyrwhitt, First Baronet]], G.C.B., D.S.O.<br />
| align= center | 10 May, 1870<br />
| align= center | 30 May, 1951<br />
| align= center | 31 July, 1934<br />
| align= center | 27 February, 1929<br />
| align= center | 18 January, 1925<br />
| align= center | 2 December, 1919<br />
| align= left | Admiral of the Fleet<br />
| align= center | 31 July, 1939<br />
|}<br />
<br />
[[Category:Featured Articles]]</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Attach%C3%A9_Report_on_the_Battle_of_Jutland&diff=334741Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland2024-03-11T10:32:57Z<p>Simon Harley: /* Bibliography */</p>
<hr />
<div>Soon after the [[Battle of Jutland]] on 31 May &ndash; 1 June 1916 the Naval Attaché of the [[Austro-Hungarian Navy|Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Navy]] at the embassy in Berlin, ''Fregattenkapitäne'' Hieronymus Graf von Colloredo-Mannsfeld,<ref>''Schematismus für das K.u.K. Heer und für die Kriegsmarine für 1914''. p. 1270. ''Almanach für die k. und k. Kriegsmarine 1917''. p. 668.</ref> visited the High Sea Fleet. He composed a report on the battle for his superiors using first-hand accounts, interspersed here and there with his own observations. The version reproduced here is a translation in English apparently made by the [[Naval Intelligence Division (Royal Navy)|Naval Intelligence Division]] in 1919 from a copy which was subsequently returned to "F.N.A.", presumably the French Naval Attaché. A copy of the translation then made its way into the papers of the British Cabinet, from where historian Arthur J. Marder obtained a copy which is in his papers.<ref>Original number N.I.D. 087/19. Marder papers, Special Collections and Archives, Langson Library, University of California, Irvine, MS-F002, Box 27.</ref> He does not appear to have used it for the 1966 edition of ''From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow'', Volume III, but certainly used it for the revised edition in 1978.<ref>The quote on p. 189 of the 1966 edition differs from that on p. 234 of the 1978 edition, which is identical to that used here.</ref> <br />
<br />
It is worth comparing this translation with that made by Hungarian historian Mihály Krámli of a post-war copy of a slightly different version of the report in a Hungarian archive which has been published on the ''NavWeaps'' online resource.<ref>Krámli, Mihály. [http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-124.pdf "The Report on the Battle of Jutland by the Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché in Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Colloredo-Mannsfeld."] ''NavWeaps''.</ref><br />
<br />
The original grammar and punctuation of the typescript has been reproduced here wherever possible.<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
From:- Austrian Naval Attache in Berlin.<br />
<br />
To:- Commander-in-Chief, Pola.<br />
<div style="float:right;">Berlin,<br>17 June, 1916.</div><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<center><u>NAVAL ENGAGEMENT OF 31 MAY 1916.</u></center><br />
<br />
The following is a report of the naval proceedings of 31 May - 1 June, 1916, and also of the damage sustained by the German Fleet.<br />
<br />
During my 3-days' visit to Wilhelmshaven, followed by a cursory examination of the "MARKGRAF" and "KURFURST" at Hamburg, I endeavoured to gain merely a general idea of the results of gunfire and concentrated my attention on the course of the action itself.<br />
Admiral Scheer, whom I only saw for a short time as he left for Kiel to attend the funeral of his borther-in-law [sic], Lieut.-Commander Mohr, who was killed in the action, very kindly arranged that his Chief of Staff, Captain Trotha, should give me an account of the whole proceedings, illustrated by plans, and that I should be furnished with all information. I have tried to fill in the gaps by conversations with officers whom I know; this has resulted in some contradictory statements, and several points remain obscure, the accounts from the various ships not having all come in.<br />
<br />
Many episodes will therefore be explained later and may appear in a different light, but, as regards the broad outlines which are of chief importance, the picture of this interesting engagement is fairly clear. The accompanying plan of the action was made in haste for the Kaiser and will therefore need much correction.<br />
<br />
The spirit pervading the Fleet can only be described as one of enthusiasm; they are intoxicated with victory. The heavy load weighing on them all, the dear that this war might end without an encounter of the Fleets, have vanished. They have learnt what fighting really means, they know themselves to be superior to the enemy as regards tactics, and that they were following the right lines and have nothing to unlearn; they know that their gunfire was more effective than that of the enemy, and that they can rely implicitly on their flotillas which have always been looked upon in the German Navy as one of the chief factors in an action. Finally they know that their largest ships can stand heavy fire and serious damage, that they leave nothing to be desired as regards construction and cannot be sunk easily. In short, they feel that the British, in spite of all their boasting, cannot overcome the German Fleet and have a considerable respect for it.<br />
<br />
This conviction imbues the whole Fleet, down to the last man, with confidence in their strength and a calm assurance regarding future encounters. At the same time they are free from over-confidence and from under-estimation of the enemy. On the contrary, the British fire-control and the enormous piercing power of their heavy shell at great distances have roused their admiration, so that a careless conception of the situation is not to be feared, the less so, as well-balanced minds such as those of Admiral Scheer and his Staff are unlikely to be led away by former successes to undertake rash enterprises in the future.<br />
<br />
They do not deny that they were extraordinarily fortunate, and that if the action had been prosecuted with energy on the British side, and if the "Nelson touch" had been in evidence, things might have gone very badly for Germany, especially as the British still had an intact Battle Squadron of 12 units at their disposal which had not yet taken part in the action. But they console themselves with the knowledge that no naval action was ever won without some stroke of luck.<br />
<br />
The Kaiser's visit, the day before my arrival, and his address to the Fleet gave great satisfaction, and subsequently many important personages arrive to inspect the ships, such as Prince Henry and the Grand Dukes of Mecklenburg and Oldenburg, and numbers of decorations were distributed. Vice-Admiral Scheer was promoted to Admiral, and he and Vice-Admiral Hipper received the Pour le Merite.<br />
<br />
I also visited Rear-Admiral Behncke, who was wounded and in hospital; his wounds are slight, a few small splinters in his head, elbow and knee, and he will probably soon be well again.<br />
<br />
<center><u>COURSE OF THE ACTION.</u></center><br />
<br />
The Commander-in-Chief intended to advance with the whole Fleet to the waters of the Skagerrak, in order to make his presence felt unpleasantly by disturbing the shipping, hoping thereby to lure on the British forces and in this manner to be in a position to attack a part of the British Fleet with superior or at least with equal forces. He reckoned that any movements of the British Fleet would be reported to him in good time by the submarines which had been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and he hoped that the airships would prove a better means of reconnoitring than any possessed by the enemy.<br />
<br />
Unfavourable weather prevented him for a considerable period from undertaking any operations, and, as the submarines were to return home on 1 June and be relieved by a new group, the 31 May was the last date for carrying out the planned advance.<br />
<br />
The cruisers left the Jade at 3 a.m., the Main Fleet at 4 a.m., steering an easterly course, and then, after passing Heligoland, a N.N.W'ly course. No reports were received from submarines. These were stationed chiefly off the Orkneys and the Firth of Forth, and the large group of Flanders boats were off the Thames and at the entrance to the Channel. <br />
<br />
While proceeding northwards, a few W/T messages were received, but they were corrupt, appeared to refer only to small formations and gave no clue to the movements of the Grand Fleet. The airships were unable to start in the morning, on account of the wind, and, as it blew hard throughout the day in the Heligoland Bight, they could not start until the early hours of 1 June. In this respect things did not go well, but Admiral Scheer decided nevertheless to continue on his course to the Skagerrak. <br />
<br />
This the account given by Captain von Trotha, who affirms that nothing was known of the presence of the British Fleet in the waters of the Skagerrak, and that there seemed no probability of encountering this Fleet before 1 June.<br />
<br />
There are some points here which I am unable to understand. The submarines are said to have been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and were to return home on 1 June to be relieved probably by a weaker group. For, If the same number of boats were to to keep watch off the English coast, why should 31 May have been the last day for the German Fleet to sail. The day of departure was, therefore, too late in any case, for, if no encounter was to be expected before 1 June, the boats stationed off the coast could not possibly encounter the damaged British ships, as was intended, for probably no damaged ships would be there before 2 June.<br />
<br />
The battleship "KONIG ALBERT" had to carry out repairs to her condensers and did not proceed with the Fleet. Von Trotha told me that there was no alternative and that a ship must carry out small overhauls regularly in a dockyard according to programme. But could it not be arranged, when one is taking the initiative, to choose one's moment for an advance and to have all the ships together for this short time? And why should just that moment be chosen when one of the most powerful ships of the "Kaiser" class is in the dockyard, instead, for instance, of one of the "Nassau" class with 11-in. guns.<br />
<br />
In addition, the "BAYERN" was to have joined up a few days later. After having waited so long, why should not the plan have been postponed for 2 or 3 weeks, instead of dispensing with the only ship carrying 15-in. guns.<br />
<br />
In the same manner they dispensed with air reconnaissance, from which they had expected so much.<br />
<br />
These considerations make me doubt whether the account given me is quite correct, and whether, on the contrary, they knew of certain movements of the British Fleet and considered the moment extremely favourable for an attack. Perhaps they only knew of Beatty's battle squadron, and thinking the Main Fleet was far away, hoped to entrap this squadron. In Berlin, they have much to say, even in military circles, about the British Fleet's intention to push through into the Baltic, and of Kitchener's mission having some connection with this. I consider this senseless, for it cannot be presemed [sic] that the British Fleet would leave their shores unprotected and do the Germans the favour of operating in the Baltic, which would certainly be a most advantageous area for the German Fleet. In any case, there appear to be discrepancies which will probably be explained at some later date.<br />
<br />
Scouting groups, battle cruisers and light cruisers, together with flotillas, preceded the Main Fleet by 50 - 60 miles. At 4 p.m. the light cruisers encountered some British battle cruisers. These at once opened fire on the light cruisers, at an estimated distance of 26,247 yds.; the range could be taken accurately. Though they did not obtain a hit, the salvoes fell so well that the German cruisers thought it advisable to turn away and fall back on their battle cruisers.<br />
<br />
As the British approached, these battle cruisers turned on to a southerly course, in order to lure the enemy on to the German Main Fleet. A running action, on a southerly course, ensued. The British were to starboard and to the west of the Germans, who had therefore the following advantage: in the North Sea, in summer, the western horizon is quite light and visibility towards the west is good, while towards the east, and in a still greater degree off the Jutland Coast, it is misty and visibility is bad and no silhouettes stand out against the eastern horizon. This phenomenon also played great part in the subsequent course of the action. The sun was still high and was not troublesome, and the British ships offered admirable targets. The sea was calm, the wind N.W. 1-2, altering subsequently through W. to S.W.<br />
<br />
The following British ships were recognised:-<br />
3 "Lion" class, 1 "Tiger" and 2 "Indefatigable" class; they were soon reinforced by 5 "Queen Elizabeth" class following astern.<br />
<br />
It is asserted that, judging from shell splinters, the ship of the "Tiger" class carried 15-in. guns, and that she was therefore the mysterious vessel which replaced the "TIGER" sunk on 24.1.15; as the last-named "TIGER" carried only 13.5-in.guns, this was taken as a further proof of her loss. The silhouette of the new "TIGER", however, is said to have resembled that of the old "TIGER" exactly. As the "Queen Elizabeths" soon opened fire also with 15-in. guns, I rather doubt this assertion regarding the "TIGER", and the various ships on this early part of the engagement are altogether somewhat at variance.<br />
<br />
On the German side the ships proceeded in the following sequence:- "LÜTZOW", Flagship of Vice-Admiral Hipper, "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN".<br />
<br />
As Hipper edged towards the enemy, the distance decreased to about 7655 yds. The German fire was unquestionably superior, but the speed of the British vessels was greater. After a short time the "INDEFATIGABLE" and "QUEEN MARY" blew up, and 2 battle-cruisers and two attacking destroyers were also accounted for. The "QUEEN MARY" must have been destroyed by the explosion of a magazine; she was torn in two halves, and a water-colour painted by an officer represents her enveloped in an enormous column of black smoke; she disappeared in a few seconds. Only one cadet was subsequently picked.<br />
<br />
The second battle cruiser disappeared under similar circumstances. The "VON DER TANN" claims to have accounted for one of these battle-cruisers by a broadside. But the "MOLTKE" fired 4 torpedoes and also claims this achievement.<br />
<br />
The Germans suffered very little during this phase of the action, the "MOLTKE" alone receiving hits on the starboard side. The fire of the British battle-cruisers is said not to have been nearly as good as that of the "QUEEN ELIZABETH" class later on.<br />
<br />
When they had approached the German Main Fleet, the British turned on to a contrary course and the German cruisers did the same. The German Main Fleet proceeded in divisions in starboard quarter-line, the 3rd Battle Squadron: 4 "König" class and 3 "Kaiser" class, Fleet Flagship, 1st Battle Squadron: 4 "Ostfriesland" class and 4 "Westfalen" class, and the 2nd Battle Squadron: 5 "Deutschland" class and the "Hessen". They endeavoured to effect a junction with the cruisers, but were unable to take part very effectually.<br />
<br />
The course of the action was now in a northerly direction, over the area which had just been traversed, and the British ships now drew ahead considerably and turned more and more towards the East; the Germans followed this movement, and in consequence the conditions of visibility became less and less favourable for them.<br />
<br />
The "Queen Elizabeths" now made their presence more greatly felt; one of them had dropped out, but I was unable to ascertain when this occurred.<br />
<br />
The course of the German Math Fleet at first led past the 2 disabled British destroyers, which were lying stopped. The crews had already taken to the boats and were picked up later on by German destroyers. As the Main Fleet was doubtful about the advisability of passing the destroyers while they were still afloat, they were sunk by a few broadsides. One of the officers who was picked up was in pyjamas and is said to have stayed in his cabin during the action. He declared "We did not expect so much resistance," while another said - "The battle is rather disappointing." It has been ascertained that these destroyers were greatly under-manned; their crews seemed very exhausted, which points to their having been in the water for a long time.<br />
<br />
While on this easterly course, the light cruisers of the fast 2nd Scouting Group: "FRANKFURT", "PILLAU", "ELBING" and "WIESBADEN", were heavily fired on from the N.E. and E. without their being able to see more than the gun flashes. In addition, they were under continual fire from the N., and while turning away to S.E. and S., they ascertained that they were opposed by an interminable line of British ships, which appeared at first to be on a N.W.'ly course, and had then evidently turned together on to a S.'ly course.<br />
<br />
It may be noted here that the battleships, and, generally speaking, the battle-cruisers also, never sighted the British Main Fleet, and saw nothing but the flashes of the guns and the effects of the fire. These British ships, about 25 in number, were only sighted by a few light cruisers and by the flotillas, and were counted by them as accurately as possible.<br />
<br />
Surrounded thus from the N. and the E. and under fire, the "WIESBADEN" was disabled, apparently by a hit in the engine-room. The Admiral noticed, it is true, that his leading ships must have encountered new and powerful forces and that they were turning away; but he thought it his duty to go to the assistance of the "WIESBADEN" and therefore continued on an easterly course.<br />
<br />
The van of the Main Fleet, led by the "KÖNIG" (Rear-Admiral Behncke) now came under heavy fire from right ahead; the "KÖNIG" turned away under this fire towards the S.E., whereupon the Commander-in-Chief ordered the whole line to "turn together" to starboard and gave up the idea of helping the "WIESBADEN". About this time Vice-Admiral Hipper transferred his flag from the "LÜTZOW" to the "MOLTKE" with the help of a destroyer, his W/T station being damaged.<br />
<br />
Hardly had the Main Fleet drawn away on a westerly course, before it was ascertained that the pressure was relaxing and the fire decreasing, and that the British were no longer pursuing so hotly. Scheer therefore ordered the ships to "turn together" back on to their former course, and made the signal 'R' = 'Engage the enemy'. This second advance may be termed the zenith of the action. Admiral Scheer gave his views on it approximately as follows:- "Those who make a study of this engagement will be very puzzled as to my object in advancing thus against the wall of British ships. The fact is that I had no particular object. I made the first advance because I had a feeling that I ought to endeavour to assist the "WIESBADEN" and because the situation ahead was quite obscure to me, for I saw nothing of the "LÜTZOW" and received no W/T reports. I soon saw, however, that the leading ships were coming under an overwhelming fire, and that I could not risk the Fleet on the "WIESBADEN'S" account. When I noticed that the British pressure had quite ceased and that the Fleet remained intact in my hands, I turned back, under the impression that the action could not end in this way and that I ought to seek contact with the enemy again."<br />
<br />
The situation during the first and second advances may serve as an example of what should not take place according to all the laws of tactics, for it could not have been worse; von Trotha said jokingly that, if an Admiral brought about such a situation at a war game or in manoeuvres, he would never be entrusted without another command. In the North, the "Queen Elizabeths", then the battle-cruisers, and from N.E. through E. to S.E., an endless line of battleships formed an arc round the German van and kept it under fire. Evidently it had fallen into the most perfect trap. In addition to this unfavourable tactical position, there was a further difficulty, namely that the German ships could be clearly distinguished while they themselves only saw the gun flashes, 4 or 5 to each salvo, but could find no target.<br />
<br />
The Gunnery Officer of the "MARKGRAF" told me that he could not fire at all during half-an-hour, and that they were at the mercy of the British broadsides. Critical though the position was, in theory, they think that experience justifies the conclusion that this 'crossing the T' is in reality not so disastrous at longer ranges; for, in spite of the enormous superiority of their fire, the British made comparatively few hits, the simple reason being that, when fire is thus concentrated on a few leading ships, there can be no question of improving the shooting by spotting.<br />
<br />
Given good tactical training and squadrons which work well together, it is always easy to retire rapidly from an unfavourable position and even possibly to reach an advantageous one.<br />
<br />
The small amount of damage sustained by the Main Fleet may be owing partly to the fact that the leading battle-cruisers drew the enemy's fire, thus relieving the battleships. Only the three leading ships, "KÖNIG", "GROSSER KURFÜRST" and "MARKGRAF" received several hits; while among all the other ships, the "KAISER", "HELGOLAND" and the "SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN" received one hit each, and the rest were not hit at all.<br />
<br />
Simultaneously with the battle-cruisers, which were ahead and pressing forward in quarter-line formation, the 6th and 9th Flotillas, left by the "REGENSBURG", also proceeded to a torpedo attack. Regarding this cruiser advance, the Commanding Officer of the "SEYDLITZ" told me that he was in such a position that he was able to avoid the British salvoes, for he altered course towards the point where each salvo fell and thus evaded the spotting correction.<br />
<br />
This torpedo attack was carried out with great determination and seems to have been completely successful, although nobody is able to state how many hits were obtained. The British ships overlapped somewhat and their line was almost unbroken, and, as about 100 torpedoes were fired, it is estimates that there must have been a considerable number of hits, some people affirm that there were 20, but I do not place much confidence in these figures and it is useless to trouble about them as nobody is certain.<br />
<br />
The boats were fired on by guns of all calibres, even the heaviest, but with little effect, only one boat being destroyed; two other boats had been sunk in an earlier attack during the cruiser action.<br />
<br />
The battle-cruisers were also attacked by British torpedoes, the "SEYDLITZ" being hit once. The "MOLTKE" was lucky, for, when close to the ship, one torpedo apparently had a gyro failure and ran parallel with her. The "LÜTZOW" was probably hit also.<br />
<br />
After the attack, the destroyers laid fog and a heavy smoke screen, which interposed between the Fleet; this benefitted not only the heavily-damaged "LÜTZOW" and "DERFFLINGER", whose nets had been shot away and were hanging down, but also the whole Fleet. It may also have made an impression on the British.<br />
<br />
The German Main Fleet and cruisers turned on a westerly course, fire having again entirely ceased; and the ships of the Main Fleet then turned gradually in succession and in inverse sequence from W. to S.W., subsequently steering towards Horns Reef.<br />
<br />
It is not known what the British did; all that is certain, is that they did not follow in pursuit and that nothing further was seen of their Main Fleet. It remained light until 11 p.m. (summer time), and it would not have been impossible, considering their superior speed, for them to have come within firing range. The Germans expected it too, and now have to content themselves with surmises about the British Commander-in-Chief's reasons for not doing so. It is probably that the unfavourable issue of the fleet part of the battle and the demoralising losses in ships took away any desire on Jellicoe's part for further fighting. His Fleet may have lost heavily and been severely shaken by the torpedo attack; and, as the Germans still had some intact flotillas at their disposal, he may have feared further strong torpedo attacks in the critical hours of twilight, for in the German Navy they say that Jellicoe fears their destroyers in particular.<br />
<br />
Nevertheless, the Germans were not under the impression of having shaken the British Fleet to the extent of obliging them to give up the struggle, and when the evening passed without further incident, they reckoned with certainty on encountering Jellicoe off Horns Reef at daybreak. They were the more astonished at his non-appearance when their air reconnaissance reported that on the morning of 1 June a squadron of 12 battle-ships was proceeding North from the southern part of North Sea and that it suddenly turned on to an opposite course and proceeded South.<br />
<br />
As it could not possibly have been the intention of the British Commander-in-Chief to let the German Fleet escape after having encountered it at last far from its base, and as he still had an intact battle-squadron at his disposal, one is compelled to take the view that he no longer felt strong enough for a second encounter; the achievement of the German Fleet must therefore be very highly thought of.<br />
<br />
During the night cruising following the action, numerous small episodes and minor engagements took place, of which no clear idea can be formed. <br />
<br />
In view of a possible fresh attack or of a possible pursuit on the part of the enemy, it was thought undesirable to leave the 2nd Battle Squadron either in the van or in the rear, it therefore took station to starboard and at first proceeded on an opening course from the other squadrons, and continued fairly independently during the night.<br />
<br />
The 1st Battle Squadron therefore led, with the "WESTFALEN" as guide, and it was followed by the 3rd Battle Squadron.<br />
<br />
After the action had been broken off, the 4 remaining battle cruisers were ahead to port, where they were suddenly again brought under heavy fire from the port side and from ahead, apparently by 3 or 4 battle cruisers. It is presumed that these were the remaining 3 or 4 older cruisers of the "Invincible" class, which Jellicoe probably always stationed ahead of the Main Fleet, for it would hardly have been possible for the "Lions", which were following in the rear in the British line, to have taken station ahead so quickly. The German battle cruisers, all severely damaged, did not feel able to withstand this fire and turned away to starboard, passing ahead of the Main Fleet and between it and the 2nd Battle Squadron, which proceeded quietly on their course and before which the mysterious ships retired, not to be sighted again.<br />
<br />
The battle-cruisers then gradually fell astern, and as they were making much water, and also owing to their differing speeds, they lost contact with the Main Fleet and with each other.<br />
<br />
The "LÜTZOW" had dropped out during the engagement and proceeded independently, accompanied by 4 destroyers. At first she was able to steam 14 knots, but her speed decreased rapidly and dropped finally to 4 knots. Her bows sank slowly, and when the whole forecastle was under water the Commanding Officer decided to leave the ship. The badly wounded were transferred carefully to the boats and the disembarkation was conducted in good order. A torpedo was then fired at the ship and this coup de grace sank her in deep water at about 1 o'clock, I believe.<br />
<br />
The "SEYDLITZ" was hardly in a better condition than the "LÜTZOW"; she also sank gradually by the bows till the water was almost level with the deck, and she had a heavy list to port, but she continued on her course. In the darkest hours of the night she suddenly sighted 3 large ships to port, quite close to. She turned away, made a British recognition signal and was not pursued. As bad luck would have it, the steaming light had short-circuited, could not be switched off and showed intermittently.<br />
<br />
The "DERFFLINGER", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN" followed the Main Fleet more or less and met with no particular experiences.<br />
<br />
The Main Fleet had to repulse a series of destroyer attacks and was also engaged by cruisers. The movements of these British cruisers, which came up singly, are incomprehensible and give the impression of having lost their heads. They appear to have received the order, judging by an intercepted W/T message, to proceed on a northerly and north-westerly course, and thereby they ran into the extended German line which they probably imagined they had passed to the South.<br />
<br />
One large cruiser (?"WARRIOR") proceeded unsuspectingly within 875 yds. of the line of battleships and came under concentrated fire from several ships before she could reply, so that she blew up enveloped in flames and disappeared in 47 seconds. The "BIRMINGHAM" seems to have been accounted for in a similar manner. The destroyers all approached in a really insane manner; frequently not from ahead but from a direction astern, scattered, singly or in pairs, or at most 3 together, never in large numbers. Most of them were disabled forthwith by a few salvoes and set on fire. The "WESTFALEN" distinguished herself particularly at this time.<br />
<br />
These burning destroyers strewn along the course, lit it up as if for a festival. Evidently the fires were largely due to the light American and Mexican oils; at any rate German firing trials on oil bunkers never caused any such conflagrations.<br />
<br />
The attacking boats directed shrapnel fire on the searchlights with fairly good results, the searchlights of two battleships and one light cruiser being hit.<br />
<br />
One large destroyer, which only recognised the danger at the last moment and endeavoured to avoid it by altering course was rammed by the "NASSAU", which put her helm over for this purpose. The boat exploded internally and sank.<br />
<br />
The only ships hit were the "POMMERN" in the 2ns Battle Squadron, and the "ROSTOCK". The "POMMERN" blew up at once and nobody was saved. The "ROSTOCK" was just passing between ships of the Main Fleet when she was hit; the loss of life on board was small.<br />
<br />
The Germans believe they destroyed 11 British destroyers in all. The manner in which these destroyers were handled has not left a good impression on the whole, and one has certainly lost respect for this weapon. The view is also taken that the boats are too large and offer too wide a target.<br />
<br />
The light cruiser "ELBING", like the "ROSTOCK", apparently wanted to break through the line from port to starboard under pressure from the British cruisers; she was, however, rammed by the "POSEN" and had to be abandoned in a sinking condition. The Germans also fired a torpedo into her.<br />
<br />
The "FRAUENLOB" and 2 destroyers were lost during the night; no details of their loss are known.<br />
<br />
Not far from Heligoland, the "OSTFRIESLAND", 7th of the line, struck a mine. This brings the account of the chief events of this exciting cruiser to an end.<br />
<br />
The German flotillas were detached from the Fleet to clear the area off the Jutland Coast, which was divided up into sectors. The flotillas stationed furthest to the North proceeded to the Skagerrak and through these straits into the Baltic and to Kiel.<br />
<br />
None of the flotillas sighted the British Main Fleet again, which proves that it must have turned away to the N. or N.W. immediately after the action. According to confidential reports the Fleet entered British ports as early as 1 June.<br />
<br />
Two British battleships, in a severely damaged condition and accompanied by destroyers, were sighted proceeding back to England. One was attacked by a submarine, but without success.<br />
<br />
On the morning of 1 June, in fairly misty weather, a Zeppelin sighted groups of British ships leaving the Channel on a N.E.'ly course. The reports were rather vague, as sometimes 6 and sometimes 12 ships were mentioned; but it seems most likely that 12 battleships and 3 cruisers were in question, and that they soon retired. The airship, which flew low at one time to get a clearer view, was also fired on.<br />
<br />
Some of the ships are said to have had tripod masts.<br />
<br />
The German Fleet, with the exception of "SEYDLITZ", reached the Jade in the afternoon. The "SEYDLITZ" could not cross the bar on account of being so much down by the bows, and it was not till the next day at high water that she was towed in, stern first.<br />
<br />
<center><u>MISCELLANEOUS.<br>TACTICS.</u></center><br />
<br />
The Germans ascribe their success to various causes, and in the first place to their own superiority as regards tactics. This is a point which every officer discusses, and it is constantly repeated that it all happened just as in tactical manoeuvres and in "battle exercises", and that things could not have gone better.<br />
<br />
Movements of squadrons, divisions and individual ships, "turns together" and alterations of course and speed, all went like clockwork and demonstrated the very great mobility of all formations.<br />
<br />
The W/T signalling system of the Main Fleet never failed, and its failure would have been immaterial, as the primary and secondary flag action signals, showing from several positions in the ship, were made simultaneously.<br />
<br />
All this was due to the peace training and the practical experience of the Flag Officers and Captains. Though in peace time the Commander-in-Chief had never commanded a Fleet, nor the Admirals a squadron, still the training carried out on the same lines for a number of years resulted in everything proceeding with the expected precision.<br />
<br />
The British, on the contrary, are said to have displayed a certain clumsiness as regards tactics and to have preferred turning together when "turning on to an opposite course" (Wendungen im Gegenmarsch), though this conclusion does not seem altogether justified from the description of the action.<br />
<br />
The ships kept station 547 yds. apart, and Vice-Admiral Schmidt told me that, in his opinion, this distance is too small for large ships and that he prefers 656 yds., as the shorter distances result in the ships getting bunched and overlapping during alterations of course. In order to relieve this during the first turn to starboard, the Fleet Flagship herself turned to port and then closed gradually into line. At night the distance was 656 yds.<br />
<br />
No interruption of W/T communication was occasioned by the enemy.<br />
<br />
<center><u>GUNNERY</u></center><br />
<br />
It is admitted that the British are superior as regards their gunnery technique. Their salvoes fall most astoundingly close together and aroused admiration on all sides. Some people affirm that they fell too close together, and that it was consequently difficult to cover a sufficiently large danger space.<br />
<br />
This is particularly the case with the heaviest calibres: 13.5-in. and 15-in. and the battle-cruisers' fire was noticeably inferior to that of the "Queen Elizabeth" class, for example.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> Literal translation; the meaning is not clear. - Tr.] The spread of the salvoes frequently only covered a few square yards. In the "KÖNIG" 3 rounds, out of a salvo of 4 rounds, hit between the capstan and the bridge.<br />
<br />
This is attributed to careful calibration, which the British have studied for a long time and which, as is well known, was abandoned by the German Navy after a few trials. The gunnery officers declare unanimously that it must unquestionably be re-introduced.<br />
<br />
The British range-finders are superior to the German, and the construction of their turrets enables them to shoot at ranges impossible for German guns. The question of range appears to be immaterial to the British, who fire at any range so long as visibility permits.<br />
<br />
The Germans are fully convinced of the great superiority of 15-in. guns over all others, and deplore the fact that, owing to the predominant conservative tendencies in the German Navy, this calibre was not introduced until so lately. Vice-Admiral Gerdes, the Head of the Armament Department, is responsible for this, for he always opposed it on the ground that the poor visibility in German waters and the consequent short ranges rendered an increase of calibre useless; he considered the German 12-in. gun to be an altogether superior weapon, capable of competing with every other.<br />
<br />
In one respect the British seem behindhand as compared with the Germans: namely that they cannot alter range quickly enough and they are too dependent on the range clock. The British rely on steady fire at long range, and they adapt their tactics to this and avoid alterations of course and range most assiduously.<br />
<br />
The Germans, on the contrary, in their firing practices always work with big and rapid alterations of range and exercise firing while turning, so that the gunnery officers consider they have an advantage in this respect.<br />
<br />
The Turn on to an opposite course was certainly not advantageous for the German Fleet, but in this particular instance it made little difference, as the German ships were already unable to find a target; besides which, it must have disconcerted the British and it prevented them from obtaining good results with their fire. The salvoes fell very close together round the ships, but few hits were obtained. The rate of fire in the British ships is said to have been fair, but not excessive. Some people affirm that it was very modest.<br />
<br />
The British shell had great penetrating power, and from all reasonable distances the main armour was generally pierced clean through. The shell splinters picked up prove conclusively that at least 2 kinds of shell were used, differing considerably in material and quality. One kind of shell had a very thick wall and an extremely small explosive charge, it might almost be called a solid shot. It seems to have broken up frequently without exploding and the fuse did not function. Its explosive power, if it possessed any at all, was quite inconsiderable, and it is presumed that the explosives used was not high explosive.<br />
<br />
It appears from the splinters of these 15-in. shell that the wall was 6.3 - 6.7 ins. (16 - 17 cm.), so that the hollow space cannot measure more than 2.4 ins. - 1.8 ins. (4 - 6 cm.). It is true that the large pieces into which these shell broke pierced everything in their course and often went right through the whole ship, unless they struck an armoured part. Several intact heads were found, with and without caps, and also entire bases.<br />
<br />
The second kind of shell had considerably thinner walls, only about half as thick, but it also often broke up into quite large pieces and displayed no great explosive power, and little or no incendiary power.<br />
<br />
It appears therefore that the British aimed only at attaining penetrating power, and the Germans are of opinion that they do not possess (rohrsicheren)* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D.Note.- This appears to be a special fuse which is very delicate, but safe until it has left the gun.] fuses for high explosive shell; this was their opinion before the war also.<br />
<br />
They believe that the high explosive power of the German ammunition gives them a great advantage which may partly counterbalance the smaller calibre of their guns and perhaps also their inferior gunnery. In any case, the effect of the German shell at the point of impact was very considerable.<br />
<br />
The fact that the ships blew up must be attributed to explosions in their magazines. (In this connection one may recall a turret of the "SEYDLITZ" being hit in the action of 24 January, 1915; see my report No.47 ex 15). The turret armour must have been pierced and the shells in the turret must have been exploded. The British have no metal cartridge-cases and also no cartridge-holders such as the Germans have, but they keep their cartridges in locked boxes which are perhaps not flash-proof enough. It seems therefore, from the incident experienced by the "SEYDLITZ", that this must constitute a particular danger to British ships. In this last action also turrets in German ships were frequently hit; further details are given in the account of damage sustained.<br />
<br />
After having compared the hits received in the German ships with the observations of results on enemy targets, it may be safely affirmed that the explosive power of the German shells exceeds that of the British; this was already known after the action of 24 January 1915. The Germans are therefore very much annoyed that they had no 15-in. guns to fire, as they are persuaded that ships so knocked about (eingedeckte) as, for example, the "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" would have been completely destroyed by German shell.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. Note.- The writer appears to mean that if German 15-in. shell had been used against "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" these ships would have been sunk.]<br />
<br />
It may be noted here that the "BAYERN", the first of their ships to carry 15-in. guns, will not join the Fleet for another few days, and the "BADEN" not until the autumn.<br />
<br />
Medium armament played no part, only a few hits were obtained and they did little damage.<br />
<br />
The British fired part-salvoes, like the Germans; full salvoes may have been fired now and again.<br />
<br />
The method of repulsing destroyer attacks, which has previously been reported, namely the 'turning away' and firing on one, or at most two boats, proved to be sound, and the repulsing of attacks both by day and night offered no difficulties.<br />
<br />
As regards gunnery, it may also be mentioned that the fire-control apparatus worked without a hitch and withstood the heaviest shocks. The elevation pointers worked admirably. A few ships were not yet fitted with them.<br />
<br />
<center><u>Torpedo.</u></center><br />
<br />
As regards torpedo work the Germans consider themselves very much superior. There were prolonged discussions about depriving Flotilla Leaders of their independence and putting them under the orders of a Leader Ship, but they are now convinced that this is necessary to ensure the flotillas attacking at the right moment and all together.<br />
<br />
The flotillas were led by the 2 leader Ships "ROSTOCK" and "REGENSBURG", the first having 2 flotillas and the second 3 flotillas allocated to them. The remaining 2 flotillas accompanied the Main Fleet or the battle-cruisers. The leaders carried out their duties with great daring and circumspection. The attacks of the British were weak and scattered, and could therefore have little or only occasional success.<br />
<br />
The German 2nd Flotilla, composed of the larger 1500 ton boats were held back instead of being sent to attack. Although these boats are spoken of very highly and are indispensable for certain enterprises, the view is now taken that they are too large and too valuable to be used for attacking during an action. This Flotilla proceeded to Zeebrugge immediately after the action and arrived there safely. It is to be employed in preventing the British from blockading the harbour with nets, and thus make it impossible for the German submarines to proceed out.<br />
<br />
As far as I have heard, the "MOLTKE" alone of the larger ships fired 4 torpedoes.<br />
<br />
Submarines were not in evidence. No German submarines were present; on the other hand a German destroyer claims to have rammed a British submarine. This claim appears to be erroneous, at least it was declared to be nonsense by the Chief of Staff. The submarines failed as regards scouting and also doing the pursuit.<br />
<br />
Some people state that a British aeroplane was sighted to the northward, and that it had apparently risen from a cruiser. It played no part in the action.<br />
<br />
The use of "Höschter"* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. note:- Probably the name of the inventor.] fog seems to have been of good service, it and the smoke made by the destroyers having completely masked the Main Fleet and its movements at critical moments.<br />
<br />
<center><u>SPEED</u></center><br />
<br />
The advantage of speed lay entirely with the British, not only as regards the Main Fleet on account of the "Deutschland" class, but also as regards the battle-cruisers. The latter are said to have proved considerably faster than the German battle cruisers, an unpleasant experience which had already been made on 25 January 1915. This alone proves that the British are talking nonsense when they assert that the German Fleet sought safety in flight; on the contrary, it was far from its bases and entirely in the power of the British, who either did not wish to take advantage of their superior speed, or were unable to do so on account of the damage sustained. The visibility was no worse than it had been during the day and Jellicoe may have even welcomed the "Höschter" fog which would enable him to plead bad visibility as a reason for abandoning the pursuit. On the German side in the light of experience the factor of speed in the battleships is considered very important. But the moderate depths of the German harbours limits the draught of the ships, and make it particularly difficult for German builders to do much in this respect. In spite of greater length and higher horse power the most modern cruisers "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ" and "LÜTZOW" attained only a quite inconsiderable increase of speed in comparison with the older "GOEBEN" class, and proved a disappointment in this particular.<br />
<br />
The question whether the older battleships should take part in an important engagement was not easy to decide. The 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons composed of the "WITTLESBACH" and "BARBAROSSA" class, re-commissioned at the beginning of the war, were intended to be used in such actions, but have long since been paid off; some have been disarmed and employed as guardships and instructional ships, etc. It was considered however, that the 2nd Battle Squadron, composed of the most modern of the older ships, would be of some service in the action; but this squadron was in a privileged position, inasmuch as it was merely attached to the 1st and 3rd Battle Squadrons and its Admiral was allowed to operate independently and select the position he thought best. On this occasion it kept station quite well and did not prove a hindrance, but, on the other hand, it did not come under any heavy fire. This must be considered very fortunate, for, in view of the damage sustained by other ships and in view of the fact that the British shell pierced all armour above or below water even at the longest range, it is certain that every ship of this class would have been sunk by a few hits, as their internal sub-division is not proof against large inrushes of water.<br />
<br />
The loss of the "Pommern", which gives the British an opportunity for a hollow triumph, also teaches a clear lesson. The Chief of Staff told me that they will probably consider carefully before again exposing this Squadron to danger; therefore this action will have further confirmed the complete worthlessness of all Dreadnought types [sic] and will condemn them as old iron.<br />
<br />
<center><u>TORPEDO NETS.</u></center><br />
<br />
The torpedo nets of the battle cruisers are all badly damaged and the gear so knocked about by gunfire that they were almost useless. This was particularly the case with the "Derfflinger", where the after port nets were hanging in the water, and would have fallen across the propeller had they not chanced to remain held up by a temporary lashing. The ship was obliged to stop during the action to secure the nets, and they might easily have occasioned the loss of the ship.<br />
<br />
For this reason all the nets, together with the booms, were unshipped immediately after the ships' return, to everybody's satisfaction. They will not be carried any more, except perhaps for operations in the Baltic, where the ships may be obliged to anchor at sea.<br />
<br />
<center><u>LEAK-STOPPING SERVICE.</u></center><br />
<br />
The leak-stopping service which had been systematically developed, worked admirably and the Germans are convinced that they owe much to it. They believed that the "Seydlitz" could not have been brought in if the strengthening of the bulkheads, etc., had not been so thoroughly exercised and if the personnel had not been so well trained.<br />
<br />
It is also said, that in the "Lutzow", which had only been in commission for 2 months, was naturally not up to the mark in this respect, and that it is not impossible that small shortcomings, for which of course nobody can be blamed, were responsible for the ship sinking. The "Lutzow" was an unfortunate ship altogether. First her turbines collapsed, thus delaying her commissioning for 6 months, then she immediately struck a mine, and she was hardly out of dockyard hands before she was sunk.<br />
<br />
<center><u>DANGER FROM GAS FUMES.</u></center><br />
<br />
Only 2 days before sailing, a large number of the ships, and fortunately exactly those that came most under fire, namely battle-cruisers and the 3rd Squadron, were supplied with gas masks fitted with alkali cartridges for the whole crew and a plentiful reserve (in the "Seydlitz" 1500 masks for about 1200 men). The masks are similar to those used in the army for poisonous gases. Each man carries a mask slung round him, if he is not actually wearing it.<br />
<br />
I was told emphatically by all the officers, that, in their experience, these masks are absolutely necessary and not only saved many lives but enabled the men to carry on in parts of the ship which they would otherwise have been compelled to leave.<br />
<br />
The gases from shells, mines and torpedoes penetrate in an incredible manner through ventilators, telephone leads, etc. to compartments far away from the point of impact. In many cases the masks enabled large numbers of the guns' crews to escape from turrets that were hit, and to help out others who were badly wounded. In one case the men in one of the main engine rooms were able to remain at their posts after gas had penetrated, until the engine-room was ventilated.<br />
<br />
The Fleet breathing apparatus (Flottenathmer) is preferable to masks in some cases, but it cannot be supplied to everyone and it hampers one's movements, which the masks do not.<br />
<br />
On account of the great danger from gases, it is also advisable to fit hinged flaps in all shafts, and to have wooden bungs to fit the voice-pipes, keeping a hammer at hand to hammer them into the mouth-pieces.<br />
<br />
They tell me that it proved very useful to keep all the personnel employed below, such as in central control rooms, engine-rooms, torpedo flats, etc. continually informed of what was going on. The men get nervous, particularly at first, with the tremendous shocks caused by shell falling close to the ship, though the shocks are felt less on deck, and such information gives them confidence and they like knowing what is going on above them.<br />
<br />
<center><u>DAMAGE</u></center><br />
<br />
The distribution of ships needing repair in the various dockyards is as follows:-<br />
<br />
The "König" proceeded at once to Kiel and is under repair at Howaldt's yard. I did not see her.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" and "Moltke" in Blohm and Voss yard, Hamburg, the first in the Imperial Dock.<br />
<br />
The "Kurfürst["] in Vulkan Yard, Hamburg.<br />
<br />
The "Derfflinger" was first docked in Wilhelmshaven and the leaks temporarily stopped, she then proceeded to the Imperial dockyard, Kiel. The "Seydlitz" will now be docked in the large dock at Wilhelmshaven; during my stay the "Seydlitz" was still in the lock.<br />
<br />
The "Von der Tann", "Ostfriesland" and "Helgoland" will be repaired in dry docks in Wilhelmshaven. No other large ships require to be docked.<br />
<br />
"<u>Seydlitz</u>" The number of hits was still uncertain, as the whole forepart of the ship up to the upper deck was still under water, and it is not known what she looks like below water. The ship was brought into the lock with difficulty, and as she is 43 ft. down by the bows, she cannot be taken into harbour. They will not venture to dock the ship inside the lock, and intend first to raise her bows slightly.<br />
<br />
The roof and guns of the fore turret and anchors, cables etc., have already been unshipped, and they now intend to bring caissons alongside and pump out the fore part sufficiently to enable her to enter the harbour.<br />
<br />
The great inrush of water, that flooded more or less the whole fore part of the ship as far as the first boiler-room bulkhead, was caused by a number of hits. Firstly, one of the belt armour plates forward on the port side is missing, having fallen off. Secondly, there are believed to be at least 2 or 3 more hits below water, forward on the port side; for the list and the settling down had already become ominous when the ship was hit at the edge of the upper deck, port side, abreast the bridge; this was followed by an inrush of water in the battery deck, which did a great amount of damage.<br />
<br />
In addition, during the day action, she was hit by a torpedo on the starboard side under the forward 5.9 in. gun, which caused her to settle down still more by the bows. This gun was so much damaged by the shock from underneath as to be disabled.<br />
<br />
Further, there are 4 severe hits in the ship's side (mess deck, port side, forward of the turret), which also demolished the port capstan.<br />
<br />
These shell, or shell splinters, naturally penetrated to the armoured deck, so that the entire fore part of the ship above and below the armoured deck is holed in many places, allowing free passage for the water. The fore part of the ship was struck therefore by at least 8 or 9 shells and one torpedo.<br />
<br />
Apparently the only compartments which are not flooded, are the bow torpedo flats and the central control room. The former is being pumped out continuously, as a great deal of water is flowing in from above. The torpedo control room had to be abandoned, as the forward partition was not watertight. The central control room abaft this was not abandoned, but of its 2 entrances from the starboard and port passages, only the port one can be used, as the starboard one is flooded.<br />
<br />
The gunnery control room is far further aft and was not affected.<br />
<br />
The ship has a list of 7° to port, and as she has now been slightly raised, about 1¾ ft. of her bows are above water; at one time it was up to the level of the deck.<br />
<br />
While under way the forward boiler room bulkhead had to withstand most of the pressure; supports have been built up everywhere, but it leaks in places.<br />
<br />
The other hits of consequences were those in the turrets. The fore starboard turret No.2 received a direct hit on the fore face of the revolving structure. One curved plate was forced out, but fortunately the main effect of the explosion was outward. The right hand gun was disabled by slight damage to the mounting; with this exception the turret remained in action and kept up fire.<br />
<br />
The right hand gun of turret No.3 received a direct hit, which cut out a wide groove along the tube of the gun. The left hand gun continued to fire.<br />
<br />
The barbette of turret No.4 was hit on a level with the rammer, and the armour was pierced clean through. This hit is of special interest, as the "Seydlitz" received a similar hit and at the same level in turret No.5 on 24th January 1915, which caused a fire, disabled both the after turrets and killed all the guns' crews. This last time, however, the damage was slight. There was no ready ammunition in the turret, and only one cartridge was exploded, in contrast to the (6200 Kg.) 13,670 lbs. of powder on Jan.1915. The turret officer and a large number of the gun's crews were saved by their gas masks. The destruction caused by splinters was, however, considerable and the turret was abandoned, as it was not possible to continue fire from it. This was a 13.5 in. shell, at 15,310 yds. range, strength of armour pierced 8.6 inches.<br />
<br />
After the turret had been abandoned, it was hit a second time in the after side of the revolving part, which was pierced; this of course increased the havoc in the interior.<br />
<br />
Turret No.5 was hit in the roof. The shell richochetted, and the roof is slightly dented. Nobody was hurt and the turret continued to fire.<br />
<br />
In the "Seydlitz" therefore, all the turrets were hit, with the exception of the foremost turret, and one was hit twice.<br />
<br />
A further hit pierced the 5.9 in. (150mm.) casemate armour of the aftermost 5.9 in. starboard gun, No.2. The deck was pierced from beneath, and splinters also pierced the splinter bulkhead. The gun was disabled and all the crew were killed, with the exception of the ship's chaplain who happened to be in the casemate and must be watched over by a special guardian angel.<br />
<br />
A similar hit, with a 15 in. shell, struck the casemate armour of the 6-in. gun No.7 and exploded in the casemate. Men were killed, the gun was disabled and the splinter bulkhead pierced by large splinters. This time again, surprise was aroused by the comparatively small damage caused by a large calibre shell.<br />
<br />
"<u>Derfflinger</u>". One shell hit the armour belt forward of the hawse pipe, probably at the junction of 2 plates, as 2 plates broke away. The plates underneath were consequently strained apart and a great deal of water flowed in.<br />
<br />
The armour belt on the port side also received 2 further hits in the centre and was pierced clean through. The splinters penetrated more than half way through the ship, and in one case a piece of plating was driven half way though the ship. These hits, combined perhaps with others, destroyed the nets and their supports in several places.<br />
<br />
The two after turrets received direct hits, in one case on the roof, in the other case in the barbette above the deck; the armour was pierced and the upper portions of the turrets burnt out and severely damaged, but the flames did not penetrate to the magazines. The crew in the upper part of the turret were killed, and both turrets were disabled. This occurred at an early stage of the action.<br />
<br />
The guns at high elevation cannot yet be dismounted, as everything is wedged in, but they do not appear to be damaged.<br />
<br />
The muzzles were carried away off the 4 foremost 6 in. (15 cm.) guns on the port side; two of them probably having been accounted for by one and the same shell which hit the armour. One gun, the muzzle of which was perhaps damaged by a splinter, afterwards burst, the tube splitting open in the shape of a tulip.<br />
<br />
The "Derfflinger" received a few other hits of no particular interest. She appears the next most severely damaged ship after the "Lützow".<br />
<br />
The "<u>Moltke</u>" only received 5 hits, all of them during that part of the action which took place on a southerly course; while the cruisers mentioned above received most of the hits on the port side, consequently during the later stages of the action.<br />
<br />
One shell pieced the bulwarks in the after part of the ship above the armour, passed through the ship and struck the armour on the port side from inside, about 3.3 ft. below the water-line. One plate was forced out and is missing. The inrush of water was considerable. The after compartments, above the armoured deck which remained intact, were all more or less flooded.<br />
<br />
The second hit was further forward, below the armour belt. The shell exploded in a bunker, but the armoured deck held and no water penetrated it from below. The neighbouring bunkers made little water and could be pumped out.<br />
<br />
Another shell struck the 5.9 in. armour in the upper bunker, above the water-line. The armoured deck again held, but the inner wall of the bunker parted, and the battery deck was pierced from below, a 6 in. gun being damaged and disabled.<br />
<br />
In the fore part of the ship a shell struck the armour belt below the water-line. The plate remained intact and was driven in about 8 inches. The compartment was flooded, but the torpedo bulkhead remained watertight. A neighbouring compartment leaked slightly, the rivets having parted.<br />
<br />
The fifth case of damage, namely a plate beneath the armour belt being driven and pressed in, was probably not due to a direct hit, but to splinters of a shell which fell short.<br />
<br />
"<u>Von der Tann</u>". A shell hit and pierced the lower part of the 3.9 in. armour belt in the after part of the ship to starboard. The compartments above the armoured deck, and some of those on the deck above, were flooded. The chief effect of the shell was outside the ship, but it bent the plates below the otherwise undamaged armoured deck, so that a considerable amount of water flowed into the compartments below the armoured deck. The after torpedo flat was flooded half way up, and the men in the starboard steering engine room were shut in for a long time owing to the exits being blocked.<br />
<br />
The fore turret was hit on the starboard side on the upper edge of the barbette and a semi-circular armour plate was forced out. The machinery of the turret was so badly knocked about that the turret was disabled.<br />
<br />
The hydraulic piping was damaged, so that all the heavy armament was put out of action temporarily. Strangely enough, though men were wounded none were killed.<br />
<br />
The aftermost turret was hit in the barbette. The armour was pierced, but the effect of the shell was exterior, the turret sustained little internal damage, so that the handgear of the turret remained in action. The turret was wedged in one place and could not revolve; they succeeded, however, in cutting off with oxy-acetylene the piece of revolving part which was jammed against the inner side of the barbette thus getting rid of the obstruction.<br />
<br />
Outside the turret, the shell did considerable damage; some splinters striking downwards, bent the armoured deck and pierced it in places. As far as I know, the armoured deck sustained no further damage, and this was of little importance.<br />
<br />
The after conning-tower was hit and a piece of the armour torn away; the occupants, including the 3rd gunnery officer, were killed. Splinters struck downwards to the engine-room ventilation hatches, but were stopped by the armoured gratings.<br />
<br />
"<u>Ostfriesland"</u> was struck by a mine below the foremost port turret. The whole measures 197 ft.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. note:- Literal translation is 12 times 5 metres large.] The torpedo bulkhead is only slightly torn, and the inrush of water was only local.<br />
<br />
"<u>Helgoland</u>". A 13.5 in. shell hit the 7.9 in. armour belt forward on the port side and pierced it. The shell appears to have broken only as no explosive action can be traced. The range was about 14,217 yds.<br />
<br />
"<u>Nassau</u>" rammed a British destroyer, or rather, the destroyer ran into her forward on the port side. Her bows must have lifted right up, for her hawse-pipe remained on board the "Nassau", so firmly wedged into the side of the upper deck that it will have to be cut out. The "Nassau's" side below the deck is torn away for 33 ft. The destroyer then glanced off the "Nassau's" side and exploded internally. One of the crew remained behind in one of the nets, but fell into the water when the "Nassau" fired a salvo.<br />
<br />
The "Nassau" was hit by shrapnel from attacking destroyers in the foremost searchlight group, both port searchlights were put out of action. The searchlight control and electric cables were destroyed and many of the searchlight crews were killed. The after searchlight group was hit in a similar manner, and one of the searchlights was disabled.<br />
<br />
The "Rhineland" and a light cruiser were also hit in a similar manner.<br />
<br />
I have seen all the above mentioned ships in Wilhelmshaven.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" and "Kurfürst" were at Hamburg, but unfortunately I am unable to report much about them. They had already been under repair for several days, and the damage was to some extent made good. Besides this, the conditions were not favourable for undisturbed examination: commissioners from the Imperial Navy Office were on board, besides crowds of workmen, the noise was deafening and it was pouring with rain. Consequently I took no notes on the spot and relied on my memory, which however fails me now among the very many received of similar cases. I am therefore unable to report each hit with accuracy.<br />
<br />
This is immaterial, however, as there were no particularly interesting hits, and none of the ships had been hit in the turrets. The armour had been pierced in several places, the effect and character of the hits being similar in all cases; the hits on unarmoured parts were of little consequence.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" was hit aft on the port side of the water line just on a junction of two plates, a piece of equal size being torn away from each plate. The shell then struck the sloping part of the armoured deck and the splinters ricochetted and passed right through the ship. These plates have already been removed.<br />
<br />
A casemate was pierced and the gun disabled.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" is the only ship whose mast was hit, the mast remained standing and has now been removed.<br />
<br />
The spotting platform had to be abandoned, as communications with the conning tower was cut off. This was the only hit received in a conning tower; it only grazed the upper edge and glanced off, and the men inside hardly noticed it.<br />
<br />
The port engine was disabled, not in consequence of damage to the turbine which is in good condition, but owing to one of the main propeller bearings becoming overheated. The cause of this is not clear, but it is believed to be due to concussions. The ship was well able to keep station with her two remaining engines.<br />
<br />
The "<u>Kurfürst</u>" suffered especially from a great inrush of water forward on the port side, above the armoured deck; it was caused by a hit in the armour belt. No further damage of importance was sustained.<br />
<br />
With regard to time necessary for repair to these ships, it is not yet possible to say anything definite, as it is still undecided whether they shall undergo thorough repair or not. The chief difficulty is the manufacture of new armour plates; but some of the holed plates can, no doubt, be left in position for the present.<br />
<br />
A considerable time will be needed to repair some of the turrets of the battle-cruisers, but here too, they will contrive to get things done. For instance, the "Von der Tann" is to have an entire turret out of a ship of the "Nassau" class, probably the foremost turret, and this ship will be left without a turret for some time. They talk a great deal also of transferring guns, and they will perhaps make use of those intended for the "Hindenburg", which will not be completed will the late autumn.<br />
<br />
It may be presumed that the battleships will be ready for sea in 4-6 weeks, and the battle-cruisers, particularly the "Seydlitz", in not less than 4 months. Naturally work is going on day and night, and repairs are given priority over all new construction.<br />
<br />
The damage sustained by light cruisers and destroyers is inconsiderable. The "Hamburg" had a funnel shot away. As these ships seem to be of minor importance, I did not trouble further about them.<br />
<br />
As our Allies appear not to have the intention of communicating to us what effect the examination of damages sustained will have on their construction in the future, we must endeavour to ascertain this as time goes on by means of cross questioning and by studying their new constructions in detail. I do not feel called upon to draw premature and rash conclusions to-day, on the strength of impressions received, but this will not prevent me from giving a summary of my opinion and of the opinions expresses in my hearing.<br />
<br />
Firstly, it is a remarkable fact that in all the ships that have returned home, all the engine and boiler-rooms are undamaged; the "Lützow" is no exception to this, as she proceeded under her own steam until late in the night after the action. I have also been assured by the Imperial Navy Office, after an inspection carried out by the Chief Engineer, that not a single auxiliary engine was defective. The only boiler-room put out of action was the foremost one in the "Seydlitz" where the bulkhead gave a little, allowing water to penetrate through rivet holes and cracks when the ship was under way. The conclusion may therefore be drawn that these vital parts of the ship are sufficiently protected and that the armour belt of the usual German thicknesses, though it cannot stop the shells, at least fulfils its purpose by breaking them up. Consequently it has become almost impossible even for the largest splinters of 15 in. shell to penetrate through armoured deck or torpedo bulkhead in engine and boiler rooms.<br />
<br />
Even at these long ranges and steep angles there was no question of the armoured decks being pierced; but the fitting of strong gratings over the hatches, which prevented the engines of the "Von der Tann" from sustaining severe damage, appears very necessary.<br />
<br />
The torpedo bulkheads also resisted shells, mines and torpedoes effectually; and in cases where slight damage was sustained, it had no further consequences than the flooding of the compartment affected.<br />
<br />
Perhaps it would be advisable to construct a specially strong boiler-room bulkhead, similar to a torpedo bulkhead, so that it could not be damaged by splinters or water-pressure.<br />
<br />
The inspection of the "Seydlitz" has left me with the impression that the commanding officer of the "Seydlitz" expected rather too much of his ship, and that nothing short of extraordinary good luck enabled her to be brought back. At one time when the whole forepart of the ship was flooded and the bows were under water, he proceeded occasionally with revolutions for 22 knots, just in order to show how seaworthy his ship was, so he told me. This may have been very sporting, or perhaps it may have been necessary under the circumstances in order not to drop too far behind and be overtaken by the enemy, but it certainly was not good seamanship, and if his stokehold bulkhead had burst, the "Seydlitz" would have gone down like the "Lutzow", where the circumstances appear to have been very similar. Later on he decreased speed and finally proceeded stern first.<br />
<br />
I therefore think it not impossible that the loss of the "Lützow", which is said to have been proceeded at 14 knots for a time, was also due only to recklessly high speed, and that the ship might have been saved if she had proceeded stern first or been taken in tow.<br />
<br />
As the danger from water-pressure must always be greatest from ahead, it would certainly be advisable to take special preventative measures against it.<br />
<br />
Vice-Admiral Schmidt told me that, in his opinion, the armoured belt ought to be strongest in the centre, and possible in the afterpart to protect the steering engines, and possibly in the bows, but that it ought not to taper off gradually from the centre to the extremities. He was also entirely in favour of a protected upper deck forming a second armoured deck.<br />
<br />
The admirably thorough system of internal division in the German ships and the floating capability thus attained is the finest proof of the merit of German construction which pursued this aim, and it shows that Admiral von Tirpitz, the creator of the Battle Fleet of to-day, was right when he upheld the principle that, above all things, the ships must be capable of remaining afloat and must not sink or heel over, and that everything else is of secondary consideration.<br />
<br />
The large number of hits in the turrets is remarkable, and it is generally considered that the turret armour should be appreciably stronger, especially in the lower part of the barbettes; for it is not only the disablement of the guns that comes into question, serious though this might be, but also the blowing up of magazines and the total destruction of the ship, as the wide shaft down to the magazines cannot possibly be made completely flash-proof. This is the most vital part of the ship. It is only owing to the small explosive charges in British shells, that there were no explosions of magazines in the German ships.<br />
<br />
Everything possible had been done after the action of 24.1.15 to ensure protection against this danger; the ready ammunition was removed from the top of the hoists and wherever possible all the openings in shafts leading down below were fitted with flaps, covers and heavy asbestos mats, while German ammunition is particularly carefully stowed and packed in cases with screwed-on covers.<br />
<br />
The disasters on the British side are a proof that this is a question of the greatest importance. It must also be taken into consideration that while any other damage turret may take months.<br />
<br />
The numerous hits in turrets would appear to justify the opinion of those who decided against triple turrets, on the ground [sic] that if one was disabled it would put too many heavy guns out of action.<br />
<br />
A hit in a casemate will of course destroy it and disable the gun, but this is of little consequence. Care must be taken here also not to have any ready ammunition, and to close the ammunition hand-up hermetically with heavy asbestos mats at the magazine end also. With the German "Paternoster" (dredger hoist) the ammunition lifts this mat as it comes up and the mat then falls to and closes the opening, which is a practical arrangement.<br />
<br />
Other hits through unarmoured parts, which destroyed more or less small gear and at the first glance give an impression of terrible havoc, are really of no consequence.<br />
<br />
In the "Von der Tann" they wanted to flood a turret magazine. This was impossible, as the flooding valve in the battery, or between deck was piled up with debris, cabin fittings, etc., and was inaccessible. Fortunately the flooding of the magazine turned out to be unnecessary. The Executive Officer remarked to me how critical such a trivial matter might become, and that one could not be careful enough about choosing the positions for the flooding valves, which must be kept clear of easily destructible objects.<br />
<br />
The man-hole covers in the decks, coal shoots [chutes], etc., were pointed out to me as dangerous, as they may be burst open by pressure of gas from below, thus causing damage and giving passage to the gases. These covers should be secured in a different manner and much more firmly.<br />
<br />
The flooding and draining system worked admirably, and is hardly capable of improvement. The only disadvantage is that the compartments above the armoured deck have no draining arrangements. This should be provided. A list, consequent on an inrush of water, could always be corrected by flooding an opposite compartment. This is an important matter both as affecting gunnery and personnel.<br />
<br />
The searchlights, which were not taken down in the German ships, all came out of the action undamaged; anxiety on their account was therefore unfounded. It was very unpleasant when attacking boats fired on the searchlights, and it is therefore considered necessary to fit light armour protection on the masts for the crews of the searchlight control and electric cables.<br />
<br />
Damage from flames is nowhere visible. The Germans are now rather amused at the care with which interior partitions were scraped.<br />
<br />
I could not help comparing the German ships with the Russian battleship "Orel", which I saw in Madzurn after the battle of Tsushima. If I remember rightly, the "Orel" had 5 severe hits and 40 hits with medium-calibre shell.<br />
<br />
The enormous explosive power of the Shimosa shell, which breaks up into minute splinters, did not do the slightest damage to the vital parts of the ship, but the upper deck was transformed into a confused heap of ruins. Superstructure, bridges, masts, funnels, etc., were destroyed, guns dismounted and fires started.<br />
<br />
Nothing of the kind is to be seen in the German ships, outwardly only a few more or less clean shell holes are visible, and they look so orderly and so little damaged that they do not appear to have gone through an action.<br />
<br />
It is true that the upper decks are said to have been littered with countless splinters, but they flew on to the decks from shells which struck the water, the ship receiving violent shocks.<br />
<br />
The holes in the armour show the characteristic concentric cracks round the hole and the radial splashes, the latter proving that the shells exploded on impact or at the latest, as they passed through. In many cases, as already noted, the force of the explosion was external and only pieces of plate, and possibly the head of the shell were driven in.<br />
<br />
<center><u>FLAG OFFICERS OF THE FLEET AND LEADERS</u></center><br />
<br />
{|<br />
| Commander-in-Chief:<br />
| Vice Admiral Scheer<br />
|-<br />
| <u>I Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Vice Admiral Schmidt<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Engelhard<br />
|-<br />
| <u>II Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Mauve<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Baron von Dalwigh<br />
|-<br />
| <u>III Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Behncke<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Nordmann<br />
|-<br />
| Officer commanding the Scouting Forces and<br>Commanding 1st Scouting Group<br />
| Vice Admiral Hipper<br />
|-<br />
| " 2nd " "<br />
| Rear Admiral Bodicker<br />
|-<br />
| " 4th " "<br />
| Commodore "Captain" v. Reuter<br />
|-<br />
| Leaders of Destroyers<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| in "Rostock"<br />
| Commodore "Captain" Michelsen<br />
|-<br />
| in Regensburg<br />
| Commodore "Captain" Heinrich<br />
|-<br />
| Leader of submarines<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| In Hamburg<br />
| Captain Bauer<br />
|}<br />
<br />
<center><u>REMARKS</u></center><br />
<br />
The lecture on the action, upon which this report is based, was illustrated by a plan prepared in haste for H.M. the Kaiser, and a copy was promised to me. But the Admiral Staff does not wish to part with this first incomplete draft, and the preparation of an accurate plan has not yet been completed, as the Admiral Staff is not yet in possession of all the details.<br />
<br />
In time to be included in this report I have only received the sketch of the first stage of the battle, namely the cruiser action on a southerly course, together with a small sketch of the situation when the action was broken off; both are enclosed.<br />
<br />
I conclude from the sketch of the cruiser action, that the accounts given to me were not quite accurate; for instance, the assertion of the commanding officer of the "Moltke" that the shortest range at that stage was 7,650 yds. and that he had accounted for one of the armoured cruisers with a torpedo.<br />
<br />
The sketch shows that the "Indefatigable" was probably first destroyed by gun fire from the "Von der Tann", and later the "Queen Mary" by gunfire from the "Derfflinger", and that the range was never less than 14,220 yds.<br />
<br />
The loss of "V. 27" and "V. 29" and of 4 British destroyers is also apparent, while I was only told of two.<br />
<br />
In the original sketch, 2 British armoured cruisers are also shown as having fallen out during this stage, but this is not shown on the accompanying sketch and probably took place later.<br />
<br />
I was told by the Admiral Staff that the accompanying sketches are not to be taken as strictly accurate.<br />
<br />
It is requested that the sketches and course of the action and the account of damages may be treated as strictly confidential.<br />
<br />
==Footnotes==<br />
{{reflist}}<br />
<br />
==Bibliography==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
*''Schematismus für das K.u.K. Heer und für die Kriegsmarine für 1914. Separatausgabe''. Wien: 1914.<br />
*''Almanach für die k. und k. Kriegsmarine 1917. Kriegsausgabe''. '''XXXVII'''. Pola: 1917.<br />
*[[Arthur Marder (Naval Historian)|Marder, Arthur J.]] (1966). ''From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919: Jutland and After, May 1916–December 1916''. '''Volume III'''. London: Oxford University Press.<br />
*{{MarderFDSFIII}}<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
==External Links==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
*Krámli, Mihály. [http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-124.pdf "The Report on the Battle of Jutland by the Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché in Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Colloredo-Mannsfeld."] ''NavWeaps''.<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
[[Category:Battle of Jutland]]</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Attach%C3%A9_Report_on_the_Battle_of_Jutland&diff=334740Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland2024-03-10T16:08:33Z<p>Simon Harley: Oops.</p>
<hr />
<div>Soon after the [[Battle of Jutland]] on 31 May &ndash; 1 June 1916 the Naval Attaché of the [[Austro-Hungarian Navy|Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Navy]] at the embassy in Berlin, ''Fregattenkapitäne'' Hieronymus Graf von Colloredo-Mannsfeld,<ref>''Schematismus für das K.u.K. Heer und für die Kriegsmarine für 1914''. p. 1270. ''Almanach für die k. und k. Kriegsmarine 1917''. p. 668.</ref> visited the High Sea Fleet. He composed a report on the battle for his superiors using first-hand accounts, interspersed here and there with his own observations. The version reproduced here is a translation in English apparently made by the [[Naval Intelligence Division (Royal Navy)|Naval Intelligence Division]] in 1919 from a copy which was subsequently returned to "F.N.A.", presumably the French Naval Attaché. A copy of the translation then made its way into the papers of the British Cabinet, from where historian Arthur J. Marder obtained a copy which is in his papers.<ref>Original number N.I.D. 087/19. Marder papers, Special Collections and Archives, Langson Library, University of California, Irvine, MS-F002, Box 27.</ref> He does not appear to have used it for the 1966 edition of ''From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow'', Volume III, but certainly used it for the revised edition in 1978.<ref>The quote on p. 189 of the 1966 edition differs from that on p. 234 of the 1978 edition, which is identical to that used here.</ref> <br />
<br />
It is worth comparing this translation with that made by Hungarian historian Mihály Krámli of a post-war copy of a slightly different version of the report in a Hungarian archive which has been published on the ''NavWeaps'' online resource.<ref>Krámli, Mihály. [http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-124.pdf "The Report on the Battle of Jutland by the Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché in Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Colloredo-Mannsfeld."] ''NavWeaps''.</ref><br />
<br />
The original grammar and punctuation of the typescript has been reproduced here wherever possible.<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
From:- Austrian Naval Attache in Berlin.<br />
<br />
To:- Commander-in-Chief, Pola.<br />
<div style="float:right;">Berlin,<br>17 June, 1916.</div><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<center><u>NAVAL ENGAGEMENT OF 31 MAY 1916.</u></center><br />
<br />
The following is a report of the naval proceedings of 31 May - 1 June, 1916, and also of the damage sustained by the German Fleet.<br />
<br />
During my 3-days' visit to Wilhelmshaven, followed by a cursory examination of the "MARKGRAF" and "KURFURST" at Hamburg, I endeavoured to gain merely a general idea of the results of gunfire and concentrated my attention on the course of the action itself.<br />
Admiral Scheer, whom I only saw for a short time as he left for Kiel to attend the funeral of his borther-in-law [sic], Lieut.-Commander Mohr, who was killed in the action, very kindly arranged that his Chief of Staff, Captain Trotha, should give me an account of the whole proceedings, illustrated by plans, and that I should be furnished with all information. I have tried to fill in the gaps by conversations with officers whom I know; this has resulted in some contradictory statements, and several points remain obscure, the accounts from the various ships not having all come in.<br />
<br />
Many episodes will therefore be explained later and may appear in a different light, but, as regards the broad outlines which are of chief importance, the picture of this interesting engagement is fairly clear. The accompanying plan of the action was made in haste for the Kaiser and will therefore need much correction.<br />
<br />
The spirit pervading the Fleet can only be described as one of enthusiasm; they are intoxicated with victory. The heavy load weighing on them all, the dear that this war might end without an encounter of the Fleets, have vanished. They have learnt what fighting really means, they know themselves to be superior to the enemy as regards tactics, and that they were following the right lines and have nothing to unlearn; they know that their gunfire was more effective than that of the enemy, and that they can rely implicitly on their flotillas which have always been looked upon in the German Navy as one of the chief factors in an action. Finally they know that their largest ships can stand heavy fire and serious damage, that they leave nothing to be desired as regards construction and cannot be sunk easily. In short, they feel that the British, in spite of all their boasting, cannot overcome the German Fleet and have a considerable respect for it.<br />
<br />
This conviction imbues the whole Fleet, down to the last man, with confidence in their strength and a calm assurance regarding future encounters. At the same time they are free from over-confidence and from under-estimation of the enemy. On the contrary, the British fire-control and the enormous piercing power of their heavy shell at great distances have roused their admiration, so that a careless conception of the situation is not to be feared, the less so, as well-balanced minds such as those of Admiral Scheer and his Staff are unlikely to be led away by former successes to undertake rash enterprises in the future.<br />
<br />
They do not deny that they were extraordinarily fortunate, and that if the action had been prosecuted with energy on the British side, and if the "Nelson touch" had been in evidence, things might have gone very badly for Germany, especially as the British still had an intact Battle Squadron of 12 units at their disposal which had not yet taken part in the action. But they console themselves with the knowledge that no naval action was ever won without some stroke of luck.<br />
<br />
The Kaiser's visit, the day before my arrival, and his address to the Fleet gave great satisfaction, and subsequently many important personages arrive to inspect the ships, such as Prince Henry and the Grand Dukes of Mecklenburg and Oldenburg, and numbers of decorations were distributed. Vice-Admiral Scheer was promoted to Admiral, and he and Vice-Admiral Hipper received the Pour le Merite.<br />
<br />
I also visited Rear-Admiral Behncke, who was wounded and in hospital; his wounds are slight, a few small splinters in his head, elbow and knee, and he will probably soon be well again.<br />
<br />
<center><u>COURSE OF THE ACTION.</u></center><br />
<br />
The Commander-in-Chief intended to advance with the whole Fleet to the waters of the Skagerrak, in order to make his presence felt unpleasantly by disturbing the shipping, hoping thereby to lure on the British forces and in this manner to be in a position to attack a part of the British Fleet with superior or at least with equal forces. He reckoned that any movements of the British Fleet would be reported to him in good time by the submarines which had been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and he hoped that the airships would prove a better means of reconnoitring than any possessed by the enemy.<br />
<br />
Unfavourable weather prevented him for a considerable period from undertaking any operations, and, as the submarines were to return home on 1 June and be relieved by a new group, the 31 May was the last date for carrying out the planned advance.<br />
<br />
The cruisers left the Jade at 3 a.m., the Main Fleet at 4 a.m., steering an easterly course, and then, after passing Heligoland, a N.N.W'ly course. No reports were received from submarines. These were stationed chiefly off the Orkneys and the Firth of Forth, and the large group of Flanders boats were off the Thames and at the entrance to the Channel. <br />
<br />
While proceeding northwards, a few W/T messages were received, but they were corrupt, appeared to refer only to small formations and gave no clue to the movements of the Grand Fleet. The airships were unable to start in the morning, on account of the wind, and, as it blew hard throughout the day in the Heligoland Bight, they could not start until the early hours of 1 June. In this respect things did not go well, but Admiral Scheer decided nevertheless to continue on his course to the Skagerrak. <br />
<br />
This the account given by Captain von Trotha, who affirms that nothing was known of the presence of the British Fleet in the waters of the Skagerrak, and that there seemed no probability of encountering this Fleet before 1 June.<br />
<br />
There are some points here which I am unable to understand. The submarines are said to have been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and were to return home on 1 June to be relieved probably by a weaker group. For, If the same number of boats were to to keep watch off the English coast, why should 31 May have been the last day for the German Fleet to sail. The day of departure was, therefore, too late in any case, for, if no encounter was to be expected before 1 June, the boats stationed off the coast could not possibly encounter the damaged British ships, as was intended, for probably no damaged ships would be there before 2 June.<br />
<br />
The battleship "KONIG ALBERT" had to carry out repairs to her condensers and did not proceed with the Fleet. Von Trotha told me that there was no alternative and that a ship must carry out small overhauls regularly in a dockyard according to programme. But could it not be arranged, when one is taking the initiative, to choose one's moment for an advance and to have all the ships together for this short time? And why should just that moment be chosen when one of the most powerful ships of the "Kaiser" class is in the dockyard, instead, for instance, of one of the "Nassau" class with 11-in. guns.<br />
<br />
In addition, the "BAYERN" was to have joined up a few days later. After having waited so long, why should not the plan have been postponed for 2 or 3 weeks, instead of dispensing with the only ship carrying 15-in. guns.<br />
<br />
In the same manner they dispensed with air reconnaissance, from which they had expected so much.<br />
<br />
These considerations make me doubt whether the account given me is quite correct, and whether, on the contrary, they knew of certain movements of the British Fleet and considered the moment extremely favourable for an attack. Perhaps they only knew of Beatty's battle squadron, and thinking the Main Fleet was far away, hoped to entrap this squadron. In Berlin, they have much to say, even in military circles, about the British Fleet's intention to push through into the Baltic, and of Kitchener's mission having some connection with this. I consider this senseless, for it cannot be presemed [sic] that the British Fleet would leave their shores unprotected and do the Germans the favour of operating in the Baltic, which would certainly be a most advantageous area for the German Fleet. In any case, there appear to be discrepancies which will probably be explained at some later date.<br />
<br />
Scouting groups, battle cruisers and light cruisers, together with flotillas, preceded the Main Fleet by 50 - 60 miles. At 4 p.m. the light cruisers encountered some British battle cruisers. These at once opened fire on the light cruisers, at an estimated distance of 26,247 yds.; the range could be taken accurately. Though they did not obtain a hit, the salvoes fell so well that the German cruisers thought it advisable to turn away and fall back on their battle cruisers.<br />
<br />
As the British approached, these battle cruisers turned on to a southerly course, in order to lure the enemy on to the German Main Fleet. A running action, on a southerly course, ensued. The British were to starboard and to the west of the Germans, who had therefore the following advantage: in the North Sea, in summer, the western horizon is quite light and visibility towards the west is good, while towards the east, and in a still greater degree off the Jutland Coast, it is misty and visibility is bad and no silhouettes stand out against the eastern horizon. This phenomenon also played great part in the subsequent course of the action. The sun was still high and was not troublesome, and the British ships offered admirable targets. The sea was calm, the wind N.W. 1-2, altering subsequently through W. to S.W.<br />
<br />
The following British ships were recognised:-<br />
3 "Lion" class, 1 "Tiger" and 2 "Indefatigable" class; they were soon reinforced by 5 "Queen Elizabeth" class following astern.<br />
<br />
It is asserted that, judging from shell splinters, the ship of the "Tiger" class carried 15-in. guns, and that she was therefore the mysterious vessel which replaced the "TIGER" sunk on 24.1.15; as the last-named "TIGER" carried only 13.5-in.guns, this was taken as a further proof of her loss. The silhouette of the new "TIGER", however, is said to have resembled that of the old "TIGER" exactly. As the "Queen Elizabeths" soon opened fire also with 15-in. guns, I rather doubt this assertion regarding the "TIGER", and the various ships on this early part of the engagement are altogether somewhat at variance.<br />
<br />
On the German side the ships proceeded in the following sequence:- "LÜTZOW", Flagship of Vice-Admiral Hipper, "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN".<br />
<br />
As Hipper edged towards the enemy, the distance decreased to about 7655 yds. The German fire was unquestionably superior, but the speed of the British vessels was greater. After a short time the "INDEFATIGABLE" and "QUEEN MARY" blew up, and 2 battle-cruisers and two attacking destroyers were also accounted for. The "QUEEN MARY" must have been destroyed by the explosion of a magazine; she was torn in two halves, and a water-colour painted by an officer represents her enveloped in an enormous column of black smoke; she disappeared in a few seconds. Only one cadet was subsequently picked.<br />
<br />
The second battle cruiser disappeared under similar circumstances. The "VON DER TANN" claims to have accounted for one of these battle-cruisers by a broadside. But the "MOLTKE" fired 4 torpedoes and also claims this achievement.<br />
<br />
The Germans suffered very little during this phase of the action, the "MOLTKE" alone receiving hits on the starboard side. The fire of the British battle-cruisers is said not to have been nearly as good as that of the "QUEEN ELIZABETH" class later on.<br />
<br />
When they had approached the German Main Fleet, the British turned on to a contrary course and the German cruisers did the same. The German Main Fleet proceeded in divisions in starboard quarter-line, the 3rd Battle Squadron: 4 "König" class and 3 "Kaiser" class, Fleet Flagship, 1st Battle Squadron: 4 "Ostfriesland" class and 4 "Westfalen" class, and the 2nd Battle Squadron: 5 "Deutschland" class and the "Hessen". They endeavoured to effect a junction with the cruisers, but were unable to take part very effectually.<br />
<br />
The course of the action was now in a northerly direction, over the area which had just been traversed, and the British ships now drew ahead considerably and turned more and more towards the East; the Germans followed this movement, and in consequence the conditions of visibility became less and less favourable for them.<br />
<br />
The "Queen Elizabeths" now made their presence more greatly felt; one of them had dropped out, but I was unable to ascertain when this occurred.<br />
<br />
The course of the German Math Fleet at first led past the 2 disabled British destroyers, which were lying stopped. The crews had already taken to the boats and were picked up later on by German destroyers. As the Main Fleet was doubtful about the advisability of passing the destroyers while they were still afloat, they were sunk by a few broadsides. One of the officers who was picked up was in pyjamas and is said to have stayed in his cabin during the action. He declared "We did not expect so much resistance," while another said - "The battle is rather disappointing." It has been ascertained that these destroyers were greatly under-manned; their crews seemed very exhausted, which points to their having been in the water for a long time.<br />
<br />
While on this easterly course, the light cruisers of the fast 2nd Scouting Group: "FRANKFURT", "PILLAU", "ELBING" and "WIESBADEN", were heavily fired on from the N.E. and E. without their being able to see more than the gun flashes. In addition, they were under continual fire from the N., and while turning away to S.E. and S., they ascertained that they were opposed by an interminable line of British ships, which appeared at first to be on a N.W.'ly course, and had then evidently turned together on to a S.'ly course.<br />
<br />
It may be noted here that the battleships, and, generally speaking, the battle-cruisers also, never sighted the British Main Fleet, and saw nothing but the flashes of the guns and the effects of the fire. These British ships, about 25 in number, were only sighted by a few light cruisers and by the flotillas, and were counted by them as accurately as possible.<br />
<br />
Surrounded thus from the N. and the E. and under fire, the "WIESBADEN" was disabled, apparently by a hit in the engine-room. The Admiral noticed, it is true, that his leading ships must have encountered new and powerful forces and that they were turning away; but he thought it his duty to go to the assistance of the "WIESBADEN" and therefore continued on an easterly course.<br />
<br />
The van of the Main Fleet, led by the "KÖNIG" (Rear-Admiral Behncke) now came under heavy fire from right ahead; the "KÖNIG" turned away under this fire towards the S.E., whereupon the Commander-in-Chief ordered the whole line to "turn together" to starboard and gave up the idea of helping the "WIESBADEN". About this time Vice-Admiral Hipper transferred his flag from the "LÜTZOW" to the "MOLTKE" with the help of a destroyer, his W/T station being damaged.<br />
<br />
Hardly had the Main Fleet drawn away on a westerly course, before it was ascertained that the pressure was relaxing and the fire decreasing, and that the British were no longer pursuing so hotly. Scheer therefore ordered the ships to "turn together" back on to their former course, and made the signal 'R' = 'Engage the enemy'. This second advance may be termed the zenith of the action. Admiral Scheer gave his views on it approximately as follows:- "Those who make a study of this engagement will be very puzzled as to my object in advancing thus against the wall of British ships. The fact is that I had no particular object. I made the first advance because I had a feeling that I ought to endeavour to assist the "WIESBADEN" and because the situation ahead was quite obscure to me, for I saw nothing of the "LÜTZOW" and received no W/T reports. I soon saw, however, that the leading ships were coming under an overwhelming fire, and that I could not risk the Fleet on the "WIESBADEN'S" account. When I noticed that the British pressure had quite ceased and that the Fleet remained intact in my hands, I turned back, under the impression that the action could not end in this way and that I ought to seek contact with the enemy again."<br />
<br />
The situation during the first and second advances may serve as an example of what should not take place according to all the laws of tactics, for it could not have been worse; von Trotha said jokingly that, if an Admiral brought about such a situation at a war game or in manoeuvres, he would never be entrusted without another command. In the North, the "Queen Elizabeths", then the battle-cruisers, and from N.E. through E. to S.E., an endless line of battleships formed an arc round the German van and kept it under fire. Evidently it had fallen into the most perfect trap. In addition to this unfavourable tactical position, there was a further difficulty, namely that the German ships could be clearly distinguished while they themselves only saw the gun flashes, 4 or 5 to each salvo, but could find no target.<br />
<br />
The Gunnery Officer of the "MARKGRAF" told me that he could not fire at all during half-an-hour, and that they were at the mercy of the British broadsides. Critical though the position was, in theory, they think that experience justifies the conclusion that this 'crossing the T' is in reality not so disastrous at longer ranges; for, in spite of the enormous superiority of their fire, the British made comparatively few hits, the simple reason being that, when fire is thus concentrated on a few leading ships, there can be no question of improving the shooting by spotting.<br />
<br />
Given good tactical training and squadrons which work well together, it is always easy to retire rapidly from an unfavourable position and even possibly to reach an advantageous one.<br />
<br />
The small amount of damage sustained by the Main Fleet may be owing partly to the fact that the leading battle-cruisers drew the enemy's fire, thus relieving the battleships. Only the three leading ships, "KÖNIG", "GROSSER KURFÜRST" and "MARKGRAF" received several hits; while among all the other ships, the "KAISER", "HELGOLAND" and the "SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN" received one hit each, and the rest were not hit at all.<br />
<br />
Simultaneously with the battle-cruisers, which were ahead and pressing forward in quarter-line formation, the 6th and 9th Flotillas, left by the "REGENSBURG", also proceeded to a torpedo attack. Regarding this cruiser advance, the Commanding Officer of the "SEYDLITZ" told me that he was in such a position that he was able to avoid the British salvoes, for he altered course towards the point where each salvo fell and thus evaded the spotting correction.<br />
<br />
This torpedo attack was carried out with great determination and seems to have been completely successful, although nobody is able to state how many hits were obtained. The British ships overlapped somewhat and their line was almost unbroken, and, as about 100 torpedoes were fired, it is estimates that there must have been a considerable number of hits, some people affirm that there were 20, but I do not place much confidence in these figures and it is useless to trouble about them as nobody is certain.<br />
<br />
The boats were fired on by guns of all calibres, even the heaviest, but with little effect, only one boat being destroyed; two other boats had been sunk in an earlier attack during the cruiser action.<br />
<br />
The battle-cruisers were also attacked by British torpedoes, the "SEYDLITZ" being hit once. The "MOLTKE" was lucky, for, when close to the ship, one torpedo apparently had a gyro failure and ran parallel with her. The "LÜTZOW" was probably hit also.<br />
<br />
After the attack, the destroyers laid fog and a heavy smoke screen, which interposed between the Fleet; this benefitted not only the heavily-damaged "LÜTZOW" and "DERFFLINGER", whose nets had been shot away and were hanging down, but also the whole Fleet. It may also have made an impression on the British.<br />
<br />
The German Main Fleet and cruisers turned on a westerly course, fire having again entirely ceased; and the ships of the Main Fleet then turned gradually in succession and in inverse sequence from W. to S.W., subsequently steering towards Horns Reef.<br />
<br />
It is not known what the British did; all that is certain, is that they did not follow in pursuit and that nothing further was seen of their Main Fleet. It remained light until 11 p.m. (summer time), and it would not have been impossible, considering their superior speed, for them to have come within firing range. The Germans expected it too, and now have to content themselves with surmises about the British Commander-in-Chief's reasons for not doing so. It is probably that the unfavourable issue of the fleet part of the battle and the demoralising losses in ships took away any desire on Jellicoe's part for further fighting. His Fleet may have lost heavily and been severely shaken by the torpedo attack; and, as the Germans still had some intact flotillas at their disposal, he may have feared further strong torpedo attacks in the critical hours of twilight, for in the German Navy they say that Jellicoe fears their destroyers in particular.<br />
<br />
Nevertheless, the Germans were not under the impression of having shaken the British Fleet to the extent of obliging them to give up the struggle, and when the evening passed without further incident, they reckoned with certainty on encountering Jellicoe off Horns Reef at daybreak. They were the more astonished at his non-appearance when their air reconnaissance reported that on the morning of 1 June a squadron of 12 battle-ships was proceeding North from the southern part of North Sea and that it suddenly turned on to an opposite course and proceeded South.<br />
<br />
As it could not possibly have been the intention of the British Commander-in-Chief to let the German Fleet escape after having encountered it at last far from its base, and as he still had an intact battle-squadron at his disposal, one is compelled to take the view that he no longer felt strong enough for a second encounter; the achievement of the German Fleet must therefore be very highly thought of.<br />
<br />
During the night cruising following the action, numerous small episodes and minor engagements took place, of which no clear idea can be formed. <br />
<br />
In view of a possible fresh attack or of a possible pursuit on the part of the enemy, it was thought undesirable to leave the 2nd Battle Squadron either in the van or in the rear, it therefore took station to starboard and at first proceeded on an opening course from the other squadrons, and continued fairly independently during the night.<br />
<br />
The 1st Battle Squadron therefore led, with the "WESTFALEN" as guide, and it was followed by the 3rd Battle Squadron.<br />
<br />
After the action had been broken off, the 4 remaining battle cruisers were ahead to port, where they were suddenly again brought under heavy fire from the port side and from ahead, apparently by 3 or 4 battle cruisers. It is presumed that these were the remaining 3 or 4 older cruisers of the "Invincible" class, which Jellicoe probably always stationed ahead of the Main Fleet, for it would hardly have been possible for the "Lions", which were following in the rear in the British line, to have taken station ahead so quickly. The German battle cruisers, all severely damaged, did not feel able to withstand this fire and turned away to starboard, passing ahead of the Main Fleet and between it and the 2nd Battle Squadron, which proceeded quietly on their course and before which the mysterious ships retired, not to be sighted again.<br />
<br />
The battle-cruisers then gradually fell astern, and as they were making much water, and also owing to their differing speeds, they lost contact with the Main Fleet and with each other.<br />
<br />
The "LÜTZOW" had dropped out during the engagement and proceeded independently, accompanied by 4 destroyers. At first she was able to steam 14 knots, but her speed decreased rapidly and dropped finally to 4 knots. Her bows sank slowly, and when the whole forecastle was under water the Commanding Officer decided to leave the ship. The badly wounded were transferred carefully to the boats and the disembarkation was conducted in good order. A torpedo was then fired at the ship and this coup de grace sank her in deep water at about 1 o'clock, I believe.<br />
<br />
The "SEYDLITZ" was hardly in a better condition than the "LÜTZOW"; she also sank gradually by the bows till the water was almost level with the deck, and she had a heavy list to port, but she continued on her course. In the darkest hours of the night she suddenly sighted 3 large ships to port, quite close to. She turned away, made a British recognition signal and was not pursued. As bad luck would have it, the steaming light had short-circuited, could not be switched off and showed intermittently.<br />
<br />
The "DERFFLINGER", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN" followed the Main Fleet more or less and met with no particular experiences.<br />
<br />
The Main Fleet had to repulse a series of destroyer attacks and was also engaged by cruisers. The movements of these British cruisers, which came up singly, are incomprehensible and give the impression of having lost their heads. They appear to have received the order, judging by an intercepted W/T message, to proceed on a northerly and north-westerly course, and thereby they ran into the extended German line which they probably imagined they had passed to the South.<br />
<br />
One large cruiser (?"WARRIOR") proceeded unsuspectingly within 875 yds. of the line of battleships and came under concentrated fire from several ships before she could reply, so that she blew up enveloped in flames and disappeared in 47 seconds. The "BIRMINGHAM" seems to have been accounted for in a similar manner. The destroyers all approached in a really insane manner; frequently not from ahead but from a direction astern, scattered, singly or in pairs, or at most 3 together, never in large numbers. Most of them were disabled forthwith by a few salvoes and set on fire. The "WESTFALEN" distinguished herself particularly at this time.<br />
<br />
These burning destroyers strewn along the course, lit it up as if for a festival. Evidently the fires were largely due to the light American and Mexican oils; at any rate German firing trials on oil bunkers never caused any such conflagrations.<br />
<br />
The attacking boats directed shrapnel fire on the searchlights with fairly good results, the searchlights of two battleships and one light cruiser being hit.<br />
<br />
One large destroyer, which only recognised the danger at the last moment and endeavoured to avoid it by altering course was rammed by the "NASSAU", which put her helm over for this purpose. The boat exploded internally and sank.<br />
<br />
The only ships hit were the "POMMERN" in the 2ns Battle Squadron, and the "ROSTOCK". The "POMMERN" blew up at once and nobody was saved. The "ROSTOCK" was just passing between ships of the Main Fleet when she was hit; the loss of life on board was small.<br />
<br />
The Germans believe they destroyed 11 British destroyers in all. The manner in which these destroyers were handled has not left a good impression on the whole, and one has certainly lost respect for this weapon. The view is also taken that the boats are too large and offer too wide a target.<br />
<br />
The light cruiser "ELBING", like the "ROSTOCK", apparently wanted to break through the line from port to starboard under pressure from the British cruisers; she was, however, rammed by the "POSEN" and had to be abandoned in a sinking condition. The Germans also fired a torpedo into her.<br />
<br />
The "FRAUENLOB" and 2 destroyers were lost during the night; no details of their loss are known.<br />
<br />
Not far from Heligoland, the "OSTFRIESLAND", 7th of the line, struck a mine. This brings the account of the chief events of this exciting cruiser to an end.<br />
<br />
The German flotillas were detached from the Fleet to clear the area off the Jutland Coast, which was divided up into sectors. The flotillas stationed furthest to the North proceeded to the Skagerrak and through these straits into the Baltic and to Kiel.<br />
<br />
None of the flotillas sighted the British Main Fleet again, which proves that it must have turned away to the N. or N.W. immediately after the action. According to confidential reports the Fleet entered British ports as early as 1 June.<br />
<br />
Two British battleships, in a severely damaged condition and accompanied by destroyers, were sighted proceeding back to England. One was attacked by a submarine, but without success.<br />
<br />
On the morning of 1 June, in fairly misty weather, a Zeppelin sighted groups of British ships leaving the Channel on a N.E.'ly course. The reports were rather vague, as sometimes 6 and sometimes 12 ships were mentioned; but it seems most likely that 12 battleships and 3 cruisers were in question, and that they soon retired. The airship, which flew low at one time to get a clearer view, was also fired on.<br />
<br />
Some of the ships are said to have had tripod masts.<br />
<br />
The German Fleet, with the exception of "SEYDLITZ", reached the Jade in the afternoon. The "SEYDLITZ" could not cross the bar on account of being so much down by the bows, and it was not till the next day at high water that she was towed in, stern first.<br />
<br />
<center><u>MISCELLANEOUS.<br>TACTICS.</u></center><br />
<br />
The Germans ascribe their success to various causes, and in the first place to their own superiority as regards tactics. This is a point which every officer discusses, and it is constantly repeated that it all happened just as in tactical manoeuvres and in "battle exercises", and that things could not have gone better.<br />
<br />
Movements of squadrons, divisions and individual ships, "turns together" and alterations of course and speed, all went like clockwork and demonstrated the very great mobility of all formations.<br />
<br />
The W/T signalling system of the Main Fleet never failed, and its failure would have been immaterial, as the primary and secondary flag action signals, showing from several positions in the ship, were made simultaneously.<br />
<br />
All this was due to the peace training and the practical experience of the Flag Officers and Captains. Though in peace time the Commander-in-Chief had never commanded a Fleet, nor the Admirals a squadron, still the training carried out on the same lines for a number of years resulted in everything proceeding with the expected precision.<br />
<br />
The British, on the contrary, are said to have displayed a certain clumsiness as regards tactics and to have preferred turning together when "turning on to an opposite course" (Wendungen im Gegenmarsch), though this conclusion does not seem altogether justified from the description of the action.<br />
<br />
The ships kept station 547 yds. apart, and Vice-Admiral Schmidt told me that, in his opinion, this distance is too small for large ships and that he prefers 656 yds., as the shorter distances result in the ships getting bunched and overlapping during alterations of course. In order to relieve this during the first turn to starboard, the Fleet Flagship herself turned to port and then closed gradually into line. At night the distance was 656 yds.<br />
<br />
No interruption of W/T communication was occasioned by the enemy.<br />
<br />
<center><u>GUNNERY</u></center><br />
<br />
It is admitted that the British are superior as regards their gunnery technique. Their salvoes fall most astoundingly close together and aroused admiration on all sides. Some people affirm that they fell too close together, and that it was consequently difficult to cover a sufficiently large danger space.<br />
<br />
This is particularly the case with the heaviest calibres: 13.5-in. and 15-in. and the battle-cruisers' fire was noticeably inferior to that of the "Queen Elizabeth" class, for example.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> Literal translation; the meaning is not clear. - Tr.] The spread of the salvoes frequently only covered a few square yards. In the "KÖNIG" 3 rounds, out of a salvo of 4 rounds, hit between the capstan and the bridge.<br />
<br />
This is attributed to careful calibration, which the British have studied for a long time and which, as is well known, was abandoned by the German Navy after a few trials. The gunnery officers declare unanimously that it must unquestionably be re-introduced.<br />
<br />
The British range-finders are superior to the German, and the construction of their turrets enables them to shoot at ranges impossible for German guns. The question of range appears to be immaterial to the British, who fire at any range so long as visibility permits.<br />
<br />
The Germans are fully convinced of the great superiority of 15-in. guns over all others, and deplore the fact that, owing to the predominant conservative tendencies in the German Navy, this calibre was not introduced until so lately. Vice-Admiral Gerdes, the Head of the Armament Department, is responsible for this, for he always opposed it on the ground that the poor visibility in German waters and the consequent short ranges rendered an increase of calibre useless; he considered the German 12-in. gun to be an altogether superior weapon, capable of competing with every other.<br />
<br />
In one respect the British seem behindhand as compared with the Germans: namely that they cannot alter range quickly enough and they are too dependent on the range clock. The British rely on steady fire at long range, and they adapt their tactics to this and avoid alterations of course and range most assiduously.<br />
<br />
The Germans, on the contrary, in their firing practices always work with big and rapid alterations of range and exercise firing while turning, so that the gunnery officers consider they have an advantage in this respect.<br />
<br />
The Turn on to an opposite course was certainly not advantageous for the German Fleet, but in this particular instance it made little difference, as the German ships were already unable to find a target; besides which, it must have disconcerted the British and it prevented them from obtaining good results with their fire. The salvoes fell very close together round the ships, but few hits were obtained. The rate of fire in the British ships is said to have been fair, but not excessive. Some people affirm that it was very modest.<br />
<br />
The British shell had great penetrating power, and from all reasonable distances the main armour was generally pierced clean through. The shell splinters picked up prove conclusively that at least 2 kinds of shell were used, differing considerably in material and quality. One kind of shell had a very thick wall and an extremely small explosive charge, it might almost be called a solid shot. It seems to have broken up frequently without exploding and the fuse did not function. Its explosive power, if it possessed any at all, was quite inconsiderable, and it is presumed that the explosives used was not high explosive.<br />
<br />
It appears from the splinters of these 15-in. shell that the wall was 6.3 - 6.7 ins. (16 - 17 cm.), so that the hollow space cannot measure more than 2.4 ins. - 1.8 ins. (4 - 6 cm.). It is true that the large pieces into which these shell broke pierced everything in their course and often went right through the whole ship, unless they struck an armoured part. Several intact heads were found, with and without caps, and also entire bases.<br />
<br />
The second kind of shell had considerably thinner walls, only about half as thick, but it also often broke up into quite large pieces and displayed no great explosive power, and little or no incendiary power.<br />
<br />
It appears therefore that the British aimed only at attaining penetrating power, and the Germans are of opinion that they do not possess (rohrsicheren)* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D.Note.- This appears to be a special fuse which is very delicate, but safe until it has left the gun.] fuses for high explosive shell; this was their opinion before the war also.<br />
<br />
They believe that the high explosive power of the German ammunition gives them a great advantage which may partly counterbalance the smaller calibre of their guns and perhaps also their inferior gunnery. In any case, the effect of the German shell at the point of impact was very considerable.<br />
<br />
The fact that the ships blew up must be attributed to explosions in their magazines. (In this connection one may recall a turret of the "SEYDLITZ" being hit in the action of 24 January, 1915; see my report No.47 ex 15). The turret armour must have been pierced and the shells in the turret must have been exploded. The British have no metal cartridge-cases and also no cartridge-holders such as the Germans have, but they keep their cartridges in locked boxes which are perhaps not flash-proof enough. It seems therefore, from the incident experienced by the "SEYDLITZ", that this must constitute a particular danger to British ships. In this last action also turrets in German ships were frequently hit; further details are given in the account of damage sustained.<br />
<br />
After having compared the hits received in the German ships with the observations of results on enemy targets, it may be safely affirmed that the explosive power of the German shells exceeds that of the British; this was already known after the action of 24 January 1915. The Germans are therefore very much annoyed that they had no 15-in. guns to fire, as they are persuaded that ships so knocked about (eingedeckte) as, for example, the "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" would have been completely destroyed by German shell.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. Note.- The writer appears to mean that if German 15-in. shell had been used against "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" these ships would have been sunk.]<br />
<br />
It may be noted here that the "BAYERN", the first of their ships to carry 15-in. guns, will not join the Fleet for another few days, and the "BADEN" not until the autumn.<br />
<br />
Medium armament played no part, only a few hits were obtained and they did little damage.<br />
<br />
The British fired part-salvoes, like the Germans; full salvoes may have been fired now and again.<br />
<br />
The method of repulsing destroyer attacks, which has previously been reported, namely the 'turning away' and firing on one, or at most two boats, proved to be sound, and the repulsing of attacks both by day and night offered no difficulties.<br />
<br />
As regards gunnery, it may also be mentioned that the fire-control apparatus worked without a hitch and withstood the heaviest shocks. The elevation pointers worked admirably. A few ships were not yet fitted with them.<br />
<br />
<center><u>Torpedo.</u></center><br />
<br />
As regards torpedo work the Germans consider themselves very much superior. There were prolonged discussions about depriving Flotilla Leaders of their independence and putting them under the orders of a Leader Ship, but they are now convinced that this is necessary to ensure the flotillas attacking at the right moment and all together.<br />
<br />
The flotillas were led by the 2 leader Ships "ROSTOCK" and "REGENSBURG", the first having 2 flotillas and the second 3 flotillas allocated to them. The remaining 2 flotillas accompanied the Main Fleet or the battle-cruisers. The leaders carried out their duties with great daring and circumspection. The attacks of the British were weak and scattered, and could therefore have little or only occasional success.<br />
<br />
The German 2nd Flotilla, composed of the larger 1500 ton boats were held back instead of being sent to attack. Although these boats are spoken of very highly and are indispensable for certain enterprises, the view is now taken that they are too large and too valuable to be used for attacking during an action. This Flotilla proceeded to Zeebrugge immediately after the action and arrived there safely. It is to be employed in preventing the British from blockading the harbour with nets, and thus make it impossible for the German submarines to proceed out.<br />
<br />
As far as I have heard, the "MOLTKE" alone of the larger ships fired 4 torpedoes.<br />
<br />
Submarines were not in evidence. No German submarines were present; on the other hand a German destroyer claims to have rammed a British submarine. This claim appears to be erroneous, at least it was declared to be nonsense by the Chief of Staff. The submarines failed as regards scouting and also doing the pursuit.<br />
<br />
Some people state that a British aeroplane was sighted to the northward, and that it had apparently risen from a cruiser. It played no part in the action.<br />
<br />
The use of "Höschter"* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. note:- Probably the name of the inventor.] fog seems to have been of good service, it and the smoke made by the destroyers having completely masked the Main Fleet and its movements at critical moments.<br />
<br />
<center><u>SPEED</u></center><br />
<br />
The advantage of speed lay entirely with the British, not only as regards the Main Fleet on account of the "Deutschland" class, but also as regards the battle-cruisers. The latter are said to have proved considerably faster than the German battle cruisers, an unpleasant experience which had already been made on 25 January 1915. This alone proves that the British are talking nonsense when they assert that the German Fleet sought safety in flight; on the contrary, it was far from its bases and entirely in the power of the British, who either did not wish to take advantage of their superior speed, or were unable to do so on account of the damage sustained. The visibility was no worse than it had been during the day and Jellicoe may have even welcomed the "Höschter" fog which would enable him to plead bad visibility as a reason for abandoning the pursuit. On the German side in the light of experience the factor of speed in the battleships is considered very important. But the moderate depths of the German harbours limits the draught of the ships, and make it particularly difficult for German builders to do much in this respect. In spite of greater length and higher horse power the most modern cruisers "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ" and "LÜTZOW" attained only a quite inconsiderable increase of speed in comparison with the older "GOEBEN" class, and proved a disappointment in this particular.<br />
<br />
The question whether the older battleships should take part in an important engagement was not easy to decide. The 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons composed of the "WITTLESBACH" and "BARBAROSSA" class, re-commissioned at the beginning of the war, were intended to be used in such actions, but have long since been paid off; some have been disarmed and employed as guardships and instructional ships, etc. It was considered however, that the 2nd Battle Squadron, composed of the most modern of the older ships, would be of some service in the action; but this squadron was in a privileged position, inasmuch as it was merely attached to the 1st and 3rd Battle Squadrons and its Admiral was allowed to operate independently and select the position he thought best. On this occasion it kept station quite well and did not prove a hindrance, but, on the other hand, it did not come under any heavy fire. This must be considered very fortunate, for, in view of the damage sustained by other ships and in view of the fact that the British shell pierced all armour above or below water even at the longest range, it is certain that every ship of this class would have been sunk by a few hits, as their internal sub-division is not proof against large inrushes of water.<br />
<br />
The loss of the "Pommern", which gives the British an opportunity for a hollow triumph, also teaches a clear lesson. The Chief of Staff told me that they will probably consider carefully before again exposing this Squadron to danger; therefore this action will have further confirmed the complete worthlessness of all Dreadnought types [sic] and will condemn them as old iron.<br />
<br />
<center><u>TORPEDO NETS.</u></center><br />
<br />
The torpedo nets of the battle cruisers are all badly damaged and the gear so knocked about by gunfire that they were almost useless. This was particularly the case with the "Derfflinger", where the after port nets were hanging in the water, and would have fallen across the propeller had they not chanced to remain held up by a temporary lashing. The ship was obliged to stop during the action to secure the nets, and they might easily have occasioned the loss of the ship.<br />
<br />
For this reason all the nets, together with the booms, were unshipped immediately after the ships' return, to everybody's satisfaction. They will not be carried any more, except perhaps for operations in the Baltic, where the ships may be obliged to anchor at sea.<br />
<br />
<center><u>LEAK-STOPPING SERVICE.</u></center><br />
<br />
The leak-stopping service which had been systematically developed, worked admirably and the Germans are convinced that they owe much to it. They believed that the "Seydlitz" could not have been brought in if the strengthening of the bulkheads, etc., had not been so thoroughly exercised and if the personnel had not been so well trained.<br />
<br />
It is also said, that in the "Lutzow", which had only been in commission for 2 months, was naturally not up to the mark in this respect, and that it is not impossible that small shortcomings, for which of course nobody can be blamed, were responsible for the ship sinking. The "Lutzow" was an unfortunate ship altogether. First her turbines collapsed, thus delaying her commissioning for 6 months, then she immediately struck a mine, and she was hardly out of dockyard hands before she was sunk.<br />
<br />
<center><u>DANGER FROM GAS FUMES.</u></center><br />
<br />
Only 2 days before sailing, a large number of the ships, and fortunately exactly those that came most under fire, namely battle-cruisers and the 3rd Squadron, were supplied with gas masks fitted with alkali cartridges for the whole crew and a plentiful reserve (in the "Seydlitz" 1500 masks for about 1200 men). The masks are similar to those used in the army for poisonous gases. Each man carries a mask slung round him, if he is not actually wearing it.<br />
<br />
I was told emphatically by all the officers, that, in their experience, these masks are absolutely necessary and not only saved many lives but enabled the men to carry on in parts of the ship which they would otherwise have been compelled to leave.<br />
<br />
The gases from shells, mines and torpedoes penetrate in an incredible manner through ventilators, telephone leads, etc. to compartments far away from the point of impact. In many cases the masks enabled large numbers of the guns' crews to escape from turrets that were hit, and to help out others who were badly wounded. In one case the men in one of the main engine rooms were able to remain at their posts after gas had penetrated, until the engine-room was ventilated.<br />
<br />
The Fleet breathing apparatus (Flottenathmer) is preferable to masks in some cases, but it cannot be supplied to everyone and it hampers one's movements, which the masks do not.<br />
<br />
On account of the great danger from gases, it is also advisable to fit hinged flaps in all shafts, and to have wooden bungs to fit the voice-pipes, keeping a hammer at hand to hammer them into the mouth-pieces.<br />
<br />
They tell me that it proved very useful to keep all the personnel employed below, such as in central control rooms, engine-rooms, torpedo flats, etc. continually informed of what was going on. The men get nervous, particularly at first, with the tremendous shocks caused by shell falling close to the ship, though the shocks are felt less on deck, and such information gives them confidence and they like knowing what is going on above them.<br />
<br />
<center><u>DAMAGE</u></center><br />
<br />
The distribution of ships needing repair in the various dockyards is as follows:-<br />
<br />
The "König" proceeded at once to Kiel and is under repair at Howaldt's yard. I did not see her.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" and "Moltke" in Blohm and Voss yard, Hamburg, the first in the Imperial Dock.<br />
<br />
The "Kurfürst["] in Vulkan Yard, Hamburg.<br />
<br />
The "Derfflinger" was first docked in Wilhelmshaven and the leaks temporarily stopped, she then proceeded to the Imperial dockyard, Kiel. The "Seydlitz" will now be docked in the large dock at Wilhelmshaven; during my stay the "Seydlitz" was still in the lock.<br />
<br />
The "Von der Tann", "Ostfriesland" and "Helgoland" will be repaired in dry docks in Wilhelmshaven. No other large ships require to be docked.<br />
<br />
"<u>Seydlitz</u>" The number of hits was still uncertain, as the whole forepart of the ship up to the upper deck was still under water, and it is not known what she looks like below water. The ship was brought into the lock with difficulty, and as she is 43 ft. down by the bows, she cannot be taken into harbour. They will not venture to dock the ship inside the lock, and intend first to raise her bows slightly.<br />
<br />
The roof and guns of the fore turret and anchors, cables etc., have already been unshipped, and they now intend to bring caissons alongside and pump out the fore part sufficiently to enable her to enter the harbour.<br />
<br />
The great inrush of water, that flooded more or less the whole fore part of the ship as far as the first boiler-room bulkhead, was caused by a number of hits. Firstly, one of the belt armour plates forward on the port side is missing, having fallen off. Secondly, there are believed to be at least 2 or 3 more hits below water, forward on the port side; for the list and the settling down had already become ominous when the ship was hit at the edge of the upper deck, port side, abreast the bridge; this was followed by an inrush of water in the battery deck, which did a great amount of damage.<br />
<br />
In addition, during the day action, she was hit by a torpedo on the starboard side under the forward 5.9 in. gun, which caused her to settle down still more by the bows. This gun was so much damaged by the shock from underneath as to be disabled.<br />
<br />
Further, there are 4 severe hits in the ship's side (mess deck, port side, forward of the turret), which also demolished the port capstan.<br />
<br />
These shell, or shell splinters, naturally penetrated to the armoured deck, so that the entire fore part of the ship above and below the armoured deck is holed in many places, allowing free passage for the water. The fore part of the ship was struck therefore by at least 8 or 9 shells and one torpedo.<br />
<br />
Apparently the only compartments which are not flooded, are the bow torpedo flats and the central control room. The former is being pumped out continuously, as a great deal of water is flowing in from above. The torpedo control room had to be abandoned, as the forward partition was not watertight. The central control room abaft this was not abandoned, but of its 2 entrances from the starboard and port passages, only the port one can be used, as the starboard one is flooded.<br />
<br />
The gunnery control room is far further aft and was not affected.<br />
<br />
The ship has a list of 7° to port, and as she has now been slightly raised, about 1¾ ft. of her bows are above water; at one time it was up to the level of the deck.<br />
<br />
While under way the forward boiler room bulkhead had to withstand most of the pressure; supports have been built up everywhere, but it leaks in places.<br />
<br />
The other hits of consequences were those in the turrets. The fore starboard turret No.2 received a direct hit on the fore face of the revolving structure. One curved plate was forced out, but fortunately the main effect of the explosion was outward. The right hand gun was disabled by slight damage to the mounting; with this exception the turret remained in action and kept up fire.<br />
<br />
The right hand gun of turret No.3 received a direct hit, which cut out a wide groove along the tube of the gun. The left hand gun continued to fire.<br />
<br />
The barbette of turret No.4 was hit on a level with the rammer, and the armour was pierced clean through. This hit is of special interest, as the "Seydlitz" received a similar hit and at the same level in turret No.5 on 24th January 1915, which caused a fire, disabled both the after turrets and killed all the guns' crews. This last time, however, the damage was slight. There was no ready ammunition in the turret, and only one cartridge was exploded, in contrast to the (6200 Kg.) 13,670 lbs. of powder on Jan.1915. The turret officer and a large number of the gun's crews were saved by their gas masks. The destruction caused by splinters was, however, considerable and the turret was abandoned, as it was not possible to continue fire from it. This was a 13.5 in. shell, at 15,310 yds. range, strength of armour pierced 8.6 inches.<br />
<br />
After the turret had been abandoned, it was hit a second time in the after side of the revolving part, which was pierced; this of course increased the havoc in the interior.<br />
<br />
Turret No.5 was hit in the roof. The shell richochetted, and the roof is slightly dented. Nobody was hurt and the turret continued to fire.<br />
<br />
In the "Seydlitz" therefore, all the turrets were hit, with the exception of the foremost turret, and one was hit twice.<br />
<br />
A further hit pierced the 5.9 in. (150mm.) casemate armour of the aftermost 5.9 in. starboard gun, No.2. The deck was pierced from beneath, and splinters also pierced the splinter bulkhead. The gun was disabled and all the crew were killed, with the exception of the ship's chaplain who happened to be in the casemate and must be watched over by a special guardian angel.<br />
<br />
A similar hit, with a 15 in. shell, struck the casemate armour of the 6-in. gun No.7 and exploded in the casemate. Men were killed, the gun was disabled and the splinter bulkhead pierced by large splinters. This time again, surprise was aroused by the comparatively small damage caused by a large calibre shell.<br />
<br />
"<u>Derfflinger</u>". One shell hit the armour belt forward of the hawse pipe, probably at the junction of 2 plates, as 2 plates broke away. The plates underneath were consequently strained apart and a great deal of water flowed in.<br />
<br />
The armour belt on the port side also received 2 further hits in the centre and was pierced clean through. The splinters penetrated more than half way through the ship, and in one case a piece of plating was driven half way though the ship. These hits, combined perhaps with others, destroyed the nets and their supports in several places.<br />
<br />
The two after turrets received direct hits, in one case on the roof, in the other case in the barbette above the deck; the armour was pierced and the upper portions of the turrets burnt out and severely damaged, but the flames did not penetrate to the magazines. The crew in the upper part of the turret were killed, and both turrets were disabled. This occurred at an early stage of the action.<br />
<br />
The guns at high elevation cannot yet be dismounted, as everything is wedged in, but they do not appear to be damaged.<br />
<br />
The muzzles were carried away off the 4 foremost 6 in. (15 cm.) guns on the port side; two of them probably having been accounted for by one and the same shell which hit the armour. One gun, the muzzle of which was perhaps damaged by a splinter, afterwards burst, the tube splitting open in the shape of a tulip.<br />
<br />
The "Derfflinger" received a few other hits of no particular interest. She appears the next most severely damaged ship after the "Lützow".<br />
<br />
The "<u>Moltke</u>" only received 5 hits, all of them during that part of the action which took place on a southerly course; while the cruisers mentioned above received most of the hits on the port side, consequently during the later stages of the action.<br />
<br />
One shell pieced the bulwarks in the after part of the ship above the armour, passed through the ship and struck the armour on the port side from inside, about 3.3 ft. below the water-line. One plate was forced out and is missing. The inrush of water was considerable. The after compartments, above the armoured deck which remained intact, were all more or less flooded.<br />
<br />
The second hit was further forward, below the armour belt. The shell exploded in a bunker, but the armoured deck held and no water penetrated it from below. The neighbouring bunkers made little water and could be pumped out.<br />
<br />
Another shell struck the 5.9 in. armour in the upper bunker, above the water-line. The armoured deck again held, but the inner wall of the bunker parted, and the battery deck was pierced from below, a 6 in. gun being damaged and disabled.<br />
<br />
In the fore part of the ship a shell struck the armour belt below the water-line. The plate remained intact and was driven in about 8 inches. The compartment was flooded, but the torpedo bulkhead remained watertight. A neighbouring compartment leaked slightly, the rivets having parted.<br />
<br />
The fifth case of damage, namely a plate beneath the armour belt being driven and pressed in, was probably not due to a direct hit, but to splinters of a shell which fell short.<br />
<br />
"<u>Von der Tann</u>". A shell hit and pierced the lower part of the 3.9 in. armour belt in the after part of the ship to starboard. The compartments above the armoured deck, and some of those on the deck above, were flooded. The chief effect of the shell was outside the ship, but it bent the plates below the otherwise undamaged armoured deck, so that a considerable amount of water flowed into the compartments below the armoured deck. The after torpedo flat was flooded half way up, and the men in the starboard steering engine room were shut in for a long time owing to the exits being blocked.<br />
<br />
The fore turret was hit on the starboard side on the upper edge of the barbette and a semi-circular armour plate was forced out. The machinery of the turret was so badly knocked about that the turret was disabled.<br />
<br />
The hydraulic piping was damaged, so that all the heavy armament was put out of action temporarily. Strangely enough, though men were wounded none were killed.<br />
<br />
The aftermost turret was hit in the barbette. The armour was pierced, but the effect of the shell was exterior, the turret sustained little internal damage, so that the handgear of the turret remained in action. The turret was wedged in one place and could not revolve; they succeeded, however, in cutting off with oxy-acetylene the piece of revolving part which was jammed against the inner side of the barbette thus getting rid of the obstruction.<br />
<br />
Outside the turret, the shell did considerable damage; some splinters striking downwards, bent the armoured deck and pierced it in places. As far as I know, the armoured deck sustained no further damage, and this was of little importance.<br />
<br />
The after conning-tower was hit and a piece of the armour torn away; the occupants, including the 3rd gunnery officer, were killed. Splinters struck downwards to the engine-room ventilation hatches, but were stopped by the armoured gratings.<br />
<br />
"<u>Ostfriesland"</u> was struck by a mine below the foremost port turret. The whole measures 197 ft.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. note:- Literal translation is 12 times 5 metres large.] The torpedo bulkhead is only slightly torn, and the inrush of water was only local.<br />
<br />
"<u>Helgoland</u>". A 13.5 in. shell hit the 7.9 in. armour belt forward on the port side and pierced it. The shell appears to have broken only as no explosive action can be traced. The range was about 14,217 yds.<br />
<br />
"<u>Nassau</u>" rammed a British destroyer, or rather, the destroyer ran into her forward on the port side. Her bows must have lifted right up, for her hawse-pipe remained on board the "Nassau", so firmly wedged into the side of the upper deck that it will have to be cut out. The "Nassau's" side below the deck is torn away for 33 ft. The destroyer then glanced off the "Nassau's" side and exploded internally. One of the crew remained behind in one of the nets, but fell into the water when the "Nassau" fired a salvo.<br />
<br />
The "Nassau" was hit by shrapnel from attacking destroyers in the foremost searchlight group, both port searchlights were put out of action. The searchlight control and electric cables were destroyed and many of the searchlight crews were killed. The after searchlight group was hit in a similar manner, and one of the searchlights was disabled.<br />
<br />
The "Rhineland" and a light cruiser were also hit in a similar manner.<br />
<br />
I have seen all the above mentioned ships in Wilhelmshaven.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" and "Kurfürst" were at Hamburg, but unfortunately I am unable to report much about them. They had already been under repair for several days, and the damage was to some extent made good. Besides this, the conditions were not favourable for undisturbed examination: commissioners from the Imperial Navy Office were on board, besides crowds of workmen, the noise was deafening and it was pouring with rain. Consequently I took no notes on the spot and relied on my memory, which however fails me now among the very many received of similar cases. I am therefore unable to report each hit with accuracy.<br />
<br />
This is immaterial, however, as there were no particularly interesting hits, and none of the ships had been hit in the turrets. The armour had been pierced in several places, the effect and character of the hits being similar in all cases; the hits on unarmoured parts were of little consequence.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" was hit aft on the port side of the water line just on a junction of two plates, a piece of equal size being torn away from each plate. The shell then struck the sloping part of the armoured deck and the splinters ricochetted and passed right through the ship. These plates have already been removed.<br />
<br />
A casemate was pierced and the gun disabled.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" is the only ship whose mast was hit, the mast remained standing and has now been removed.<br />
<br />
The spotting platform had to be abandoned, as communications with the conning tower was cut off. This was the only hit received in a conning tower; it only grazed the upper edge and glanced off, and the men inside hardly noticed it.<br />
<br />
The port engine was disabled, not in consequence of damage to the turbine which is in good condition, but owing to one of the main propeller bearings becoming overheated. The cause of this is not clear, but it is believed to be due to concussions. The ship was well able to keep station with her two remaining engines.<br />
<br />
The "<u>Kurfürst</u>" suffered especially from a great inrush of water forward on the port side, above the armoured deck; it was caused by a hit in the armour belt. No further damage of importance was sustained.<br />
<br />
With regard to time necessary for repair to these ships, it is not yet possible to say anything definite, as it is still undecided whether they shall undergo thorough repair or not. The chief difficulty is the manufacture of new armour plates; but some of the holed plates can, no doubt, be left in position for the present.<br />
<br />
A considerable time will be needed to repair some of the turrets of the battle-cruisers, but here too, they will contrive to get things done. For instance, the "Von der Tann" is to have an entire turret out of a ship of the "Nassau" class, probably the foremost turret, and this ship will be left without a turret for some time. They talk a great deal also of transferring guns, and they will perhaps make use of those intended for the "Hindenburg", which will not be completed will the late autumn.<br />
<br />
It may be presumed that the battleships will be ready for sea in 4-6 weeks, and the battle-cruisers, particularly the "Seydlitz", in not less than 4 months. Naturally work is going on day and night, and repairs are given priority over all new construction.<br />
<br />
The damage sustained by light cruisers and destroyers is inconsiderable. The "Hamburg" had a funnel shot away. As these ships seem to be of minor importance, I did not trouble further about them.<br />
<br />
As our Allies appear not to have the intention of communicating to us what effect the examination of damages sustained will have on their construction in the future, we must endeavour to ascertain this as time goes on by means of cross questioning and by studying their new constructions in detail. I do not feel called upon to draw premature and rash conclusions to-day, on the strength of impressions received, but this will not prevent me from giving a summary of my opinion and of the opinions expresses in my hearing.<br />
<br />
Firstly, it is a remarkable fact that in all the ships that have returned home, all the engine and boiler-rooms are undamaged; the "Lützow" is no exception to this, as she proceeded under her own steam until late in the night after the action. I have also been assured by the Imperial Navy Office, after an inspection carried out by the Chief Engineer, that not a single auxiliary engine was defective. The only boiler-room put out of action was the foremost one in the "Seydlitz" where the bulkhead gave a little, allowing water to penetrate through rivet holes and cracks when the ship was under way. The conclusion may therefore be drawn that these vital parts of the ship are sufficiently protected and that the armour belt of the usual German thicknesses, though it cannot stop the shells, at least fulfils its purpose by breaking them up. Consequently it has become almost impossible even for the largest splinters of 15 in. shell to penetrate through armoured deck or torpedo bulkhead in engine and boiler rooms.<br />
<br />
Even at these long ranges and steep angles there was no question of the armoured decks being pierced; but the fitting of strong gratings over the hatches, which prevented the engines of the "Von der Tann" from sustaining severe damage, appears very necessary.<br />
<br />
The torpedo bulkheads also resisted shells, mines and torpedoes effectually; and in cases where slight damage was sustained, it had no further consequences than the flooding of the compartment affected.<br />
<br />
Perhaps it would be advisable to construct a specially strong boiler-room bulkhead, similar to a torpedo bulkhead, so that it could not be damaged by splinters or water-pressure.<br />
<br />
The inspection of the "Seydlitz" has left me with the impression that the commanding officer of the "Seydlitz" expected rather too much of his ship, and that nothing short of extraordinary good luck enabled her to be brought back. At one time when the whole forepart of the ship was flooded and the bows were under water, he proceeded occasionally with revolutions for 22 knots, just in order to show how seaworthy his ship was, so he told me. This may have been very sporting, or perhaps it may have been necessary under the circumstances in order not to drop too far behind and be overtaken by the enemy, but it certainly was not good seamanship, and if his stokehold bulkhead had burst, the "Seydlitz" would have gone down like the "Lutzow", where the circumstances appear to have been very similar. Later on he decreased speed and finally proceeded stern first.<br />
<br />
I therefore think it not impossible that the loss of the "Lützow", which is said to have been proceeded at 14 knots for a time, was also due only to recklessly high speed, and that the ship might have been saved if she had proceeded stern first or been taken in tow.<br />
<br />
As the danger from water-pressure must always be greatest from ahead, it would certainly be advisable to take special preventative measures against it.<br />
<br />
Vice-Admiral Schmidt told me that, in his opinion, the armoured belt ought to be strongest in the centre, and possible in the afterpart to protect the steering engines, and possibly in the bows, but that it ought not to taper off gradually from the centre to the extremities. He was also entirely in favour of a protected upper deck forming a second armoured deck.<br />
<br />
The admirably thorough system of internal division in the German ships and the floating capability thus attained is the finest proof of the merit of German construction which pursued this aim, and it shows that Admiral von Tirpitz, the creator of the Battle Fleet of to-day, was right when he upheld the principle that, above all things, the ships must be capable of remaining afloat and must not sink or heel over, and that everything else is of secondary consideration.<br />
<br />
The large number of hits in the turrets is remarkable, and it is generally considered that the turret armour should be appreciably stronger, especially in the lower part of the barbettes; for it is not only the disablement of the guns that comes into question, serious though this might be, but also the blowing up of magazines and the total destruction of the ship, as the wide shaft down to the magazines cannot possibly be made completely flash-proof. This is the most vital part of the ship. It is only owing to the small explosive charges in British shells, that there were no explosions of magazines in the German ships.<br />
<br />
Everything possible had been done after the action of 24.1.15 to ensure protection against this danger; the ready ammunition was removed from the top of the hoists and wherever possible all the openings in shafts leading down below were fitted with flaps, covers and heavy asbestos mats, while German ammunition is particularly carefully stowed and packed in cases with screwed-on covers.<br />
<br />
The disasters on the British side are a proof that this is a question of the greatest importance. It must also be taken into consideration that while any other damage turret may take months.<br />
<br />
The numerous hits in turrets would appear to justify the opinion of those who decided against triple turrets, on the ground [sic] that if one was disabled it would put too many heavy guns out of action.<br />
<br />
A hit in a casemate will of course destroy it and disable the gun, but this is of little consequence. Care must be taken here also not to have any ready ammunition, and to close the ammunition hand-up hermetically with heavy asbestos mats at the magazine end also. With the German "Paternoster" (dredger hoist) the ammunition lifts this mat as it comes up and the mat then falls to and closes the opening, which is a practical arrangement.<br />
<br />
Other hits through unarmoured parts, which destroyed more or less small gear and at the first glance give an impression of terrible havoc, are really of no consequence.<br />
<br />
In the "Von der Tann" they wanted to flood a turret magazine. This was impossible, as the flooding valve in the battery, or between deck was piled up with debris, cabin fittings, etc., and was inaccessible. Fortunately the flooding of the magazine turned out to be unnecessary. The Executive Officer remarked to me how critical such a trivial matter might become, and that one could not be careful enough about choosing the positions for the flooding valves, which must be kept clear of easily destructible objects.<br />
<br />
The man-hole covers in the decks, coal shoots [chutes], etc., were pointed out to me as dangerous, as they may be burst open by pressure of gas from below, thus causing damage and giving passage to the gases. These covers should be secured in a different manner and much more firmly.<br />
<br />
The flooding and draining system worked admirably, and is hardly capable of improvement. The only disadvantage is that the compartments above the armoured deck have no draining arrangements. This should be provided. A list, consequent on an inrush of water, could always be corrected by flooding an opposite compartment. This is an important matter both as affecting gunnery and personnel.<br />
<br />
The searchlights, which were not taken down in the German ships, all came out of the action undamaged; anxiety on their account was therefore unfounded. It was very unpleasant when attacking boats fired on the searchlights, and it is therefore considered necessary to fit light armour protection on the masts for the crews of the searchlight control and electric cables.<br />
<br />
Damage from flames is nowhere visible. The Germans are now rather amused at the care with which interior partitions were scraped.<br />
<br />
I could not help comparing the German ships with the Russian battleship "Orel", which I saw in Madzurn after the battle of Tsushima. If I remember rightly, the "Orel" had 5 severe hits and 40 hits with medium-calibre shell.<br />
<br />
The enormous explosive power of the Shimosa shell, which breaks up into minute splinters, did not do the slightest damage to the vital parts of the ship, but the upper deck was transformed into a confused heap of ruins. Superstructure, bridges, masts, funnels, etc., were destroyed, guns dismounted and fires started.<br />
<br />
Nothing of the kind is to be seen in the German ships, outwardly only a few more or less clean shell holes are visible, and they look so orderly and so little damaged that they do not appear to have gone through an action.<br />
<br />
It is true that the upper decks are said to have been littered with countless splinters, but they flew on to the decks from shells which struck the water, the ship receiving violent shocks.<br />
<br />
The holes in the armour show the characteristic concentric cracks round the hole and the radial splashes, the latter proving that the shells exploded on impact or at the latest, as they passed through. In many cases, as already noted, the force of the explosion was external and only pieces of plate, and possibly the head of the shell were driven in.<br />
<br />
<center><u>FLAG OFFICERS OF THE FLEET AND LEADERS</u></center><br />
<br />
{|<br />
| Commander-in-Chief:<br />
| Vice Admiral Scheer<br />
|-<br />
| <u>I Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Vice Admiral Schmidt<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Engelhard<br />
|-<br />
| <u>II Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Mauve<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Baron von Dalwigh<br />
|-<br />
| <u>III Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Behncke<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Nordmann<br />
|-<br />
| Officer commanding the Scouting Forces and<br>Commanding 1st Scouting Group<br />
| Vice Admiral Hipper<br />
|-<br />
| " 2nd " "<br />
| Rear Admiral Bodicker<br />
|-<br />
| " 4th " "<br />
| Commodore "Captain" v. Reuter<br />
|-<br />
| Leaders of Destroyers<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| in "Rostock"<br />
| Commodore "Captain" Michelsen<br />
|-<br />
| in Regensburg<br />
| Commodore "Captain" Heinrich<br />
|-<br />
| Leader of submarines<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| In Hamburg<br />
| Captain Bauer<br />
|}<br />
<br />
<center><u>REMARKS</u></center><br />
<br />
The lecture on the action, upon which this report is based, was illustrated by a plan prepared in haste for H.M. the Kaiser, and a copy was promised to me. But the Admiral Staff does not wish to part with this first incomplete draft, and the preparation of an accurate plan has not yet been completed, as the Admiral Staff is not yet in possession of all the details.<br />
<br />
In time to be included in this report I have only received the sketch of the first stage of the battle, namely the cruiser action on a southerly course, together with a small sketch of the situation when the action was broken off; both are enclosed.<br />
<br />
I conclude from the sketch of the cruiser action, that the accounts given to me were not quite accurate; for instance, the assertion of the commanding officer of the "Moltke" that the shortest range at that stage was 7,650 yds. and that he had accounted for one of the armoured cruisers with a torpedo.<br />
<br />
The sketch shows that the "Indefatigable" was probably first destroyed by gun fire from the "Von der Tann", and later the "Queen Mary" by gunfire from the "Derfflinger", and that the range was never less than 14,220 yds.<br />
<br />
The loss of "V. 27" and "V. 29" and of 4 British destroyers is also apparent, while I was only told of two.<br />
<br />
In the original sketch, 2 British armoured cruisers are also shown as having fallen out during this stage, but this is not shown on the accompanying sketch and probably took place later.<br />
<br />
I was told by the Admiral Staff that the accompanying sketches are not to be taken as strictly accurate.<br />
<br />
It is requested that the sketches and course of the action and the account of damages may be treated as strictly confidential.<br />
<br />
==Footnotes==<br />
{{reflist}}<br />
<br />
==Bibliography==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
*''Schematismus für das K.u.K. Heer und für die Kriegsmarine für 1914. Separatausgabe''. Wien. 1914.<br />
*''Almanach für die k. und k. Kriegsmarine 1917. Kriegsausgabe''. '''XXXVII'''. Pola. 1917.<br />
*[[Arthur Marder (Naval Historian)|Marder, Arthur J.]] (1966). ''From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919: Jutland and After, May 1916–December 1916''. '''Volume III'''. London: Oxford University Press.<br />
*{{MarderFDSFIII}}<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
==External Links==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
*Krámli, Mihály. [http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-124.pdf "The Report on the Battle of Jutland by the Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché in Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Colloredo-Mannsfeld."] ''NavWeaps''.<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
[[Category:Battle of Jutland]]</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Attach%C3%A9_Report_on_the_Battle_of_Jutland&diff=334739Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland2024-03-10T16:07:46Z<p>Simon Harley: </p>
<hr />
<div>Soon after the [[Battle of Jutland]] on 31 May &ndash; 1 June 1916 the Naval Attaché of the [[Austro-Hungarian Navy|Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Navy]] at the embassy in Berlin, ''Fregattenkapitäne'' Hieronymus Graf von Colloredo-Mannsfeld,<ref>''Schematismus für das K.u.K. Heer und für die Kriegsmarine für 1914''. p. 1270. ''Almanach für die k. und k. Kriegsmarine 1917''. p. 668.</ref> visited the High Sea Fleet. He composed a report on the battle for his superiors using first-hand accounts, interspersed here and there with his own observations. The version reproduced here is a translation in English apparently made by the [[Naval Intelligence Division (Royal Navy)|Naval Intelligence Division]] in 1919 from a copy which was subsequently returned to "F.N.A.", presumably the French Naval Attaché. A copy of the translation then made its way into the papers of the British Cabinet, from where historian Arthur J. Marder obtained a copy which is in his papers.<ref>Original number N.I.D. 087/19. Marder papers, Special Collections and Archives, Langson Library, University of California, Irvine, MS-F002, Box 27.</ref> He does not appear to have used it for the 1966 edition of ''From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow'', Volume III, but certainly used it for the revised edition in 1978.<ref>The quote on p. 189 of the 1965 edition differs from that on p. 234 of the 1978 edition, which is identical to that used here.</ref> <br />
<br />
It is worth comparing this translation with that made by Hungarian historian Mihály Krámli of a post-war copy of a slightly different version of the report in a Hungarian archive which has been published on the ''NavWeaps'' online resource.<ref>Krámli, Mihály. [http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-124.pdf "The Report on the Battle of Jutland by the Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché in Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Colloredo-Mannsfeld."] ''NavWeaps''.</ref><br />
<br />
The original grammar and punctuation of the typescript has been reproduced here wherever possible.<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
From:- Austrian Naval Attache in Berlin.<br />
<br />
To:- Commander-in-Chief, Pola.<br />
<div style="float:right;">Berlin,<br>17 June, 1916.</div><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<center><u>NAVAL ENGAGEMENT OF 31 MAY 1916.</u></center><br />
<br />
The following is a report of the naval proceedings of 31 May - 1 June, 1916, and also of the damage sustained by the German Fleet.<br />
<br />
During my 3-days' visit to Wilhelmshaven, followed by a cursory examination of the "MARKGRAF" and "KURFURST" at Hamburg, I endeavoured to gain merely a general idea of the results of gunfire and concentrated my attention on the course of the action itself.<br />
Admiral Scheer, whom I only saw for a short time as he left for Kiel to attend the funeral of his borther-in-law [sic], Lieut.-Commander Mohr, who was killed in the action, very kindly arranged that his Chief of Staff, Captain Trotha, should give me an account of the whole proceedings, illustrated by plans, and that I should be furnished with all information. I have tried to fill in the gaps by conversations with officers whom I know; this has resulted in some contradictory statements, and several points remain obscure, the accounts from the various ships not having all come in.<br />
<br />
Many episodes will therefore be explained later and may appear in a different light, but, as regards the broad outlines which are of chief importance, the picture of this interesting engagement is fairly clear. The accompanying plan of the action was made in haste for the Kaiser and will therefore need much correction.<br />
<br />
The spirit pervading the Fleet can only be described as one of enthusiasm; they are intoxicated with victory. The heavy load weighing on them all, the dear that this war might end without an encounter of the Fleets, have vanished. They have learnt what fighting really means, they know themselves to be superior to the enemy as regards tactics, and that they were following the right lines and have nothing to unlearn; they know that their gunfire was more effective than that of the enemy, and that they can rely implicitly on their flotillas which have always been looked upon in the German Navy as one of the chief factors in an action. Finally they know that their largest ships can stand heavy fire and serious damage, that they leave nothing to be desired as regards construction and cannot be sunk easily. In short, they feel that the British, in spite of all their boasting, cannot overcome the German Fleet and have a considerable respect for it.<br />
<br />
This conviction imbues the whole Fleet, down to the last man, with confidence in their strength and a calm assurance regarding future encounters. At the same time they are free from over-confidence and from under-estimation of the enemy. On the contrary, the British fire-control and the enormous piercing power of their heavy shell at great distances have roused their admiration, so that a careless conception of the situation is not to be feared, the less so, as well-balanced minds such as those of Admiral Scheer and his Staff are unlikely to be led away by former successes to undertake rash enterprises in the future.<br />
<br />
They do not deny that they were extraordinarily fortunate, and that if the action had been prosecuted with energy on the British side, and if the "Nelson touch" had been in evidence, things might have gone very badly for Germany, especially as the British still had an intact Battle Squadron of 12 units at their disposal which had not yet taken part in the action. But they console themselves with the knowledge that no naval action was ever won without some stroke of luck.<br />
<br />
The Kaiser's visit, the day before my arrival, and his address to the Fleet gave great satisfaction, and subsequently many important personages arrive to inspect the ships, such as Prince Henry and the Grand Dukes of Mecklenburg and Oldenburg, and numbers of decorations were distributed. Vice-Admiral Scheer was promoted to Admiral, and he and Vice-Admiral Hipper received the Pour le Merite.<br />
<br />
I also visited Rear-Admiral Behncke, who was wounded and in hospital; his wounds are slight, a few small splinters in his head, elbow and knee, and he will probably soon be well again.<br />
<br />
<center><u>COURSE OF THE ACTION.</u></center><br />
<br />
The Commander-in-Chief intended to advance with the whole Fleet to the waters of the Skagerrak, in order to make his presence felt unpleasantly by disturbing the shipping, hoping thereby to lure on the British forces and in this manner to be in a position to attack a part of the British Fleet with superior or at least with equal forces. He reckoned that any movements of the British Fleet would be reported to him in good time by the submarines which had been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and he hoped that the airships would prove a better means of reconnoitring than any possessed by the enemy.<br />
<br />
Unfavourable weather prevented him for a considerable period from undertaking any operations, and, as the submarines were to return home on 1 June and be relieved by a new group, the 31 May was the last date for carrying out the planned advance.<br />
<br />
The cruisers left the Jade at 3 a.m., the Main Fleet at 4 a.m., steering an easterly course, and then, after passing Heligoland, a N.N.W'ly course. No reports were received from submarines. These were stationed chiefly off the Orkneys and the Firth of Forth, and the large group of Flanders boats were off the Thames and at the entrance to the Channel. <br />
<br />
While proceeding northwards, a few W/T messages were received, but they were corrupt, appeared to refer only to small formations and gave no clue to the movements of the Grand Fleet. The airships were unable to start in the morning, on account of the wind, and, as it blew hard throughout the day in the Heligoland Bight, they could not start until the early hours of 1 June. In this respect things did not go well, but Admiral Scheer decided nevertheless to continue on his course to the Skagerrak. <br />
<br />
This the account given by Captain von Trotha, who affirms that nothing was known of the presence of the British Fleet in the waters of the Skagerrak, and that there seemed no probability of encountering this Fleet before 1 June.<br />
<br />
There are some points here which I am unable to understand. The submarines are said to have been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and were to return home on 1 June to be relieved probably by a weaker group. For, If the same number of boats were to to keep watch off the English coast, why should 31 May have been the last day for the German Fleet to sail. The day of departure was, therefore, too late in any case, for, if no encounter was to be expected before 1 June, the boats stationed off the coast could not possibly encounter the damaged British ships, as was intended, for probably no damaged ships would be there before 2 June.<br />
<br />
The battleship "KONIG ALBERT" had to carry out repairs to her condensers and did not proceed with the Fleet. Von Trotha told me that there was no alternative and that a ship must carry out small overhauls regularly in a dockyard according to programme. But could it not be arranged, when one is taking the initiative, to choose one's moment for an advance and to have all the ships together for this short time? And why should just that moment be chosen when one of the most powerful ships of the "Kaiser" class is in the dockyard, instead, for instance, of one of the "Nassau" class with 11-in. guns.<br />
<br />
In addition, the "BAYERN" was to have joined up a few days later. After having waited so long, why should not the plan have been postponed for 2 or 3 weeks, instead of dispensing with the only ship carrying 15-in. guns.<br />
<br />
In the same manner they dispensed with air reconnaissance, from which they had expected so much.<br />
<br />
These considerations make me doubt whether the account given me is quite correct, and whether, on the contrary, they knew of certain movements of the British Fleet and considered the moment extremely favourable for an attack. Perhaps they only knew of Beatty's battle squadron, and thinking the Main Fleet was far away, hoped to entrap this squadron. In Berlin, they have much to say, even in military circles, about the British Fleet's intention to push through into the Baltic, and of Kitchener's mission having some connection with this. I consider this senseless, for it cannot be presemed [sic] that the British Fleet would leave their shores unprotected and do the Germans the favour of operating in the Baltic, which would certainly be a most advantageous area for the German Fleet. In any case, there appear to be discrepancies which will probably be explained at some later date.<br />
<br />
Scouting groups, battle cruisers and light cruisers, together with flotillas, preceded the Main Fleet by 50 - 60 miles. At 4 p.m. the light cruisers encountered some British battle cruisers. These at once opened fire on the light cruisers, at an estimated distance of 26,247 yds.; the range could be taken accurately. Though they did not obtain a hit, the salvoes fell so well that the German cruisers thought it advisable to turn away and fall back on their battle cruisers.<br />
<br />
As the British approached, these battle cruisers turned on to a southerly course, in order to lure the enemy on to the German Main Fleet. A running action, on a southerly course, ensued. The British were to starboard and to the west of the Germans, who had therefore the following advantage: in the North Sea, in summer, the western horizon is quite light and visibility towards the west is good, while towards the east, and in a still greater degree off the Jutland Coast, it is misty and visibility is bad and no silhouettes stand out against the eastern horizon. This phenomenon also played great part in the subsequent course of the action. The sun was still high and was not troublesome, and the British ships offered admirable targets. The sea was calm, the wind N.W. 1-2, altering subsequently through W. to S.W.<br />
<br />
The following British ships were recognised:-<br />
3 "Lion" class, 1 "Tiger" and 2 "Indefatigable" class; they were soon reinforced by 5 "Queen Elizabeth" class following astern.<br />
<br />
It is asserted that, judging from shell splinters, the ship of the "Tiger" class carried 15-in. guns, and that she was therefore the mysterious vessel which replaced the "TIGER" sunk on 24.1.15; as the last-named "TIGER" carried only 13.5-in.guns, this was taken as a further proof of her loss. The silhouette of the new "TIGER", however, is said to have resembled that of the old "TIGER" exactly. As the "Queen Elizabeths" soon opened fire also with 15-in. guns, I rather doubt this assertion regarding the "TIGER", and the various ships on this early part of the engagement are altogether somewhat at variance.<br />
<br />
On the German side the ships proceeded in the following sequence:- "LÜTZOW", Flagship of Vice-Admiral Hipper, "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN".<br />
<br />
As Hipper edged towards the enemy, the distance decreased to about 7655 yds. The German fire was unquestionably superior, but the speed of the British vessels was greater. After a short time the "INDEFATIGABLE" and "QUEEN MARY" blew up, and 2 battle-cruisers and two attacking destroyers were also accounted for. The "QUEEN MARY" must have been destroyed by the explosion of a magazine; she was torn in two halves, and a water-colour painted by an officer represents her enveloped in an enormous column of black smoke; she disappeared in a few seconds. Only one cadet was subsequently picked.<br />
<br />
The second battle cruiser disappeared under similar circumstances. The "VON DER TANN" claims to have accounted for one of these battle-cruisers by a broadside. But the "MOLTKE" fired 4 torpedoes and also claims this achievement.<br />
<br />
The Germans suffered very little during this phase of the action, the "MOLTKE" alone receiving hits on the starboard side. The fire of the British battle-cruisers is said not to have been nearly as good as that of the "QUEEN ELIZABETH" class later on.<br />
<br />
When they had approached the German Main Fleet, the British turned on to a contrary course and the German cruisers did the same. The German Main Fleet proceeded in divisions in starboard quarter-line, the 3rd Battle Squadron: 4 "König" class and 3 "Kaiser" class, Fleet Flagship, 1st Battle Squadron: 4 "Ostfriesland" class and 4 "Westfalen" class, and the 2nd Battle Squadron: 5 "Deutschland" class and the "Hessen". They endeavoured to effect a junction with the cruisers, but were unable to take part very effectually.<br />
<br />
The course of the action was now in a northerly direction, over the area which had just been traversed, and the British ships now drew ahead considerably and turned more and more towards the East; the Germans followed this movement, and in consequence the conditions of visibility became less and less favourable for them.<br />
<br />
The "Queen Elizabeths" now made their presence more greatly felt; one of them had dropped out, but I was unable to ascertain when this occurred.<br />
<br />
The course of the German Math Fleet at first led past the 2 disabled British destroyers, which were lying stopped. The crews had already taken to the boats and were picked up later on by German destroyers. As the Main Fleet was doubtful about the advisability of passing the destroyers while they were still afloat, they were sunk by a few broadsides. One of the officers who was picked up was in pyjamas and is said to have stayed in his cabin during the action. He declared "We did not expect so much resistance," while another said - "The battle is rather disappointing." It has been ascertained that these destroyers were greatly under-manned; their crews seemed very exhausted, which points to their having been in the water for a long time.<br />
<br />
While on this easterly course, the light cruisers of the fast 2nd Scouting Group: "FRANKFURT", "PILLAU", "ELBING" and "WIESBADEN", were heavily fired on from the N.E. and E. without their being able to see more than the gun flashes. In addition, they were under continual fire from the N., and while turning away to S.E. and S., they ascertained that they were opposed by an interminable line of British ships, which appeared at first to be on a N.W.'ly course, and had then evidently turned together on to a S.'ly course.<br />
<br />
It may be noted here that the battleships, and, generally speaking, the battle-cruisers also, never sighted the British Main Fleet, and saw nothing but the flashes of the guns and the effects of the fire. These British ships, about 25 in number, were only sighted by a few light cruisers and by the flotillas, and were counted by them as accurately as possible.<br />
<br />
Surrounded thus from the N. and the E. and under fire, the "WIESBADEN" was disabled, apparently by a hit in the engine-room. The Admiral noticed, it is true, that his leading ships must have encountered new and powerful forces and that they were turning away; but he thought it his duty to go to the assistance of the "WIESBADEN" and therefore continued on an easterly course.<br />
<br />
The van of the Main Fleet, led by the "KÖNIG" (Rear-Admiral Behncke) now came under heavy fire from right ahead; the "KÖNIG" turned away under this fire towards the S.E., whereupon the Commander-in-Chief ordered the whole line to "turn together" to starboard and gave up the idea of helping the "WIESBADEN". About this time Vice-Admiral Hipper transferred his flag from the "LÜTZOW" to the "MOLTKE" with the help of a destroyer, his W/T station being damaged.<br />
<br />
Hardly had the Main Fleet drawn away on a westerly course, before it was ascertained that the pressure was relaxing and the fire decreasing, and that the British were no longer pursuing so hotly. Scheer therefore ordered the ships to "turn together" back on to their former course, and made the signal 'R' = 'Engage the enemy'. This second advance may be termed the zenith of the action. Admiral Scheer gave his views on it approximately as follows:- "Those who make a study of this engagement will be very puzzled as to my object in advancing thus against the wall of British ships. The fact is that I had no particular object. I made the first advance because I had a feeling that I ought to endeavour to assist the "WIESBADEN" and because the situation ahead was quite obscure to me, for I saw nothing of the "LÜTZOW" and received no W/T reports. I soon saw, however, that the leading ships were coming under an overwhelming fire, and that I could not risk the Fleet on the "WIESBADEN'S" account. When I noticed that the British pressure had quite ceased and that the Fleet remained intact in my hands, I turned back, under the impression that the action could not end in this way and that I ought to seek contact with the enemy again."<br />
<br />
The situation during the first and second advances may serve as an example of what should not take place according to all the laws of tactics, for it could not have been worse; von Trotha said jokingly that, if an Admiral brought about such a situation at a war game or in manoeuvres, he would never be entrusted without another command. In the North, the "Queen Elizabeths", then the battle-cruisers, and from N.E. through E. to S.E., an endless line of battleships formed an arc round the German van and kept it under fire. Evidently it had fallen into the most perfect trap. In addition to this unfavourable tactical position, there was a further difficulty, namely that the German ships could be clearly distinguished while they themselves only saw the gun flashes, 4 or 5 to each salvo, but could find no target.<br />
<br />
The Gunnery Officer of the "MARKGRAF" told me that he could not fire at all during half-an-hour, and that they were at the mercy of the British broadsides. Critical though the position was, in theory, they think that experience justifies the conclusion that this 'crossing the T' is in reality not so disastrous at longer ranges; for, in spite of the enormous superiority of their fire, the British made comparatively few hits, the simple reason being that, when fire is thus concentrated on a few leading ships, there can be no question of improving the shooting by spotting.<br />
<br />
Given good tactical training and squadrons which work well together, it is always easy to retire rapidly from an unfavourable position and even possibly to reach an advantageous one.<br />
<br />
The small amount of damage sustained by the Main Fleet may be owing partly to the fact that the leading battle-cruisers drew the enemy's fire, thus relieving the battleships. Only the three leading ships, "KÖNIG", "GROSSER KURFÜRST" and "MARKGRAF" received several hits; while among all the other ships, the "KAISER", "HELGOLAND" and the "SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN" received one hit each, and the rest were not hit at all.<br />
<br />
Simultaneously with the battle-cruisers, which were ahead and pressing forward in quarter-line formation, the 6th and 9th Flotillas, left by the "REGENSBURG", also proceeded to a torpedo attack. Regarding this cruiser advance, the Commanding Officer of the "SEYDLITZ" told me that he was in such a position that he was able to avoid the British salvoes, for he altered course towards the point where each salvo fell and thus evaded the spotting correction.<br />
<br />
This torpedo attack was carried out with great determination and seems to have been completely successful, although nobody is able to state how many hits were obtained. The British ships overlapped somewhat and their line was almost unbroken, and, as about 100 torpedoes were fired, it is estimates that there must have been a considerable number of hits, some people affirm that there were 20, but I do not place much confidence in these figures and it is useless to trouble about them as nobody is certain.<br />
<br />
The boats were fired on by guns of all calibres, even the heaviest, but with little effect, only one boat being destroyed; two other boats had been sunk in an earlier attack during the cruiser action.<br />
<br />
The battle-cruisers were also attacked by British torpedoes, the "SEYDLITZ" being hit once. The "MOLTKE" was lucky, for, when close to the ship, one torpedo apparently had a gyro failure and ran parallel with her. The "LÜTZOW" was probably hit also.<br />
<br />
After the attack, the destroyers laid fog and a heavy smoke screen, which interposed between the Fleet; this benefitted not only the heavily-damaged "LÜTZOW" and "DERFFLINGER", whose nets had been shot away and were hanging down, but also the whole Fleet. It may also have made an impression on the British.<br />
<br />
The German Main Fleet and cruisers turned on a westerly course, fire having again entirely ceased; and the ships of the Main Fleet then turned gradually in succession and in inverse sequence from W. to S.W., subsequently steering towards Horns Reef.<br />
<br />
It is not known what the British did; all that is certain, is that they did not follow in pursuit and that nothing further was seen of their Main Fleet. It remained light until 11 p.m. (summer time), and it would not have been impossible, considering their superior speed, for them to have come within firing range. The Germans expected it too, and now have to content themselves with surmises about the British Commander-in-Chief's reasons for not doing so. It is probably that the unfavourable issue of the fleet part of the battle and the demoralising losses in ships took away any desire on Jellicoe's part for further fighting. His Fleet may have lost heavily and been severely shaken by the torpedo attack; and, as the Germans still had some intact flotillas at their disposal, he may have feared further strong torpedo attacks in the critical hours of twilight, for in the German Navy they say that Jellicoe fears their destroyers in particular.<br />
<br />
Nevertheless, the Germans were not under the impression of having shaken the British Fleet to the extent of obliging them to give up the struggle, and when the evening passed without further incident, they reckoned with certainty on encountering Jellicoe off Horns Reef at daybreak. They were the more astonished at his non-appearance when their air reconnaissance reported that on the morning of 1 June a squadron of 12 battle-ships was proceeding North from the southern part of North Sea and that it suddenly turned on to an opposite course and proceeded South.<br />
<br />
As it could not possibly have been the intention of the British Commander-in-Chief to let the German Fleet escape after having encountered it at last far from its base, and as he still had an intact battle-squadron at his disposal, one is compelled to take the view that he no longer felt strong enough for a second encounter; the achievement of the German Fleet must therefore be very highly thought of.<br />
<br />
During the night cruising following the action, numerous small episodes and minor engagements took place, of which no clear idea can be formed. <br />
<br />
In view of a possible fresh attack or of a possible pursuit on the part of the enemy, it was thought undesirable to leave the 2nd Battle Squadron either in the van or in the rear, it therefore took station to starboard and at first proceeded on an opening course from the other squadrons, and continued fairly independently during the night.<br />
<br />
The 1st Battle Squadron therefore led, with the "WESTFALEN" as guide, and it was followed by the 3rd Battle Squadron.<br />
<br />
After the action had been broken off, the 4 remaining battle cruisers were ahead to port, where they were suddenly again brought under heavy fire from the port side and from ahead, apparently by 3 or 4 battle cruisers. It is presumed that these were the remaining 3 or 4 older cruisers of the "Invincible" class, which Jellicoe probably always stationed ahead of the Main Fleet, for it would hardly have been possible for the "Lions", which were following in the rear in the British line, to have taken station ahead so quickly. The German battle cruisers, all severely damaged, did not feel able to withstand this fire and turned away to starboard, passing ahead of the Main Fleet and between it and the 2nd Battle Squadron, which proceeded quietly on their course and before which the mysterious ships retired, not to be sighted again.<br />
<br />
The battle-cruisers then gradually fell astern, and as they were making much water, and also owing to their differing speeds, they lost contact with the Main Fleet and with each other.<br />
<br />
The "LÜTZOW" had dropped out during the engagement and proceeded independently, accompanied by 4 destroyers. At first she was able to steam 14 knots, but her speed decreased rapidly and dropped finally to 4 knots. Her bows sank slowly, and when the whole forecastle was under water the Commanding Officer decided to leave the ship. The badly wounded were transferred carefully to the boats and the disembarkation was conducted in good order. A torpedo was then fired at the ship and this coup de grace sank her in deep water at about 1 o'clock, I believe.<br />
<br />
The "SEYDLITZ" was hardly in a better condition than the "LÜTZOW"; she also sank gradually by the bows till the water was almost level with the deck, and she had a heavy list to port, but she continued on her course. In the darkest hours of the night she suddenly sighted 3 large ships to port, quite close to. She turned away, made a British recognition signal and was not pursued. As bad luck would have it, the steaming light had short-circuited, could not be switched off and showed intermittently.<br />
<br />
The "DERFFLINGER", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN" followed the Main Fleet more or less and met with no particular experiences.<br />
<br />
The Main Fleet had to repulse a series of destroyer attacks and was also engaged by cruisers. The movements of these British cruisers, which came up singly, are incomprehensible and give the impression of having lost their heads. They appear to have received the order, judging by an intercepted W/T message, to proceed on a northerly and north-westerly course, and thereby they ran into the extended German line which they probably imagined they had passed to the South.<br />
<br />
One large cruiser (?"WARRIOR") proceeded unsuspectingly within 875 yds. of the line of battleships and came under concentrated fire from several ships before she could reply, so that she blew up enveloped in flames and disappeared in 47 seconds. The "BIRMINGHAM" seems to have been accounted for in a similar manner. The destroyers all approached in a really insane manner; frequently not from ahead but from a direction astern, scattered, singly or in pairs, or at most 3 together, never in large numbers. Most of them were disabled forthwith by a few salvoes and set on fire. The "WESTFALEN" distinguished herself particularly at this time.<br />
<br />
These burning destroyers strewn along the course, lit it up as if for a festival. Evidently the fires were largely due to the light American and Mexican oils; at any rate German firing trials on oil bunkers never caused any such conflagrations.<br />
<br />
The attacking boats directed shrapnel fire on the searchlights with fairly good results, the searchlights of two battleships and one light cruiser being hit.<br />
<br />
One large destroyer, which only recognised the danger at the last moment and endeavoured to avoid it by altering course was rammed by the "NASSAU", which put her helm over for this purpose. The boat exploded internally and sank.<br />
<br />
The only ships hit were the "POMMERN" in the 2ns Battle Squadron, and the "ROSTOCK". The "POMMERN" blew up at once and nobody was saved. The "ROSTOCK" was just passing between ships of the Main Fleet when she was hit; the loss of life on board was small.<br />
<br />
The Germans believe they destroyed 11 British destroyers in all. The manner in which these destroyers were handled has not left a good impression on the whole, and one has certainly lost respect for this weapon. The view is also taken that the boats are too large and offer too wide a target.<br />
<br />
The light cruiser "ELBING", like the "ROSTOCK", apparently wanted to break through the line from port to starboard under pressure from the British cruisers; she was, however, rammed by the "POSEN" and had to be abandoned in a sinking condition. The Germans also fired a torpedo into her.<br />
<br />
The "FRAUENLOB" and 2 destroyers were lost during the night; no details of their loss are known.<br />
<br />
Not far from Heligoland, the "OSTFRIESLAND", 7th of the line, struck a mine. This brings the account of the chief events of this exciting cruiser to an end.<br />
<br />
The German flotillas were detached from the Fleet to clear the area off the Jutland Coast, which was divided up into sectors. The flotillas stationed furthest to the North proceeded to the Skagerrak and through these straits into the Baltic and to Kiel.<br />
<br />
None of the flotillas sighted the British Main Fleet again, which proves that it must have turned away to the N. or N.W. immediately after the action. According to confidential reports the Fleet entered British ports as early as 1 June.<br />
<br />
Two British battleships, in a severely damaged condition and accompanied by destroyers, were sighted proceeding back to England. One was attacked by a submarine, but without success.<br />
<br />
On the morning of 1 June, in fairly misty weather, a Zeppelin sighted groups of British ships leaving the Channel on a N.E.'ly course. The reports were rather vague, as sometimes 6 and sometimes 12 ships were mentioned; but it seems most likely that 12 battleships and 3 cruisers were in question, and that they soon retired. The airship, which flew low at one time to get a clearer view, was also fired on.<br />
<br />
Some of the ships are said to have had tripod masts.<br />
<br />
The German Fleet, with the exception of "SEYDLITZ", reached the Jade in the afternoon. The "SEYDLITZ" could not cross the bar on account of being so much down by the bows, and it was not till the next day at high water that she was towed in, stern first.<br />
<br />
<center><u>MISCELLANEOUS.<br>TACTICS.</u></center><br />
<br />
The Germans ascribe their success to various causes, and in the first place to their own superiority as regards tactics. This is a point which every officer discusses, and it is constantly repeated that it all happened just as in tactical manoeuvres and in "battle exercises", and that things could not have gone better.<br />
<br />
Movements of squadrons, divisions and individual ships, "turns together" and alterations of course and speed, all went like clockwork and demonstrated the very great mobility of all formations.<br />
<br />
The W/T signalling system of the Main Fleet never failed, and its failure would have been immaterial, as the primary and secondary flag action signals, showing from several positions in the ship, were made simultaneously.<br />
<br />
All this was due to the peace training and the practical experience of the Flag Officers and Captains. Though in peace time the Commander-in-Chief had never commanded a Fleet, nor the Admirals a squadron, still the training carried out on the same lines for a number of years resulted in everything proceeding with the expected precision.<br />
<br />
The British, on the contrary, are said to have displayed a certain clumsiness as regards tactics and to have preferred turning together when "turning on to an opposite course" (Wendungen im Gegenmarsch), though this conclusion does not seem altogether justified from the description of the action.<br />
<br />
The ships kept station 547 yds. apart, and Vice-Admiral Schmidt told me that, in his opinion, this distance is too small for large ships and that he prefers 656 yds., as the shorter distances result in the ships getting bunched and overlapping during alterations of course. In order to relieve this during the first turn to starboard, the Fleet Flagship herself turned to port and then closed gradually into line. At night the distance was 656 yds.<br />
<br />
No interruption of W/T communication was occasioned by the enemy.<br />
<br />
<center><u>GUNNERY</u></center><br />
<br />
It is admitted that the British are superior as regards their gunnery technique. Their salvoes fall most astoundingly close together and aroused admiration on all sides. Some people affirm that they fell too close together, and that it was consequently difficult to cover a sufficiently large danger space.<br />
<br />
This is particularly the case with the heaviest calibres: 13.5-in. and 15-in. and the battle-cruisers' fire was noticeably inferior to that of the "Queen Elizabeth" class, for example.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> Literal translation; the meaning is not clear. - Tr.] The spread of the salvoes frequently only covered a few square yards. In the "KÖNIG" 3 rounds, out of a salvo of 4 rounds, hit between the capstan and the bridge.<br />
<br />
This is attributed to careful calibration, which the British have studied for a long time and which, as is well known, was abandoned by the German Navy after a few trials. The gunnery officers declare unanimously that it must unquestionably be re-introduced.<br />
<br />
The British range-finders are superior to the German, and the construction of their turrets enables them to shoot at ranges impossible for German guns. The question of range appears to be immaterial to the British, who fire at any range so long as visibility permits.<br />
<br />
The Germans are fully convinced of the great superiority of 15-in. guns over all others, and deplore the fact that, owing to the predominant conservative tendencies in the German Navy, this calibre was not introduced until so lately. Vice-Admiral Gerdes, the Head of the Armament Department, is responsible for this, for he always opposed it on the ground that the poor visibility in German waters and the consequent short ranges rendered an increase of calibre useless; he considered the German 12-in. gun to be an altogether superior weapon, capable of competing with every other.<br />
<br />
In one respect the British seem behindhand as compared with the Germans: namely that they cannot alter range quickly enough and they are too dependent on the range clock. The British rely on steady fire at long range, and they adapt their tactics to this and avoid alterations of course and range most assiduously.<br />
<br />
The Germans, on the contrary, in their firing practices always work with big and rapid alterations of range and exercise firing while turning, so that the gunnery officers consider they have an advantage in this respect.<br />
<br />
The Turn on to an opposite course was certainly not advantageous for the German Fleet, but in this particular instance it made little difference, as the German ships were already unable to find a target; besides which, it must have disconcerted the British and it prevented them from obtaining good results with their fire. The salvoes fell very close together round the ships, but few hits were obtained. The rate of fire in the British ships is said to have been fair, but not excessive. Some people affirm that it was very modest.<br />
<br />
The British shell had great penetrating power, and from all reasonable distances the main armour was generally pierced clean through. The shell splinters picked up prove conclusively that at least 2 kinds of shell were used, differing considerably in material and quality. One kind of shell had a very thick wall and an extremely small explosive charge, it might almost be called a solid shot. It seems to have broken up frequently without exploding and the fuse did not function. Its explosive power, if it possessed any at all, was quite inconsiderable, and it is presumed that the explosives used was not high explosive.<br />
<br />
It appears from the splinters of these 15-in. shell that the wall was 6.3 - 6.7 ins. (16 - 17 cm.), so that the hollow space cannot measure more than 2.4 ins. - 1.8 ins. (4 - 6 cm.). It is true that the large pieces into which these shell broke pierced everything in their course and often went right through the whole ship, unless they struck an armoured part. Several intact heads were found, with and without caps, and also entire bases.<br />
<br />
The second kind of shell had considerably thinner walls, only about half as thick, but it also often broke up into quite large pieces and displayed no great explosive power, and little or no incendiary power.<br />
<br />
It appears therefore that the British aimed only at attaining penetrating power, and the Germans are of opinion that they do not possess (rohrsicheren)* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D.Note.- This appears to be a special fuse which is very delicate, but safe until it has left the gun.] fuses for high explosive shell; this was their opinion before the war also.<br />
<br />
They believe that the high explosive power of the German ammunition gives them a great advantage which may partly counterbalance the smaller calibre of their guns and perhaps also their inferior gunnery. In any case, the effect of the German shell at the point of impact was very considerable.<br />
<br />
The fact that the ships blew up must be attributed to explosions in their magazines. (In this connection one may recall a turret of the "SEYDLITZ" being hit in the action of 24 January, 1915; see my report No.47 ex 15). The turret armour must have been pierced and the shells in the turret must have been exploded. The British have no metal cartridge-cases and also no cartridge-holders such as the Germans have, but they keep their cartridges in locked boxes which are perhaps not flash-proof enough. It seems therefore, from the incident experienced by the "SEYDLITZ", that this must constitute a particular danger to British ships. In this last action also turrets in German ships were frequently hit; further details are given in the account of damage sustained.<br />
<br />
After having compared the hits received in the German ships with the observations of results on enemy targets, it may be safely affirmed that the explosive power of the German shells exceeds that of the British; this was already known after the action of 24 January 1915. The Germans are therefore very much annoyed that they had no 15-in. guns to fire, as they are persuaded that ships so knocked about (eingedeckte) as, for example, the "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" would have been completely destroyed by German shell.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. Note.- The writer appears to mean that if German 15-in. shell had been used against "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" these ships would have been sunk.]<br />
<br />
It may be noted here that the "BAYERN", the first of their ships to carry 15-in. guns, will not join the Fleet for another few days, and the "BADEN" not until the autumn.<br />
<br />
Medium armament played no part, only a few hits were obtained and they did little damage.<br />
<br />
The British fired part-salvoes, like the Germans; full salvoes may have been fired now and again.<br />
<br />
The method of repulsing destroyer attacks, which has previously been reported, namely the 'turning away' and firing on one, or at most two boats, proved to be sound, and the repulsing of attacks both by day and night offered no difficulties.<br />
<br />
As regards gunnery, it may also be mentioned that the fire-control apparatus worked without a hitch and withstood the heaviest shocks. The elevation pointers worked admirably. A few ships were not yet fitted with them.<br />
<br />
<center><u>Torpedo.</u></center><br />
<br />
As regards torpedo work the Germans consider themselves very much superior. There were prolonged discussions about depriving Flotilla Leaders of their independence and putting them under the orders of a Leader Ship, but they are now convinced that this is necessary to ensure the flotillas attacking at the right moment and all together.<br />
<br />
The flotillas were led by the 2 leader Ships "ROSTOCK" and "REGENSBURG", the first having 2 flotillas and the second 3 flotillas allocated to them. The remaining 2 flotillas accompanied the Main Fleet or the battle-cruisers. The leaders carried out their duties with great daring and circumspection. The attacks of the British were weak and scattered, and could therefore have little or only occasional success.<br />
<br />
The German 2nd Flotilla, composed of the larger 1500 ton boats were held back instead of being sent to attack. Although these boats are spoken of very highly and are indispensable for certain enterprises, the view is now taken that they are too large and too valuable to be used for attacking during an action. This Flotilla proceeded to Zeebrugge immediately after the action and arrived there safely. It is to be employed in preventing the British from blockading the harbour with nets, and thus make it impossible for the German submarines to proceed out.<br />
<br />
As far as I have heard, the "MOLTKE" alone of the larger ships fired 4 torpedoes.<br />
<br />
Submarines were not in evidence. No German submarines were present; on the other hand a German destroyer claims to have rammed a British submarine. This claim appears to be erroneous, at least it was declared to be nonsense by the Chief of Staff. The submarines failed as regards scouting and also doing the pursuit.<br />
<br />
Some people state that a British aeroplane was sighted to the northward, and that it had apparently risen from a cruiser. It played no part in the action.<br />
<br />
The use of "Höschter"* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. note:- Probably the name of the inventor.] fog seems to have been of good service, it and the smoke made by the destroyers having completely masked the Main Fleet and its movements at critical moments.<br />
<br />
<center><u>SPEED</u></center><br />
<br />
The advantage of speed lay entirely with the British, not only as regards the Main Fleet on account of the "Deutschland" class, but also as regards the battle-cruisers. The latter are said to have proved considerably faster than the German battle cruisers, an unpleasant experience which had already been made on 25 January 1915. This alone proves that the British are talking nonsense when they assert that the German Fleet sought safety in flight; on the contrary, it was far from its bases and entirely in the power of the British, who either did not wish to take advantage of their superior speed, or were unable to do so on account of the damage sustained. The visibility was no worse than it had been during the day and Jellicoe may have even welcomed the "Höschter" fog which would enable him to plead bad visibility as a reason for abandoning the pursuit. On the German side in the light of experience the factor of speed in the battleships is considered very important. But the moderate depths of the German harbours limits the draught of the ships, and make it particularly difficult for German builders to do much in this respect. In spite of greater length and higher horse power the most modern cruisers "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ" and "LÜTZOW" attained only a quite inconsiderable increase of speed in comparison with the older "GOEBEN" class, and proved a disappointment in this particular.<br />
<br />
The question whether the older battleships should take part in an important engagement was not easy to decide. The 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons composed of the "WITTLESBACH" and "BARBAROSSA" class, re-commissioned at the beginning of the war, were intended to be used in such actions, but have long since been paid off; some have been disarmed and employed as guardships and instructional ships, etc. It was considered however, that the 2nd Battle Squadron, composed of the most modern of the older ships, would be of some service in the action; but this squadron was in a privileged position, inasmuch as it was merely attached to the 1st and 3rd Battle Squadrons and its Admiral was allowed to operate independently and select the position he thought best. On this occasion it kept station quite well and did not prove a hindrance, but, on the other hand, it did not come under any heavy fire. This must be considered very fortunate, for, in view of the damage sustained by other ships and in view of the fact that the British shell pierced all armour above or below water even at the longest range, it is certain that every ship of this class would have been sunk by a few hits, as their internal sub-division is not proof against large inrushes of water.<br />
<br />
The loss of the "Pommern", which gives the British an opportunity for a hollow triumph, also teaches a clear lesson. The Chief of Staff told me that they will probably consider carefully before again exposing this Squadron to danger; therefore this action will have further confirmed the complete worthlessness of all Dreadnought types [sic] and will condemn them as old iron.<br />
<br />
<center><u>TORPEDO NETS.</u></center><br />
<br />
The torpedo nets of the battle cruisers are all badly damaged and the gear so knocked about by gunfire that they were almost useless. This was particularly the case with the "Derfflinger", where the after port nets were hanging in the water, and would have fallen across the propeller had they not chanced to remain held up by a temporary lashing. The ship was obliged to stop during the action to secure the nets, and they might easily have occasioned the loss of the ship.<br />
<br />
For this reason all the nets, together with the booms, were unshipped immediately after the ships' return, to everybody's satisfaction. They will not be carried any more, except perhaps for operations in the Baltic, where the ships may be obliged to anchor at sea.<br />
<br />
<center><u>LEAK-STOPPING SERVICE.</u></center><br />
<br />
The leak-stopping service which had been systematically developed, worked admirably and the Germans are convinced that they owe much to it. They believed that the "Seydlitz" could not have been brought in if the strengthening of the bulkheads, etc., had not been so thoroughly exercised and if the personnel had not been so well trained.<br />
<br />
It is also said, that in the "Lutzow", which had only been in commission for 2 months, was naturally not up to the mark in this respect, and that it is not impossible that small shortcomings, for which of course nobody can be blamed, were responsible for the ship sinking. The "Lutzow" was an unfortunate ship altogether. First her turbines collapsed, thus delaying her commissioning for 6 months, then she immediately struck a mine, and she was hardly out of dockyard hands before she was sunk.<br />
<br />
<center><u>DANGER FROM GAS FUMES.</u></center><br />
<br />
Only 2 days before sailing, a large number of the ships, and fortunately exactly those that came most under fire, namely battle-cruisers and the 3rd Squadron, were supplied with gas masks fitted with alkali cartridges for the whole crew and a plentiful reserve (in the "Seydlitz" 1500 masks for about 1200 men). The masks are similar to those used in the army for poisonous gases. Each man carries a mask slung round him, if he is not actually wearing it.<br />
<br />
I was told emphatically by all the officers, that, in their experience, these masks are absolutely necessary and not only saved many lives but enabled the men to carry on in parts of the ship which they would otherwise have been compelled to leave.<br />
<br />
The gases from shells, mines and torpedoes penetrate in an incredible manner through ventilators, telephone leads, etc. to compartments far away from the point of impact. In many cases the masks enabled large numbers of the guns' crews to escape from turrets that were hit, and to help out others who were badly wounded. In one case the men in one of the main engine rooms were able to remain at their posts after gas had penetrated, until the engine-room was ventilated.<br />
<br />
The Fleet breathing apparatus (Flottenathmer) is preferable to masks in some cases, but it cannot be supplied to everyone and it hampers one's movements, which the masks do not.<br />
<br />
On account of the great danger from gases, it is also advisable to fit hinged flaps in all shafts, and to have wooden bungs to fit the voice-pipes, keeping a hammer at hand to hammer them into the mouth-pieces.<br />
<br />
They tell me that it proved very useful to keep all the personnel employed below, such as in central control rooms, engine-rooms, torpedo flats, etc. continually informed of what was going on. The men get nervous, particularly at first, with the tremendous shocks caused by shell falling close to the ship, though the shocks are felt less on deck, and such information gives them confidence and they like knowing what is going on above them.<br />
<br />
<center><u>DAMAGE</u></center><br />
<br />
The distribution of ships needing repair in the various dockyards is as follows:-<br />
<br />
The "König" proceeded at once to Kiel and is under repair at Howaldt's yard. I did not see her.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" and "Moltke" in Blohm and Voss yard, Hamburg, the first in the Imperial Dock.<br />
<br />
The "Kurfürst["] in Vulkan Yard, Hamburg.<br />
<br />
The "Derfflinger" was first docked in Wilhelmshaven and the leaks temporarily stopped, she then proceeded to the Imperial dockyard, Kiel. The "Seydlitz" will now be docked in the large dock at Wilhelmshaven; during my stay the "Seydlitz" was still in the lock.<br />
<br />
The "Von der Tann", "Ostfriesland" and "Helgoland" will be repaired in dry docks in Wilhelmshaven. No other large ships require to be docked.<br />
<br />
"<u>Seydlitz</u>" The number of hits was still uncertain, as the whole forepart of the ship up to the upper deck was still under water, and it is not known what she looks like below water. The ship was brought into the lock with difficulty, and as she is 43 ft. down by the bows, she cannot be taken into harbour. They will not venture to dock the ship inside the lock, and intend first to raise her bows slightly.<br />
<br />
The roof and guns of the fore turret and anchors, cables etc., have already been unshipped, and they now intend to bring caissons alongside and pump out the fore part sufficiently to enable her to enter the harbour.<br />
<br />
The great inrush of water, that flooded more or less the whole fore part of the ship as far as the first boiler-room bulkhead, was caused by a number of hits. Firstly, one of the belt armour plates forward on the port side is missing, having fallen off. Secondly, there are believed to be at least 2 or 3 more hits below water, forward on the port side; for the list and the settling down had already become ominous when the ship was hit at the edge of the upper deck, port side, abreast the bridge; this was followed by an inrush of water in the battery deck, which did a great amount of damage.<br />
<br />
In addition, during the day action, she was hit by a torpedo on the starboard side under the forward 5.9 in. gun, which caused her to settle down still more by the bows. This gun was so much damaged by the shock from underneath as to be disabled.<br />
<br />
Further, there are 4 severe hits in the ship's side (mess deck, port side, forward of the turret), which also demolished the port capstan.<br />
<br />
These shell, or shell splinters, naturally penetrated to the armoured deck, so that the entire fore part of the ship above and below the armoured deck is holed in many places, allowing free passage for the water. The fore part of the ship was struck therefore by at least 8 or 9 shells and one torpedo.<br />
<br />
Apparently the only compartments which are not flooded, are the bow torpedo flats and the central control room. The former is being pumped out continuously, as a great deal of water is flowing in from above. The torpedo control room had to be abandoned, as the forward partition was not watertight. The central control room abaft this was not abandoned, but of its 2 entrances from the starboard and port passages, only the port one can be used, as the starboard one is flooded.<br />
<br />
The gunnery control room is far further aft and was not affected.<br />
<br />
The ship has a list of 7° to port, and as she has now been slightly raised, about 1¾ ft. of her bows are above water; at one time it was up to the level of the deck.<br />
<br />
While under way the forward boiler room bulkhead had to withstand most of the pressure; supports have been built up everywhere, but it leaks in places.<br />
<br />
The other hits of consequences were those in the turrets. The fore starboard turret No.2 received a direct hit on the fore face of the revolving structure. One curved plate was forced out, but fortunately the main effect of the explosion was outward. The right hand gun was disabled by slight damage to the mounting; with this exception the turret remained in action and kept up fire.<br />
<br />
The right hand gun of turret No.3 received a direct hit, which cut out a wide groove along the tube of the gun. The left hand gun continued to fire.<br />
<br />
The barbette of turret No.4 was hit on a level with the rammer, and the armour was pierced clean through. This hit is of special interest, as the "Seydlitz" received a similar hit and at the same level in turret No.5 on 24th January 1915, which caused a fire, disabled both the after turrets and killed all the guns' crews. This last time, however, the damage was slight. There was no ready ammunition in the turret, and only one cartridge was exploded, in contrast to the (6200 Kg.) 13,670 lbs. of powder on Jan.1915. The turret officer and a large number of the gun's crews were saved by their gas masks. The destruction caused by splinters was, however, considerable and the turret was abandoned, as it was not possible to continue fire from it. This was a 13.5 in. shell, at 15,310 yds. range, strength of armour pierced 8.6 inches.<br />
<br />
After the turret had been abandoned, it was hit a second time in the after side of the revolving part, which was pierced; this of course increased the havoc in the interior.<br />
<br />
Turret No.5 was hit in the roof. The shell richochetted, and the roof is slightly dented. Nobody was hurt and the turret continued to fire.<br />
<br />
In the "Seydlitz" therefore, all the turrets were hit, with the exception of the foremost turret, and one was hit twice.<br />
<br />
A further hit pierced the 5.9 in. (150mm.) casemate armour of the aftermost 5.9 in. starboard gun, No.2. The deck was pierced from beneath, and splinters also pierced the splinter bulkhead. The gun was disabled and all the crew were killed, with the exception of the ship's chaplain who happened to be in the casemate and must be watched over by a special guardian angel.<br />
<br />
A similar hit, with a 15 in. shell, struck the casemate armour of the 6-in. gun No.7 and exploded in the casemate. Men were killed, the gun was disabled and the splinter bulkhead pierced by large splinters. This time again, surprise was aroused by the comparatively small damage caused by a large calibre shell.<br />
<br />
"<u>Derfflinger</u>". One shell hit the armour belt forward of the hawse pipe, probably at the junction of 2 plates, as 2 plates broke away. The plates underneath were consequently strained apart and a great deal of water flowed in.<br />
<br />
The armour belt on the port side also received 2 further hits in the centre and was pierced clean through. The splinters penetrated more than half way through the ship, and in one case a piece of plating was driven half way though the ship. These hits, combined perhaps with others, destroyed the nets and their supports in several places.<br />
<br />
The two after turrets received direct hits, in one case on the roof, in the other case in the barbette above the deck; the armour was pierced and the upper portions of the turrets burnt out and severely damaged, but the flames did not penetrate to the magazines. The crew in the upper part of the turret were killed, and both turrets were disabled. This occurred at an early stage of the action.<br />
<br />
The guns at high elevation cannot yet be dismounted, as everything is wedged in, but they do not appear to be damaged.<br />
<br />
The muzzles were carried away off the 4 foremost 6 in. (15 cm.) guns on the port side; two of them probably having been accounted for by one and the same shell which hit the armour. One gun, the muzzle of which was perhaps damaged by a splinter, afterwards burst, the tube splitting open in the shape of a tulip.<br />
<br />
The "Derfflinger" received a few other hits of no particular interest. She appears the next most severely damaged ship after the "Lützow".<br />
<br />
The "<u>Moltke</u>" only received 5 hits, all of them during that part of the action which took place on a southerly course; while the cruisers mentioned above received most of the hits on the port side, consequently during the later stages of the action.<br />
<br />
One shell pieced the bulwarks in the after part of the ship above the armour, passed through the ship and struck the armour on the port side from inside, about 3.3 ft. below the water-line. One plate was forced out and is missing. The inrush of water was considerable. The after compartments, above the armoured deck which remained intact, were all more or less flooded.<br />
<br />
The second hit was further forward, below the armour belt. The shell exploded in a bunker, but the armoured deck held and no water penetrated it from below. The neighbouring bunkers made little water and could be pumped out.<br />
<br />
Another shell struck the 5.9 in. armour in the upper bunker, above the water-line. The armoured deck again held, but the inner wall of the bunker parted, and the battery deck was pierced from below, a 6 in. gun being damaged and disabled.<br />
<br />
In the fore part of the ship a shell struck the armour belt below the water-line. The plate remained intact and was driven in about 8 inches. The compartment was flooded, but the torpedo bulkhead remained watertight. A neighbouring compartment leaked slightly, the rivets having parted.<br />
<br />
The fifth case of damage, namely a plate beneath the armour belt being driven and pressed in, was probably not due to a direct hit, but to splinters of a shell which fell short.<br />
<br />
"<u>Von der Tann</u>". A shell hit and pierced the lower part of the 3.9 in. armour belt in the after part of the ship to starboard. The compartments above the armoured deck, and some of those on the deck above, were flooded. The chief effect of the shell was outside the ship, but it bent the plates below the otherwise undamaged armoured deck, so that a considerable amount of water flowed into the compartments below the armoured deck. The after torpedo flat was flooded half way up, and the men in the starboard steering engine room were shut in for a long time owing to the exits being blocked.<br />
<br />
The fore turret was hit on the starboard side on the upper edge of the barbette and a semi-circular armour plate was forced out. The machinery of the turret was so badly knocked about that the turret was disabled.<br />
<br />
The hydraulic piping was damaged, so that all the heavy armament was put out of action temporarily. Strangely enough, though men were wounded none were killed.<br />
<br />
The aftermost turret was hit in the barbette. The armour was pierced, but the effect of the shell was exterior, the turret sustained little internal damage, so that the handgear of the turret remained in action. The turret was wedged in one place and could not revolve; they succeeded, however, in cutting off with oxy-acetylene the piece of revolving part which was jammed against the inner side of the barbette thus getting rid of the obstruction.<br />
<br />
Outside the turret, the shell did considerable damage; some splinters striking downwards, bent the armoured deck and pierced it in places. As far as I know, the armoured deck sustained no further damage, and this was of little importance.<br />
<br />
The after conning-tower was hit and a piece of the armour torn away; the occupants, including the 3rd gunnery officer, were killed. Splinters struck downwards to the engine-room ventilation hatches, but were stopped by the armoured gratings.<br />
<br />
"<u>Ostfriesland"</u> was struck by a mine below the foremost port turret. The whole measures 197 ft.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. note:- Literal translation is 12 times 5 metres large.] The torpedo bulkhead is only slightly torn, and the inrush of water was only local.<br />
<br />
"<u>Helgoland</u>". A 13.5 in. shell hit the 7.9 in. armour belt forward on the port side and pierced it. The shell appears to have broken only as no explosive action can be traced. The range was about 14,217 yds.<br />
<br />
"<u>Nassau</u>" rammed a British destroyer, or rather, the destroyer ran into her forward on the port side. Her bows must have lifted right up, for her hawse-pipe remained on board the "Nassau", so firmly wedged into the side of the upper deck that it will have to be cut out. The "Nassau's" side below the deck is torn away for 33 ft. The destroyer then glanced off the "Nassau's" side and exploded internally. One of the crew remained behind in one of the nets, but fell into the water when the "Nassau" fired a salvo.<br />
<br />
The "Nassau" was hit by shrapnel from attacking destroyers in the foremost searchlight group, both port searchlights were put out of action. The searchlight control and electric cables were destroyed and many of the searchlight crews were killed. The after searchlight group was hit in a similar manner, and one of the searchlights was disabled.<br />
<br />
The "Rhineland" and a light cruiser were also hit in a similar manner.<br />
<br />
I have seen all the above mentioned ships in Wilhelmshaven.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" and "Kurfürst" were at Hamburg, but unfortunately I am unable to report much about them. They had already been under repair for several days, and the damage was to some extent made good. Besides this, the conditions were not favourable for undisturbed examination: commissioners from the Imperial Navy Office were on board, besides crowds of workmen, the noise was deafening and it was pouring with rain. Consequently I took no notes on the spot and relied on my memory, which however fails me now among the very many received of similar cases. I am therefore unable to report each hit with accuracy.<br />
<br />
This is immaterial, however, as there were no particularly interesting hits, and none of the ships had been hit in the turrets. The armour had been pierced in several places, the effect and character of the hits being similar in all cases; the hits on unarmoured parts were of little consequence.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" was hit aft on the port side of the water line just on a junction of two plates, a piece of equal size being torn away from each plate. The shell then struck the sloping part of the armoured deck and the splinters ricochetted and passed right through the ship. These plates have already been removed.<br />
<br />
A casemate was pierced and the gun disabled.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" is the only ship whose mast was hit, the mast remained standing and has now been removed.<br />
<br />
The spotting platform had to be abandoned, as communications with the conning tower was cut off. This was the only hit received in a conning tower; it only grazed the upper edge and glanced off, and the men inside hardly noticed it.<br />
<br />
The port engine was disabled, not in consequence of damage to the turbine which is in good condition, but owing to one of the main propeller bearings becoming overheated. The cause of this is not clear, but it is believed to be due to concussions. The ship was well able to keep station with her two remaining engines.<br />
<br />
The "<u>Kurfürst</u>" suffered especially from a great inrush of water forward on the port side, above the armoured deck; it was caused by a hit in the armour belt. No further damage of importance was sustained.<br />
<br />
With regard to time necessary for repair to these ships, it is not yet possible to say anything definite, as it is still undecided whether they shall undergo thorough repair or not. The chief difficulty is the manufacture of new armour plates; but some of the holed plates can, no doubt, be left in position for the present.<br />
<br />
A considerable time will be needed to repair some of the turrets of the battle-cruisers, but here too, they will contrive to get things done. For instance, the "Von der Tann" is to have an entire turret out of a ship of the "Nassau" class, probably the foremost turret, and this ship will be left without a turret for some time. They talk a great deal also of transferring guns, and they will perhaps make use of those intended for the "Hindenburg", which will not be completed will the late autumn.<br />
<br />
It may be presumed that the battleships will be ready for sea in 4-6 weeks, and the battle-cruisers, particularly the "Seydlitz", in not less than 4 months. Naturally work is going on day and night, and repairs are given priority over all new construction.<br />
<br />
The damage sustained by light cruisers and destroyers is inconsiderable. The "Hamburg" had a funnel shot away. As these ships seem to be of minor importance, I did not trouble further about them.<br />
<br />
As our Allies appear not to have the intention of communicating to us what effect the examination of damages sustained will have on their construction in the future, we must endeavour to ascertain this as time goes on by means of cross questioning and by studying their new constructions in detail. I do not feel called upon to draw premature and rash conclusions to-day, on the strength of impressions received, but this will not prevent me from giving a summary of my opinion and of the opinions expresses in my hearing.<br />
<br />
Firstly, it is a remarkable fact that in all the ships that have returned home, all the engine and boiler-rooms are undamaged; the "Lützow" is no exception to this, as she proceeded under her own steam until late in the night after the action. I have also been assured by the Imperial Navy Office, after an inspection carried out by the Chief Engineer, that not a single auxiliary engine was defective. The only boiler-room put out of action was the foremost one in the "Seydlitz" where the bulkhead gave a little, allowing water to penetrate through rivet holes and cracks when the ship was under way. The conclusion may therefore be drawn that these vital parts of the ship are sufficiently protected and that the armour belt of the usual German thicknesses, though it cannot stop the shells, at least fulfils its purpose by breaking them up. Consequently it has become almost impossible even for the largest splinters of 15 in. shell to penetrate through armoured deck or torpedo bulkhead in engine and boiler rooms.<br />
<br />
Even at these long ranges and steep angles there was no question of the armoured decks being pierced; but the fitting of strong gratings over the hatches, which prevented the engines of the "Von der Tann" from sustaining severe damage, appears very necessary.<br />
<br />
The torpedo bulkheads also resisted shells, mines and torpedoes effectually; and in cases where slight damage was sustained, it had no further consequences than the flooding of the compartment affected.<br />
<br />
Perhaps it would be advisable to construct a specially strong boiler-room bulkhead, similar to a torpedo bulkhead, so that it could not be damaged by splinters or water-pressure.<br />
<br />
The inspection of the "Seydlitz" has left me with the impression that the commanding officer of the "Seydlitz" expected rather too much of his ship, and that nothing short of extraordinary good luck enabled her to be brought back. At one time when the whole forepart of the ship was flooded and the bows were under water, he proceeded occasionally with revolutions for 22 knots, just in order to show how seaworthy his ship was, so he told me. This may have been very sporting, or perhaps it may have been necessary under the circumstances in order not to drop too far behind and be overtaken by the enemy, but it certainly was not good seamanship, and if his stokehold bulkhead had burst, the "Seydlitz" would have gone down like the "Lutzow", where the circumstances appear to have been very similar. Later on he decreased speed and finally proceeded stern first.<br />
<br />
I therefore think it not impossible that the loss of the "Lützow", which is said to have been proceeded at 14 knots for a time, was also due only to recklessly high speed, and that the ship might have been saved if she had proceeded stern first or been taken in tow.<br />
<br />
As the danger from water-pressure must always be greatest from ahead, it would certainly be advisable to take special preventative measures against it.<br />
<br />
Vice-Admiral Schmidt told me that, in his opinion, the armoured belt ought to be strongest in the centre, and possible in the afterpart to protect the steering engines, and possibly in the bows, but that it ought not to taper off gradually from the centre to the extremities. He was also entirely in favour of a protected upper deck forming a second armoured deck.<br />
<br />
The admirably thorough system of internal division in the German ships and the floating capability thus attained is the finest proof of the merit of German construction which pursued this aim, and it shows that Admiral von Tirpitz, the creator of the Battle Fleet of to-day, was right when he upheld the principle that, above all things, the ships must be capable of remaining afloat and must not sink or heel over, and that everything else is of secondary consideration.<br />
<br />
The large number of hits in the turrets is remarkable, and it is generally considered that the turret armour should be appreciably stronger, especially in the lower part of the barbettes; for it is not only the disablement of the guns that comes into question, serious though this might be, but also the blowing up of magazines and the total destruction of the ship, as the wide shaft down to the magazines cannot possibly be made completely flash-proof. This is the most vital part of the ship. It is only owing to the small explosive charges in British shells, that there were no explosions of magazines in the German ships.<br />
<br />
Everything possible had been done after the action of 24.1.15 to ensure protection against this danger; the ready ammunition was removed from the top of the hoists and wherever possible all the openings in shafts leading down below were fitted with flaps, covers and heavy asbestos mats, while German ammunition is particularly carefully stowed and packed in cases with screwed-on covers.<br />
<br />
The disasters on the British side are a proof that this is a question of the greatest importance. It must also be taken into consideration that while any other damage turret may take months.<br />
<br />
The numerous hits in turrets would appear to justify the opinion of those who decided against triple turrets, on the ground [sic] that if one was disabled it would put too many heavy guns out of action.<br />
<br />
A hit in a casemate will of course destroy it and disable the gun, but this is of little consequence. Care must be taken here also not to have any ready ammunition, and to close the ammunition hand-up hermetically with heavy asbestos mats at the magazine end also. With the German "Paternoster" (dredger hoist) the ammunition lifts this mat as it comes up and the mat then falls to and closes the opening, which is a practical arrangement.<br />
<br />
Other hits through unarmoured parts, which destroyed more or less small gear and at the first glance give an impression of terrible havoc, are really of no consequence.<br />
<br />
In the "Von der Tann" they wanted to flood a turret magazine. This was impossible, as the flooding valve in the battery, or between deck was piled up with debris, cabin fittings, etc., and was inaccessible. Fortunately the flooding of the magazine turned out to be unnecessary. The Executive Officer remarked to me how critical such a trivial matter might become, and that one could not be careful enough about choosing the positions for the flooding valves, which must be kept clear of easily destructible objects.<br />
<br />
The man-hole covers in the decks, coal shoots [chutes], etc., were pointed out to me as dangerous, as they may be burst open by pressure of gas from below, thus causing damage and giving passage to the gases. These covers should be secured in a different manner and much more firmly.<br />
<br />
The flooding and draining system worked admirably, and is hardly capable of improvement. The only disadvantage is that the compartments above the armoured deck have no draining arrangements. This should be provided. A list, consequent on an inrush of water, could always be corrected by flooding an opposite compartment. This is an important matter both as affecting gunnery and personnel.<br />
<br />
The searchlights, which were not taken down in the German ships, all came out of the action undamaged; anxiety on their account was therefore unfounded. It was very unpleasant when attacking boats fired on the searchlights, and it is therefore considered necessary to fit light armour protection on the masts for the crews of the searchlight control and electric cables.<br />
<br />
Damage from flames is nowhere visible. The Germans are now rather amused at the care with which interior partitions were scraped.<br />
<br />
I could not help comparing the German ships with the Russian battleship "Orel", which I saw in Madzurn after the battle of Tsushima. If I remember rightly, the "Orel" had 5 severe hits and 40 hits with medium-calibre shell.<br />
<br />
The enormous explosive power of the Shimosa shell, which breaks up into minute splinters, did not do the slightest damage to the vital parts of the ship, but the upper deck was transformed into a confused heap of ruins. Superstructure, bridges, masts, funnels, etc., were destroyed, guns dismounted and fires started.<br />
<br />
Nothing of the kind is to be seen in the German ships, outwardly only a few more or less clean shell holes are visible, and they look so orderly and so little damaged that they do not appear to have gone through an action.<br />
<br />
It is true that the upper decks are said to have been littered with countless splinters, but they flew on to the decks from shells which struck the water, the ship receiving violent shocks.<br />
<br />
The holes in the armour show the characteristic concentric cracks round the hole and the radial splashes, the latter proving that the shells exploded on impact or at the latest, as they passed through. In many cases, as already noted, the force of the explosion was external and only pieces of plate, and possibly the head of the shell were driven in.<br />
<br />
<center><u>FLAG OFFICERS OF THE FLEET AND LEADERS</u></center><br />
<br />
{|<br />
| Commander-in-Chief:<br />
| Vice Admiral Scheer<br />
|-<br />
| <u>I Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Vice Admiral Schmidt<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Engelhard<br />
|-<br />
| <u>II Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Mauve<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Baron von Dalwigh<br />
|-<br />
| <u>III Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Behncke<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Nordmann<br />
|-<br />
| Officer commanding the Scouting Forces and<br>Commanding 1st Scouting Group<br />
| Vice Admiral Hipper<br />
|-<br />
| " 2nd " "<br />
| Rear Admiral Bodicker<br />
|-<br />
| " 4th " "<br />
| Commodore "Captain" v. Reuter<br />
|-<br />
| Leaders of Destroyers<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| in "Rostock"<br />
| Commodore "Captain" Michelsen<br />
|-<br />
| in Regensburg<br />
| Commodore "Captain" Heinrich<br />
|-<br />
| Leader of submarines<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| In Hamburg<br />
| Captain Bauer<br />
|}<br />
<br />
<center><u>REMARKS</u></center><br />
<br />
The lecture on the action, upon which this report is based, was illustrated by a plan prepared in haste for H.M. the Kaiser, and a copy was promised to me. But the Admiral Staff does not wish to part with this first incomplete draft, and the preparation of an accurate plan has not yet been completed, as the Admiral Staff is not yet in possession of all the details.<br />
<br />
In time to be included in this report I have only received the sketch of the first stage of the battle, namely the cruiser action on a southerly course, together with a small sketch of the situation when the action was broken off; both are enclosed.<br />
<br />
I conclude from the sketch of the cruiser action, that the accounts given to me were not quite accurate; for instance, the assertion of the commanding officer of the "Moltke" that the shortest range at that stage was 7,650 yds. and that he had accounted for one of the armoured cruisers with a torpedo.<br />
<br />
The sketch shows that the "Indefatigable" was probably first destroyed by gun fire from the "Von der Tann", and later the "Queen Mary" by gunfire from the "Derfflinger", and that the range was never less than 14,220 yds.<br />
<br />
The loss of "V. 27" and "V. 29" and of 4 British destroyers is also apparent, while I was only told of two.<br />
<br />
In the original sketch, 2 British armoured cruisers are also shown as having fallen out during this stage, but this is not shown on the accompanying sketch and probably took place later.<br />
<br />
I was told by the Admiral Staff that the accompanying sketches are not to be taken as strictly accurate.<br />
<br />
It is requested that the sketches and course of the action and the account of damages may be treated as strictly confidential.<br />
<br />
==Footnotes==<br />
{{reflist}}<br />
<br />
==Bibliography==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
*''Schematismus für das K.u.K. Heer und für die Kriegsmarine für 1914. Separatausgabe''. Wien. 1914.<br />
*''Almanach für die k. und k. Kriegsmarine 1917. Kriegsausgabe''. '''XXXVII'''. Pola. 1917.<br />
*[[Arthur Marder (Naval Historian)|Marder, Arthur J.]] (1966). ''From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919: Jutland and After, May 1916–December 1916''. '''Volume III'''. London: Oxford University Press.<br />
*{{MarderFDSFIII}}<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
==External Links==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
*Krámli, Mihály. [http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-124.pdf "The Report on the Battle of Jutland by the Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché in Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Colloredo-Mannsfeld."] ''NavWeaps''.<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
[[Category:Battle of Jutland]]</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Attach%C3%A9_Report_on_the_Battle_of_Jutland&diff=334738Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland2024-03-10T16:07:07Z<p>Simon Harley: /* Bibliography */</p>
<hr />
<div>Soon after the [[Battle of Jutland]] on 31 May &ndash; 1 June 1916 the Naval Attaché of the [[Austro-Hungarian Navy|Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Navy]] at the embassy in Berlin, ''Fregattenkapitäne'' Hieronymus Graf von Colloredo-Mannsfeld,<ref>''Schematismus für das K.u.K. Heer und für die Kriegsmarine für 1914''. p. 1270. ''Almanach für die k. und k. Kriegsmarine 1917''. p. 668.</ref> visited the High Sea Fleet. He composed a report on the battle for his superiors using first-hand accounts, interspersed here and there with his own observations. The version reproduced here is a translation in English apparently made by the [[Naval Intelligence Division (Royal Navy)|Naval Intelligence Division]] in 1919 from a copy which was subsequently returned to "F.N.A.", presumably the French Naval Attaché. A copy of the translation then made its way into the papers of the British Cabinet, from where historian Arthur J. Marder obtained a copy which is in his papers.<ref>Original number N.I.D. 087/19. Marder papers, Special Collections and Archives, Langson Library, University of California, Irvine, MS-F002, Box 27.</ref> He does not appear to have used it for the 1965 edition of ''From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow'', Volume III, but certainly used it for the revised edition in 1978.<ref>The quote on p. 189 of the 1965 edition differs from that on p. 234 of the 1978 edition which is the same used here.</ref> <br />
<br />
It is worth comparing this translation with that made by Hungarian historian Mihály Krámli of a post-war copy of a slightly different version of the report in a Hungarian archive which has been published on the ''NavWeaps'' online resource.<ref>Krámli, Mihály. [http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-124.pdf "The Report on the Battle of Jutland by the Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché in Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Colloredo-Mannsfeld."] ''NavWeaps''.</ref><br />
<br />
The original grammar and punctuation of the typescript has been reproduced here wherever possible.<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
From:- Austrian Naval Attache in Berlin.<br />
<br />
To:- Commander-in-Chief, Pola.<br />
<div style="float:right;">Berlin,<br>17 June, 1916.</div><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<center><u>NAVAL ENGAGEMENT OF 31 MAY 1916.</u></center><br />
<br />
The following is a report of the naval proceedings of 31 May - 1 June, 1916, and also of the damage sustained by the German Fleet.<br />
<br />
During my 3-days' visit to Wilhelmshaven, followed by a cursory examination of the "MARKGRAF" and "KURFURST" at Hamburg, I endeavoured to gain merely a general idea of the results of gunfire and concentrated my attention on the course of the action itself.<br />
Admiral Scheer, whom I only saw for a short time as he left for Kiel to attend the funeral of his borther-in-law [sic], Lieut.-Commander Mohr, who was killed in the action, very kindly arranged that his Chief of Staff, Captain Trotha, should give me an account of the whole proceedings, illustrated by plans, and that I should be furnished with all information. I have tried to fill in the gaps by conversations with officers whom I know; this has resulted in some contradictory statements, and several points remain obscure, the accounts from the various ships not having all come in.<br />
<br />
Many episodes will therefore be explained later and may appear in a different light, but, as regards the broad outlines which are of chief importance, the picture of this interesting engagement is fairly clear. The accompanying plan of the action was made in haste for the Kaiser and will therefore need much correction.<br />
<br />
The spirit pervading the Fleet can only be described as one of enthusiasm; they are intoxicated with victory. The heavy load weighing on them all, the dear that this war might end without an encounter of the Fleets, have vanished. They have learnt what fighting really means, they know themselves to be superior to the enemy as regards tactics, and that they were following the right lines and have nothing to unlearn; they know that their gunfire was more effective than that of the enemy, and that they can rely implicitly on their flotillas which have always been looked upon in the German Navy as one of the chief factors in an action. Finally they know that their largest ships can stand heavy fire and serious damage, that they leave nothing to be desired as regards construction and cannot be sunk easily. In short, they feel that the British, in spite of all their boasting, cannot overcome the German Fleet and have a considerable respect for it.<br />
<br />
This conviction imbues the whole Fleet, down to the last man, with confidence in their strength and a calm assurance regarding future encounters. At the same time they are free from over-confidence and from under-estimation of the enemy. On the contrary, the British fire-control and the enormous piercing power of their heavy shell at great distances have roused their admiration, so that a careless conception of the situation is not to be feared, the less so, as well-balanced minds such as those of Admiral Scheer and his Staff are unlikely to be led away by former successes to undertake rash enterprises in the future.<br />
<br />
They do not deny that they were extraordinarily fortunate, and that if the action had been prosecuted with energy on the British side, and if the "Nelson touch" had been in evidence, things might have gone very badly for Germany, especially as the British still had an intact Battle Squadron of 12 units at their disposal which had not yet taken part in the action. But they console themselves with the knowledge that no naval action was ever won without some stroke of luck.<br />
<br />
The Kaiser's visit, the day before my arrival, and his address to the Fleet gave great satisfaction, and subsequently many important personages arrive to inspect the ships, such as Prince Henry and the Grand Dukes of Mecklenburg and Oldenburg, and numbers of decorations were distributed. Vice-Admiral Scheer was promoted to Admiral, and he and Vice-Admiral Hipper received the Pour le Merite.<br />
<br />
I also visited Rear-Admiral Behncke, who was wounded and in hospital; his wounds are slight, a few small splinters in his head, elbow and knee, and he will probably soon be well again.<br />
<br />
<center><u>COURSE OF THE ACTION.</u></center><br />
<br />
The Commander-in-Chief intended to advance with the whole Fleet to the waters of the Skagerrak, in order to make his presence felt unpleasantly by disturbing the shipping, hoping thereby to lure on the British forces and in this manner to be in a position to attack a part of the British Fleet with superior or at least with equal forces. He reckoned that any movements of the British Fleet would be reported to him in good time by the submarines which had been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and he hoped that the airships would prove a better means of reconnoitring than any possessed by the enemy.<br />
<br />
Unfavourable weather prevented him for a considerable period from undertaking any operations, and, as the submarines were to return home on 1 June and be relieved by a new group, the 31 May was the last date for carrying out the planned advance.<br />
<br />
The cruisers left the Jade at 3 a.m., the Main Fleet at 4 a.m., steering an easterly course, and then, after passing Heligoland, a N.N.W'ly course. No reports were received from submarines. These were stationed chiefly off the Orkneys and the Firth of Forth, and the large group of Flanders boats were off the Thames and at the entrance to the Channel. <br />
<br />
While proceeding northwards, a few W/T messages were received, but they were corrupt, appeared to refer only to small formations and gave no clue to the movements of the Grand Fleet. The airships were unable to start in the morning, on account of the wind, and, as it blew hard throughout the day in the Heligoland Bight, they could not start until the early hours of 1 June. In this respect things did not go well, but Admiral Scheer decided nevertheless to continue on his course to the Skagerrak. <br />
<br />
This the account given by Captain von Trotha, who affirms that nothing was known of the presence of the British Fleet in the waters of the Skagerrak, and that there seemed no probability of encountering this Fleet before 1 June.<br />
<br />
There are some points here which I am unable to understand. The submarines are said to have been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and were to return home on 1 June to be relieved probably by a weaker group. For, If the same number of boats were to to keep watch off the English coast, why should 31 May have been the last day for the German Fleet to sail. The day of departure was, therefore, too late in any case, for, if no encounter was to be expected before 1 June, the boats stationed off the coast could not possibly encounter the damaged British ships, as was intended, for probably no damaged ships would be there before 2 June.<br />
<br />
The battleship "KONIG ALBERT" had to carry out repairs to her condensers and did not proceed with the Fleet. Von Trotha told me that there was no alternative and that a ship must carry out small overhauls regularly in a dockyard according to programme. But could it not be arranged, when one is taking the initiative, to choose one's moment for an advance and to have all the ships together for this short time? And why should just that moment be chosen when one of the most powerful ships of the "Kaiser" class is in the dockyard, instead, for instance, of one of the "Nassau" class with 11-in. guns.<br />
<br />
In addition, the "BAYERN" was to have joined up a few days later. After having waited so long, why should not the plan have been postponed for 2 or 3 weeks, instead of dispensing with the only ship carrying 15-in. guns.<br />
<br />
In the same manner they dispensed with air reconnaissance, from which they had expected so much.<br />
<br />
These considerations make me doubt whether the account given me is quite correct, and whether, on the contrary, they knew of certain movements of the British Fleet and considered the moment extremely favourable for an attack. Perhaps they only knew of Beatty's battle squadron, and thinking the Main Fleet was far away, hoped to entrap this squadron. In Berlin, they have much to say, even in military circles, about the British Fleet's intention to push through into the Baltic, and of Kitchener's mission having some connection with this. I consider this senseless, for it cannot be presemed [sic] that the British Fleet would leave their shores unprotected and do the Germans the favour of operating in the Baltic, which would certainly be a most advantageous area for the German Fleet. In any case, there appear to be discrepancies which will probably be explained at some later date.<br />
<br />
Scouting groups, battle cruisers and light cruisers, together with flotillas, preceded the Main Fleet by 50 - 60 miles. At 4 p.m. the light cruisers encountered some British battle cruisers. These at once opened fire on the light cruisers, at an estimated distance of 26,247 yds.; the range could be taken accurately. Though they did not obtain a hit, the salvoes fell so well that the German cruisers thought it advisable to turn away and fall back on their battle cruisers.<br />
<br />
As the British approached, these battle cruisers turned on to a southerly course, in order to lure the enemy on to the German Main Fleet. A running action, on a southerly course, ensued. The British were to starboard and to the west of the Germans, who had therefore the following advantage: in the North Sea, in summer, the western horizon is quite light and visibility towards the west is good, while towards the east, and in a still greater degree off the Jutland Coast, it is misty and visibility is bad and no silhouettes stand out against the eastern horizon. This phenomenon also played great part in the subsequent course of the action. The sun was still high and was not troublesome, and the British ships offered admirable targets. The sea was calm, the wind N.W. 1-2, altering subsequently through W. to S.W.<br />
<br />
The following British ships were recognised:-<br />
3 "Lion" class, 1 "Tiger" and 2 "Indefatigable" class; they were soon reinforced by 5 "Queen Elizabeth" class following astern.<br />
<br />
It is asserted that, judging from shell splinters, the ship of the "Tiger" class carried 15-in. guns, and that she was therefore the mysterious vessel which replaced the "TIGER" sunk on 24.1.15; as the last-named "TIGER" carried only 13.5-in.guns, this was taken as a further proof of her loss. The silhouette of the new "TIGER", however, is said to have resembled that of the old "TIGER" exactly. As the "Queen Elizabeths" soon opened fire also with 15-in. guns, I rather doubt this assertion regarding the "TIGER", and the various ships on this early part of the engagement are altogether somewhat at variance.<br />
<br />
On the German side the ships proceeded in the following sequence:- "LÜTZOW", Flagship of Vice-Admiral Hipper, "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN".<br />
<br />
As Hipper edged towards the enemy, the distance decreased to about 7655 yds. The German fire was unquestionably superior, but the speed of the British vessels was greater. After a short time the "INDEFATIGABLE" and "QUEEN MARY" blew up, and 2 battle-cruisers and two attacking destroyers were also accounted for. The "QUEEN MARY" must have been destroyed by the explosion of a magazine; she was torn in two halves, and a water-colour painted by an officer represents her enveloped in an enormous column of black smoke; she disappeared in a few seconds. Only one cadet was subsequently picked.<br />
<br />
The second battle cruiser disappeared under similar circumstances. The "VON DER TANN" claims to have accounted for one of these battle-cruisers by a broadside. But the "MOLTKE" fired 4 torpedoes and also claims this achievement.<br />
<br />
The Germans suffered very little during this phase of the action, the "MOLTKE" alone receiving hits on the starboard side. The fire of the British battle-cruisers is said not to have been nearly as good as that of the "QUEEN ELIZABETH" class later on.<br />
<br />
When they had approached the German Main Fleet, the British turned on to a contrary course and the German cruisers did the same. The German Main Fleet proceeded in divisions in starboard quarter-line, the 3rd Battle Squadron: 4 "König" class and 3 "Kaiser" class, Fleet Flagship, 1st Battle Squadron: 4 "Ostfriesland" class and 4 "Westfalen" class, and the 2nd Battle Squadron: 5 "Deutschland" class and the "Hessen". They endeavoured to effect a junction with the cruisers, but were unable to take part very effectually.<br />
<br />
The course of the action was now in a northerly direction, over the area which had just been traversed, and the British ships now drew ahead considerably and turned more and more towards the East; the Germans followed this movement, and in consequence the conditions of visibility became less and less favourable for them.<br />
<br />
The "Queen Elizabeths" now made their presence more greatly felt; one of them had dropped out, but I was unable to ascertain when this occurred.<br />
<br />
The course of the German Math Fleet at first led past the 2 disabled British destroyers, which were lying stopped. The crews had already taken to the boats and were picked up later on by German destroyers. As the Main Fleet was doubtful about the advisability of passing the destroyers while they were still afloat, they were sunk by a few broadsides. One of the officers who was picked up was in pyjamas and is said to have stayed in his cabin during the action. He declared "We did not expect so much resistance," while another said - "The battle is rather disappointing." It has been ascertained that these destroyers were greatly under-manned; their crews seemed very exhausted, which points to their having been in the water for a long time.<br />
<br />
While on this easterly course, the light cruisers of the fast 2nd Scouting Group: "FRANKFURT", "PILLAU", "ELBING" and "WIESBADEN", were heavily fired on from the N.E. and E. without their being able to see more than the gun flashes. In addition, they were under continual fire from the N., and while turning away to S.E. and S., they ascertained that they were opposed by an interminable line of British ships, which appeared at first to be on a N.W.'ly course, and had then evidently turned together on to a S.'ly course.<br />
<br />
It may be noted here that the battleships, and, generally speaking, the battle-cruisers also, never sighted the British Main Fleet, and saw nothing but the flashes of the guns and the effects of the fire. These British ships, about 25 in number, were only sighted by a few light cruisers and by the flotillas, and were counted by them as accurately as possible.<br />
<br />
Surrounded thus from the N. and the E. and under fire, the "WIESBADEN" was disabled, apparently by a hit in the engine-room. The Admiral noticed, it is true, that his leading ships must have encountered new and powerful forces and that they were turning away; but he thought it his duty to go to the assistance of the "WIESBADEN" and therefore continued on an easterly course.<br />
<br />
The van of the Main Fleet, led by the "KÖNIG" (Rear-Admiral Behncke) now came under heavy fire from right ahead; the "KÖNIG" turned away under this fire towards the S.E., whereupon the Commander-in-Chief ordered the whole line to "turn together" to starboard and gave up the idea of helping the "WIESBADEN". About this time Vice-Admiral Hipper transferred his flag from the "LÜTZOW" to the "MOLTKE" with the help of a destroyer, his W/T station being damaged.<br />
<br />
Hardly had the Main Fleet drawn away on a westerly course, before it was ascertained that the pressure was relaxing and the fire decreasing, and that the British were no longer pursuing so hotly. Scheer therefore ordered the ships to "turn together" back on to their former course, and made the signal 'R' = 'Engage the enemy'. This second advance may be termed the zenith of the action. Admiral Scheer gave his views on it approximately as follows:- "Those who make a study of this engagement will be very puzzled as to my object in advancing thus against the wall of British ships. The fact is that I had no particular object. I made the first advance because I had a feeling that I ought to endeavour to assist the "WIESBADEN" and because the situation ahead was quite obscure to me, for I saw nothing of the "LÜTZOW" and received no W/T reports. I soon saw, however, that the leading ships were coming under an overwhelming fire, and that I could not risk the Fleet on the "WIESBADEN'S" account. When I noticed that the British pressure had quite ceased and that the Fleet remained intact in my hands, I turned back, under the impression that the action could not end in this way and that I ought to seek contact with the enemy again."<br />
<br />
The situation during the first and second advances may serve as an example of what should not take place according to all the laws of tactics, for it could not have been worse; von Trotha said jokingly that, if an Admiral brought about such a situation at a war game or in manoeuvres, he would never be entrusted without another command. In the North, the "Queen Elizabeths", then the battle-cruisers, and from N.E. through E. to S.E., an endless line of battleships formed an arc round the German van and kept it under fire. Evidently it had fallen into the most perfect trap. In addition to this unfavourable tactical position, there was a further difficulty, namely that the German ships could be clearly distinguished while they themselves only saw the gun flashes, 4 or 5 to each salvo, but could find no target.<br />
<br />
The Gunnery Officer of the "MARKGRAF" told me that he could not fire at all during half-an-hour, and that they were at the mercy of the British broadsides. Critical though the position was, in theory, they think that experience justifies the conclusion that this 'crossing the T' is in reality not so disastrous at longer ranges; for, in spite of the enormous superiority of their fire, the British made comparatively few hits, the simple reason being that, when fire is thus concentrated on a few leading ships, there can be no question of improving the shooting by spotting.<br />
<br />
Given good tactical training and squadrons which work well together, it is always easy to retire rapidly from an unfavourable position and even possibly to reach an advantageous one.<br />
<br />
The small amount of damage sustained by the Main Fleet may be owing partly to the fact that the leading battle-cruisers drew the enemy's fire, thus relieving the battleships. Only the three leading ships, "KÖNIG", "GROSSER KURFÜRST" and "MARKGRAF" received several hits; while among all the other ships, the "KAISER", "HELGOLAND" and the "SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN" received one hit each, and the rest were not hit at all.<br />
<br />
Simultaneously with the battle-cruisers, which were ahead and pressing forward in quarter-line formation, the 6th and 9th Flotillas, left by the "REGENSBURG", also proceeded to a torpedo attack. Regarding this cruiser advance, the Commanding Officer of the "SEYDLITZ" told me that he was in such a position that he was able to avoid the British salvoes, for he altered course towards the point where each salvo fell and thus evaded the spotting correction.<br />
<br />
This torpedo attack was carried out with great determination and seems to have been completely successful, although nobody is able to state how many hits were obtained. The British ships overlapped somewhat and their line was almost unbroken, and, as about 100 torpedoes were fired, it is estimates that there must have been a considerable number of hits, some people affirm that there were 20, but I do not place much confidence in these figures and it is useless to trouble about them as nobody is certain.<br />
<br />
The boats were fired on by guns of all calibres, even the heaviest, but with little effect, only one boat being destroyed; two other boats had been sunk in an earlier attack during the cruiser action.<br />
<br />
The battle-cruisers were also attacked by British torpedoes, the "SEYDLITZ" being hit once. The "MOLTKE" was lucky, for, when close to the ship, one torpedo apparently had a gyro failure and ran parallel with her. The "LÜTZOW" was probably hit also.<br />
<br />
After the attack, the destroyers laid fog and a heavy smoke screen, which interposed between the Fleet; this benefitted not only the heavily-damaged "LÜTZOW" and "DERFFLINGER", whose nets had been shot away and were hanging down, but also the whole Fleet. It may also have made an impression on the British.<br />
<br />
The German Main Fleet and cruisers turned on a westerly course, fire having again entirely ceased; and the ships of the Main Fleet then turned gradually in succession and in inverse sequence from W. to S.W., subsequently steering towards Horns Reef.<br />
<br />
It is not known what the British did; all that is certain, is that they did not follow in pursuit and that nothing further was seen of their Main Fleet. It remained light until 11 p.m. (summer time), and it would not have been impossible, considering their superior speed, for them to have come within firing range. The Germans expected it too, and now have to content themselves with surmises about the British Commander-in-Chief's reasons for not doing so. It is probably that the unfavourable issue of the fleet part of the battle and the demoralising losses in ships took away any desire on Jellicoe's part for further fighting. His Fleet may have lost heavily and been severely shaken by the torpedo attack; and, as the Germans still had some intact flotillas at their disposal, he may have feared further strong torpedo attacks in the critical hours of twilight, for in the German Navy they say that Jellicoe fears their destroyers in particular.<br />
<br />
Nevertheless, the Germans were not under the impression of having shaken the British Fleet to the extent of obliging them to give up the struggle, and when the evening passed without further incident, they reckoned with certainty on encountering Jellicoe off Horns Reef at daybreak. They were the more astonished at his non-appearance when their air reconnaissance reported that on the morning of 1 June a squadron of 12 battle-ships was proceeding North from the southern part of North Sea and that it suddenly turned on to an opposite course and proceeded South.<br />
<br />
As it could not possibly have been the intention of the British Commander-in-Chief to let the German Fleet escape after having encountered it at last far from its base, and as he still had an intact battle-squadron at his disposal, one is compelled to take the view that he no longer felt strong enough for a second encounter; the achievement of the German Fleet must therefore be very highly thought of.<br />
<br />
During the night cruising following the action, numerous small episodes and minor engagements took place, of which no clear idea can be formed. <br />
<br />
In view of a possible fresh attack or of a possible pursuit on the part of the enemy, it was thought undesirable to leave the 2nd Battle Squadron either in the van or in the rear, it therefore took station to starboard and at first proceeded on an opening course from the other squadrons, and continued fairly independently during the night.<br />
<br />
The 1st Battle Squadron therefore led, with the "WESTFALEN" as guide, and it was followed by the 3rd Battle Squadron.<br />
<br />
After the action had been broken off, the 4 remaining battle cruisers were ahead to port, where they were suddenly again brought under heavy fire from the port side and from ahead, apparently by 3 or 4 battle cruisers. It is presumed that these were the remaining 3 or 4 older cruisers of the "Invincible" class, which Jellicoe probably always stationed ahead of the Main Fleet, for it would hardly have been possible for the "Lions", which were following in the rear in the British line, to have taken station ahead so quickly. The German battle cruisers, all severely damaged, did not feel able to withstand this fire and turned away to starboard, passing ahead of the Main Fleet and between it and the 2nd Battle Squadron, which proceeded quietly on their course and before which the mysterious ships retired, not to be sighted again.<br />
<br />
The battle-cruisers then gradually fell astern, and as they were making much water, and also owing to their differing speeds, they lost contact with the Main Fleet and with each other.<br />
<br />
The "LÜTZOW" had dropped out during the engagement and proceeded independently, accompanied by 4 destroyers. At first she was able to steam 14 knots, but her speed decreased rapidly and dropped finally to 4 knots. Her bows sank slowly, and when the whole forecastle was under water the Commanding Officer decided to leave the ship. The badly wounded were transferred carefully to the boats and the disembarkation was conducted in good order. A torpedo was then fired at the ship and this coup de grace sank her in deep water at about 1 o'clock, I believe.<br />
<br />
The "SEYDLITZ" was hardly in a better condition than the "LÜTZOW"; she also sank gradually by the bows till the water was almost level with the deck, and she had a heavy list to port, but she continued on her course. In the darkest hours of the night she suddenly sighted 3 large ships to port, quite close to. She turned away, made a British recognition signal and was not pursued. As bad luck would have it, the steaming light had short-circuited, could not be switched off and showed intermittently.<br />
<br />
The "DERFFLINGER", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN" followed the Main Fleet more or less and met with no particular experiences.<br />
<br />
The Main Fleet had to repulse a series of destroyer attacks and was also engaged by cruisers. The movements of these British cruisers, which came up singly, are incomprehensible and give the impression of having lost their heads. They appear to have received the order, judging by an intercepted W/T message, to proceed on a northerly and north-westerly course, and thereby they ran into the extended German line which they probably imagined they had passed to the South.<br />
<br />
One large cruiser (?"WARRIOR") proceeded unsuspectingly within 875 yds. of the line of battleships and came under concentrated fire from several ships before she could reply, so that she blew up enveloped in flames and disappeared in 47 seconds. The "BIRMINGHAM" seems to have been accounted for in a similar manner. The destroyers all approached in a really insane manner; frequently not from ahead but from a direction astern, scattered, singly or in pairs, or at most 3 together, never in large numbers. Most of them were disabled forthwith by a few salvoes and set on fire. The "WESTFALEN" distinguished herself particularly at this time.<br />
<br />
These burning destroyers strewn along the course, lit it up as if for a festival. Evidently the fires were largely due to the light American and Mexican oils; at any rate German firing trials on oil bunkers never caused any such conflagrations.<br />
<br />
The attacking boats directed shrapnel fire on the searchlights with fairly good results, the searchlights of two battleships and one light cruiser being hit.<br />
<br />
One large destroyer, which only recognised the danger at the last moment and endeavoured to avoid it by altering course was rammed by the "NASSAU", which put her helm over for this purpose. The boat exploded internally and sank.<br />
<br />
The only ships hit were the "POMMERN" in the 2ns Battle Squadron, and the "ROSTOCK". The "POMMERN" blew up at once and nobody was saved. The "ROSTOCK" was just passing between ships of the Main Fleet when she was hit; the loss of life on board was small.<br />
<br />
The Germans believe they destroyed 11 British destroyers in all. The manner in which these destroyers were handled has not left a good impression on the whole, and one has certainly lost respect for this weapon. The view is also taken that the boats are too large and offer too wide a target.<br />
<br />
The light cruiser "ELBING", like the "ROSTOCK", apparently wanted to break through the line from port to starboard under pressure from the British cruisers; she was, however, rammed by the "POSEN" and had to be abandoned in a sinking condition. The Germans also fired a torpedo into her.<br />
<br />
The "FRAUENLOB" and 2 destroyers were lost during the night; no details of their loss are known.<br />
<br />
Not far from Heligoland, the "OSTFRIESLAND", 7th of the line, struck a mine. This brings the account of the chief events of this exciting cruiser to an end.<br />
<br />
The German flotillas were detached from the Fleet to clear the area off the Jutland Coast, which was divided up into sectors. The flotillas stationed furthest to the North proceeded to the Skagerrak and through these straits into the Baltic and to Kiel.<br />
<br />
None of the flotillas sighted the British Main Fleet again, which proves that it must have turned away to the N. or N.W. immediately after the action. According to confidential reports the Fleet entered British ports as early as 1 June.<br />
<br />
Two British battleships, in a severely damaged condition and accompanied by destroyers, were sighted proceeding back to England. One was attacked by a submarine, but without success.<br />
<br />
On the morning of 1 June, in fairly misty weather, a Zeppelin sighted groups of British ships leaving the Channel on a N.E.'ly course. The reports were rather vague, as sometimes 6 and sometimes 12 ships were mentioned; but it seems most likely that 12 battleships and 3 cruisers were in question, and that they soon retired. The airship, which flew low at one time to get a clearer view, was also fired on.<br />
<br />
Some of the ships are said to have had tripod masts.<br />
<br />
The German Fleet, with the exception of "SEYDLITZ", reached the Jade in the afternoon. The "SEYDLITZ" could not cross the bar on account of being so much down by the bows, and it was not till the next day at high water that she was towed in, stern first.<br />
<br />
<center><u>MISCELLANEOUS.<br>TACTICS.</u></center><br />
<br />
The Germans ascribe their success to various causes, and in the first place to their own superiority as regards tactics. This is a point which every officer discusses, and it is constantly repeated that it all happened just as in tactical manoeuvres and in "battle exercises", and that things could not have gone better.<br />
<br />
Movements of squadrons, divisions and individual ships, "turns together" and alterations of course and speed, all went like clockwork and demonstrated the very great mobility of all formations.<br />
<br />
The W/T signalling system of the Main Fleet never failed, and its failure would have been immaterial, as the primary and secondary flag action signals, showing from several positions in the ship, were made simultaneously.<br />
<br />
All this was due to the peace training and the practical experience of the Flag Officers and Captains. Though in peace time the Commander-in-Chief had never commanded a Fleet, nor the Admirals a squadron, still the training carried out on the same lines for a number of years resulted in everything proceeding with the expected precision.<br />
<br />
The British, on the contrary, are said to have displayed a certain clumsiness as regards tactics and to have preferred turning together when "turning on to an opposite course" (Wendungen im Gegenmarsch), though this conclusion does not seem altogether justified from the description of the action.<br />
<br />
The ships kept station 547 yds. apart, and Vice-Admiral Schmidt told me that, in his opinion, this distance is too small for large ships and that he prefers 656 yds., as the shorter distances result in the ships getting bunched and overlapping during alterations of course. In order to relieve this during the first turn to starboard, the Fleet Flagship herself turned to port and then closed gradually into line. At night the distance was 656 yds.<br />
<br />
No interruption of W/T communication was occasioned by the enemy.<br />
<br />
<center><u>GUNNERY</u></center><br />
<br />
It is admitted that the British are superior as regards their gunnery technique. Their salvoes fall most astoundingly close together and aroused admiration on all sides. Some people affirm that they fell too close together, and that it was consequently difficult to cover a sufficiently large danger space.<br />
<br />
This is particularly the case with the heaviest calibres: 13.5-in. and 15-in. and the battle-cruisers' fire was noticeably inferior to that of the "Queen Elizabeth" class, for example.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> Literal translation; the meaning is not clear. - Tr.] The spread of the salvoes frequently only covered a few square yards. In the "KÖNIG" 3 rounds, out of a salvo of 4 rounds, hit between the capstan and the bridge.<br />
<br />
This is attributed to careful calibration, which the British have studied for a long time and which, as is well known, was abandoned by the German Navy after a few trials. The gunnery officers declare unanimously that it must unquestionably be re-introduced.<br />
<br />
The British range-finders are superior to the German, and the construction of their turrets enables them to shoot at ranges impossible for German guns. The question of range appears to be immaterial to the British, who fire at any range so long as visibility permits.<br />
<br />
The Germans are fully convinced of the great superiority of 15-in. guns over all others, and deplore the fact that, owing to the predominant conservative tendencies in the German Navy, this calibre was not introduced until so lately. Vice-Admiral Gerdes, the Head of the Armament Department, is responsible for this, for he always opposed it on the ground that the poor visibility in German waters and the consequent short ranges rendered an increase of calibre useless; he considered the German 12-in. gun to be an altogether superior weapon, capable of competing with every other.<br />
<br />
In one respect the British seem behindhand as compared with the Germans: namely that they cannot alter range quickly enough and they are too dependent on the range clock. The British rely on steady fire at long range, and they adapt their tactics to this and avoid alterations of course and range most assiduously.<br />
<br />
The Germans, on the contrary, in their firing practices always work with big and rapid alterations of range and exercise firing while turning, so that the gunnery officers consider they have an advantage in this respect.<br />
<br />
The Turn on to an opposite course was certainly not advantageous for the German Fleet, but in this particular instance it made little difference, as the German ships were already unable to find a target; besides which, it must have disconcerted the British and it prevented them from obtaining good results with their fire. The salvoes fell very close together round the ships, but few hits were obtained. The rate of fire in the British ships is said to have been fair, but not excessive. Some people affirm that it was very modest.<br />
<br />
The British shell had great penetrating power, and from all reasonable distances the main armour was generally pierced clean through. The shell splinters picked up prove conclusively that at least 2 kinds of shell were used, differing considerably in material and quality. One kind of shell had a very thick wall and an extremely small explosive charge, it might almost be called a solid shot. It seems to have broken up frequently without exploding and the fuse did not function. Its explosive power, if it possessed any at all, was quite inconsiderable, and it is presumed that the explosives used was not high explosive.<br />
<br />
It appears from the splinters of these 15-in. shell that the wall was 6.3 - 6.7 ins. (16 - 17 cm.), so that the hollow space cannot measure more than 2.4 ins. - 1.8 ins. (4 - 6 cm.). It is true that the large pieces into which these shell broke pierced everything in their course and often went right through the whole ship, unless they struck an armoured part. Several intact heads were found, with and without caps, and also entire bases.<br />
<br />
The second kind of shell had considerably thinner walls, only about half as thick, but it also often broke up into quite large pieces and displayed no great explosive power, and little or no incendiary power.<br />
<br />
It appears therefore that the British aimed only at attaining penetrating power, and the Germans are of opinion that they do not possess (rohrsicheren)* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D.Note.- This appears to be a special fuse which is very delicate, but safe until it has left the gun.] fuses for high explosive shell; this was their opinion before the war also.<br />
<br />
They believe that the high explosive power of the German ammunition gives them a great advantage which may partly counterbalance the smaller calibre of their guns and perhaps also their inferior gunnery. In any case, the effect of the German shell at the point of impact was very considerable.<br />
<br />
The fact that the ships blew up must be attributed to explosions in their magazines. (In this connection one may recall a turret of the "SEYDLITZ" being hit in the action of 24 January, 1915; see my report No.47 ex 15). The turret armour must have been pierced and the shells in the turret must have been exploded. The British have no metal cartridge-cases and also no cartridge-holders such as the Germans have, but they keep their cartridges in locked boxes which are perhaps not flash-proof enough. It seems therefore, from the incident experienced by the "SEYDLITZ", that this must constitute a particular danger to British ships. In this last action also turrets in German ships were frequently hit; further details are given in the account of damage sustained.<br />
<br />
After having compared the hits received in the German ships with the observations of results on enemy targets, it may be safely affirmed that the explosive power of the German shells exceeds that of the British; this was already known after the action of 24 January 1915. The Germans are therefore very much annoyed that they had no 15-in. guns to fire, as they are persuaded that ships so knocked about (eingedeckte) as, for example, the "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" would have been completely destroyed by German shell.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. Note.- The writer appears to mean that if German 15-in. shell had been used against "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" these ships would have been sunk.]<br />
<br />
It may be noted here that the "BAYERN", the first of their ships to carry 15-in. guns, will not join the Fleet for another few days, and the "BADEN" not until the autumn.<br />
<br />
Medium armament played no part, only a few hits were obtained and they did little damage.<br />
<br />
The British fired part-salvoes, like the Germans; full salvoes may have been fired now and again.<br />
<br />
The method of repulsing destroyer attacks, which has previously been reported, namely the 'turning away' and firing on one, or at most two boats, proved to be sound, and the repulsing of attacks both by day and night offered no difficulties.<br />
<br />
As regards gunnery, it may also be mentioned that the fire-control apparatus worked without a hitch and withstood the heaviest shocks. The elevation pointers worked admirably. A few ships were not yet fitted with them.<br />
<br />
<center><u>Torpedo.</u></center><br />
<br />
As regards torpedo work the Germans consider themselves very much superior. There were prolonged discussions about depriving Flotilla Leaders of their independence and putting them under the orders of a Leader Ship, but they are now convinced that this is necessary to ensure the flotillas attacking at the right moment and all together.<br />
<br />
The flotillas were led by the 2 leader Ships "ROSTOCK" and "REGENSBURG", the first having 2 flotillas and the second 3 flotillas allocated to them. The remaining 2 flotillas accompanied the Main Fleet or the battle-cruisers. The leaders carried out their duties with great daring and circumspection. The attacks of the British were weak and scattered, and could therefore have little or only occasional success.<br />
<br />
The German 2nd Flotilla, composed of the larger 1500 ton boats were held back instead of being sent to attack. Although these boats are spoken of very highly and are indispensable for certain enterprises, the view is now taken that they are too large and too valuable to be used for attacking during an action. This Flotilla proceeded to Zeebrugge immediately after the action and arrived there safely. It is to be employed in preventing the British from blockading the harbour with nets, and thus make it impossible for the German submarines to proceed out.<br />
<br />
As far as I have heard, the "MOLTKE" alone of the larger ships fired 4 torpedoes.<br />
<br />
Submarines were not in evidence. No German submarines were present; on the other hand a German destroyer claims to have rammed a British submarine. This claim appears to be erroneous, at least it was declared to be nonsense by the Chief of Staff. The submarines failed as regards scouting and also doing the pursuit.<br />
<br />
Some people state that a British aeroplane was sighted to the northward, and that it had apparently risen from a cruiser. It played no part in the action.<br />
<br />
The use of "Höschter"* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. note:- Probably the name of the inventor.] fog seems to have been of good service, it and the smoke made by the destroyers having completely masked the Main Fleet and its movements at critical moments.<br />
<br />
<center><u>SPEED</u></center><br />
<br />
The advantage of speed lay entirely with the British, not only as regards the Main Fleet on account of the "Deutschland" class, but also as regards the battle-cruisers. The latter are said to have proved considerably faster than the German battle cruisers, an unpleasant experience which had already been made on 25 January 1915. This alone proves that the British are talking nonsense when they assert that the German Fleet sought safety in flight; on the contrary, it was far from its bases and entirely in the power of the British, who either did not wish to take advantage of their superior speed, or were unable to do so on account of the damage sustained. The visibility was no worse than it had been during the day and Jellicoe may have even welcomed the "Höschter" fog which would enable him to plead bad visibility as a reason for abandoning the pursuit. On the German side in the light of experience the factor of speed in the battleships is considered very important. But the moderate depths of the German harbours limits the draught of the ships, and make it particularly difficult for German builders to do much in this respect. In spite of greater length and higher horse power the most modern cruisers "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ" and "LÜTZOW" attained only a quite inconsiderable increase of speed in comparison with the older "GOEBEN" class, and proved a disappointment in this particular.<br />
<br />
The question whether the older battleships should take part in an important engagement was not easy to decide. The 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons composed of the "WITTLESBACH" and "BARBAROSSA" class, re-commissioned at the beginning of the war, were intended to be used in such actions, but have long since been paid off; some have been disarmed and employed as guardships and instructional ships, etc. It was considered however, that the 2nd Battle Squadron, composed of the most modern of the older ships, would be of some service in the action; but this squadron was in a privileged position, inasmuch as it was merely attached to the 1st and 3rd Battle Squadrons and its Admiral was allowed to operate independently and select the position he thought best. On this occasion it kept station quite well and did not prove a hindrance, but, on the other hand, it did not come under any heavy fire. This must be considered very fortunate, for, in view of the damage sustained by other ships and in view of the fact that the British shell pierced all armour above or below water even at the longest range, it is certain that every ship of this class would have been sunk by a few hits, as their internal sub-division is not proof against large inrushes of water.<br />
<br />
The loss of the "Pommern", which gives the British an opportunity for a hollow triumph, also teaches a clear lesson. The Chief of Staff told me that they will probably consider carefully before again exposing this Squadron to danger; therefore this action will have further confirmed the complete worthlessness of all Dreadnought types [sic] and will condemn them as old iron.<br />
<br />
<center><u>TORPEDO NETS.</u></center><br />
<br />
The torpedo nets of the battle cruisers are all badly damaged and the gear so knocked about by gunfire that they were almost useless. This was particularly the case with the "Derfflinger", where the after port nets were hanging in the water, and would have fallen across the propeller had they not chanced to remain held up by a temporary lashing. The ship was obliged to stop during the action to secure the nets, and they might easily have occasioned the loss of the ship.<br />
<br />
For this reason all the nets, together with the booms, were unshipped immediately after the ships' return, to everybody's satisfaction. They will not be carried any more, except perhaps for operations in the Baltic, where the ships may be obliged to anchor at sea.<br />
<br />
<center><u>LEAK-STOPPING SERVICE.</u></center><br />
<br />
The leak-stopping service which had been systematically developed, worked admirably and the Germans are convinced that they owe much to it. They believed that the "Seydlitz" could not have been brought in if the strengthening of the bulkheads, etc., had not been so thoroughly exercised and if the personnel had not been so well trained.<br />
<br />
It is also said, that in the "Lutzow", which had only been in commission for 2 months, was naturally not up to the mark in this respect, and that it is not impossible that small shortcomings, for which of course nobody can be blamed, were responsible for the ship sinking. The "Lutzow" was an unfortunate ship altogether. First her turbines collapsed, thus delaying her commissioning for 6 months, then she immediately struck a mine, and she was hardly out of dockyard hands before she was sunk.<br />
<br />
<center><u>DANGER FROM GAS FUMES.</u></center><br />
<br />
Only 2 days before sailing, a large number of the ships, and fortunately exactly those that came most under fire, namely battle-cruisers and the 3rd Squadron, were supplied with gas masks fitted with alkali cartridges for the whole crew and a plentiful reserve (in the "Seydlitz" 1500 masks for about 1200 men). The masks are similar to those used in the army for poisonous gases. Each man carries a mask slung round him, if he is not actually wearing it.<br />
<br />
I was told emphatically by all the officers, that, in their experience, these masks are absolutely necessary and not only saved many lives but enabled the men to carry on in parts of the ship which they would otherwise have been compelled to leave.<br />
<br />
The gases from shells, mines and torpedoes penetrate in an incredible manner through ventilators, telephone leads, etc. to compartments far away from the point of impact. In many cases the masks enabled large numbers of the guns' crews to escape from turrets that were hit, and to help out others who were badly wounded. In one case the men in one of the main engine rooms were able to remain at their posts after gas had penetrated, until the engine-room was ventilated.<br />
<br />
The Fleet breathing apparatus (Flottenathmer) is preferable to masks in some cases, but it cannot be supplied to everyone and it hampers one's movements, which the masks do not.<br />
<br />
On account of the great danger from gases, it is also advisable to fit hinged flaps in all shafts, and to have wooden bungs to fit the voice-pipes, keeping a hammer at hand to hammer them into the mouth-pieces.<br />
<br />
They tell me that it proved very useful to keep all the personnel employed below, such as in central control rooms, engine-rooms, torpedo flats, etc. continually informed of what was going on. The men get nervous, particularly at first, with the tremendous shocks caused by shell falling close to the ship, though the shocks are felt less on deck, and such information gives them confidence and they like knowing what is going on above them.<br />
<br />
<center><u>DAMAGE</u></center><br />
<br />
The distribution of ships needing repair in the various dockyards is as follows:-<br />
<br />
The "König" proceeded at once to Kiel and is under repair at Howaldt's yard. I did not see her.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" and "Moltke" in Blohm and Voss yard, Hamburg, the first in the Imperial Dock.<br />
<br />
The "Kurfürst["] in Vulkan Yard, Hamburg.<br />
<br />
The "Derfflinger" was first docked in Wilhelmshaven and the leaks temporarily stopped, she then proceeded to the Imperial dockyard, Kiel. The "Seydlitz" will now be docked in the large dock at Wilhelmshaven; during my stay the "Seydlitz" was still in the lock.<br />
<br />
The "Von der Tann", "Ostfriesland" and "Helgoland" will be repaired in dry docks in Wilhelmshaven. No other large ships require to be docked.<br />
<br />
"<u>Seydlitz</u>" The number of hits was still uncertain, as the whole forepart of the ship up to the upper deck was still under water, and it is not known what she looks like below water. The ship was brought into the lock with difficulty, and as she is 43 ft. down by the bows, she cannot be taken into harbour. They will not venture to dock the ship inside the lock, and intend first to raise her bows slightly.<br />
<br />
The roof and guns of the fore turret and anchors, cables etc., have already been unshipped, and they now intend to bring caissons alongside and pump out the fore part sufficiently to enable her to enter the harbour.<br />
<br />
The great inrush of water, that flooded more or less the whole fore part of the ship as far as the first boiler-room bulkhead, was caused by a number of hits. Firstly, one of the belt armour plates forward on the port side is missing, having fallen off. Secondly, there are believed to be at least 2 or 3 more hits below water, forward on the port side; for the list and the settling down had already become ominous when the ship was hit at the edge of the upper deck, port side, abreast the bridge; this was followed by an inrush of water in the battery deck, which did a great amount of damage.<br />
<br />
In addition, during the day action, she was hit by a torpedo on the starboard side under the forward 5.9 in. gun, which caused her to settle down still more by the bows. This gun was so much damaged by the shock from underneath as to be disabled.<br />
<br />
Further, there are 4 severe hits in the ship's side (mess deck, port side, forward of the turret), which also demolished the port capstan.<br />
<br />
These shell, or shell splinters, naturally penetrated to the armoured deck, so that the entire fore part of the ship above and below the armoured deck is holed in many places, allowing free passage for the water. The fore part of the ship was struck therefore by at least 8 or 9 shells and one torpedo.<br />
<br />
Apparently the only compartments which are not flooded, are the bow torpedo flats and the central control room. The former is being pumped out continuously, as a great deal of water is flowing in from above. The torpedo control room had to be abandoned, as the forward partition was not watertight. The central control room abaft this was not abandoned, but of its 2 entrances from the starboard and port passages, only the port one can be used, as the starboard one is flooded.<br />
<br />
The gunnery control room is far further aft and was not affected.<br />
<br />
The ship has a list of 7° to port, and as she has now been slightly raised, about 1¾ ft. of her bows are above water; at one time it was up to the level of the deck.<br />
<br />
While under way the forward boiler room bulkhead had to withstand most of the pressure; supports have been built up everywhere, but it leaks in places.<br />
<br />
The other hits of consequences were those in the turrets. The fore starboard turret No.2 received a direct hit on the fore face of the revolving structure. One curved plate was forced out, but fortunately the main effect of the explosion was outward. The right hand gun was disabled by slight damage to the mounting; with this exception the turret remained in action and kept up fire.<br />
<br />
The right hand gun of turret No.3 received a direct hit, which cut out a wide groove along the tube of the gun. The left hand gun continued to fire.<br />
<br />
The barbette of turret No.4 was hit on a level with the rammer, and the armour was pierced clean through. This hit is of special interest, as the "Seydlitz" received a similar hit and at the same level in turret No.5 on 24th January 1915, which caused a fire, disabled both the after turrets and killed all the guns' crews. This last time, however, the damage was slight. There was no ready ammunition in the turret, and only one cartridge was exploded, in contrast to the (6200 Kg.) 13,670 lbs. of powder on Jan.1915. The turret officer and a large number of the gun's crews were saved by their gas masks. The destruction caused by splinters was, however, considerable and the turret was abandoned, as it was not possible to continue fire from it. This was a 13.5 in. shell, at 15,310 yds. range, strength of armour pierced 8.6 inches.<br />
<br />
After the turret had been abandoned, it was hit a second time in the after side of the revolving part, which was pierced; this of course increased the havoc in the interior.<br />
<br />
Turret No.5 was hit in the roof. The shell richochetted, and the roof is slightly dented. Nobody was hurt and the turret continued to fire.<br />
<br />
In the "Seydlitz" therefore, all the turrets were hit, with the exception of the foremost turret, and one was hit twice.<br />
<br />
A further hit pierced the 5.9 in. (150mm.) casemate armour of the aftermost 5.9 in. starboard gun, No.2. The deck was pierced from beneath, and splinters also pierced the splinter bulkhead. The gun was disabled and all the crew were killed, with the exception of the ship's chaplain who happened to be in the casemate and must be watched over by a special guardian angel.<br />
<br />
A similar hit, with a 15 in. shell, struck the casemate armour of the 6-in. gun No.7 and exploded in the casemate. Men were killed, the gun was disabled and the splinter bulkhead pierced by large splinters. This time again, surprise was aroused by the comparatively small damage caused by a large calibre shell.<br />
<br />
"<u>Derfflinger</u>". One shell hit the armour belt forward of the hawse pipe, probably at the junction of 2 plates, as 2 plates broke away. The plates underneath were consequently strained apart and a great deal of water flowed in.<br />
<br />
The armour belt on the port side also received 2 further hits in the centre and was pierced clean through. The splinters penetrated more than half way through the ship, and in one case a piece of plating was driven half way though the ship. These hits, combined perhaps with others, destroyed the nets and their supports in several places.<br />
<br />
The two after turrets received direct hits, in one case on the roof, in the other case in the barbette above the deck; the armour was pierced and the upper portions of the turrets burnt out and severely damaged, but the flames did not penetrate to the magazines. The crew in the upper part of the turret were killed, and both turrets were disabled. This occurred at an early stage of the action.<br />
<br />
The guns at high elevation cannot yet be dismounted, as everything is wedged in, but they do not appear to be damaged.<br />
<br />
The muzzles were carried away off the 4 foremost 6 in. (15 cm.) guns on the port side; two of them probably having been accounted for by one and the same shell which hit the armour. One gun, the muzzle of which was perhaps damaged by a splinter, afterwards burst, the tube splitting open in the shape of a tulip.<br />
<br />
The "Derfflinger" received a few other hits of no particular interest. She appears the next most severely damaged ship after the "Lützow".<br />
<br />
The "<u>Moltke</u>" only received 5 hits, all of them during that part of the action which took place on a southerly course; while the cruisers mentioned above received most of the hits on the port side, consequently during the later stages of the action.<br />
<br />
One shell pieced the bulwarks in the after part of the ship above the armour, passed through the ship and struck the armour on the port side from inside, about 3.3 ft. below the water-line. One plate was forced out and is missing. The inrush of water was considerable. The after compartments, above the armoured deck which remained intact, were all more or less flooded.<br />
<br />
The second hit was further forward, below the armour belt. The shell exploded in a bunker, but the armoured deck held and no water penetrated it from below. The neighbouring bunkers made little water and could be pumped out.<br />
<br />
Another shell struck the 5.9 in. armour in the upper bunker, above the water-line. The armoured deck again held, but the inner wall of the bunker parted, and the battery deck was pierced from below, a 6 in. gun being damaged and disabled.<br />
<br />
In the fore part of the ship a shell struck the armour belt below the water-line. The plate remained intact and was driven in about 8 inches. The compartment was flooded, but the torpedo bulkhead remained watertight. A neighbouring compartment leaked slightly, the rivets having parted.<br />
<br />
The fifth case of damage, namely a plate beneath the armour belt being driven and pressed in, was probably not due to a direct hit, but to splinters of a shell which fell short.<br />
<br />
"<u>Von der Tann</u>". A shell hit and pierced the lower part of the 3.9 in. armour belt in the after part of the ship to starboard. The compartments above the armoured deck, and some of those on the deck above, were flooded. The chief effect of the shell was outside the ship, but it bent the plates below the otherwise undamaged armoured deck, so that a considerable amount of water flowed into the compartments below the armoured deck. The after torpedo flat was flooded half way up, and the men in the starboard steering engine room were shut in for a long time owing to the exits being blocked.<br />
<br />
The fore turret was hit on the starboard side on the upper edge of the barbette and a semi-circular armour plate was forced out. The machinery of the turret was so badly knocked about that the turret was disabled.<br />
<br />
The hydraulic piping was damaged, so that all the heavy armament was put out of action temporarily. Strangely enough, though men were wounded none were killed.<br />
<br />
The aftermost turret was hit in the barbette. The armour was pierced, but the effect of the shell was exterior, the turret sustained little internal damage, so that the handgear of the turret remained in action. The turret was wedged in one place and could not revolve; they succeeded, however, in cutting off with oxy-acetylene the piece of revolving part which was jammed against the inner side of the barbette thus getting rid of the obstruction.<br />
<br />
Outside the turret, the shell did considerable damage; some splinters striking downwards, bent the armoured deck and pierced it in places. As far as I know, the armoured deck sustained no further damage, and this was of little importance.<br />
<br />
The after conning-tower was hit and a piece of the armour torn away; the occupants, including the 3rd gunnery officer, were killed. Splinters struck downwards to the engine-room ventilation hatches, but were stopped by the armoured gratings.<br />
<br />
"<u>Ostfriesland"</u> was struck by a mine below the foremost port turret. The whole measures 197 ft.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. note:- Literal translation is 12 times 5 metres large.] The torpedo bulkhead is only slightly torn, and the inrush of water was only local.<br />
<br />
"<u>Helgoland</u>". A 13.5 in. shell hit the 7.9 in. armour belt forward on the port side and pierced it. The shell appears to have broken only as no explosive action can be traced. The range was about 14,217 yds.<br />
<br />
"<u>Nassau</u>" rammed a British destroyer, or rather, the destroyer ran into her forward on the port side. Her bows must have lifted right up, for her hawse-pipe remained on board the "Nassau", so firmly wedged into the side of the upper deck that it will have to be cut out. The "Nassau's" side below the deck is torn away for 33 ft. The destroyer then glanced off the "Nassau's" side and exploded internally. One of the crew remained behind in one of the nets, but fell into the water when the "Nassau" fired a salvo.<br />
<br />
The "Nassau" was hit by shrapnel from attacking destroyers in the foremost searchlight group, both port searchlights were put out of action. The searchlight control and electric cables were destroyed and many of the searchlight crews were killed. The after searchlight group was hit in a similar manner, and one of the searchlights was disabled.<br />
<br />
The "Rhineland" and a light cruiser were also hit in a similar manner.<br />
<br />
I have seen all the above mentioned ships in Wilhelmshaven.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" and "Kurfürst" were at Hamburg, but unfortunately I am unable to report much about them. They had already been under repair for several days, and the damage was to some extent made good. Besides this, the conditions were not favourable for undisturbed examination: commissioners from the Imperial Navy Office were on board, besides crowds of workmen, the noise was deafening and it was pouring with rain. Consequently I took no notes on the spot and relied on my memory, which however fails me now among the very many received of similar cases. I am therefore unable to report each hit with accuracy.<br />
<br />
This is immaterial, however, as there were no particularly interesting hits, and none of the ships had been hit in the turrets. The armour had been pierced in several places, the effect and character of the hits being similar in all cases; the hits on unarmoured parts were of little consequence.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" was hit aft on the port side of the water line just on a junction of two plates, a piece of equal size being torn away from each plate. The shell then struck the sloping part of the armoured deck and the splinters ricochetted and passed right through the ship. These plates have already been removed.<br />
<br />
A casemate was pierced and the gun disabled.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" is the only ship whose mast was hit, the mast remained standing and has now been removed.<br />
<br />
The spotting platform had to be abandoned, as communications with the conning tower was cut off. This was the only hit received in a conning tower; it only grazed the upper edge and glanced off, and the men inside hardly noticed it.<br />
<br />
The port engine was disabled, not in consequence of damage to the turbine which is in good condition, but owing to one of the main propeller bearings becoming overheated. The cause of this is not clear, but it is believed to be due to concussions. The ship was well able to keep station with her two remaining engines.<br />
<br />
The "<u>Kurfürst</u>" suffered especially from a great inrush of water forward on the port side, above the armoured deck; it was caused by a hit in the armour belt. No further damage of importance was sustained.<br />
<br />
With regard to time necessary for repair to these ships, it is not yet possible to say anything definite, as it is still undecided whether they shall undergo thorough repair or not. The chief difficulty is the manufacture of new armour plates; but some of the holed plates can, no doubt, be left in position for the present.<br />
<br />
A considerable time will be needed to repair some of the turrets of the battle-cruisers, but here too, they will contrive to get things done. For instance, the "Von der Tann" is to have an entire turret out of a ship of the "Nassau" class, probably the foremost turret, and this ship will be left without a turret for some time. They talk a great deal also of transferring guns, and they will perhaps make use of those intended for the "Hindenburg", which will not be completed will the late autumn.<br />
<br />
It may be presumed that the battleships will be ready for sea in 4-6 weeks, and the battle-cruisers, particularly the "Seydlitz", in not less than 4 months. Naturally work is going on day and night, and repairs are given priority over all new construction.<br />
<br />
The damage sustained by light cruisers and destroyers is inconsiderable. The "Hamburg" had a funnel shot away. As these ships seem to be of minor importance, I did not trouble further about them.<br />
<br />
As our Allies appear not to have the intention of communicating to us what effect the examination of damages sustained will have on their construction in the future, we must endeavour to ascertain this as time goes on by means of cross questioning and by studying their new constructions in detail. I do not feel called upon to draw premature and rash conclusions to-day, on the strength of impressions received, but this will not prevent me from giving a summary of my opinion and of the opinions expresses in my hearing.<br />
<br />
Firstly, it is a remarkable fact that in all the ships that have returned home, all the engine and boiler-rooms are undamaged; the "Lützow" is no exception to this, as she proceeded under her own steam until late in the night after the action. I have also been assured by the Imperial Navy Office, after an inspection carried out by the Chief Engineer, that not a single auxiliary engine was defective. The only boiler-room put out of action was the foremost one in the "Seydlitz" where the bulkhead gave a little, allowing water to penetrate through rivet holes and cracks when the ship was under way. The conclusion may therefore be drawn that these vital parts of the ship are sufficiently protected and that the armour belt of the usual German thicknesses, though it cannot stop the shells, at least fulfils its purpose by breaking them up. Consequently it has become almost impossible even for the largest splinters of 15 in. shell to penetrate through armoured deck or torpedo bulkhead in engine and boiler rooms.<br />
<br />
Even at these long ranges and steep angles there was no question of the armoured decks being pierced; but the fitting of strong gratings over the hatches, which prevented the engines of the "Von der Tann" from sustaining severe damage, appears very necessary.<br />
<br />
The torpedo bulkheads also resisted shells, mines and torpedoes effectually; and in cases where slight damage was sustained, it had no further consequences than the flooding of the compartment affected.<br />
<br />
Perhaps it would be advisable to construct a specially strong boiler-room bulkhead, similar to a torpedo bulkhead, so that it could not be damaged by splinters or water-pressure.<br />
<br />
The inspection of the "Seydlitz" has left me with the impression that the commanding officer of the "Seydlitz" expected rather too much of his ship, and that nothing short of extraordinary good luck enabled her to be brought back. At one time when the whole forepart of the ship was flooded and the bows were under water, he proceeded occasionally with revolutions for 22 knots, just in order to show how seaworthy his ship was, so he told me. This may have been very sporting, or perhaps it may have been necessary under the circumstances in order not to drop too far behind and be overtaken by the enemy, but it certainly was not good seamanship, and if his stokehold bulkhead had burst, the "Seydlitz" would have gone down like the "Lutzow", where the circumstances appear to have been very similar. Later on he decreased speed and finally proceeded stern first.<br />
<br />
I therefore think it not impossible that the loss of the "Lützow", which is said to have been proceeded at 14 knots for a time, was also due only to recklessly high speed, and that the ship might have been saved if she had proceeded stern first or been taken in tow.<br />
<br />
As the danger from water-pressure must always be greatest from ahead, it would certainly be advisable to take special preventative measures against it.<br />
<br />
Vice-Admiral Schmidt told me that, in his opinion, the armoured belt ought to be strongest in the centre, and possible in the afterpart to protect the steering engines, and possibly in the bows, but that it ought not to taper off gradually from the centre to the extremities. He was also entirely in favour of a protected upper deck forming a second armoured deck.<br />
<br />
The admirably thorough system of internal division in the German ships and the floating capability thus attained is the finest proof of the merit of German construction which pursued this aim, and it shows that Admiral von Tirpitz, the creator of the Battle Fleet of to-day, was right when he upheld the principle that, above all things, the ships must be capable of remaining afloat and must not sink or heel over, and that everything else is of secondary consideration.<br />
<br />
The large number of hits in the turrets is remarkable, and it is generally considered that the turret armour should be appreciably stronger, especially in the lower part of the barbettes; for it is not only the disablement of the guns that comes into question, serious though this might be, but also the blowing up of magazines and the total destruction of the ship, as the wide shaft down to the magazines cannot possibly be made completely flash-proof. This is the most vital part of the ship. It is only owing to the small explosive charges in British shells, that there were no explosions of magazines in the German ships.<br />
<br />
Everything possible had been done after the action of 24.1.15 to ensure protection against this danger; the ready ammunition was removed from the top of the hoists and wherever possible all the openings in shafts leading down below were fitted with flaps, covers and heavy asbestos mats, while German ammunition is particularly carefully stowed and packed in cases with screwed-on covers.<br />
<br />
The disasters on the British side are a proof that this is a question of the greatest importance. It must also be taken into consideration that while any other damage turret may take months.<br />
<br />
The numerous hits in turrets would appear to justify the opinion of those who decided against triple turrets, on the ground [sic] that if one was disabled it would put too many heavy guns out of action.<br />
<br />
A hit in a casemate will of course destroy it and disable the gun, but this is of little consequence. Care must be taken here also not to have any ready ammunition, and to close the ammunition hand-up hermetically with heavy asbestos mats at the magazine end also. With the German "Paternoster" (dredger hoist) the ammunition lifts this mat as it comes up and the mat then falls to and closes the opening, which is a practical arrangement.<br />
<br />
Other hits through unarmoured parts, which destroyed more or less small gear and at the first glance give an impression of terrible havoc, are really of no consequence.<br />
<br />
In the "Von der Tann" they wanted to flood a turret magazine. This was impossible, as the flooding valve in the battery, or between deck was piled up with debris, cabin fittings, etc., and was inaccessible. Fortunately the flooding of the magazine turned out to be unnecessary. The Executive Officer remarked to me how critical such a trivial matter might become, and that one could not be careful enough about choosing the positions for the flooding valves, which must be kept clear of easily destructible objects.<br />
<br />
The man-hole covers in the decks, coal shoots [chutes], etc., were pointed out to me as dangerous, as they may be burst open by pressure of gas from below, thus causing damage and giving passage to the gases. These covers should be secured in a different manner and much more firmly.<br />
<br />
The flooding and draining system worked admirably, and is hardly capable of improvement. The only disadvantage is that the compartments above the armoured deck have no draining arrangements. This should be provided. A list, consequent on an inrush of water, could always be corrected by flooding an opposite compartment. This is an important matter both as affecting gunnery and personnel.<br />
<br />
The searchlights, which were not taken down in the German ships, all came out of the action undamaged; anxiety on their account was therefore unfounded. It was very unpleasant when attacking boats fired on the searchlights, and it is therefore considered necessary to fit light armour protection on the masts for the crews of the searchlight control and electric cables.<br />
<br />
Damage from flames is nowhere visible. The Germans are now rather amused at the care with which interior partitions were scraped.<br />
<br />
I could not help comparing the German ships with the Russian battleship "Orel", which I saw in Madzurn after the battle of Tsushima. If I remember rightly, the "Orel" had 5 severe hits and 40 hits with medium-calibre shell.<br />
<br />
The enormous explosive power of the Shimosa shell, which breaks up into minute splinters, did not do the slightest damage to the vital parts of the ship, but the upper deck was transformed into a confused heap of ruins. Superstructure, bridges, masts, funnels, etc., were destroyed, guns dismounted and fires started.<br />
<br />
Nothing of the kind is to be seen in the German ships, outwardly only a few more or less clean shell holes are visible, and they look so orderly and so little damaged that they do not appear to have gone through an action.<br />
<br />
It is true that the upper decks are said to have been littered with countless splinters, but they flew on to the decks from shells which struck the water, the ship receiving violent shocks.<br />
<br />
The holes in the armour show the characteristic concentric cracks round the hole and the radial splashes, the latter proving that the shells exploded on impact or at the latest, as they passed through. In many cases, as already noted, the force of the explosion was external and only pieces of plate, and possibly the head of the shell were driven in.<br />
<br />
<center><u>FLAG OFFICERS OF THE FLEET AND LEADERS</u></center><br />
<br />
{|<br />
| Commander-in-Chief:<br />
| Vice Admiral Scheer<br />
|-<br />
| <u>I Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Vice Admiral Schmidt<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Engelhard<br />
|-<br />
| <u>II Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Mauve<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Baron von Dalwigh<br />
|-<br />
| <u>III Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Behncke<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Nordmann<br />
|-<br />
| Officer commanding the Scouting Forces and<br>Commanding 1st Scouting Group<br />
| Vice Admiral Hipper<br />
|-<br />
| " 2nd " "<br />
| Rear Admiral Bodicker<br />
|-<br />
| " 4th " "<br />
| Commodore "Captain" v. Reuter<br />
|-<br />
| Leaders of Destroyers<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| in "Rostock"<br />
| Commodore "Captain" Michelsen<br />
|-<br />
| in Regensburg<br />
| Commodore "Captain" Heinrich<br />
|-<br />
| Leader of submarines<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| In Hamburg<br />
| Captain Bauer<br />
|}<br />
<br />
<center><u>REMARKS</u></center><br />
<br />
The lecture on the action, upon which this report is based, was illustrated by a plan prepared in haste for H.M. the Kaiser, and a copy was promised to me. But the Admiral Staff does not wish to part with this first incomplete draft, and the preparation of an accurate plan has not yet been completed, as the Admiral Staff is not yet in possession of all the details.<br />
<br />
In time to be included in this report I have only received the sketch of the first stage of the battle, namely the cruiser action on a southerly course, together with a small sketch of the situation when the action was broken off; both are enclosed.<br />
<br />
I conclude from the sketch of the cruiser action, that the accounts given to me were not quite accurate; for instance, the assertion of the commanding officer of the "Moltke" that the shortest range at that stage was 7,650 yds. and that he had accounted for one of the armoured cruisers with a torpedo.<br />
<br />
The sketch shows that the "Indefatigable" was probably first destroyed by gun fire from the "Von der Tann", and later the "Queen Mary" by gunfire from the "Derfflinger", and that the range was never less than 14,220 yds.<br />
<br />
The loss of "V. 27" and "V. 29" and of 4 British destroyers is also apparent, while I was only told of two.<br />
<br />
In the original sketch, 2 British armoured cruisers are also shown as having fallen out during this stage, but this is not shown on the accompanying sketch and probably took place later.<br />
<br />
I was told by the Admiral Staff that the accompanying sketches are not to be taken as strictly accurate.<br />
<br />
It is requested that the sketches and course of the action and the account of damages may be treated as strictly confidential.<br />
<br />
==Footnotes==<br />
{{reflist}}<br />
<br />
==Bibliography==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
*''Schematismus für das K.u.K. Heer und für die Kriegsmarine für 1914. Separatausgabe''. Wien. 1914.<br />
*''Almanach für die k. und k. Kriegsmarine 1917. Kriegsausgabe''. '''XXXVII'''. Pola. 1917.<br />
*[[Arthur Marder (Naval Historian)|Marder, Arthur J.]] (1966). ''From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919: Jutland and After, May 1916–December 1916''. '''Volume III'''. London: Oxford University Press.<br />
*{{MarderFDSFIII}}<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
==External Links==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
*Krámli, Mihály. [http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-124.pdf "The Report on the Battle of Jutland by the Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché in Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Colloredo-Mannsfeld."] ''NavWeaps''.<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
[[Category:Battle of Jutland]]</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Attach%C3%A9_Report_on_the_Battle_of_Jutland&diff=334737Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland2024-03-10T16:04:51Z<p>Simon Harley: /* Bibliography */</p>
<hr />
<div>Soon after the [[Battle of Jutland]] on 31 May &ndash; 1 June 1916 the Naval Attaché of the [[Austro-Hungarian Navy|Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Navy]] at the embassy in Berlin, ''Fregattenkapitäne'' Hieronymus Graf von Colloredo-Mannsfeld,<ref>''Schematismus für das K.u.K. Heer und für die Kriegsmarine für 1914''. p. 1270. ''Almanach für die k. und k. Kriegsmarine 1917''. p. 668.</ref> visited the High Sea Fleet. He composed a report on the battle for his superiors using first-hand accounts, interspersed here and there with his own observations. The version reproduced here is a translation in English apparently made by the [[Naval Intelligence Division (Royal Navy)|Naval Intelligence Division]] in 1919 from a copy which was subsequently returned to "F.N.A.", presumably the French Naval Attaché. A copy of the translation then made its way into the papers of the British Cabinet, from where historian Arthur J. Marder obtained a copy which is in his papers.<ref>Original number N.I.D. 087/19. Marder papers, Special Collections and Archives, Langson Library, University of California, Irvine, MS-F002, Box 27.</ref> He does not appear to have used it for the 1965 edition of ''From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow'', Volume III, but certainly used it for the revised edition in 1978.<ref>The quote on p. 189 of the 1965 edition differs from that on p. 234 of the 1978 edition which is the same used here.</ref> <br />
<br />
It is worth comparing this translation with that made by Hungarian historian Mihály Krámli of a post-war copy of a slightly different version of the report in a Hungarian archive which has been published on the ''NavWeaps'' online resource.<ref>Krámli, Mihály. [http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-124.pdf "The Report on the Battle of Jutland by the Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché in Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Colloredo-Mannsfeld."] ''NavWeaps''.</ref><br />
<br />
The original grammar and punctuation of the typescript has been reproduced here wherever possible.<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
From:- Austrian Naval Attache in Berlin.<br />
<br />
To:- Commander-in-Chief, Pola.<br />
<div style="float:right;">Berlin,<br>17 June, 1916.</div><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<center><u>NAVAL ENGAGEMENT OF 31 MAY 1916.</u></center><br />
<br />
The following is a report of the naval proceedings of 31 May - 1 June, 1916, and also of the damage sustained by the German Fleet.<br />
<br />
During my 3-days' visit to Wilhelmshaven, followed by a cursory examination of the "MARKGRAF" and "KURFURST" at Hamburg, I endeavoured to gain merely a general idea of the results of gunfire and concentrated my attention on the course of the action itself.<br />
Admiral Scheer, whom I only saw for a short time as he left for Kiel to attend the funeral of his borther-in-law [sic], Lieut.-Commander Mohr, who was killed in the action, very kindly arranged that his Chief of Staff, Captain Trotha, should give me an account of the whole proceedings, illustrated by plans, and that I should be furnished with all information. I have tried to fill in the gaps by conversations with officers whom I know; this has resulted in some contradictory statements, and several points remain obscure, the accounts from the various ships not having all come in.<br />
<br />
Many episodes will therefore be explained later and may appear in a different light, but, as regards the broad outlines which are of chief importance, the picture of this interesting engagement is fairly clear. The accompanying plan of the action was made in haste for the Kaiser and will therefore need much correction.<br />
<br />
The spirit pervading the Fleet can only be described as one of enthusiasm; they are intoxicated with victory. The heavy load weighing on them all, the dear that this war might end without an encounter of the Fleets, have vanished. They have learnt what fighting really means, they know themselves to be superior to the enemy as regards tactics, and that they were following the right lines and have nothing to unlearn; they know that their gunfire was more effective than that of the enemy, and that they can rely implicitly on their flotillas which have always been looked upon in the German Navy as one of the chief factors in an action. Finally they know that their largest ships can stand heavy fire and serious damage, that they leave nothing to be desired as regards construction and cannot be sunk easily. In short, they feel that the British, in spite of all their boasting, cannot overcome the German Fleet and have a considerable respect for it.<br />
<br />
This conviction imbues the whole Fleet, down to the last man, with confidence in their strength and a calm assurance regarding future encounters. At the same time they are free from over-confidence and from under-estimation of the enemy. On the contrary, the British fire-control and the enormous piercing power of their heavy shell at great distances have roused their admiration, so that a careless conception of the situation is not to be feared, the less so, as well-balanced minds such as those of Admiral Scheer and his Staff are unlikely to be led away by former successes to undertake rash enterprises in the future.<br />
<br />
They do not deny that they were extraordinarily fortunate, and that if the action had been prosecuted with energy on the British side, and if the "Nelson touch" had been in evidence, things might have gone very badly for Germany, especially as the British still had an intact Battle Squadron of 12 units at their disposal which had not yet taken part in the action. But they console themselves with the knowledge that no naval action was ever won without some stroke of luck.<br />
<br />
The Kaiser's visit, the day before my arrival, and his address to the Fleet gave great satisfaction, and subsequently many important personages arrive to inspect the ships, such as Prince Henry and the Grand Dukes of Mecklenburg and Oldenburg, and numbers of decorations were distributed. Vice-Admiral Scheer was promoted to Admiral, and he and Vice-Admiral Hipper received the Pour le Merite.<br />
<br />
I also visited Rear-Admiral Behncke, who was wounded and in hospital; his wounds are slight, a few small splinters in his head, elbow and knee, and he will probably soon be well again.<br />
<br />
<center><u>COURSE OF THE ACTION.</u></center><br />
<br />
The Commander-in-Chief intended to advance with the whole Fleet to the waters of the Skagerrak, in order to make his presence felt unpleasantly by disturbing the shipping, hoping thereby to lure on the British forces and in this manner to be in a position to attack a part of the British Fleet with superior or at least with equal forces. He reckoned that any movements of the British Fleet would be reported to him in good time by the submarines which had been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and he hoped that the airships would prove a better means of reconnoitring than any possessed by the enemy.<br />
<br />
Unfavourable weather prevented him for a considerable period from undertaking any operations, and, as the submarines were to return home on 1 June and be relieved by a new group, the 31 May was the last date for carrying out the planned advance.<br />
<br />
The cruisers left the Jade at 3 a.m., the Main Fleet at 4 a.m., steering an easterly course, and then, after passing Heligoland, a N.N.W'ly course. No reports were received from submarines. These were stationed chiefly off the Orkneys and the Firth of Forth, and the large group of Flanders boats were off the Thames and at the entrance to the Channel. <br />
<br />
While proceeding northwards, a few W/T messages were received, but they were corrupt, appeared to refer only to small formations and gave no clue to the movements of the Grand Fleet. The airships were unable to start in the morning, on account of the wind, and, as it blew hard throughout the day in the Heligoland Bight, they could not start until the early hours of 1 June. In this respect things did not go well, but Admiral Scheer decided nevertheless to continue on his course to the Skagerrak. <br />
<br />
This the account given by Captain von Trotha, who affirms that nothing was known of the presence of the British Fleet in the waters of the Skagerrak, and that there seemed no probability of encountering this Fleet before 1 June.<br />
<br />
There are some points here which I am unable to understand. The submarines are said to have been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and were to return home on 1 June to be relieved probably by a weaker group. For, If the same number of boats were to to keep watch off the English coast, why should 31 May have been the last day for the German Fleet to sail. The day of departure was, therefore, too late in any case, for, if no encounter was to be expected before 1 June, the boats stationed off the coast could not possibly encounter the damaged British ships, as was intended, for probably no damaged ships would be there before 2 June.<br />
<br />
The battleship "KONIG ALBERT" had to carry out repairs to her condensers and did not proceed with the Fleet. Von Trotha told me that there was no alternative and that a ship must carry out small overhauls regularly in a dockyard according to programme. But could it not be arranged, when one is taking the initiative, to choose one's moment for an advance and to have all the ships together for this short time? And why should just that moment be chosen when one of the most powerful ships of the "Kaiser" class is in the dockyard, instead, for instance, of one of the "Nassau" class with 11-in. guns.<br />
<br />
In addition, the "BAYERN" was to have joined up a few days later. After having waited so long, why should not the plan have been postponed for 2 or 3 weeks, instead of dispensing with the only ship carrying 15-in. guns.<br />
<br />
In the same manner they dispensed with air reconnaissance, from which they had expected so much.<br />
<br />
These considerations make me doubt whether the account given me is quite correct, and whether, on the contrary, they knew of certain movements of the British Fleet and considered the moment extremely favourable for an attack. Perhaps they only knew of Beatty's battle squadron, and thinking the Main Fleet was far away, hoped to entrap this squadron. In Berlin, they have much to say, even in military circles, about the British Fleet's intention to push through into the Baltic, and of Kitchener's mission having some connection with this. I consider this senseless, for it cannot be presemed [sic] that the British Fleet would leave their shores unprotected and do the Germans the favour of operating in the Baltic, which would certainly be a most advantageous area for the German Fleet. In any case, there appear to be discrepancies which will probably be explained at some later date.<br />
<br />
Scouting groups, battle cruisers and light cruisers, together with flotillas, preceded the Main Fleet by 50 - 60 miles. At 4 p.m. the light cruisers encountered some British battle cruisers. These at once opened fire on the light cruisers, at an estimated distance of 26,247 yds.; the range could be taken accurately. Though they did not obtain a hit, the salvoes fell so well that the German cruisers thought it advisable to turn away and fall back on their battle cruisers.<br />
<br />
As the British approached, these battle cruisers turned on to a southerly course, in order to lure the enemy on to the German Main Fleet. A running action, on a southerly course, ensued. The British were to starboard and to the west of the Germans, who had therefore the following advantage: in the North Sea, in summer, the western horizon is quite light and visibility towards the west is good, while towards the east, and in a still greater degree off the Jutland Coast, it is misty and visibility is bad and no silhouettes stand out against the eastern horizon. This phenomenon also played great part in the subsequent course of the action. The sun was still high and was not troublesome, and the British ships offered admirable targets. The sea was calm, the wind N.W. 1-2, altering subsequently through W. to S.W.<br />
<br />
The following British ships were recognised:-<br />
3 "Lion" class, 1 "Tiger" and 2 "Indefatigable" class; they were soon reinforced by 5 "Queen Elizabeth" class following astern.<br />
<br />
It is asserted that, judging from shell splinters, the ship of the "Tiger" class carried 15-in. guns, and that she was therefore the mysterious vessel which replaced the "TIGER" sunk on 24.1.15; as the last-named "TIGER" carried only 13.5-in.guns, this was taken as a further proof of her loss. The silhouette of the new "TIGER", however, is said to have resembled that of the old "TIGER" exactly. As the "Queen Elizabeths" soon opened fire also with 15-in. guns, I rather doubt this assertion regarding the "TIGER", and the various ships on this early part of the engagement are altogether somewhat at variance.<br />
<br />
On the German side the ships proceeded in the following sequence:- "LÜTZOW", Flagship of Vice-Admiral Hipper, "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN".<br />
<br />
As Hipper edged towards the enemy, the distance decreased to about 7655 yds. The German fire was unquestionably superior, but the speed of the British vessels was greater. After a short time the "INDEFATIGABLE" and "QUEEN MARY" blew up, and 2 battle-cruisers and two attacking destroyers were also accounted for. The "QUEEN MARY" must have been destroyed by the explosion of a magazine; she was torn in two halves, and a water-colour painted by an officer represents her enveloped in an enormous column of black smoke; she disappeared in a few seconds. Only one cadet was subsequently picked.<br />
<br />
The second battle cruiser disappeared under similar circumstances. The "VON DER TANN" claims to have accounted for one of these battle-cruisers by a broadside. But the "MOLTKE" fired 4 torpedoes and also claims this achievement.<br />
<br />
The Germans suffered very little during this phase of the action, the "MOLTKE" alone receiving hits on the starboard side. The fire of the British battle-cruisers is said not to have been nearly as good as that of the "QUEEN ELIZABETH" class later on.<br />
<br />
When they had approached the German Main Fleet, the British turned on to a contrary course and the German cruisers did the same. The German Main Fleet proceeded in divisions in starboard quarter-line, the 3rd Battle Squadron: 4 "König" class and 3 "Kaiser" class, Fleet Flagship, 1st Battle Squadron: 4 "Ostfriesland" class and 4 "Westfalen" class, and the 2nd Battle Squadron: 5 "Deutschland" class and the "Hessen". They endeavoured to effect a junction with the cruisers, but were unable to take part very effectually.<br />
<br />
The course of the action was now in a northerly direction, over the area which had just been traversed, and the British ships now drew ahead considerably and turned more and more towards the East; the Germans followed this movement, and in consequence the conditions of visibility became less and less favourable for them.<br />
<br />
The "Queen Elizabeths" now made their presence more greatly felt; one of them had dropped out, but I was unable to ascertain when this occurred.<br />
<br />
The course of the German Math Fleet at first led past the 2 disabled British destroyers, which were lying stopped. The crews had already taken to the boats and were picked up later on by German destroyers. As the Main Fleet was doubtful about the advisability of passing the destroyers while they were still afloat, they were sunk by a few broadsides. One of the officers who was picked up was in pyjamas and is said to have stayed in his cabin during the action. He declared "We did not expect so much resistance," while another said - "The battle is rather disappointing." It has been ascertained that these destroyers were greatly under-manned; their crews seemed very exhausted, which points to their having been in the water for a long time.<br />
<br />
While on this easterly course, the light cruisers of the fast 2nd Scouting Group: "FRANKFURT", "PILLAU", "ELBING" and "WIESBADEN", were heavily fired on from the N.E. and E. without their being able to see more than the gun flashes. In addition, they were under continual fire from the N., and while turning away to S.E. and S., they ascertained that they were opposed by an interminable line of British ships, which appeared at first to be on a N.W.'ly course, and had then evidently turned together on to a S.'ly course.<br />
<br />
It may be noted here that the battleships, and, generally speaking, the battle-cruisers also, never sighted the British Main Fleet, and saw nothing but the flashes of the guns and the effects of the fire. These British ships, about 25 in number, were only sighted by a few light cruisers and by the flotillas, and were counted by them as accurately as possible.<br />
<br />
Surrounded thus from the N. and the E. and under fire, the "WIESBADEN" was disabled, apparently by a hit in the engine-room. The Admiral noticed, it is true, that his leading ships must have encountered new and powerful forces and that they were turning away; but he thought it his duty to go to the assistance of the "WIESBADEN" and therefore continued on an easterly course.<br />
<br />
The van of the Main Fleet, led by the "KÖNIG" (Rear-Admiral Behncke) now came under heavy fire from right ahead; the "KÖNIG" turned away under this fire towards the S.E., whereupon the Commander-in-Chief ordered the whole line to "turn together" to starboard and gave up the idea of helping the "WIESBADEN". About this time Vice-Admiral Hipper transferred his flag from the "LÜTZOW" to the "MOLTKE" with the help of a destroyer, his W/T station being damaged.<br />
<br />
Hardly had the Main Fleet drawn away on a westerly course, before it was ascertained that the pressure was relaxing and the fire decreasing, and that the British were no longer pursuing so hotly. Scheer therefore ordered the ships to "turn together" back on to their former course, and made the signal 'R' = 'Engage the enemy'. This second advance may be termed the zenith of the action. Admiral Scheer gave his views on it approximately as follows:- "Those who make a study of this engagement will be very puzzled as to my object in advancing thus against the wall of British ships. The fact is that I had no particular object. I made the first advance because I had a feeling that I ought to endeavour to assist the "WIESBADEN" and because the situation ahead was quite obscure to me, for I saw nothing of the "LÜTZOW" and received no W/T reports. I soon saw, however, that the leading ships were coming under an overwhelming fire, and that I could not risk the Fleet on the "WIESBADEN'S" account. When I noticed that the British pressure had quite ceased and that the Fleet remained intact in my hands, I turned back, under the impression that the action could not end in this way and that I ought to seek contact with the enemy again."<br />
<br />
The situation during the first and second advances may serve as an example of what should not take place according to all the laws of tactics, for it could not have been worse; von Trotha said jokingly that, if an Admiral brought about such a situation at a war game or in manoeuvres, he would never be entrusted without another command. In the North, the "Queen Elizabeths", then the battle-cruisers, and from N.E. through E. to S.E., an endless line of battleships formed an arc round the German van and kept it under fire. Evidently it had fallen into the most perfect trap. In addition to this unfavourable tactical position, there was a further difficulty, namely that the German ships could be clearly distinguished while they themselves only saw the gun flashes, 4 or 5 to each salvo, but could find no target.<br />
<br />
The Gunnery Officer of the "MARKGRAF" told me that he could not fire at all during half-an-hour, and that they were at the mercy of the British broadsides. Critical though the position was, in theory, they think that experience justifies the conclusion that this 'crossing the T' is in reality not so disastrous at longer ranges; for, in spite of the enormous superiority of their fire, the British made comparatively few hits, the simple reason being that, when fire is thus concentrated on a few leading ships, there can be no question of improving the shooting by spotting.<br />
<br />
Given good tactical training and squadrons which work well together, it is always easy to retire rapidly from an unfavourable position and even possibly to reach an advantageous one.<br />
<br />
The small amount of damage sustained by the Main Fleet may be owing partly to the fact that the leading battle-cruisers drew the enemy's fire, thus relieving the battleships. Only the three leading ships, "KÖNIG", "GROSSER KURFÜRST" and "MARKGRAF" received several hits; while among all the other ships, the "KAISER", "HELGOLAND" and the "SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN" received one hit each, and the rest were not hit at all.<br />
<br />
Simultaneously with the battle-cruisers, which were ahead and pressing forward in quarter-line formation, the 6th and 9th Flotillas, left by the "REGENSBURG", also proceeded to a torpedo attack. Regarding this cruiser advance, the Commanding Officer of the "SEYDLITZ" told me that he was in such a position that he was able to avoid the British salvoes, for he altered course towards the point where each salvo fell and thus evaded the spotting correction.<br />
<br />
This torpedo attack was carried out with great determination and seems to have been completely successful, although nobody is able to state how many hits were obtained. The British ships overlapped somewhat and their line was almost unbroken, and, as about 100 torpedoes were fired, it is estimates that there must have been a considerable number of hits, some people affirm that there were 20, but I do not place much confidence in these figures and it is useless to trouble about them as nobody is certain.<br />
<br />
The boats were fired on by guns of all calibres, even the heaviest, but with little effect, only one boat being destroyed; two other boats had been sunk in an earlier attack during the cruiser action.<br />
<br />
The battle-cruisers were also attacked by British torpedoes, the "SEYDLITZ" being hit once. The "MOLTKE" was lucky, for, when close to the ship, one torpedo apparently had a gyro failure and ran parallel with her. The "LÜTZOW" was probably hit also.<br />
<br />
After the attack, the destroyers laid fog and a heavy smoke screen, which interposed between the Fleet; this benefitted not only the heavily-damaged "LÜTZOW" and "DERFFLINGER", whose nets had been shot away and were hanging down, but also the whole Fleet. It may also have made an impression on the British.<br />
<br />
The German Main Fleet and cruisers turned on a westerly course, fire having again entirely ceased; and the ships of the Main Fleet then turned gradually in succession and in inverse sequence from W. to S.W., subsequently steering towards Horns Reef.<br />
<br />
It is not known what the British did; all that is certain, is that they did not follow in pursuit and that nothing further was seen of their Main Fleet. It remained light until 11 p.m. (summer time), and it would not have been impossible, considering their superior speed, for them to have come within firing range. The Germans expected it too, and now have to content themselves with surmises about the British Commander-in-Chief's reasons for not doing so. It is probably that the unfavourable issue of the fleet part of the battle and the demoralising losses in ships took away any desire on Jellicoe's part for further fighting. His Fleet may have lost heavily and been severely shaken by the torpedo attack; and, as the Germans still had some intact flotillas at their disposal, he may have feared further strong torpedo attacks in the critical hours of twilight, for in the German Navy they say that Jellicoe fears their destroyers in particular.<br />
<br />
Nevertheless, the Germans were not under the impression of having shaken the British Fleet to the extent of obliging them to give up the struggle, and when the evening passed without further incident, they reckoned with certainty on encountering Jellicoe off Horns Reef at daybreak. They were the more astonished at his non-appearance when their air reconnaissance reported that on the morning of 1 June a squadron of 12 battle-ships was proceeding North from the southern part of North Sea and that it suddenly turned on to an opposite course and proceeded South.<br />
<br />
As it could not possibly have been the intention of the British Commander-in-Chief to let the German Fleet escape after having encountered it at last far from its base, and as he still had an intact battle-squadron at his disposal, one is compelled to take the view that he no longer felt strong enough for a second encounter; the achievement of the German Fleet must therefore be very highly thought of.<br />
<br />
During the night cruising following the action, numerous small episodes and minor engagements took place, of which no clear idea can be formed. <br />
<br />
In view of a possible fresh attack or of a possible pursuit on the part of the enemy, it was thought undesirable to leave the 2nd Battle Squadron either in the van or in the rear, it therefore took station to starboard and at first proceeded on an opening course from the other squadrons, and continued fairly independently during the night.<br />
<br />
The 1st Battle Squadron therefore led, with the "WESTFALEN" as guide, and it was followed by the 3rd Battle Squadron.<br />
<br />
After the action had been broken off, the 4 remaining battle cruisers were ahead to port, where they were suddenly again brought under heavy fire from the port side and from ahead, apparently by 3 or 4 battle cruisers. It is presumed that these were the remaining 3 or 4 older cruisers of the "Invincible" class, which Jellicoe probably always stationed ahead of the Main Fleet, for it would hardly have been possible for the "Lions", which were following in the rear in the British line, to have taken station ahead so quickly. The German battle cruisers, all severely damaged, did not feel able to withstand this fire and turned away to starboard, passing ahead of the Main Fleet and between it and the 2nd Battle Squadron, which proceeded quietly on their course and before which the mysterious ships retired, not to be sighted again.<br />
<br />
The battle-cruisers then gradually fell astern, and as they were making much water, and also owing to their differing speeds, they lost contact with the Main Fleet and with each other.<br />
<br />
The "LÜTZOW" had dropped out during the engagement and proceeded independently, accompanied by 4 destroyers. At first she was able to steam 14 knots, but her speed decreased rapidly and dropped finally to 4 knots. Her bows sank slowly, and when the whole forecastle was under water the Commanding Officer decided to leave the ship. The badly wounded were transferred carefully to the boats and the disembarkation was conducted in good order. A torpedo was then fired at the ship and this coup de grace sank her in deep water at about 1 o'clock, I believe.<br />
<br />
The "SEYDLITZ" was hardly in a better condition than the "LÜTZOW"; she also sank gradually by the bows till the water was almost level with the deck, and she had a heavy list to port, but she continued on her course. In the darkest hours of the night she suddenly sighted 3 large ships to port, quite close to. She turned away, made a British recognition signal and was not pursued. As bad luck would have it, the steaming light had short-circuited, could not be switched off and showed intermittently.<br />
<br />
The "DERFFLINGER", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN" followed the Main Fleet more or less and met with no particular experiences.<br />
<br />
The Main Fleet had to repulse a series of destroyer attacks and was also engaged by cruisers. The movements of these British cruisers, which came up singly, are incomprehensible and give the impression of having lost their heads. They appear to have received the order, judging by an intercepted W/T message, to proceed on a northerly and north-westerly course, and thereby they ran into the extended German line which they probably imagined they had passed to the South.<br />
<br />
One large cruiser (?"WARRIOR") proceeded unsuspectingly within 875 yds. of the line of battleships and came under concentrated fire from several ships before she could reply, so that she blew up enveloped in flames and disappeared in 47 seconds. The "BIRMINGHAM" seems to have been accounted for in a similar manner. The destroyers all approached in a really insane manner; frequently not from ahead but from a direction astern, scattered, singly or in pairs, or at most 3 together, never in large numbers. Most of them were disabled forthwith by a few salvoes and set on fire. The "WESTFALEN" distinguished herself particularly at this time.<br />
<br />
These burning destroyers strewn along the course, lit it up as if for a festival. Evidently the fires were largely due to the light American and Mexican oils; at any rate German firing trials on oil bunkers never caused any such conflagrations.<br />
<br />
The attacking boats directed shrapnel fire on the searchlights with fairly good results, the searchlights of two battleships and one light cruiser being hit.<br />
<br />
One large destroyer, which only recognised the danger at the last moment and endeavoured to avoid it by altering course was rammed by the "NASSAU", which put her helm over for this purpose. The boat exploded internally and sank.<br />
<br />
The only ships hit were the "POMMERN" in the 2ns Battle Squadron, and the "ROSTOCK". The "POMMERN" blew up at once and nobody was saved. The "ROSTOCK" was just passing between ships of the Main Fleet when she was hit; the loss of life on board was small.<br />
<br />
The Germans believe they destroyed 11 British destroyers in all. The manner in which these destroyers were handled has not left a good impression on the whole, and one has certainly lost respect for this weapon. The view is also taken that the boats are too large and offer too wide a target.<br />
<br />
The light cruiser "ELBING", like the "ROSTOCK", apparently wanted to break through the line from port to starboard under pressure from the British cruisers; she was, however, rammed by the "POSEN" and had to be abandoned in a sinking condition. The Germans also fired a torpedo into her.<br />
<br />
The "FRAUENLOB" and 2 destroyers were lost during the night; no details of their loss are known.<br />
<br />
Not far from Heligoland, the "OSTFRIESLAND", 7th of the line, struck a mine. This brings the account of the chief events of this exciting cruiser to an end.<br />
<br />
The German flotillas were detached from the Fleet to clear the area off the Jutland Coast, which was divided up into sectors. The flotillas stationed furthest to the North proceeded to the Skagerrak and through these straits into the Baltic and to Kiel.<br />
<br />
None of the flotillas sighted the British Main Fleet again, which proves that it must have turned away to the N. or N.W. immediately after the action. According to confidential reports the Fleet entered British ports as early as 1 June.<br />
<br />
Two British battleships, in a severely damaged condition and accompanied by destroyers, were sighted proceeding back to England. One was attacked by a submarine, but without success.<br />
<br />
On the morning of 1 June, in fairly misty weather, a Zeppelin sighted groups of British ships leaving the Channel on a N.E.'ly course. The reports were rather vague, as sometimes 6 and sometimes 12 ships were mentioned; but it seems most likely that 12 battleships and 3 cruisers were in question, and that they soon retired. The airship, which flew low at one time to get a clearer view, was also fired on.<br />
<br />
Some of the ships are said to have had tripod masts.<br />
<br />
The German Fleet, with the exception of "SEYDLITZ", reached the Jade in the afternoon. The "SEYDLITZ" could not cross the bar on account of being so much down by the bows, and it was not till the next day at high water that she was towed in, stern first.<br />
<br />
<center><u>MISCELLANEOUS.<br>TACTICS.</u></center><br />
<br />
The Germans ascribe their success to various causes, and in the first place to their own superiority as regards tactics. This is a point which every officer discusses, and it is constantly repeated that it all happened just as in tactical manoeuvres and in "battle exercises", and that things could not have gone better.<br />
<br />
Movements of squadrons, divisions and individual ships, "turns together" and alterations of course and speed, all went like clockwork and demonstrated the very great mobility of all formations.<br />
<br />
The W/T signalling system of the Main Fleet never failed, and its failure would have been immaterial, as the primary and secondary flag action signals, showing from several positions in the ship, were made simultaneously.<br />
<br />
All this was due to the peace training and the practical experience of the Flag Officers and Captains. Though in peace time the Commander-in-Chief had never commanded a Fleet, nor the Admirals a squadron, still the training carried out on the same lines for a number of years resulted in everything proceeding with the expected precision.<br />
<br />
The British, on the contrary, are said to have displayed a certain clumsiness as regards tactics and to have preferred turning together when "turning on to an opposite course" (Wendungen im Gegenmarsch), though this conclusion does not seem altogether justified from the description of the action.<br />
<br />
The ships kept station 547 yds. apart, and Vice-Admiral Schmidt told me that, in his opinion, this distance is too small for large ships and that he prefers 656 yds., as the shorter distances result in the ships getting bunched and overlapping during alterations of course. In order to relieve this during the first turn to starboard, the Fleet Flagship herself turned to port and then closed gradually into line. At night the distance was 656 yds.<br />
<br />
No interruption of W/T communication was occasioned by the enemy.<br />
<br />
<center><u>GUNNERY</u></center><br />
<br />
It is admitted that the British are superior as regards their gunnery technique. Their salvoes fall most astoundingly close together and aroused admiration on all sides. Some people affirm that they fell too close together, and that it was consequently difficult to cover a sufficiently large danger space.<br />
<br />
This is particularly the case with the heaviest calibres: 13.5-in. and 15-in. and the battle-cruisers' fire was noticeably inferior to that of the "Queen Elizabeth" class, for example.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> Literal translation; the meaning is not clear. - Tr.] The spread of the salvoes frequently only covered a few square yards. In the "KÖNIG" 3 rounds, out of a salvo of 4 rounds, hit between the capstan and the bridge.<br />
<br />
This is attributed to careful calibration, which the British have studied for a long time and which, as is well known, was abandoned by the German Navy after a few trials. The gunnery officers declare unanimously that it must unquestionably be re-introduced.<br />
<br />
The British range-finders are superior to the German, and the construction of their turrets enables them to shoot at ranges impossible for German guns. The question of range appears to be immaterial to the British, who fire at any range so long as visibility permits.<br />
<br />
The Germans are fully convinced of the great superiority of 15-in. guns over all others, and deplore the fact that, owing to the predominant conservative tendencies in the German Navy, this calibre was not introduced until so lately. Vice-Admiral Gerdes, the Head of the Armament Department, is responsible for this, for he always opposed it on the ground that the poor visibility in German waters and the consequent short ranges rendered an increase of calibre useless; he considered the German 12-in. gun to be an altogether superior weapon, capable of competing with every other.<br />
<br />
In one respect the British seem behindhand as compared with the Germans: namely that they cannot alter range quickly enough and they are too dependent on the range clock. The British rely on steady fire at long range, and they adapt their tactics to this and avoid alterations of course and range most assiduously.<br />
<br />
The Germans, on the contrary, in their firing practices always work with big and rapid alterations of range and exercise firing while turning, so that the gunnery officers consider they have an advantage in this respect.<br />
<br />
The Turn on to an opposite course was certainly not advantageous for the German Fleet, but in this particular instance it made little difference, as the German ships were already unable to find a target; besides which, it must have disconcerted the British and it prevented them from obtaining good results with their fire. The salvoes fell very close together round the ships, but few hits were obtained. The rate of fire in the British ships is said to have been fair, but not excessive. Some people affirm that it was very modest.<br />
<br />
The British shell had great penetrating power, and from all reasonable distances the main armour was generally pierced clean through. The shell splinters picked up prove conclusively that at least 2 kinds of shell were used, differing considerably in material and quality. One kind of shell had a very thick wall and an extremely small explosive charge, it might almost be called a solid shot. It seems to have broken up frequently without exploding and the fuse did not function. Its explosive power, if it possessed any at all, was quite inconsiderable, and it is presumed that the explosives used was not high explosive.<br />
<br />
It appears from the splinters of these 15-in. shell that the wall was 6.3 - 6.7 ins. (16 - 17 cm.), so that the hollow space cannot measure more than 2.4 ins. - 1.8 ins. (4 - 6 cm.). It is true that the large pieces into which these shell broke pierced everything in their course and often went right through the whole ship, unless they struck an armoured part. Several intact heads were found, with and without caps, and also entire bases.<br />
<br />
The second kind of shell had considerably thinner walls, only about half as thick, but it also often broke up into quite large pieces and displayed no great explosive power, and little or no incendiary power.<br />
<br />
It appears therefore that the British aimed only at attaining penetrating power, and the Germans are of opinion that they do not possess (rohrsicheren)* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D.Note.- This appears to be a special fuse which is very delicate, but safe until it has left the gun.] fuses for high explosive shell; this was their opinion before the war also.<br />
<br />
They believe that the high explosive power of the German ammunition gives them a great advantage which may partly counterbalance the smaller calibre of their guns and perhaps also their inferior gunnery. In any case, the effect of the German shell at the point of impact was very considerable.<br />
<br />
The fact that the ships blew up must be attributed to explosions in their magazines. (In this connection one may recall a turret of the "SEYDLITZ" being hit in the action of 24 January, 1915; see my report No.47 ex 15). The turret armour must have been pierced and the shells in the turret must have been exploded. The British have no metal cartridge-cases and also no cartridge-holders such as the Germans have, but they keep their cartridges in locked boxes which are perhaps not flash-proof enough. It seems therefore, from the incident experienced by the "SEYDLITZ", that this must constitute a particular danger to British ships. In this last action also turrets in German ships were frequently hit; further details are given in the account of damage sustained.<br />
<br />
After having compared the hits received in the German ships with the observations of results on enemy targets, it may be safely affirmed that the explosive power of the German shells exceeds that of the British; this was already known after the action of 24 January 1915. The Germans are therefore very much annoyed that they had no 15-in. guns to fire, as they are persuaded that ships so knocked about (eingedeckte) as, for example, the "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" would have been completely destroyed by German shell.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. Note.- The writer appears to mean that if German 15-in. shell had been used against "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" these ships would have been sunk.]<br />
<br />
It may be noted here that the "BAYERN", the first of their ships to carry 15-in. guns, will not join the Fleet for another few days, and the "BADEN" not until the autumn.<br />
<br />
Medium armament played no part, only a few hits were obtained and they did little damage.<br />
<br />
The British fired part-salvoes, like the Germans; full salvoes may have been fired now and again.<br />
<br />
The method of repulsing destroyer attacks, which has previously been reported, namely the 'turning away' and firing on one, or at most two boats, proved to be sound, and the repulsing of attacks both by day and night offered no difficulties.<br />
<br />
As regards gunnery, it may also be mentioned that the fire-control apparatus worked without a hitch and withstood the heaviest shocks. The elevation pointers worked admirably. A few ships were not yet fitted with them.<br />
<br />
<center><u>Torpedo.</u></center><br />
<br />
As regards torpedo work the Germans consider themselves very much superior. There were prolonged discussions about depriving Flotilla Leaders of their independence and putting them under the orders of a Leader Ship, but they are now convinced that this is necessary to ensure the flotillas attacking at the right moment and all together.<br />
<br />
The flotillas were led by the 2 leader Ships "ROSTOCK" and "REGENSBURG", the first having 2 flotillas and the second 3 flotillas allocated to them. The remaining 2 flotillas accompanied the Main Fleet or the battle-cruisers. The leaders carried out their duties with great daring and circumspection. The attacks of the British were weak and scattered, and could therefore have little or only occasional success.<br />
<br />
The German 2nd Flotilla, composed of the larger 1500 ton boats were held back instead of being sent to attack. Although these boats are spoken of very highly and are indispensable for certain enterprises, the view is now taken that they are too large and too valuable to be used for attacking during an action. This Flotilla proceeded to Zeebrugge immediately after the action and arrived there safely. It is to be employed in preventing the British from blockading the harbour with nets, and thus make it impossible for the German submarines to proceed out.<br />
<br />
As far as I have heard, the "MOLTKE" alone of the larger ships fired 4 torpedoes.<br />
<br />
Submarines were not in evidence. No German submarines were present; on the other hand a German destroyer claims to have rammed a British submarine. This claim appears to be erroneous, at least it was declared to be nonsense by the Chief of Staff. The submarines failed as regards scouting and also doing the pursuit.<br />
<br />
Some people state that a British aeroplane was sighted to the northward, and that it had apparently risen from a cruiser. It played no part in the action.<br />
<br />
The use of "Höschter"* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. note:- Probably the name of the inventor.] fog seems to have been of good service, it and the smoke made by the destroyers having completely masked the Main Fleet and its movements at critical moments.<br />
<br />
<center><u>SPEED</u></center><br />
<br />
The advantage of speed lay entirely with the British, not only as regards the Main Fleet on account of the "Deutschland" class, but also as regards the battle-cruisers. The latter are said to have proved considerably faster than the German battle cruisers, an unpleasant experience which had already been made on 25 January 1915. This alone proves that the British are talking nonsense when they assert that the German Fleet sought safety in flight; on the contrary, it was far from its bases and entirely in the power of the British, who either did not wish to take advantage of their superior speed, or were unable to do so on account of the damage sustained. The visibility was no worse than it had been during the day and Jellicoe may have even welcomed the "Höschter" fog which would enable him to plead bad visibility as a reason for abandoning the pursuit. On the German side in the light of experience the factor of speed in the battleships is considered very important. But the moderate depths of the German harbours limits the draught of the ships, and make it particularly difficult for German builders to do much in this respect. In spite of greater length and higher horse power the most modern cruisers "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ" and "LÜTZOW" attained only a quite inconsiderable increase of speed in comparison with the older "GOEBEN" class, and proved a disappointment in this particular.<br />
<br />
The question whether the older battleships should take part in an important engagement was not easy to decide. The 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons composed of the "WITTLESBACH" and "BARBAROSSA" class, re-commissioned at the beginning of the war, were intended to be used in such actions, but have long since been paid off; some have been disarmed and employed as guardships and instructional ships, etc. It was considered however, that the 2nd Battle Squadron, composed of the most modern of the older ships, would be of some service in the action; but this squadron was in a privileged position, inasmuch as it was merely attached to the 1st and 3rd Battle Squadrons and its Admiral was allowed to operate independently and select the position he thought best. On this occasion it kept station quite well and did not prove a hindrance, but, on the other hand, it did not come under any heavy fire. This must be considered very fortunate, for, in view of the damage sustained by other ships and in view of the fact that the British shell pierced all armour above or below water even at the longest range, it is certain that every ship of this class would have been sunk by a few hits, as their internal sub-division is not proof against large inrushes of water.<br />
<br />
The loss of the "Pommern", which gives the British an opportunity for a hollow triumph, also teaches a clear lesson. The Chief of Staff told me that they will probably consider carefully before again exposing this Squadron to danger; therefore this action will have further confirmed the complete worthlessness of all Dreadnought types [sic] and will condemn them as old iron.<br />
<br />
<center><u>TORPEDO NETS.</u></center><br />
<br />
The torpedo nets of the battle cruisers are all badly damaged and the gear so knocked about by gunfire that they were almost useless. This was particularly the case with the "Derfflinger", where the after port nets were hanging in the water, and would have fallen across the propeller had they not chanced to remain held up by a temporary lashing. The ship was obliged to stop during the action to secure the nets, and they might easily have occasioned the loss of the ship.<br />
<br />
For this reason all the nets, together with the booms, were unshipped immediately after the ships' return, to everybody's satisfaction. They will not be carried any more, except perhaps for operations in the Baltic, where the ships may be obliged to anchor at sea.<br />
<br />
<center><u>LEAK-STOPPING SERVICE.</u></center><br />
<br />
The leak-stopping service which had been systematically developed, worked admirably and the Germans are convinced that they owe much to it. They believed that the "Seydlitz" could not have been brought in if the strengthening of the bulkheads, etc., had not been so thoroughly exercised and if the personnel had not been so well trained.<br />
<br />
It is also said, that in the "Lutzow", which had only been in commission for 2 months, was naturally not up to the mark in this respect, and that it is not impossible that small shortcomings, for which of course nobody can be blamed, were responsible for the ship sinking. The "Lutzow" was an unfortunate ship altogether. First her turbines collapsed, thus delaying her commissioning for 6 months, then she immediately struck a mine, and she was hardly out of dockyard hands before she was sunk.<br />
<br />
<center><u>DANGER FROM GAS FUMES.</u></center><br />
<br />
Only 2 days before sailing, a large number of the ships, and fortunately exactly those that came most under fire, namely battle-cruisers and the 3rd Squadron, were supplied with gas masks fitted with alkali cartridges for the whole crew and a plentiful reserve (in the "Seydlitz" 1500 masks for about 1200 men). The masks are similar to those used in the army for poisonous gases. Each man carries a mask slung round him, if he is not actually wearing it.<br />
<br />
I was told emphatically by all the officers, that, in their experience, these masks are absolutely necessary and not only saved many lives but enabled the men to carry on in parts of the ship which they would otherwise have been compelled to leave.<br />
<br />
The gases from shells, mines and torpedoes penetrate in an incredible manner through ventilators, telephone leads, etc. to compartments far away from the point of impact. In many cases the masks enabled large numbers of the guns' crews to escape from turrets that were hit, and to help out others who were badly wounded. In one case the men in one of the main engine rooms were able to remain at their posts after gas had penetrated, until the engine-room was ventilated.<br />
<br />
The Fleet breathing apparatus (Flottenathmer) is preferable to masks in some cases, but it cannot be supplied to everyone and it hampers one's movements, which the masks do not.<br />
<br />
On account of the great danger from gases, it is also advisable to fit hinged flaps in all shafts, and to have wooden bungs to fit the voice-pipes, keeping a hammer at hand to hammer them into the mouth-pieces.<br />
<br />
They tell me that it proved very useful to keep all the personnel employed below, such as in central control rooms, engine-rooms, torpedo flats, etc. continually informed of what was going on. The men get nervous, particularly at first, with the tremendous shocks caused by shell falling close to the ship, though the shocks are felt less on deck, and such information gives them confidence and they like knowing what is going on above them.<br />
<br />
<center><u>DAMAGE</u></center><br />
<br />
The distribution of ships needing repair in the various dockyards is as follows:-<br />
<br />
The "König" proceeded at once to Kiel and is under repair at Howaldt's yard. I did not see her.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" and "Moltke" in Blohm and Voss yard, Hamburg, the first in the Imperial Dock.<br />
<br />
The "Kurfürst["] in Vulkan Yard, Hamburg.<br />
<br />
The "Derfflinger" was first docked in Wilhelmshaven and the leaks temporarily stopped, she then proceeded to the Imperial dockyard, Kiel. The "Seydlitz" will now be docked in the large dock at Wilhelmshaven; during my stay the "Seydlitz" was still in the lock.<br />
<br />
The "Von der Tann", "Ostfriesland" and "Helgoland" will be repaired in dry docks in Wilhelmshaven. No other large ships require to be docked.<br />
<br />
"<u>Seydlitz</u>" The number of hits was still uncertain, as the whole forepart of the ship up to the upper deck was still under water, and it is not known what she looks like below water. The ship was brought into the lock with difficulty, and as she is 43 ft. down by the bows, she cannot be taken into harbour. They will not venture to dock the ship inside the lock, and intend first to raise her bows slightly.<br />
<br />
The roof and guns of the fore turret and anchors, cables etc., have already been unshipped, and they now intend to bring caissons alongside and pump out the fore part sufficiently to enable her to enter the harbour.<br />
<br />
The great inrush of water, that flooded more or less the whole fore part of the ship as far as the first boiler-room bulkhead, was caused by a number of hits. Firstly, one of the belt armour plates forward on the port side is missing, having fallen off. Secondly, there are believed to be at least 2 or 3 more hits below water, forward on the port side; for the list and the settling down had already become ominous when the ship was hit at the edge of the upper deck, port side, abreast the bridge; this was followed by an inrush of water in the battery deck, which did a great amount of damage.<br />
<br />
In addition, during the day action, she was hit by a torpedo on the starboard side under the forward 5.9 in. gun, which caused her to settle down still more by the bows. This gun was so much damaged by the shock from underneath as to be disabled.<br />
<br />
Further, there are 4 severe hits in the ship's side (mess deck, port side, forward of the turret), which also demolished the port capstan.<br />
<br />
These shell, or shell splinters, naturally penetrated to the armoured deck, so that the entire fore part of the ship above and below the armoured deck is holed in many places, allowing free passage for the water. The fore part of the ship was struck therefore by at least 8 or 9 shells and one torpedo.<br />
<br />
Apparently the only compartments which are not flooded, are the bow torpedo flats and the central control room. The former is being pumped out continuously, as a great deal of water is flowing in from above. The torpedo control room had to be abandoned, as the forward partition was not watertight. The central control room abaft this was not abandoned, but of its 2 entrances from the starboard and port passages, only the port one can be used, as the starboard one is flooded.<br />
<br />
The gunnery control room is far further aft and was not affected.<br />
<br />
The ship has a list of 7° to port, and as she has now been slightly raised, about 1¾ ft. of her bows are above water; at one time it was up to the level of the deck.<br />
<br />
While under way the forward boiler room bulkhead had to withstand most of the pressure; supports have been built up everywhere, but it leaks in places.<br />
<br />
The other hits of consequences were those in the turrets. The fore starboard turret No.2 received a direct hit on the fore face of the revolving structure. One curved plate was forced out, but fortunately the main effect of the explosion was outward. The right hand gun was disabled by slight damage to the mounting; with this exception the turret remained in action and kept up fire.<br />
<br />
The right hand gun of turret No.3 received a direct hit, which cut out a wide groove along the tube of the gun. The left hand gun continued to fire.<br />
<br />
The barbette of turret No.4 was hit on a level with the rammer, and the armour was pierced clean through. This hit is of special interest, as the "Seydlitz" received a similar hit and at the same level in turret No.5 on 24th January 1915, which caused a fire, disabled both the after turrets and killed all the guns' crews. This last time, however, the damage was slight. There was no ready ammunition in the turret, and only one cartridge was exploded, in contrast to the (6200 Kg.) 13,670 lbs. of powder on Jan.1915. The turret officer and a large number of the gun's crews were saved by their gas masks. The destruction caused by splinters was, however, considerable and the turret was abandoned, as it was not possible to continue fire from it. This was a 13.5 in. shell, at 15,310 yds. range, strength of armour pierced 8.6 inches.<br />
<br />
After the turret had been abandoned, it was hit a second time in the after side of the revolving part, which was pierced; this of course increased the havoc in the interior.<br />
<br />
Turret No.5 was hit in the roof. The shell richochetted, and the roof is slightly dented. Nobody was hurt and the turret continued to fire.<br />
<br />
In the "Seydlitz" therefore, all the turrets were hit, with the exception of the foremost turret, and one was hit twice.<br />
<br />
A further hit pierced the 5.9 in. (150mm.) casemate armour of the aftermost 5.9 in. starboard gun, No.2. The deck was pierced from beneath, and splinters also pierced the splinter bulkhead. The gun was disabled and all the crew were killed, with the exception of the ship's chaplain who happened to be in the casemate and must be watched over by a special guardian angel.<br />
<br />
A similar hit, with a 15 in. shell, struck the casemate armour of the 6-in. gun No.7 and exploded in the casemate. Men were killed, the gun was disabled and the splinter bulkhead pierced by large splinters. This time again, surprise was aroused by the comparatively small damage caused by a large calibre shell.<br />
<br />
"<u>Derfflinger</u>". One shell hit the armour belt forward of the hawse pipe, probably at the junction of 2 plates, as 2 plates broke away. The plates underneath were consequently strained apart and a great deal of water flowed in.<br />
<br />
The armour belt on the port side also received 2 further hits in the centre and was pierced clean through. The splinters penetrated more than half way through the ship, and in one case a piece of plating was driven half way though the ship. These hits, combined perhaps with others, destroyed the nets and their supports in several places.<br />
<br />
The two after turrets received direct hits, in one case on the roof, in the other case in the barbette above the deck; the armour was pierced and the upper portions of the turrets burnt out and severely damaged, but the flames did not penetrate to the magazines. The crew in the upper part of the turret were killed, and both turrets were disabled. This occurred at an early stage of the action.<br />
<br />
The guns at high elevation cannot yet be dismounted, as everything is wedged in, but they do not appear to be damaged.<br />
<br />
The muzzles were carried away off the 4 foremost 6 in. (15 cm.) guns on the port side; two of them probably having been accounted for by one and the same shell which hit the armour. One gun, the muzzle of which was perhaps damaged by a splinter, afterwards burst, the tube splitting open in the shape of a tulip.<br />
<br />
The "Derfflinger" received a few other hits of no particular interest. She appears the next most severely damaged ship after the "Lützow".<br />
<br />
The "<u>Moltke</u>" only received 5 hits, all of them during that part of the action which took place on a southerly course; while the cruisers mentioned above received most of the hits on the port side, consequently during the later stages of the action.<br />
<br />
One shell pieced the bulwarks in the after part of the ship above the armour, passed through the ship and struck the armour on the port side from inside, about 3.3 ft. below the water-line. One plate was forced out and is missing. The inrush of water was considerable. The after compartments, above the armoured deck which remained intact, were all more or less flooded.<br />
<br />
The second hit was further forward, below the armour belt. The shell exploded in a bunker, but the armoured deck held and no water penetrated it from below. The neighbouring bunkers made little water and could be pumped out.<br />
<br />
Another shell struck the 5.9 in. armour in the upper bunker, above the water-line. The armoured deck again held, but the inner wall of the bunker parted, and the battery deck was pierced from below, a 6 in. gun being damaged and disabled.<br />
<br />
In the fore part of the ship a shell struck the armour belt below the water-line. The plate remained intact and was driven in about 8 inches. The compartment was flooded, but the torpedo bulkhead remained watertight. A neighbouring compartment leaked slightly, the rivets having parted.<br />
<br />
The fifth case of damage, namely a plate beneath the armour belt being driven and pressed in, was probably not due to a direct hit, but to splinters of a shell which fell short.<br />
<br />
"<u>Von der Tann</u>". A shell hit and pierced the lower part of the 3.9 in. armour belt in the after part of the ship to starboard. The compartments above the armoured deck, and some of those on the deck above, were flooded. The chief effect of the shell was outside the ship, but it bent the plates below the otherwise undamaged armoured deck, so that a considerable amount of water flowed into the compartments below the armoured deck. The after torpedo flat was flooded half way up, and the men in the starboard steering engine room were shut in for a long time owing to the exits being blocked.<br />
<br />
The fore turret was hit on the starboard side on the upper edge of the barbette and a semi-circular armour plate was forced out. The machinery of the turret was so badly knocked about that the turret was disabled.<br />
<br />
The hydraulic piping was damaged, so that all the heavy armament was put out of action temporarily. Strangely enough, though men were wounded none were killed.<br />
<br />
The aftermost turret was hit in the barbette. The armour was pierced, but the effect of the shell was exterior, the turret sustained little internal damage, so that the handgear of the turret remained in action. The turret was wedged in one place and could not revolve; they succeeded, however, in cutting off with oxy-acetylene the piece of revolving part which was jammed against the inner side of the barbette thus getting rid of the obstruction.<br />
<br />
Outside the turret, the shell did considerable damage; some splinters striking downwards, bent the armoured deck and pierced it in places. As far as I know, the armoured deck sustained no further damage, and this was of little importance.<br />
<br />
The after conning-tower was hit and a piece of the armour torn away; the occupants, including the 3rd gunnery officer, were killed. Splinters struck downwards to the engine-room ventilation hatches, but were stopped by the armoured gratings.<br />
<br />
"<u>Ostfriesland"</u> was struck by a mine below the foremost port turret. The whole measures 197 ft.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. note:- Literal translation is 12 times 5 metres large.] The torpedo bulkhead is only slightly torn, and the inrush of water was only local.<br />
<br />
"<u>Helgoland</u>". A 13.5 in. shell hit the 7.9 in. armour belt forward on the port side and pierced it. The shell appears to have broken only as no explosive action can be traced. The range was about 14,217 yds.<br />
<br />
"<u>Nassau</u>" rammed a British destroyer, or rather, the destroyer ran into her forward on the port side. Her bows must have lifted right up, for her hawse-pipe remained on board the "Nassau", so firmly wedged into the side of the upper deck that it will have to be cut out. The "Nassau's" side below the deck is torn away for 33 ft. The destroyer then glanced off the "Nassau's" side and exploded internally. One of the crew remained behind in one of the nets, but fell into the water when the "Nassau" fired a salvo.<br />
<br />
The "Nassau" was hit by shrapnel from attacking destroyers in the foremost searchlight group, both port searchlights were put out of action. The searchlight control and electric cables were destroyed and many of the searchlight crews were killed. The after searchlight group was hit in a similar manner, and one of the searchlights was disabled.<br />
<br />
The "Rhineland" and a light cruiser were also hit in a similar manner.<br />
<br />
I have seen all the above mentioned ships in Wilhelmshaven.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" and "Kurfürst" were at Hamburg, but unfortunately I am unable to report much about them. They had already been under repair for several days, and the damage was to some extent made good. Besides this, the conditions were not favourable for undisturbed examination: commissioners from the Imperial Navy Office were on board, besides crowds of workmen, the noise was deafening and it was pouring with rain. Consequently I took no notes on the spot and relied on my memory, which however fails me now among the very many received of similar cases. I am therefore unable to report each hit with accuracy.<br />
<br />
This is immaterial, however, as there were no particularly interesting hits, and none of the ships had been hit in the turrets. The armour had been pierced in several places, the effect and character of the hits being similar in all cases; the hits on unarmoured parts were of little consequence.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" was hit aft on the port side of the water line just on a junction of two plates, a piece of equal size being torn away from each plate. The shell then struck the sloping part of the armoured deck and the splinters ricochetted and passed right through the ship. These plates have already been removed.<br />
<br />
A casemate was pierced and the gun disabled.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" is the only ship whose mast was hit, the mast remained standing and has now been removed.<br />
<br />
The spotting platform had to be abandoned, as communications with the conning tower was cut off. This was the only hit received in a conning tower; it only grazed the upper edge and glanced off, and the men inside hardly noticed it.<br />
<br />
The port engine was disabled, not in consequence of damage to the turbine which is in good condition, but owing to one of the main propeller bearings becoming overheated. The cause of this is not clear, but it is believed to be due to concussions. The ship was well able to keep station with her two remaining engines.<br />
<br />
The "<u>Kurfürst</u>" suffered especially from a great inrush of water forward on the port side, above the armoured deck; it was caused by a hit in the armour belt. No further damage of importance was sustained.<br />
<br />
With regard to time necessary for repair to these ships, it is not yet possible to say anything definite, as it is still undecided whether they shall undergo thorough repair or not. The chief difficulty is the manufacture of new armour plates; but some of the holed plates can, no doubt, be left in position for the present.<br />
<br />
A considerable time will be needed to repair some of the turrets of the battle-cruisers, but here too, they will contrive to get things done. For instance, the "Von der Tann" is to have an entire turret out of a ship of the "Nassau" class, probably the foremost turret, and this ship will be left without a turret for some time. They talk a great deal also of transferring guns, and they will perhaps make use of those intended for the "Hindenburg", which will not be completed will the late autumn.<br />
<br />
It may be presumed that the battleships will be ready for sea in 4-6 weeks, and the battle-cruisers, particularly the "Seydlitz", in not less than 4 months. Naturally work is going on day and night, and repairs are given priority over all new construction.<br />
<br />
The damage sustained by light cruisers and destroyers is inconsiderable. The "Hamburg" had a funnel shot away. As these ships seem to be of minor importance, I did not trouble further about them.<br />
<br />
As our Allies appear not to have the intention of communicating to us what effect the examination of damages sustained will have on their construction in the future, we must endeavour to ascertain this as time goes on by means of cross questioning and by studying their new constructions in detail. I do not feel called upon to draw premature and rash conclusions to-day, on the strength of impressions received, but this will not prevent me from giving a summary of my opinion and of the opinions expresses in my hearing.<br />
<br />
Firstly, it is a remarkable fact that in all the ships that have returned home, all the engine and boiler-rooms are undamaged; the "Lützow" is no exception to this, as she proceeded under her own steam until late in the night after the action. I have also been assured by the Imperial Navy Office, after an inspection carried out by the Chief Engineer, that not a single auxiliary engine was defective. The only boiler-room put out of action was the foremost one in the "Seydlitz" where the bulkhead gave a little, allowing water to penetrate through rivet holes and cracks when the ship was under way. The conclusion may therefore be drawn that these vital parts of the ship are sufficiently protected and that the armour belt of the usual German thicknesses, though it cannot stop the shells, at least fulfils its purpose by breaking them up. Consequently it has become almost impossible even for the largest splinters of 15 in. shell to penetrate through armoured deck or torpedo bulkhead in engine and boiler rooms.<br />
<br />
Even at these long ranges and steep angles there was no question of the armoured decks being pierced; but the fitting of strong gratings over the hatches, which prevented the engines of the "Von der Tann" from sustaining severe damage, appears very necessary.<br />
<br />
The torpedo bulkheads also resisted shells, mines and torpedoes effectually; and in cases where slight damage was sustained, it had no further consequences than the flooding of the compartment affected.<br />
<br />
Perhaps it would be advisable to construct a specially strong boiler-room bulkhead, similar to a torpedo bulkhead, so that it could not be damaged by splinters or water-pressure.<br />
<br />
The inspection of the "Seydlitz" has left me with the impression that the commanding officer of the "Seydlitz" expected rather too much of his ship, and that nothing short of extraordinary good luck enabled her to be brought back. At one time when the whole forepart of the ship was flooded and the bows were under water, he proceeded occasionally with revolutions for 22 knots, just in order to show how seaworthy his ship was, so he told me. This may have been very sporting, or perhaps it may have been necessary under the circumstances in order not to drop too far behind and be overtaken by the enemy, but it certainly was not good seamanship, and if his stokehold bulkhead had burst, the "Seydlitz" would have gone down like the "Lutzow", where the circumstances appear to have been very similar. Later on he decreased speed and finally proceeded stern first.<br />
<br />
I therefore think it not impossible that the loss of the "Lützow", which is said to have been proceeded at 14 knots for a time, was also due only to recklessly high speed, and that the ship might have been saved if she had proceeded stern first or been taken in tow.<br />
<br />
As the danger from water-pressure must always be greatest from ahead, it would certainly be advisable to take special preventative measures against it.<br />
<br />
Vice-Admiral Schmidt told me that, in his opinion, the armoured belt ought to be strongest in the centre, and possible in the afterpart to protect the steering engines, and possibly in the bows, but that it ought not to taper off gradually from the centre to the extremities. He was also entirely in favour of a protected upper deck forming a second armoured deck.<br />
<br />
The admirably thorough system of internal division in the German ships and the floating capability thus attained is the finest proof of the merit of German construction which pursued this aim, and it shows that Admiral von Tirpitz, the creator of the Battle Fleet of to-day, was right when he upheld the principle that, above all things, the ships must be capable of remaining afloat and must not sink or heel over, and that everything else is of secondary consideration.<br />
<br />
The large number of hits in the turrets is remarkable, and it is generally considered that the turret armour should be appreciably stronger, especially in the lower part of the barbettes; for it is not only the disablement of the guns that comes into question, serious though this might be, but also the blowing up of magazines and the total destruction of the ship, as the wide shaft down to the magazines cannot possibly be made completely flash-proof. This is the most vital part of the ship. It is only owing to the small explosive charges in British shells, that there were no explosions of magazines in the German ships.<br />
<br />
Everything possible had been done after the action of 24.1.15 to ensure protection against this danger; the ready ammunition was removed from the top of the hoists and wherever possible all the openings in shafts leading down below were fitted with flaps, covers and heavy asbestos mats, while German ammunition is particularly carefully stowed and packed in cases with screwed-on covers.<br />
<br />
The disasters on the British side are a proof that this is a question of the greatest importance. It must also be taken into consideration that while any other damage turret may take months.<br />
<br />
The numerous hits in turrets would appear to justify the opinion of those who decided against triple turrets, on the ground [sic] that if one was disabled it would put too many heavy guns out of action.<br />
<br />
A hit in a casemate will of course destroy it and disable the gun, but this is of little consequence. Care must be taken here also not to have any ready ammunition, and to close the ammunition hand-up hermetically with heavy asbestos mats at the magazine end also. With the German "Paternoster" (dredger hoist) the ammunition lifts this mat as it comes up and the mat then falls to and closes the opening, which is a practical arrangement.<br />
<br />
Other hits through unarmoured parts, which destroyed more or less small gear and at the first glance give an impression of terrible havoc, are really of no consequence.<br />
<br />
In the "Von der Tann" they wanted to flood a turret magazine. This was impossible, as the flooding valve in the battery, or between deck was piled up with debris, cabin fittings, etc., and was inaccessible. Fortunately the flooding of the magazine turned out to be unnecessary. The Executive Officer remarked to me how critical such a trivial matter might become, and that one could not be careful enough about choosing the positions for the flooding valves, which must be kept clear of easily destructible objects.<br />
<br />
The man-hole covers in the decks, coal shoots [chutes], etc., were pointed out to me as dangerous, as they may be burst open by pressure of gas from below, thus causing damage and giving passage to the gases. These covers should be secured in a different manner and much more firmly.<br />
<br />
The flooding and draining system worked admirably, and is hardly capable of improvement. The only disadvantage is that the compartments above the armoured deck have no draining arrangements. This should be provided. A list, consequent on an inrush of water, could always be corrected by flooding an opposite compartment. This is an important matter both as affecting gunnery and personnel.<br />
<br />
The searchlights, which were not taken down in the German ships, all came out of the action undamaged; anxiety on their account was therefore unfounded. It was very unpleasant when attacking boats fired on the searchlights, and it is therefore considered necessary to fit light armour protection on the masts for the crews of the searchlight control and electric cables.<br />
<br />
Damage from flames is nowhere visible. The Germans are now rather amused at the care with which interior partitions were scraped.<br />
<br />
I could not help comparing the German ships with the Russian battleship "Orel", which I saw in Madzurn after the battle of Tsushima. If I remember rightly, the "Orel" had 5 severe hits and 40 hits with medium-calibre shell.<br />
<br />
The enormous explosive power of the Shimosa shell, which breaks up into minute splinters, did not do the slightest damage to the vital parts of the ship, but the upper deck was transformed into a confused heap of ruins. Superstructure, bridges, masts, funnels, etc., were destroyed, guns dismounted and fires started.<br />
<br />
Nothing of the kind is to be seen in the German ships, outwardly only a few more or less clean shell holes are visible, and they look so orderly and so little damaged that they do not appear to have gone through an action.<br />
<br />
It is true that the upper decks are said to have been littered with countless splinters, but they flew on to the decks from shells which struck the water, the ship receiving violent shocks.<br />
<br />
The holes in the armour show the characteristic concentric cracks round the hole and the radial splashes, the latter proving that the shells exploded on impact or at the latest, as they passed through. In many cases, as already noted, the force of the explosion was external and only pieces of plate, and possibly the head of the shell were driven in.<br />
<br />
<center><u>FLAG OFFICERS OF THE FLEET AND LEADERS</u></center><br />
<br />
{|<br />
| Commander-in-Chief:<br />
| Vice Admiral Scheer<br />
|-<br />
| <u>I Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Vice Admiral Schmidt<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Engelhard<br />
|-<br />
| <u>II Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Mauve<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Baron von Dalwigh<br />
|-<br />
| <u>III Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Behncke<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Nordmann<br />
|-<br />
| Officer commanding the Scouting Forces and<br>Commanding 1st Scouting Group<br />
| Vice Admiral Hipper<br />
|-<br />
| " 2nd " "<br />
| Rear Admiral Bodicker<br />
|-<br />
| " 4th " "<br />
| Commodore "Captain" v. Reuter<br />
|-<br />
| Leaders of Destroyers<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| in "Rostock"<br />
| Commodore "Captain" Michelsen<br />
|-<br />
| in Regensburg<br />
| Commodore "Captain" Heinrich<br />
|-<br />
| Leader of submarines<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| In Hamburg<br />
| Captain Bauer<br />
|}<br />
<br />
<center><u>REMARKS</u></center><br />
<br />
The lecture on the action, upon which this report is based, was illustrated by a plan prepared in haste for H.M. the Kaiser, and a copy was promised to me. But the Admiral Staff does not wish to part with this first incomplete draft, and the preparation of an accurate plan has not yet been completed, as the Admiral Staff is not yet in possession of all the details.<br />
<br />
In time to be included in this report I have only received the sketch of the first stage of the battle, namely the cruiser action on a southerly course, together with a small sketch of the situation when the action was broken off; both are enclosed.<br />
<br />
I conclude from the sketch of the cruiser action, that the accounts given to me were not quite accurate; for instance, the assertion of the commanding officer of the "Moltke" that the shortest range at that stage was 7,650 yds. and that he had accounted for one of the armoured cruisers with a torpedo.<br />
<br />
The sketch shows that the "Indefatigable" was probably first destroyed by gun fire from the "Von der Tann", and later the "Queen Mary" by gunfire from the "Derfflinger", and that the range was never less than 14,220 yds.<br />
<br />
The loss of "V. 27" and "V. 29" and of 4 British destroyers is also apparent, while I was only told of two.<br />
<br />
In the original sketch, 2 British armoured cruisers are also shown as having fallen out during this stage, but this is not shown on the accompanying sketch and probably took place later.<br />
<br />
I was told by the Admiral Staff that the accompanying sketches are not to be taken as strictly accurate.<br />
<br />
It is requested that the sketches and course of the action and the account of damages may be treated as strictly confidential.<br />
<br />
==Footnotes==<br />
{{reflist}}<br />
<br />
==Bibliography==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
*''Schematismus für das K.u.K. Heer und für die Kriegsmarine für 1914. Separatausgabe''. Wien. 1914.<br />
*''Almanach für die k. und k. Kriegsmarine 1917. Kriegsausgabe''. '''XXXVII'''. Pola. 1917.<br />
*[[Arthur Marder (Naval Historian)|Marder, Arthur J.]] (1965). From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919: Jutland and After, May 1916–December 1916. '''Volume III'''. London: Oxford University Press.<br />
*{{MarderFDSFIII}}<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
==External Links==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
*Krámli, Mihály. [http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-124.pdf "The Report on the Battle of Jutland by the Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché in Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Colloredo-Mannsfeld."] ''NavWeaps''.<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
[[Category:Battle of Jutland]]</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Attach%C3%A9_Report_on_the_Battle_of_Jutland&diff=334736Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland2024-03-10T16:04:16Z<p>Simon Harley: Made Changes.</p>
<hr />
<div>Soon after the [[Battle of Jutland]] on 31 May &ndash; 1 June 1916 the Naval Attaché of the [[Austro-Hungarian Navy|Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Navy]] at the embassy in Berlin, ''Fregattenkapitäne'' Hieronymus Graf von Colloredo-Mannsfeld,<ref>''Schematismus für das K.u.K. Heer und für die Kriegsmarine für 1914''. p. 1270. ''Almanach für die k. und k. Kriegsmarine 1917''. p. 668.</ref> visited the High Sea Fleet. He composed a report on the battle for his superiors using first-hand accounts, interspersed here and there with his own observations. The version reproduced here is a translation in English apparently made by the [[Naval Intelligence Division (Royal Navy)|Naval Intelligence Division]] in 1919 from a copy which was subsequently returned to "F.N.A.", presumably the French Naval Attaché. A copy of the translation then made its way into the papers of the British Cabinet, from where historian Arthur J. Marder obtained a copy which is in his papers.<ref>Original number N.I.D. 087/19. Marder papers, Special Collections and Archives, Langson Library, University of California, Irvine, MS-F002, Box 27.</ref> He does not appear to have used it for the 1965 edition of ''From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow'', Volume III, but certainly used it for the revised edition in 1978.<ref>The quote on p. 189 of the 1965 edition differs from that on p. 234 of the 1978 edition which is the same used here.</ref> <br />
<br />
It is worth comparing this translation with that made by Hungarian historian Mihály Krámli of a post-war copy of a slightly different version of the report in a Hungarian archive which has been published on the ''NavWeaps'' online resource.<ref>Krámli, Mihály. [http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-124.pdf "The Report on the Battle of Jutland by the Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché in Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Colloredo-Mannsfeld."] ''NavWeaps''.</ref><br />
<br />
The original grammar and punctuation of the typescript has been reproduced here wherever possible.<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
From:- Austrian Naval Attache in Berlin.<br />
<br />
To:- Commander-in-Chief, Pola.<br />
<div style="float:right;">Berlin,<br>17 June, 1916.</div><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<center><u>NAVAL ENGAGEMENT OF 31 MAY 1916.</u></center><br />
<br />
The following is a report of the naval proceedings of 31 May - 1 June, 1916, and also of the damage sustained by the German Fleet.<br />
<br />
During my 3-days' visit to Wilhelmshaven, followed by a cursory examination of the "MARKGRAF" and "KURFURST" at Hamburg, I endeavoured to gain merely a general idea of the results of gunfire and concentrated my attention on the course of the action itself.<br />
Admiral Scheer, whom I only saw for a short time as he left for Kiel to attend the funeral of his borther-in-law [sic], Lieut.-Commander Mohr, who was killed in the action, very kindly arranged that his Chief of Staff, Captain Trotha, should give me an account of the whole proceedings, illustrated by plans, and that I should be furnished with all information. I have tried to fill in the gaps by conversations with officers whom I know; this has resulted in some contradictory statements, and several points remain obscure, the accounts from the various ships not having all come in.<br />
<br />
Many episodes will therefore be explained later and may appear in a different light, but, as regards the broad outlines which are of chief importance, the picture of this interesting engagement is fairly clear. The accompanying plan of the action was made in haste for the Kaiser and will therefore need much correction.<br />
<br />
The spirit pervading the Fleet can only be described as one of enthusiasm; they are intoxicated with victory. The heavy load weighing on them all, the dear that this war might end without an encounter of the Fleets, have vanished. They have learnt what fighting really means, they know themselves to be superior to the enemy as regards tactics, and that they were following the right lines and have nothing to unlearn; they know that their gunfire was more effective than that of the enemy, and that they can rely implicitly on their flotillas which have always been looked upon in the German Navy as one of the chief factors in an action. Finally they know that their largest ships can stand heavy fire and serious damage, that they leave nothing to be desired as regards construction and cannot be sunk easily. In short, they feel that the British, in spite of all their boasting, cannot overcome the German Fleet and have a considerable respect for it.<br />
<br />
This conviction imbues the whole Fleet, down to the last man, with confidence in their strength and a calm assurance regarding future encounters. At the same time they are free from over-confidence and from under-estimation of the enemy. On the contrary, the British fire-control and the enormous piercing power of their heavy shell at great distances have roused their admiration, so that a careless conception of the situation is not to be feared, the less so, as well-balanced minds such as those of Admiral Scheer and his Staff are unlikely to be led away by former successes to undertake rash enterprises in the future.<br />
<br />
They do not deny that they were extraordinarily fortunate, and that if the action had been prosecuted with energy on the British side, and if the "Nelson touch" had been in evidence, things might have gone very badly for Germany, especially as the British still had an intact Battle Squadron of 12 units at their disposal which had not yet taken part in the action. But they console themselves with the knowledge that no naval action was ever won without some stroke of luck.<br />
<br />
The Kaiser's visit, the day before my arrival, and his address to the Fleet gave great satisfaction, and subsequently many important personages arrive to inspect the ships, such as Prince Henry and the Grand Dukes of Mecklenburg and Oldenburg, and numbers of decorations were distributed. Vice-Admiral Scheer was promoted to Admiral, and he and Vice-Admiral Hipper received the Pour le Merite.<br />
<br />
I also visited Rear-Admiral Behncke, who was wounded and in hospital; his wounds are slight, a few small splinters in his head, elbow and knee, and he will probably soon be well again.<br />
<br />
<center><u>COURSE OF THE ACTION.</u></center><br />
<br />
The Commander-in-Chief intended to advance with the whole Fleet to the waters of the Skagerrak, in order to make his presence felt unpleasantly by disturbing the shipping, hoping thereby to lure on the British forces and in this manner to be in a position to attack a part of the British Fleet with superior or at least with equal forces. He reckoned that any movements of the British Fleet would be reported to him in good time by the submarines which had been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and he hoped that the airships would prove a better means of reconnoitring than any possessed by the enemy.<br />
<br />
Unfavourable weather prevented him for a considerable period from undertaking any operations, and, as the submarines were to return home on 1 June and be relieved by a new group, the 31 May was the last date for carrying out the planned advance.<br />
<br />
The cruisers left the Jade at 3 a.m., the Main Fleet at 4 a.m., steering an easterly course, and then, after passing Heligoland, a N.N.W'ly course. No reports were received from submarines. These were stationed chiefly off the Orkneys and the Firth of Forth, and the large group of Flanders boats were off the Thames and at the entrance to the Channel. <br />
<br />
While proceeding northwards, a few W/T messages were received, but they were corrupt, appeared to refer only to small formations and gave no clue to the movements of the Grand Fleet. The airships were unable to start in the morning, on account of the wind, and, as it blew hard throughout the day in the Heligoland Bight, they could not start until the early hours of 1 June. In this respect things did not go well, but Admiral Scheer decided nevertheless to continue on his course to the Skagerrak. <br />
<br />
This the account given by Captain von Trotha, who affirms that nothing was known of the presence of the British Fleet in the waters of the Skagerrak, and that there seemed no probability of encountering this Fleet before 1 June.<br />
<br />
There are some points here which I am unable to understand. The submarines are said to have been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and were to return home on 1 June to be relieved probably by a weaker group. For, If the same number of boats were to to keep watch off the English coast, why should 31 May have been the last day for the German Fleet to sail. The day of departure was, therefore, too late in any case, for, if no encounter was to be expected before 1 June, the boats stationed off the coast could not possibly encounter the damaged British ships, as was intended, for probably no damaged ships would be there before 2 June.<br />
<br />
The battleship "KONIG ALBERT" had to carry out repairs to her condensers and did not proceed with the Fleet. Von Trotha told me that there was no alternative and that a ship must carry out small overhauls regularly in a dockyard according to programme. But could it not be arranged, when one is taking the initiative, to choose one's moment for an advance and to have all the ships together for this short time? And why should just that moment be chosen when one of the most powerful ships of the "Kaiser" class is in the dockyard, instead, for instance, of one of the "Nassau" class with 11-in. guns.<br />
<br />
In addition, the "BAYERN" was to have joined up a few days later. After having waited so long, why should not the plan have been postponed for 2 or 3 weeks, instead of dispensing with the only ship carrying 15-in. guns.<br />
<br />
In the same manner they dispensed with air reconnaissance, from which they had expected so much.<br />
<br />
These considerations make me doubt whether the account given me is quite correct, and whether, on the contrary, they knew of certain movements of the British Fleet and considered the moment extremely favourable for an attack. Perhaps they only knew of Beatty's battle squadron, and thinking the Main Fleet was far away, hoped to entrap this squadron. In Berlin, they have much to say, even in military circles, about the British Fleet's intention to push through into the Baltic, and of Kitchener's mission having some connection with this. I consider this senseless, for it cannot be presemed [sic] that the British Fleet would leave their shores unprotected and do the Germans the favour of operating in the Baltic, which would certainly be a most advantageous area for the German Fleet. In any case, there appear to be discrepancies which will probably be explained at some later date.<br />
<br />
Scouting groups, battle cruisers and light cruisers, together with flotillas, preceded the Main Fleet by 50 - 60 miles. At 4 p.m. the light cruisers encountered some British battle cruisers. These at once opened fire on the light cruisers, at an estimated distance of 26,247 yds.; the range could be taken accurately. Though they did not obtain a hit, the salvoes fell so well that the German cruisers thought it advisable to turn away and fall back on their battle cruisers.<br />
<br />
As the British approached, these battle cruisers turned on to a southerly course, in order to lure the enemy on to the German Main Fleet. A running action, on a southerly course, ensued. The British were to starboard and to the west of the Germans, who had therefore the following advantage: in the North Sea, in summer, the western horizon is quite light and visibility towards the west is good, while towards the east, and in a still greater degree off the Jutland Coast, it is misty and visibility is bad and no silhouettes stand out against the eastern horizon. This phenomenon also played great part in the subsequent course of the action. The sun was still high and was not troublesome, and the British ships offered admirable targets. The sea was calm, the wind N.W. 1-2, altering subsequently through W. to S.W.<br />
<br />
The following British ships were recognised:-<br />
3 "Lion" class, 1 "Tiger" and 2 "Indefatigable" class; they were soon reinforced by 5 "Queen Elizabeth" class following astern.<br />
<br />
It is asserted that, judging from shell splinters, the ship of the "Tiger" class carried 15-in. guns, and that she was therefore the mysterious vessel which replaced the "TIGER" sunk on 24.1.15; as the last-named "TIGER" carried only 13.5-in.guns, this was taken as a further proof of her loss. The silhouette of the new "TIGER", however, is said to have resembled that of the old "TIGER" exactly. As the "Queen Elizabeths" soon opened fire also with 15-in. guns, I rather doubt this assertion regarding the "TIGER", and the various ships on this early part of the engagement are altogether somewhat at variance.<br />
<br />
On the German side the ships proceeded in the following sequence:- "LÜTZOW", Flagship of Vice-Admiral Hipper, "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN".<br />
<br />
As Hipper edged towards the enemy, the distance decreased to about 7655 yds. The German fire was unquestionably superior, but the speed of the British vessels was greater. After a short time the "INDEFATIGABLE" and "QUEEN MARY" blew up, and 2 battle-cruisers and two attacking destroyers were also accounted for. The "QUEEN MARY" must have been destroyed by the explosion of a magazine; she was torn in two halves, and a water-colour painted by an officer represents her enveloped in an enormous column of black smoke; she disappeared in a few seconds. Only one cadet was subsequently picked.<br />
<br />
The second battle cruiser disappeared under similar circumstances. The "VON DER TANN" claims to have accounted for one of these battle-cruisers by a broadside. But the "MOLTKE" fired 4 torpedoes and also claims this achievement.<br />
<br />
The Germans suffered very little during this phase of the action, the "MOLTKE" alone receiving hits on the starboard side. The fire of the British battle-cruisers is said not to have been nearly as good as that of the "QUEEN ELIZABETH" class later on.<br />
<br />
When they had approached the German Main Fleet, the British turned on to a contrary course and the German cruisers did the same. The German Main Fleet proceeded in divisions in starboard quarter-line, the 3rd Battle Squadron: 4 "König" class and 3 "Kaiser" class, Fleet Flagship, 1st Battle Squadron: 4 "Ostfriesland" class and 4 "Westfalen" class, and the 2nd Battle Squadron: 5 "Deutschland" class and the "Hessen". They endeavoured to effect a junction with the cruisers, but were unable to take part very effectually.<br />
<br />
The course of the action was now in a northerly direction, over the area which had just been traversed, and the British ships now drew ahead considerably and turned more and more towards the East; the Germans followed this movement, and in consequence the conditions of visibility became less and less favourable for them.<br />
<br />
The "Queen Elizabeths" now made their presence more greatly felt; one of them had dropped out, but I was unable to ascertain when this occurred.<br />
<br />
The course of the German Math Fleet at first led past the 2 disabled British destroyers, which were lying stopped. The crews had already taken to the boats and were picked up later on by German destroyers. As the Main Fleet was doubtful about the advisability of passing the destroyers while they were still afloat, they were sunk by a few broadsides. One of the officers who was picked up was in pyjamas and is said to have stayed in his cabin during the action. He declared "We did not expect so much resistance," while another said - "The battle is rather disappointing." It has been ascertained that these destroyers were greatly under-manned; their crews seemed very exhausted, which points to their having been in the water for a long time.<br />
<br />
While on this easterly course, the light cruisers of the fast 2nd Scouting Group: "FRANKFURT", "PILLAU", "ELBING" and "WIESBADEN", were heavily fired on from the N.E. and E. without their being able to see more than the gun flashes. In addition, they were under continual fire from the N., and while turning away to S.E. and S., they ascertained that they were opposed by an interminable line of British ships, which appeared at first to be on a N.W.'ly course, and had then evidently turned together on to a S.'ly course.<br />
<br />
It may be noted here that the battleships, and, generally speaking, the battle-cruisers also, never sighted the British Main Fleet, and saw nothing but the flashes of the guns and the effects of the fire. These British ships, about 25 in number, were only sighted by a few light cruisers and by the flotillas, and were counted by them as accurately as possible.<br />
<br />
Surrounded thus from the N. and the E. and under fire, the "WIESBADEN" was disabled, apparently by a hit in the engine-room. The Admiral noticed, it is true, that his leading ships must have encountered new and powerful forces and that they were turning away; but he thought it his duty to go to the assistance of the "WIESBADEN" and therefore continued on an easterly course.<br />
<br />
The van of the Main Fleet, led by the "KÖNIG" (Rear-Admiral Behncke) now came under heavy fire from right ahead; the "KÖNIG" turned away under this fire towards the S.E., whereupon the Commander-in-Chief ordered the whole line to "turn together" to starboard and gave up the idea of helping the "WIESBADEN". About this time Vice-Admiral Hipper transferred his flag from the "LÜTZOW" to the "MOLTKE" with the help of a destroyer, his W/T station being damaged.<br />
<br />
Hardly had the Main Fleet drawn away on a westerly course, before it was ascertained that the pressure was relaxing and the fire decreasing, and that the British were no longer pursuing so hotly. Scheer therefore ordered the ships to "turn together" back on to their former course, and made the signal 'R' = 'Engage the enemy'. This second advance may be termed the zenith of the action. Admiral Scheer gave his views on it approximately as follows:- "Those who make a study of this engagement will be very puzzled as to my object in advancing thus against the wall of British ships. The fact is that I had no particular object. I made the first advance because I had a feeling that I ought to endeavour to assist the "WIESBADEN" and because the situation ahead was quite obscure to me, for I saw nothing of the "LÜTZOW" and received no W/T reports. I soon saw, however, that the leading ships were coming under an overwhelming fire, and that I could not risk the Fleet on the "WIESBADEN'S" account. When I noticed that the British pressure had quite ceased and that the Fleet remained intact in my hands, I turned back, under the impression that the action could not end in this way and that I ought to seek contact with the enemy again."<br />
<br />
The situation during the first and second advances may serve as an example of what should not take place according to all the laws of tactics, for it could not have been worse; von Trotha said jokingly that, if an Admiral brought about such a situation at a war game or in manoeuvres, he would never be entrusted without another command. In the North, the "Queen Elizabeths", then the battle-cruisers, and from N.E. through E. to S.E., an endless line of battleships formed an arc round the German van and kept it under fire. Evidently it had fallen into the most perfect trap. In addition to this unfavourable tactical position, there was a further difficulty, namely that the German ships could be clearly distinguished while they themselves only saw the gun flashes, 4 or 5 to each salvo, but could find no target.<br />
<br />
The Gunnery Officer of the "MARKGRAF" told me that he could not fire at all during half-an-hour, and that they were at the mercy of the British broadsides. Critical though the position was, in theory, they think that experience justifies the conclusion that this 'crossing the T' is in reality not so disastrous at longer ranges; for, in spite of the enormous superiority of their fire, the British made comparatively few hits, the simple reason being that, when fire is thus concentrated on a few leading ships, there can be no question of improving the shooting by spotting.<br />
<br />
Given good tactical training and squadrons which work well together, it is always easy to retire rapidly from an unfavourable position and even possibly to reach an advantageous one.<br />
<br />
The small amount of damage sustained by the Main Fleet may be owing partly to the fact that the leading battle-cruisers drew the enemy's fire, thus relieving the battleships. Only the three leading ships, "KÖNIG", "GROSSER KURFÜRST" and "MARKGRAF" received several hits; while among all the other ships, the "KAISER", "HELGOLAND" and the "SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN" received one hit each, and the rest were not hit at all.<br />
<br />
Simultaneously with the battle-cruisers, which were ahead and pressing forward in quarter-line formation, the 6th and 9th Flotillas, left by the "REGENSBURG", also proceeded to a torpedo attack. Regarding this cruiser advance, the Commanding Officer of the "SEYDLITZ" told me that he was in such a position that he was able to avoid the British salvoes, for he altered course towards the point where each salvo fell and thus evaded the spotting correction.<br />
<br />
This torpedo attack was carried out with great determination and seems to have been completely successful, although nobody is able to state how many hits were obtained. The British ships overlapped somewhat and their line was almost unbroken, and, as about 100 torpedoes were fired, it is estimates that there must have been a considerable number of hits, some people affirm that there were 20, but I do not place much confidence in these figures and it is useless to trouble about them as nobody is certain.<br />
<br />
The boats were fired on by guns of all calibres, even the heaviest, but with little effect, only one boat being destroyed; two other boats had been sunk in an earlier attack during the cruiser action.<br />
<br />
The battle-cruisers were also attacked by British torpedoes, the "SEYDLITZ" being hit once. The "MOLTKE" was lucky, for, when close to the ship, one torpedo apparently had a gyro failure and ran parallel with her. The "LÜTZOW" was probably hit also.<br />
<br />
After the attack, the destroyers laid fog and a heavy smoke screen, which interposed between the Fleet; this benefitted not only the heavily-damaged "LÜTZOW" and "DERFFLINGER", whose nets had been shot away and were hanging down, but also the whole Fleet. It may also have made an impression on the British.<br />
<br />
The German Main Fleet and cruisers turned on a westerly course, fire having again entirely ceased; and the ships of the Main Fleet then turned gradually in succession and in inverse sequence from W. to S.W., subsequently steering towards Horns Reef.<br />
<br />
It is not known what the British did; all that is certain, is that they did not follow in pursuit and that nothing further was seen of their Main Fleet. It remained light until 11 p.m. (summer time), and it would not have been impossible, considering their superior speed, for them to have come within firing range. The Germans expected it too, and now have to content themselves with surmises about the British Commander-in-Chief's reasons for not doing so. It is probably that the unfavourable issue of the fleet part of the battle and the demoralising losses in ships took away any desire on Jellicoe's part for further fighting. His Fleet may have lost heavily and been severely shaken by the torpedo attack; and, as the Germans still had some intact flotillas at their disposal, he may have feared further strong torpedo attacks in the critical hours of twilight, for in the German Navy they say that Jellicoe fears their destroyers in particular.<br />
<br />
Nevertheless, the Germans were not under the impression of having shaken the British Fleet to the extent of obliging them to give up the struggle, and when the evening passed without further incident, they reckoned with certainty on encountering Jellicoe off Horns Reef at daybreak. They were the more astonished at his non-appearance when their air reconnaissance reported that on the morning of 1 June a squadron of 12 battle-ships was proceeding North from the southern part of North Sea and that it suddenly turned on to an opposite course and proceeded South.<br />
<br />
As it could not possibly have been the intention of the British Commander-in-Chief to let the German Fleet escape after having encountered it at last far from its base, and as he still had an intact battle-squadron at his disposal, one is compelled to take the view that he no longer felt strong enough for a second encounter; the achievement of the German Fleet must therefore be very highly thought of.<br />
<br />
During the night cruising following the action, numerous small episodes and minor engagements took place, of which no clear idea can be formed. <br />
<br />
In view of a possible fresh attack or of a possible pursuit on the part of the enemy, it was thought undesirable to leave the 2nd Battle Squadron either in the van or in the rear, it therefore took station to starboard and at first proceeded on an opening course from the other squadrons, and continued fairly independently during the night.<br />
<br />
The 1st Battle Squadron therefore led, with the "WESTFALEN" as guide, and it was followed by the 3rd Battle Squadron.<br />
<br />
After the action had been broken off, the 4 remaining battle cruisers were ahead to port, where they were suddenly again brought under heavy fire from the port side and from ahead, apparently by 3 or 4 battle cruisers. It is presumed that these were the remaining 3 or 4 older cruisers of the "Invincible" class, which Jellicoe probably always stationed ahead of the Main Fleet, for it would hardly have been possible for the "Lions", which were following in the rear in the British line, to have taken station ahead so quickly. The German battle cruisers, all severely damaged, did not feel able to withstand this fire and turned away to starboard, passing ahead of the Main Fleet and between it and the 2nd Battle Squadron, which proceeded quietly on their course and before which the mysterious ships retired, not to be sighted again.<br />
<br />
The battle-cruisers then gradually fell astern, and as they were making much water, and also owing to their differing speeds, they lost contact with the Main Fleet and with each other.<br />
<br />
The "LÜTZOW" had dropped out during the engagement and proceeded independently, accompanied by 4 destroyers. At first she was able to steam 14 knots, but her speed decreased rapidly and dropped finally to 4 knots. Her bows sank slowly, and when the whole forecastle was under water the Commanding Officer decided to leave the ship. The badly wounded were transferred carefully to the boats and the disembarkation was conducted in good order. A torpedo was then fired at the ship and this coup de grace sank her in deep water at about 1 o'clock, I believe.<br />
<br />
The "SEYDLITZ" was hardly in a better condition than the "LÜTZOW"; she also sank gradually by the bows till the water was almost level with the deck, and she had a heavy list to port, but she continued on her course. In the darkest hours of the night she suddenly sighted 3 large ships to port, quite close to. She turned away, made a British recognition signal and was not pursued. As bad luck would have it, the steaming light had short-circuited, could not be switched off and showed intermittently.<br />
<br />
The "DERFFLINGER", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN" followed the Main Fleet more or less and met with no particular experiences.<br />
<br />
The Main Fleet had to repulse a series of destroyer attacks and was also engaged by cruisers. The movements of these British cruisers, which came up singly, are incomprehensible and give the impression of having lost their heads. They appear to have received the order, judging by an intercepted W/T message, to proceed on a northerly and north-westerly course, and thereby they ran into the extended German line which they probably imagined they had passed to the South.<br />
<br />
One large cruiser (?"WARRIOR") proceeded unsuspectingly within 875 yds. of the line of battleships and came under concentrated fire from several ships before she could reply, so that she blew up enveloped in flames and disappeared in 47 seconds. The "BIRMINGHAM" seems to have been accounted for in a similar manner. The destroyers all approached in a really insane manner; frequently not from ahead but from a direction astern, scattered, singly or in pairs, or at most 3 together, never in large numbers. Most of them were disabled forthwith by a few salvoes and set on fire. The "WESTFALEN" distinguished herself particularly at this time.<br />
<br />
These burning destroyers strewn along the course, lit it up as if for a festival. Evidently the fires were largely due to the light American and Mexican oils; at any rate German firing trials on oil bunkers never caused any such conflagrations.<br />
<br />
The attacking boats directed shrapnel fire on the searchlights with fairly good results, the searchlights of two battleships and one light cruiser being hit.<br />
<br />
One large destroyer, which only recognised the danger at the last moment and endeavoured to avoid it by altering course was rammed by the "NASSAU", which put her helm over for this purpose. The boat exploded internally and sank.<br />
<br />
The only ships hit were the "POMMERN" in the 2ns Battle Squadron, and the "ROSTOCK". The "POMMERN" blew up at once and nobody was saved. The "ROSTOCK" was just passing between ships of the Main Fleet when she was hit; the loss of life on board was small.<br />
<br />
The Germans believe they destroyed 11 British destroyers in all. The manner in which these destroyers were handled has not left a good impression on the whole, and one has certainly lost respect for this weapon. The view is also taken that the boats are too large and offer too wide a target.<br />
<br />
The light cruiser "ELBING", like the "ROSTOCK", apparently wanted to break through the line from port to starboard under pressure from the British cruisers; she was, however, rammed by the "POSEN" and had to be abandoned in a sinking condition. The Germans also fired a torpedo into her.<br />
<br />
The "FRAUENLOB" and 2 destroyers were lost during the night; no details of their loss are known.<br />
<br />
Not far from Heligoland, the "OSTFRIESLAND", 7th of the line, struck a mine. This brings the account of the chief events of this exciting cruiser to an end.<br />
<br />
The German flotillas were detached from the Fleet to clear the area off the Jutland Coast, which was divided up into sectors. The flotillas stationed furthest to the North proceeded to the Skagerrak and through these straits into the Baltic and to Kiel.<br />
<br />
None of the flotillas sighted the British Main Fleet again, which proves that it must have turned away to the N. or N.W. immediately after the action. According to confidential reports the Fleet entered British ports as early as 1 June.<br />
<br />
Two British battleships, in a severely damaged condition and accompanied by destroyers, were sighted proceeding back to England. One was attacked by a submarine, but without success.<br />
<br />
On the morning of 1 June, in fairly misty weather, a Zeppelin sighted groups of British ships leaving the Channel on a N.E.'ly course. The reports were rather vague, as sometimes 6 and sometimes 12 ships were mentioned; but it seems most likely that 12 battleships and 3 cruisers were in question, and that they soon retired. The airship, which flew low at one time to get a clearer view, was also fired on.<br />
<br />
Some of the ships are said to have had tripod masts.<br />
<br />
The German Fleet, with the exception of "SEYDLITZ", reached the Jade in the afternoon. The "SEYDLITZ" could not cross the bar on account of being so much down by the bows, and it was not till the next day at high water that she was towed in, stern first.<br />
<br />
<center><u>MISCELLANEOUS.<br>TACTICS.</u></center><br />
<br />
The Germans ascribe their success to various causes, and in the first place to their own superiority as regards tactics. This is a point which every officer discusses, and it is constantly repeated that it all happened just as in tactical manoeuvres and in "battle exercises", and that things could not have gone better.<br />
<br />
Movements of squadrons, divisions and individual ships, "turns together" and alterations of course and speed, all went like clockwork and demonstrated the very great mobility of all formations.<br />
<br />
The W/T signalling system of the Main Fleet never failed, and its failure would have been immaterial, as the primary and secondary flag action signals, showing from several positions in the ship, were made simultaneously.<br />
<br />
All this was due to the peace training and the practical experience of the Flag Officers and Captains. Though in peace time the Commander-in-Chief had never commanded a Fleet, nor the Admirals a squadron, still the training carried out on the same lines for a number of years resulted in everything proceeding with the expected precision.<br />
<br />
The British, on the contrary, are said to have displayed a certain clumsiness as regards tactics and to have preferred turning together when "turning on to an opposite course" (Wendungen im Gegenmarsch), though this conclusion does not seem altogether justified from the description of the action.<br />
<br />
The ships kept station 547 yds. apart, and Vice-Admiral Schmidt told me that, in his opinion, this distance is too small for large ships and that he prefers 656 yds., as the shorter distances result in the ships getting bunched and overlapping during alterations of course. In order to relieve this during the first turn to starboard, the Fleet Flagship herself turned to port and then closed gradually into line. At night the distance was 656 yds.<br />
<br />
No interruption of W/T communication was occasioned by the enemy.<br />
<br />
<center><u>GUNNERY</u></center><br />
<br />
It is admitted that the British are superior as regards their gunnery technique. Their salvoes fall most astoundingly close together and aroused admiration on all sides. Some people affirm that they fell too close together, and that it was consequently difficult to cover a sufficiently large danger space.<br />
<br />
This is particularly the case with the heaviest calibres: 13.5-in. and 15-in. and the battle-cruisers' fire was noticeably inferior to that of the "Queen Elizabeth" class, for example.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> Literal translation; the meaning is not clear. - Tr.] The spread of the salvoes frequently only covered a few square yards. In the "KÖNIG" 3 rounds, out of a salvo of 4 rounds, hit between the capstan and the bridge.<br />
<br />
This is attributed to careful calibration, which the British have studied for a long time and which, as is well known, was abandoned by the German Navy after a few trials. The gunnery officers declare unanimously that it must unquestionably be re-introduced.<br />
<br />
The British range-finders are superior to the German, and the construction of their turrets enables them to shoot at ranges impossible for German guns. The question of range appears to be immaterial to the British, who fire at any range so long as visibility permits.<br />
<br />
The Germans are fully convinced of the great superiority of 15-in. guns over all others, and deplore the fact that, owing to the predominant conservative tendencies in the German Navy, this calibre was not introduced until so lately. Vice-Admiral Gerdes, the Head of the Armament Department, is responsible for this, for he always opposed it on the ground that the poor visibility in German waters and the consequent short ranges rendered an increase of calibre useless; he considered the German 12-in. gun to be an altogether superior weapon, capable of competing with every other.<br />
<br />
In one respect the British seem behindhand as compared with the Germans: namely that they cannot alter range quickly enough and they are too dependent on the range clock. The British rely on steady fire at long range, and they adapt their tactics to this and avoid alterations of course and range most assiduously.<br />
<br />
The Germans, on the contrary, in their firing practices always work with big and rapid alterations of range and exercise firing while turning, so that the gunnery officers consider they have an advantage in this respect.<br />
<br />
The Turn on to an opposite course was certainly not advantageous for the German Fleet, but in this particular instance it made little difference, as the German ships were already unable to find a target; besides which, it must have disconcerted the British and it prevented them from obtaining good results with their fire. The salvoes fell very close together round the ships, but few hits were obtained. The rate of fire in the British ships is said to have been fair, but not excessive. Some people affirm that it was very modest.<br />
<br />
The British shell had great penetrating power, and from all reasonable distances the main armour was generally pierced clean through. The shell splinters picked up prove conclusively that at least 2 kinds of shell were used, differing considerably in material and quality. One kind of shell had a very thick wall and an extremely small explosive charge, it might almost be called a solid shot. It seems to have broken up frequently without exploding and the fuse did not function. Its explosive power, if it possessed any at all, was quite inconsiderable, and it is presumed that the explosives used was not high explosive.<br />
<br />
It appears from the splinters of these 15-in. shell that the wall was 6.3 - 6.7 ins. (16 - 17 cm.), so that the hollow space cannot measure more than 2.4 ins. - 1.8 ins. (4 - 6 cm.). It is true that the large pieces into which these shell broke pierced everything in their course and often went right through the whole ship, unless they struck an armoured part. Several intact heads were found, with and without caps, and also entire bases.<br />
<br />
The second kind of shell had considerably thinner walls, only about half as thick, but it also often broke up into quite large pieces and displayed no great explosive power, and little or no incendiary power.<br />
<br />
It appears therefore that the British aimed only at attaining penetrating power, and the Germans are of opinion that they do not possess (rohrsicheren)* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D.Note.- This appears to be a special fuse which is very delicate, but safe until it has left the gun.] fuses for high explosive shell; this was their opinion before the war also.<br />
<br />
They believe that the high explosive power of the German ammunition gives them a great advantage which may partly counterbalance the smaller calibre of their guns and perhaps also their inferior gunnery. In any case, the effect of the German shell at the point of impact was very considerable.<br />
<br />
The fact that the ships blew up must be attributed to explosions in their magazines. (In this connection one may recall a turret of the "SEYDLITZ" being hit in the action of 24 January, 1915; see my report No.47 ex 15). The turret armour must have been pierced and the shells in the turret must have been exploded. The British have no metal cartridge-cases and also no cartridge-holders such as the Germans have, but they keep their cartridges in locked boxes which are perhaps not flash-proof enough. It seems therefore, from the incident experienced by the "SEYDLITZ", that this must constitute a particular danger to British ships. In this last action also turrets in German ships were frequently hit; further details are given in the account of damage sustained.<br />
<br />
After having compared the hits received in the German ships with the observations of results on enemy targets, it may be safely affirmed that the explosive power of the German shells exceeds that of the British; this was already known after the action of 24 January 1915. The Germans are therefore very much annoyed that they had no 15-in. guns to fire, as they are persuaded that ships so knocked about (eingedeckte) as, for example, the "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" would have been completely destroyed by German shell.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. Note.- The writer appears to mean that if German 15-in. shell had been used against "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" these ships would have been sunk.]<br />
<br />
It may be noted here that the "BAYERN", the first of their ships to carry 15-in. guns, will not join the Fleet for another few days, and the "BADEN" not until the autumn.<br />
<br />
Medium armament played no part, only a few hits were obtained and they did little damage.<br />
<br />
The British fired part-salvoes, like the Germans; full salvoes may have been fired now and again.<br />
<br />
The method of repulsing destroyer attacks, which has previously been reported, namely the 'turning away' and firing on one, or at most two boats, proved to be sound, and the repulsing of attacks both by day and night offered no difficulties.<br />
<br />
As regards gunnery, it may also be mentioned that the fire-control apparatus worked without a hitch and withstood the heaviest shocks. The elevation pointers worked admirably. A few ships were not yet fitted with them.<br />
<br />
<center><u>Torpedo.</u></center><br />
<br />
As regards torpedo work the Germans consider themselves very much superior. There were prolonged discussions about depriving Flotilla Leaders of their independence and putting them under the orders of a Leader Ship, but they are now convinced that this is necessary to ensure the flotillas attacking at the right moment and all together.<br />
<br />
The flotillas were led by the 2 leader Ships "ROSTOCK" and "REGENSBURG", the first having 2 flotillas and the second 3 flotillas allocated to them. The remaining 2 flotillas accompanied the Main Fleet or the battle-cruisers. The leaders carried out their duties with great daring and circumspection. The attacks of the British were weak and scattered, and could therefore have little or only occasional success.<br />
<br />
The German 2nd Flotilla, composed of the larger 1500 ton boats were held back instead of being sent to attack. Although these boats are spoken of very highly and are indispensable for certain enterprises, the view is now taken that they are too large and too valuable to be used for attacking during an action. This Flotilla proceeded to Zeebrugge immediately after the action and arrived there safely. It is to be employed in preventing the British from blockading the harbour with nets, and thus make it impossible for the German submarines to proceed out.<br />
<br />
As far as I have heard, the "MOLTKE" alone of the larger ships fired 4 torpedoes.<br />
<br />
Submarines were not in evidence. No German submarines were present; on the other hand a German destroyer claims to have rammed a British submarine. This claim appears to be erroneous, at least it was declared to be nonsense by the Chief of Staff. The submarines failed as regards scouting and also doing the pursuit.<br />
<br />
Some people state that a British aeroplane was sighted to the northward, and that it had apparently risen from a cruiser. It played no part in the action.<br />
<br />
The use of "Höschter"* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. note:- Probably the name of the inventor.] fog seems to have been of good service, it and the smoke made by the destroyers having completely masked the Main Fleet and its movements at critical moments.<br />
<br />
<center><u>SPEED</u></center><br />
<br />
The advantage of speed lay entirely with the British, not only as regards the Main Fleet on account of the "Deutschland" class, but also as regards the battle-cruisers. The latter are said to have proved considerably faster than the German battle cruisers, an unpleasant experience which had already been made on 25 January 1915. This alone proves that the British are talking nonsense when they assert that the German Fleet sought safety in flight; on the contrary, it was far from its bases and entirely in the power of the British, who either did not wish to take advantage of their superior speed, or were unable to do so on account of the damage sustained. The visibility was no worse than it had been during the day and Jellicoe may have even welcomed the "Höschter" fog which would enable him to plead bad visibility as a reason for abandoning the pursuit. On the German side in the light of experience the factor of speed in the battleships is considered very important. But the moderate depths of the German harbours limits the draught of the ships, and make it particularly difficult for German builders to do much in this respect. In spite of greater length and higher horse power the most modern cruisers "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ" and "LÜTZOW" attained only a quite inconsiderable increase of speed in comparison with the older "GOEBEN" class, and proved a disappointment in this particular.<br />
<br />
The question whether the older battleships should take part in an important engagement was not easy to decide. The 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons composed of the "WITTLESBACH" and "BARBAROSSA" class, re-commissioned at the beginning of the war, were intended to be used in such actions, but have long since been paid off; some have been disarmed and employed as guardships and instructional ships, etc. It was considered however, that the 2nd Battle Squadron, composed of the most modern of the older ships, would be of some service in the action; but this squadron was in a privileged position, inasmuch as it was merely attached to the 1st and 3rd Battle Squadrons and its Admiral was allowed to operate independently and select the position he thought best. On this occasion it kept station quite well and did not prove a hindrance, but, on the other hand, it did not come under any heavy fire. This must be considered very fortunate, for, in view of the damage sustained by other ships and in view of the fact that the British shell pierced all armour above or below water even at the longest range, it is certain that every ship of this class would have been sunk by a few hits, as their internal sub-division is not proof against large inrushes of water.<br />
<br />
The loss of the "Pommern", which gives the British an opportunity for a hollow triumph, also teaches a clear lesson. The Chief of Staff told me that they will probably consider carefully before again exposing this Squadron to danger; therefore this action will have further confirmed the complete worthlessness of all Dreadnought types [sic] and will condemn them as old iron.<br />
<br />
<center><u>TORPEDO NETS.</u></center><br />
<br />
The torpedo nets of the battle cruisers are all badly damaged and the gear so knocked about by gunfire that they were almost useless. This was particularly the case with the "Derfflinger", where the after port nets were hanging in the water, and would have fallen across the propeller had they not chanced to remain held up by a temporary lashing. The ship was obliged to stop during the action to secure the nets, and they might easily have occasioned the loss of the ship.<br />
<br />
For this reason all the nets, together with the booms, were unshipped immediately after the ships' return, to everybody's satisfaction. They will not be carried any more, except perhaps for operations in the Baltic, where the ships may be obliged to anchor at sea.<br />
<br />
<center><u>LEAK-STOPPING SERVICE.</u></center><br />
<br />
The leak-stopping service which had been systematically developed, worked admirably and the Germans are convinced that they owe much to it. They believed that the "Seydlitz" could not have been brought in if the strengthening of the bulkheads, etc., had not been so thoroughly exercised and if the personnel had not been so well trained.<br />
<br />
It is also said, that in the "Lutzow", which had only been in commission for 2 months, was naturally not up to the mark in this respect, and that it is not impossible that small shortcomings, for which of course nobody can be blamed, were responsible for the ship sinking. The "Lutzow" was an unfortunate ship altogether. First her turbines collapsed, thus delaying her commissioning for 6 months, then she immediately struck a mine, and she was hardly out of dockyard hands before she was sunk.<br />
<br />
<center><u>DANGER FROM GAS FUMES.</u></center><br />
<br />
Only 2 days before sailing, a large number of the ships, and fortunately exactly those that came most under fire, namely battle-cruisers and the 3rd Squadron, were supplied with gas masks fitted with alkali cartridges for the whole crew and a plentiful reserve (in the "Seydlitz" 1500 masks for about 1200 men). The masks are similar to those used in the army for poisonous gases. Each man carries a mask slung round him, if he is not actually wearing it.<br />
<br />
I was told emphatically by all the officers, that, in their experience, these masks are absolutely necessary and not only saved many lives but enabled the men to carry on in parts of the ship which they would otherwise have been compelled to leave.<br />
<br />
The gases from shells, mines and torpedoes penetrate in an incredible manner through ventilators, telephone leads, etc. to compartments far away from the point of impact. In many cases the masks enabled large numbers of the guns' crews to escape from turrets that were hit, and to help out others who were badly wounded. In one case the men in one of the main engine rooms were able to remain at their posts after gas had penetrated, until the engine-room was ventilated.<br />
<br />
The Fleet breathing apparatus (Flottenathmer) is preferable to masks in some cases, but it cannot be supplied to everyone and it hampers one's movements, which the masks do not.<br />
<br />
On account of the great danger from gases, it is also advisable to fit hinged flaps in all shafts, and to have wooden bungs to fit the voice-pipes, keeping a hammer at hand to hammer them into the mouth-pieces.<br />
<br />
They tell me that it proved very useful to keep all the personnel employed below, such as in central control rooms, engine-rooms, torpedo flats, etc. continually informed of what was going on. The men get nervous, particularly at first, with the tremendous shocks caused by shell falling close to the ship, though the shocks are felt less on deck, and such information gives them confidence and they like knowing what is going on above them.<br />
<br />
<center><u>DAMAGE</u></center><br />
<br />
The distribution of ships needing repair in the various dockyards is as follows:-<br />
<br />
The "König" proceeded at once to Kiel and is under repair at Howaldt's yard. I did not see her.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" and "Moltke" in Blohm and Voss yard, Hamburg, the first in the Imperial Dock.<br />
<br />
The "Kurfürst["] in Vulkan Yard, Hamburg.<br />
<br />
The "Derfflinger" was first docked in Wilhelmshaven and the leaks temporarily stopped, she then proceeded to the Imperial dockyard, Kiel. The "Seydlitz" will now be docked in the large dock at Wilhelmshaven; during my stay the "Seydlitz" was still in the lock.<br />
<br />
The "Von der Tann", "Ostfriesland" and "Helgoland" will be repaired in dry docks in Wilhelmshaven. No other large ships require to be docked.<br />
<br />
"<u>Seydlitz</u>" The number of hits was still uncertain, as the whole forepart of the ship up to the upper deck was still under water, and it is not known what she looks like below water. The ship was brought into the lock with difficulty, and as she is 43 ft. down by the bows, she cannot be taken into harbour. They will not venture to dock the ship inside the lock, and intend first to raise her bows slightly.<br />
<br />
The roof and guns of the fore turret and anchors, cables etc., have already been unshipped, and they now intend to bring caissons alongside and pump out the fore part sufficiently to enable her to enter the harbour.<br />
<br />
The great inrush of water, that flooded more or less the whole fore part of the ship as far as the first boiler-room bulkhead, was caused by a number of hits. Firstly, one of the belt armour plates forward on the port side is missing, having fallen off. Secondly, there are believed to be at least 2 or 3 more hits below water, forward on the port side; for the list and the settling down had already become ominous when the ship was hit at the edge of the upper deck, port side, abreast the bridge; this was followed by an inrush of water in the battery deck, which did a great amount of damage.<br />
<br />
In addition, during the day action, she was hit by a torpedo on the starboard side under the forward 5.9 in. gun, which caused her to settle down still more by the bows. This gun was so much damaged by the shock from underneath as to be disabled.<br />
<br />
Further, there are 4 severe hits in the ship's side (mess deck, port side, forward of the turret), which also demolished the port capstan.<br />
<br />
These shell, or shell splinters, naturally penetrated to the armoured deck, so that the entire fore part of the ship above and below the armoured deck is holed in many places, allowing free passage for the water. The fore part of the ship was struck therefore by at least 8 or 9 shells and one torpedo.<br />
<br />
Apparently the only compartments which are not flooded, are the bow torpedo flats and the central control room. The former is being pumped out continuously, as a great deal of water is flowing in from above. The torpedo control room had to be abandoned, as the forward partition was not watertight. The central control room abaft this was not abandoned, but of its 2 entrances from the starboard and port passages, only the port one can be used, as the starboard one is flooded.<br />
<br />
The gunnery control room is far further aft and was not affected.<br />
<br />
The ship has a list of 7° to port, and as she has now been slightly raised, about 1¾ ft. of her bows are above water; at one time it was up to the level of the deck.<br />
<br />
While under way the forward boiler room bulkhead had to withstand most of the pressure; supports have been built up everywhere, but it leaks in places.<br />
<br />
The other hits of consequences were those in the turrets. The fore starboard turret No.2 received a direct hit on the fore face of the revolving structure. One curved plate was forced out, but fortunately the main effect of the explosion was outward. The right hand gun was disabled by slight damage to the mounting; with this exception the turret remained in action and kept up fire.<br />
<br />
The right hand gun of turret No.3 received a direct hit, which cut out a wide groove along the tube of the gun. The left hand gun continued to fire.<br />
<br />
The barbette of turret No.4 was hit on a level with the rammer, and the armour was pierced clean through. This hit is of special interest, as the "Seydlitz" received a similar hit and at the same level in turret No.5 on 24th January 1915, which caused a fire, disabled both the after turrets and killed all the guns' crews. This last time, however, the damage was slight. There was no ready ammunition in the turret, and only one cartridge was exploded, in contrast to the (6200 Kg.) 13,670 lbs. of powder on Jan.1915. The turret officer and a large number of the gun's crews were saved by their gas masks. The destruction caused by splinters was, however, considerable and the turret was abandoned, as it was not possible to continue fire from it. This was a 13.5 in. shell, at 15,310 yds. range, strength of armour pierced 8.6 inches.<br />
<br />
After the turret had been abandoned, it was hit a second time in the after side of the revolving part, which was pierced; this of course increased the havoc in the interior.<br />
<br />
Turret No.5 was hit in the roof. The shell richochetted, and the roof is slightly dented. Nobody was hurt and the turret continued to fire.<br />
<br />
In the "Seydlitz" therefore, all the turrets were hit, with the exception of the foremost turret, and one was hit twice.<br />
<br />
A further hit pierced the 5.9 in. (150mm.) casemate armour of the aftermost 5.9 in. starboard gun, No.2. The deck was pierced from beneath, and splinters also pierced the splinter bulkhead. The gun was disabled and all the crew were killed, with the exception of the ship's chaplain who happened to be in the casemate and must be watched over by a special guardian angel.<br />
<br />
A similar hit, with a 15 in. shell, struck the casemate armour of the 6-in. gun No.7 and exploded in the casemate. Men were killed, the gun was disabled and the splinter bulkhead pierced by large splinters. This time again, surprise was aroused by the comparatively small damage caused by a large calibre shell.<br />
<br />
"<u>Derfflinger</u>". One shell hit the armour belt forward of the hawse pipe, probably at the junction of 2 plates, as 2 plates broke away. The plates underneath were consequently strained apart and a great deal of water flowed in.<br />
<br />
The armour belt on the port side also received 2 further hits in the centre and was pierced clean through. The splinters penetrated more than half way through the ship, and in one case a piece of plating was driven half way though the ship. These hits, combined perhaps with others, destroyed the nets and their supports in several places.<br />
<br />
The two after turrets received direct hits, in one case on the roof, in the other case in the barbette above the deck; the armour was pierced and the upper portions of the turrets burnt out and severely damaged, but the flames did not penetrate to the magazines. The crew in the upper part of the turret were killed, and both turrets were disabled. This occurred at an early stage of the action.<br />
<br />
The guns at high elevation cannot yet be dismounted, as everything is wedged in, but they do not appear to be damaged.<br />
<br />
The muzzles were carried away off the 4 foremost 6 in. (15 cm.) guns on the port side; two of them probably having been accounted for by one and the same shell which hit the armour. One gun, the muzzle of which was perhaps damaged by a splinter, afterwards burst, the tube splitting open in the shape of a tulip.<br />
<br />
The "Derfflinger" received a few other hits of no particular interest. She appears the next most severely damaged ship after the "Lützow".<br />
<br />
The "<u>Moltke</u>" only received 5 hits, all of them during that part of the action which took place on a southerly course; while the cruisers mentioned above received most of the hits on the port side, consequently during the later stages of the action.<br />
<br />
One shell pieced the bulwarks in the after part of the ship above the armour, passed through the ship and struck the armour on the port side from inside, about 3.3 ft. below the water-line. One plate was forced out and is missing. The inrush of water was considerable. The after compartments, above the armoured deck which remained intact, were all more or less flooded.<br />
<br />
The second hit was further forward, below the armour belt. The shell exploded in a bunker, but the armoured deck held and no water penetrated it from below. The neighbouring bunkers made little water and could be pumped out.<br />
<br />
Another shell struck the 5.9 in. armour in the upper bunker, above the water-line. The armoured deck again held, but the inner wall of the bunker parted, and the battery deck was pierced from below, a 6 in. gun being damaged and disabled.<br />
<br />
In the fore part of the ship a shell struck the armour belt below the water-line. The plate remained intact and was driven in about 8 inches. The compartment was flooded, but the torpedo bulkhead remained watertight. A neighbouring compartment leaked slightly, the rivets having parted.<br />
<br />
The fifth case of damage, namely a plate beneath the armour belt being driven and pressed in, was probably not due to a direct hit, but to splinters of a shell which fell short.<br />
<br />
"<u>Von der Tann</u>". A shell hit and pierced the lower part of the 3.9 in. armour belt in the after part of the ship to starboard. The compartments above the armoured deck, and some of those on the deck above, were flooded. The chief effect of the shell was outside the ship, but it bent the plates below the otherwise undamaged armoured deck, so that a considerable amount of water flowed into the compartments below the armoured deck. The after torpedo flat was flooded half way up, and the men in the starboard steering engine room were shut in for a long time owing to the exits being blocked.<br />
<br />
The fore turret was hit on the starboard side on the upper edge of the barbette and a semi-circular armour plate was forced out. The machinery of the turret was so badly knocked about that the turret was disabled.<br />
<br />
The hydraulic piping was damaged, so that all the heavy armament was put out of action temporarily. Strangely enough, though men were wounded none were killed.<br />
<br />
The aftermost turret was hit in the barbette. The armour was pierced, but the effect of the shell was exterior, the turret sustained little internal damage, so that the handgear of the turret remained in action. The turret was wedged in one place and could not revolve; they succeeded, however, in cutting off with oxy-acetylene the piece of revolving part which was jammed against the inner side of the barbette thus getting rid of the obstruction.<br />
<br />
Outside the turret, the shell did considerable damage; some splinters striking downwards, bent the armoured deck and pierced it in places. As far as I know, the armoured deck sustained no further damage, and this was of little importance.<br />
<br />
The after conning-tower was hit and a piece of the armour torn away; the occupants, including the 3rd gunnery officer, were killed. Splinters struck downwards to the engine-room ventilation hatches, but were stopped by the armoured gratings.<br />
<br />
"<u>Ostfriesland"</u> was struck by a mine below the foremost port turret. The whole measures 197 ft.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. note:- Literal translation is 12 times 5 metres large.] The torpedo bulkhead is only slightly torn, and the inrush of water was only local.<br />
<br />
"<u>Helgoland</u>". A 13.5 in. shell hit the 7.9 in. armour belt forward on the port side and pierced it. The shell appears to have broken only as no explosive action can be traced. The range was about 14,217 yds.<br />
<br />
"<u>Nassau</u>" rammed a British destroyer, or rather, the destroyer ran into her forward on the port side. Her bows must have lifted right up, for her hawse-pipe remained on board the "Nassau", so firmly wedged into the side of the upper deck that it will have to be cut out. The "Nassau's" side below the deck is torn away for 33 ft. The destroyer then glanced off the "Nassau's" side and exploded internally. One of the crew remained behind in one of the nets, but fell into the water when the "Nassau" fired a salvo.<br />
<br />
The "Nassau" was hit by shrapnel from attacking destroyers in the foremost searchlight group, both port searchlights were put out of action. The searchlight control and electric cables were destroyed and many of the searchlight crews were killed. The after searchlight group was hit in a similar manner, and one of the searchlights was disabled.<br />
<br />
The "Rhineland" and a light cruiser were also hit in a similar manner.<br />
<br />
I have seen all the above mentioned ships in Wilhelmshaven.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" and "Kurfürst" were at Hamburg, but unfortunately I am unable to report much about them. They had already been under repair for several days, and the damage was to some extent made good. Besides this, the conditions were not favourable for undisturbed examination: commissioners from the Imperial Navy Office were on board, besides crowds of workmen, the noise was deafening and it was pouring with rain. Consequently I took no notes on the spot and relied on my memory, which however fails me now among the very many received of similar cases. I am therefore unable to report each hit with accuracy.<br />
<br />
This is immaterial, however, as there were no particularly interesting hits, and none of the ships had been hit in the turrets. The armour had been pierced in several places, the effect and character of the hits being similar in all cases; the hits on unarmoured parts were of little consequence.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" was hit aft on the port side of the water line just on a junction of two plates, a piece of equal size being torn away from each plate. The shell then struck the sloping part of the armoured deck and the splinters ricochetted and passed right through the ship. These plates have already been removed.<br />
<br />
A casemate was pierced and the gun disabled.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" is the only ship whose mast was hit, the mast remained standing and has now been removed.<br />
<br />
The spotting platform had to be abandoned, as communications with the conning tower was cut off. This was the only hit received in a conning tower; it only grazed the upper edge and glanced off, and the men inside hardly noticed it.<br />
<br />
The port engine was disabled, not in consequence of damage to the turbine which is in good condition, but owing to one of the main propeller bearings becoming overheated. The cause of this is not clear, but it is believed to be due to concussions. The ship was well able to keep station with her two remaining engines.<br />
<br />
The "<u>Kurfürst</u>" suffered especially from a great inrush of water forward on the port side, above the armoured deck; it was caused by a hit in the armour belt. No further damage of importance was sustained.<br />
<br />
With regard to time necessary for repair to these ships, it is not yet possible to say anything definite, as it is still undecided whether they shall undergo thorough repair or not. The chief difficulty is the manufacture of new armour plates; but some of the holed plates can, no doubt, be left in position for the present.<br />
<br />
A considerable time will be needed to repair some of the turrets of the battle-cruisers, but here too, they will contrive to get things done. For instance, the "Von der Tann" is to have an entire turret out of a ship of the "Nassau" class, probably the foremost turret, and this ship will be left without a turret for some time. They talk a great deal also of transferring guns, and they will perhaps make use of those intended for the "Hindenburg", which will not be completed will the late autumn.<br />
<br />
It may be presumed that the battleships will be ready for sea in 4-6 weeks, and the battle-cruisers, particularly the "Seydlitz", in not less than 4 months. Naturally work is going on day and night, and repairs are given priority over all new construction.<br />
<br />
The damage sustained by light cruisers and destroyers is inconsiderable. The "Hamburg" had a funnel shot away. As these ships seem to be of minor importance, I did not trouble further about them.<br />
<br />
As our Allies appear not to have the intention of communicating to us what effect the examination of damages sustained will have on their construction in the future, we must endeavour to ascertain this as time goes on by means of cross questioning and by studying their new constructions in detail. I do not feel called upon to draw premature and rash conclusions to-day, on the strength of impressions received, but this will not prevent me from giving a summary of my opinion and of the opinions expresses in my hearing.<br />
<br />
Firstly, it is a remarkable fact that in all the ships that have returned home, all the engine and boiler-rooms are undamaged; the "Lützow" is no exception to this, as she proceeded under her own steam until late in the night after the action. I have also been assured by the Imperial Navy Office, after an inspection carried out by the Chief Engineer, that not a single auxiliary engine was defective. The only boiler-room put out of action was the foremost one in the "Seydlitz" where the bulkhead gave a little, allowing water to penetrate through rivet holes and cracks when the ship was under way. The conclusion may therefore be drawn that these vital parts of the ship are sufficiently protected and that the armour belt of the usual German thicknesses, though it cannot stop the shells, at least fulfils its purpose by breaking them up. Consequently it has become almost impossible even for the largest splinters of 15 in. shell to penetrate through armoured deck or torpedo bulkhead in engine and boiler rooms.<br />
<br />
Even at these long ranges and steep angles there was no question of the armoured decks being pierced; but the fitting of strong gratings over the hatches, which prevented the engines of the "Von der Tann" from sustaining severe damage, appears very necessary.<br />
<br />
The torpedo bulkheads also resisted shells, mines and torpedoes effectually; and in cases where slight damage was sustained, it had no further consequences than the flooding of the compartment affected.<br />
<br />
Perhaps it would be advisable to construct a specially strong boiler-room bulkhead, similar to a torpedo bulkhead, so that it could not be damaged by splinters or water-pressure.<br />
<br />
The inspection of the "Seydlitz" has left me with the impression that the commanding officer of the "Seydlitz" expected rather too much of his ship, and that nothing short of extraordinary good luck enabled her to be brought back. At one time when the whole forepart of the ship was flooded and the bows were under water, he proceeded occasionally with revolutions for 22 knots, just in order to show how seaworthy his ship was, so he told me. This may have been very sporting, or perhaps it may have been necessary under the circumstances in order not to drop too far behind and be overtaken by the enemy, but it certainly was not good seamanship, and if his stokehold bulkhead had burst, the "Seydlitz" would have gone down like the "Lutzow", where the circumstances appear to have been very similar. Later on he decreased speed and finally proceeded stern first.<br />
<br />
I therefore think it not impossible that the loss of the "Lützow", which is said to have been proceeded at 14 knots for a time, was also due only to recklessly high speed, and that the ship might have been saved if she had proceeded stern first or been taken in tow.<br />
<br />
As the danger from water-pressure must always be greatest from ahead, it would certainly be advisable to take special preventative measures against it.<br />
<br />
Vice-Admiral Schmidt told me that, in his opinion, the armoured belt ought to be strongest in the centre, and possible in the afterpart to protect the steering engines, and possibly in the bows, but that it ought not to taper off gradually from the centre to the extremities. He was also entirely in favour of a protected upper deck forming a second armoured deck.<br />
<br />
The admirably thorough system of internal division in the German ships and the floating capability thus attained is the finest proof of the merit of German construction which pursued this aim, and it shows that Admiral von Tirpitz, the creator of the Battle Fleet of to-day, was right when he upheld the principle that, above all things, the ships must be capable of remaining afloat and must not sink or heel over, and that everything else is of secondary consideration.<br />
<br />
The large number of hits in the turrets is remarkable, and it is generally considered that the turret armour should be appreciably stronger, especially in the lower part of the barbettes; for it is not only the disablement of the guns that comes into question, serious though this might be, but also the blowing up of magazines and the total destruction of the ship, as the wide shaft down to the magazines cannot possibly be made completely flash-proof. This is the most vital part of the ship. It is only owing to the small explosive charges in British shells, that there were no explosions of magazines in the German ships.<br />
<br />
Everything possible had been done after the action of 24.1.15 to ensure protection against this danger; the ready ammunition was removed from the top of the hoists and wherever possible all the openings in shafts leading down below were fitted with flaps, covers and heavy asbestos mats, while German ammunition is particularly carefully stowed and packed in cases with screwed-on covers.<br />
<br />
The disasters on the British side are a proof that this is a question of the greatest importance. It must also be taken into consideration that while any other damage turret may take months.<br />
<br />
The numerous hits in turrets would appear to justify the opinion of those who decided against triple turrets, on the ground [sic] that if one was disabled it would put too many heavy guns out of action.<br />
<br />
A hit in a casemate will of course destroy it and disable the gun, but this is of little consequence. Care must be taken here also not to have any ready ammunition, and to close the ammunition hand-up hermetically with heavy asbestos mats at the magazine end also. With the German "Paternoster" (dredger hoist) the ammunition lifts this mat as it comes up and the mat then falls to and closes the opening, which is a practical arrangement.<br />
<br />
Other hits through unarmoured parts, which destroyed more or less small gear and at the first glance give an impression of terrible havoc, are really of no consequence.<br />
<br />
In the "Von der Tann" they wanted to flood a turret magazine. This was impossible, as the flooding valve in the battery, or between deck was piled up with debris, cabin fittings, etc., and was inaccessible. Fortunately the flooding of the magazine turned out to be unnecessary. The Executive Officer remarked to me how critical such a trivial matter might become, and that one could not be careful enough about choosing the positions for the flooding valves, which must be kept clear of easily destructible objects.<br />
<br />
The man-hole covers in the decks, coal shoots [chutes], etc., were pointed out to me as dangerous, as they may be burst open by pressure of gas from below, thus causing damage and giving passage to the gases. These covers should be secured in a different manner and much more firmly.<br />
<br />
The flooding and draining system worked admirably, and is hardly capable of improvement. The only disadvantage is that the compartments above the armoured deck have no draining arrangements. This should be provided. A list, consequent on an inrush of water, could always be corrected by flooding an opposite compartment. This is an important matter both as affecting gunnery and personnel.<br />
<br />
The searchlights, which were not taken down in the German ships, all came out of the action undamaged; anxiety on their account was therefore unfounded. It was very unpleasant when attacking boats fired on the searchlights, and it is therefore considered necessary to fit light armour protection on the masts for the crews of the searchlight control and electric cables.<br />
<br />
Damage from flames is nowhere visible. The Germans are now rather amused at the care with which interior partitions were scraped.<br />
<br />
I could not help comparing the German ships with the Russian battleship "Orel", which I saw in Madzurn after the battle of Tsushima. If I remember rightly, the "Orel" had 5 severe hits and 40 hits with medium-calibre shell.<br />
<br />
The enormous explosive power of the Shimosa shell, which breaks up into minute splinters, did not do the slightest damage to the vital parts of the ship, but the upper deck was transformed into a confused heap of ruins. Superstructure, bridges, masts, funnels, etc., were destroyed, guns dismounted and fires started.<br />
<br />
Nothing of the kind is to be seen in the German ships, outwardly only a few more or less clean shell holes are visible, and they look so orderly and so little damaged that they do not appear to have gone through an action.<br />
<br />
It is true that the upper decks are said to have been littered with countless splinters, but they flew on to the decks from shells which struck the water, the ship receiving violent shocks.<br />
<br />
The holes in the armour show the characteristic concentric cracks round the hole and the radial splashes, the latter proving that the shells exploded on impact or at the latest, as they passed through. In many cases, as already noted, the force of the explosion was external and only pieces of plate, and possibly the head of the shell were driven in.<br />
<br />
<center><u>FLAG OFFICERS OF THE FLEET AND LEADERS</u></center><br />
<br />
{|<br />
| Commander-in-Chief:<br />
| Vice Admiral Scheer<br />
|-<br />
| <u>I Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Vice Admiral Schmidt<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Engelhard<br />
|-<br />
| <u>II Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Mauve<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Baron von Dalwigh<br />
|-<br />
| <u>III Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Behncke<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Nordmann<br />
|-<br />
| Officer commanding the Scouting Forces and<br>Commanding 1st Scouting Group<br />
| Vice Admiral Hipper<br />
|-<br />
| " 2nd " "<br />
| Rear Admiral Bodicker<br />
|-<br />
| " 4th " "<br />
| Commodore "Captain" v. Reuter<br />
|-<br />
| Leaders of Destroyers<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| in "Rostock"<br />
| Commodore "Captain" Michelsen<br />
|-<br />
| in Regensburg<br />
| Commodore "Captain" Heinrich<br />
|-<br />
| Leader of submarines<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| In Hamburg<br />
| Captain Bauer<br />
|}<br />
<br />
<center><u>REMARKS</u></center><br />
<br />
The lecture on the action, upon which this report is based, was illustrated by a plan prepared in haste for H.M. the Kaiser, and a copy was promised to me. But the Admiral Staff does not wish to part with this first incomplete draft, and the preparation of an accurate plan has not yet been completed, as the Admiral Staff is not yet in possession of all the details.<br />
<br />
In time to be included in this report I have only received the sketch of the first stage of the battle, namely the cruiser action on a southerly course, together with a small sketch of the situation when the action was broken off; both are enclosed.<br />
<br />
I conclude from the sketch of the cruiser action, that the accounts given to me were not quite accurate; for instance, the assertion of the commanding officer of the "Moltke" that the shortest range at that stage was 7,650 yds. and that he had accounted for one of the armoured cruisers with a torpedo.<br />
<br />
The sketch shows that the "Indefatigable" was probably first destroyed by gun fire from the "Von der Tann", and later the "Queen Mary" by gunfire from the "Derfflinger", and that the range was never less than 14,220 yds.<br />
<br />
The loss of "V. 27" and "V. 29" and of 4 British destroyers is also apparent, while I was only told of two.<br />
<br />
In the original sketch, 2 British armoured cruisers are also shown as having fallen out during this stage, but this is not shown on the accompanying sketch and probably took place later.<br />
<br />
I was told by the Admiral Staff that the accompanying sketches are not to be taken as strictly accurate.<br />
<br />
It is requested that the sketches and course of the action and the account of damages may be treated as strictly confidential.<br />
<br />
==Footnotes==<br />
{{reflist}}<br />
<br />
==Bibliography==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
*''Schematismus für das K.u.K. Heer und für die Kriegsmarine für 1914. Separatausgabe''. Wien. 1914.<br />
*''Almanach für die k. und k. Kriegsmarine 1917. Kriegsausgabe''. '''XXXVII'''. Pola. 1917.<br />
*Marder, Arthur J. (1965). From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919: Jutland and After, May 1916–December 1916. '''Volume III'''. London: Oxford University Press.<br />
*{{MarderFDSFIII}}<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
==External Links==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
*Krámli, Mihály. [http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-124.pdf "The Report on the Battle of Jutland by the Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché in Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Colloredo-Mannsfeld."] ''NavWeaps''.<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
[[Category:Battle of Jutland]]</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Attach%C3%A9_Report_on_the_Battle_of_Jutland&diff=334735Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland2024-03-10T15:48:33Z<p>Simon Harley: Made Changes.</p>
<hr />
<div>Soon after the [[Battle of Jutland]] on 31 May &ndash; 1 June 1916 the Naval Attaché of the [[Austro-Hungarian Navy|Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Navy]] at the embassy in Berlin, ''Fregattenkapitäne'' Hieronymus Graf von Colloredo-Mannsfeld,<ref>''Schematismus für das K.u.K. Heer und für die Kriegsmarine für 1914''. p. 1270. ''Almanach für die k. und k. Kriegsmarine 1917''. p. 668.</ref> visited the High Sea Fleet. He composed a report on the battle for his superiors using first-hand accounts, interspersed here and there with his own observations. The version reproduced here is a translation in English apparently made by the [[Naval Intelligence Division (Royal Navy)|Naval Intelligence Division]] in 1919 from a copy which was subsequently returned to "F.N.A.", presumably the French Naval Attaché. A copy of the translation then made its way into the papers of the British Cabinet, from where historian Arthur J. Marder obtained a copy which is in his papers.<ref>Original number N.I.D. 087/19. Marder papers, Special Collections and Archives, Langson Library, University of California, Irvine, MS-F002, Box 27.</ref> It is worth comparing this translation with that made by Hungarian historian Mihály Krámli of a post-war copy of a slightly different version of the report in a Hungarian archive which has been published on the ''NavWeaps'' online resource.<ref>Krámli, Mihály. [http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-124.pdf "The Report on the Battle of Jutland by the Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché in Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Colloredo-Mannsfeld."] ''NavWeaps''.</ref><br />
<br />
The original grammar and punctuation of the typescript has been reproduced here wherever possible.<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
From:- Austrian Naval Attache in Berlin.<br />
<br />
To:- Commander-in-Chief, Pola.<br />
<div style="float:right;">Berlin,<br>17 June, 1916.</div><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<center><u>NAVAL ENGAGEMENT OF 31 MAY 1916.</u></center><br />
<br />
The following is a report of the naval proceedings of 31 May - 1 June, 1916, and also of the damage sustained by the German Fleet.<br />
<br />
During my 3-days' visit to Wilhelmshaven, followed by a cursory examination of the "MARKGRAF" and "KURFURST" at Hamburg, I endeavoured to gain merely a general idea of the results of gunfire and concentrated my attention on the course of the action itself.<br />
Admiral Scheer, whom I only saw for a short time as he left for Kiel to attend the funeral of his borther-in-law [sic], Lieut.-Commander Mohr, who was killed in the action, very kindly arranged that his Chief of Staff, Captain Trotha, should give me an account of the whole proceedings, illustrated by plans, and that I should be furnished with all information. I have tried to fill in the gaps by conversations with officers whom I know; this has resulted in some contradictory statements, and several points remain obscure, the accounts from the various ships not having all come in.<br />
<br />
Many episodes will therefore be explained later and may appear in a different light, but, as regards the broad outlines which are of chief importance, the picture of this interesting engagement is fairly clear. The accompanying plan of the action was made in haste for the Kaiser and will therefore need much correction.<br />
<br />
The spirit pervading the Fleet can only be described as one of enthusiasm; they are intoxicated with victory. The heavy load weighing on them all, the dear that this war might end without an encounter of the Fleets, have vanished. They have learnt what fighting really means, they know themselves to be superior to the enemy as regards tactics, and that they were following the right lines and have nothing to unlearn; they know that their gunfire was more effective than that of the enemy, and that they can rely implicitly on their flotillas which have always been looked upon in the German Navy as one of the chief factors in an action. Finally they know that their largest ships can stand heavy fire and serious damage, that they leave nothing to be desired as regards construction and cannot be sunk easily. In short, they feel that the British, in spite of all their boasting, cannot overcome the German Fleet and have a considerable respect for it.<br />
<br />
This conviction imbues the whole Fleet, down to the last man, with confidence in their strength and a calm assurance regarding future encounters. At the same time they are free from over-confidence and from under-estimation of the enemy. On the contrary, the British fire-control and the enormous piercing power of their heavy shell at great distances have roused their admiration, so that a careless conception of the situation is not to be feared, the less so, as well-balanced minds such as those of Admiral Scheer and his Staff are unlikely to be led away by former successes to undertake rash enterprises in the future.<br />
<br />
They do not deny that they were extraordinarily fortunate, and that if the action had been prosecuted with energy on the British side, and if the "Nelson touch" had been in evidence, things might have gone very badly for Germany, especially as the British still had an intact Battle Squadron of 12 units at their disposal which had not yet taken part in the action. But they console themselves with the knowledge that no naval action was ever won without some stroke of luck.<br />
<br />
The Kaiser's visit, the day before my arrival, and his address to the Fleet gave great satisfaction, and subsequently many important personages arrive to inspect the ships, such as Prince Henry and the Grand Dukes of Mecklenburg and Oldenburg, and numbers of decorations were distributed. Vice-Admiral Scheer was promoted to Admiral, and he and Vice-Admiral Hipper received the Pour le Merite.<br />
<br />
I also visited Rear-Admiral Behncke, who was wounded and in hospital; his wounds are slight, a few small splinters in his head, elbow and knee, and he will probably soon be well again.<br />
<br />
<center><u>COURSE OF THE ACTION.</u></center><br />
<br />
The Commander-in-Chief intended to advance with the whole Fleet to the waters of the Skagerrak, in order to make his presence felt unpleasantly by disturbing the shipping, hoping thereby to lure on the British forces and in this manner to be in a position to attack a part of the British Fleet with superior or at least with equal forces. He reckoned that any movements of the British Fleet would be reported to him in good time by the submarines which had been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and he hoped that the airships would prove a better means of reconnoitring than any possessed by the enemy.<br />
<br />
Unfavourable weather prevented him for a considerable period from undertaking any operations, and, as the submarines were to return home on 1 June and be relieved by a new group, the 31 May was the last date for carrying out the planned advance.<br />
<br />
The cruisers left the Jade at 3 a.m., the Main Fleet at 4 a.m., steering an easterly course, and then, after passing Heligoland, a N.N.W'ly course. No reports were received from submarines. These were stationed chiefly off the Orkneys and the Firth of Forth, and the large group of Flanders boats were off the Thames and at the entrance to the Channel. <br />
<br />
While proceeding northwards, a few W/T messages were received, but they were corrupt, appeared to refer only to small formations and gave no clue to the movements of the Grand Fleet. The airships were unable to start in the morning, on account of the wind, and, as it blew hard throughout the day in the Heligoland Bight, they could not start until the early hours of 1 June. In this respect things did not go well, but Admiral Scheer decided nevertheless to continue on his course to the Skagerrak. <br />
<br />
This the account given by Captain von Trotha, who affirms that nothing was known of the presence of the British Fleet in the waters of the Skagerrak, and that there seemed no probability of encountering this Fleet before 1 June.<br />
<br />
There are some points here which I am unable to understand. The submarines are said to have been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and were to return home on 1 June to be relieved probably by a weaker group. For, If the same number of boats were to to keep watch off the English coast, why should 31 May have been the last day for the German Fleet to sail. The day of departure was, therefore, too late in any case, for, if no encounter was to be expected before 1 June, the boats stationed off the coast could not possibly encounter the damaged British ships, as was intended, for probably no damaged ships would be there before 2 June.<br />
<br />
The battleship "KONIG ALBERT" had to carry out repairs to her condensers and did not proceed with the Fleet. Von Trotha told me that there was no alternative and that a ship must carry out small overhauls regularly in a dockyard according to programme. But could it not be arranged, when one is taking the initiative, to choose one's moment for an advance and to have all the ships together for this short time? And why should just that moment be chosen when one of the most powerful ships of the "Kaiser" class is in the dockyard, instead, for instance, of one of the "Nassau" class with 11-in. guns.<br />
<br />
In addition, the "BAYERN" was to have joined up a few days later. After having waited so long, why should not the plan have been postponed for 2 or 3 weeks, instead of dispensing with the only ship carrying 15-in. guns.<br />
<br />
In the same manner they dispensed with air reconnaissance, from which they had expected so much.<br />
<br />
These considerations make me doubt whether the account given me is quite correct, and whether, on the contrary, they knew of certain movements of the British Fleet and considered the moment extremely favourable for an attack. Perhaps they only knew of Beatty's battle squadron, and thinking the Main Fleet was far away, hoped to entrap this squadron. In Berlin, they have much to say, even in military circles, about the British Fleet's intention to push through into the Baltic, and of Kitchener's mission having some connection with this. I consider this senseless, for it cannot be presemed [sic] that the British Fleet would leave their shores unprotected and do the Germans the favour of operating in the Baltic, which would certainly be a most advantageous area for the German Fleet. In any case, there appear to be discrepancies which will probably be explained at some later date.<br />
<br />
Scouting groups, battle cruisers and light cruisers, together with flotillas, preceded the Main Fleet by 50 - 60 miles. At 4 p.m. the light cruisers encountered some British battle cruisers. These at once opened fire on the light cruisers, at an estimated distance of 26,247 yds.; the range could be taken accurately. Though they did not obtain a hit, the salvoes fell so well that the German cruisers thought it advisable to turn away and fall back on their battle cruisers.<br />
<br />
As the British approached, these battle cruisers turned on to a southerly course, in order to lure the enemy on to the German Main Fleet. A running action, on a southerly course, ensued. The British were to starboard and to the west of the Germans, who had therefore the following advantage: in the North Sea, in summer, the western horizon is quite light and visibility towards the west is good, while towards the east, and in a still greater degree off the Jutland Coast, it is misty and visibility is bad and no silhouettes stand out against the eastern horizon. This phenomenon also played great part in the subsequent course of the action. The sun was still high and was not troublesome, and the British ships offered admirable targets. The sea was calm, the wind N.W. 1-2, altering subsequently through W. to S.W.<br />
<br />
The following British ships were recognised:-<br />
3 "Lion" class, 1 "Tiger" and 2 "Indefatigable" class; they were soon reinforced by 5 "Queen Elizabeth" class following astern.<br />
<br />
It is asserted that, judging from shell splinters, the ship of the "Tiger" class carried 15-in. guns, and that she was therefore the mysterious vessel which replaced the "TIGER" sunk on 24.1.15; as the last-named "TIGER" carried only 13.5-in.guns, this was taken as a further proof of her loss. The silhouette of the new "TIGER", however, is said to have resembled that of the old "TIGER" exactly. As the "Queen Elizabeths" soon opened fire also with 15-in. guns, I rather doubt this assertion regarding the "TIGER", and the various ships on this early part of the engagement are altogether somewhat at variance.<br />
<br />
On the German side the ships proceeded in the following sequence:- "LÜTZOW", Flagship of Vice-Admiral Hipper, "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN".<br />
<br />
As Hipper edged towards the enemy, the distance decreased to about 7655 yds. The German fire was unquestionably superior, but the speed of the British vessels was greater. After a short time the "INDEFATIGABLE" and "QUEEN MARY" blew up, and 2 battle-cruisers and two attacking destroyers were also accounted for. The "QUEEN MARY" must have been destroyed by the explosion of a magazine; she was torn in two halves, and a water-colour painted by an officer represents her enveloped in an enormous column of black smoke; she disappeared in a few seconds. Only one cadet was subsequently picked.<br />
<br />
The second battle cruiser disappeared under similar circumstances. The "VON DER TANN" claims to have accounted for one of these battle-cruisers by a broadside. But the "MOLTKE" fired 4 torpedoes and also claims this achievement.<br />
<br />
The Germans suffered very little during this phase of the action, the "MOLTKE" alone receiving hits on the starboard side. The fire of the British battle-cruisers is said not to have been nearly as good as that of the "QUEEN ELIZABETH" class later on.<br />
<br />
When they had approached the German Main Fleet, the British turned on to a contrary course and the German cruisers did the same. The German Main Fleet proceeded in divisions in starboard quarter-line, the 3rd Battle Squadron: 4 "König" class and 3 "Kaiser" class, Fleet Flagship, 1st Battle Squadron: 4 "Ostfriesland" class and 4 "Westfalen" class, and the 2nd Battle Squadron: 5 "Deutschland" class and the "Hessen". They endeavoured to effect a junction with the cruisers, but were unable to take part very effectually.<br />
<br />
The course of the action was now in a northerly direction, over the area which had just been traversed, and the British ships now drew ahead considerably and turned more and more towards the East; the Germans followed this movement, and in consequence the conditions of visibility became less and less favourable for them.<br />
<br />
The "Queen Elizabeths" now made their presence more greatly felt; one of them had dropped out, but I was unable to ascertain when this occurred.<br />
<br />
The course of the German Math Fleet at first led past the 2 disabled British destroyers, which were lying stopped. The crews had already taken to the boats and were picked up later on by German destroyers. As the Main Fleet was doubtful about the advisability of passing the destroyers while they were still afloat, they were sunk by a few broadsides. One of the officers who was picked up was in pyjamas and is said to have stayed in his cabin during the action. He declared "We did not expect so much resistance," while another said - "The battle is rather disappointing." It has been ascertained that these destroyers were greatly under-manned; their crews seemed very exhausted, which points to their having been in the water for a long time.<br />
<br />
While on this easterly course, the light cruisers of the fast 2nd Scouting Group: "FRANKFURT", "PILLAU", "ELBING" and "WIESBADEN", were heavily fired on from the N.E. and E. without their being able to see more than the gun flashes. In addition, they were under continual fire from the N., and while turning away to S.E. and S., they ascertained that they were opposed by an interminable line of British ships, which appeared at first to be on a N.W.'ly course, and had then evidently turned together on to a S.'ly course.<br />
<br />
It may be noted here that the battleships, and, generally speaking, the battle-cruisers also, never sighted the British Main Fleet, and saw nothing but the flashes of the guns and the effects of the fire. These British ships, about 25 in number, were only sighted by a few light cruisers and by the flotillas, and were counted by them as accurately as possible.<br />
<br />
Surrounded thus from the N. and the E. and under fire, the "WIESBADEN" was disabled, apparently by a hit in the engine-room. The Admiral noticed, it is true, that his leading ships must have encountered new and powerful forces and that they were turning away; but he thought it his duty to go to the assistance of the "WIESBADEN" and therefore continued on an easterly course.<br />
<br />
The van of the Main Fleet, led by the "KÖNIG" (Rear-Admiral Behncke) now came under heavy fire from right ahead; the "KÖNIG" turned away under this fire towards the S.E., whereupon the Commander-in-Chief ordered the whole line to "turn together" to starboard and gave up the idea of helping the "WIESBADEN". About this time Vice-Admiral Hipper transferred his flag from the "LÜTZOW" to the "MOLTKE" with the help of a destroyer, his W/T station being damaged.<br />
<br />
Hardly had the Main Fleet drawn away on a westerly course, before it was ascertained that the pressure was relaxing and the fire decreasing, and that the British were no longer pursuing so hotly. Scheer therefore ordered the ships to "turn together" back on to their former course, and made the signal 'R' = 'Engage the enemy'. This second advance may be termed the zenith of the action. Admiral Scheer gave his views on it approximately as follows:- "Those who make a study of this engagement will be very puzzled as to my object in advancing thus against the wall of British ships. The fact is that I had no particular object. I made the first advance because I had a feeling that I ought to endeavour to assist the "WIESBADEN" and because the situation ahead was quite obscure to me, for I saw nothing of the "LÜTZOW" and received no W/T reports. I soon saw, however, that the leading ships were coming under an overwhelming fire, and that I could not risk the Fleet on the "WIESBADEN'S" account. When I noticed that the British pressure had quite ceased and that the Fleet remained intact in my hands, I turned back, under the impression that the action could not end in this way and that I ought to seek contact with the enemy again."<br />
<br />
The situation during the first and second advances may serve as an example of what should not take place according to all the laws of tactics, for it could not have been worse; von Trotha said jokingly that, if an Admiral brought about such a situation at a war game or in manoeuvres, he would never be entrusted without another command. In the North, the "Queen Elizabeths", then the battle-cruisers, and from N.E. through E. to S.E., an endless line of battleships formed an arc round the German van and kept it under fire. Evidently it had fallen into the most perfect trap. In addition to this unfavourable tactical position, there was a further difficulty, namely that the German ships could be clearly distinguished while they themselves only saw the gun flashes, 4 or 5 to each salvo, but could find no target.<br />
<br />
The Gunnery Officer of the "MARKGRAF" told me that he could not fire at all during half-an-hour, and that they were at the mercy of the British broadsides. Critical though the position was, in theory, they think that experience justifies the conclusion that this 'crossing the T' is in reality not so disastrous at longer ranges; for, in spite of the enormous superiority of their fire, the British made comparatively few hits, the simple reason being that, when fire is thus concentrated on a few leading ships, there can be no question of improving the shooting by spotting.<br />
<br />
Given good tactical training and squadrons which work well together, it is always easy to retire rapidly from an unfavourable position and even possibly to reach an advantageous one.<br />
<br />
The small amount of damage sustained by the Main Fleet may be owing partly to the fact that the leading battle-cruisers drew the enemy's fire, thus relieving the battleships. Only the three leading ships, "KÖNIG", "GROSSER KURFÜRST" and "MARKGRAF" received several hits; while among all the other ships, the "KAISER", "HELGOLAND" and the "SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN" received one hit each, and the rest were not hit at all.<br />
<br />
Simultaneously with the battle-cruisers, which were ahead and pressing forward in quarter-line formation, the 6th and 9th Flotillas, left by the "REGENSBURG", also proceeded to a torpedo attack. Regarding this cruiser advance, the Commanding Officer of the "SEYDLITZ" told me that he was in such a position that he was able to avoid the British salvoes, for he altered course towards the point where each salvo fell and thus evaded the spotting correction.<br />
<br />
This torpedo attack was carried out with great determination and seems to have been completely successful, although nobody is able to state how many hits were obtained. The British ships overlapped somewhat and their line was almost unbroken, and, as about 100 torpedoes were fired, it is estimates that there must have been a considerable number of hits, some people affirm that there were 20, but I do not place much confidence in these figures and it is useless to trouble about them as nobody is certain.<br />
<br />
The boats were fired on by guns of all calibres, even the heaviest, but with little effect, only one boat being destroyed; two other boats had been sunk in an earlier attack during the cruiser action.<br />
<br />
The battle-cruisers were also attacked by British torpedoes, the "SEYDLITZ" being hit once. The "MOLTKE" was lucky, for, when close to the ship, one torpedo apparently had a gyro failure and ran parallel with her. The "LÜTZOW" was probably hit also.<br />
<br />
After the attack, the destroyers laid fog and a heavy smoke screen, which interposed between the Fleet; this benefitted not only the heavily-damaged "LÜTZOW" and "DERFFLINGER", whose nets had been shot away and were hanging down, but also the whole Fleet. It may also have made an impression on the British.<br />
<br />
The German Main Fleet and cruisers turned on a westerly course, fire having again entirely ceased; and the ships of the Main Fleet then turned gradually in succession and in inverse sequence from W. to S.W., subsequently steering towards Horns Reef.<br />
<br />
It is not known what the British did; all that is certain, is that they did not follow in pursuit and that nothing further was seen of their Main Fleet. It remained light until 11 p.m. (summer time), and it would not have been impossible, considering their superior speed, for them to have come within firing range. The Germans expected it too, and now have to content themselves with surmises about the British Commander-in-Chief's reasons for not doing so. It is probably that the unfavourable issue of the fleet part of the battle and the demoralising losses in ships took away any desire on Jellicoe's part for further fighting. His Fleet may have lost heavily and been severely shaken by the torpedo attack; and, as the Germans still had some intact flotillas at their disposal, he may have feared further strong torpedo attacks in the critical hours of twilight, for in the German Navy they say that Jellicoe fears their destroyers in particular.<br />
<br />
Nevertheless, the Germans were not under the impression of having shaken the British Fleet to the extent of obliging them to give up the struggle, and when the evening passed without further incident, they reckoned with certainty on encountering Jellicoe off Horns Reef at daybreak. They were the more astonished at his non-appearance when their air reconnaissance reported that on the morning of 1 June a squadron of 12 battle-ships was proceeding North from the southern part of North Sea and that it suddenly turned on to an opposite course and proceeded South.<br />
<br />
As it could not possibly have been the intention of the British Commander-in-Chief to let the German Fleet escape after having encountered it at last far from its base, and as he still had an intact battle-squadron at his disposal, one is compelled to take the view that he no longer felt strong enough for a second encounter; the achievement of the German Fleet must therefore be very highly thought of.<br />
<br />
During the night cruising following the action, numerous small episodes and minor engagements took place, of which no clear idea can be formed. <br />
<br />
In view of a possible fresh attack or of a possible pursuit on the part of the enemy, it was thought undesirable to leave the 2nd Battle Squadron either in the van or in the rear, it therefore took station to starboard and at first proceeded on an opening course from the other squadrons, and continued fairly independently during the night.<br />
<br />
The 1st Battle Squadron therefore led, with the "WESTFALEN" as guide, and it was followed by the 3rd Battle Squadron.<br />
<br />
After the action had been broken off, the 4 remaining battle cruisers were ahead to port, where they were suddenly again brought under heavy fire from the port side and from ahead, apparently by 3 or 4 battle cruisers. It is presumed that these were the remaining 3 or 4 older cruisers of the "Invincible" class, which Jellicoe probably always stationed ahead of the Main Fleet, for it would hardly have been possible for the "Lions", which were following in the rear in the British line, to have taken station ahead so quickly. The German battle cruisers, all severely damaged, did not feel able to withstand this fire and turned away to starboard, passing ahead of the Main Fleet and between it and the 2nd Battle Squadron, which proceeded quietly on their course and before which the mysterious ships retired, not to be sighted again.<br />
<br />
The battle-cruisers then gradually fell astern, and as they were making much water, and also owing to their differing speeds, they lost contact with the Main Fleet and with each other.<br />
<br />
The "LÜTZOW" had dropped out during the engagement and proceeded independently, accompanied by 4 destroyers. At first she was able to steam 14 knots, but her speed decreased rapidly and dropped finally to 4 knots. Her bows sank slowly, and when the whole forecastle was under water the Commanding Officer decided to leave the ship. The badly wounded were transferred carefully to the boats and the disembarkation was conducted in good order. A torpedo was then fired at the ship and this coup de grace sank her in deep water at about 1 o'clock, I believe.<br />
<br />
The "SEYDLITZ" was hardly in a better condition than the "LÜTZOW"; she also sank gradually by the bows till the water was almost level with the deck, and she had a heavy list to port, but she continued on her course. In the darkest hours of the night she suddenly sighted 3 large ships to port, quite close to. She turned away, made a British recognition signal and was not pursued. As bad luck would have it, the steaming light had short-circuited, could not be switched off and showed intermittently.<br />
<br />
The "DERFFLINGER", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN" followed the Main Fleet more or less and met with no particular experiences.<br />
<br />
The Main Fleet had to repulse a series of destroyer attacks and was also engaged by cruisers. The movements of these British cruisers, which came up singly, are incomprehensible and give the impression of having lost their heads. They appear to have received the order, judging by an intercepted W/T message, to proceed on a northerly and north-westerly course, and thereby they ran into the extended German line which they probably imagined they had passed to the South.<br />
<br />
One large cruiser (?"WARRIOR") proceeded unsuspectingly within 875 yds. of the line of battleships and came under concentrated fire from several ships before she could reply, so that she blew up enveloped in flames and disappeared in 47 seconds. The "BIRMINGHAM" seems to have been accounted for in a similar manner. The destroyers all approached in a really insane manner; frequently not from ahead but from a direction astern, scattered, singly or in pairs, or at most 3 together, never in large numbers. Most of them were disabled forthwith by a few salvoes and set on fire. The "WESTFALEN" distinguished herself particularly at this time.<br />
<br />
These burning destroyers strewn along the course, lit it up as if for a festival. Evidently the fires were largely due to the light American and Mexican oils; at any rate German firing trials on oil bunkers never caused any such conflagrations.<br />
<br />
The attacking boats directed shrapnel fire on the searchlights with fairly good results, the searchlights of two battleships and one light cruiser being hit.<br />
<br />
One large destroyer, which only recognised the danger at the last moment and endeavoured to avoid it by altering course was rammed by the "NASSAU", which put her helm over for this purpose. The boat exploded internally and sank.<br />
<br />
The only ships hit were the "POMMERN" in the 2ns Battle Squadron, and the "ROSTOCK". The "POMMERN" blew up at once and nobody was saved. The "ROSTOCK" was just passing between ships of the Main Fleet when she was hit; the loss of life on board was small.<br />
<br />
The Germans believe they destroyed 11 British destroyers in all. The manner in which these destroyers were handled has not left a good impression on the whole, and one has certainly lost respect for this weapon. The view is also taken that the boats are too large and offer too wide a target.<br />
<br />
The light cruiser "ELBING", like the "ROSTOCK", apparently wanted to break through the line from port to starboard under pressure from the British cruisers; she was, however, rammed by the "POSEN" and had to be abandoned in a sinking condition. The Germans also fired a torpedo into her.<br />
<br />
The "FRAUENLOB" and 2 destroyers were lost during the night; no details of their loss are known.<br />
<br />
Not far from Heligoland, the "OSTFRIESLAND", 7th of the line, struck a mine. This brings the account of the chief events of this exciting cruiser to an end.<br />
<br />
The German flotillas were detached from the Fleet to clear the area off the Jutland Coast, which was divided up into sectors. The flotillas stationed furthest to the North proceeded to the Skagerrak and through these straits into the Baltic and to Kiel.<br />
<br />
None of the flotillas sighted the British Main Fleet again, which proves that it must have turned away to the N. or N.W. immediately after the action. According to confidential reports the Fleet entered British ports as early as 1 June.<br />
<br />
Two British battleships, in a severely damaged condition and accompanied by destroyers, were sighted proceeding back to England. One was attacked by a submarine, but without success.<br />
<br />
On the morning of 1 June, in fairly misty weather, a Zeppelin sighted groups of British ships leaving the Channel on a N.E.'ly course. The reports were rather vague, as sometimes 6 and sometimes 12 ships were mentioned; but it seems most likely that 12 battleships and 3 cruisers were in question, and that they soon retired. The airship, which flew low at one time to get a clearer view, was also fired on.<br />
<br />
Some of the ships are said to have had tripod masts.<br />
<br />
The German Fleet, with the exception of "SEYDLITZ", reached the Jade in the afternoon. The "SEYDLITZ" could not cross the bar on account of being so much down by the bows, and it was not till the next day at high water that she was towed in, stern first.<br />
<br />
<center><u>MISCELLANEOUS.<br>TACTICS.</u></center><br />
<br />
The Germans ascribe their success to various causes, and in the first place to their own superiority as regards tactics. This is a point which every officer discusses, and it is constantly repeated that it all happened just as in tactical manoeuvres and in "battle exercises", and that things could not have gone better.<br />
<br />
Movements of squadrons, divisions and individual ships, "turns together" and alterations of course and speed, all went like clockwork and demonstrated the very great mobility of all formations.<br />
<br />
The W/T signalling system of the Main Fleet never failed, and its failure would have been immaterial, as the primary and secondary flag action signals, showing from several positions in the ship, were made simultaneously.<br />
<br />
All this was due to the peace training and the practical experience of the Flag Officers and Captains. Though in peace time the Commander-in-Chief had never commanded a Fleet, nor the Admirals a squadron, still the training carried out on the same lines for a number of years resulted in everything proceeding with the expected precision.<br />
<br />
The British, on the contrary, are said to have displayed a certain clumsiness as regards tactics and to have preferred turning together when "turning on to an opposite course" (Wendungen im Gegenmarsch), though this conclusion does not seem altogether justified from the description of the action.<br />
<br />
The ships kept station 547 yds. apart, and Vice-Admiral Schmidt told me that, in his opinion, this distance is too small for large ships and that he prefers 656 yds., as the shorter distances result in the ships getting bunched and overlapping during alterations of course. In order to relieve this during the first turn to starboard, the Fleet Flagship herself turned to port and then closed gradually into line. At night the distance was 656 yds.<br />
<br />
No interruption of W/T communication was occasioned by the enemy.<br />
<br />
<center><u>GUNNERY</u></center><br />
<br />
It is admitted that the British are superior as regards their gunnery technique. Their salvoes fall most astoundingly close together and aroused admiration on all sides. Some people affirm that they fell too close together, and that it was consequently difficult to cover a sufficiently large danger space.<br />
<br />
This is particularly the case with the heaviest calibres: 13.5-in. and 15-in. and the battle-cruisers' fire was noticeably inferior to that of the "Queen Elizabeth" class, for example.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> Literal translation; the meaning is not clear. - Tr.] The spread of the salvoes frequently only covered a few square yards. In the "KÖNIG" 3 rounds, out of a salvo of 4 rounds, hit between the capstan and the bridge.<br />
<br />
This is attributed to careful calibration, which the British have studied for a long time and which, as is well known, was abandoned by the German Navy after a few trials. The gunnery officers declare unanimously that it must unquestionably be re-introduced.<br />
<br />
The British range-finders are superior to the German, and the construction of their turrets enables them to shoot at ranges impossible for German guns. The question of range appears to be immaterial to the British, who fire at any range so long as visibility permits.<br />
<br />
The Germans are fully convinced of the great superiority of 15-in. guns over all others, and deplore the fact that, owing to the predominant conservative tendencies in the German Navy, this calibre was not introduced until so lately. Vice-Admiral Gerdes, the Head of the Armament Department, is responsible for this, for he always opposed it on the ground that the poor visibility in German waters and the consequent short ranges rendered an increase of calibre useless; he considered the German 12-in. gun to be an altogether superior weapon, capable of competing with every other.<br />
<br />
In one respect the British seem behindhand as compared with the Germans: namely that they cannot alter range quickly enough and they are too dependent on the range clock. The British rely on steady fire at long range, and they adapt their tactics to this and avoid alterations of course and range most assiduously.<br />
<br />
The Germans, on the contrary, in their firing practices always work with big and rapid alterations of range and exercise firing while turning, so that the gunnery officers consider they have an advantage in this respect.<br />
<br />
The Turn on to an opposite course was certainly not advantageous for the German Fleet, but in this particular instance it made little difference, as the German ships were already unable to find a target; besides which, it must have disconcerted the British and it prevented them from obtaining good results with their fire. The salvoes fell very close together round the ships, but few hits were obtained. The rate of fire in the British ships is said to have been fair, but not excessive. Some people affirm that it was very modest.<br />
<br />
The British shell had great penetrating power, and from all reasonable distances the main armour was generally pierced clean through. The shell splinters picked up prove conclusively that at least 2 kinds of shell were used, differing considerably in material and quality. One kind of shell had a very thick wall and an extremely small explosive charge, it might almost be called a solid shot. It seems to have broken up frequently without exploding and the fuse did not function. Its explosive power, if it possessed any at all, was quite inconsiderable, and it is presumed that the explosives used was not high explosive.<br />
<br />
It appears from the splinters of these 15-in. shell that the wall was 6.3 - 6.7 ins. (16 - 17 cm.), so that the hollow space cannot measure more than 2.4 ins. - 1.8 ins. (4 - 6 cm.). It is true that the large pieces into which these shell broke pierced everything in their course and often went right through the whole ship, unless they struck an armoured part. Several intact heads were found, with and without caps, and also entire bases.<br />
<br />
The second kind of shell had considerably thinner walls, only about half as thick, but it also often broke up into quite large pieces and displayed no great explosive power, and little or no incendiary power.<br />
<br />
It appears therefore that the British aimed only at attaining penetrating power, and the Germans are of opinion that they do not possess (rohrsicheren)* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D.Note.- This appears to be a special fuse which is very delicate, but safe until it has left the gun.] fuses for high explosive shell; this was their opinion before the war also.<br />
<br />
They believe that the high explosive power of the German ammunition gives them a great advantage which may partly counterbalance the smaller calibre of their guns and perhaps also their inferior gunnery. In any case, the effect of the German shell at the point of impact was very considerable.<br />
<br />
The fact that the ships blew up must be attributed to explosions in their magazines. (In this connection one may recall a turret of the "SEYDLITZ" being hit in the action of 24 January, 1915; see my report No.47 ex 15). The turret armour must have been pierced and the shells in the turret must have been exploded. The British have no metal cartridge-cases and also no cartridge-holders such as the Germans have, but they keep their cartridges in locked boxes which are perhaps not flash-proof enough. It seems therefore, from the incident experienced by the "SEYDLITZ", that this must constitute a particular danger to British ships. In this last action also turrets in German ships were frequently hit; further details are given in the account of damage sustained.<br />
<br />
After having compared the hits received in the German ships with the observations of results on enemy targets, it may be safely affirmed that the explosive power of the German shells exceeds that of the British; this was already known after the action of 24 January 1915. The Germans are therefore very much annoyed that they had no 15-in. guns to fire, as they are persuaded that ships so knocked about (eingedeckte) as, for example, the "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" would have been completely destroyed by German shell.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. Note.- The writer appears to mean that if German 15-in. shell had been used against "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" these ships would have been sunk.]<br />
<br />
It may be noted here that the "BAYERN", the first of their ships to carry 15-in. guns, will not join the Fleet for another few days, and the "BADEN" not until the autumn.<br />
<br />
Medium armament played no part, only a few hits were obtained and they did little damage.<br />
<br />
The British fired part-salvoes, like the Germans; full salvoes may have been fired now and again.<br />
<br />
The method of repulsing destroyer attacks, which has previously been reported, namely the 'turning away' and firing on one, or at most two boats, proved to be sound, and the repulsing of attacks both by day and night offered no difficulties.<br />
<br />
As regards gunnery, it may also be mentioned that the fire-control apparatus worked without a hitch and withstood the heaviest shocks. The elevation pointers worked admirably. A few ships were not yet fitted with them.<br />
<br />
<center><u>Torpedo.</u></center><br />
<br />
As regards torpedo work the Germans consider themselves very much superior. There were prolonged discussions about depriving Flotilla Leaders of their independence and putting them under the orders of a Leader Ship, but they are now convinced that this is necessary to ensure the flotillas attacking at the right moment and all together.<br />
<br />
The flotillas were led by the 2 leader Ships "ROSTOCK" and "REGENSBURG", the first having 2 flotillas and the second 3 flotillas allocated to them. The remaining 2 flotillas accompanied the Main Fleet or the battle-cruisers. The leaders carried out their duties with great daring and circumspection. The attacks of the British were weak and scattered, and could therefore have little or only occasional success.<br />
<br />
The German 2nd Flotilla, composed of the larger 1500 ton boats were held back instead of being sent to attack. Although these boats are spoken of very highly and are indispensable for certain enterprises, the view is now taken that they are too large and too valuable to be used for attacking during an action. This Flotilla proceeded to Zeebrugge immediately after the action and arrived there safely. It is to be employed in preventing the British from blockading the harbour with nets, and thus make it impossible for the German submarines to proceed out.<br />
<br />
As far as I have heard, the "MOLTKE" alone of the larger ships fired 4 torpedoes.<br />
<br />
Submarines were not in evidence. No German submarines were present; on the other hand a German destroyer claims to have rammed a British submarine. This claim appears to be erroneous, at least it was declared to be nonsense by the Chief of Staff. The submarines failed as regards scouting and also doing the pursuit.<br />
<br />
Some people state that a British aeroplane was sighted to the northward, and that it had apparently risen from a cruiser. It played no part in the action.<br />
<br />
The use of "Höschter"* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. note:- Probably the name of the inventor.] fog seems to have been of good service, it and the smoke made by the destroyers having completely masked the Main Fleet and its movements at critical moments.<br />
<br />
<center><u>SPEED</u></center><br />
<br />
The advantage of speed lay entirely with the British, not only as regards the Main Fleet on account of the "Deutschland" class, but also as regards the battle-cruisers. The latter are said to have proved considerably faster than the German battle cruisers, an unpleasant experience which had already been made on 25 January 1915. This alone proves that the British are talking nonsense when they assert that the German Fleet sought safety in flight; on the contrary, it was far from its bases and entirely in the power of the British, who either did not wish to take advantage of their superior speed, or were unable to do so on account of the damage sustained. The visibility was no worse than it had been during the day and Jellicoe may have even welcomed the "Höschter" fog which would enable him to plead bad visibility as a reason for abandoning the pursuit. On the German side in the light of experience the factor of speed in the battleships is considered very important. But the moderate depths of the German harbours limits the draught of the ships, and make it particularly difficult for German builders to do much in this respect. In spite of greater length and higher horse power the most modern cruisers "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ" and "LÜTZOW" attained only a quite inconsiderable increase of speed in comparison with the older "GOEBEN" class, and proved a disappointment in this particular.<br />
<br />
The question whether the older battleships should take part in an important engagement was not easy to decide. The 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons composed of the "WITTLESBACH" and "BARBAROSSA" class, re-commissioned at the beginning of the war, were intended to be used in such actions, but have long since been paid off; some have been disarmed and employed as guardships and instructional ships, etc. It was considered however, that the 2nd Battle Squadron, composed of the most modern of the older ships, would be of some service in the action; but this squadron was in a privileged position, inasmuch as it was merely attached to the 1st and 3rd Battle Squadrons and its Admiral was allowed to operate independently and select the position he thought best. On this occasion it kept station quite well and did not prove a hindrance, but, on the other hand, it did not come under any heavy fire. This must be considered very fortunate, for, in view of the damage sustained by other ships and in view of the fact that the British shell pierced all armour above or below water even at the longest range, it is certain that every ship of this class would have been sunk by a few hits, as their internal sub-division is not proof against large inrushes of water.<br />
<br />
The loss of the "Pommern", which gives the British an opportunity for a hollow triumph, also teaches a clear lesson. The Chief of Staff told me that they will probably consider carefully before again exposing this Squadron to danger; therefore this action will have further confirmed the complete worthlessness of all Dreadnought types [sic] and will condemn them as old iron.<br />
<br />
<center><u>TORPEDO NETS.</u></center><br />
<br />
The torpedo nets of the battle cruisers are all badly damaged and the gear so knocked about by gunfire that they were almost useless. This was particularly the case with the "Derfflinger", where the after port nets were hanging in the water, and would have fallen across the propeller had they not chanced to remain held up by a temporary lashing. The ship was obliged to stop during the action to secure the nets, and they might easily have occasioned the loss of the ship.<br />
<br />
For this reason all the nets, together with the booms, were unshipped immediately after the ships' return, to everybody's satisfaction. They will not be carried any more, except perhaps for operations in the Baltic, where the ships may be obliged to anchor at sea.<br />
<br />
<center><u>LEAK-STOPPING SERVICE.</u></center><br />
<br />
The leak-stopping service which had been systematically developed, worked admirably and the Germans are convinced that they owe much to it. They believed that the "Seydlitz" could not have been brought in if the strengthening of the bulkheads, etc., had not been so thoroughly exercised and if the personnel had not been so well trained.<br />
<br />
It is also said, that in the "Lutzow", which had only been in commission for 2 months, was naturally not up to the mark in this respect, and that it is not impossible that small shortcomings, for which of course nobody can be blamed, were responsible for the ship sinking. The "Lutzow" was an unfortunate ship altogether. First her turbines collapsed, thus delaying her commissioning for 6 months, then she immediately struck a mine, and she was hardly out of dockyard hands before she was sunk.<br />
<br />
<center><u>DANGER FROM GAS FUMES.</u></center><br />
<br />
Only 2 days before sailing, a large number of the ships, and fortunately exactly those that came most under fire, namely battle-cruisers and the 3rd Squadron, were supplied with gas masks fitted with alkali cartridges for the whole crew and a plentiful reserve (in the "Seydlitz" 1500 masks for about 1200 men). The masks are similar to those used in the army for poisonous gases. Each man carries a mask slung round him, if he is not actually wearing it.<br />
<br />
I was told emphatically by all the officers, that, in their experience, these masks are absolutely necessary and not only saved many lives but enabled the men to carry on in parts of the ship which they would otherwise have been compelled to leave.<br />
<br />
The gases from shells, mines and torpedoes penetrate in an incredible manner through ventilators, telephone leads, etc. to compartments far away from the point of impact. In many cases the masks enabled large numbers of the guns' crews to escape from turrets that were hit, and to help out others who were badly wounded. In one case the men in one of the main engine rooms were able to remain at their posts after gas had penetrated, until the engine-room was ventilated.<br />
<br />
The Fleet breathing apparatus (Flottenathmer) is preferable to masks in some cases, but it cannot be supplied to everyone and it hampers one's movements, which the masks do not.<br />
<br />
On account of the great danger from gases, it is also advisable to fit hinged flaps in all shafts, and to have wooden bungs to fit the voice-pipes, keeping a hammer at hand to hammer them into the mouth-pieces.<br />
<br />
They tell me that it proved very useful to keep all the personnel employed below, such as in central control rooms, engine-rooms, torpedo flats, etc. continually informed of what was going on. The men get nervous, particularly at first, with the tremendous shocks caused by shell falling close to the ship, though the shocks are felt less on deck, and such information gives them confidence and they like knowing what is going on above them.<br />
<br />
<center><u>DAMAGE</u></center><br />
<br />
The distribution of ships needing repair in the various dockyards is as follows:-<br />
<br />
The "König" proceeded at once to Kiel and is under repair at Howaldt's yard. I did not see her.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" and "Moltke" in Blohm and Voss yard, Hamburg, the first in the Imperial Dock.<br />
<br />
The "Kurfürst["] in Vulkan Yard, Hamburg.<br />
<br />
The "Derfflinger" was first docked in Wilhelmshaven and the leaks temporarily stopped, she then proceeded to the Imperial dockyard, Kiel. The "Seydlitz" will now be docked in the large dock at Wilhelmshaven; during my stay the "Seydlitz" was still in the lock.<br />
<br />
The "Von der Tann", "Ostfriesland" and "Helgoland" will be repaired in dry docks in Wilhelmshaven. No other large ships require to be docked.<br />
<br />
"<u>Seydlitz</u>" The number of hits was still uncertain, as the whole forepart of the ship up to the upper deck was still under water, and it is not known what she looks like below water. The ship was brought into the lock with difficulty, and as she is 43 ft. down by the bows, she cannot be taken into harbour. They will not venture to dock the ship inside the lock, and intend first to raise her bows slightly.<br />
<br />
The roof and guns of the fore turret and anchors, cables etc., have already been unshipped, and they now intend to bring caissons alongside and pump out the fore part sufficiently to enable her to enter the harbour.<br />
<br />
The great inrush of water, that flooded more or less the whole fore part of the ship as far as the first boiler-room bulkhead, was caused by a number of hits. Firstly, one of the belt armour plates forward on the port side is missing, having fallen off. Secondly, there are believed to be at least 2 or 3 more hits below water, forward on the port side; for the list and the settling down had already become ominous when the ship was hit at the edge of the upper deck, port side, abreast the bridge; this was followed by an inrush of water in the battery deck, which did a great amount of damage.<br />
<br />
In addition, during the day action, she was hit by a torpedo on the starboard side under the forward 5.9 in. gun, which caused her to settle down still more by the bows. This gun was so much damaged by the shock from underneath as to be disabled.<br />
<br />
Further, there are 4 severe hits in the ship's side (mess deck, port side, forward of the turret), which also demolished the port capstan.<br />
<br />
These shell, or shell splinters, naturally penetrated to the armoured deck, so that the entire fore part of the ship above and below the armoured deck is holed in many places, allowing free passage for the water. The fore part of the ship was struck therefore by at least 8 or 9 shells and one torpedo.<br />
<br />
Apparently the only compartments which are not flooded, are the bow torpedo flats and the central control room. The former is being pumped out continuously, as a great deal of water is flowing in from above. The torpedo control room had to be abandoned, as the forward partition was not watertight. The central control room abaft this was not abandoned, but of its 2 entrances from the starboard and port passages, only the port one can be used, as the starboard one is flooded.<br />
<br />
The gunnery control room is far further aft and was not affected.<br />
<br />
The ship has a list of 7° to port, and as she has now been slightly raised, about 1¾ ft. of her bows are above water; at one time it was up to the level of the deck.<br />
<br />
While under way the forward boiler room bulkhead had to withstand most of the pressure; supports have been built up everywhere, but it leaks in places.<br />
<br />
The other hits of consequences were those in the turrets. The fore starboard turret No.2 received a direct hit on the fore face of the revolving structure. One curved plate was forced out, but fortunately the main effect of the explosion was outward. The right hand gun was disabled by slight damage to the mounting; with this exception the turret remained in action and kept up fire.<br />
<br />
The right hand gun of turret No.3 received a direct hit, which cut out a wide groove along the tube of the gun. The left hand gun continued to fire.<br />
<br />
The barbette of turret No.4 was hit on a level with the rammer, and the armour was pierced clean through. This hit is of special interest, as the "Seydlitz" received a similar hit and at the same level in turret No.5 on 24th January 1915, which caused a fire, disabled both the after turrets and killed all the guns' crews. This last time, however, the damage was slight. There was no ready ammunition in the turret, and only one cartridge was exploded, in contrast to the (6200 Kg.) 13,670 lbs. of powder on Jan.1915. The turret officer and a large number of the gun's crews were saved by their gas masks. The destruction caused by splinters was, however, considerable and the turret was abandoned, as it was not possible to continue fire from it. This was a 13.5 in. shell, at 15,310 yds. range, strength of armour pierced 8.6 inches.<br />
<br />
After the turret had been abandoned, it was hit a second time in the after side of the revolving part, which was pierced; this of course increased the havoc in the interior.<br />
<br />
Turret No.5 was hit in the roof. The shell richochetted, and the roof is slightly dented. Nobody was hurt and the turret continued to fire.<br />
<br />
In the "Seydlitz" therefore, all the turrets were hit, with the exception of the foremost turret, and one was hit twice.<br />
<br />
A further hit pierced the 5.9 in. (150mm.) casemate armour of the aftermost 5.9 in. starboard gun, No.2. The deck was pierced from beneath, and splinters also pierced the splinter bulkhead. The gun was disabled and all the crew were killed, with the exception of the ship's chaplain who happened to be in the casemate and must be watched over by a special guardian angel.<br />
<br />
A similar hit, with a 15 in. shell, struck the casemate armour of the 6-in. gun No.7 and exploded in the casemate. Men were killed, the gun was disabled and the splinter bulkhead pierced by large splinters. This time again, surprise was aroused by the comparatively small damage caused by a large calibre shell.<br />
<br />
"<u>Derfflinger</u>". One shell hit the armour belt forward of the hawse pipe, probably at the junction of 2 plates, as 2 plates broke away. The plates underneath were consequently strained apart and a great deal of water flowed in.<br />
<br />
The armour belt on the port side also received 2 further hits in the centre and was pierced clean through. The splinters penetrated more than half way through the ship, and in one case a piece of plating was driven half way though the ship. These hits, combined perhaps with others, destroyed the nets and their supports in several places.<br />
<br />
The two after turrets received direct hits, in one case on the roof, in the other case in the barbette above the deck; the armour was pierced and the upper portions of the turrets burnt out and severely damaged, but the flames did not penetrate to the magazines. The crew in the upper part of the turret were killed, and both turrets were disabled. This occurred at an early stage of the action.<br />
<br />
The guns at high elevation cannot yet be dismounted, as everything is wedged in, but they do not appear to be damaged.<br />
<br />
The muzzles were carried away off the 4 foremost 6 in. (15 cm.) guns on the port side; two of them probably having been accounted for by one and the same shell which hit the armour. One gun, the muzzle of which was perhaps damaged by a splinter, afterwards burst, the tube splitting open in the shape of a tulip.<br />
<br />
The "Derfflinger" received a few other hits of no particular interest. She appears the next most severely damaged ship after the "Lützow".<br />
<br />
The "<u>Moltke</u>" only received 5 hits, all of them during that part of the action which took place on a southerly course; while the cruisers mentioned above received most of the hits on the port side, consequently during the later stages of the action.<br />
<br />
One shell pieced the bulwarks in the after part of the ship above the armour, passed through the ship and struck the armour on the port side from inside, about 3.3 ft. below the water-line. One plate was forced out and is missing. The inrush of water was considerable. The after compartments, above the armoured deck which remained intact, were all more or less flooded.<br />
<br />
The second hit was further forward, below the armour belt. The shell exploded in a bunker, but the armoured deck held and no water penetrated it from below. The neighbouring bunkers made little water and could be pumped out.<br />
<br />
Another shell struck the 5.9 in. armour in the upper bunker, above the water-line. The armoured deck again held, but the inner wall of the bunker parted, and the battery deck was pierced from below, a 6 in. gun being damaged and disabled.<br />
<br />
In the fore part of the ship a shell struck the armour belt below the water-line. The plate remained intact and was driven in about 8 inches. The compartment was flooded, but the torpedo bulkhead remained watertight. A neighbouring compartment leaked slightly, the rivets having parted.<br />
<br />
The fifth case of damage, namely a plate beneath the armour belt being driven and pressed in, was probably not due to a direct hit, but to splinters of a shell which fell short.<br />
<br />
"<u>Von der Tann</u>". A shell hit and pierced the lower part of the 3.9 in. armour belt in the after part of the ship to starboard. The compartments above the armoured deck, and some of those on the deck above, were flooded. The chief effect of the shell was outside the ship, but it bent the plates below the otherwise undamaged armoured deck, so that a considerable amount of water flowed into the compartments below the armoured deck. The after torpedo flat was flooded half way up, and the men in the starboard steering engine room were shut in for a long time owing to the exits being blocked.<br />
<br />
The fore turret was hit on the starboard side on the upper edge of the barbette and a semi-circular armour plate was forced out. The machinery of the turret was so badly knocked about that the turret was disabled.<br />
<br />
The hydraulic piping was damaged, so that all the heavy armament was put out of action temporarily. Strangely enough, though men were wounded none were killed.<br />
<br />
The aftermost turret was hit in the barbette. The armour was pierced, but the effect of the shell was exterior, the turret sustained little internal damage, so that the handgear of the turret remained in action. The turret was wedged in one place and could not revolve; they succeeded, however, in cutting off with oxy-acetylene the piece of revolving part which was jammed against the inner side of the barbette thus getting rid of the obstruction.<br />
<br />
Outside the turret, the shell did considerable damage; some splinters striking downwards, bent the armoured deck and pierced it in places. As far as I know, the armoured deck sustained no further damage, and this was of little importance.<br />
<br />
The after conning-tower was hit and a piece of the armour torn away; the occupants, including the 3rd gunnery officer, were killed. Splinters struck downwards to the engine-room ventilation hatches, but were stopped by the armoured gratings.<br />
<br />
"<u>Ostfriesland"</u> was struck by a mine below the foremost port turret. The whole measures 197 ft.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. note:- Literal translation is 12 times 5 metres large.] The torpedo bulkhead is only slightly torn, and the inrush of water was only local.<br />
<br />
"<u>Helgoland</u>". A 13.5 in. shell hit the 7.9 in. armour belt forward on the port side and pierced it. The shell appears to have broken only as no explosive action can be traced. The range was about 14,217 yds.<br />
<br />
"<u>Nassau</u>" rammed a British destroyer, or rather, the destroyer ran into her forward on the port side. Her bows must have lifted right up, for her hawse-pipe remained on board the "Nassau", so firmly wedged into the side of the upper deck that it will have to be cut out. The "Nassau's" side below the deck is torn away for 33 ft. The destroyer then glanced off the "Nassau's" side and exploded internally. One of the crew remained behind in one of the nets, but fell into the water when the "Nassau" fired a salvo.<br />
<br />
The "Nassau" was hit by shrapnel from attacking destroyers in the foremost searchlight group, both port searchlights were put out of action. The searchlight control and electric cables were destroyed and many of the searchlight crews were killed. The after searchlight group was hit in a similar manner, and one of the searchlights was disabled.<br />
<br />
The "Rhineland" and a light cruiser were also hit in a similar manner.<br />
<br />
I have seen all the above mentioned ships in Wilhelmshaven.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" and "Kurfürst" were at Hamburg, but unfortunately I am unable to report much about them. They had already been under repair for several days, and the damage was to some extent made good. Besides this, the conditions were not favourable for undisturbed examination: commissioners from the Imperial Navy Office were on board, besides crowds of workmen, the noise was deafening and it was pouring with rain. Consequently I took no notes on the spot and relied on my memory, which however fails me now among the very many received of similar cases. I am therefore unable to report each hit with accuracy.<br />
<br />
This is immaterial, however, as there were no particularly interesting hits, and none of the ships had been hit in the turrets. The armour had been pierced in several places, the effect and character of the hits being similar in all cases; the hits on unarmoured parts were of little consequence.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" was hit aft on the port side of the water line just on a junction of two plates, a piece of equal size being torn away from each plate. The shell then struck the sloping part of the armoured deck and the splinters ricochetted and passed right through the ship. These plates have already been removed.<br />
<br />
A casemate was pierced and the gun disabled.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" is the only ship whose mast was hit, the mast remained standing and has now been removed.<br />
<br />
The spotting platform had to be abandoned, as communications with the conning tower was cut off. This was the only hit received in a conning tower; it only grazed the upper edge and glanced off, and the men inside hardly noticed it.<br />
<br />
The port engine was disabled, not in consequence of damage to the turbine which is in good condition, but owing to one of the main propeller bearings becoming overheated. The cause of this is not clear, but it is believed to be due to concussions. The ship was well able to keep station with her two remaining engines.<br />
<br />
The "<u>Kurfürst</u>" suffered especially from a great inrush of water forward on the port side, above the armoured deck; it was caused by a hit in the armour belt. No further damage of importance was sustained.<br />
<br />
With regard to time necessary for repair to these ships, it is not yet possible to say anything definite, as it is still undecided whether they shall undergo thorough repair or not. The chief difficulty is the manufacture of new armour plates; but some of the holed plates can, no doubt, be left in position for the present.<br />
<br />
A considerable time will be needed to repair some of the turrets of the battle-cruisers, but here too, they will contrive to get things done. For instance, the "Von der Tann" is to have an entire turret out of a ship of the "Nassau" class, probably the foremost turret, and this ship will be left without a turret for some time. They talk a great deal also of transferring guns, and they will perhaps make use of those intended for the "Hindenburg", which will not be completed will the late autumn.<br />
<br />
It may be presumed that the battleships will be ready for sea in 4-6 weeks, and the battle-cruisers, particularly the "Seydlitz", in not less than 4 months. Naturally work is going on day and night, and repairs are given priority over all new construction.<br />
<br />
The damage sustained by light cruisers and destroyers is inconsiderable. The "Hamburg" had a funnel shot away. As these ships seem to be of minor importance, I did not trouble further about them.<br />
<br />
As our Allies appear not to have the intention of communicating to us what effect the examination of damages sustained will have on their construction in the future, we must endeavour to ascertain this as time goes on by means of cross questioning and by studying their new constructions in detail. I do not feel called upon to draw premature and rash conclusions to-day, on the strength of impressions received, but this will not prevent me from giving a summary of my opinion and of the opinions expresses in my hearing.<br />
<br />
Firstly, it is a remarkable fact that in all the ships that have returned home, all the engine and boiler-rooms are undamaged; the "Lützow" is no exception to this, as she proceeded under her own steam until late in the night after the action. I have also been assured by the Imperial Navy Office, after an inspection carried out by the Chief Engineer, that not a single auxiliary engine was defective. The only boiler-room put out of action was the foremost one in the "Seydlitz" where the bulkhead gave a little, allowing water to penetrate through rivet holes and cracks when the ship was under way. The conclusion may therefore be drawn that these vital parts of the ship are sufficiently protected and that the armour belt of the usual German thicknesses, though it cannot stop the shells, at least fulfils its purpose by breaking them up. Consequently it has become almost impossible even for the largest splinters of 15 in. shell to penetrate through armoured deck or torpedo bulkhead in engine and boiler rooms.<br />
<br />
Even at these long ranges and steep angles there was no question of the armoured decks being pierced; but the fitting of strong gratings over the hatches, which prevented the engines of the "Von der Tann" from sustaining severe damage, appears very necessary.<br />
<br />
The torpedo bulkheads also resisted shells, mines and torpedoes effectually; and in cases where slight damage was sustained, it had no further consequences than the flooding of the compartment affected.<br />
<br />
Perhaps it would be advisable to construct a specially strong boiler-room bulkhead, similar to a torpedo bulkhead, so that it could not be damaged by splinters or water-pressure.<br />
<br />
The inspection of the "Seydlitz" has left me with the impression that the commanding officer of the "Seydlitz" expected rather too much of his ship, and that nothing short of extraordinary good luck enabled her to be brought back. At one time when the whole forepart of the ship was flooded and the bows were under water, he proceeded occasionally with revolutions for 22 knots, just in order to show how seaworthy his ship was, so he told me. This may have been very sporting, or perhaps it may have been necessary under the circumstances in order not to drop too far behind and be overtaken by the enemy, but it certainly was not good seamanship, and if his stokehold bulkhead had burst, the "Seydlitz" would have gone down like the "Lutzow", where the circumstances appear to have been very similar. Later on he decreased speed and finally proceeded stern first.<br />
<br />
I therefore think it not impossible that the loss of the "Lützow", which is said to have been proceeded at 14 knots for a time, was also due only to recklessly high speed, and that the ship might have been saved if she had proceeded stern first or been taken in tow.<br />
<br />
As the danger from water-pressure must always be greatest from ahead, it would certainly be advisable to take special preventative measures against it.<br />
<br />
Vice-Admiral Schmidt told me that, in his opinion, the armoured belt ought to be strongest in the centre, and possible in the afterpart to protect the steering engines, and possibly in the bows, but that it ought not to taper off gradually from the centre to the extremities. He was also entirely in favour of a protected upper deck forming a second armoured deck.<br />
<br />
The admirably thorough system of internal division in the German ships and the floating capability thus attained is the finest proof of the merit of German construction which pursued this aim, and it shows that Admiral von Tirpitz, the creator of the Battle Fleet of to-day, was right when he upheld the principle that, above all things, the ships must be capable of remaining afloat and must not sink or heel over, and that everything else is of secondary consideration.<br />
<br />
The large number of hits in the turrets is remarkable, and it is generally considered that the turret armour should be appreciably stronger, especially in the lower part of the barbettes; for it is not only the disablement of the guns that comes into question, serious though this might be, but also the blowing up of magazines and the total destruction of the ship, as the wide shaft down to the magazines cannot possibly be made completely flash-proof. This is the most vital part of the ship. It is only owing to the small explosive charges in British shells, that there were no explosions of magazines in the German ships.<br />
<br />
Everything possible had been done after the action of 24.1.15 to ensure protection against this danger; the ready ammunition was removed from the top of the hoists and wherever possible all the openings in shafts leading down below were fitted with flaps, covers and heavy asbestos mats, while German ammunition is particularly carefully stowed and packed in cases with screwed-on covers.<br />
<br />
The disasters on the British side are a proof that this is a question of the greatest importance. It must also be taken into consideration that while any other damage turret may take months.<br />
<br />
The numerous hits in turrets would appear to justify the opinion of those who decided against triple turrets, on the ground [sic] that if one was disabled it would put too many heavy guns out of action.<br />
<br />
A hit in a casemate will of course destroy it and disable the gun, but this is of little consequence. Care must be taken here also not to have any ready ammunition, and to close the ammunition hand-up hermetically with heavy asbestos mats at the magazine end also. With the German "Paternoster" (dredger hoist) the ammunition lifts this mat as it comes up and the mat then falls to and closes the opening, which is a practical arrangement.<br />
<br />
Other hits through unarmoured parts, which destroyed more or less small gear and at the first glance give an impression of terrible havoc, are really of no consequence.<br />
<br />
In the "Von der Tann" they wanted to flood a turret magazine. This was impossible, as the flooding valve in the battery, or between deck was piled up with debris, cabin fittings, etc., and was inaccessible. Fortunately the flooding of the magazine turned out to be unnecessary. The Executive Officer remarked to me how critical such a trivial matter might become, and that one could not be careful enough about choosing the positions for the flooding valves, which must be kept clear of easily destructible objects.<br />
<br />
The man-hole covers in the decks, coal shoots [chutes], etc., were pointed out to me as dangerous, as they may be burst open by pressure of gas from below, thus causing damage and giving passage to the gases. These covers should be secured in a different manner and much more firmly.<br />
<br />
The flooding and draining system worked admirably, and is hardly capable of improvement. The only disadvantage is that the compartments above the armoured deck have no draining arrangements. This should be provided. A list, consequent on an inrush of water, could always be corrected by flooding an opposite compartment. This is an important matter both as affecting gunnery and personnel.<br />
<br />
The searchlights, which were not taken down in the German ships, all came out of the action undamaged; anxiety on their account was therefore unfounded. It was very unpleasant when attacking boats fired on the searchlights, and it is therefore considered necessary to fit light armour protection on the masts for the crews of the searchlight control and electric cables.<br />
<br />
Damage from flames is nowhere visible. The Germans are now rather amused at the care with which interior partitions were scraped.<br />
<br />
I could not help comparing the German ships with the Russian battleship "Orel", which I saw in Madzurn after the battle of Tsushima. If I remember rightly, the "Orel" had 5 severe hits and 40 hits with medium-calibre shell.<br />
<br />
The enormous explosive power of the Shimosa shell, which breaks up into minute splinters, did not do the slightest damage to the vital parts of the ship, but the upper deck was transformed into a confused heap of ruins. Superstructure, bridges, masts, funnels, etc., were destroyed, guns dismounted and fires started.<br />
<br />
Nothing of the kind is to be seen in the German ships, outwardly only a few more or less clean shell holes are visible, and they look so orderly and so little damaged that they do not appear to have gone through an action.<br />
<br />
It is true that the upper decks are said to have been littered with countless splinters, but they flew on to the decks from shells which struck the water, the ship receiving violent shocks.<br />
<br />
The holes in the armour show the characteristic concentric cracks round the hole and the radial splashes, the latter proving that the shells exploded on impact or at the latest, as they passed through. In many cases, as already noted, the force of the explosion was external and only pieces of plate, and possibly the head of the shell were driven in.<br />
<br />
<center><u>FLAG OFFICERS OF THE FLEET AND LEADERS</u></center><br />
<br />
{|<br />
| Commander-in-Chief:<br />
| Vice Admiral Scheer<br />
|-<br />
| <u>I Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Vice Admiral Schmidt<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Engelhard<br />
|-<br />
| <u>II Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Mauve<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Baron von Dalwigh<br />
|-<br />
| <u>III Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Behncke<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Nordmann<br />
|-<br />
| Officer commanding the Scouting Forces and<br>Commanding 1st Scouting Group<br />
| Vice Admiral Hipper<br />
|-<br />
| " 2nd " "<br />
| Rear Admiral Bodicker<br />
|-<br />
| " 4th " "<br />
| Commodore "Captain" v. Reuter<br />
|-<br />
| Leaders of Destroyers<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| in "Rostock"<br />
| Commodore "Captain" Michelsen<br />
|-<br />
| in Regensburg<br />
| Commodore "Captain" Heinrich<br />
|-<br />
| Leader of submarines<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| In Hamburg<br />
| Captain Bauer<br />
|}<br />
<br />
<center><u>REMARKS</u></center><br />
<br />
The lecture on the action, upon which this report is based, was illustrated by a plan prepared in haste for H.M. the Kaiser, and a copy was promised to me. But the Admiral Staff does not wish to part with this first incomplete draft, and the preparation of an accurate plan has not yet been completed, as the Admiral Staff is not yet in possession of all the details.<br />
<br />
In time to be included in this report I have only received the sketch of the first stage of the battle, namely the cruiser action on a southerly course, together with a small sketch of the situation when the action was broken off; both are enclosed.<br />
<br />
I conclude from the sketch of the cruiser action, that the accounts given to me were not quite accurate; for instance, the assertion of the commanding officer of the "Moltke" that the shortest range at that stage was 7,650 yds. and that he had accounted for one of the armoured cruisers with a torpedo.<br />
<br />
The sketch shows that the "Indefatigable" was probably first destroyed by gun fire from the "Von der Tann", and later the "Queen Mary" by gunfire from the "Derfflinger", and that the range was never less than 14,220 yds.<br />
<br />
The loss of "V. 27" and "V. 29" and of 4 British destroyers is also apparent, while I was only told of two.<br />
<br />
In the original sketch, 2 British armoured cruisers are also shown as having fallen out during this stage, but this is not shown on the accompanying sketch and probably took place later.<br />
<br />
I was told by the Admiral Staff that the accompanying sketches are not to be taken as strictly accurate.<br />
<br />
It is requested that the sketches and course of the action and the account of damages may be treated as strictly confidential.<br />
<br />
==Footnotes==<br />
{{reflist}}<br />
<br />
==Bibliography==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
*''Schematismus für das K.u.K. Heer und für die Kriegsmarine für 1914. Separatausgabe''. Wien. 1914.<br />
*''Almanach für die k. und k. Kriegsmarine 1917. Kriegsausgabe''. '''XXXVII'''. Pola. 1917.<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
==External Links==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
*Krámli, Mihály. [http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-124.pdf "The Report on the Battle of Jutland by the Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché in Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Colloredo-Mannsfeld."] ''NavWeaps''.<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
[[Category:Battle of Jutland]]</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Attach%C3%A9_Report_on_the_Battle_of_Jutland&diff=334734Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland2024-03-05T09:10:13Z<p>Simon Harley: Made Changes.</p>
<hr />
<div>Soon after the [[Battle of Jutland]] on 31 May &ndash; 1 June 1916 the Naval Attaché of the [[Austro-Hungarian Navy|Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Navy]] at the embassy in Berlin, ''Fregattenkapitäne'' Hieronymus Graf von Colloredo-Mannsfeld,<ref>''Schematismus für das K.u.K. Heer und für die Kriegsmarine für 1914''. p. 1270. ''Almanach für die k. und k. Kriegsmarine 1917''. p. 668.</ref> visited the High Sea Fleet. He composed a report on the battle for his superiors using first-hand accounts, interspersed here and there with his own observations. The version reproduced here is a translation in English apparently made by the [[Naval Intelligence Division (Royal Navy)|Naval Intelligence Division]] in 1919 from a copy which was subsequently returned to "F.N.A.", presumably the French Naval Attaché. A copy of the translation then made its way into the papers of the British Cabinet, from where historian Arthur J. Marder obtained a copy which is in his papers.<ref>Original number N.I.D. 087/19. Marder papers, Special Collections and Archives, Langson Library, University of California, Irvine, MS-F002, Box 27.</ref> It is worth comparing this translation with the translation made by Mihály Krámli of an original, apparently slightly different, report published on the ''NavWeaps'' online resource.<ref>Krámli, Mihály. [http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-124.pdf "The Report on the Battle of Jutland by the Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché in Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Colloredo-Mannsfeld."] ''NavWeaps''.</ref><br />
<br />
The original grammar and punctuation of the typescript has been reproduced here wherever possible.<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
From:- Austrian Naval Attache in Berlin.<br />
<br />
To:- Commander-in-Chief, Pola.<br />
<div style="float:right;">Berlin,<br>17 June, 1916.</div><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<center><u>NAVAL ENGAGEMENT OF 31 MAY 1916.</u></center><br />
<br />
The following is a report of the naval proceedings of 31 May - 1 June, 1916, and also of the damage sustained by the German Fleet.<br />
<br />
During my 3-days' visit to Wilhelmshaven, followed by a cursory examination of the "MARKGRAF" and "KURFURST" at Hamburg, I endeavoured to gain merely a general idea of the results of gunfire and concentrated my attention on the course of the action itself.<br />
Admiral Scheer, whom I only saw for a short time as he left for Kiel to attend the funeral of his borther-in-law [sic], Lieut.-Commander Mohr, who was killed in the action, very kindly arranged that his Chief of Staff, Captain Trotha, should give me an account of the whole proceedings, illustrated by plans, and that I should be furnished with all information. I have tried to fill in the gaps by conversations with officers whom I know; this has resulted in some contradictory statements, and several points remain obscure, the accounts from the various ships not having all come in.<br />
<br />
Many episodes will therefore be explained later and may appear in a different light, but, as regards the broad outlines which are of chief importance, the picture of this interesting engagement is fairly clear. The accompanying plan of the action was made in haste for the Kaiser and will therefore need much correction.<br />
<br />
The spirit pervading the Fleet can only be described as one of enthusiasm; they are intoxicated with victory. The heavy load weighing on them all, the dear that this war might end without an encounter of the Fleets, have vanished. They have learnt what fighting really means, they know themselves to be superior to the enemy as regards tactics, and that they were following the right lines and have nothing to unlearn; they know that their gunfire was more effective than that of the enemy, and that they can rely implicitly on their flotillas which have always been looked upon in the German Navy as one of the chief factors in an action. Finally they know that their largest ships can stand heavy fire and serious damage, that they leave nothing to be desired as regards construction and cannot be sunk easily. In short, they feel that the British, in spite of all their boasting, cannot overcome the German Fleet and have a considerable respect for it.<br />
<br />
This conviction imbues the whole Fleet, down to the last man, with confidence in their strength and a calm assurance regarding future encounters. At the same time they are free from over-confidence and from under-estimation of the enemy. On the contrary, the British fire-control and the enormous piercing power of their heavy shell at great distances have roused their admiration, so that a careless conception of the situation is not to be feared, the less so, as well-balanced minds such as those of Admiral Scheer and his Staff are unlikely to be led away by former successes to undertake rash enterprises in the future.<br />
<br />
They do not deny that they were extraordinarily fortunate, and that if the action had been prosecuted with energy on the British side, and if the "Nelson touch" had been in evidence, things might have gone very badly for Germany, especially as the British still had an intact Battle Squadron of 12 units at their disposal which had not yet taken part in the action. But they console themselves with the knowledge that no naval action was ever won without some stroke of luck.<br />
<br />
The Kaiser's visit, the day before my arrival, and his address to the Fleet gave great satisfaction, and subsequently many important personages arrive to inspect the ships, such as Prince Henry and the Grand Dukes of Mecklenburg and Oldenburg, and numbers of decorations were distributed. Vice-Admiral Scheer was promoted to Admiral, and he and Vice-Admiral Hipper received the Pour le Merite.<br />
<br />
I also visited Rear-Admiral Behncke, who was wounded and in hospital; his wounds are slight, a few small splinters in his head, elbow and knee, and he will probably soon be well again.<br />
<br />
<center><u>COURSE OF THE ACTION.</u></center><br />
<br />
The Commander-in-Chief intended to advance with the whole Fleet to the waters of the Skagerrak, in order to make his presence felt unpleasantly by disturbing the shipping, hoping thereby to lure on the British forces and in this manner to be in a position to attack a part of the British Fleet with superior or at least with equal forces. He reckoned that any movements of the British Fleet would be reported to him in good time by the submarines which had been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and he hoped that the airships would prove a better means of reconnoitring than any possessed by the enemy.<br />
<br />
Unfavourable weather prevented him for a considerable period from undertaking any operations, and, as the submarines were to return home on 1 June and be relieved by a new group, the 31 May was the last date for carrying out the planned advance.<br />
<br />
The cruisers left the Jade at 3 a.m., the Main Fleet at 4 a.m., steering an easterly course, and then, after passing Heligoland, a N.N.W'ly course. No reports were received from submarines. These were stationed chiefly off the Orkneys and the Firth of Forth, and the large group of Flanders boats were off the Thames and at the entrance to the Channel. <br />
<br />
While proceeding northwards, a few W/T messages were received, but they were corrupt, appeared to refer only to small formations and gave no clue to the movements of the Grand Fleet. The airships were unable to start in the morning, on account of the wind, and, as it blew hard throughout the day in the Heligoland Bight, they could not start until the early hours of 1 June. In this respect things did not go well, but Admiral Scheer decided nevertheless to continue on his course to the Skagerrak. <br />
<br />
This the account given by Captain von Trotha, who affirms that nothing was known of the presence of the British Fleet in the waters of the Skagerrak, and that there seemed no probability of encountering this Fleet before 1 June.<br />
<br />
There are some points here which I am unable to understand. The submarines are said to have been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and were to return home on 1 June to be relieved probably by a weaker group. For, If the same number of boats were to to keep watch off the English coast, why should 31 May have been the last day for the German Fleet to sail. The day of departure was, therefore, too late in any case, for, if no encounter was to be expected before 1 June, the boats stationed off the coast could not possibly encounter the damaged British ships, as was intended, for probably no damaged ships would be there before 2 June.<br />
<br />
The battleship "KONIG ALBERT" had to carry out repairs to her condensers and did not proceed with the Fleet. Von Trotha told me that there was no alternative and that a ship must carry out small overhauls regularly in a dockyard according to programme. But could it not be arranged, when one is taking the initiative, to choose one's moment for an advance and to have all the ships together for this short time? And why should just that moment be chosen when one of the most powerful ships of the "Kaiser" class is in the dockyard, instead, for instance, of one of the "Nassau" class with 11-in. guns.<br />
<br />
In addition, the "BAYERN" was to have joined up a few days later. After having waited so long, why should not the plan have been postponed for 2 or 3 weeks, instead of dispensing with the only ship carrying 15-in. guns.<br />
<br />
In the same manner they dispensed with air reconnaissance, from which they had expected so much.<br />
<br />
These considerations make me doubt whether the account given me is quite correct, and whether, on the contrary, they knew of certain movements of the British Fleet and considered the moment extremely favourable for an attack. Perhaps they only knew of Beatty's battle squadron, and thinking the Main Fleet was far away, hoped to entrap this squadron. In Berlin, they have much to say, even in military circles, about the British Fleet's intention to push through into the Baltic, and of Kitchener's mission having some connection with this. I consider this senseless, for it cannot be presemed [sic] that the British Fleet would leave their shores unprotected and do the Germans the favour of operating in the Baltic, which would certainly be a most advantageous area for the German Fleet. In any case, there appear to be discrepancies which will probably be explained at some later date.<br />
<br />
Scouting groups, battle cruisers and light cruisers, together with flotillas, preceded the Main Fleet by 50 - 60 miles. At 4 p.m. the light cruisers encountered some British battle cruisers. These at once opened fire on the light cruisers, at an estimated distance of 26,247 yds.; the range could be taken accurately. Though they did not obtain a hit, the salvoes fell so well that the German cruisers thought it advisable to turn away and fall back on their battle cruisers.<br />
<br />
As the British approached, these battle cruisers turned on to a southerly course, in order to lure the enemy on to the German Main Fleet. A running action, on a southerly course, ensued. The British were to starboard and to the west of the Germans, who had therefore the following advantage: in the North Sea, in summer, the western horizon is quite light and visibility towards the west is good, while towards the east, and in a still greater degree off the Jutland Coast, it is misty and visibility is bad and no silhouettes stand out against the eastern horizon. This phenomenon also played great part in the subsequent course of the action. The sun was still high and was not troublesome, and the British ships offered admirable targets. The sea was calm, the wind N.W. 1-2, altering subsequently through W. to S.W.<br />
<br />
The following British ships were recognised:-<br />
3 "Lion" class, 1 "Tiger" and 2 "Indefatigable" class; they were soon reinforced by 5 "Queen Elizabeth" class following astern.<br />
<br />
It is asserted that, judging from shell splinters, the ship of the "Tiger" class carried 15-in. guns, and that she was therefore the mysterious vessel which replaced the "TIGER" sunk on 24.1.15; as the last-named "TIGER" carried only 13.5-in.guns, this was taken as a further proof of her loss. The silhouette of the new "TIGER", however, is said to have resembled that of the old "TIGER" exactly. As the "Queen Elizabeths" soon opened fire also with 15-in. guns, I rather doubt this assertion regarding the "TIGER", and the various ships on this early part of the engagement are altogether somewhat at variance.<br />
<br />
On the German side the ships proceeded in the following sequence:- "LÜTZOW", Flagship of Vice-Admiral Hipper, "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN".<br />
<br />
As Hipper edged towards the enemy, the distance decreased to about 7655 yds. The German fire was unquestionably superior, but the speed of the British vessels was greater. After a short time the "INDEFATIGABLE" and "QUEEN MARY" blew up, and 2 battle-cruisers and two attacking destroyers were also accounted for. The "QUEEN MARY" must have been destroyed by the explosion of a magazine; she was torn in two halves, and a water-colour painted by an officer represents her enveloped in an enormous column of black smoke; she disappeared in a few seconds. Only one cadet was subsequently picked.<br />
<br />
The second battle cruiser disappeared under similar circumstances. The "VON DER TANN" claims to have accounted for one of these battle-cruisers by a broadside. But the "MOLTKE" fired 4 torpedoes and also claims this achievement.<br />
<br />
The Germans suffered very little during this phase of the action, the "MOLTKE" alone receiving hits on the starboard side. The fire of the British battle-cruisers is said not to have been nearly as good as that of the "QUEEN ELIZABETH" class later on.<br />
<br />
When they had approached the German Main Fleet, the British turned on to a contrary course and the German cruisers did the same. The German Main Fleet proceeded in divisions in starboard quarter-line, the 3rd Battle Squadron: 4 "König" class and 3 "Kaiser" class, Fleet Flagship, 1st Battle Squadron: 4 "Ostfriesland" class and 4 "Westfalen" class, and the 2nd Battle Squadron: 5 "Deutschland" class and the "Hessen". They endeavoured to effect a junction with the cruisers, but were unable to take part very effectually.<br />
<br />
The course of the action was now in a northerly direction, over the area which had just been traversed, and the British ships now drew ahead considerably and turned more and more towards the East; the Germans followed this movement, and in consequence the conditions of visibility became less and less favourable for them.<br />
<br />
The "Queen Elizabeths" now made their presence more greatly felt; one of them had dropped out, but I was unable to ascertain when this occurred.<br />
<br />
The course of the German Math Fleet at first led past the 2 disabled British destroyers, which were lying stopped. The crews had already taken to the boats and were picked up later on by German destroyers. As the Main Fleet was doubtful about the advisability of passing the destroyers while they were still afloat, they were sunk by a few broadsides. One of the officers who was picked up was in pyjamas and is said to have stayed in his cabin during the action. He declared "We did not expect so much resistance," while another said - "The battle is rather disappointing." It has been ascertained that these destroyers were greatly under-manned; their crews seemed very exhausted, which points to their having been in the water for a long time.<br />
<br />
While on this easterly course, the light cruisers of the fast 2nd Scouting Group: "FRANKFURT", "PILLAU", "ELBING" and "WIESBADEN", were heavily fired on from the N.E. and E. without their being able to see more than the gun flashes. In addition, they were under continual fire from the N., and while turning away to S.E. and S., they ascertained that they were opposed by an interminable line of British ships, which appeared at first to be on a N.W.'ly course, and had then evidently turned together on to a S.'ly course.<br />
<br />
It may be noted here that the battleships, and, generally speaking, the battle-cruisers also, never sighted the British Main Fleet, and saw nothing but the flashes of the guns and the effects of the fire. These British ships, about 25 in number, were only sighted by a few light cruisers and by the flotillas, and were counted by them as accurately as possible.<br />
<br />
Surrounded thus from the N. and the E. and under fire, the "WIESBADEN" was disabled, apparently by a hit in the engine-room. The Admiral noticed, it is true, that his leading ships must have encountered new and powerful forces and that they were turning away; but he thought it his duty to go to the assistance of the "WIESBADEN" and therefore continued on an easterly course.<br />
<br />
The van of the Main Fleet, led by the "KÖNIG" (Rear-Admiral Behncke) now came under heavy fire from right ahead; the "KÖNIG" turned away under this fire towards the S.E., whereupon the Commander-in-Chief ordered the whole line to "turn together" to starboard and gave up the idea of helping the "WIESBADEN". About this time Vice-Admiral Hipper transferred his flag from the "LÜTZOW" to the "MOLTKE" with the help of a destroyer, his W/T station being damaged.<br />
<br />
Hardly had the Main Fleet drawn away on a westerly course, before it was ascertained that the pressure was relaxing and the fire decreasing, and that the British were no longer pursuing so hotly. Scheer therefore ordered the ships to "turn together" back on to their former course, and made the signal 'R' = 'Engage the enemy'. This second advance may be termed the zenith of the action. Admiral Scheer gave his views on it approximately as follows:- "Those who make a study of this engagement will be very puzzled as to my object in advancing thus against the wall of British ships. The fact is that I had no particular object. I made the first advance because I had a feeling that I ought to endeavour to assist the "WIESBADEN" and because the situation ahead was quite obscure to me, for I saw nothing of the "LÜTZOW" and received no W/T reports. I soon saw, however, that the leading ships were coming under an overwhelming fire, and that I could not risk the Fleet on the "WIESBADEN'S" account. When I noticed that the British pressure had quite ceased and that the Fleet remained intact in my hands, I turned back, under the impression that the action could not end in this way and that I ought to seek contact with the enemy again."<br />
<br />
The situation during the first and second advances may serve as an example of what should not take place according to all the laws of tactics, for it could not have been worse; von Trotha said jokingly that, if an Admiral brought about such a situation at a war game or in manoeuvres, he would never be entrusted without another command. In the North, the "Queen Elizabeths", then the battle-cruisers, and from N.E. through E. to S.E., an endless line of battleships formed an arc round the German van and kept it under fire. Evidently it had fallen into the most perfect trap. In addition to this unfavourable tactical position, there was a further difficulty, namely that the German ships could be clearly distinguished while they themselves only saw the gun flashes, 4 or 5 to each salvo, but could find no target.<br />
<br />
The Gunnery Officer of the "MARKGRAF" told me that he could not fire at all during half-an-hour, and that they were at the mercy of the British broadsides. Critical though the position was, in theory, they think that experience justifies the conclusion that this 'crossing the T' is in reality not so disastrous at longer ranges; for, in spite of the enormous superiority of their fire, the British made comparatively few hits, the simple reason being that, when fire is thus concentrated on a few leading ships, there can be no question of improving the shooting by spotting.<br />
<br />
Given good tactical training and squadrons which work well together, it is always easy to retire rapidly from an unfavourable position and even possibly to reach an advantageous one.<br />
<br />
The small amount of damage sustained by the Main Fleet may be owing partly to the fact that the leading battle-cruisers drew the enemy's fire, thus relieving the battleships. Only the three leading ships, "KÖNIG", "GROSSER KURFÜRST" and "MARKGRAF" received several hits; while among all the other ships, the "KAISER", "HELGOLAND" and the "SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN" received one hit each, and the rest were not hit at all.<br />
<br />
Simultaneously with the battle-cruisers, which were ahead and pressing forward in quarter-line formation, the 6th and 9th Flotillas, left by the "REGENSBURG", also proceeded to a torpedo attack. Regarding this cruiser advance, the Commanding Officer of the "SEYDLITZ" told me that he was in such a position that he was able to avoid the British salvoes, for he altered course towards the point where each salvo fell and thus evaded the spotting correction.<br />
<br />
This torpedo attack was carried out with great determination and seems to have been completely successful, although nobody is able to state how many hits were obtained. The British ships overlapped somewhat and their line was almost unbroken, and, as about 100 torpedoes were fired, it is estimates that there must have been a considerable number of hits, some people affirm that there were 20, but I do not place much confidence in these figures and it is useless to trouble about them as nobody is certain.<br />
<br />
The boats were fired on by guns of all calibres, even the heaviest, but with little effect, only one boat being destroyed; two other boats had been sunk in an earlier attack during the cruiser action.<br />
<br />
The battle-cruisers were also attacked by British torpedoes, the "SEYDLITZ" being hit once. The "MOLTKE" was lucky, for, when close to the ship, one torpedo apparently had a gyro failure and ran parallel with her. The "LÜTZOW" was probably hit also.<br />
<br />
After the attack, the destroyers laid fog and a heavy smoke screen, which interposed between the Fleet; this benefitted not only the heavily-damaged "LÜTZOW" and "DERFFLINGER", whose nets had been shot away and were hanging down, but also the whole Fleet. It may also have made an impression on the British.<br />
<br />
The German Main Fleet and cruisers turned on a westerly course, fire having again entirely ceased; and the ships of the Main Fleet then turned gradually in succession and in inverse sequence from W. to S.W., subsequently steering towards Horns Reef.<br />
<br />
It is not known what the British did; all that is certain, is that they did not follow in pursuit and that nothing further was seen of their Main Fleet. It remained light until 11 p.m. (summer time), and it would not have been impossible, considering their superior speed, for them to have come within firing range. The Germans expected it too, and now have to content themselves with surmises about the British Commander-in-Chief's reasons for not doing so. It is probably that the unfavourable issue of the fleet part of the battle and the demoralising losses in ships took away any desire on Jellicoe's part for further fighting. His Fleet may have lost heavily and been severely shaken by the torpedo attack; and, as the Germans still had some intact flotillas at their disposal, he may have feared further strong torpedo attacks in the critical hours of twilight, for in the German Navy they say that Jellicoe fears their destroyers in particular.<br />
<br />
Nevertheless, the Germans were not under the impression of having shaken the British Fleet to the extent of obliging them to give up the struggle, and when the evening passed without further incident, they reckoned with certainty on encountering Jellicoe off Horns Reef at daybreak. They were the more astonished at his non-appearance when their air reconnaissance reported that on the morning of 1 June a squadron of 12 battle-ships was proceeding North from the southern part of North Sea and that it suddenly turned on to an opposite course and proceeded South.<br />
<br />
As it could not possibly have been the intention of the British Commander-in-Chief to let the German Fleet escape after having encountered it at last far from its base, and as he still had an intact battle-squadron at his disposal, one is compelled to take the view that he no longer felt strong enough for a second encounter; the achievement of the German Fleet must therefore be very highly thought of.<br />
<br />
During the night cruising following the action, numerous small episodes and minor engagements took place, of which no clear idea can be formed. <br />
<br />
In view of a possible fresh attack or of a possible pursuit on the part of the enemy, it was thought undesirable to leave the 2nd Battle Squadron either in the van or in the rear, it therefore took station to starboard and at first proceeded on an opening course from the other squadrons, and continued fairly independently during the night.<br />
<br />
The 1st Battle Squadron therefore led, with the "WESTFALEN" as guide, and it was followed by the 3rd Battle Squadron.<br />
<br />
After the action had been broken off, the 4 remaining battle cruisers were ahead to port, where they were suddenly again brought under heavy fire from the port side and from ahead, apparently by 3 or 4 battle cruisers. It is presumed that these were the remaining 3 or 4 older cruisers of the "Invincible" class, which Jellicoe probably always stationed ahead of the Main Fleet, for it would hardly have been possible for the "Lions", which were following in the rear in the British line, to have taken station ahead so quickly. The German battle cruisers, all severely damaged, did not feel able to withstand this fire and turned away to starboard, passing ahead of the Main Fleet and between it and the 2nd Battle Squadron, which proceeded quietly on their course and before which the mysterious ships retired, not to be sighted again.<br />
<br />
The battle-cruisers then gradually fell astern, and as they were making much water, and also owing to their differing speeds, they lost contact with the Main Fleet and with each other.<br />
<br />
The "LÜTZOW" had dropped out during the engagement and proceeded independently, accompanied by 4 destroyers. At first she was able to steam 14 knots, but her speed decreased rapidly and dropped finally to 4 knots. Her bows sank slowly, and when the whole forecastle was under water the Commanding Officer decided to leave the ship. The badly wounded were transferred carefully to the boats and the disembarkation was conducted in good order. A torpedo was then fired at the ship and this coup de grace sank her in deep water at about 1 o'clock, I believe.<br />
<br />
The "SEYDLITZ" was hardly in a better condition than the "LÜTZOW"; she also sank gradually by the bows till the water was almost level with the deck, and she had a heavy list to port, but she continued on her course. In the darkest hours of the night she suddenly sighted 3 large ships to port, quite close to. She turned away, made a British recognition signal and was not pursued. As bad luck would have it, the steaming light had short-circuited, could not be switched off and showed intermittently.<br />
<br />
The "DERFFLINGER", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN" followed the Main Fleet more or less and met with no particular experiences.<br />
<br />
The Main Fleet had to repulse a series of destroyer attacks and was also engaged by cruisers. The movements of these British cruisers, which came up singly, are incomprehensible and give the impression of having lost their heads. They appear to have received the order, judging by an intercepted W/T message, to proceed on a northerly and north-westerly course, and thereby they ran into the extended German line which they probably imagined they had passed to the South.<br />
<br />
One large cruiser (?"WARRIOR") proceeded unsuspectingly within 875 yds. of the line of battleships and came under concentrated fire from several ships before she could reply, so that she blew up enveloped in flames and disappeared in 47 seconds. The "BIRMINGHAM" seems to have been accounted for in a similar manner. The destroyers all approached in a really insane manner; frequently not from ahead but from a direction astern, scattered, singly or in pairs, or at most 3 together, never in large numbers. Most of them were disabled forthwith by a few salvoes and set on fire. The "WESTFALEN" distinguished herself particularly at this time.<br />
<br />
These burning destroyers strewn along the course, lit it up as if for a festival. Evidently the fires were largely due to the light American and Mexican oils; at any rate German firing trials on oil bunkers never caused any such conflagrations.<br />
<br />
The attacking boats directed shrapnel fire on the searchlights with fairly good results, the searchlights of two battleships and one light cruiser being hit.<br />
<br />
One large destroyer, which only recognised the danger at the last moment and endeavoured to avoid it by altering course was rammed by the "NASSAU", which put her helm over for this purpose. The boat exploded internally and sank.<br />
<br />
The only ships hit were the "POMMERN" in the 2ns Battle Squadron, and the "ROSTOCK". The "POMMERN" blew up at once and nobody was saved. The "ROSTOCK" was just passing between ships of the Main Fleet when she was hit; the loss of life on board was small.<br />
<br />
The Germans believe they destroyed 11 British destroyers in all. The manner in which these destroyers were handled has not left a good impression on the whole, and one has certainly lost respect for this weapon. The view is also taken that the boats are too large and offer too wide a target.<br />
<br />
The light cruiser "ELBING", like the "ROSTOCK", apparently wanted to break through the line from port to starboard under pressure from the British cruisers; she was, however, rammed by the "POSEN" and had to be abandoned in a sinking condition. The Germans also fired a torpedo into her.<br />
<br />
The "FRAUENLOB" and 2 destroyers were lost during the night; no details of their loss are known.<br />
<br />
Not far from Heligoland, the "OSTFRIESLAND", 7th of the line, struck a mine. This brings the account of the chief events of this exciting cruiser to an end.<br />
<br />
The German flotillas were detached from the Fleet to clear the area off the Jutland Coast, which was divided up into sectors. The flotillas stationed furthest to the North proceeded to the Skagerrak and through these straits into the Baltic and to Kiel.<br />
<br />
None of the flotillas sighted the British Main Fleet again, which proves that it must have turned away to the N. or N.W. immediately after the action. According to confidential reports the Fleet entered British ports as early as 1 June.<br />
<br />
Two British battleships, in a severely damaged condition and accompanied by destroyers, were sighted proceeding back to England. One was attacked by a submarine, but without success.<br />
<br />
On the morning of 1 June, in fairly misty weather, a Zeppelin sighted groups of British ships leaving the Channel on a N.E.'ly course. The reports were rather vague, as sometimes 6 and sometimes 12 ships were mentioned; but it seems most likely that 12 battleships and 3 cruisers were in question, and that they soon retired. The airship, which flew low at one time to get a clearer view, was also fired on.<br />
<br />
Some of the ships are said to have had tripod masts.<br />
<br />
The German Fleet, with the exception of "SEYDLITZ", reached the Jade in the afternoon. The "SEYDLITZ" could not cross the bar on account of being so much down by the bows, and it was not till the next day at high water that she was towed in, stern first.<br />
<br />
<center><u>MISCELLANEOUS.<br>TACTICS.</u></center><br />
<br />
The Germans ascribe their success to various causes, and in the first place to their own superiority as regards tactics. This is a point which every officer discusses, and it is constantly repeated that it all happened just as in tactical manoeuvres and in "battle exercises", and that things could not have gone better.<br />
<br />
Movements of squadrons, divisions and individual ships, "turns together" and alterations of course and speed, all went like clockwork and demonstrated the very great mobility of all formations.<br />
<br />
The W/T signalling system of the Main Fleet never failed, and its failure would have been immaterial, as the primary and secondary flag action signals, showing from several positions in the ship, were made simultaneously.<br />
<br />
All this was due to the peace training and the practical experience of the Flag Officers and Captains. Though in peace time the Commander-in-Chief had never commanded a Fleet, nor the Admirals a squadron, still the training carried out on the same lines for a number of years resulted in everything proceeding with the expected precision.<br />
<br />
The British, on the contrary, are said to have displayed a certain clumsiness as regards tactics and to have preferred turning together when "turning on to an opposite course" (Wendungen im Gegenmarsch), though this conclusion does not seem altogether justified from the description of the action.<br />
<br />
The ships kept station 547 yds. apart, and Vice-Admiral Schmidt told me that, in his opinion, this distance is too small for large ships and that he prefers 656 yds., as the shorter distances result in the ships getting bunched and overlapping during alterations of course. In order to relieve this during the first turn to starboard, the Fleet Flagship herself turned to port and then closed gradually into line. At night the distance was 656 yds.<br />
<br />
No interruption of W/T communication was occasioned by the enemy.<br />
<br />
<center><u>GUNNERY</u></center><br />
<br />
It is admitted that the British are superior as regards their gunnery technique. Their salvoes fall most astoundingly close together and aroused admiration on all sides. Some people affirm that they fell too close together, and that it was consequently difficult to cover a sufficiently large danger space.<br />
<br />
This is particularly the case with the heaviest calibres: 13.5-in. and 15-in. and the battle-cruisers' fire was noticeably inferior to that of the "Queen Elizabeth" class, for example.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> Literal translation; the meaning is not clear. - Tr.] The spread of the salvoes frequently only covered a few square yards. In the "KÖNIG" 3 rounds, out of a salvo of 4 rounds, hit between the capstan and the bridge.<br />
<br />
This is attributed to careful calibration, which the British have studied for a long time and which, as is well known, was abandoned by the German Navy after a few trials. The gunnery officers declare unanimously that it must unquestionably be re-introduced.<br />
<br />
The British range-finders are superior to the German, and the construction of their turrets enables them to shoot at ranges impossible for German guns. The question of range appears to be immaterial to the British, who fire at any range so long as visibility permits.<br />
<br />
The Germans are fully convinced of the great superiority of 15-in. guns over all others, and deplore the fact that, owing to the predominant conservative tendencies in the German Navy, this calibre was not introduced until so lately. Vice-Admiral Gerdes, the Head of the Armament Department, is responsible for this, for he always opposed it on the ground that the poor visibility in German waters and the consequent short ranges rendered an increase of calibre useless; he considered the German 12-in. gun to be an altogether superior weapon, capable of competing with every other.<br />
<br />
In one respect the British seem behindhand as compared with the Germans: namely that they cannot alter range quickly enough and they are too dependent on the range clock. The British rely on steady fire at long range, and they adapt their tactics to this and avoid alterations of course and range most assiduously.<br />
<br />
The Germans, on the contrary, in their firing practices always work with big and rapid alterations of range and exercise firing while turning, so that the gunnery officers consider they have an advantage in this respect.<br />
<br />
The Turn on to an opposite course was certainly not advantageous for the German Fleet, but in this particular instance it made little difference, as the German ships were already unable to find a target; besides which, it must have disconcerted the British and it prevented them from obtaining good results with their fire. The salvoes fell very close together round the ships, but few hits were obtained. The rate of fire in the British ships is said to have been fair, but not excessive. Some people affirm that it was very modest.<br />
<br />
The British shell had great penetrating power, and from all reasonable distances the main armour was generally pierced clean through. The shell splinters picked up prove conclusively that at least 2 kinds of shell were used, differing considerably in material and quality. One kind of shell had a very thick wall and an extremely small explosive charge, it might almost be called a solid shot. It seems to have broken up frequently without exploding and the fuse did not function. Its explosive power, if it possessed any at all, was quite inconsiderable, and it is presumed that the explosives used was not high explosive.<br />
<br />
It appears from the splinters of these 15-in. shell that the wall was 6.3 - 6.7 ins. (16 - 17 cm.), so that the hollow space cannot measure more than 2.4 ins. - 1.8 ins. (4 - 6 cm.). It is true that the large pieces into which these shell broke pierced everything in their course and often went right through the whole ship, unless they struck an armoured part. Several intact heads were found, with and without caps, and also entire bases.<br />
<br />
The second kind of shell had considerably thinner walls, only about half as thick, but it also often broke up into quite large pieces and displayed no great explosive power, and little or no incendiary power.<br />
<br />
It appears therefore that the British aimed only at attaining penetrating power, and the Germans are of opinion that they do not possess (rohrsicheren)* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D.Note.- This appears to be a special fuse which is very delicate, but safe until it has left the gun.] fuses for high explosive shell; this was their opinion before the war also.<br />
<br />
They believe that the high explosive power of the German ammunition gives them a great advantage which may partly counterbalance the smaller calibre of their guns and perhaps also their inferior gunnery. In any case, the effect of the German shell at the point of impact was very considerable.<br />
<br />
The fact that the ships blew up must be attributed to explosions in their magazines. (In this connection one may recall a turret of the "SEYDLITZ" being hit in the action of 24 January, 1915; see my report No.47 ex 15). The turret armour must have been pierced and the shells in the turret must have been exploded. The British have no metal cartridge-cases and also no cartridge-holders such as the Germans have, but they keep their cartridges in locked boxes which are perhaps not flash-proof enough. It seems therefore, from the incident experienced by the "SEYDLITZ", that this must constitute a particular danger to British ships. In this last action also turrets in German ships were frequently hit; further details are given in the account of damage sustained.<br />
<br />
After having compared the hits received in the German ships with the observations of results on enemy targets, it may be safely affirmed that the explosive power of the German shells exceeds that of the British; this was already known after the action of 24 January 1915. The Germans are therefore very much annoyed that they had no 15-in. guns to fire, as they are persuaded that ships so knocked about (eingedeckte) as, for example, the "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" would have been completely destroyed by German shell.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. Note.- The writer appears to mean that if German 15-in. shell had been used against "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" these ships would have been sunk.]<br />
<br />
It may be noted here that the "BAYERN", the first of their ships to carry 15-in. guns, will not join the Fleet for another few days, and the "BADEN" not until the autumn.<br />
<br />
Medium armament played no part, only a few hits were obtained and they did little damage.<br />
<br />
The British fired part-salvoes, like the Germans; full salvoes may have been fired now and again.<br />
<br />
The method of repulsing destroyer attacks, which has previously been reported, namely the 'turning away' and firing on one, or at most two boats, proved to be sound, and the repulsing of attacks both by day and night offered no difficulties.<br />
<br />
As regards gunnery, it may also be mentioned that the fire-control apparatus worked without a hitch and withstood the heaviest shocks. The elevation pointers worked admirably. A few ships were not yet fitted with them.<br />
<br />
<center><u>Torpedo.</u></center><br />
<br />
As regards torpedo work the Germans consider themselves very much superior. There were prolonged discussions about depriving Flotilla Leaders of their independence and putting them under the orders of a Leader Ship, but they are now convinced that this is necessary to ensure the flotillas attacking at the right moment and all together.<br />
<br />
The flotillas were led by the 2 leader Ships "ROSTOCK" and "REGENSBURG", the first having 2 flotillas and the second 3 flotillas allocated to them. The remaining 2 flotillas accompanied the Main Fleet or the battle-cruisers. The leaders carried out their duties with great daring and circumspection. The attacks of the British were weak and scattered, and could therefore have little or only occasional success.<br />
<br />
The German 2nd Flotilla, composed of the larger 1500 ton boats were held back instead of being sent to attack. Although these boats are spoken of very highly and are indispensable for certain enterprises, the view is now taken that they are too large and too valuable to be used for attacking during an action. This Flotilla proceeded to Zeebrugge immediately after the action and arrived there safely. It is to be employed in preventing the British from blockading the harbour with nets, and thus make it impossible for the German submarines to proceed out.<br />
<br />
As far as I have heard, the "MOLTKE" alone of the larger ships fired 4 torpedoes.<br />
<br />
Submarines were not in evidence. No German submarines were present; on the other hand a German destroyer claims to have rammed a British submarine. This claim appears to be erroneous, at least it was declared to be nonsense by the Chief of Staff. The submarines failed as regards scouting and also doing the pursuit.<br />
<br />
Some people state that a British aeroplane was sighted to the northward, and that it had apparently risen from a cruiser. It played no part in the action.<br />
<br />
The use of "Höschter"* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. note:- Probably the name of the inventor.] fog seems to have been of good service, it and the smoke made by the destroyers having completely masked the Main Fleet and its movements at critical moments.<br />
<br />
<center><u>SPEED</u></center><br />
<br />
The advantage of speed lay entirely with the British, not only as regards the Main Fleet on account of the "Deutschland" class, but also as regards the battle-cruisers. The latter are said to have proved considerably faster than the German battle cruisers, an unpleasant experience which had already been made on 25 January 1915. This alone proves that the British are talking nonsense when they assert that the German Fleet sought safety in flight; on the contrary, it was far from its bases and entirely in the power of the British, who either did not wish to take advantage of their superior speed, or were unable to do so on account of the damage sustained. The visibility was no worse than it had been during the day and Jellicoe may have even welcomed the "Höschter" fog which would enable him to plead bad visibility as a reason for abandoning the pursuit. On the German side in the light of experience the factor of speed in the battleships is considered very important. But the moderate depths of the German harbours limits the draught of the ships, and make it particularly difficult for German builders to do much in this respect. In spite of greater length and higher horse power the most modern cruisers "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ" and "LÜTZOW" attained only a quite inconsiderable increase of speed in comparison with the older "GOEBEN" class, and proved a disappointment in this particular.<br />
<br />
The question whether the older battleships should take part in an important engagement was not easy to decide. The 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons composed of the "WITTLESBACH" and "BARBAROSSA" class, re-commissioned at the beginning of the war, were intended to be used in such actions, but have long since been paid off; some have been disarmed and employed as guardships and instructional ships, etc. It was considered however, that the 2nd Battle Squadron, composed of the most modern of the older ships, would be of some service in the action; but this squadron was in a privileged position, inasmuch as it was merely attached to the 1st and 3rd Battle Squadrons and its Admiral was allowed to operate independently and select the position he thought best. On this occasion it kept station quite well and did not prove a hindrance, but, on the other hand, it did not come under any heavy fire. This must be considered very fortunate, for, in view of the damage sustained by other ships and in view of the fact that the British shell pierced all armour above or below water even at the longest range, it is certain that every ship of this class would have been sunk by a few hits, as their internal sub-division is not proof against large inrushes of water.<br />
<br />
The loss of the "Pommern", which gives the British an opportunity for a hollow triumph, also teaches a clear lesson. The Chief of Staff told me that they will probably consider carefully before again exposing this Squadron to danger; therefore this action will have further confirmed the complete worthlessness of all Dreadnought types [sic] and will condemn them as old iron.<br />
<br />
<center><u>TORPEDO NETS.</u></center><br />
<br />
The torpedo nets of the battle cruisers are all badly damaged and the gear so knocked about by gunfire that they were almost useless. This was particularly the case with the "Derfflinger", where the after port nets were hanging in the water, and would have fallen across the propeller had they not chanced to remain held up by a temporary lashing. The ship was obliged to stop during the action to secure the nets, and they might easily have occasioned the loss of the ship.<br />
<br />
For this reason all the nets, together with the booms, were unshipped immediately after the ships' return, to everybody's satisfaction. They will not be carried any more, except perhaps for operations in the Baltic, where the ships may be obliged to anchor at sea.<br />
<br />
<center><u>LEAK-STOPPING SERVICE.</u></center><br />
<br />
The leak-stopping service which had been systematically developed, worked admirably and the Germans are convinced that they owe much to it. They believed that the "Seydlitz" could not have been brought in if the strengthening of the bulkheads, etc., had not been so thoroughly exercised and if the personnel had not been so well trained.<br />
<br />
It is also said, that in the "Lutzow", which had only been in commission for 2 months, was naturally not up to the mark in this respect, and that it is not impossible that small shortcomings, for which of course nobody can be blamed, were responsible for the ship sinking. The "Lutzow" was an unfortunate ship altogether. First her turbines collapsed, thus delaying her commissioning for 6 months, then she immediately struck a mine, and she was hardly out of dockyard hands before she was sunk.<br />
<br />
<center><u>DANGER FROM GAS FUMES.</u></center><br />
<br />
Only 2 days before sailing, a large number of the ships, and fortunately exactly those that came most under fire, namely battle-cruisers and the 3rd Squadron, were supplied with gas masks fitted with alkali cartridges for the whole crew and a plentiful reserve (in the "Seydlitz" 1500 masks for about 1200 men). The masks are similar to those used in the army for poisonous gases. Each man carries a mask slung round him, if he is not actually wearing it.<br />
<br />
I was told emphatically by all the officers, that, in their experience, these masks are absolutely necessary and not only saved many lives but enabled the men to carry on in parts of the ship which they would otherwise have been compelled to leave.<br />
<br />
The gases from shells, mines and torpedoes penetrate in an incredible manner through ventilators, telephone leads, etc. to compartments far away from the point of impact. In many cases the masks enabled large numbers of the guns' crews to escape from turrets that were hit, and to help out others who were badly wounded. In one case the men in one of the main engine rooms were able to remain at their posts after gas had penetrated, until the engine-room was ventilated.<br />
<br />
The Fleet breathing apparatus (Flottenathmer) is preferable to masks in some cases, but it cannot be supplied to everyone and it hampers one's movements, which the masks do not.<br />
<br />
On account of the great danger from gases, it is also advisable to fit hinged flaps in all shafts, and to have wooden bungs to fit the voice-pipes, keeping a hammer at hand to hammer them into the mouth-pieces.<br />
<br />
They tell me that it proved very useful to keep all the personnel employed below, such as in central control rooms, engine-rooms, torpedo flats, etc. continually informed of what was going on. The men get nervous, particularly at first, with the tremendous shocks caused by shell falling close to the ship, though the shocks are felt less on deck, and such information gives them confidence and they like knowing what is going on above them.<br />
<br />
<center><u>DAMAGE</u></center><br />
<br />
The distribution of ships needing repair in the various dockyards is as follows:-<br />
<br />
The "König" proceeded at once to Kiel and is under repair at Howaldt's yard. I did not see her.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" and "Moltke" in Blohm and Voss yard, Hamburg, the first in the Imperial Dock.<br />
<br />
The "Kurfürst["] in Vulkan Yard, Hamburg.<br />
<br />
The "Derfflinger" was first docked in Wilhelmshaven and the leaks temporarily stopped, she then proceeded to the Imperial dockyard, Kiel. The "Seydlitz" will now be docked in the large dock at Wilhelmshaven; during my stay the "Seydlitz" was still in the lock.<br />
<br />
The "Von der Tann", "Ostfriesland" and "Helgoland" will be repaired in dry docks in Wilhelmshaven. No other large ships require to be docked.<br />
<br />
"<u>Seydlitz</u>" The number of hits was still uncertain, as the whole forepart of the ship up to the upper deck was still under water, and it is not known what she looks like below water. The ship was brought into the lock with difficulty, and as she is 43 ft. down by the bows, she cannot be taken into harbour. They will not venture to dock the ship inside the lock, and intend first to raise her bows slightly.<br />
<br />
The roof and guns of the fore turret and anchors, cables etc., have already been unshipped, and they now intend to bring caissons alongside and pump out the fore part sufficiently to enable her to enter the harbour.<br />
<br />
The great inrush of water, that flooded more or less the whole fore part of the ship as far as the first boiler-room bulkhead, was caused by a number of hits. Firstly, one of the belt armour plates forward on the port side is missing, having fallen off. Secondly, there are believed to be at least 2 or 3 more hits below water, forward on the port side; for the list and the settling down had already become ominous when the ship was hit at the edge of the upper deck, port side, abreast the bridge; this was followed by an inrush of water in the battery deck, which did a great amount of damage.<br />
<br />
In addition, during the day action, she was hit by a torpedo on the starboard side under the forward 5.9 in. gun, which caused her to settle down still more by the bows. This gun was so much damaged by the shock from underneath as to be disabled.<br />
<br />
Further, there are 4 severe hits in the ship's side (mess deck, port side, forward of the turret), which also demolished the port capstan.<br />
<br />
These shell, or shell splinters, naturally penetrated to the armoured deck, so that the entire fore part of the ship above and below the armoured deck is holed in many places, allowing free passage for the water. The fore part of the ship was struck therefore by at least 8 or 9 shells and one torpedo.<br />
<br />
Apparently the only compartments which are not flooded, are the bow torpedo flats and the central control room. The former is being pumped out continuously, as a great deal of water is flowing in from above. The torpedo control room had to be abandoned, as the forward partition was not watertight. The central control room abaft this was not abandoned, but of its 2 entrances from the starboard and port passages, only the port one can be used, as the starboard one is flooded.<br />
<br />
The gunnery control room is far further aft and was not affected.<br />
<br />
The ship has a list of 7° to port, and as she has now been slightly raised, about 1¾ ft. of her bows are above water; at one time it was up to the level of the deck.<br />
<br />
While under way the forward boiler room bulkhead had to withstand most of the pressure; supports have been built up everywhere, but it leaks in places.<br />
<br />
The other hits of consequences were those in the turrets. The fore starboard turret No.2 received a direct hit on the fore face of the revolving structure. One curved plate was forced out, but fortunately the main effect of the explosion was outward. The right hand gun was disabled by slight damage to the mounting; with this exception the turret remained in action and kept up fire.<br />
<br />
The right hand gun of turret No.3 received a direct hit, which cut out a wide groove along the tube of the gun. The left hand gun continued to fire.<br />
<br />
The barbette of turret No.4 was hit on a level with the rammer, and the armour was pierced clean through. This hit is of special interest, as the "Seydlitz" received a similar hit and at the same level in turret No.5 on 24th January 1915, which caused a fire, disabled both the after turrets and killed all the guns' crews. This last time, however, the damage was slight. There was no ready ammunition in the turret, and only one cartridge was exploded, in contrast to the (6200 Kg.) 13,670 lbs. of powder on Jan.1915. The turret officer and a large number of the gun's crews were saved by their gas masks. The destruction caused by splinters was, however, considerable and the turret was abandoned, as it was not possible to continue fire from it. This was a 13.5 in. shell, at 15,310 yds. range, strength of armour pierced 8.6 inches.<br />
<br />
After the turret had been abandoned, it was hit a second time in the after side of the revolving part, which was pierced; this of course increased the havoc in the interior.<br />
<br />
Turret No.5 was hit in the roof. The shell richochetted, and the roof is slightly dented. Nobody was hurt and the turret continued to fire.<br />
<br />
In the "Seydlitz" therefore, all the turrets were hit, with the exception of the foremost turret, and one was hit twice.<br />
<br />
A further hit pierced the 5.9 in. (150mm.) casemate armour of the aftermost 5.9 in. starboard gun, No.2. The deck was pierced from beneath, and splinters also pierced the splinter bulkhead. The gun was disabled and all the crew were killed, with the exception of the ship's chaplain who happened to be in the casemate and must be watched over by a special guardian angel.<br />
<br />
A similar hit, with a 15 in. shell, struck the casemate armour of the 6-in. gun No.7 and exploded in the casemate. Men were killed, the gun was disabled and the splinter bulkhead pierced by large splinters. This time again, surprise was aroused by the comparatively small damage caused by a large calibre shell.<br />
<br />
"<u>Derfflinger</u>". One shell hit the armour belt forward of the hawse pipe, probably at the junction of 2 plates, as 2 plates broke away. The plates underneath were consequently strained apart and a great deal of water flowed in.<br />
<br />
The armour belt on the port side also received 2 further hits in the centre and was pierced clean through. The splinters penetrated more than half way through the ship, and in one case a piece of plating was driven half way though the ship. These hits, combined perhaps with others, destroyed the nets and their supports in several places.<br />
<br />
The two after turrets received direct hits, in one case on the roof, in the other case in the barbette above the deck; the armour was pierced and the upper portions of the turrets burnt out and severely damaged, but the flames did not penetrate to the magazines. The crew in the upper part of the turret were killed, and both turrets were disabled. This occurred at an early stage of the action.<br />
<br />
The guns at high elevation cannot yet be dismounted, as everything is wedged in, but they do not appear to be damaged.<br />
<br />
The muzzles were carried away off the 4 foremost 6 in. (15 cm.) guns on the port side; two of them probably having been accounted for by one and the same shell which hit the armour. One gun, the muzzle of which was perhaps damaged by a splinter, afterwards burst, the tube splitting open in the shape of a tulip.<br />
<br />
The "Derfflinger" received a few other hits of no particular interest. She appears the next most severely damaged ship after the "Lützow".<br />
<br />
The "<u>Moltke</u>" only received 5 hits, all of them during that part of the action which took place on a southerly course; while the cruisers mentioned above received most of the hits on the port side, consequently during the later stages of the action.<br />
<br />
One shell pieced the bulwarks in the after part of the ship above the armour, passed through the ship and struck the armour on the port side from inside, about 3.3 ft. below the water-line. One plate was forced out and is missing. The inrush of water was considerable. The after compartments, above the armoured deck which remained intact, were all more or less flooded.<br />
<br />
The second hit was further forward, below the armour belt. The shell exploded in a bunker, but the armoured deck held and no water penetrated it from below. The neighbouring bunkers made little water and could be pumped out.<br />
<br />
Another shell struck the 5.9 in. armour in the upper bunker, above the water-line. The armoured deck again held, but the inner wall of the bunker parted, and the battery deck was pierced from below, a 6 in. gun being damaged and disabled.<br />
<br />
In the fore part of the ship a shell struck the armour belt below the water-line. The plate remained intact and was driven in about 8 inches. The compartment was flooded, but the torpedo bulkhead remained watertight. A neighbouring compartment leaked slightly, the rivets having parted.<br />
<br />
The fifth case of damage, namely a plate beneath the armour belt being driven and pressed in, was probably not due to a direct hit, but to splinters of a shell which fell short.<br />
<br />
"<u>Von der Tann</u>". A shell hit and pierced the lower part of the 3.9 in. armour belt in the after part of the ship to starboard. The compartments above the armoured deck, and some of those on the deck above, were flooded. The chief effect of the shell was outside the ship, but it bent the plates below the otherwise undamaged armoured deck, so that a considerable amount of water flowed into the compartments below the armoured deck. The after torpedo flat was flooded half way up, and the men in the starboard steering engine room were shut in for a long time owing to the exits being blocked.<br />
<br />
The fore turret was hit on the starboard side on the upper edge of the barbette and a semi-circular armour plate was forced out. The machinery of the turret was so badly knocked about that the turret was disabled.<br />
<br />
The hydraulic piping was damaged, so that all the heavy armament was put out of action temporarily. Strangely enough, though men were wounded none were killed.<br />
<br />
The aftermost turret was hit in the barbette. The armour was pierced, but the effect of the shell was exterior, the turret sustained little internal damage, so that the handgear of the turret remained in action. The turret was wedged in one place and could not revolve; they succeeded, however, in cutting off with oxy-acetylene the piece of revolving part which was jammed against the inner side of the barbette thus getting rid of the obstruction.<br />
<br />
Outside the turret, the shell did considerable damage; some splinters striking downwards, bent the armoured deck and pierced it in places. As far as I know, the armoured deck sustained no further damage, and this was of little importance.<br />
<br />
The after conning-tower was hit and a piece of the armour torn away; the occupants, including the 3rd gunnery officer, were killed. Splinters struck downwards to the engine-room ventilation hatches, but were stopped by the armoured gratings.<br />
<br />
"<u>Ostfriesland"</u> was struck by a mine below the foremost port turret. The whole measures 197 ft.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. note:- Literal translation is 12 times 5 metres large.] The torpedo bulkhead is only slightly torn, and the inrush of water was only local.<br />
<br />
"<u>Helgoland</u>". A 13.5 in. shell hit the 7.9 in. armour belt forward on the port side and pierced it. The shell appears to have broken only as no explosive action can be traced. The range was about 14,217 yds.<br />
<br />
"<u>Nassau</u>" rammed a British destroyer, or rather, the destroyer ran into her forward on the port side. Her bows must have lifted right up, for her hawse-pipe remained on board the "Nassau", so firmly wedged into the side of the upper deck that it will have to be cut out. The "Nassau's" side below the deck is torn away for 33 ft. The destroyer then glanced off the "Nassau's" side and exploded internally. One of the crew remained behind in one of the nets, but fell into the water when the "Nassau" fired a salvo.<br />
<br />
The "Nassau" was hit by shrapnel from attacking destroyers in the foremost searchlight group, both port searchlights were put out of action. The searchlight control and electric cables were destroyed and many of the searchlight crews were killed. The after searchlight group was hit in a similar manner, and one of the searchlights was disabled.<br />
<br />
The "Rhineland" and a light cruiser were also hit in a similar manner.<br />
<br />
I have seen all the above mentioned ships in Wilhelmshaven.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" and "Kurfürst" were at Hamburg, but unfortunately I am unable to report much about them. They had already been under repair for several days, and the damage was to some extent made good. Besides this, the conditions were not favourable for undisturbed examination: commissioners from the Imperial Navy Office were on board, besides crowds of workmen, the noise was deafening and it was pouring with rain. Consequently I took no notes on the spot and relied on my memory, which however fails me now among the very many received of similar cases. I am therefore unable to report each hit with accuracy.<br />
<br />
This is immaterial, however, as there were no particularly interesting hits, and none of the ships had been hit in the turrets. The armour had been pierced in several places, the effect and character of the hits being similar in all cases; the hits on unarmoured parts were of little consequence.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" was hit aft on the port side of the water line just on a junction of two plates, a piece of equal size being torn away from each plate. The shell then struck the sloping part of the armoured deck and the splinters ricochetted and passed right through the ship. These plates have already been removed.<br />
<br />
A casemate was pierced and the gun disabled.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" is the only ship whose mast was hit, the mast remained standing and has now been removed.<br />
<br />
The spotting platform had to be abandoned, as communications with the conning tower was cut off. This was the only hit received in a conning tower; it only grazed the upper edge and glanced off, and the men inside hardly noticed it.<br />
<br />
The port engine was disabled, not in consequence of damage to the turbine which is in good condition, but owing to one of the main propeller bearings becoming overheated. The cause of this is not clear, but it is believed to be due to concussions. The ship was well able to keep station with her two remaining engines.<br />
<br />
The "<u>Kurfürst</u>" suffered especially from a great inrush of water forward on the port side, above the armoured deck; it was caused by a hit in the armour belt. No further damage of importance was sustained.<br />
<br />
With regard to time necessary for repair to these ships, it is not yet possible to say anything definite, as it is still undecided whether they shall undergo thorough repair or not. The chief difficulty is the manufacture of new armour plates; but some of the holed plates can, no doubt, be left in position for the present.<br />
<br />
A considerable time will be needed to repair some of the turrets of the battle-cruisers, but here too, they will contrive to get things done. For instance, the "Von der Tann" is to have an entire turret out of a ship of the "Nassau" class, probably the foremost turret, and this ship will be left without a turret for some time. They talk a great deal also of transferring guns, and they will perhaps make use of those intended for the "Hindenburg", which will not be completed will the late autumn.<br />
<br />
It may be presumed that the battleships will be ready for sea in 4-6 weeks, and the battle-cruisers, particularly the "Seydlitz", in not less than 4 months. Naturally work is going on day and night, and repairs are given priority over all new construction.<br />
<br />
The damage sustained by light cruisers and destroyers is inconsiderable. The "Hamburg" had a funnel shot away. As these ships seem to be of minor importance, I did not trouble further about them.<br />
<br />
As our Allies appear not to have the intention of communicating to us what effect the examination of damages sustained will have on their construction in the future, we must endeavour to ascertain this as time goes on by means of cross questioning and by studying their new constructions in detail. I do not feel called upon to draw premature and rash conclusions to-day, on the strength of impressions received, but this will not prevent me from giving a summary of my opinion and of the opinions expresses in my hearing.<br />
<br />
Firstly, it is a remarkable fact that in all the ships that have returned home, all the engine and boiler-rooms are undamaged; the "Lützow" is no exception to this, as she proceeded under her own steam until late in the night after the action. I have also been assured by the Imperial Navy Office, after an inspection carried out by the Chief Engineer, that not a single auxiliary engine was defective. The only boiler-room put out of action was the foremost one in the "Seydlitz" where the bulkhead gave a little, allowing water to penetrate through rivet holes and cracks when the ship was under way. The conclusion may therefore be drawn that these vital parts of the ship are sufficiently protected and that the armour belt of the usual German thicknesses, though it cannot stop the shells, at least fulfils its purpose by breaking them up. Consequently it has become almost impossible even for the largest splinters of 15 in. shell to penetrate through armoured deck or torpedo bulkhead in engine and boiler rooms.<br />
<br />
Even at these long ranges and steep angles there was no question of the armoured decks being pierced; but the fitting of strong gratings over the hatches, which prevented the engines of the "Von der Tann" from sustaining severe damage, appears very necessary.<br />
<br />
The torpedo bulkheads also resisted shells, mines and torpedoes effectually; and in cases where slight damage was sustained, it had no further consequences than the flooding of the compartment affected.<br />
<br />
Perhaps it would be advisable to construct a specially strong boiler-room bulkhead, similar to a torpedo bulkhead, so that it could not be damaged by splinters or water-pressure.<br />
<br />
The inspection of the "Seydlitz" has left me with the impression that the commanding officer of the "Seydlitz" expected rather too much of his ship, and that nothing short of extraordinary good luck enabled her to be brought back. At one time when the whole forepart of the ship was flooded and the bows were under water, he proceeded occasionally with revolutions for 22 knots, just in order to show how seaworthy his ship was, so he told me. This may have been very sporting, or perhaps it may have been necessary under the circumstances in order not to drop too far behind and be overtaken by the enemy, but it certainly was not good seamanship, and if his stokehold bulkhead had burst, the "Seydlitz" would have gone down like the "Lutzow", where the circumstances appear to have been very similar. Later on he decreased speed and finally proceeded stern first.<br />
<br />
I therefore think it not impossible that the loss of the "Lützow", which is said to have been proceeded at 14 knots for a time, was also due only to recklessly high speed, and that the ship might have been saved if she had proceeded stern first or been taken in tow.<br />
<br />
As the danger from water-pressure must always be greatest from ahead, it would certainly be advisable to take special preventative measures against it.<br />
<br />
Vice-Admiral Schmidt told me that, in his opinion, the armoured belt ought to be strongest in the centre, and possible in the afterpart to protect the steering engines, and possibly in the bows, but that it ought not to taper off gradually from the centre to the extremities. He was also entirely in favour of a protected upper deck forming a second armoured deck.<br />
<br />
The admirably thorough system of internal division in the German ships and the floating capability thus attained is the finest proof of the merit of German construction which pursued this aim, and it shows that Admiral von Tirpitz, the creator of the Battle Fleet of to-day, was right when he upheld the principle that, above all things, the ships must be capable of remaining afloat and must not sink or heel over, and that everything else is of secondary consideration.<br />
<br />
The large number of hits in the turrets is remarkable, and it is generally considered that the turret armour should be appreciably stronger, especially in the lower part of the barbettes; for it is not only the disablement of the guns that comes into question, serious though this might be, but also the blowing up of magazines and the total destruction of the ship, as the wide shaft down to the magazines cannot possibly be made completely flash-proof. This is the most vital part of the ship. It is only owing to the small explosive charges in British shells, that there were no explosions of magazines in the German ships.<br />
<br />
Everything possible had been done after the action of 24.1.15 to ensure protection against this danger; the ready ammunition was removed from the top of the hoists and wherever possible all the openings in shafts leading down below were fitted with flaps, covers and heavy asbestos mats, while German ammunition is particularly carefully stowed and packed in cases with screwed-on covers.<br />
<br />
The disasters on the British side are a proof that this is a question of the greatest importance. It must also be taken into consideration that while any other damage turret may take months.<br />
<br />
The numerous hits in turrets would appear to justify the opinion of those who decided against triple turrets, on the ground [sic] that if one was disabled it would put too many heavy guns out of action.<br />
<br />
A hit in a casemate will of course destroy it and disable the gun, but this is of little consequence. Care must be taken here also not to have any ready ammunition, and to close the ammunition hand-up hermetically with heavy asbestos mats at the magazine end also. With the German "Paternoster" (dredger hoist) the ammunition lifts this mat as it comes up and the mat then falls to and closes the opening, which is a practical arrangement.<br />
<br />
Other hits through unarmoured parts, which destroyed more or less small gear and at the first glance give an impression of terrible havoc, are really of no consequence.<br />
<br />
In the "Von der Tann" they wanted to flood a turret magazine. This was impossible, as the flooding valve in the battery, or between deck was piled up with debris, cabin fittings, etc., and was inaccessible. Fortunately the flooding of the magazine turned out to be unnecessary. The Executive Officer remarked to me how critical such a trivial matter might become, and that one could not be careful enough about choosing the positions for the flooding valves, which must be kept clear of easily destructible objects.<br />
<br />
The man-hole covers in the decks, coal shoots [chutes], etc., were pointed out to me as dangerous, as they may be burst open by pressure of gas from below, thus causing damage and giving passage to the gases. These covers should be secured in a different manner and much more firmly.<br />
<br />
The flooding and draining system worked admirably, and is hardly capable of improvement. The only disadvantage is that the compartments above the armoured deck have no draining arrangements. This should be provided. A list, consequent on an inrush of water, could always be corrected by flooding an opposite compartment. This is an important matter both as affecting gunnery and personnel.<br />
<br />
The searchlights, which were not taken down in the German ships, all came out of the action undamaged; anxiety on their account was therefore unfounded. It was very unpleasant when attacking boats fired on the searchlights, and it is therefore considered necessary to fit light armour protection on the masts for the crews of the searchlight control and electric cables.<br />
<br />
Damage from flames is nowhere visible. The Germans are now rather amused at the care with which interior partitions were scraped.<br />
<br />
I could not help comparing the German ships with the Russian battleship "Orel", which I saw in Madzurn after the battle of Tsushima. If I remember rightly, the "Orel" had 5 severe hits and 40 hits with medium-calibre shell.<br />
<br />
The enormous explosive power of the Shimosa shell, which breaks up into minute splinters, did not do the slightest damage to the vital parts of the ship, but the upper deck was transformed into a confused heap of ruins. Superstructure, bridges, masts, funnels, etc., were destroyed, guns dismounted and fires started.<br />
<br />
Nothing of the kind is to be seen in the German ships, outwardly only a few more or less clean shell holes are visible, and they look so orderly and so little damaged that they do not appear to have gone through an action.<br />
<br />
It is true that the upper decks are said to have been littered with countless splinters, but they flew on to the decks from shells which struck the water, the ship receiving violent shocks.<br />
<br />
The holes in the armour show the characteristic concentric cracks round the hole and the radial splashes, the latter proving that the shells exploded on impact or at the latest, as they passed through. In many cases, as already noted, the force of the explosion was external and only pieces of plate, and possibly the head of the shell were driven in.<br />
<br />
<center><u>FLAG OFFICERS OF THE FLEET AND LEADERS</u></center><br />
<br />
{|<br />
| Commander-in-Chief:<br />
| Vice Admiral Scheer<br />
|-<br />
| <u>I Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Vice Admiral Schmidt<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Engelhard<br />
|-<br />
| <u>II Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Mauve<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Baron von Dalwigh<br />
|-<br />
| <u>III Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Behncke<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Nordmann<br />
|-<br />
| Officer commanding the Scouting Forces and<br>Commanding 1st Scouting Group<br />
| Vice Admiral Hipper<br />
|-<br />
| " 2nd " "<br />
| Rear Admiral Bodicker<br />
|-<br />
| " 4th " "<br />
| Commodore "Captain" v. Reuter<br />
|-<br />
| Leaders of Destroyers<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| in "Rostock"<br />
| Commodore "Captain" Michelsen<br />
|-<br />
| in Regensburg<br />
| Commodore "Captain" Heinrich<br />
|-<br />
| Leader of submarines<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| In Hamburg<br />
| Captain Bauer<br />
|}<br />
<br />
<center><u>REMARKS</u></center><br />
<br />
The lecture on the action, upon which this report is based, was illustrated by a plan prepared in haste for H.M. the Kaiser, and a copy was promised to me. But the Admiral Staff does not wish to part with this first incomplete draft, and the preparation of an accurate plan has not yet been completed, as the Admiral Staff is not yet in possession of all the details.<br />
<br />
In time to be included in this report I have only received the sketch of the first stage of the battle, namely the cruiser action on a southerly course, together with a small sketch of the situation when the action was broken off; both are enclosed.<br />
<br />
I conclude from the sketch of the cruiser action, that the accounts given to me were not quite accurate; for instance, the assertion of the commanding officer of the "Moltke" that the shortest range at that stage was 7,650 yds. and that he had accounted for one of the armoured cruisers with a torpedo.<br />
<br />
The sketch shows that the "Indefatigable" was probably first destroyed by gun fire from the "Von der Tann", and later the "Queen Mary" by gunfire from the "Derfflinger", and that the range was never less than 14,220 yds.<br />
<br />
The loss of "V. 27" and "V. 29" and of 4 British destroyers is also apparent, while I was only told of two.<br />
<br />
In the original sketch, 2 British armoured cruisers are also shown as having fallen out during this stage, but this is not shown on the accompanying sketch and probably took place later.<br />
<br />
I was told by the Admiral Staff that the accompanying sketches are not to be taken as strictly accurate.<br />
<br />
It is requested that the sketches and course of the action and the account of damages may be treated as strictly confidential.<br />
<br />
==Footnotes==<br />
{{reflist}}<br />
<br />
==Bibliography==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
*''Schematismus für das K.u.K. Heer und für die Kriegsmarine für 1914. Separatausgabe''. Wien. 1914.<br />
*''Almanach für die k. und k. Kriegsmarine 1917. Kriegsausgabe''. '''XXXVII'''. Pola. 1917.<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
==External Links==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
*Krámli, Mihály. [http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-124.pdf "The Report on the Battle of Jutland by the Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché in Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Colloredo-Mannsfeld."] ''NavWeaps''.<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
[[Category:Battle of Jutland]]</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Attach%C3%A9_Report_on_the_Battle_of_Jutland&diff=334731Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland2024-03-02T03:00:31Z<p>Simon Harley: Oops.</p>
<hr />
<div>Soon after the [[Battle of Jutland]] on 31 May &ndash; 1 June 1916 the Naval Attaché of the [[Austro-Hungarian Navy|Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Navy]] to the German Empire visited the High Sea Fleet. He composed a report on the battle for his superiors using first-hand accounts, interspersed here and there with his own observations. The version reproduced here is a translation in English apparently made by the [[Naval Intelligence Division (Royal Navy)|Naval Intelligence Division]] in 1919 from a copy which was subsequently returned to "F.N.A.", presumably the French Naval Attaché. A copy of the translation then made its way into the papers of the British Cabinet, from where historian Arthur J. Marder obtained a copy which is in his papers.<ref>Original number N.I.D. 087/19. Marder papers, Special Collections and Archives, Langson Library, University of California, Irvine, MS-F002, Box 27.</ref> It is worth comparing this translation with the translation made by Mihály Krámli of an original, apparently slightly different, report published on the ''NavWeaps'' online resource.<ref>Krámli, Mihály. [http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-124.pdf "The Report on the Battle of Jutland by the Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché in Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Colloredo-Mannsfeld."] ''NavWeaps''.</ref><br />
<br />
The original grammar and punctuation of the typescript has been reproduced here wherever possible.<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
From:- Austrian Naval Attache in Berlin.<br />
<br />
To:- Commander-in-Chief, Pola.<br />
<div style="float:right;">Berlin,<br>17 June, 1916.</div><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<center><u>NAVAL ENGAGEMENT OF 31 MAY 1916.</u></center><br />
<br />
The following is a report of the naval proceedings of 31 May - 1 June, 1916, and also of the damage sustained by the German Fleet.<br />
<br />
During my 3-days' visit to Wilhelmshaven, followed by a cursory examination of the "MARKGRAF" and "KURFURST" at Hamburg, I endeavoured to gain merely a general idea of the results of gunfire and concentrated my attention on the course of the action itself.<br />
Admiral Scheer, whom I only saw for a short time as he left for Kiel to attend the funeral of his borther-in-law [sic], Lieut.-Commander Mohr, who was killed in the action, very kindly arranged that his Chief of Staff, Captain Trotha, should give me an account of the whole proceedings, illustrated by plans, and that I should be furnished with all information. I have tried to fill in the gaps by conversations with officers whom I know; this has resulted in some contradictory statements, and several points remain obscure, the accounts from the various ships not having all come in.<br />
<br />
Many episodes will therefore be explained later and may appear in a different light, but, as regards the broad outlines which are of chief importance, the picture of this interesting engagement is fairly clear. The accompanying plan of the action was made in haste for the Kaiser and will therefore need much correction.<br />
<br />
The spirit pervading the Fleet can only be described as one of enthusiasm; they are intoxicated with victory. The heavy load weighing on them all, the dear that this war might end without an encounter of the Fleets, have vanished. They have learnt what fighting really means, they know themselves to be superior to the enemy as regards tactics, and that they were following the right lines and have nothing to unlearn; they know that their gunfire was more effective than that of the enemy, and that they can rely implicitly on their flotillas which have always been looked upon in the German Navy as one of the chief factors in an action. Finally they know that their largest ships can stand heavy fire and serious damage, that they leave nothing to be desired as regards construction and cannot be sunk easily. In short, they feel that the British, in spite of all their boasting, cannot overcome the German Fleet and have a considerable respect for it.<br />
<br />
This conviction imbues the whole Fleet, down to the last man, with confidence in their strength and a calm assurance regarding future encounters. At the same time they are free from over-confidence and from under-estimation of the enemy. On the contrary, the British fire-control and the enormous piercing power of their heavy shell at great distances have roused their admiration, so that a careless conception of the situation is not to be feared, the less so, as well-balanced minds such as those of Admiral Scheer and his Staff are unlikely to be led away by former successes to undertake rash enterprises in the future.<br />
<br />
They do not deny that they were extraordinarily fortunate, and that if the action had been prosecuted with energy on the British side, and if the "Nelson touch" had been in evidence, things might have gone very badly for Germany, especially as the British still had an intact Battle Squadron of 12 units at their disposal which had not yet taken part in the action. But they console themselves with the knowledge that no naval action was ever won without some stroke of luck.<br />
<br />
The Kaiser's visit, the day before my arrival, and his address to the Fleet gave great satisfaction, and subsequently many important personages arrive to inspect the ships, such as Prince Henry and the Grand Dukes of Mecklenburg and Oldenburg, and numbers of decorations were distributed. Vice-Admiral Scheer was promoted to Admiral, and he and Vice-Admiral Hipper received the Pour le Merite.<br />
<br />
I also visited Rear-Admiral Behncke, who was wounded and in hospital; his wounds are slight, a few small splinters in his head, elbow and knee, and he will probably soon be well again.<br />
<br />
<center><u>COURSE OF THE ACTION.</u></center><br />
<br />
The Commander-in-Chief intended to advance with the whole Fleet to the waters of the Skagerrak, in order to make his presence felt unpleasantly by disturbing the shipping, hoping thereby to lure on the British forces and in this manner to be in a position to attack a part of the British Fleet with superior or at least with equal forces. He reckoned that any movements of the British Fleet would be reported to him in good time by the submarines which had been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and he hoped that the airships would prove a better means of reconnoitring than any possessed by the enemy.<br />
<br />
Unfavourable weather prevented him for a considerable period from undertaking any operations, and, as the submarines were to return home on 1 June and be relieved by a new group, the 31 May was the last date for carrying out the planned advance.<br />
<br />
The cruisers left the Jade at 3 a.m., the Main Fleet at 4 a.m., steering an easterly course, and then, after passing Heligoland, a N.N.W'ly course. No reports were received from submarines. These were stationed chiefly off the Orkneys and the Firth of Forth, and the large group of Flanders boats were off the Thames and at the entrance to the Channel. <br />
<br />
While proceeding northwards, a few W/T messages were received, but they were corrupt, appeared to refer only to small formations and gave no clue to the movements of the Grand Fleet. The airships were unable to start in the morning, on account of the wind, and, as it blew hard throughout the day in the Heligoland Bight, they could not start until the early hours of 1 June. In this respect things did not go well, but Admiral Scheer decided nevertheless to continue on his course to the Skagerrak. <br />
<br />
This the account given by Captain von Trotha, who affirms that nothing was known of the presence of the British Fleet in the waters of the Skagerrak, and that there seemed no probability of encountering this Fleet before 1 June.<br />
<br />
There are some points here which I am unable to understand. The submarines are said to have been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and were to return home on 1 June to be relieved probably by a weaker group. For, If the same number of boats were to to keep watch off the English coast, why should 31 May have been the last day for the German Fleet to sail. The day of departure was, therefore, too late in any case, for, if no encounter was to be expected before 1 June, the boats stationed off the coast could not possibly encounter the damaged British ships, as was intended, for probably no damaged ships would be there before 2 June.<br />
<br />
The battleship "KONIG ALBERT" had to carry out repairs to her condensers and did not proceed with the Fleet. Von Trotha told me that there was no alternative and that a ship must carry out small overhauls regularly in a dockyard according to programme. But could it not be arranged, when one is taking the initiative, to choose one's moment for an advance and to have all the ships together for this short time? And why should just that moment be chosen when one of the most powerful ships of the "Kaiser" class is in the dockyard, instead, for instance, of one of the "Nassau" class with 11-in. guns.<br />
<br />
In addition, the "BAYERN" was to have joined up a few days later. After having waited so long, why should not the plan have been postponed for 2 or 3 weeks, instead of dispensing with the only ship carrying 15-in. guns.<br />
<br />
In the same manner they dispensed with air reconnaissance, from which they had expected so much.<br />
<br />
These considerations make me doubt whether the account given me is quite correct, and whether, on the contrary, they knew of certain movements of the British Fleet and considered the moment extremely favourable for an attack. Perhaps they only knew of Beatty's battle squadron, and thinking the Main Fleet was far away, hoped to entrap this squadron. In Berlin, they have much to say, even in military circles, about the British Fleet's intention to push through into the Baltic, and of Kitchener's mission having some connection with this. I consider this senseless, for it cannot be presemed [sic] that the British Fleet would leave their shores unprotected and do the Germans the favour of operating in the Baltic, which would certainly be a most advantageous area for the German Fleet. In any case, there appear to be discrepancies which will probably be explained at some later date.<br />
<br />
Scouting groups, battle cruisers and light cruisers, together with flotillas, preceded the Main Fleet by 50 - 60 miles. At 4 p.m. the light cruisers encountered some British battle cruisers. These at once opened fire on the light cruisers, at an estimated distance of 26,247 yds.; the range could be taken accurately. Though they did not obtain a hit, the salvoes fell so well that the German cruisers thought it advisable to turn away and fall back on their battle cruisers.<br />
<br />
As the British approached, these battle cruisers turned on to a southerly course, in order to lure the enemy on to the German Main Fleet. A running action, on a southerly course, ensued. The British were to starboard and to the west of the Germans, who had therefore the following advantage: in the North Sea, in summer, the western horizon is quite light and visibility towards the west is good, while towards the east, and in a still greater degree off the Jutland Coast, it is misty and visibility is bad and no silhouettes stand out against the eastern horizon. This phenomenon also played great part in the subsequent course of the action. The sun was still high and was not troublesome, and the British ships offered admirable targets. The sea was calm, the wind N.W. 1-2, altering subsequently through W. to S.W.<br />
<br />
The following British ships were recognised:-<br />
3 "Lion" class, 1 "Tiger" and 2 "Indefatigable" class; they were soon reinforced by 5 "Queen Elizabeth" class following astern.<br />
<br />
It is asserted that, judging from shell splinters, the ship of the "Tiger" class carried 15-in. guns, and that she was therefore the mysterious vessel which replaced the "TIGER" sunk on 24.1.15; as the last-named "TIGER" carried only 13.5-in.guns, this was taken as a further proof of her loss. The silhouette of the new "TIGER", however, is said to have resembled that of the old "TIGER" exactly. As the "Queen Elizabeths" soon opened fire also with 15-in. guns, I rather doubt this assertion regarding the "TIGER", and the various ships on this early part of the engagement are altogether somewhat at variance.<br />
<br />
On the German side the ships proceeded in the following sequence:- "LÜTZOW", Flagship of Vice-Admiral Hipper, "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN".<br />
<br />
As Hipper edged towards the enemy, the distance decreased to about 7655 yds. The German fire was unquestionably superior, but the speed of the British vessels was greater. After a short time the "INDEFATIGABLE" and "QUEEN MARY" blew up, and 2 battle-cruisers and two attacking destroyers were also accounted for. The "QUEEN MARY" must have been destroyed by the explosion of a magazine; she was torn in two halves, and a water-colour painted by an officer represents her enveloped in an enormous column of black smoke; she disappeared in a few seconds. Only one cadet was subsequently picked.<br />
<br />
The second battle cruiser disappeared under similar circumstances. The "VON DER TANN" claims to have accounted for one of these battle-cruisers by a broadside. But the "MOLTKE" fired 4 torpedoes and also claims this achievement.<br />
<br />
The Germans suffered very little during this phase of the action, the "MOLTKE" alone receiving hits on the starboard side. The fire of the British battle-cruisers is said not to have been nearly as good as that of the "QUEEN ELIZABETH" class later on.<br />
<br />
When they had approached the German Main Fleet, the British turned on to a contrary course and the German cruisers did the same. The German Main Fleet proceeded in divisions in starboard quarter-line, the 3rd Battle Squadron: 4 "König" class and 3 "Kaiser" class, Fleet Flagship, 1st Battle Squadron: 4 "Ostfriesland" class and 4 "Westfalen" class, and the 2nd Battle Squadron: 5 "Deutschland" class and the "Hessen". They endeavoured to effect a junction with the cruisers, but were unable to take part very effectually.<br />
<br />
The course of the action was now in a northerly direction, over the area which had just been traversed, and the British ships now drew ahead considerably and turned more and more towards the East; the Germans followed this movement, and in consequence the conditions of visibility became less and less favourable for them.<br />
<br />
The "Queen Elizabeths" now made their presence more greatly felt; one of them had dropped out, but I was unable to ascertain when this occurred.<br />
<br />
The course of the German Math Fleet at first led past the 2 disabled British destroyers, which were lying stopped. The crews had already taken to the boats and were picked up later on by German destroyers. As the Main Fleet was doubtful about the advisability of passing the destroyers while they were still afloat, they were sunk by a few broadsides. One of the officers who was picked up was in pyjamas and is said to have stayed in his cabin during the action. He declared "We did not expect so much resistance," while another said - "The battle is rather disappointing." It has been ascertained that these destroyers were greatly under-manned; their crews seemed very exhausted, which points to their having been in the water for a long time.<br />
<br />
While on this easterly course, the light cruisers of the fast 2nd Scouting Group: "FRANKFURT", "PILLAU", "ELBING" and "WIESBADEN", were heavily fired on from the N.E. and E. without their being able to see more than the gun flashes. In addition, they were under continual fire from the N., and while turning away to S.E. and S., they ascertained that they were opposed by an interminable line of British ships, which appeared at first to be on a N.W.'ly course, and had then evidently turned together on to a S.'ly course.<br />
<br />
It may be noted here that the battleships, and, generally speaking, the battle-cruisers also, never sighted the British Main Fleet, and saw nothing but the flashes of the guns and the effects of the fire. These British ships, about 25 in number, were only sighted by a few light cruisers and by the flotillas, and were counted by them as accurately as possible.<br />
<br />
Surrounded thus from the N. and the E. and under fire, the "WIESBADEN" was disabled, apparently by a hit in the engine-room. The Admiral noticed, it is true, that his leading ships must have encountered new and powerful forces and that they were turning away; but he thought it his duty to go to the assistance of the "WIESBADEN" and therefore continued on an easterly course.<br />
<br />
The van of the Main Fleet, led by the "KÖNIG" (Rear-Admiral Behncke) now came under heavy fire from right ahead; the "KÖNIG" turned away under this fire towards the S.E., whereupon the Commander-in-Chief ordered the whole line to "turn together" to starboard and gave up the idea of helping the "WIESBADEN". About this time Vice-Admiral Hipper transferred his flag from the "LÜTZOW" to the "MOLTKE" with the help of a destroyer, his W/T station being damaged.<br />
<br />
Hardly had the Main Fleet drawn away on a westerly course, before it was ascertained that the pressure was relaxing and the fire decreasing, and that the British were no longer pursuing so hotly. Scheer therefore ordered the ships to "turn together" back on to their former course, and made the signal 'R' = 'Engage the enemy'. This second advance may be termed the zenith of the action. Admiral Scheer gave his views on it approximately as follows:- "Those who make a study of this engagement will be very puzzled as to my object in advancing thus against the wall of British ships. The fact is that I had no particular object. I made the first advance because I had a feeling that I ought to endeavour to assist the "WIESBADEN" and because the situation ahead was quite obscure to me, for I saw nothing of the "LÜTZOW" and received no W/T reports. I soon saw, however, that the leading ships were coming under an overwhelming fire, and that I could not risk the Fleet on the "WIESBADEN'S" account. When I noticed that the British pressure had quite ceased and that the Fleet remained intact in my hands, I turned back, under the impression that the action could not end in this way and that I ought to seek contact with the enemy again."<br />
<br />
The situation during the first and second advances may serve as an example of what should not take place according to all the laws of tactics, for it could not have been worse; von Trotha said jokingly that, if an Admiral brought about such a situation at a war game or in manoeuvres, he would never be entrusted without another command. In the North, the "Queen Elizabeths", then the battle-cruisers, and from N.E. through E. to S.E., an endless line of battleships formed an arc round the German van and kept it under fire. Evidently it had fallen into the most perfect trap. In addition to this unfavourable tactical position, there was a further difficulty, namely that the German ships could be clearly distinguished while they themselves only saw the gun flashes, 4 or 5 to each salvo, but could find no target.<br />
<br />
The Gunnery Officer of the "MARKGRAF" told me that he could not fire at all during half-an-hour, and that they were at the mercy of the British broadsides. Critical though the position was, in theory, they think that experience justifies the conclusion that this 'crossing the T' is in reality not so disastrous at longer ranges; for, in spite of the enormous superiority of their fire, the British made comparatively few hits, the simple reason being that, when fire is thus concentrated on a few leading ships, there can be no question of improving the shooting by spotting.<br />
<br />
Given good tactical training and squadrons which work well together, it is always easy to retire rapidly from an unfavourable position and even possibly to reach an advantageous one.<br />
<br />
The small amount of damage sustained by the Main Fleet may be owing partly to the fact that the leading battle-cruisers drew the enemy's fire, thus relieving the battleships. Only the three leading ships, "KÖNIG", "GROSSER KURFÜRST" and "MARKGRAF" received several hits; while among all the other ships, the "KAISER", "HELGOLAND" and the "SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN" received one hit each, and the rest were not hit at all.<br />
<br />
Simultaneously with the battle-cruisers, which were ahead and pressing forward in quarter-line formation, the 6th and 9th Flotillas, left by the "REGENSBURG", also proceeded to a torpedo attack. Regarding this cruiser advance, the Commanding Officer of the "SEYDLITZ" told me that he was in such a position that he was able to avoid the British salvoes, for he altered course towards the point where each salvo fell and thus evaded the spotting correction.<br />
<br />
This torpedo attack was carried out with great determination and seems to have been completely successful, although nobody is able to state how many hits were obtained. The British ships overlapped somewhat and their line was almost unbroken, and, as about 100 torpedoes were fired, it is estimates that there must have been a considerable number of hits, some people affirm that there were 20, but I do not place much confidence in these figures and it is useless to trouble about them as nobody is certain.<br />
<br />
The boats were fired on by guns of all calibres, even the heaviest, but with little effect, only one boat being destroyed; two other boats had been sunk in an earlier attack during the cruiser action.<br />
<br />
The battle-cruisers were also attacked by British torpedoes, the "SEYDLITZ" being hit once. The "MOLTKE" was lucky, for, when close to the ship, one torpedo apparently had a gyro failure and ran parallel with her. The "LÜTZOW" was probably hit also.<br />
<br />
After the attack, the destroyers laid fog and a heavy smoke screen, which interposed between the Fleet; this benefitted not only the heavily-damaged "LÜTZOW" and "DERFFLINGER", whose nets had been shot away and were hanging down, but also the whole Fleet. It may also have made an impression on the British.<br />
<br />
The German Main Fleet and cruisers turned on a westerly course, fire having again entirely ceased; and the ships of the Main Fleet then turned gradually in succession and in inverse sequence from W. to S.W., subsequently steering towards Horns Reef.<br />
<br />
It is not known what the British did; all that is certain, is that they did not follow in pursuit and that nothing further was seen of their Main Fleet. It remained light until 11 p.m. (summer time), and it would not have been impossible, considering their superior speed, for them to have come within firing range. The Germans expected it too, and now have to content themselves with surmises about the British Commander-in-Chief's reasons for not doing so. It is probably that the unfavourable issue of the fleet part of the battle and the demoralising losses in ships took away any desire on Jellicoe's part for further fighting. His Fleet may have lost heavily and been severely shaken by the torpedo attack; and, as the Germans still had some intact flotillas at their disposal, he may have feared further strong torpedo attacks in the critical hours of twilight, for in the German Navy they say that Jellicoe fears their destroyers in particular.<br />
<br />
Nevertheless, the Germans were not under the impression of having shaken the British Fleet to the extent of obliging them to give up the struggle, and when the evening passed without further incident, they reckoned with certainty on encountering Jellicoe off Horns Reef at daybreak. They were the more astonished at his non-appearance when their air reconnaissance reported that on the morning of 1 June a squadron of 12 battle-ships was proceeding North from the southern part of North Sea and that it suddenly turned on to an opposite course and proceeded South.<br />
<br />
As it could not possibly have been the intention of the British Commander-in-Chief to let the German Fleet escape after having encountered it at last far from its base, and as he still had an intact battle-squadron at his disposal, one is compelled to take the view that he no longer felt strong enough for a second encounter; the achievement of the German Fleet must therefore be very highly thought of.<br />
<br />
During the night cruising following the action, numerous small episodes and minor engagements took place, of which no clear idea can be formed. <br />
<br />
In view of a possible fresh attack or of a possible pursuit on the part of the enemy, it was thought undesirable to leave the 2nd Battle Squadron either in the van or in the rear, it therefore took station to starboard and at first proceeded on an opening course from the other squadrons, and continued fairly independently during the night.<br />
<br />
The 1st Battle Squadron therefore led, with the "WESTFALEN" as guide, and it was followed by the 3rd Battle Squadron.<br />
<br />
After the action had been broken off, the 4 remaining battle cruisers were ahead to port, where they were suddenly again brought under heavy fire from the port side and from ahead, apparently by 3 or 4 battle cruisers. It is presumed that these were the remaining 3 or 4 older cruisers of the "Invincible" class, which Jellicoe probably always stationed ahead of the Main Fleet, for it would hardly have been possible for the "Lions", which were following in the rear in the British line, to have taken station ahead so quickly. The German battle cruisers, all severely damaged, did not feel able to withstand this fire and turned away to starboard, passing ahead of the Main Fleet and between it and the 2nd Battle Squadron, which proceeded quietly on their course and before which the mysterious ships retired, not to be sighted again.<br />
<br />
The battle-cruisers then gradually fell astern, and as they were making much water, and also owing to their differing speeds, they lost contact with the Main Fleet and with each other.<br />
<br />
The "LÜTZOW" had dropped out during the engagement and proceeded independently, accompanied by 4 destroyers. At first she was able to steam 14 knots, but her speed decreased rapidly and dropped finally to 4 knots. Her bows sank slowly, and when the whole forecastle was under water the Commanding Officer decided to leave the ship. The badly wounded were transferred carefully to the boats and the disembarkation was conducted in good order. A torpedo was then fired at the ship and this coup de grace sank her in deep water at about 1 o'clock, I believe.<br />
<br />
The "SEYDLITZ" was hardly in a better condition than the "LÜTZOW"; she also sank gradually by the bows till the water was almost level with the deck, and she had a heavy list to port, but she continued on her course. In the darkest hours of the night she suddenly sighted 3 large ships to port, quite close to. She turned away, made a British recognition signal and was not pursued. As bad luck would have it, the steaming light had short-circuited, could not be switched off and showed intermittently.<br />
<br />
The "DERFFLINGER", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN" followed the Main Fleet more or less and met with no particular experiences.<br />
<br />
The Main Fleet had to repulse a series of destroyer attacks and was also engaged by cruisers. The movements of these British cruisers, which came up singly, are incomprehensible and give the impression of having lost their heads. They appear to have received the order, judging by an intercepted W/T message, to proceed on a northerly and north-westerly course, and thereby they ran into the extended German line which they probably imagined they had passed to the South.<br />
<br />
One large cruiser (?"WARRIOR") proceeded unsuspectingly within 875 yds. of the line of battleships and came under concentrated fire from several ships before she could reply, so that she blew up enveloped in flames and disappeared in 47 seconds. The "BIRMINGHAM" seems to have been accounted for in a similar manner. The destroyers all approached in a really insane manner; frequently not from ahead but from a direction astern, scattered, singly or in pairs, or at most 3 together, never in large numbers. Most of them were disabled forthwith by a few salvoes and set on fire. The "WESTFALEN" distinguished herself particularly at this time.<br />
<br />
These burning destroyers strewn along the course, lit it up as if for a festival. Evidently the fires were largely due to the light American and Mexican oils; at any rate German firing trials on oil bunkers never caused any such conflagrations.<br />
<br />
The attacking boats directed shrapnel fire on the searchlights with fairly good results, the searchlights of two battleships and one light cruiser being hit.<br />
<br />
One large destroyer, which only recognised the danger at the last moment and endeavoured to avoid it by altering course was rammed by the "NASSAU", which put her helm over for this purpose. The boat exploded internally and sank.<br />
<br />
The only ships hit were the "POMMERN" in the 2ns Battle Squadron, and the "ROSTOCK". The "POMMERN" blew up at once and nobody was saved. The "ROSTOCK" was just passing between ships of the Main Fleet when she was hit; the loss of life on board was small.<br />
<br />
The Germans believe they destroyed 11 British destroyers in all. The manner in which these destroyers were handled has not left a good impression on the whole, and one has certainly lost respect for this weapon. The view is also taken that the boats are too large and offer too wide a target.<br />
<br />
The light cruiser "ELBING", like the "ROSTOCK", apparently wanted to break through the line from port to starboard under pressure from the British cruisers; she was, however, rammed by the "POSEN" and had to be abandoned in a sinking condition. The Germans also fired a torpedo into her.<br />
<br />
The "FRAUENLOB" and 2 destroyers were lost during the night; no details of their loss are known.<br />
<br />
Not far from Heligoland, the "OSTFRIESLAND", 7th of the line, struck a mine. This brings the account of the chief events of this exciting cruiser to an end.<br />
<br />
The German flotillas were detached from the Fleet to clear the area off the Jutland Coast, which was divided up into sectors. The flotillas stationed furthest to the North proceeded to the Skagerrak and through these straits into the Baltic and to Kiel.<br />
<br />
None of the flotillas sighted the British Main Fleet again, which proves that it must have turned away to the N. or N.W. immediately after the action. According to confidential reports the Fleet entered British ports as early as 1 June.<br />
<br />
Two British battleships, in a severely damaged condition and accompanied by destroyers, were sighted proceeding back to England. One was attacked by a submarine, but without success.<br />
<br />
On the morning of 1 June, in fairly misty weather, a Zeppelin sighted groups of British ships leaving the Channel on a N.E.'ly course. The reports were rather vague, as sometimes 6 and sometimes 12 ships were mentioned; but it seems most likely that 12 battleships and 3 cruisers were in question, and that they soon retired. The airship, which flew low at one time to get a clearer view, was also fired on.<br />
<br />
Some of the ships are said to have had tripod masts.<br />
<br />
The German Fleet, with the exception of "SEYDLITZ", reached the Jade in the afternoon. The "SEYDLITZ" could not cross the bar on account of being so much down by the bows, and it was not till the next day at high water that she was towed in, stern first.<br />
<br />
<center><u>MISCELLANEOUS.<br>TACTICS.</u></center><br />
<br />
The Germans ascribe their success to various causes, and in the first place to their own superiority as regards tactics. This is a point which every officer discusses, and it is constantly repeated that it all happened just as in tactical manoeuvres and in "battle exercises", and that things could not have gone better.<br />
<br />
Movements of squadrons, divisions and individual ships, "turns together" and alterations of course and speed, all went like clockwork and demonstrated the very great mobility of all formations.<br />
<br />
The W/T signalling system of the Main Fleet never failed, and its failure would have been immaterial, as the primary and secondary flag action signals, showing from several positions in the ship, were made simultaneously.<br />
<br />
All this was due to the peace training and the practical experience of the Flag Officers and Captains. Though in peace time the Commander-in-Chief had never commanded a Fleet, nor the Admirals a squadron, still the training carried out on the same lines for a number of years resulted in everything proceeding with the expected precision.<br />
<br />
The British, on the contrary, are said to have displayed a certain clumsiness as regards tactics and to have preferred turning together when "turning on to an opposite course" (Wendungen im Gegenmarsch), though this conclusion does not seem altogether justified from the description of the action.<br />
<br />
The ships kept station 547 yds. apart, and Vice-Admiral Schmidt told me that, in his opinion, this distance is too small for large ships and that he prefers 656 yds., as the shorter distances result in the ships getting bunched and overlapping during alterations of course. In order to relieve this during the first turn to starboard, the Fleet Flagship herself turned to port and then closed gradually into line. At night the distance was 656 yds.<br />
<br />
No interruption of W/T communication was occasioned by the enemy.<br />
<br />
<center><u>GUNNERY</u></center><br />
<br />
It is admitted that the British are superior as regards their gunnery technique. Their salvoes fall most astoundingly close together and aroused admiration on all sides. Some people affirm that they fell too close together, and that it was consequently difficult to cover a sufficiently large danger space.<br />
<br />
This is particularly the case with the heaviest calibres: 13.5-in. and 15-in. and the battle-cruisers' fire was noticeably inferior to that of the "Queen Elizabeth" class, for example.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> Literal translation; the meaning is not clear. - Tr.] The spread of the salvoes frequently only covered a few square yards. In the "KÖNIG" 3 rounds, out of a salvo of 4 rounds, hit between the capstan and the bridge.<br />
<br />
This is attributed to careful calibration, which the British have studied for a long time and which, as is well known, was abandoned by the German Navy after a few trials. The gunnery officers declare unanimously that it must unquestionably be re-introduced.<br />
<br />
The British range-finders are superior to the German, and the construction of their turrets enables them to shoot at ranges impossible for German guns. The question of range appears to be immaterial to the British, who fire at any range so long as visibility permits.<br />
<br />
The Germans are fully convinced of the great superiority of 15-in. guns over all others, and deplore the fact that, owing to the predominant conservative tendencies in the German Navy, this calibre was not introduced until so lately. Vice-Admiral Gerdes, the Head of the Armament Department, is responsible for this, for he always opposed it on the ground that the poor visibility in German waters and the consequent short ranges rendered an increase of calibre useless; he considered the German 12-in. gun to be an altogether superior weapon, capable of competing with every other.<br />
<br />
In one respect the British seem behindhand as compared with the Germans: namely that they cannot alter range quickly enough and they are too dependent on the range clock. The British rely on steady fire at long range, and they adapt their tactics to this and avoid alterations of course and range most assiduously.<br />
<br />
The Germans, on the contrary, in their firing practices always work with big and rapid alterations of range and exercise firing while turning, so that the gunnery officers consider they have an advantage in this respect.<br />
<br />
The Turn on to an opposite course was certainly not advantageous for the German Fleet, but in this particular instance it made little difference, as the German ships were already unable to find a target; besides which, it must have disconcerted the British and it prevented them from obtaining good results with their fire. The salvoes fell very close together round the ships, but few hits were obtained. The rate of fire in the British ships is said to have been fair, but not excessive. Some people affirm that it was very modest.<br />
<br />
The British shell had great penetrating power, and from all reasonable distances the main armour was generally pierced clean through. The shell splinters picked up prove conclusively that at least 2 kinds of shell were used, differing considerably in material and quality. One kind of shell had a very thick wall and an extremely small explosive charge, it might almost be called a solid shot. It seems to have broken up frequently without exploding and the fuse did not function. Its explosive power, if it possessed any at all, was quite inconsiderable, and it is presumed that the explosives used was not high explosive.<br />
<br />
It appears from the splinters of these 15-in. shell that the wall was 6.3 - 6.7 ins. (16 - 17 cm.), so that the hollow space cannot measure more than 2.4 ins. - 1.8 ins. (4 - 6 cm.). It is true that the large pieces into which these shell broke pierced everything in their course and often went right through the whole ship, unless they struck an armoured part. Several intact heads were found, with and without caps, and also entire bases.<br />
<br />
The second kind of shell had considerably thinner walls, only about half as thick, but it also often broke up into quite large pieces and displayed no great explosive power, and little or no incendiary power.<br />
<br />
It appears therefore that the British aimed only at attaining penetrating power, and the Germans are of opinion that they do not possess (rohrsicheren)* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D.Note.- This appears to be a special fuse which is very delicate, but safe until it has left the gun.] fuses for high explosive shell; this was their opinion before the war also.<br />
<br />
They believe that the high explosive power of the German ammunition gives them a great advantage which may partly counterbalance the smaller calibre of their guns and perhaps also their inferior gunnery. In any case, the effect of the German shell at the point of impact was very considerable.<br />
<br />
The fact that the ships blew up must be attributed to explosions in their magazines. (In this connection one may recall a turret of the "SEYDLITZ" being hit in the action of 24 January, 1915; see my report No.47 ex 15). The turret armour must have been pierced and the shells in the turret must have been exploded. The British have no metal cartridge-cases and also no cartridge-holders such as the Germans have, but they keep their cartridges in locked boxes which are perhaps not flash-proof enough. It seems therefore, from the incident experienced by the "SEYDLITZ", that this must constitute a particular danger to British ships. In this last action also turrets in German ships were frequently hit; further details are given in the account of damage sustained.<br />
<br />
After having compared the hits received in the German ships with the observations of results on enemy targets, it may be safely affirmed that the explosive power of the German shells exceeds that of the British; this was already known after the action of 24 January 1915. The Germans are therefore very much annoyed that they had no 15-in. guns to fire, as they are persuaded that ships so knocked about (eingedeckte) as, for example, the "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" would have been completely destroyed by German shell.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. Note.- The writer appears to mean that if German 15-in. shell had been used against "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" these ships would have been sunk.]<br />
<br />
It may be noted here that the "BAYERN", the first of their ships to carry 15-in. guns, will not join the Fleet for another few days, and the "BADEN" not until the autumn.<br />
<br />
Medium armament played no part, only a few hits were obtained and they did little damage.<br />
<br />
The British fired part-salvoes, like the Germans; full salvoes may have been fired now and again.<br />
<br />
The method of repulsing destroyer attacks, which has previously been reported, namely the 'turning away' and firing on one, or at most two boats, proved to be sound, and the repulsing of attacks both by day and night offered no difficulties.<br />
<br />
As regards gunnery, it may also be mentioned that the fire-control apparatus worked without a hitch and withstood the heaviest shocks. The elevation pointers worked admirably. A few ships were not yet fitted with them.<br />
<br />
<center><u>Torpedo.</u></center><br />
<br />
As regards torpedo work the Germans consider themselves very much superior. There were prolonged discussions about depriving Flotilla Leaders of their independence and putting them under the orders of a Leader Ship, but they are now convinced that this is necessary to ensure the flotillas attacking at the right moment and all together.<br />
<br />
The flotillas were led by the 2 leader Ships "ROSTOCK" and "REGENSBURG", the first having 2 flotillas and the second 3 flotillas allocated to them. The remaining 2 flotillas accompanied the Main Fleet or the battle-cruisers. The leaders carried out their duties with great daring and circumspection. The attacks of the British were weak and scattered, and could therefore have little or only occasional success.<br />
<br />
The German 2nd Flotilla, composed of the larger 1500 ton boats were held back instead of being sent to attack. Although these boats are spoken of very highly and are indispensable for certain enterprises, the view is now taken that they are too large and too valuable to be used for attacking during an action. This Flotilla proceeded to Zeebrugge immediately after the action and arrived there safely. It is to be employed in preventing the British from blockading the harbour with nets, and thus make it impossible for the German submarines to proceed out.<br />
<br />
As far as I have heard, the "MOLTKE" alone of the larger ships fired 4 torpedoes.<br />
<br />
Submarines were not in evidence. No German submarines were present; on the other hand a German destroyer claims to have rammed a British submarine. This claim appears to be erroneous, at least it was declared to be nonsense by the Chief of Staff. The submarines failed as regards scouting and also doing the pursuit.<br />
<br />
Some people state that a British aeroplane was sighted to the northward, and that it had apparently risen from a cruiser. It played no part in the action.<br />
<br />
The use of "Höschter"* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. note:- Probably the name of the inventor.] fog seems to have been of good service, it and the smoke made by the destroyers having completely masked the Main Fleet and its movements at critical moments.<br />
<br />
<center><u>SPEED</u></center><br />
<br />
The advantage of speed lay entirely with the British, not only as regards the Main Fleet on account of the "Deutschland" class, but also as regards the battle-cruisers. The latter are said to have proved considerably faster than the German battle cruisers, an unpleasant experience which had already been made on 25 January 1915. This alone proves that the British are talking nonsense when they assert that the German Fleet sought safety in flight; on the contrary, it was far from its bases and entirely in the power of the British, who either did not wish to take advantage of their superior speed, or were unable to do so on account of the damage sustained. The visibility was no worse than it had been during the day and Jellicoe may have even welcomed the "Höschter" fog which would enable him to plead bad visibility as a reason for abandoning the pursuit. On the German side in the light of experience the factor of speed in the battleships is considered very important. But the moderate depths of the German harbours limits the draught of the ships, and make it particularly difficult for German builders to do much in this respect. In spite of greater length and higher horse power the most modern cruisers "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ" and "LÜTZOW" attained only a quite inconsiderable increase of speed in comparison with the older "GOEBEN" class, and proved a disappointment in this particular.<br />
<br />
The question whether the older battleships should take part in an important engagement was not easy to decide. The 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons composed of the "WITTLESBACH" and "BARBAROSSA" class, re-commissioned at the beginning of the war, were intended to be used in such actions, but have long since been paid off; some have been disarmed and employed as guardships and instructional ships, etc. It was considered however, that the 2nd Battle Squadron, composed of the most modern of the older ships, would be of some service in the action; but this squadron was in a privileged position, inasmuch as it was merely attached to the 1st and 3rd Battle Squadrons and its Admiral was allowed to operate independently and select the position he thought best. On this occasion it kept station quite well and did not prove a hindrance, but, on the other hand, it did not come under any heavy fire. This must be considered very fortunate, for, in view of the damage sustained by other ships and in view of the fact that the British shell pierced all armour above or below water even at the longest range, it is certain that every ship of this class would have been sunk by a few hits, as their internal sub-division is not proof against large inrushes of water.<br />
<br />
The loss of the "Pommern", which gives the British an opportunity for a hollow triumph, also teaches a clear lesson. The Chief of Staff told me that they will probably consider carefully before again exposing this Squadron to danger; therefore this action will have further confirmed the complete worthlessness of all Dreadnought types [sic] and will condemn them as old iron.<br />
<br />
<center><u>TORPEDO NETS.</u></center><br />
<br />
The torpedo nets of the battle cruisers are all badly damaged and the gear so knocked about by gunfire that they were almost useless. This was particularly the case with the "Derfflinger", where the after port nets were hanging in the water, and would have fallen across the propeller had they not chanced to remain held up by a temporary lashing. The ship was obliged to stop during the action to secure the nets, and they might easily have occasioned the loss of the ship.<br />
<br />
For this reason all the nets, together with the booms, were unshipped immediately after the ships' return, to everybody's satisfaction. They will not be carried any more, except perhaps for operations in the Baltic, where the ships may be obliged to anchor at sea.<br />
<br />
<center><u>LEAK-STOPPING SERVICE.</u></center><br />
<br />
The leak-stopping service which had been systematically developed, worked admirably and the Germans are convinced that they owe much to it. They believed that the "Seydlitz" could not have been brought in if the strengthening of the bulkheads, etc., had not been so thoroughly exercised and if the personnel had not been so well trained.<br />
<br />
It is also said, that in the "Lutzow", which had only been in commission for 2 months, was naturally not up to the mark in this respect, and that it is not impossible that small shortcomings, for which of course nobody can be blamed, were responsible for the ship sinking. The "Lutzow" was an unfortunate ship altogether. First her turbines collapsed, thus delaying her commissioning for 6 months, then she immediately struck a mine, and she was hardly out of dockyard hands before she was sunk.<br />
<br />
<center><u>DANGER FROM GAS FUMES.</u></center><br />
<br />
Only 2 days before sailing, a large number of the ships, and fortunately exactly those that came most under fire, namely battle-cruisers and the 3rd Squadron, were supplied with gas masks fitted with alkali cartridges for the whole crew and a plentiful reserve (in the "Seydlitz" 1500 masks for about 1200 men). The masks are similar to those used in the army for poisonous gases. Each man carries a mask slung round him, if he is not actually wearing it.<br />
<br />
I was told emphatically by all the officers, that, in their experience, these masks are absolutely necessary and not only saved many lives but enabled the men to carry on in parts of the ship which they would otherwise have been compelled to leave.<br />
<br />
The gases from shells, mines and torpedoes penetrate in an incredible manner through ventilators, telephone leads, etc. to compartments far away from the point of impact. In many cases the masks enabled large numbers of the guns' crews to escape from turrets that were hit, and to help out others who were badly wounded. In one case the men in one of the main engine rooms were able to remain at their posts after gas had penetrated, until the engine-room was ventilated.<br />
<br />
The Fleet breathing apparatus (Flottenathmer) is preferable to masks in some cases, but it cannot be supplied to everyone and it hampers one's movements, which the masks do not.<br />
<br />
On account of the great danger from gases, it is also advisable to fit hinged flaps in all shafts, and to have wooden bungs to fit the voice-pipes, keeping a hammer at hand to hammer them into the mouth-pieces.<br />
<br />
They tell me that it proved very useful to keep all the personnel employed below, such as in central control rooms, engine-rooms, torpedo flats, etc. continually informed of what was going on. The men get nervous, particularly at first, with the tremendous shocks caused by shell falling close to the ship, though the shocks are felt less on deck, and such information gives them confidence and they like knowing what is going on above them.<br />
<br />
<center><u>DAMAGE</u></center><br />
<br />
The distribution of ships needing repair in the various dockyards is as follows:-<br />
<br />
The "König" proceeded at once to Kiel and is under repair at Howaldt's yard. I did not see her.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" and "Moltke" in Blohm and Voss yard, Hamburg, the first in the Imperial Dock.<br />
<br />
The "Kurfürst["] in Vulkan Yard, Hamburg.<br />
<br />
The "Derfflinger" was first docked in Wilhelmshaven and the leaks temporarily stopped, she then proceeded to the Imperial dockyard, Kiel. The "Seydlitz" will now be docked in the large dock at Wilhelmshaven; during my stay the "Seydlitz" was still in the lock.<br />
<br />
The "Von der Tann", "Ostfriesland" and "Helgoland" will be repaired in dry docks in Wilhelmshaven. No other large ships require to be docked.<br />
<br />
"<u>Seydlitz</u>" The number of hits was still uncertain, as the whole forepart of the ship up to the upper deck was still under water, and it is not known what she looks like below water. The ship was brought into the lock with difficulty, and as she is 43 ft. down by the bows, she cannot be taken into harbour. They will not venture to dock the ship inside the lock, and intend first to raise her bows slightly.<br />
<br />
The roof and guns of the fore turret and anchors, cables etc., have already been unshipped, and they now intend to bring caissons alongside and pump out the fore part sufficiently to enable her to enter the harbour.<br />
<br />
The great inrush of water, that flooded more or less the whole fore part of the ship as far as the first boiler-room bulkhead, was caused by a number of hits. Firstly, one of the belt armour plates forward on the port side is missing, having fallen off. Secondly, there are believed to be at least 2 or 3 more hits below water, forward on the port side; for the list and the settling down had already become ominous when the ship was hit at the edge of the upper deck, port side, abreast the bridge; this was followed by an inrush of water in the battery deck, which did a great amount of damage.<br />
<br />
In addition, during the day action, she was hit by a torpedo on the starboard side under the forward 5.9 in. gun, which caused her to settle down still more by the bows. This gun was so much damaged by the shock from underneath as to be disabled.<br />
<br />
Further, there are 4 severe hits in the ship's side (mess deck, port side, forward of the turret), which also demolished the port capstan.<br />
<br />
These shell, or shell splinters, naturally penetrated to the armoured deck, so that the entire fore part of the ship above and below the armoured deck is holed in many places, allowing free passage for the water. The fore part of the ship was struck therefore by at least 8 or 9 shells and one torpedo.<br />
<br />
Apparently the only compartments which are not flooded, are the bow torpedo flats and the central control room. The former is being pumped out continuously, as a great deal of water is flowing in from above. The torpedo control room had to be abandoned, as the forward partition was not watertight. The central control room abaft this was not abandoned, but of its 2 entrances from the starboard and port passages, only the port one can be used, as the starboard one is flooded.<br />
<br />
The gunnery control room is far further aft and was not affected.<br />
<br />
The ship has a list of 7° to port, and as she has now been slightly raised, about 1¾ ft. of her bows are above water; at one time it was up to the level of the deck.<br />
<br />
While under way the forward boiler room bulkhead had to withstand most of the pressure; supports have been built up everywhere, but it leaks in places.<br />
<br />
The other hits of consequences were those in the turrets. The fore starboard turret No.2 received a direct hit on the fore face of the revolving structure. One curved plate was forced out, but fortunately the main effect of the explosion was outward. The right hand gun was disabled by slight damage to the mounting; with this exception the turret remained in action and kept up fire.<br />
<br />
The right hand gun of turret No.3 received a direct hit, which cut out a wide groove along the tube of the gun. The left hand gun continued to fire.<br />
<br />
The barbette of turret No.4 was hit on a level with the rammer, and the armour was pierced clean through. This hit is of special interest, as the "Seydlitz" received a similar hit and at the same level in turret No.5 on 24th January 1915, which caused a fire, disabled both the after turrets and killed all the guns' crews. This last time, however, the damage was slight. There was no ready ammunition in the turret, and only one cartridge was exploded, in contrast to the (6200 Kg.) 13,670 lbs. of powder on Jan.1915. The turret officer and a large number of the gun's crews were saved by their gas masks. The destruction caused by splinters was, however, considerable and the turret was abandoned, as it was not possible to continue fire from it. This was a 13.5 in. shell, at 15,310 yds. range, strength of armour pierced 8.6 inches.<br />
<br />
After the turret had been abandoned, it was hit a second time in the after side of the revolving part, which was pierced; this of course increased the havoc in the interior.<br />
<br />
Turret No.5 was hit in the roof. The shell richochetted, and the roof is slightly dented. Nobody was hurt and the turret continued to fire.<br />
<br />
In the "Seydlitz" therefore, all the turrets were hit, with the exception of the foremost turret, and one was hit twice.<br />
<br />
A further hit pierced the 5.9 in. (150mm.) casemate armour of the aftermost 5.9 in. starboard gun, No.2. The deck was pierced from beneath, and splinters also pierced the splinter bulkhead. The gun was disabled and all the crew were killed, with the exception of the ship's chaplain who happened to be in the casemate and must be watched over by a special guardian angel.<br />
<br />
A similar hit, with a 15 in. shell, struck the casemate armour of the 6-in. gun No.7 and exploded in the casemate. Men were killed, the gun was disabled and the splinter bulkhead pierced by large splinters. This time again, surprise was aroused by the comparatively small damage caused by a large calibre shell.<br />
<br />
"<u>Derfflinger</u>". One shell hit the armour belt forward of the hawse pipe, probably at the junction of 2 plates, as 2 plates broke away. The plates underneath were consequently strained apart and a great deal of water flowed in.<br />
<br />
The armour belt on the port side also received 2 further hits in the centre and was pierced clean through. The splinters penetrated more than half way through the ship, and in one case a piece of plating was driven half way though the ship. These hits, combined perhaps with others, destroyed the nets and their supports in several places.<br />
<br />
The two after turrets received direct hits, in one case on the roof, in the other case in the barbette above the deck; the armour was pierced and the upper portions of the turrets burnt out and severely damaged, but the flames did not penetrate to the magazines. The crew in the upper part of the turret were killed, and both turrets were disabled. This occurred at an early stage of the action.<br />
<br />
The guns at high elevation cannot yet be dismounted, as everything is wedged in, but they do not appear to be damaged.<br />
<br />
The muzzles were carried away off the 4 foremost 6 in. (15 cm.) guns on the port side; two of them probably having been accounted for by one and the same shell which hit the armour. One gun, the muzzle of which was perhaps damaged by a splinter, afterwards burst, the tube splitting open in the shape of a tulip.<br />
<br />
The "Derfflinger" received a few other hits of no particular interest. She appears the next most severely damaged ship after the "Lützow".<br />
<br />
The "<u>Moltke</u>" only received 5 hits, all of them during that part of the action which took place on a southerly course; while the cruisers mentioned above received most of the hits on the port side, consequently during the later stages of the action.<br />
<br />
One shell pieced the bulwarks in the after part of the ship above the armour, passed through the ship and struck the armour on the port side from inside, about 3.3 ft. below the water-line. One plate was forced out and is missing. The inrush of water was considerable. The after compartments, above the armoured deck which remained intact, were all more or less flooded.<br />
<br />
The second hit was further forward, below the armour belt. The shell exploded in a bunker, but the armoured deck held and no water penetrated it from below. The neighbouring bunkers made little water and could be pumped out.<br />
<br />
Another shell struck the 5.9 in. armour in the upper bunker, above the water-line. The armoured deck again held, but the inner wall of the bunker parted, and the battery deck was pierced from below, a 6 in. gun being damaged and disabled.<br />
<br />
In the fore part of the ship a shell struck the armour belt below the water-line. The plate remained intact and was driven in about 8 inches. The compartment was flooded, but the torpedo bulkhead remained watertight. A neighbouring compartment leaked slightly, the rivets having parted.<br />
<br />
The fifth case of damage, namely a plate beneath the armour belt being driven and pressed in, was probably not due to a direct hit, but to splinters of a shell which fell short.<br />
<br />
"<u>Von der Tann</u>". A shell hit and pierced the lower part of the 3.9 in. armour belt in the after part of the ship to starboard. The compartments above the armoured deck, and some of those on the deck above, were flooded. The chief effect of the shell was outside the ship, but it bent the plates below the otherwise undamaged armoured deck, so that a considerable amount of water flowed into the compartments below the armoured deck. The after torpedo flat was flooded half way up, and the men in the starboard steering engine room were shut in for a long time owing to the exits being blocked.<br />
<br />
The fore turret was hit on the starboard side on the upper edge of the barbette and a semi-circular armour plate was forced out. The machinery of the turret was so badly knocked about that the turret was disabled.<br />
<br />
The hydraulic piping was damaged, so that all the heavy armament was put out of action temporarily. Strangely enough, though men were wounded none were killed.<br />
<br />
The aftermost turret was hit in the barbette. The armour was pierced, but the effect of the shell was exterior, the turret sustained little internal damage, so that the handgear of the turret remained in action. The turret was wedged in one place and could not revolve; they succeeded, however, in cutting off with oxy-acetylene the piece of revolving part which was jammed against the inner side of the barbette thus getting rid of the obstruction.<br />
<br />
Outside the turret, the shell did considerable damage; some splinters striking downwards, bent the armoured deck and pierced it in places. As far as I know, the armoured deck sustained no further damage, and this was of little importance.<br />
<br />
The after conning-tower was hit and a piece of the armour torn away; the occupants, including the 3rd gunnery officer, were killed. Splinters struck downwards to the engine-room ventilation hatches, but were stopped by the armoured gratings.<br />
<br />
"<u>Ostfriesland"</u> was struck by a mine below the foremost port turret. The whole measures 197 ft.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. note:- Literal translation is 12 times 5 metres large.] The torpedo bulkhead is only slightly torn, and the inrush of water was only local.<br />
<br />
"<u>Helgoland</u>". A 13.5 in. shell hit the 7.9 in. armour belt forward on the port side and pierced it. The shell appears to have broken only as no explosive action can be traced. The range was about 14,217 yds.<br />
<br />
"<u>Nassau</u>" rammed a British destroyer, or rather, the destroyer ran into her forward on the port side. Her bows must have lifted right up, for her hawse-pipe remained on board the "Nassau", so firmly wedged into the side of the upper deck that it will have to be cut out. The "Nassau's" side below the deck is torn away for 33 ft. The destroyer then glanced off the "Nassau's" side and exploded internally. One of the crew remained behind in one of the nets, but fell into the water when the "Nassau" fired a salvo.<br />
<br />
The "Nassau" was hit by shrapnel from attacking destroyers in the foremost searchlight group, both port searchlights were put out of action. The searchlight control and electric cables were destroyed and many of the searchlight crews were killed. The after searchlight group was hit in a similar manner, and one of the searchlights was disabled.<br />
<br />
The "Rhineland" and a light cruiser were also hit in a similar manner.<br />
<br />
I have seen all the above mentioned ships in Wilhelmshaven.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" and "Kurfürst" were at Hamburg, but unfortunately I am unable to report much about them. They had already been under repair for several days, and the damage was to some extent made good. Besides this, the conditions were not favourable for undisturbed examination: commissioners from the Imperial Navy Office were on board, besides crowds of workmen, the noise was deafening and it was pouring with rain. Consequently I took no notes on the spot and relied on my memory, which however fails me now among the very many received of similar cases. I am therefore unable to report each hit with accuracy.<br />
<br />
This is immaterial, however, as there were no particularly interesting hits, and none of the ships had been hit in the turrets. The armour had been pierced in several places, the effect and character of the hits being similar in all cases; the hits on unarmoured parts were of little consequence.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" was hit aft on the port side of the water line just on a junction of two plates, a piece of equal size being torn away from each plate. The shell then struck the sloping part of the armoured deck and the splinters ricochetted and passed right through the ship. These plates have already been removed.<br />
<br />
A casemate was pierced and the gun disabled.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" is the only ship whose mast was hit, the mast remained standing and has now been removed.<br />
<br />
The spotting platform had to be abandoned, as communications with the conning tower was cut off. This was the only hit received in a conning tower; it only grazed the upper edge and glanced off, and the men inside hardly noticed it.<br />
<br />
The port engine was disabled, not in consequence of damage to the turbine which is in good condition, but owing to one of the main propeller bearings becoming overheated. The cause of this is not clear, but it is believed to be due to concussions. The ship was well able to keep station with her two remaining engines.<br />
<br />
The "<u>Kurfürst</u>" suffered especially from a great inrush of water forward on the port side, above the armoured deck; it was caused by a hit in the armour belt. No further damage of importance was sustained.<br />
<br />
With regard to time necessary for repair to these ships, it is not yet possible to say anything definite, as it is still undecided whether they shall undergo thorough repair or not. The chief difficulty is the manufacture of new armour plates; but some of the holed plates can, no doubt, be left in position for the present.<br />
<br />
A considerable time will be needed to repair some of the turrets of the battle-cruisers, but here too, they will contrive to get things done. For instance, the "Von der Tann" is to have an entire turret out of a ship of the "Nassau" class, probably the foremost turret, and this ship will be left without a turret for some time. They talk a great deal also of transferring guns, and they will perhaps make use of those intended for the "Hindenburg", which will not be completed will the late autumn.<br />
<br />
It may be presumed that the battleships will be ready for sea in 4-6 weeks, and the battle-cruisers, particularly the "Seydlitz", in not less than 4 months. Naturally work is going on day and night, and repairs are given priority over all new construction.<br />
<br />
The damage sustained by light cruisers and destroyers is inconsiderable. The "Hamburg" had a funnel shot away. As these ships seem to be of minor importance, I did not trouble further about them.<br />
<br />
As our Allies appear not to have the intention of communicating to us what effect the examination of damages sustained will have on their construction in the future, we must endeavour to ascertain this as time goes on by means of cross questioning and by studying their new constructions in detail. I do not feel called upon to draw premature and rash conclusions to-day, on the strength of impressions received, but this will not prevent me from giving a summary of my opinion and of the opinions expresses in my hearing.<br />
<br />
Firstly, it is a remarkable fact that in all the ships that have returned home, all the engine and boiler-rooms are undamaged; the "Lützow" is no exception to this, as she proceeded under her own steam until late in the night after the action. I have also been assured by the Imperial Navy Office, after an inspection carried out by the Chief Engineer, that not a single auxiliary engine was defective. The only boiler-room put out of action was the foremost one in the "Seydlitz" where the bulkhead gave a little, allowing water to penetrate through rivet holes and cracks when the ship was under way. The conclusion may therefore be drawn that these vital parts of the ship are sufficiently protected and that the armour belt of the usual German thicknesses, though it cannot stop the shells, at least fulfils its purpose by breaking them up. Consequently it has become almost impossible even for the largest splinters of 15 in. shell to penetrate through armoured deck or torpedo bulkhead in engine and boiler rooms.<br />
<br />
Even at these long ranges and steep angles there was no question of the armoured decks being pierced; but the fitting of strong gratings over the hatches, which prevented the engines of the "Von der Tann" from sustaining severe damage, appears very necessary.<br />
<br />
The torpedo bulkheads also resisted shells, mines and torpedoes effectually; and in cases where slight damage was sustained, it had no further consequences than the flooding of the compartment affected.<br />
<br />
Perhaps it would be advisable to construct a specially strong boiler-room bulkhead, similar to a torpedo bulkhead, so that it could not be damaged by splinters or water-pressure.<br />
<br />
The inspection of the "Seydlitz" has left me with the impression that the commanding officer of the "Seydlitz" expected rather too much of his ship, and that nothing short of extraordinary good luck enabled her to be brought back. At one time when the whole forepart of the ship was flooded and the bows were under water, he proceeded occasionally with revolutions for 22 knots, just in order to show how seaworthy his ship was, so he told me. This may have been very sporting, or perhaps it may have been necessary under the circumstances in order not to drop too far behind and be overtaken by the enemy, but it certainly was not good seamanship, and if his stokehold bulkhead had burst, the "Seydlitz" would have gone down like the "Lutzow", where the circumstances appear to have been very similar. Later on he decreased speed and finally proceeded stern first.<br />
<br />
I therefore think it not impossible that the loss of the "Lützow", which is said to have been proceeded at 14 knots for a time, was also due only to recklessly high speed, and that the ship might have been saved if she had proceeded stern first or been taken in tow.<br />
<br />
As the danger from water-pressure must always be greatest from ahead, it would certainly be advisable to take special preventative measures against it.<br />
<br />
Vice-Admiral Schmidt told me that, in his opinion, the armoured belt ought to be strongest in the centre, and possible in the afterpart to protect the steering engines, and possibly in the bows, but that it ought not to taper off gradually from the centre to the extremities. He was also entirely in favour of a protected upper deck forming a second armoured deck.<br />
<br />
The admirably thorough system of internal division in the German ships and the floating capability thus attained is the finest proof of the merit of German construction which pursued this aim, and it shows that Admiral von Tirpitz, the creator of the Battle Fleet of to-day, was right when he upheld the principle that, above all things, the ships must be capable of remaining afloat and must not sink or heel over, and that everything else is of secondary consideration.<br />
<br />
The large number of hits in the turrets is remarkable, and it is generally considered that the turret armour should be appreciably stronger, especially in the lower part of the barbettes; for it is not only the disablement of the guns that comes into question, serious though this might be, but also the blowing up of magazines and the total destruction of the ship, as the wide shaft down to the magazines cannot possibly be made completely flash-proof. This is the most vital part of the ship. It is only owing to the small explosive charges in British shells, that there were no explosions of magazines in the German ships.<br />
<br />
Everything possible had been done after the action of 24.1.15 to ensure protection against this danger; the ready ammunition was removed from the top of the hoists and wherever possible all the openings in shafts leading down below were fitted with flaps, covers and heavy asbestos mats, while German ammunition is particularly carefully stowed and packed in cases with screwed-on covers.<br />
<br />
The disasters on the British side are a proof that this is a question of the greatest importance. It must also be taken into consideration that while any other damage turret may take months.<br />
<br />
The numerous hits in turrets would appear to justify the opinion of those who decided against triple turrets, on the ground [sic] that if one was disabled it would put too many heavy guns out of action.<br />
<br />
A hit in a casemate will of course destroy it and disable the gun, but this is of little consequence. Care must be taken here also not to have any ready ammunition, and to close the ammunition hand-up hermetically with heavy asbestos mats at the magazine end also. With the German "Paternoster" (dredger hoist) the ammunition lifts this mat as it comes up and the mat then falls to and closes the opening, which is a practical arrangement.<br />
<br />
Other hits through unarmoured parts, which destroyed more or less small gear and at the first glance give an impression of terrible havoc, are really of no consequence.<br />
<br />
In the "Von der Tann" they wanted to flood a turret magazine. This was impossible, as the flooding valve in the battery, or between deck was piled up with debris, cabin fittings, etc., and was inaccessible. Fortunately the flooding of the magazine turned out to be unnecessary. The Executive Officer remarked to me how critical such a trivial matter might become, and that one could not be careful enough about choosing the positions for the flooding valves, which must be kept clear of easily destructible objects.<br />
<br />
The man-hole covers in the decks, coal shoots [chutes], etc., were pointed out to me as dangerous, as they may be burst open by pressure of gas from below, thus causing damage and giving passage to the gases. These covers should be secured in a different manner and much more firmly.<br />
<br />
The flooding and draining system worked admirably, and is hardly capable of improvement. The only disadvantage is that the compartments above the armoured deck have no draining arrangements. This should be provided. A list, consequent on an inrush of water, could always be corrected by flooding an opposite compartment. This is an important matter both as affecting gunnery and personnel.<br />
<br />
The searchlights, which were not taken down in the German ships, all came out of the action undamaged; anxiety on their account was therefore unfounded. It was very unpleasant when attacking boats fired on the searchlights, and it is therefore considered necessary to fit light armour protection on the masts for the crews of the searchlight control and electric cables.<br />
<br />
Damage from flames is nowhere visible. The Germans are now rather amused at the care with which interior partitions were scraped.<br />
<br />
I could not help comparing the German ships with the Russian battleship "Orel", which I saw in Madzurn after the battle of Tsushima. If I remember rightly, the "Orel" had 5 severe hits and 40 hits with medium-calibre shell.<br />
<br />
The enormous explosive power of the Shimosa shell, which breaks up into minute splinters, did not do the slightest damage to the vital parts of the ship, but the upper deck was transformed into a confused heap of ruins. Superstructure, bridges, masts, funnels, etc., were destroyed, guns dismounted and fires started.<br />
<br />
Nothing of the kind is to be seen in the German ships, outwardly only a few more or less clean shell holes are visible, and they look so orderly and so little damaged that they do not appear to have gone through an action.<br />
<br />
It is true that the upper decks are said to have been littered with countless splinters, but they flew on to the decks from shells which struck the water, the ship receiving violent shocks.<br />
<br />
The holes in the armour show the characteristic concentric cracks round the hole and the radial splashes, the latter proving that the shells exploded on impact or at the latest, as they passed through. In many cases, as already noted, the force of the explosion was external and only pieces of plate, and possibly the head of the shell were driven in.<br />
<br />
<center><u>FLAG OFFICERS OF THE FLEET AND LEADERS</u></center><br />
<br />
{|<br />
| Commander-in-Chief:<br />
| Vice Admiral Scheer<br />
|-<br />
| <u>I Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Vice Admiral Schmidt<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Engelhard<br />
|-<br />
| <u>II Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Mauve<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Baron von Dalwigh<br />
|-<br />
| <u>III Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Behncke<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Nordmann<br />
|-<br />
| Officer commanding the Scouting Forces and<br>Commanding 1st Scouting Group<br />
| Vice Admiral Hipper<br />
|-<br />
| " 2nd " "<br />
| Rear Admiral Bodicker<br />
|-<br />
| " 4th " "<br />
| Commodore "Captain" v. Reuter<br />
|-<br />
| Leaders of Destroyers<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| in "Rostock"<br />
| Commodore "Captain" Michelsen<br />
|-<br />
| in Regensburg<br />
| Commodore "Captain" Heinrich<br />
|-<br />
| Leader of submarines<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| In Hamburg<br />
| Captain Bauer<br />
|}<br />
<br />
<center><u>REMARKS</u></center><br />
<br />
The lecture on the action, upon which this report is based, was illustrated by a plan prepared in haste for H.M. the Kaiser, and a copy was promised to me. But the Admiral Staff does not wish to part with this first incomplete draft, and the preparation of an accurate plan has not yet been completed, as the Admiral Staff is not yet in possession of all the details.<br />
<br />
In time to be included in this report I have only received the sketch of the first stage of the battle, namely the cruiser action on a southerly course, together with a small sketch of the situation when the action was broken off; both are enclosed.<br />
<br />
I conclude from the sketch of the cruiser action, that the accounts given to me were not quite accurate; for instance, the assertion of the commanding officer of the "Moltke" that the shortest range at that stage was 7,650 yds. and that he had accounted for one of the armoured cruisers with a torpedo.<br />
<br />
The sketch shows that the "Indefatigable" was probably first destroyed by gun fire from the "Von der Tann", and later the "Queen Mary" by gunfire from the "Derfflinger", and that the range was never less than 14,220 yds.<br />
<br />
The loss of "V. 27" and "V. 29" and of 4 British destroyers is also apparent, while I was only told of two.<br />
<br />
In the original sketch, 2 British armoured cruisers are also shown as having fallen out during this stage, but this is not shown on the accompanying sketch and probably took place later.<br />
<br />
I was told by the Admiral Staff that the accompanying sketches are not to be taken as strictly accurate.<br />
<br />
It is requested that the sketches and course of the action and the account of damages may be treated as strictly confidential.<br />
<br />
==Footnotes==<br />
{{reflist}}<br />
<br />
==External Links==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
*Krámli, Mihály. [http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-124.pdf "The Report on the Battle of Jutland by the Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché in Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Colloredo-Mannsfeld."] ''NavWeaps''.<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
[[Category:Battle of Jutland]]</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Attach%C3%A9_Report_on_the_Battle_of_Jutland&diff=334730Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland2024-03-02T02:57:59Z<p>Simon Harley: Oops.</p>
<hr />
<div>Soon after the [[Battle of Jutland]] on 31 May &ndash; 1 June 1916 the Naval Attaché of the [[Austro-Hungarian Navy|Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Navy]] to the German Empire visited the High Sea Fleet. He composed a report on the battle for his superiors using first-hand accounts, interspersed here and there with his own observations. The version reproduced here is a translation in English apparently made by the [[Naval Intelligence Division (Royal Navy)|Naval Intelligence Division]] in 1919 from a copy which was subsequently returned to "F.N.A.", presumably the French Naval Attaché. A copy of the translation then made its way into the papers of the British Cabinet, from where historian Arthur J. Marder obtained a copy which is in his papers.<ref>Original number N.I.D. 087/19. Marder papers, Special Collections and Archives, Langson Library, University of California, Irvine, MS-F002, Box 27.</ref> It is worth comparing this translation with the translation made by Mihály Krámli of an original, slightly different, report published on the ''NavWeaps'' online resource.<ref>Krámli, Mihály. [http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-124.pdf "The Report on the Battle of Jutland by the Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché in Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Colloredo-Mannsfeld."] ''NavWeaps''.</ref><br />
<br />
The original grammar and punctuation of the typescript has been reproduced here wherever possible.<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
From:- Austrian Naval Attache in Berlin.<br />
<br />
To:- Commander-in-Chief, Pola.<br />
<div style="float:right;">Berlin,<br>17 June, 1916.</div><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<center><u>NAVAL ENGAGEMENT OF 31 MAY 1916.</u></center><br />
<br />
The following is a report of the naval proceedings of 31 May - 1 June, 1916, and also of the damage sustained by the German Fleet.<br />
<br />
During my 3-days' visit to Wilhelmshaven, followed by a cursory examination of the "MARKGRAF" and "KURFURST" at Hamburg, I endeavoured to gain merely a general idea of the results of gunfire and concentrated my attention on the course of the action itself.<br />
Admiral Scheer, whom I only saw for a short time as he left for Kiel to attend the funeral of his borther-in-law [sic], Lieut.-Commander Mohr, who was killed in the action, very kindly arranged that his Chief of Staff, Captain Trotha, should give me an account of the whole proceedings, illustrated by plans, and that I should be furnished with all information. I have tried to fill in the gaps by conversations with officers whom I know; this has resulted in some contradictory statements, and several points remain obscure, the accounts from the various ships not having all come in.<br />
<br />
Many episodes will therefore be explained later and may appear in a different light, but, as regards the broad outlines which are of chief importance, the picture of this interesting engagement is fairly clear. The accompanying plan of the action was made in haste for the Kaiser and will therefore need much correction.<br />
<br />
The spirit pervading the Fleet can only be described as one of enthusiasm; they are intoxicated with victory. The heavy load weighing on them all, the dear that this war might end without an encounter of the Fleets, have vanished. They have learnt what fighting really means, they know themselves to be superior to the enemy as regards tactics, and that they were following the right lines and have nothing to unlearn; they know that their gunfire was more effective than that of the enemy, and that they can rely implicitly on their flotillas which have always been looked upon in the German Navy as one of the chief factors in an action. Finally they know that their largest ships can stand heavy fire and serious damage, that they leave nothing to be desired as regards construction and cannot be sunk easily. In short, they feel that the British, in spite of all their boasting, cannot overcome the German Fleet and have a considerable respect for it.<br />
<br />
This conviction imbues the whole Fleet, down to the last man, with confidence in their strength and a calm assurance regarding future encounters. At the same time they are free from over-confidence and from under-estimation of the enemy. On the contrary, the British fire-control and the enormous piercing power of their heavy shell at great distances have roused their admiration, so that a careless conception of the situation is not to be feared, the less so, as well-balanced minds such as those of Admiral Scheer and his Staff are unlikely to be led away by former successes to undertake rash enterprises in the future.<br />
<br />
They do not deny that they were extraordinarily fortunate, and that if the action had been prosecuted with energy on the British side, and if the "Nelson touch" had been in evidence, things might have gone very badly for Germany, especially as the British still had an intact Battle Squadron of 12 units at their disposal which had not yet taken part in the action. But they console themselves with the knowledge that no naval action was ever won without some stroke of luck.<br />
<br />
The Kaiser's visit, the day before my arrival, and his address to the Fleet gave great satisfaction, and subsequently many important personages arrive to inspect the ships, such as Prince Henry and the Grand Dukes of Mecklenburg and Oldenburg, and numbers of decorations were distributed. Vice-Admiral Scheer was promoted to Admiral, and he and Vice-Admiral Hipper received the Pour le Merite.<br />
<br />
I also visited Rear-Admiral Behncke, who was wounded and in hospital; his wounds are slight, a few small splinters in his head, elbow and knee, and he will probably soon be well again.<br />
<br />
<center><u>COURSE OF THE ACTION.</u></center><br />
<br />
The Commander-in-Chief intended to advance with the whole Fleet to the waters of the Skagerrak, in order to make his presence felt unpleasantly by disturbing the shipping, hoping thereby to lure on the British forces and in this manner to be in a position to attack a part of the British Fleet with superior or at least with equal forces. He reckoned that any movements of the British Fleet would be reported to him in good time by the submarines which had been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and he hoped that the airships would prove a better means of reconnoitring than any possessed by the enemy.<br />
<br />
Unfavourable weather prevented him for a considerable period from undertaking any operations, and, as the submarines were to return home on 1 June and be relieved by a new group, the 31 May was the last date for carrying out the planned advance.<br />
<br />
The cruisers left the Jade at 3 a.m., the Main Fleet at 4 a.m., steering an easterly course, and then, after passing Heligoland, a N.N.W'ly course. No reports were received from submarines. These were stationed chiefly off the Orkneys and the Firth of Forth, and the large group of Flanders boats were off the Thames and at the entrance to the Channel. <br />
<br />
While proceeding northwards, a few W/T messages were received, but they were corrupt, appeared to refer only to small formations and gave no clue to the movements of the Grand Fleet. The airships were unable to start in the morning, on account of the wind, and, as it blew hard throughout the day in the Heligoland Bight, they could not start until the early hours of 1 June. In this respect things did not go well, but Admiral Scheer decided nevertheless to continue on his course to the Skagerrak. <br />
<br />
This the account given by Captain von Trotha, who affirms that nothing was known of the presence of the British Fleet in the waters of the Skagerrak, and that there seemed no probability of encountering this Fleet before 1 June.<br />
<br />
There are some points here which I am unable to understand. The submarines are said to have been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and were to return home on 1 June to be relieved probably by a weaker group. For, If the same number of boats were to to keep watch off the English coast, why should 31 May have been the last day for the German Fleet to sail. The day of departure was, therefore, too late in any case, for, if no encounter was to be expected before 1 June, the boats stationed off the coast could not possibly encounter the damaged British ships, as was intended, for probably no damaged ships would be there before 2 June.<br />
<br />
The battleship "KONIG ALBERT" had to carry out repairs to her condensers and did not proceed with the Fleet. Von Trotha told me that there was no alternative and that a ship must carry out small overhauls regularly in a dockyard according to programme. But could it not be arranged, when one is taking the initiative, to choose one's moment for an advance and to have all the ships together for this short time? And why should just that moment be chosen when one of the most powerful ships of the "Kaiser" class is in the dockyard, instead, for instance, of one of the "Nassau" class with 11-in. guns.<br />
<br />
In addition, the "BAYERN" was to have joined up a few days later. After having waited so long, why should not the plan have been postponed for 2 or 3 weeks, instead of dispensing with the only ship carrying 15-in. guns.<br />
<br />
In the same manner they dispensed with air reconnaissance, from which they had expected so much.<br />
<br />
These considerations make me doubt whether the account given me is quite correct, and whether, on the contrary, they knew of certain movements of the British Fleet and considered the moment extremely favourable for an attack. Perhaps they only knew of Beatty's battle squadron, and thinking the Main Fleet was far away, hoped to entrap this squadron. In Berlin, they have much to say, even in military circles, about the British Fleet's intention to push through into the Baltic, and of Kitchener's mission having some connection with this. I consider this senseless, for it cannot be presemed [sic] that the British Fleet would leave their shores unprotected and do the Germans the favour of operating in the Baltic, which would certainly be a most advantageous area for the German Fleet. In any case, there appear to be discrepancies which will probably be explained at some later date.<br />
<br />
Scouting groups, battle cruisers and light cruisers, together with flotillas, preceded the Main Fleet by 50 - 60 miles. At 4 p.m. the light cruisers encountered some British battle cruisers. These at once opened fire on the light cruisers, at an estimated distance of 26,247 yds.; the range could be taken accurately. Though they did not obtain a hit, the salvoes fell so well that the German cruisers thought it advisable to turn away and fall back on their battle cruisers.<br />
<br />
As the British approached, these battle cruisers turned on to a southerly course, in order to lure the enemy on to the German Main Fleet. A running action, on a southerly course, ensued. The British were to starboard and to the west of the Germans, who had therefore the following advantage: in the North Sea, in summer, the western horizon is quite light and visibility towards the west is good, while towards the east, and in a still greater degree off the Jutland Coast, it is misty and visibility is bad and no silhouettes stand out against the eastern horizon. This phenomenon also played great part in the subsequent course of the action. The sun was still high and was not troublesome, and the British ships offered admirable targets. The sea was calm, the wind N.W. 1-2, altering subsequently through W. to S.W.<br />
<br />
The following British ships were recognised:-<br />
3 "Lion" class, 1 "Tiger" and 2 "Indefatigable" class; they were soon reinforced by 5 "Queen Elizabeth" class following astern.<br />
<br />
It is asserted that, judging from shell splinters, the ship of the "Tiger" class carried 15-in. guns, and that she was therefore the mysterious vessel which replaced the "TIGER" sunk on 24.1.15; as the last-named "TIGER" carried only 13.5-in.guns, this was taken as a further proof of her loss. The silhouette of the new "TIGER", however, is said to have resembled that of the old "TIGER" exactly. As the "Queen Elizabeths" soon opened fire also with 15-in. guns, I rather doubt this assertion regarding the "TIGER", and the various ships on this early part of the engagement are altogether somewhat at variance.<br />
<br />
On the German side the ships proceeded in the following sequence:- "LÜTZOW", Flagship of Vice-Admiral Hipper, "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN".<br />
<br />
As Hipper edged towards the enemy, the distance decreased to about 7655 yds. The German fire was unquestionably superior, but the speed of the British vessels was greater. After a short time the "INDEFATIGABLE" and "QUEEN MARY" blew up, and 2 battle-cruisers and two attacking destroyers were also accounted for. The "QUEEN MARY" must have been destroyed by the explosion of a magazine; she was torn in two halves, and a water-colour painted by an officer represents her enveloped in an enormous column of black smoke; she disappeared in a few seconds. Only one cadet was subsequently picked.<br />
<br />
The second battle cruiser disappeared under similar circumstances. The "VON DER TANN" claims to have accounted for one of these battle-cruisers by a broadside. But the "MOLTKE" fired 4 torpedoes and also claims this achievement.<br />
<br />
The Germans suffered very little during this phase of the action, the "MOLTKE" alone receiving hits on the starboard side. The fire of the British battle-cruisers is said not to have been nearly as good as that of the "QUEEN ELIZABETH" class later on.<br />
<br />
When they had approached the German Main Fleet, the British turned on to a contrary course and the German cruisers did the same. The German Main Fleet proceeded in divisions in starboard quarter-line, the 3rd Battle Squadron: 4 "König" class and 3 "Kaiser" class, Fleet Flagship, 1st Battle Squadron: 4 "Ostfriesland" class and 4 "Westfalen" class, and the 2nd Battle Squadron: 5 "Deutschland" class and the "Hessen". They endeavoured to effect a junction with the cruisers, but were unable to take part very effectually.<br />
<br />
The course of the action was now in a northerly direction, over the area which had just been traversed, and the British ships now drew ahead considerably and turned more and more towards the East; the Germans followed this movement, and in consequence the conditions of visibility became less and less favourable for them.<br />
<br />
The "Queen Elizabeths" now made their presence more greatly felt; one of them had dropped out, but I was unable to ascertain when this occurred.<br />
<br />
The course of the German Math Fleet at first led past the 2 disabled British destroyers, which were lying stopped. The crews had already taken to the boats and were picked up later on by German destroyers. As the Main Fleet was doubtful about the advisability of passing the destroyers while they were still afloat, they were sunk by a few broadsides. One of the officers who was picked up was in pyjamas and is said to have stayed in his cabin during the action. He declared "We did not expect so much resistance," while another said - "The battle is rather disappointing." It has been ascertained that these destroyers were greatly under-manned; their crews seemed very exhausted, which points to their having been in the water for a long time.<br />
<br />
While on this easterly course, the light cruisers of the fast 2nd Scouting Group: "FRANKFURT", "PILLAU", "ELBING" and "WIESBADEN", were heavily fired on from the N.E. and E. without their being able to see more than the gun flashes. In addition, they were under continual fire from the N., and while turning away to S.E. and S., they ascertained that they were opposed by an interminable line of British ships, which appeared at first to be on a N.W.'ly course, and had then evidently turned together on to a S.'ly course.<br />
<br />
It may be noted here that the battleships, and, generally speaking, the battle-cruisers also, never sighted the British Main Fleet, and saw nothing but the flashes of the guns and the effects of the fire. These British ships, about 25 in number, were only sighted by a few light cruisers and by the flotillas, and were counted by them as accurately as possible.<br />
<br />
Surrounded thus from the N. and the E. and under fire, the "WIESBADEN" was disabled, apparently by a hit in the engine-room. The Admiral noticed, it is true, that his leading ships must have encountered new and powerful forces and that they were turning away; but he thought it his duty to go to the assistance of the "WIESBADEN" and therefore continued on an easterly course.<br />
<br />
The van of the Main Fleet, led by the "KÖNIG" (Rear-Admiral Behncke) now came under heavy fire from right ahead; the "KÖNIG" turned away under this fire towards the S.E., whereupon the Commander-in-Chief ordered the whole line to "turn together" to starboard and gave up the idea of helping the "WIESBADEN". About this time Vice-Admiral Hipper transferred his flag from the "LÜTZOW" to the "MOLTKE" with the help of a destroyer, his W/T station being damaged.<br />
<br />
Hardly had the Main Fleet drawn away on a westerly course, before it was ascertained that the pressure was relaxing and the fire decreasing, and that the British were no longer pursuing so hotly. Scheer therefore ordered the ships to "turn together" back on to their former course, and made the signal 'R' = 'Engage the enemy'. This second advance may be termed the zenith of the action. Admiral Scheer gave his views on it approximately as follows:- "Those who make a study of this engagement will be very puzzled as to my object in advancing thus against the wall of British ships. The fact is that I had no particular object. I made the first advance because I had a feeling that I ought to endeavour to assist the "WIESBADEN" and because the situation ahead was quite obscure to me, for I saw nothing of the "LÜTZOW" and received no W/T reports. I soon saw, however, that the leading ships were coming under an overwhelming fire, and that I could not risk the Fleet on the "WIESBADEN'S" account. When I noticed that the British pressure had quite ceased and that the Fleet remained intact in my hands, I turned back, under the impression that the action could not end in this way and that I ought to seek contact with the enemy again."<br />
<br />
The situation during the first and second advances may serve as an example of what should not take place according to all the laws of tactics, for it could not have been worse; von Trotha said jokingly that, if an Admiral brought about such a situation at a war game or in manoeuvres, he would never be entrusted without another command. In the North, the "Queen Elizabeths", then the battle-cruisers, and from N.E. through E. to S.E., an endless line of battleships formed an arc round the German van and kept it under fire. Evidently it had fallen into the most perfect trap. In addition to this unfavourable tactical position, there was a further difficulty, namely that the German ships could be clearly distinguished while they themselves only saw the gun flashes, 4 or 5 to each salvo, but could find no target.<br />
<br />
The Gunnery Officer of the "MARKGRAF" told me that he could not fire at all during half-an-hour, and that they were at the mercy of the British broadsides. Critical though the position was, in theory, they think that experience justifies the conclusion that this 'crossing the T' is in reality not so disastrous at longer ranges; for, in spite of the enormous superiority of their fire, the British made comparatively few hits, the simple reason being that, when fire is thus concentrated on a few leading ships, there can be no question of improving the shooting by spotting.<br />
<br />
Given good tactical training and squadrons which work well together, it is always easy to retire rapidly from an unfavourable position and even possibly to reach an advantageous one.<br />
<br />
The small amount of damage sustained by the Main Fleet may be owing partly to the fact that the leading battle-cruisers drew the enemy's fire, thus relieving the battleships. Only the three leading ships, "KÖNIG", "GROSSER KURFÜRST" and "MARKGRAF" received several hits; while among all the other ships, the "KAISER", "HELGOLAND" and the "SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN" received one hit each, and the rest were not hit at all.<br />
<br />
Simultaneously with the battle-cruisers, which were ahead and pressing forward in quarter-line formation, the 6th and 9th Flotillas, left by the "REGENSBURG", also proceeded to a torpedo attack. Regarding this cruiser advance, the Commanding Officer of the "SEYDLITZ" told me that he was in such a position that he was able to avoid the British salvoes, for he altered course towards the point where each salvo fell and thus evaded the spotting correction.<br />
<br />
This torpedo attack was carried out with great determination and seems to have been completely successful, although nobody is able to state how many hits were obtained. The British ships overlapped somewhat and their line was almost unbroken, and, as about 100 torpedoes were fired, it is estimates that there must have been a considerable number of hits, some people affirm that there were 20, but I do not place much confidence in these figures and it is useless to trouble about them as nobody is certain.<br />
<br />
The boats were fired on by guns of all calibres, even the heaviest, but with little effect, only one boat being destroyed; two other boats had been sunk in an earlier attack during the cruiser action.<br />
<br />
The battle-cruisers were also attacked by British torpedoes, the "SEYDLITZ" being hit once. The "MOLTKE" was lucky, for, when close to the ship, one torpedo apparently had a gyro failure and ran parallel with her. The "LÜTZOW" was probably hit also.<br />
<br />
After the attack, the destroyers laid fog and a heavy smoke screen, which interposed between the Fleet; this benefitted not only the heavily-damaged "LÜTZOW" and "DERFFLINGER", whose nets had been shot away and were hanging down, but also the whole Fleet. It may also have made an impression on the British.<br />
<br />
The German Main Fleet and cruisers turned on a westerly course, fire having again entirely ceased; and the ships of the Main Fleet then turned gradually in succession and in inverse sequence from W. to S.W., subsequently steering towards Horns Reef.<br />
<br />
It is not known what the British did; all that is certain, is that they did not follow in pursuit and that nothing further was seen of their Main Fleet. It remained light until 11 p.m. (summer time), and it would not have been impossible, considering their superior speed, for them to have come within firing range. The Germans expected it too, and now have to content themselves with surmises about the British Commander-in-Chief's reasons for not doing so. It is probably that the unfavourable issue of the fleet part of the battle and the demoralising losses in ships took away any desire on Jellicoe's part for further fighting. His Fleet may have lost heavily and been severely shaken by the torpedo attack; and, as the Germans still had some intact flotillas at their disposal, he may have feared further strong torpedo attacks in the critical hours of twilight, for in the German Navy they say that Jellicoe fears their destroyers in particular.<br />
<br />
Nevertheless, the Germans were not under the impression of having shaken the British Fleet to the extent of obliging them to give up the struggle, and when the evening passed without further incident, they reckoned with certainty on encountering Jellicoe off Horns Reef at daybreak. They were the more astonished at his non-appearance when their air reconnaissance reported that on the morning of 1 June a squadron of 12 battle-ships was proceeding North from the southern part of North Sea and that it suddenly turned on to an opposite course and proceeded South.<br />
<br />
As it could not possibly have been the intention of the British Commander-in-Chief to let the German Fleet escape after having encountered it at last far from its base, and as he still had an intact battle-squadron at his disposal, one is compelled to take the view that he no longer felt strong enough for a second encounter; the achievement of the German Fleet must therefore be very highly thought of.<br />
<br />
During the night cruising following the action, numerous small episodes and minor engagements took place, of which no clear idea can be formed. <br />
<br />
In view of a possible fresh attack or of a possible pursuit on the part of the enemy, it was thought undesirable to leave the 2nd Battle Squadron either in the van or in the rear, it therefore took station to starboard and at first proceeded on an opening course from the other squadrons, and continued fairly independently during the night.<br />
<br />
The 1st Battle Squadron therefore led, with the "WESTFALEN" as guide, and it was followed by the 3rd Battle Squadron.<br />
<br />
After the action had been broken off, the 4 remaining battle cruisers were ahead to port, where they were suddenly again brought under heavy fire from the port side and from ahead, apparently by 3 or 4 battle cruisers. It is presumed that these were the remaining 3 or 4 older cruisers of the "Invincible" class, which Jellicoe probably always stationed ahead of the Main Fleet, for it would hardly have been possible for the "Lions", which were following in the rear in the British line, to have taken station ahead so quickly. The German battle cruisers, all severely damaged, did not feel able to withstand this fire and turned away to starboard, passing ahead of the Main Fleet and between it and the 2nd Battle Squadron, which proceeded quietly on their course and before which the mysterious ships retired, not to be sighted again.<br />
<br />
The battle-cruisers then gradually fell astern, and as they were making much water, and also owing to their differing speeds, they lost contact with the Main Fleet and with each other.<br />
<br />
The "LÜTZOW" had dropped out during the engagement and proceeded independently, accompanied by 4 destroyers. At first she was able to steam 14 knots, but her speed decreased rapidly and dropped finally to 4 knots. Her bows sank slowly, and when the whole forecastle was under water the Commanding Officer decided to leave the ship. The badly wounded were transferred carefully to the boats and the disembarkation was conducted in good order. A torpedo was then fired at the ship and this coup de grace sank her in deep water at about 1 o'clock, I believe.<br />
<br />
The "SEYDLITZ" was hardly in a better condition than the "LÜTZOW"; she also sank gradually by the bows till the water was almost level with the deck, and she had a heavy list to port, but she continued on her course. In the darkest hours of the night she suddenly sighted 3 large ships to port, quite close to. She turned away, made a British recognition signal and was not pursued. As bad luck would have it, the steaming light had short-circuited, could not be switched off and showed intermittently.<br />
<br />
The "DERFFLINGER", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN" followed the Main Fleet more or less and met with no particular experiences.<br />
<br />
The Main Fleet had to repulse a series of destroyer attacks and was also engaged by cruisers. The movements of these British cruisers, which came up singly, are incomprehensible and give the impression of having lost their heads. They appear to have received the order, judging by an intercepted W/T message, to proceed on a northerly and north-westerly course, and thereby they ran into the extended German line which they probably imagined they had passed to the South.<br />
<br />
One large cruiser (?"WARRIOR") proceeded unsuspectingly within 875 yds. of the line of battleships and came under concentrated fire from several ships before she could reply, so that she blew up enveloped in flames and disappeared in 47 seconds. The "BIRMINGHAM" seems to have been accounted for in a similar manner. The destroyers all approached in a really insane manner; frequently not from ahead but from a direction astern, scattered, singly or in pairs, or at most 3 together, never in large numbers. Most of them were disabled forthwith by a few salvoes and set on fire. The "WESTFALEN" distinguished herself particularly at this time.<br />
<br />
These burning destroyers strewn along the course, lit it up as if for a festival. Evidently the fires were largely due to the light American and Mexican oils; at any rate German firing trials on oil bunkers never caused any such conflagrations.<br />
<br />
The attacking boats directed shrapnel fire on the searchlights with fairly good results, the searchlights of two battleships and one light cruiser being hit.<br />
<br />
One large destroyer, which only recognised the danger at the last moment and endeavoured to avoid it by altering course was rammed by the "NASSAU", which put her helm over for this purpose. The boat exploded internally and sank.<br />
<br />
The only ships hit were the "POMMERN" in the 2ns Battle Squadron, and the "ROSTOCK". The "POMMERN" blew up at once and nobody was saved. The "ROSTOCK" was just passing between ships of the Main Fleet when she was hit; the loss of life on board was small.<br />
<br />
The Germans believe they destroyed 11 British destroyers in all. The manner in which these destroyers were handled has not left a good impression on the whole, and one has certainly lost respect for this weapon. The view is also taken that the boats are too large and offer too wide a target.<br />
<br />
The light cruiser "ELBING", like the "ROSTOCK", apparently wanted to break through the line from port to starboard under pressure from the British cruisers; she was, however, rammed by the "POSEN" and had to be abandoned in a sinking condition. The Germans also fired a torpedo into her.<br />
<br />
The "FRAUENLOB" and 2 destroyers were lost during the night; no details of their loss are known.<br />
<br />
Not far from Heligoland, the "OSTFRIESLAND", 7th of the line, struck a mine. This brings the account of the chief events of this exciting cruiser to an end.<br />
<br />
The German flotillas were detached from the Fleet to clear the area off the Jutland Coast, which was divided up into sectors. The flotillas stationed furthest to the North proceeded to the Skagerrak and through these straits into the Baltic and to Kiel.<br />
<br />
None of the flotillas sighted the British Main Fleet again, which proves that it must have turned away to the N. or N.W. immediately after the action. According to confidential reports the Fleet entered British ports as early as 1 June.<br />
<br />
Two British battleships, in a severely damaged condition and accompanied by destroyers, were sighted proceeding back to England. One was attacked by a submarine, but without success.<br />
<br />
On the morning of 1 June, in fairly misty weather, a Zeppelin sighted groups of British ships leaving the Channel on a N.E.'ly course. The reports were rather vague, as sometimes 6 and sometimes 12 ships were mentioned; but it seems most likely that 12 battleships and 3 cruisers were in question, and that they soon retired. The airship, which flew low at one time to get a clearer view, was also fired on.<br />
<br />
Some of the ships are said to have had tripod masts.<br />
<br />
The German Fleet, with the exception of "SEYDLITZ", reached the Jade in the afternoon. The "SEYDLITZ" could not cross the bar on account of being so much down by the bows, and it was not till the next day at high water that she was towed in, stern first.<br />
<br />
<center><u>MISCELLANEOUS.<br>TACTICS.</u></center><br />
<br />
The Germans ascribe their success to various causes, and in the first place to their own superiority as regards tactics. This is a point which every officer discusses, and it is constantly repeated that it all happened just as in tactical manoeuvres and in "battle exercises", and that things could not have gone better.<br />
<br />
Movements of squadrons, divisions and individual ships, "turns together" and alterations of course and speed, all went like clockwork and demonstrated the very great mobility of all formations.<br />
<br />
The W/T signalling system of the Main Fleet never failed, and its failure would have been immaterial, as the primary and secondary flag action signals, showing from several positions in the ship, were made simultaneously.<br />
<br />
All this was due to the peace training and the practical experience of the Flag Officers and Captains. Though in peace time the Commander-in-Chief had never commanded a Fleet, nor the Admirals a squadron, still the training carried out on the same lines for a number of years resulted in everything proceeding with the expected precision.<br />
<br />
The British, on the contrary, are said to have displayed a certain clumsiness as regards tactics and to have preferred turning together when "turning on to an opposite course" (Wendungen im Gegenmarsch), though this conclusion does not seem altogether justified from the description of the action.<br />
<br />
The ships kept station 547 yds. apart, and Vice-Admiral Schmidt told me that, in his opinion, this distance is too small for large ships and that he prefers 656 yds., as the shorter distances result in the ships getting bunched and overlapping during alterations of course. In order to relieve this during the first turn to starboard, the Fleet Flagship herself turned to port and then closed gradually into line. At night the distance was 656 yds.<br />
<br />
No interruption of W/T communication was occasioned by the enemy.<br />
<br />
<center><u>GUNNERY</u></center><br />
<br />
It is admitted that the British are superior as regards their gunnery technique. Their salvoes fall most astoundingly close together and aroused admiration on all sides. Some people affirm that they fell too close together, and that it was consequently difficult to cover a sufficiently large danger space.<br />
<br />
This is particularly the case with the heaviest calibres: 13.5-in. and 15-in. and the battle-cruisers' fire was noticeably inferior to that of the "Queen Elizabeth" class, for example.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> Literal translation; the meaning is not clear. - Tr.] The spread of the salvoes frequently only covered a few square yards. In the "KÖNIG" 3 rounds, out of a salvo of 4 rounds, hit between the capstan and the bridge.<br />
<br />
This is attributed to careful calibration, which the British have studied for a long time and which, as is well known, was abandoned by the German Navy after a few trials. The gunnery officers declare unanimously that it must unquestionably be re-introduced.<br />
<br />
The British range-finders are superior to the German, and the construction of their turrets enables them to shoot at ranges impossible for German guns. The question of range appears to be immaterial to the British, who fire at any range so long as visibility permits.<br />
<br />
The Germans are fully convinced of the great superiority of 15-in. guns over all others, and deplore the fact that, owing to the predominant conservative tendencies in the German Navy, this calibre was not introduced until so lately. Vice-Admiral Gerdes, the Head of the Armament Department, is responsible for this, for he always opposed it on the ground that the poor visibility in German waters and the consequent short ranges rendered an increase of calibre useless; he considered the German 12-in. gun to be an altogether superior weapon, capable of competing with every other.<br />
<br />
In one respect the British seem behindhand as compared with the Germans: namely that they cannot alter range quickly enough and they are too dependent on the range clock. The British rely on steady fire at long range, and they adapt their tactics to this and avoid alterations of course and range most assiduously.<br />
<br />
The Germans, on the contrary, in their firing practices always work with big and rapid alterations of range and exercise firing while turning, so that the gunnery officers consider they have an advantage in this respect.<br />
<br />
The Turn on to an opposite course was certainly not advantageous for the German Fleet, but in this particular instance it made little difference, as the German ships were already unable to find a target; besides which, it must have disconcerted the British and it prevented them from obtaining good results with their fire. The salvoes fell very close together round the ships, but few hits were obtained. The rate of fire in the British ships is said to have been fair, but not excessive. Some people affirm that it was very modest.<br />
<br />
The British shell had great penetrating power, and from all reasonable distances the main armour was generally pierced clean through. The shell splinters picked up prove conclusively that at least 2 kinds of shell were used, differing considerably in material and quality. One kind of shell had a very thick wall and an extremely small explosive charge, it might almost be called a solid shot. It seems to have broken up frequently without exploding and the fuse did not function. Its explosive power, if it possessed any at all, was quite inconsiderable, and it is presumed that the explosives used was not high explosive.<br />
<br />
It appears from the splinters of these 15-in. shell that the wall was 6.3 - 6.7 ins. (16 - 17 cm.), so that the hollow space cannot measure more than 2.4 ins. - 1.8 ins. (4 - 6 cm.). It is true that the large pieces into which these shell broke pierced everything in their course and often went right through the whole ship, unless they struck an armoured part. Several intact heads were found, with and without caps, and also entire bases.<br />
<br />
The second kind of shell had considerably thinner walls, only about half as thick, but it also often broke up into quite large pieces and displayed no great explosive power, and little or no incendiary power.<br />
<br />
It appears therefore that the British aimed only at attaining penetrating power, and the Germans are of opinion that they do not possess (rohrsicheren)* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D.Note.- This appears to be a special fuse which is very delicate, but safe until it has left the gun.] fuses for high explosive shell; this was their opinion before the war also.<br />
<br />
They believe that the high explosive power of the German ammunition gives them a great advantage which may partly counterbalance the smaller calibre of their guns and perhaps also their inferior gunnery. In any case, the effect of the German shell at the point of impact was very considerable.<br />
<br />
The fact that the ships blew up must be attributed to explosions in their magazines. (In this connection one may recall a turret of the "SEYDLITZ" being hit in the action of 24 January, 1915; see my report No.47 ex 15). The turret armour must have been pierced and the shells in the turret must have been exploded. The British have no metal cartridge-cases and also no cartridge-holders such as the Germans have, but they keep their cartridges in locked boxes which are perhaps not flash-proof enough. It seems therefore, from the incident experienced by the "SEYDLITZ", that this must constitute a particular danger to British ships. In this last action also turrets in German ships were frequently hit; further details are given in the account of damage sustained.<br />
<br />
After having compared the hits received in the German ships with the observations of results on enemy targets, it may be safely affirmed that the explosive power of the German shells exceeds that of the British; this was already known after the action of 24 January 1915. The Germans are therefore very much annoyed that they had no 15-in. guns to fire, as they are persuaded that ships so knocked about (eingedeckte) as, for example, the "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" would have been completely destroyed by German shell.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. Note.- The writer appears to mean that if German 15-in. shell had been used against "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" these ships would have been sunk.]<br />
<br />
It may be noted here that the "BAYERN", the first of their ships to carry 15-in. guns, will not join the Fleet for another few days, and the "BADEN" not until the autumn.<br />
<br />
Medium armament played no part, only a few hits were obtained and they did little damage.<br />
<br />
The British fired part-salvoes, like the Germans; full salvoes may have been fired now and again.<br />
<br />
The method of repulsing destroyer attacks, which has previously been reported, namely the 'turning away' and firing on one, or at most two boats, proved to be sound, and the repulsing of attacks both by day and night offered no difficulties.<br />
<br />
As regards gunnery, it may also be mentioned that the fire-control apparatus worked without a hitch and withstood the heaviest shocks. The elevation pointers worked admirably. A few ships were not yet fitted with them.<br />
<br />
<center><u>Torpedo.</u></center><br />
<br />
As regards torpedo work the Germans consider themselves very much superior. There were prolonged discussions about depriving Flotilla Leaders of their independence and putting them under the orders of a Leader Ship, but they are now convinced that this is necessary to ensure the flotillas attacking at the right moment and all together.<br />
<br />
The flotillas were led by the 2 leader Ships "ROSTOCK" and "REGENSBURG", the first having 2 flotillas and the second 3 flotillas allocated to them. The remaining 2 flotillas accompanied the Main Fleet or the battle-cruisers. The leaders carried out their duties with great daring and circumspection. The attacks of the British were weak and scattered, and could therefore have little or only occasional success.<br />
<br />
The German 2nd Flotilla, composed of the larger 1500 ton boats were held back instead of being sent to attack. Although these boats are spoken of very highly and are indispensable for certain enterprises, the view is now taken that they are too large and too valuable to be used for attacking during an action. This Flotilla proceeded to Zeebrugge immediately after the action and arrived there safely. It is to be employed in preventing the British from blockading the harbour with nets, and thus make it impossible for the German submarines to proceed out.<br />
<br />
As far as I have heard, the "MOLTKE" alone of the larger ships fired 4 torpedoes.<br />
<br />
Submarines were not in evidence. No German submarines were present; on the other hand a German destroyer claims to have rammed a British submarine. This claim appears to be erroneous, at least it was declared to be nonsense by the Chief of Staff. The submarines failed as regards scouting and also doing the pursuit.<br />
<br />
Some people state that a British aeroplane was sighted to the northward, and that it had apparently risen from a cruiser. It played no part in the action.<br />
<br />
The use of "Höschter"* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. note:- Probably the name of the inventor.] fog seems to have been of good service, it and the smoke made by the destroyers having completely masked the Main Fleet and its movements at critical moments.<br />
<br />
<center><u>SPEED</u></center><br />
<br />
The advantage of speed lay entirely with the British, not only as regards the Main Fleet on account of the "Deutschland" class, but also as regards the battle-cruisers. The latter are said to have proved considerably faster than the German battle cruisers, an unpleasant experience which had already been made on 25 January 1915. This alone proves that the British are talking nonsense when they assert that the German Fleet sought safety in flight; on the contrary, it was far from its bases and entirely in the power of the British, who either did not wish to take advantage of their superior speed, or were unable to do so on account of the damage sustained. The visibility was no worse than it had been during the day and Jellicoe may have even welcomed the "Höschter" fog which would enable him to plead bad visibility as a reason for abandoning the pursuit. On the German side in the light of experience the factor of speed in the battleships is considered very important. But the moderate depths of the German harbours limits the draught of the ships, and make it particularly difficult for German builders to do much in this respect. In spite of greater length and higher horse power the most modern cruisers "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ" and "LÜTZOW" attained only a quite inconsiderable increase of speed in comparison with the older "GOEBEN" class, and proved a disappointment in this particular.<br />
<br />
The question whether the older battleships should take part in an important engagement was not easy to decide. The 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons composed of the "WITTLESBACH" and "BARBAROSSA" class, re-commissioned at the beginning of the war, were intended to be used in such actions, but have long since been paid off; some have been disarmed and employed as guardships and instructional ships, etc. It was considered however, that the 2nd Battle Squadron, composed of the most modern of the older ships, would be of some service in the action; but this squadron was in a privileged position, inasmuch as it was merely attached to the 1st and 3rd Battle Squadrons and its Admiral was allowed to operate independently and select the position he thought best. On this occasion it kept station quite well and did not prove a hindrance, but, on the other hand, it did not come under any heavy fire. This must be considered very fortunate, for, in view of the damage sustained by other ships and in view of the fact that the British shell pierced all armour above or below water even at the longest range, it is certain that every ship of this class would have been sunk by a few hits, as their internal sub-division is not proof against large inrushes of water.<br />
<br />
The loss of the "Pommern", which gives the British an opportunity for a hollow triumph, also teaches a clear lesson. The Chief of Staff told me that they will probably consider carefully before again exposing this Squadron to danger; therefore this action will have further confirmed the complete worthlessness of all Dreadnought types [sic] and will condemn them as old iron.<br />
<br />
<center><u>TORPEDO NETS.</u></center><br />
<br />
The torpedo nets of the battle cruisers are all badly damaged and the gear so knocked about by gunfire that they were almost useless. This was particularly the case with the "Derfflinger", where the after port nets were hanging in the water, and would have fallen across the propeller had they not chanced to remain held up by a temporary lashing. The ship was obliged to stop during the action to secure the nets, and they might easily have occasioned the loss of the ship.<br />
<br />
For this reason all the nets, together with the booms, were unshipped immediately after the ships' return, to everybody's satisfaction. They will not be carried any more, except perhaps for operations in the Baltic, where the ships may be obliged to anchor at sea.<br />
<br />
<center><u>LEAK-STOPPING SERVICE.</u></center><br />
<br />
The leak-stopping service which had been systematically developed, worked admirably and the Germans are convinced that they owe much to it. They believed that the "Seydlitz" could not have been brought in if the strengthening of the bulkheads, etc., had not been so thoroughly exercised and if the personnel had not been so well trained.<br />
<br />
It is also said, that in the "Lutzow", which had only been in commission for 2 months, was naturally not up to the mark in this respect, and that it is not impossible that small shortcomings, for which of course nobody can be blamed, were responsible for the ship sinking. The "Lutzow" was an unfortunate ship altogether. First her turbines collapsed, thus delaying her commissioning for 6 months, then she immediately struck a mine, and she was hardly out of dockyard hands before she was sunk.<br />
<br />
<center><u>DANGER FROM GAS FUMES.</u></center><br />
<br />
Only 2 days before sailing, a large number of the ships, and fortunately exactly those that came most under fire, namely battle-cruisers and the 3rd Squadron, were supplied with gas masks fitted with alkali cartridges for the whole crew and a plentiful reserve (in the "Seydlitz" 1500 masks for about 1200 men). The masks are similar to those used in the army for poisonous gases. Each man carries a mask slung round him, if he is not actually wearing it.<br />
<br />
I was told emphatically by all the officers, that, in their experience, these masks are absolutely necessary and not only saved many lives but enabled the men to carry on in parts of the ship which they would otherwise have been compelled to leave.<br />
<br />
The gases from shells, mines and torpedoes penetrate in an incredible manner through ventilators, telephone leads, etc. to compartments far away from the point of impact. In many cases the masks enabled large numbers of the guns' crews to escape from turrets that were hit, and to help out others who were badly wounded. In one case the men in one of the main engine rooms were able to remain at their posts after gas had penetrated, until the engine-room was ventilated.<br />
<br />
The Fleet breathing apparatus (Flottenathmer) is preferable to masks in some cases, but it cannot be supplied to everyone and it hampers one's movements, which the masks do not.<br />
<br />
On account of the great danger from gases, it is also advisable to fit hinged flaps in all shafts, and to have wooden bungs to fit the voice-pipes, keeping a hammer at hand to hammer them into the mouth-pieces.<br />
<br />
They tell me that it proved very useful to keep all the personnel employed below, such as in central control rooms, engine-rooms, torpedo flats, etc. continually informed of what was going on. The men get nervous, particularly at first, with the tremendous shocks caused by shell falling close to the ship, though the shocks are felt less on deck, and such information gives them confidence and they like knowing what is going on above them.<br />
<br />
<center><u>DAMAGE</u></center><br />
<br />
The distribution of ships needing repair in the various dockyards is as follows:-<br />
<br />
The "König" proceeded at once to Kiel and is under repair at Howaldt's yard. I did not see her.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" and "Moltke" in Blohm and Voss yard, Hamburg, the first in the Imperial Dock.<br />
<br />
The "Kurfürst["] in Vulkan Yard, Hamburg.<br />
<br />
The "Derfflinger" was first docked in Wilhelmshaven and the leaks temporarily stopped, she then proceeded to the Imperial dockyard, Kiel. The "Seydlitz" will now be docked in the large dock at Wilhelmshaven; during my stay the "Seydlitz" was still in the lock.<br />
<br />
The "Von der Tann", "Ostfriesland" and "Helgoland" will be repaired in dry docks in Wilhelmshaven. No other large ships require to be docked.<br />
<br />
"<u>Seydlitz</u>" The number of hits was still uncertain, as the whole forepart of the ship up to the upper deck was still under water, and it is not known what she looks like below water. The ship was brought into the lock with difficulty, and as she is 43 ft. down by the bows, she cannot be taken into harbour. They will not venture to dock the ship inside the lock, and intend first to raise her bows slightly.<br />
<br />
The roof and guns of the fore turret and anchors, cables etc., have already been unshipped, and they now intend to bring caissons alongside and pump out the fore part sufficiently to enable her to enter the harbour.<br />
<br />
The great inrush of water, that flooded more or less the whole fore part of the ship as far as the first boiler-room bulkhead, was caused by a number of hits. Firstly, one of the belt armour plates forward on the port side is missing, having fallen off. Secondly, there are believed to be at least 2 or 3 more hits below water, forward on the port side; for the list and the settling down had already become ominous when the ship was hit at the edge of the upper deck, port side, abreast the bridge; this was followed by an inrush of water in the battery deck, which did a great amount of damage.<br />
<br />
In addition, during the day action, she was hit by a torpedo on the starboard side under the forward 5.9 in. gun, which caused her to settle down still more by the bows. This gun was so much damaged by the shock from underneath as to be disabled.<br />
<br />
Further, there are 4 severe hits in the ship's side (mess deck, port side, forward of the turret), which also demolished the port capstan.<br />
<br />
These shell, or shell splinters, naturally penetrated to the armoured deck, so that the entire fore part of the ship above and below the armoured deck is holed in many places, allowing free passage for the water. The fore part of the ship was struck therefore by at least 8 or 9 shells and one torpedo.<br />
<br />
Apparently the only compartments which are not flooded, are the bow torpedo flats and the central control room. The former is being pumped out continuously, as a great deal of water is flowing in from above. The torpedo control room had to be abandoned, as the forward partition was not watertight. The central control room abaft this was not abandoned, but of its 2 entrances from the starboard and port passages, only the port one can be used, as the starboard one is flooded.<br />
<br />
The gunnery control room is far further aft and was not affected.<br />
<br />
The ship has a list of 7° to port, and as she has now been slightly raised, about 1¾ ft. of her bows are above water; at one time it was up to the level of the deck.<br />
<br />
While under way the forward boiler room bulkhead had to withstand most of the pressure; supports have been built up everywhere, but it leaks in places.<br />
<br />
The other hits of consequences were those in the turrets. The fore starboard turret No.2 received a direct hit on the fore face of the revolving structure. One curved plate was forced out, but fortunately the main effect of the explosion was outward. The right hand gun was disabled by slight damage to the mounting; with this exception the turret remained in action and kept up fire.<br />
<br />
The right hand gun of turret No.3 received a direct hit, which cut out a wide groove along the tube of the gun. The left hand gun continued to fire.<br />
<br />
The barbette of turret No.4 was hit on a level with the rammer, and the armour was pierced clean through. This hit is of special interest, as the "Seydlitz" received a similar hit and at the same level in turret No.5 on 24th January 1915, which caused a fire, disabled both the after turrets and killed all the guns' crews. This last time, however, the damage was slight. There was no ready ammunition in the turret, and only one cartridge was exploded, in contrast to the (6200 Kg.) 13,670 lbs. of powder on Jan.1915. The turret officer and a large number of the gun's crews were saved by their gas masks. The destruction caused by splinters was, however, considerable and the turret was abandoned, as it was not possible to continue fire from it. This was a 13.5 in. shell, at 15,310 yds. range, strength of armour pierced 8.6 inches.<br />
<br />
After the turret had been abandoned, it was hit a second time in the after side of the revolving part, which was pierced; this of course increased the havoc in the interior.<br />
<br />
Turret No.5 was hit in the roof. The shell richochetted, and the roof is slightly dented. Nobody was hurt and the turret continued to fire.<br />
<br />
In the "Seydlitz" therefore, all the turrets were hit, with the exception of the foremost turret, and one was hit twice.<br />
<br />
A further hit pierced the 5.9 in. (150mm.) casemate armour of the aftermost 5.9 in. starboard gun, No.2. The deck was pierced from beneath, and splinters also pierced the splinter bulkhead. The gun was disabled and all the crew were killed, with the exception of the ship's chaplain who happened to be in the casemate and must be watched over by a special guardian angel.<br />
<br />
A similar hit, with a 15 in. shell, struck the casemate armour of the 6-in. gun No.7 and exploded in the casemate. Men were killed, the gun was disabled and the splinter bulkhead pierced by large splinters. This time again, surprise was aroused by the comparatively small damage caused by a large calibre shell.<br />
<br />
"<u>Derfflinger</u>". One shell hit the armour belt forward of the hawse pipe, probably at the junction of 2 plates, as 2 plates broke away. The plates underneath were consequently strained apart and a great deal of water flowed in.<br />
<br />
The armour belt on the port side also received 2 further hits in the centre and was pierced clean through. The splinters penetrated more than half way through the ship, and in one case a piece of plating was driven half way though the ship. These hits, combined perhaps with others, destroyed the nets and their supports in several places.<br />
<br />
The two after turrets received direct hits, in one case on the roof, in the other case in the barbette above the deck; the armour was pierced and the upper portions of the turrets burnt out and severely damaged, but the flames did not penetrate to the magazines. The crew in the upper part of the turret were killed, and both turrets were disabled. This occurred at an early stage of the action.<br />
<br />
The guns at high elevation cannot yet be dismounted, as everything is wedged in, but they do not appear to be damaged.<br />
<br />
The muzzles were carried away off the 4 foremost 6 in. (15 cm.) guns on the port side; two of them probably having been accounted for by one and the same shell which hit the armour. One gun, the muzzle of which was perhaps damaged by a splinter, afterwards burst, the tube splitting open in the shape of a tulip.<br />
<br />
The "Derfflinger" received a few other hits of no particular interest. She appears the next most severely damaged ship after the "Lützow".<br />
<br />
The "<u>Moltke</u>" only received 5 hits, all of them during that part of the action which took place on a southerly course; while the cruisers mentioned above received most of the hits on the port side, consequently during the later stages of the action.<br />
<br />
One shell pieced the bulwarks in the after part of the ship above the armour, passed through the ship and struck the armour on the port side from inside, about 3.3 ft. below the water-line. One plate was forced out and is missing. The inrush of water was considerable. The after compartments, above the armoured deck which remained intact, were all more or less flooded.<br />
<br />
The second hit was further forward, below the armour belt. The shell exploded in a bunker, but the armoured deck held and no water penetrated it from below. The neighbouring bunkers made little water and could be pumped out.<br />
<br />
Another shell struck the 5.9 in. armour in the upper bunker, above the water-line. The armoured deck again held, but the inner wall of the bunker parted, and the battery deck was pierced from below, a 6 in. gun being damaged and disabled.<br />
<br />
In the fore part of the ship a shell struck the armour belt below the water-line. The plate remained intact and was driven in about 8 inches. The compartment was flooded, but the torpedo bulkhead remained watertight. A neighbouring compartment leaked slightly, the rivets having parted.<br />
<br />
The fifth case of damage, namely a plate beneath the armour belt being driven and pressed in, was probably not due to a direct hit, but to splinters of a shell which fell short.<br />
<br />
"<u>Von der Tann</u>". A shell hit and pierced the lower part of the 3.9 in. armour belt in the after part of the ship to starboard. The compartments above the armoured deck, and some of those on the deck above, were flooded. The chief effect of the shell was outside the ship, but it bent the plates below the otherwise undamaged armoured deck, so that a considerable amount of water flowed into the compartments below the armoured deck. The after torpedo flat was flooded half way up, and the men in the starboard steering engine room were shut in for a long time owing to the exits being blocked.<br />
<br />
The fore turret was hit on the starboard side on the upper edge of the barbette and a semi-circular armour plate was forced out. The machinery of the turret was so badly knocked about that the turret was disabled.<br />
<br />
The hydraulic piping was damaged, so that all the heavy armament was put out of action temporarily. Strangely enough, though men were wounded none were killed.<br />
<br />
The aftermost turret was hit in the barbette. The armour was pierced, but the effect of the shell was exterior, the turret sustained little internal damage, so that the handgear of the turret remained in action. The turret was wedged in one place and could not revolve; they succeeded, however, in cutting off with oxy-acetylene the piece of revolving part which was jammed against the inner side of the barbette thus getting rid of the obstruction.<br />
<br />
Outside the turret, the shell did considerable damage; some splinters striking downwards, bent the armoured deck and pierced it in places. As far as I know, the armoured deck sustained no further damage, and this was of little importance.<br />
<br />
The after conning-tower was hit and a piece of the armour torn away; the occupants, including the 3rd gunnery officer, were killed. Splinters struck downwards to the engine-room ventilation hatches, but were stopped by the armoured gratings.<br />
<br />
"<u>Ostfriesland"</u> was struck by a mine below the foremost port turret. The whole measures 197 ft.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. note:- Literal translation is 12 times 5 metres large.] The torpedo bulkhead is only slightly torn, and the inrush of water was only local.<br />
<br />
"<u>Helgoland</u>". A 13.5 in. shell hit the 7.9 in. armour belt forward on the port side and pierced it. The shell appears to have broken only as no explosive action can be traced. The range was about 14,217 yds.<br />
<br />
"<u>Nassau</u>" rammed a British destroyer, or rather, the destroyer ran into her forward on the port side. Her bows must have lifted right up, for her hawse-pipe remained on board the "Nassau", so firmly wedged into the side of the upper deck that it will have to be cut out. The "Nassau's" side below the deck is torn away for 33 ft. The destroyer then glanced off the "Nassau's" side and exploded internally. One of the crew remained behind in one of the nets, but fell into the water when the "Nassau" fired a salvo.<br />
<br />
The "Nassau" was hit by shrapnel from attacking destroyers in the foremost searchlight group, both port searchlights were put out of action. The searchlight control and electric cables were destroyed and many of the searchlight crews were killed. The after searchlight group was hit in a similar manner, and one of the searchlights was disabled.<br />
<br />
The "Rhineland" and a light cruiser were also hit in a similar manner.<br />
<br />
I have seen all the above mentioned ships in Wilhelmshaven.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" and "Kurfürst" were at Hamburg, but unfortunately I am unable to report much about them. They had already been under repair for several days, and the damage was to some extent made good. Besides this, the conditions were not favourable for undisturbed examination: commissioners from the Imperial Navy Office were on board, besides crowds of workmen, the noise was deafening and it was pouring with rain. Consequently I took no notes on the spot and relied on my memory, which however fails me now among the very many received of similar cases. I am therefore unable to report each hit with accuracy.<br />
<br />
This is immaterial, however, as there were no particularly interesting hits, and none of the ships had been hit in the turrets. The armour had been pierced in several places, the effect and character of the hits being similar in all cases; the hits on unarmoured parts were of little consequence.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" was hit aft on the port side of the water line just on a junction of two plates, a piece of equal size being torn away from each plate. The shell then struck the sloping part of the armoured deck and the splinters ricochetted and passed right through the ship. These plates have already been removed.<br />
<br />
A casemate was pierced and the gun disabled.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" is the only ship whose mast was hit, the mast remained standing and has now been removed.<br />
<br />
The spotting platform had to be abandoned, as communications with the conning tower was cut off. This was the only hit received in a conning tower; it only grazed the upper edge and glanced off, and the men inside hardly noticed it.<br />
<br />
The port engine was disabled, not in consequence of damage to the turbine which is in good condition, but owing to one of the main propeller bearings becoming overheated. The cause of this is not clear, but it is believed to be due to concussions. The ship was well able to keep station with her two remaining engines.<br />
<br />
The "<u>Kurfürst</u>" suffered especially from a great inrush of water forward on the port side, above the armoured deck; it was caused by a hit in the armour belt. No further damage of importance was sustained.<br />
<br />
With regard to time necessary for repair to these ships, it is not yet possible to say anything definite, as it is still undecided whether they shall undergo thorough repair or not. The chief difficulty is the manufacture of new armour plates; but some of the holed plates can, no doubt, be left in position for the present.<br />
<br />
A considerable time will be needed to repair some of the turrets of the battle-cruisers, but here too, they will contrive to get things done. For instance, the "Von der Tann" is to have an entire turret out of a ship of the "Nassau" class, probably the foremost turret, and this ship will be left without a turret for some time. They talk a great deal also of transferring guns, and they will perhaps make use of those intended for the "Hindenburg", which will not be completed will the late autumn.<br />
<br />
It may be presumed that the battleships will be ready for sea in 4-6 weeks, and the battle-cruisers, particularly the "Seydlitz", in not less than 4 months. Naturally work is going on day and night, and repairs are given priority over all new construction.<br />
<br />
The damage sustained by light cruisers and destroyers is inconsiderable. The "Hamburg" had a funnel shot away. As these ships seem to be of minor importance, I did not trouble further about them.<br />
<br />
As our Allies appear not to have the intention of communicating to us what effect the examination of damages sustained will have on their construction in the future, we must endeavour to ascertain this as time goes on by means of cross questioning and by studying their new constructions in detail. I do not feel called upon to draw premature and rash conclusions to-day, on the strength of impressions received, but this will not prevent me from giving a summary of my opinion and of the opinions expresses in my hearing.<br />
<br />
Firstly, it is a remarkable fact that in all the ships that have returned home, all the engine and boiler-rooms are undamaged; the "Lützow" is no exception to this, as she proceeded under her own steam until late in the night after the action. I have also been assured by the Imperial Navy Office, after an inspection carried out by the Chief Engineer, that not a single auxiliary engine was defective. The only boiler-room put out of action was the foremost one in the "Seydlitz" where the bulkhead gave a little, allowing water to penetrate through rivet holes and cracks when the ship was under way. The conclusion may therefore be drawn that these vital parts of the ship are sufficiently protected and that the armour belt of the usual German thicknesses, though it cannot stop the shells, at least fulfils its purpose by breaking them up. Consequently it has become almost impossible even for the largest splinters of 15 in. shell to penetrate through armoured deck or torpedo bulkhead in engine and boiler rooms.<br />
<br />
Even at these long ranges and steep angles there was no question of the armoured decks being pierced; but the fitting of strong gratings over the hatches, which prevented the engines of the "Von der Tann" from sustaining severe damage, appears very necessary.<br />
<br />
The torpedo bulkheads also resisted shells, mines and torpedoes effectually; and in cases where slight damage was sustained, it had no further consequences than the flooding of the compartment affected.<br />
<br />
Perhaps it would be advisable to construct a specially strong boiler-room bulkhead, similar to a torpedo bulkhead, so that it could not be damaged by splinters or water-pressure.<br />
<br />
The inspection of the "Seydlitz" has left me with the impression that the commanding officer of the "Seydlitz" expected rather too much of his ship, and that nothing short of extraordinary good luck enabled her to be brought back. At one time when the whole forepart of the ship was flooded and the bows were under water, he proceeded occasionally with revolutions for 22 knots, just in order to show how seaworthy his ship was, so he told me. This may have been very sporting, or perhaps it may have been necessary under the circumstances in order not to drop too far behind and be overtaken by the enemy, but it certainly was not good seamanship, and if his stokehold bulkhead had burst, the "Seydlitz" would have gone down like the "Lutzow", where the circumstances appear to have been very similar. Later on he decreased speed and finally proceeded stern first.<br />
<br />
I therefore think it not impossible that the loss of the "Lützow", which is said to have been proceeded at 14 knots for a time, was also due only to recklessly high speed, and that the ship might have been saved if she had proceeded stern first or been taken in tow.<br />
<br />
As the danger from water-pressure must always be greatest from ahead, it would certainly be advisable to take special preventative measures against it.<br />
<br />
Vice-Admiral Schmidt told me that, in his opinion, the armoured belt ought to be strongest in the centre, and possible in the afterpart to protect the steering engines, and possibly in the bows, but that it ought not to taper off gradually from the centre to the extremities. He was also entirely in favour of a protected upper deck forming a second armoured deck.<br />
<br />
The admirably thorough system of internal division in the German ships and the floating capability thus attained is the finest proof of the merit of German construction which pursued this aim, and it shows that Admiral von Tirpitz, the creator of the Battle Fleet of to-day, was right when he upheld the principle that, above all things, the ships must be capable of remaining afloat and must not sink or heel over, and that everything else is of secondary consideration.<br />
<br />
The large number of hits in the turrets is remarkable, and it is generally considered that the turret armour should be appreciably stronger, especially in the lower part of the barbettes; for it is not only the disablement of the guns that comes into question, serious though this might be, but also the blowing up of magazines and the total destruction of the ship, as the wide shaft down to the magazines cannot possibly be made completely flash-proof. This is the most vital part of the ship. It is only owing to the small explosive charges in British shells, that there were no explosions of magazines in the German ships.<br />
<br />
Everything possible had been done after the action of 24.1.15 to ensure protection against this danger; the ready ammunition was removed from the top of the hoists and wherever possible all the openings in shafts leading down below were fitted with flaps, covers and heavy asbestos mats, while German ammunition is particularly carefully stowed and packed in cases with screwed-on covers.<br />
<br />
The disasters on the British side are a proof that this is a question of the greatest importance. It must also be taken into consideration that while any other damage turret may take months.<br />
<br />
The numerous hits in turrets would appear to justify the opinion of those who decided against triple turrets, on the ground [sic] that if one was disabled it would put too many heavy guns out of action.<br />
<br />
A hit in a casemate will of course destroy it and disable the gun, but this is of little consequence. Care must be taken here also not to have any ready ammunition, and to close the ammunition hand-up hermetically with heavy asbestos mats at the magazine end also. With the German "Paternoster" (dredger hoist) the ammunition lifts this mat as it comes up and the mat then falls to and closes the opening, which is a practical arrangement.<br />
<br />
Other hits through unarmoured parts, which destroyed more or less small gear and at the first glance give an impression of terrible havoc, are really of no consequence.<br />
<br />
In the "Von der Tann" they wanted to flood a turret magazine. This was impossible, as the flooding valve in the battery, or between deck was piled up with debris, cabin fittings, etc., and was inaccessible. Fortunately the flooding of the magazine turned out to be unnecessary. The Executive Officer remarked to me how critical such a trivial matter might become, and that one could not be careful enough about choosing the positions for the flooding valves, which must be kept clear of easily destructible objects.<br />
<br />
The man-hole covers in the decks, coal shoots [chutes], etc., were pointed out to me as dangerous, as they may be burst open by pressure of gas from below, thus causing damage and giving passage to the gases. These covers should be secured in a different manner and much more firmly.<br />
<br />
The flooding and draining system worked admirably, and is hardly capable of improvement. The only disadvantage is that the compartments above the armoured deck have no draining arrangements. This should be provided. A list, consequent on an inrush of water, could always be corrected by flooding an opposite compartment. This is an important matter both as affecting gunnery and personnel.<br />
<br />
The searchlights, which were not taken down in the German ships, all came out of the action undamaged; anxiety on their account was therefore unfounded. It was very unpleasant when attacking boats fired on the searchlights, and it is therefore considered necessary to fit light armour protection on the masts for the crews of the searchlight control and electric cables.<br />
<br />
Damage from flames is nowhere visible. The Germans are now rather amused at the care with which interior partitions were scraped.<br />
<br />
I could not help comparing the German ships with the Russian battleship "Orel", which I saw in Madzurn after the battle of Tsushima. If I remember rightly, the "Orel" had 5 severe hits and 40 hits with medium-calibre shell.<br />
<br />
The enormous explosive power of the Shimosa shell, which breaks up into minute splinters, did not do the slightest damage to the vital parts of the ship, but the upper deck was transformed into a confused heap of ruins. Superstructure, bridges, masts, funnels, etc., were destroyed, guns dismounted and fires started.<br />
<br />
Nothing of the kind is to be seen in the German ships, outwardly only a few more or less clean shell holes are visible, and they look so orderly and so little damaged that they do not appear to have gone through an action.<br />
<br />
It is true that the upper decks are said to have been littered with countless splinters, but they flew on to the decks from shells which struck the water, the ship receiving violent shocks.<br />
<br />
The holes in the armour show the characteristic concentric cracks round the hole and the radial splashes, the latter proving that the shells exploded on impact or at the latest, as they passed through. In many cases, as already noted, the force of the explosion was external and only pieces of plate, and possibly the head of the shell were driven in.<br />
<br />
<center><u>FLAG OFFICERS OF THE FLEET AND LEADERS</u></center><br />
<br />
{|<br />
| Commander-in-Chief:<br />
| Vice Admiral Scheer<br />
|-<br />
| <u>I Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Vice Admiral Schmidt<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Engelhard<br />
|-<br />
| <u>II Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Mauve<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Baron von Dalwigh<br />
|-<br />
| <u>III Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Behncke<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Nordmann<br />
|-<br />
| Officer commanding the Scouting Forces and<br>Commanding 1st Scouting Group<br />
| Vice Admiral Hipper<br />
|-<br />
| " 2nd " "<br />
| Rear Admiral Bodicker<br />
|-<br />
| " 4th " "<br />
| Commodore "Captain" v. Reuter<br />
|-<br />
| Leaders of Destroyers<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| in "Rostock"<br />
| Commodore "Captain" Michelsen<br />
|-<br />
| in Regensburg<br />
| Commodore "Captain" Heinrich<br />
|-<br />
| Leader of submarines<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| In Hamburg<br />
| Captain Bauer<br />
|}<br />
<br />
<center><u>REMARKS</u></center><br />
<br />
The lecture on the action, upon which this report is based, was illustrated by a plan prepared in haste for H.M. the Kaiser, and a copy was promised to me. But the Admiral Staff does not wish to part with this first incomplete draft, and the preparation of an accurate plan has not yet been completed, as the Admiral Staff is not yet in possession of all the details.<br />
<br />
In time to be included in this report I have only received the sketch of the first stage of the battle, namely the cruiser action on a southerly course, together with a small sketch of the situation when the action was broken off; both are enclosed.<br />
<br />
I conclude from the sketch of the cruiser action, that the accounts given to me were not quite accurate; for instance, the assertion of the commanding officer of the "Moltke" that the shortest range at that stage was 7,650 yds. and that he had accounted for one of the armoured cruisers with a torpedo.<br />
<br />
The sketch shows that the "Indefatigable" was probably first destroyed by gun fire from the "Von der Tann", and later the "Queen Mary" by gunfire from the "Derfflinger", and that the range was never less than 14,220 yds.<br />
<br />
The loss of "V. 27" and "V. 29" and of 4 British destroyers is also apparent, while I was only told of two.<br />
<br />
In the original sketch, 2 British armoured cruisers are also shown as having fallen out during this stage, but this is not shown on the accompanying sketch and probably took place later.<br />
<br />
I was told by the Admiral Staff that the accompanying sketches are not to be taken as strictly accurate.<br />
<br />
It is requested that the sketches and course of the action and the account of damages may be treated as strictly confidential.<br />
<br />
==Footnotes==<br />
{{reflist}}<br />
<br />
==External Links==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
*Krámli, Mihály. [http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-124.pdf "The Report on the Battle of Jutland by the Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché in Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Colloredo-Mannsfeld."] ''NavWeaps''.<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
[[Category:Battle of Jutland]]</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=User:Simon_Harley&diff=334728User:Simon Harley2024-03-01T19:52:15Z<p>Simon Harley: </p>
<hr />
<div>[[File:Confing.jpg|thumb|right|300px|The editor presenting a paper based on [[A Direct Train of Cordite]] at the British Commission for Maritime History's New Researchers' Conference, 2013.]] <br />
My name is '''Simon Harley''' and I am a thirty-eight year old researcher of the Royal Navy in the [[Dreadnought Era]].<br />
<br />
I currently live on the North-West coast of England. For the past 16 years I've been accumulating material on the [[Royal Navy Flag Officers of the Great War]], which will eventually form the basis of a multi-volume history of the Royal Navy, from Lord Fisher's going to sea up to the Treaty of Versailles. By providing a background to these Flag Officers' services from 1854 to 1914, their actions in the Great War will be put into their proper context.<br />
<br />
During the COVID-19 pandemic, and the consequent closure of archives, I started a new project on cordite handling at the Battle of Jutland which has (as of March 2024) matured into a 600 page work on the subject.<br />
<br />
If you have any questions or material relating to the subjects of this website, please [http://dreadnoughtproject.org/contact.php get in touch] or email me at simon AT-SIGN dreadnoughtproject.org. I would be especially happy to hear from descendants of naval officers who served in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.<br />
<br />
My personal website and blog can be found at [http://www.simonharley.com http://www.simonharley.com].<br />
<br />
Elected an Associate Fellow of the Royal Historical Society in 2024.<br />
<br />
Invited to present a paper at the 2017 McMullen Naval History Symposium at the United States Naval Academy.<br />
<br />
Speaker at the 2013 New Researchers in Maritime History Conference hosted by the British Commission for Maritime History.<br />
<br />
Author of:<br />
<br />
*[http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00253359.2016.1167397 "'It's a Case of All or None': 'Jacky' Fisher's Advice to Winston Churchill, 1911"]. ''The Mariner's Mirror''. '''102''' (2): 174–190. doi:10.1080/00253359.2016.1167397.<br />
<br />
*[http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00253359.2016.1202488 "'A Distinct Point in Modern Naval Tactics'"]. ''The Mariner's Mirror''. '''102''' (3): 325–330. doi:10.1080/00253359.2016.1202488.<br />
<br />
*[http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00253359.2016.1240978 "Vice-Admiral Bethell's Third Fleet Battle Orders, about 1914"]. ''The Mariner's Mirror''. '''102''' (4): 442–443. doi:10.1080/00253359.2016.1240978.<br />
<br />
*[http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00253359.2017.1304709 "The Promotion of David Beatty to Rear-Admiral"]. ''The Mariner's Mirror''. '''103''' (2): 213–216. doi:10.1080/00253359.2017.1304709.<br />
<br />
*[http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00253359.2017.1348040 "War Course Attendance at Greenwich from 1900 to 1904"]. ''The Mariner's Mirror''. '''103''' (4): 471–474. doi:10.1080/00253359.2017.1348040.<br />
<br />
===Links===<br />
*[[User:Simon Harley/Library|Library]] &mdash; A list of ''some'' of my books. I'm always willing to share information or the books themselves on request.<br />
<br />
*[[User:Simon Harley/Archives|Archives]] &mdash; A list of ''some'' of the archival (i.e. primary) sources I have and need. If you can help acquire them, or are interested in the contents of some of them, please get in touch.<br />
<br />
*[[User:Simon Harley/Acknowledgements|Acknowledgements]] &mdash; Research like this requires a lot of time, luck, effort, and ''help''.<br />
<br />
===External Links===<br />
*[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:Simon_Harley My Wikipedia user page.]<br />
*[https://twitter.com/simonharley My Twitter page.]<br />
<br />
==Works in Progress==<br />
Far too many to list.<br />
<br />
''Review copies of new publications are always welcome.''</div>Simon Harleyhttp://dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php?title=Austro-Hungarian_Naval_Attach%C3%A9_Report_on_the_Battle_of_Jutland&diff=334727Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché Report on the Battle of Jutland2024-03-01T19:51:35Z<p>Simon Harley: Added detail on source.</p>
<hr />
<div>Soon after the [[Battle of Jutland]] on 31 May &ndash; 1 June 1916 the Naval Attaché of the [[Austro-Hungarian Navy|Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Navy]] to the German Empire visited the High Sea Fleet. He composed a report on the battle for his superiors using first-hand accounts, interspersed here and there with his own observations. The version reproduced here is a translation in English apparently made by the [[Naval Intelligence Division (Royal Navy)|Naval Intelligence Division]] in 1919 from a copy which was subsequently returned to "F.N.A.", presumably the French Naval Attaché. A copy of the translation then made its way into the papers of the British Cabinet, from where historian Arthur J. Marder obtained a copy which is in his papers.<ref>Original number N.I.D. 087/19. Marder papers, Special Collections and Archives, Langson Library, University of California, Irvine, MS-F002, Box 27.</ref> It is worth comparing this translation with the translation made by Mihály Krámli of an original, slightly different, report published on the ''NavWeaps'' online resource.<ref>Krámli, Mihály. [http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-124.pdf "The Report on the Battle of Jutland by the Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché in Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Colloredo-Mannsfeld."] ''NavWeaps''.</ref><br />
<br />
The original grammar and punctuation of the typescript has been reproduced here whereever possible.<br />
<br />
==Report==<br />
From:- Austrian Naval Attache in Berlin.<br />
<br />
To:- Commander-in-Chief, Pola.<br />
<div style="float:right;">Berlin,<br>17 June, 1916.</div><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<center><u>NAVAL ENGAGEMENT OF 31 MAY 1916.</u></center><br />
<br />
The following is a report of the naval proceedings of 31 May - 1 June, 1916, and also of the damage sustained by the German Fleet.<br />
<br />
During my 3-days' visit to Wilhelmshaven, followed by a cursory examination of the "MARKGRAF" and "KURFURST" at Hamburg, I endeavoured to gain merely a general idea of the results of gunfire and concentrated my attention on the course of the action itself.<br />
Admiral Scheer, whom I only saw for a short time as he left for Kiel to attend the funeral of his borther-in-law [sic], Lieut.-Commander Mohr, who was killed in the action, very kindly arranged that his Chief of Staff, Captain Trotha, should give me an account of the whole proceedings, illustrated by plans, and that I should be furnished with all information. I have tried to fill in the gaps by conversations with officers whom I know; this has resulted in some contradictory statements, and several points remain obscure, the accounts from the various ships not having all come in.<br />
<br />
Many episodes will therefore be explained later and may appear in a different light, but, as regards the broad outlines which are of chief importance, the picture of this interesting engagement is fairly clear. The accompanying plan of the action was made in haste for the Kaiser and will therefore need much correction.<br />
<br />
The spirit pervading the Fleet can only be described as one of enthusiasm; they are intoxicated with victory. The heavy load weighing on them all, the dear that this war might end without an encounter of the Fleets, have vanished. They have learnt what fighting really means, they know themselves to be superior to the enemy as regards tactics, and that they were following the right lines and have nothing to unlearn; they know that their gunfire was more effective than that of the enemy, and that they can rely implicitly on their flotillas which have always been looked upon in the German Navy as one of the chief factors in an action. Finally they know that their largest ships can stand heavy fire and serious damage, that they leave nothing to be desired as regards construction and cannot be sunk easily. In short, they feel that the British, in spite of all their boasting, cannot overcome the German Fleet and have a considerable respect for it.<br />
<br />
This conviction imbues the whole Fleet, down to the last man, with confidence in their strength and a calm assurance regarding future encounters. At the same time they are free from over-confidence and from under-estimation of the enemy. On the contrary, the British fire-control and the enormous piercing power of their heavy shell at great distances have roused their admiration, so that a careless conception of the situation is not to be feared, the less so, as well-balanced minds such as those of Admiral Scheer and his Staff are unlikely to be led away by former successes to undertake rash enterprises in the future.<br />
<br />
They do not deny that they were extraordinarily fortunate, and that if the action had been prosecuted with energy on the British side, and if the "Nelson touch" had been in evidence, things might have gone very badly for Germany, especially as the British still had an intact Battle Squadron of 12 units at their disposal which had not yet taken part in the action. But they console themselves with the knowledge that no naval action was ever won without some stroke of luck.<br />
<br />
The Kaiser's visit, the day before my arrival, and his address to the Fleet gave great satisfaction, and subsequently many important personages arrive to inspect the ships, such as Prince Henry and the Grand Dukes of Mecklenburg and Oldenburg, and numbers of decorations were distributed. Vice-Admiral Scheer was promoted to Admiral, and he and Vice-Admiral Hipper received the Pour le Merite.<br />
<br />
I also visited Rear-Admiral Behncke, who was wounded and in hospital; his wounds are slight, a few small splinters in his head, elbow and knee, and he will probably soon be well again.<br />
<br />
<center><u>COURSE OF THE ACTION.</u></center><br />
<br />
The Commander-in-Chief intended to advance with the whole Fleet to the waters of the Skagerrak, in order to make his presence felt unpleasantly by disturbing the shipping, hoping thereby to lure on the British forces and in this manner to be in a position to attack a part of the British Fleet with superior or at least with equal forces. He reckoned that any movements of the British Fleet would be reported to him in good time by the submarines which had been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and he hoped that the airships would prove a better means of reconnoitring than any possessed by the enemy.<br />
<br />
Unfavourable weather prevented him for a considerable period from undertaking any operations, and, as the submarines were to return home on 1 June and be relieved by a new group, the 31 May was the last date for carrying out the planned advance.<br />
<br />
The cruisers left the Jade at 3 a.m., the Main Fleet at 4 a.m., steering an easterly course, and then, after passing Heligoland, a N.N.W'ly course. No reports were received from submarines. These were stationed chiefly off the Orkneys and the Firth of Forth, and the large group of Flanders boats were off the Thames and at the entrance to the Channel. <br />
<br />
While proceeding northwards, a few W/T messages were received, but they were corrupt, appeared to refer only to small formations and gave no clue to the movements of the Grand Fleet. The airships were unable to start in the morning, on account of the wind, and, as it blew hard throughout the day in the Heligoland Bight, they could not start until the early hours of 1 June. In this respect things did not go well, but Admiral Scheer decided nevertheless to continue on his course to the Skagerrak. <br />
<br />
This the account given by Captain von Trotha, who affirms that nothing was known of the presence of the British Fleet in the waters of the Skagerrak, and that there seemed no probability of encountering this Fleet before 1 June.<br />
<br />
There are some points here which I am unable to understand. The submarines are said to have been stationed off the English coast for some time past, and were to return home on 1 June to be relieved probably by a weaker group. For, If the same number of boats were to to keep watch off the English coast, why should 31 May have been the last day for the German Fleet to sail. The day of departure was, therefore, too late in any case, for, if no encounter was to be expected before 1 June, the boats stationed off the coast could not possibly encounter the damaged British ships, as was intended, for probably no damaged ships would be there before 2 June.<br />
<br />
The battleship "KONIG ALBERT" had to carry out repairs to her condensers and did not proceed with the Fleet. Von Trotha told me that there was no alternative and that a ship must carry out small overhauls regularly in a dockyard according to programme. But could it not be arranged, when one is taking the initiative, to choose one's moment for an advance and to have all the ships together for this short time? And why should just that moment be chosen when one of the most powerful ships of the "Kaiser" class is in the dockyard, instead, for instance, of one of the "Nassau" class with 11-in. guns.<br />
<br />
In addition, the "BAYERN" was to have joined up a few days later. After having waited so long, why should not the plan have been postponed for 2 or 3 weeks, instead of dispensing with the only ship carrying 15-in. guns.<br />
<br />
In the same manner they dispensed with air reconnaissance, from which they had expected so much.<br />
<br />
These considerations make me doubt whether the account given me is quite correct, and whether, on the contrary, they knew of certain movements of the British Fleet and considered the moment extremely favourable for an attack. Perhaps they only knew of Beatty's battle squadron, and thinking the Main Fleet was far away, hoped to entrap this squadron. In Berlin, they have much to say, even in military circles, about the British Fleet's intention to push through into the Baltic, and of Kitchener's mission having some connection with this. I consider this senseless, for it cannot be presemed [sic] that the British Fleet would leave their shores unprotected and do the Germans the favour of operating in the Baltic, which would certainly be a most advantageous area for the German Fleet. In any case, there appear to be discrepancies which will probably be explained at some later date.<br />
<br />
Scouting groups, battle cruisers and light cruisers, together with flotillas, preceded the Main Fleet by 50 - 60 miles. At 4 p.m. the light cruisers encountered some British battle cruisers. These at once opened fire on the light cruisers, at an estimated distance of 26,247 yds.; the range could be taken accurately. Though they did not obtain a hit, the salvoes fell so well that the German cruisers thought it advisable to turn away and fall back on their battle cruisers.<br />
<br />
As the British approached, these battle cruisers turned on to a southerly course, in order to lure the enemy on to the German Main Fleet. A running action, on a southerly course, ensued. The British were to starboard and to the west of the Germans, who had therefore the following advantage: in the North Sea, in summer, the western horizon is quite light and visibility towards the west is good, while towards the east, and in a still greater degree off the Jutland Coast, it is misty and visibility is bad and no silhouettes stand out against the eastern horizon. This phenomenon also played great part in the subsequent course of the action. The sun was still high and was not troublesome, and the British ships offered admirable targets. The sea was calm, the wind N.W. 1-2, altering subsequently through W. to S.W.<br />
<br />
The following British ships were recognised:-<br />
3 "Lion" class, 1 "Tiger" and 2 "Indefatigable" class; they were soon reinforced by 5 "Queen Elizabeth" class following astern.<br />
<br />
It is asserted that, judging from shell splinters, the ship of the "Tiger" class carried 15-in. guns, and that she was therefore the mysterious vessel which replaced the "TIGER" sunk on 24.1.15; as the last-named "TIGER" carried only 13.5-in.guns, this was taken as a further proof of her loss. The silhouette of the new "TIGER", however, is said to have resembled that of the old "TIGER" exactly. As the "Queen Elizabeths" soon opened fire also with 15-in. guns, I rather doubt this assertion regarding the "TIGER", and the various ships on this early part of the engagement are altogether somewhat at variance.<br />
<br />
On the German side the ships proceeded in the following sequence:- "LÜTZOW", Flagship of Vice-Admiral Hipper, "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN".<br />
<br />
As Hipper edged towards the enemy, the distance decreased to about 7655 yds. The German fire was unquestionably superior, but the speed of the British vessels was greater. After a short time the "INDEFATIGABLE" and "QUEEN MARY" blew up, and 2 battle-cruisers and two attacking destroyers were also accounted for. The "QUEEN MARY" must have been destroyed by the explosion of a magazine; she was torn in two halves, and a water-colour painted by an officer represents her enveloped in an enormous column of black smoke; she disappeared in a few seconds. Only one cadet was subsequently picked.<br />
<br />
The second battle cruiser disappeared under similar circumstances. The "VON DER TANN" claims to have accounted for one of these battle-cruisers by a broadside. But the "MOLTKE" fired 4 torpedoes and also claims this achievement.<br />
<br />
The Germans suffered very little during this phase of the action, the "MOLTKE" alone receiving hits on the starboard side. The fire of the British battle-cruisers is said not to have been nearly as good as that of the "QUEEN ELIZABETH" class later on.<br />
<br />
When they had approached the German Main Fleet, the British turned on to a contrary course and the German cruisers did the same. The German Main Fleet proceeded in divisions in starboard quarter-line, the 3rd Battle Squadron: 4 "König" class and 3 "Kaiser" class, Fleet Flagship, 1st Battle Squadron: 4 "Ostfriesland" class and 4 "Westfalen" class, and the 2nd Battle Squadron: 5 "Deutschland" class and the "Hessen". They endeavoured to effect a junction with the cruisers, but were unable to take part very effectually.<br />
<br />
The course of the action was now in a northerly direction, over the area which had just been traversed, and the British ships now drew ahead considerably and turned more and more towards the East; the Germans followed this movement, and in consequence the conditions of visibility became less and less favourable for them.<br />
<br />
The "Queen Elizabeths" now made their presence more greatly felt; one of them had dropped out, but I was unable to ascertain when this occurred.<br />
<br />
The course of the German Math Fleet at first led past the 2 disabled British destroyers, which were lying stopped. The crews had already taken to the boats and were picked up later on by German destroyers. As the Main Fleet was doubtful about the advisability of passing the destroyers while they were still afloat, they were sunk by a few broadsides. One of the officers who was picked up was in pyjamas and is said to have stayed in his cabin during the action. He declared "We did not expect so much resistance," while another said - "The battle is rather disappointing." It has been ascertained that these destroyers were greatly under-manned; their crews seemed very exhausted, which points to their having been in the water for a long time.<br />
<br />
While on this easterly course, the light cruisers of the fast 2nd Scouting Group: "FRANKFURT", "PILLAU", "ELBING" and "WIESBADEN", were heavily fired on from the N.E. and E. without their being able to see more than the gun flashes. In addition, they were under continual fire from the N., and while turning away to S.E. and S., they ascertained that they were opposed by an interminable line of British ships, which appeared at first to be on a N.W.'ly course, and had then evidently turned together on to a S.'ly course.<br />
<br />
It may be noted here that the battleships, and, generally speaking, the battle-cruisers also, never sighted the British Main Fleet, and saw nothing but the flashes of the guns and the effects of the fire. These British ships, about 25 in number, were only sighted by a few light cruisers and by the flotillas, and were counted by them as accurately as possible.<br />
<br />
Surrounded thus from the N. and the E. and under fire, the "WIESBADEN" was disabled, apparently by a hit in the engine-room. The Admiral noticed, it is true, that his leading ships must have encountered new and powerful forces and that they were turning away; but he thought it his duty to go to the assistance of the "WIESBADEN" and therefore continued on an easterly course.<br />
<br />
The van of the Main Fleet, led by the "KÖNIG" (Rear-Admiral Behncke) now came under heavy fire from right ahead; the "KÖNIG" turned away under this fire towards the S.E., whereupon the Commander-in-Chief ordered the whole line to "turn together" to starboard and gave up the idea of helping the "WIESBADEN". About this time Vice-Admiral Hipper transferred his flag from the "LÜTZOW" to the "MOLTKE" with the help of a destroyer, his W/T station being damaged.<br />
<br />
Hardly had the Main Fleet drawn away on a westerly course, before it was ascertained that the pressure was relaxing and the fire decreasing, and that the British were no longer pursuing so hotly. Scheer therefore ordered the ships to "turn together" back on to their former course, and made the signal 'R' = 'Engage the enemy'. This second advance may be termed the zenith of the action. Admiral Scheer gave his views on it approximately as follows:- "Those who make a study of this engagement will be very puzzled as to my object in advancing thus against the wall of British ships. The fact is that I had no particular object. I made the first advance because I had a feeling that I ought to endeavour to assist the "WIESBADEN" and because the situation ahead was quite obscure to me, for I saw nothing of the "LÜTZOW" and received no W/T reports. I soon saw, however, that the leading ships were coming under an overwhelming fire, and that I could not risk the Fleet on the "WIESBADEN'S" account. When I noticed that the British pressure had quite ceased and that the Fleet remained intact in my hands, I turned back, under the impression that the action could not end in this way and that I ought to seek contact with the enemy again."<br />
<br />
The situation during the first and second advances may serve as an example of what should not take place according to all the laws of tactics, for it could not have been worse; von Trotha said jokingly that, if an Admiral brought about such a situation at a war game or in manoeuvres, he would never be entrusted without another command. In the North, the "Queen Elizabeths", then the battle-cruisers, and from N.E. through E. to S.E., an endless line of battleships formed an arc round the German van and kept it under fire. Evidently it had fallen into the most perfect trap. In addition to this unfavourable tactical position, there was a further difficulty, namely that the German ships could be clearly distinguished while they themselves only saw the gun flashes, 4 or 5 to each salvo, but could find no target.<br />
<br />
The Gunnery Officer of the "MARKGRAF" told me that he could not fire at all during half-an-hour, and that they were at the mercy of the British broadsides. Critical though the position was, in theory, they think that experience justifies the conclusion that this 'crossing the T' is in reality not so disastrous at longer ranges; for, in spite of the enormous superiority of their fire, the British made comparatively few hits, the simple reason being that, when fire is thus concentrated on a few leading ships, there can be no question of improving the shooting by spotting.<br />
<br />
Given good tactical training and squadrons which work well together, it is always easy to retire rapidly from an unfavourable position and even possibly to reach an advantageous one.<br />
<br />
The small amount of damage sustained by the Main Fleet may be owing partly to the fact that the leading battle-cruisers drew the enemy's fire, thus relieving the battleships. Only the three leading ships, "KÖNIG", "GROSSER KURFÜRST" and "MARKGRAF" received several hits; while among all the other ships, the "KAISER", "HELGOLAND" and the "SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN" received one hit each, and the rest were not hit at all.<br />
<br />
Simultaneously with the battle-cruisers, which were ahead and pressing forward in quarter-line formation, the 6th and 9th Flotillas, left by the "REGENSBURG", also proceeded to a torpedo attack. Regarding this cruiser advance, the Commanding Officer of the "SEYDLITZ" told me that he was in such a position that he was able to avoid the British salvoes, for he altered course towards the point where each salvo fell and thus evaded the spotting correction.<br />
<br />
This torpedo attack was carried out with great determination and seems to have been completely successful, although nobody is able to state how many hits were obtained. The British ships overlapped somewhat and their line was almost unbroken, and, as about 100 torpedoes were fired, it is estimates that there must have been a considerable number of hits, some people affirm that there were 20, but I do not place much confidence in these figures and it is useless to trouble about them as nobody is certain.<br />
<br />
The boats were fired on by guns of all calibres, even the heaviest, but with little effect, only one boat being destroyed; two other boats had been sunk in an earlier attack during the cruiser action.<br />
<br />
The battle-cruisers were also attacked by British torpedoes, the "SEYDLITZ" being hit once. The "MOLTKE" was lucky, for, when close to the ship, one torpedo apparently had a gyro failure and ran parallel with her. The "LÜTZOW" was probably hit also.<br />
<br />
After the attack, the destroyers laid fog and a heavy smoke screen, which interposed between the Fleet; this benefitted not only the heavily-damaged "LÜTZOW" and "DERFFLINGER", whose nets had been shot away and were hanging down, but also the whole Fleet. It may also have made an impression on the British.<br />
<br />
The German Main Fleet and cruisers turned on a westerly course, fire having again entirely ceased; and the ships of the Main Fleet then turned gradually in succession and in inverse sequence from W. to S.W., subsequently steering towards Horns Reef.<br />
<br />
It is not known what the British did; all that is certain, is that they did not follow in pursuit and that nothing further was seen of their Main Fleet. It remained light until 11 p.m. (summer time), and it would not have been impossible, considering their superior speed, for them to have come within firing range. The Germans expected it too, and now have to content themselves with surmises about the British Commander-in-Chief's reasons for not doing so. It is probably that the unfavourable issue of the fleet part of the battle and the demoralising losses in ships took away any desire on Jellicoe's part for further fighting. His Fleet may have lost heavily and been severely shaken by the torpedo attack; and, as the Germans still had some intact flotillas at their disposal, he may have feared further strong torpedo attacks in the critical hours of twilight, for in the German Navy they say that Jellicoe fears their destroyers in particular.<br />
<br />
Nevertheless, the Germans were not under the impression of having shaken the British Fleet to the extent of obliging them to give up the struggle, and when the evening passed without further incident, they reckoned with certainty on encountering Jellicoe off Horns Reef at daybreak. They were the more astonished at his non-appearance when their air reconnaissance reported that on the morning of 1 June a squadron of 12 battle-ships was proceeding North from the southern part of North Sea and that it suddenly turned on to an opposite course and proceeded South.<br />
<br />
As it could not possibly have been the intention of the British Commander-in-Chief to let the German Fleet escape after having encountered it at last far from its base, and as he still had an intact battle-squadron at his disposal, one is compelled to take the view that he no longer felt strong enough for a second encounter; the achievement of the German Fleet must therefore be very highly thought of.<br />
<br />
During the night cruising following the action, numerous small episodes and minor engagements took place, of which no clear idea can be formed. <br />
<br />
In view of a possible fresh attack or of a possible pursuit on the part of the enemy, it was thought undesirable to leave the 2nd Battle Squadron either in the van or in the rear, it therefore took station to starboard and at first proceeded on an opening course from the other squadrons, and continued fairly independently during the night.<br />
<br />
The 1st Battle Squadron therefore led, with the "WESTFALEN" as guide, and it was followed by the 3rd Battle Squadron.<br />
<br />
After the action had been broken off, the 4 remaining battle cruisers were ahead to port, where they were suddenly again brought under heavy fire from the port side and from ahead, apparently by 3 or 4 battle cruisers. It is presumed that these were the remaining 3 or 4 older cruisers of the "Invincible" class, which Jellicoe probably always stationed ahead of the Main Fleet, for it would hardly have been possible for the "Lions", which were following in the rear in the British line, to have taken station ahead so quickly. The German battle cruisers, all severely damaged, did not feel able to withstand this fire and turned away to starboard, passing ahead of the Main Fleet and between it and the 2nd Battle Squadron, which proceeded quietly on their course and before which the mysterious ships retired, not to be sighted again.<br />
<br />
The battle-cruisers then gradually fell astern, and as they were making much water, and also owing to their differing speeds, they lost contact with the Main Fleet and with each other.<br />
<br />
The "LÜTZOW" had dropped out during the engagement and proceeded independently, accompanied by 4 destroyers. At first she was able to steam 14 knots, but her speed decreased rapidly and dropped finally to 4 knots. Her bows sank slowly, and when the whole forecastle was under water the Commanding Officer decided to leave the ship. The badly wounded were transferred carefully to the boats and the disembarkation was conducted in good order. A torpedo was then fired at the ship and this coup de grace sank her in deep water at about 1 o'clock, I believe.<br />
<br />
The "SEYDLITZ" was hardly in a better condition than the "LÜTZOW"; she also sank gradually by the bows till the water was almost level with the deck, and she had a heavy list to port, but she continued on her course. In the darkest hours of the night she suddenly sighted 3 large ships to port, quite close to. She turned away, made a British recognition signal and was not pursued. As bad luck would have it, the steaming light had short-circuited, could not be switched off and showed intermittently.<br />
<br />
The "DERFFLINGER", "MOLTKE" and "VON DER TANN" followed the Main Fleet more or less and met with no particular experiences.<br />
<br />
The Main Fleet had to repulse a series of destroyer attacks and was also engaged by cruisers. The movements of these British cruisers, which came up singly, are incomprehensible and give the impression of having lost their heads. They appear to have received the order, judging by an intercepted W/T message, to proceed on a northerly and north-westerly course, and thereby they ran into the extended German line which they probably imagined they had passed to the South.<br />
<br />
One large cruiser (?"WARRIOR") proceeded unsuspectingly within 875 yds. of the line of battleships and came under concentrated fire from several ships before she could reply, so that she blew up enveloped in flames and disappeared in 47 seconds. The "BIRMINGHAM" seems to have been accounted for in a similar manner. The destroyers all approached in a really insane manner; frequently not from ahead but from a direction astern, scattered, singly or in pairs, or at most 3 together, never in large numbers. Most of them were disabled forthwith by a few salvoes and set on fire. The "WESTFALEN" distinguished herself particularly at this time.<br />
<br />
These burning destroyers strewn along the course, lit it up as if for a festival. Evidently the fires were largely due to the light American and Mexican oils; at any rate German firing trials on oil bunkers never caused any such conflagrations.<br />
<br />
The attacking boats directed shrapnel fire on the searchlights with fairly good results, the searchlights of two battleships and one light cruiser being hit.<br />
<br />
One large destroyer, which only recognised the danger at the last moment and endeavoured to avoid it by altering course was rammed by the "NASSAU", which put her helm over for this purpose. The boat exploded internally and sank.<br />
<br />
The only ships hit were the "POMMERN" in the 2ns Battle Squadron, and the "ROSTOCK". The "POMMERN" blew up at once and nobody was saved. The "ROSTOCK" was just passing between ships of the Main Fleet when she was hit; the loss of life on board was small.<br />
<br />
The Germans believe they destroyed 11 British destroyers in all. The manner in which these destroyers were handled has not left a good impression on the whole, and one has certainly lost respect for this weapon. The view is also taken that the boats are too large and offer too wide a target.<br />
<br />
The light cruiser "ELBING", like the "ROSTOCK", apparently wanted to break through the line from port to starboard under pressure from the British cruisers; she was, however, rammed by the "POSEN" and had to be abandoned in a sinking condition. The Germans also fired a torpedo into her.<br />
<br />
The "FRAUENLOB" and 2 destroyers were lost during the night; no details of their loss are known.<br />
<br />
Not far from Heligoland, the "OSTFRIESLAND", 7th of the line, struck a mine. This brings the account of the chief events of this exciting cruiser to an end.<br />
<br />
The German flotillas were detached from the Fleet to clear the area off the Jutland Coast, which was divided up into sectors. The flotillas stationed furthest to the North proceeded to the Skagerrak and through these straits into the Baltic and to Kiel.<br />
<br />
None of the flotillas sighted the British Main Fleet again, which proves that it must have turned away to the N. or N.W. immediately after the action. According to confidential reports the Fleet entered British ports as early as 1 June.<br />
<br />
Two British battleships, in a severely damaged condition and accompanied by destroyers, were sighted proceeding back to England. One was attacked by a submarine, but without success.<br />
<br />
On the morning of 1 June, in fairly misty weather, a Zeppelin sighted groups of British ships leaving the Channel on a N.E.'ly course. The reports were rather vague, as sometimes 6 and sometimes 12 ships were mentioned; but it seems most likely that 12 battleships and 3 cruisers were in question, and that they soon retired. The airship, which flew low at one time to get a clearer view, was also fired on.<br />
<br />
Some of the ships are said to have had tripod masts.<br />
<br />
The German Fleet, with the exception of "SEYDLITZ", reached the Jade in the afternoon. The "SEYDLITZ" could not cross the bar on account of being so much down by the bows, and it was not till the next day at high water that she was towed in, stern first.<br />
<br />
<center><u>MISCELLANEOUS.<br>TACTICS.</u></center><br />
<br />
The Germans ascribe their success to various causes, and in the first place to their own superiority as regards tactics. This is a point which every officer discusses, and it is constantly repeated that it all happened just as in tactical manoeuvres and in "battle exercises", and that things could not have gone better.<br />
<br />
Movements of squadrons, divisions and individual ships, "turns together" and alterations of course and speed, all went like clockwork and demonstrated the very great mobility of all formations.<br />
<br />
The W/T signalling system of the Main Fleet never failed, and its failure would have been immaterial, as the primary and secondary flag action signals, showing from several positions in the ship, were made simultaneously.<br />
<br />
All this was due to the peace training and the practical experience of the Flag Officers and Captains. Though in peace time the Commander-in-Chief had never commanded a Fleet, nor the Admirals a squadron, still the training carried out on the same lines for a number of years resulted in everything proceeding with the expected precision.<br />
<br />
The British, on the contrary, are said to have displayed a certain clumsiness as regards tactics and to have preferred turning together when "turning on to an opposite course" (Wendungen im Gegenmarsch), though this conclusion does not seem altogether justified from the description of the action.<br />
<br />
The ships kept station 547 yds. apart, and Vice-Admiral Schmidt told me that, in his opinion, this distance is too small for large ships and that he prefers 656 yds., as the shorter distances result in the ships getting bunched and overlapping during alterations of course. In order to relieve this during the first turn to starboard, the Fleet Flagship herself turned to port and then closed gradually into line. At night the distance was 656 yds.<br />
<br />
No interruption of W/T communication was occasioned by the enemy.<br />
<br />
<center><u>GUNNERY</u></center><br />
<br />
It is admitted that the British are superior as regards their gunnery technique. Their salvoes fall most astoundingly close together and aroused admiration on all sides. Some people affirm that they fell too close together, and that it was consequently difficult to cover a sufficiently large danger space.<br />
<br />
This is particularly the case with the heaviest calibres: 13.5-in. and 15-in. and the battle-cruisers' fire was noticeably inferior to that of the "Queen Elizabeth" class, for example.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> Literal translation; the meaning is not clear. - Tr.] The spread of the salvoes frequently only covered a few square yards. In the "KÖNIG" 3 rounds, out of a salvo of 4 rounds, hit between the capstan and the bridge.<br />
<br />
This is attributed to careful calibration, which the British have studied for a long time and which, as is well known, was abandoned by the German Navy after a few trials. The gunnery officers declare unanimously that it must unquestionably be re-introduced.<br />
<br />
The British range-finders are superior to the German, and the construction of their turrets enables them to shoot at ranges impossible for German guns. The question of range appears to be immaterial to the British, who fire at any range so long as visibility permits.<br />
<br />
The Germans are fully convinced of the great superiority of 15-in. guns over all others, and deplore the fact that, owing to the predominant conservative tendencies in the German Navy, this calibre was not introduced until so lately. Vice-Admiral Gerdes, the Head of the Armament Department, is responsible for this, for he always opposed it on the ground that the poor visibility in German waters and the consequent short ranges rendered an increase of calibre useless; he considered the German 12-in. gun to be an altogether superior weapon, capable of competing with every other.<br />
<br />
In one respect the British seem behindhand as compared with the Germans: namely that they cannot alter range quickly enough and they are too dependent on the range clock. The British rely on steady fire at long range, and they adapt their tactics to this and avoid alterations of course and range most assiduously.<br />
<br />
The Germans, on the contrary, in their firing practices always work with big and rapid alterations of range and exercise firing while turning, so that the gunnery officers consider they have an advantage in this respect.<br />
<br />
The Turn on to an opposite course was certainly not advantageous for the German Fleet, but in this particular instance it made little difference, as the German ships were already unable to find a target; besides which, it must have disconcerted the British and it prevented them from obtaining good results with their fire. The salvoes fell very close together round the ships, but few hits were obtained. The rate of fire in the British ships is said to have been fair, but not excessive. Some people affirm that it was very modest.<br />
<br />
The British shell had great penetrating power, and from all reasonable distances the main armour was generally pierced clean through. The shell splinters picked up prove conclusively that at least 2 kinds of shell were used, differing considerably in material and quality. One kind of shell had a very thick wall and an extremely small explosive charge, it might almost be called a solid shot. It seems to have broken up frequently without exploding and the fuse did not function. Its explosive power, if it possessed any at all, was quite inconsiderable, and it is presumed that the explosives used was not high explosive.<br />
<br />
It appears from the splinters of these 15-in. shell that the wall was 6.3 - 6.7 ins. (16 - 17 cm.), so that the hollow space cannot measure more than 2.4 ins. - 1.8 ins. (4 - 6 cm.). It is true that the large pieces into which these shell broke pierced everything in their course and often went right through the whole ship, unless they struck an armoured part. Several intact heads were found, with and without caps, and also entire bases.<br />
<br />
The second kind of shell had considerably thinner walls, only about half as thick, but it also often broke up into quite large pieces and displayed no great explosive power, and little or no incendiary power.<br />
<br />
It appears therefore that the British aimed only at attaining penetrating power, and the Germans are of opinion that they do not possess (rohrsicheren)* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D.Note.- This appears to be a special fuse which is very delicate, but safe until it has left the gun.] fuses for high explosive shell; this was their opinion before the war also.<br />
<br />
They believe that the high explosive power of the German ammunition gives them a great advantage which may partly counterbalance the smaller calibre of their guns and perhaps also their inferior gunnery. In any case, the effect of the German shell at the point of impact was very considerable.<br />
<br />
The fact that the ships blew up must be attributed to explosions in their magazines. (In this connection one may recall a turret of the "SEYDLITZ" being hit in the action of 24 January, 1915; see my report No.47 ex 15). The turret armour must have been pierced and the shells in the turret must have been exploded. The British have no metal cartridge-cases and also no cartridge-holders such as the Germans have, but they keep their cartridges in locked boxes which are perhaps not flash-proof enough. It seems therefore, from the incident experienced by the "SEYDLITZ", that this must constitute a particular danger to British ships. In this last action also turrets in German ships were frequently hit; further details are given in the account of damage sustained.<br />
<br />
After having compared the hits received in the German ships with the observations of results on enemy targets, it may be safely affirmed that the explosive power of the German shells exceeds that of the British; this was already known after the action of 24 January 1915. The Germans are therefore very much annoyed that they had no 15-in. guns to fire, as they are persuaded that ships so knocked about (eingedeckte) as, for example, the "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" would have been completely destroyed by German shell.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. Note.- The writer appears to mean that if German 15-in. shell had been used against "SEYDLITZ" and "DERFFLINGER" these ships would have been sunk.]<br />
<br />
It may be noted here that the "BAYERN", the first of their ships to carry 15-in. guns, will not join the Fleet for another few days, and the "BADEN" not until the autumn.<br />
<br />
Medium armament played no part, only a few hits were obtained and they did little damage.<br />
<br />
The British fired part-salvoes, like the Germans; full salvoes may have been fired now and again.<br />
<br />
The method of repulsing destroyer attacks, which has previously been reported, namely the 'turning away' and firing on one, or at most two boats, proved to be sound, and the repulsing of attacks both by day and night offered no difficulties.<br />
<br />
As regards gunnery, it may also be mentioned that the fire-control apparatus worked without a hitch and withstood the heaviest shocks. The elevation pointers worked admirably. A few ships were not yet fitted with them.<br />
<br />
<center><u>Torpedo.</u></center><br />
<br />
As regards torpedo work the Germans consider themselves very much superior. There were prolonged discussions about depriving Flotilla Leaders of their independence and putting them under the orders of a Leader Ship, but they are now convinced that this is necessary to ensure the flotillas attacking at the right moment and all together.<br />
<br />
The flotillas were led by the 2 leader Ships "ROSTOCK" and "REGENSBURG", the first having 2 flotillas and the second 3 flotillas allocated to them. The remaining 2 flotillas accompanied the Main Fleet or the battle-cruisers. The leaders carried out their duties with great daring and circumspection. The attacks of the British were weak and scattered, and could therefore have little or only occasional success.<br />
<br />
The German 2nd Flotilla, composed of the larger 1500 ton boats were held back instead of being sent to attack. Although these boats are spoken of very highly and are indispensable for certain enterprises, the view is now taken that they are too large and too valuable to be used for attacking during an action. This Flotilla proceeded to Zeebrugge immediately after the action and arrived there safely. It is to be employed in preventing the British from blockading the harbour with nets, and thus make it impossible for the German submarines to proceed out.<br />
<br />
As far as I have heard, the "MOLTKE" alone of the larger ships fired 4 torpedoes.<br />
<br />
Submarines were not in evidence. No German submarines were present; on the other hand a German destroyer claims to have rammed a British submarine. This claim appears to be erroneous, at least it was declared to be nonsense by the Chief of Staff. The submarines failed as regards scouting and also doing the pursuit.<br />
<br />
Some people state that a British aeroplane was sighted to the northward, and that it had apparently risen from a cruiser. It played no part in the action.<br />
<br />
The use of "Höschter"* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. note:- Probably the name of the inventor.] fog seems to have been of good service, it and the smoke made by the destroyers having completely masked the Main Fleet and its movements at critical moments.<br />
<br />
<center><u>SPEED</u></center><br />
<br />
The advantage of speed lay entirely with the British, not only as regards the Main Fleet on account of the "Deutschland" class, but also as regards the battle-cruisers. The latter are said to have proved considerably faster than the German battle cruisers, an unpleasant experience which had already been made on 25 January 1915. This alone proves that the British are talking nonsense when they assert that the German Fleet sought safety in flight; on the contrary, it was far from its bases and entirely in the power of the British, who either did not wish to take advantage of their superior speed, or were unable to do so on account of the damage sustained. The visibility was no worse than it had been during the day and Jellicoe may have even welcomed the "Höschter" fog which would enable him to plead bad visibility as a reason for abandoning the pursuit. On the German side in the light of experience the factor of speed in the battleships is considered very important. But the moderate depths of the German harbours limits the draught of the ships, and make it particularly difficult for German builders to do much in this respect. In spite of greater length and higher horse power the most modern cruisers "DERFFLINGER", "SEYDLITZ" and "LÜTZOW" attained only a quite inconsiderable increase of speed in comparison with the older "GOEBEN" class, and proved a disappointment in this particular.<br />
<br />
The question whether the older battleships should take part in an important engagement was not easy to decide. The 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons composed of the "WITTLESBACH" and "BARBAROSSA" class, re-commissioned at the beginning of the war, were intended to be used in such actions, but have long since been paid off; some have been disarmed and employed as guardships and instructional ships, etc. It was considered however, that the 2nd Battle Squadron, composed of the most modern of the older ships, would be of some service in the action; but this squadron was in a privileged position, inasmuch as it was merely attached to the 1st and 3rd Battle Squadrons and its Admiral was allowed to operate independently and select the position he thought best. On this occasion it kept station quite well and did not prove a hindrance, but, on the other hand, it did not come under any heavy fire. This must be considered very fortunate, for, in view of the damage sustained by other ships and in view of the fact that the British shell pierced all armour above or below water even at the longest range, it is certain that every ship of this class would have been sunk by a few hits, as their internal sub-division is not proof against large inrushes of water.<br />
<br />
The loss of the "Pommern", which gives the British an opportunity for a hollow triumph, also teaches a clear lesson. The Chief of Staff told me that they will probably consider carefully before again exposing this Squadron to danger; therefore this action will have further confirmed the complete worthlessness of all Dreadnought types [sic] and will condemn them as old iron.<br />
<br />
<center><u>TORPEDO NETS.</u></center><br />
<br />
The torpedo nets of the battle cruisers are all badly damaged and the gear so knocked about by gunfire that they were almost useless. This was particularly the case with the "Derfflinger", where the after port nets were hanging in the water, and would have fallen across the propeller had they not chanced to remain held up by a temporary lashing. The ship was obliged to stop during the action to secure the nets, and they might easily have occasioned the loss of the ship.<br />
<br />
For this reason all the nets, together with the booms, were unshipped immediately after the ships' return, to everybody's satisfaction. They will not be carried any more, except perhaps for operations in the Baltic, where the ships may be obliged to anchor at sea.<br />
<br />
<center><u>LEAK-STOPPING SERVICE.</u></center><br />
<br />
The leak-stopping service which had been systematically developed, worked admirably and the Germans are convinced that they owe much to it. They believed that the "Seydlitz" could not have been brought in if the strengthening of the bulkheads, etc., had not been so thoroughly exercised and if the personnel had not been so well trained.<br />
<br />
It is also said, that in the "Lutzow", which had only been in commission for 2 months, was naturally not up to the mark in this respect, and that it is not impossible that small shortcomings, for which of course nobody can be blamed, were responsible for the ship sinking. The "Lutzow" was an unfortunate ship altogether. First her turbines collapsed, thus delaying her commissioning for 6 months, then she immediately struck a mine, and she was hardly out of dockyard hands before she was sunk.<br />
<br />
<center><u>DANGER FROM GAS FUMES.</u></center><br />
<br />
Only 2 days before sailing, a large number of the ships, and fortunately exactly those that came most under fire, namely battle-cruisers and the 3rd Squadron, were supplied with gas masks fitted with alkali cartridges for the whole crew and a plentiful reserve (in the "Seydlitz" 1500 masks for about 1200 men). The masks are similar to those used in the army for poisonous gases. Each man carries a mask slung round him, if he is not actually wearing it.<br />
<br />
I was told emphatically by all the officers, that, in their experience, these masks are absolutely necessary and not only saved many lives but enabled the men to carry on in parts of the ship which they would otherwise have been compelled to leave.<br />
<br />
The gases from shells, mines and torpedoes penetrate in an incredible manner through ventilators, telephone leads, etc. to compartments far away from the point of impact. In many cases the masks enabled large numbers of the guns' crews to escape from turrets that were hit, and to help out others who were badly wounded. In one case the men in one of the main engine rooms were able to remain at their posts after gas had penetrated, until the engine-room was ventilated.<br />
<br />
The Fleet breathing apparatus (Flottenathmer) is preferable to masks in some cases, but it cannot be supplied to everyone and it hampers one's movements, which the masks do not.<br />
<br />
On account of the great danger from gases, it is also advisable to fit hinged flaps in all shafts, and to have wooden bungs to fit the voice-pipes, keeping a hammer at hand to hammer them into the mouth-pieces.<br />
<br />
They tell me that it proved very useful to keep all the personnel employed below, such as in central control rooms, engine-rooms, torpedo flats, etc. continually informed of what was going on. The men get nervous, particularly at first, with the tremendous shocks caused by shell falling close to the ship, though the shocks are felt less on deck, and such information gives them confidence and they like knowing what is going on above them.<br />
<br />
<center><u>DAMAGE</u></center><br />
<br />
The distribution of ships needing repair in the various dockyards is as follows:-<br />
<br />
The "König" proceeded at once to Kiel and is under repair at Howaldt's yard. I did not see her.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" and "Moltke" in Blohm and Voss yard, Hamburg, the first in the Imperial Dock.<br />
<br />
The "Kurfürst["] in Vulkan Yard, Hamburg.<br />
<br />
The "Derfflinger" was first docked in Wilhelmshaven and the leaks temporarily stopped, she then proceeded to the Imperial dockyard, Kiel. The "Seydlitz" will now be docked in the large dock at Wilhelmshaven; during my stay the "Seydlitz" was still in the lock.<br />
<br />
The "Von der Tann", "Ostfriesland" and "Helgoland" will be repaired in dry docks in Wilhelmshaven. No other large ships require to be docked.<br />
<br />
"<u>Seydlitz</u>" The number of hits was still uncertain, as the whole forepart of the ship up to the upper deck was still under water, and it is not known what she looks like below water. The ship was brought into the lock with difficulty, and as she is 43 ft. down by the bows, she cannot be taken into harbour. They will not venture to dock the ship inside the lock, and intend first to raise her bows slightly.<br />
<br />
The roof and guns of the fore turret and anchors, cables etc., have already been unshipped, and they now intend to bring caissons alongside and pump out the fore part sufficiently to enable her to enter the harbour.<br />
<br />
The great inrush of water, that flooded more or less the whole fore part of the ship as far as the first boiler-room bulkhead, was caused by a number of hits. Firstly, one of the belt armour plates forward on the port side is missing, having fallen off. Secondly, there are believed to be at least 2 or 3 more hits below water, forward on the port side; for the list and the settling down had already become ominous when the ship was hit at the edge of the upper deck, port side, abreast the bridge; this was followed by an inrush of water in the battery deck, which did a great amount of damage.<br />
<br />
In addition, during the day action, she was hit by a torpedo on the starboard side under the forward 5.9 in. gun, which caused her to settle down still more by the bows. This gun was so much damaged by the shock from underneath as to be disabled.<br />
<br />
Further, there are 4 severe hits in the ship's side (mess deck, port side, forward of the turret), which also demolished the port capstan.<br />
<br />
These shell, or shell splinters, naturally penetrated to the armoured deck, so that the entire fore part of the ship above and below the armoured deck is holed in many places, allowing free passage for the water. The fore part of the ship was struck therefore by at least 8 or 9 shells and one torpedo.<br />
<br />
Apparently the only compartments which are not flooded, are the bow torpedo flats and the central control room. The former is being pumped out continuously, as a great deal of water is flowing in from above. The torpedo control room had to be abandoned, as the forward partition was not watertight. The central control room abaft this was not abandoned, but of its 2 entrances from the starboard and port passages, only the port one can be used, as the starboard one is flooded.<br />
<br />
The gunnery control room is far further aft and was not affected.<br />
<br />
The ship has a list of 7° to port, and as she has now been slightly raised, about 1¾ ft. of her bows are above water; at one time it was up to the level of the deck.<br />
<br />
While under way the forward boiler room bulkhead had to withstand most of the pressure; supports have been built up everywhere, but it leaks in places.<br />
<br />
The other hits of consequences were those in the turrets. The fore starboard turret No.2 received a direct hit on the fore face of the revolving structure. One curved plate was forced out, but fortunately the main effect of the explosion was outward. The right hand gun was disabled by slight damage to the mounting; with this exception the turret remained in action and kept up fire.<br />
<br />
The right hand gun of turret No.3 received a direct hit, which cut out a wide groove along the tube of the gun. The left hand gun continued to fire.<br />
<br />
The barbette of turret No.4 was hit on a level with the rammer, and the armour was pierced clean through. This hit is of special interest, as the "Seydlitz" received a similar hit and at the same level in turret No.5 on 24th January 1915, which caused a fire, disabled both the after turrets and killed all the guns' crews. This last time, however, the damage was slight. There was no ready ammunition in the turret, and only one cartridge was exploded, in contrast to the (6200 Kg.) 13,670 lbs. of powder on Jan.1915. The turret officer and a large number of the gun's crews were saved by their gas masks. The destruction caused by splinters was, however, considerable and the turret was abandoned, as it was not possible to continue fire from it. This was a 13.5 in. shell, at 15,310 yds. range, strength of armour pierced 8.6 inches.<br />
<br />
After the turret had been abandoned, it was hit a second time in the after side of the revolving part, which was pierced; this of course increased the havoc in the interior.<br />
<br />
Turret No.5 was hit in the roof. The shell richochetted, and the roof is slightly dented. Nobody was hurt and the turret continued to fire.<br />
<br />
In the "Seydlitz" therefore, all the turrets were hit, with the exception of the foremost turret, and one was hit twice.<br />
<br />
A further hit pierced the 5.9 in. (150mm.) casemate armour of the aftermost 5.9 in. starboard gun, No.2. The deck was pierced from beneath, and splinters also pierced the splinter bulkhead. The gun was disabled and all the crew were killed, with the exception of the ship's chaplain who happened to be in the casemate and must be watched over by a special guardian angel.<br />
<br />
A similar hit, with a 15 in. shell, struck the casemate armour of the 6-in. gun No.7 and exploded in the casemate. Men were killed, the gun was disabled and the splinter bulkhead pierced by large splinters. This time again, surprise was aroused by the comparatively small damage caused by a large calibre shell.<br />
<br />
"<u>Derfflinger</u>". One shell hit the armour belt forward of the hawse pipe, probably at the junction of 2 plates, as 2 plates broke away. The plates underneath were consequently strained apart and a great deal of water flowed in.<br />
<br />
The armour belt on the port side also received 2 further hits in the centre and was pierced clean through. The splinters penetrated more than half way through the ship, and in one case a piece of plating was driven half way though the ship. These hits, combined perhaps with others, destroyed the nets and their supports in several places.<br />
<br />
The two after turrets received direct hits, in one case on the roof, in the other case in the barbette above the deck; the armour was pierced and the upper portions of the turrets burnt out and severely damaged, but the flames did not penetrate to the magazines. The crew in the upper part of the turret were killed, and both turrets were disabled. This occurred at an early stage of the action.<br />
<br />
The guns at high elevation cannot yet be dismounted, as everything is wedged in, but they do not appear to be damaged.<br />
<br />
The muzzles were carried away off the 4 foremost 6 in. (15 cm.) guns on the port side; two of them probably having been accounted for by one and the same shell which hit the armour. One gun, the muzzle of which was perhaps damaged by a splinter, afterwards burst, the tube splitting open in the shape of a tulip.<br />
<br />
The "Derfflinger" received a few other hits of no particular interest. She appears the next most severely damaged ship after the "Lützow".<br />
<br />
The "<u>Moltke</u>" only received 5 hits, all of them during that part of the action which took place on a southerly course; while the cruisers mentioned above received most of the hits on the port side, consequently during the later stages of the action.<br />
<br />
One shell pieced the bulwarks in the after part of the ship above the armour, passed through the ship and struck the armour on the port side from inside, about 3.3 ft. below the water-line. One plate was forced out and is missing. The inrush of water was considerable. The after compartments, above the armoured deck which remained intact, were all more or less flooded.<br />
<br />
The second hit was further forward, below the armour belt. The shell exploded in a bunker, but the armoured deck held and no water penetrated it from below. The neighbouring bunkers made little water and could be pumped out.<br />
<br />
Another shell struck the 5.9 in. armour in the upper bunker, above the water-line. The armoured deck again held, but the inner wall of the bunker parted, and the battery deck was pierced from below, a 6 in. gun being damaged and disabled.<br />
<br />
In the fore part of the ship a shell struck the armour belt below the water-line. The plate remained intact and was driven in about 8 inches. The compartment was flooded, but the torpedo bulkhead remained watertight. A neighbouring compartment leaked slightly, the rivets having parted.<br />
<br />
The fifth case of damage, namely a plate beneath the armour belt being driven and pressed in, was probably not due to a direct hit, but to splinters of a shell which fell short.<br />
<br />
"<u>Von der Tann</u>". A shell hit and pierced the lower part of the 3.9 in. armour belt in the after part of the ship to starboard. The compartments above the armoured deck, and some of those on the deck above, were flooded. The chief effect of the shell was outside the ship, but it bent the plates below the otherwise undamaged armoured deck, so that a considerable amount of water flowed into the compartments below the armoured deck. The after torpedo flat was flooded half way up, and the men in the starboard steering engine room were shut in for a long time owing to the exits being blocked.<br />
<br />
The fore turret was hit on the starboard side on the upper edge of the barbette and a semi-circular armour plate was forced out. The machinery of the turret was so badly knocked about that the turret was disabled.<br />
<br />
The hydraulic piping was damaged, so that all the heavy armament was put out of action temporarily. Strangely enough, though men were wounded none were killed.<br />
<br />
The aftermost turret was hit in the barbette. The armour was pierced, but the effect of the shell was exterior, the turret sustained little internal damage, so that the handgear of the turret remained in action. The turret was wedged in one place and could not revolve; they succeeded, however, in cutting off with oxy-acetylene the piece of revolving part which was jammed against the inner side of the barbette thus getting rid of the obstruction.<br />
<br />
Outside the turret, the shell did considerable damage; some splinters striking downwards, bent the armoured deck and pierced it in places. As far as I know, the armoured deck sustained no further damage, and this was of little importance.<br />
<br />
The after conning-tower was hit and a piece of the armour torn away; the occupants, including the 3rd gunnery officer, were killed. Splinters struck downwards to the engine-room ventilation hatches, but were stopped by the armoured gratings.<br />
<br />
"<u>Ostfriesland"</u> was struck by a mine below the foremost port turret. The whole measures 197 ft.* [<nowiki>*</nowiki> I.D. note:- Literal translation is 12 times 5 metres large.] The torpedo bulkhead is only slightly torn, and the inrush of water was only local.<br />
<br />
"<u>Helgoland</u>". A 13.5 in. shell hit the 7.9 in. armour belt forward on the port side and pierced it. The shell appears to have broken only as no explosive action can be traced. The range was about 14,217 yds.<br />
<br />
"<u>Nassau</u>" rammed a British destroyer, or rather, the destroyer ran into her forward on the port side. Her bows must have lifted right up, for her hawse-pipe remained on board the "Nassau", so firmly wedged into the side of the upper deck that it will have to be cut out. The "Nassau's" side below the deck is torn away for 33 ft. The destroyer then glanced off the "Nassau's" side and exploded internally. One of the crew remained behind in one of the nets, but fell into the water when the "Nassau" fired a salvo.<br />
<br />
The "Nassau" was hit by shrapnel from attacking destroyers in the foremost searchlight group, both port searchlights were put out of action. The searchlight control and electric cables were destroyed and many of the searchlight crews were killed. The after searchlight group was hit in a similar manner, and one of the searchlights was disabled.<br />
<br />
The "Rhineland" and a light cruiser were also hit in a similar manner.<br />
<br />
I have seen all the above mentioned ships in Wilhelmshaven.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" and "Kurfürst" were at Hamburg, but unfortunately I am unable to report much about them. They had already been under repair for several days, and the damage was to some extent made good. Besides this, the conditions were not favourable for undisturbed examination: commissioners from the Imperial Navy Office were on board, besides crowds of workmen, the noise was deafening and it was pouring with rain. Consequently I took no notes on the spot and relied on my memory, which however fails me now among the very many received of similar cases. I am therefore unable to report each hit with accuracy.<br />
<br />
This is immaterial, however, as there were no particularly interesting hits, and none of the ships had been hit in the turrets. The armour had been pierced in several places, the effect and character of the hits being similar in all cases; the hits on unarmoured parts were of little consequence.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" was hit aft on the port side of the water line just on a junction of two plates, a piece of equal size being torn away from each plate. The shell then struck the sloping part of the armoured deck and the splinters ricochetted and passed right through the ship. These plates have already been removed.<br />
<br />
A casemate was pierced and the gun disabled.<br />
<br />
The "Markgraf" is the only ship whose mast was hit, the mast remained standing and has now been removed.<br />
<br />
The spotting platform had to be abandoned, as communications with the conning tower was cut off. This was the only hit received in a conning tower; it only grazed the upper edge and glanced off, and the men inside hardly noticed it.<br />
<br />
The port engine was disabled, not in consequence of damage to the turbine which is in good condition, but owing to one of the main propeller bearings becoming overheated. The cause of this is not clear, but it is believed to be due to concussions. The ship was well able to keep station with her two remaining engines.<br />
<br />
The "<u>Kurfürst</u>" suffered especially from a great inrush of water forward on the port side, above the armoured deck; it was caused by a hit in the armour belt. No further damage of importance was sustained.<br />
<br />
With regard to time necessary for repair to these ships, it is not yet possible to say anything definite, as it is still undecided whether they shall undergo thorough repair or not. The chief difficulty is the manufacture of new armour plates; but some of the holed plates can, no doubt, be left in position for the present.<br />
<br />
A considerable time will be needed to repair some of the turrets of the battle-cruisers, but here too, they will contrive to get things done. For instance, the "Von der Tann" is to have an entire turret out of a ship of the "Nassau" class, probably the foremost turret, and this ship will be left without a turret for some time. They talk a great deal also of transferring guns, and they will perhaps make use of those intended for the "Hindenburg", which will not be completed will the late autumn.<br />
<br />
It may be presumed that the battleships will be ready for sea in 4-6 weeks, and the battle-cruisers, particularly the "Seydlitz", in not less than 4 months. Naturally work is going on day and night, and repairs are given priority over all new construction.<br />
<br />
The damage sustained by light cruisers and destroyers is inconsiderable. The "Hamburg" had a funnel shot away. As these ships seem to be of minor importance, I did not trouble further about them.<br />
<br />
As our Allies appear not to have the intention of communicating to us what effect the examination of damages sustained will have on their construction in the future, we must endeavour to ascertain this as time goes on by means of cross questioning and by studying their new constructions in detail. I do not feel called upon to draw premature and rash conclusions to-day, on the strength of impressions received, but this will not prevent me from giving a summary of my opinion and of the opinions expresses in my hearing.<br />
<br />
Firstly, it is a remarkable fact that in all the ships that have returned home, all the engine and boiler-rooms are undamaged; the "Lützow" is no exception to this, as she proceeded under her own steam until late in the night after the action. I have also been assured by the Imperial Navy Office, after an inspection carried out by the Chief Engineer, that not a single auxiliary engine was defective. The only boiler-room put out of action was the foremost one in the "Seydlitz" where the bulkhead gave a little, allowing water to penetrate through rivet holes and cracks when the ship was under way. The conclusion may therefore be drawn that these vital parts of the ship are sufficiently protected and that the armour belt of the usual German thicknesses, though it cannot stop the shells, at least fulfils its purpose by breaking them up. Consequently it has become almost impossible even for the largest splinters of 15 in. shell to penetrate through armoured deck or torpedo bulkhead in engine and boiler rooms.<br />
<br />
Even at these long ranges and steep angles there was no question of the armoured decks being pierced; but the fitting of strong gratings over the hatches, which prevented the engines of the "Von der Tann" from sustaining severe damage, appears very necessary.<br />
<br />
The torpedo bulkheads also resisted shells, mines and torpedoes effectually; and in cases where slight damage was sustained, it had no further consequences than the flooding of the compartment affected.<br />
<br />
Perhaps it would be advisable to construct a specially strong boiler-room bulkhead, similar to a torpedo bulkhead, so that it could not be damaged by splinters or water-pressure.<br />
<br />
The inspection of the "Seydlitz" has left me with the impression that the commanding officer of the "Seydlitz" expected rather too much of his ship, and that nothing short of extraordinary good luck enabled her to be brought back. At one time when the whole forepart of the ship was flooded and the bows were under water, he proceeded occasionally with revolutions for 22 knots, just in order to show how seaworthy his ship was, so he told me. This may have been very sporting, or perhaps it may have been necessary under the circumstances in order not to drop too far behind and be overtaken by the enemy, but it certainly was not good seamanship, and if his stokehold bulkhead had burst, the "Seydlitz" would have gone down like the "Lutzow", where the circumstances appear to have been very similar. Later on he decreased speed and finally proceeded stern first.<br />
<br />
I therefore think it not impossible that the loss of the "Lützow", which is said to have been proceeded at 14 knots for a time, was also due only to recklessly high speed, and that the ship might have been saved if she had proceeded stern first or been taken in tow.<br />
<br />
As the danger from water-pressure must always be greatest from ahead, it would certainly be advisable to take special preventative measures against it.<br />
<br />
Vice-Admiral Schmidt told me that, in his opinion, the armoured belt ought to be strongest in the centre, and possible in the afterpart to protect the steering engines, and possibly in the bows, but that it ought not to taper off gradually from the centre to the extremities. He was also entirely in favour of a protected upper deck forming a second armoured deck.<br />
<br />
The admirably thorough system of internal division in the German ships and the floating capability thus attained is the finest proof of the merit of German construction which pursued this aim, and it shows that Admiral von Tirpitz, the creator of the Battle Fleet of to-day, was right when he upheld the principle that, above all things, the ships must be capable of remaining afloat and must not sink or heel over, and that everything else is of secondary consideration.<br />
<br />
The large number of hits in the turrets is remarkable, and it is generally considered that the turret armour should be appreciably stronger, especially in the lower part of the barbettes; for it is not only the disablement of the guns that comes into question, serious though this might be, but also the blowing up of magazines and the total destruction of the ship, as the wide shaft down to the magazines cannot possibly be made completely flash-proof. This is the most vital part of the ship. It is only owing to the small explosive charges in British shells, that there were no explosions of magazines in the German ships.<br />
<br />
Everything possible had been done after the action of 24.1.15 to ensure protection against this danger; the ready ammunition was removed from the top of the hoists and wherever possible all the openings in shafts leading down below were fitted with flaps, covers and heavy asbestos mats, while German ammunition is particularly carefully stowed and packed in cases with screwed-on covers.<br />
<br />
The disasters on the British side are a proof that this is a question of the greatest importance. It must also be taken into consideration that while any other damage turret may take months.<br />
<br />
The numerous hits in turrets would appear to justify the opinion of those who decided against triple turrets, on the ground [sic] that if one was disabled it would put too many heavy guns out of action.<br />
<br />
A hit in a casemate will of course destroy it and disable the gun, but this is of little consequence. Care must be taken here also not to have any ready ammunition, and to close the ammunition hand-up hermetically with heavy asbestos mats at the magazine end also. With the German "Paternoster" (dredger hoist) the ammunition lifts this mat as it comes up and the mat then falls to and closes the opening, which is a practical arrangement.<br />
<br />
Other hits through unarmoured parts, which destroyed more or less small gear and at the first glance give an impression of terrible havoc, are really of no consequence.<br />
<br />
In the "Von der Tann" they wanted to flood a turret magazine. This was impossible, as the flooding valve in the battery, or between deck was piled up with debris, cabin fittings, etc., and was inaccessible. Fortunately the flooding of the magazine turned out to be unnecessary. The Executive Officer remarked to me how critical such a trivial matter might become, and that one could not be careful enough about choosing the positions for the flooding valves, which must be kept clear of easily destructible objects.<br />
<br />
The man-hole covers in the decks, coal shoots [chutes], etc., were pointed out to me as dangerous, as they may be burst open by pressure of gas from below, thus causing damage and giving passage to the gases. These covers should be secured in a different manner and much more firmly.<br />
<br />
The flooding and draining system worked admirably, and is hardly capable of improvement. The only disadvantage is that the compartments above the armoured deck have no draining arrangements. This should be provided. A list, consequent on an inrush of water, could always be corrected by flooding an opposite compartment. This is an important matter both as affecting gunnery and personnel.<br />
<br />
The searchlights, which were not taken down in the German ships, all came out of the action undamaged; anxiety on their account was therefore unfounded. It was very unpleasant when attacking boats fired on the searchlights, and it is therefore considered necessary to fit light armour protection on the masts for the crews of the searchlight control and electric cables.<br />
<br />
Damage from flames is nowhere visible. The Germans are now rather amused at the care with which interior partitions were scraped.<br />
<br />
I could not help comparing the German ships with the Russian battleship "Orel", which I saw in Madzurn after the battle of Tsushima. If I remember rightly, the "Orel" had 5 severe hits and 40 hits with medium-calibre shell.<br />
<br />
The enormous explosive power of the Shimosa shell, which breaks up into minute splinters, did not do the slightest damage to the vital parts of the ship, but the upper deck was transformed into a confused heap of ruins. Superstructure, bridges, masts, funnels, etc., were destroyed, guns dismounted and fires started.<br />
<br />
Nothing of the kind is to be seen in the German ships, outwardly only a few more or less clean shell holes are visible, and they look so orderly and so little damaged that they do not appear to have gone through an action.<br />
<br />
It is true that the upper decks are said to have been littered with countless splinters, but they flew on to the decks from shells which struck the water, the ship receiving violent shocks.<br />
<br />
The holes in the armour show the characteristic concentric cracks round the hole and the radial splashes, the latter proving that the shells exploded on impact or at the latest, as they passed through. In many cases, as already noted, the force of the explosion was external and only pieces of plate, and possibly the head of the shell were driven in.<br />
<br />
<center><u>FLAG OFFICERS OF THE FLEET AND LEADERS</u></center><br />
<br />
{|<br />
| Commander-in-Chief:<br />
| Vice Admiral Scheer<br />
|-<br />
| <u>I Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Vice Admiral Schmidt<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Engelhard<br />
|-<br />
| <u>II Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Mauve<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Baron von Dalwigh<br />
|-<br />
| <u>III Squadron</u><br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| Senior Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Behncke<br />
|-<br />
| 2nd Admiral<br />
| Rear Admiral Nordmann<br />
|-<br />
| Officer commanding the Scouting Forces and<br>Commanding 1st Scouting Group<br />
| Vice Admiral Hipper<br />
|-<br />
| " 2nd " "<br />
| Rear Admiral Bodicker<br />
|-<br />
| " 4th " "<br />
| Commodore "Captain" v. Reuter<br />
|-<br />
| Leaders of Destroyers<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| in "Rostock"<br />
| Commodore "Captain" Michelsen<br />
|-<br />
| in Regensburg<br />
| Commodore "Captain" Heinrich<br />
|-<br />
| Leader of submarines<br />
| <br />
|-<br />
| In Hamburg<br />
| Captain Bauer<br />
|}<br />
<br />
<center><u>REMARKS</u></center><br />
<br />
The lecture on the action, upon which this report is based, was illustrated by a plan prepared in haste for H.M. the Kaiser, and a copy was promised to me. But the Admiral Staff does not wish to part with this first incomplete draft, and the preparation of an accurate plan has not yet been completed, as the Admiral Staff is not yet in possession of all the details.<br />
<br />
In time to be included in this report I have only received the sketch of the first stage of the battle, namely the cruiser action on a southerly course, together with a small sketch of the situation when the action was broken off; both are enclosed.<br />
<br />
I conclude from the sketch of the cruiser action, that the accounts given to me were not quite accurate; for instance, the assertion of the commanding officer of the "Moltke" that the shortest range at that stage was 7,650 yds. and that he had accounted for one of the armoured cruisers with a torpedo.<br />
<br />
The sketch shows that the "Indefatigable" was probably first destroyed by gun fire from the "Von der Tann", and later the "Queen Mary" by gunfire from the "Derfflinger", and that the range was never less than 14,220 yds.<br />
<br />
The loss of "V. 27" and "V. 29" and of 4 British destroyers is also apparent, while I was only told of two.<br />
<br />
In the original sketch, 2 British armoured cruisers are also shown as having fallen out during this stage, but this is not shown on the accompanying sketch and probably took place later.<br />
<br />
I was told by the Admiral Staff that the accompanying sketches are not to be taken as strictly accurate.<br />
<br />
It is requested that the sketches and course of the action and the account of damages may be treated as strictly confidential.<br />
<br />
==Footnotes==<br />
{{reflist}}<br />
<br />
==External Links==<br />
{{refbegin}}<br />
*Krámli, Mihály. [http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-124.pdf "The Report on the Battle of Jutland by the Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché in Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Colloredo-Mannsfeld."] ''NavWeaps''.<br />
{{refend}}<br />
<br />
[[Category:Battle of Jutland]]</div>Simon Harley